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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON


THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 14

MAY 2 AND JUNE 20, 1952

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary





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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, MAY 2, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
New York, N. Y.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a. m., Hon Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senator McCarran.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. Both Mr. Carter and Mr. Holland have been sworn previously.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well; they have been sworn.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, yesterday afternoon I spent some time with Mr. Lockwood presenting to him copies of letters written to him and written by him. He was able to spend the afternoon on this, and he did make a statement authenticating the documents.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify these for the record, please?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a list of those documents?

Mr. MANDEL. I have a list which was drawn up under my direction.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that a true list of that batch of documents?

Mr. MANDEL. It is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you offer that list for the record?

Mr. MANDEL. I can.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, in connection with this list, did you notice there have been two amendments since it was originally compiled?

Mr. MANDEL. The list is authentic with the exclusion of those.

Mr. MORRIS. Those amendments are two letters, one a letter from W. W. Lockwood to Col. William Mayer dated December 26, 1942, which is file No. 131B. The other is a letter to Philo W. Parker and others from William W. Lockwood dated December 2, 1942, No. 131B.2. They were both added by Mr. Lockwood yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness identifies everything except those two?

Mr. MORRIS. No, they have been added to Mr. Mandel's list.

The CHAIRMAN. Does he identify those?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. I am going to introduce his statement on that.

The CHAIRMAN. He identifies them as what?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel will testify that all of the documents on this list as amended were taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Is that right, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that true?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Yesterday Mr. Lockwood stated that he could not be here today, and he gave a sworn statement to me which reads:

STATE OF NEW YORK,

County of New York, ss:

I have examined the documents described in the list attached hereto as exhibit A. While many of the documents so described are documents of which I have no present recollection, I am satisfied that all of the documents listed in exhibit A are letters or memoranda or copies of letters or memoranda sent by me or received by me.

[S] WILLIAM A. LOCKWOOD.

Dated: May 1, 1952.

Present:

[s] Robert Morris

ROBERT MORRIS

[s] Stuart Marks

STUART MARKS

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you there, and that was your client's list?

Mr. MARKS. Yes; that is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. May the list and the affidavit together with the documents which are named in that list be offered for the record at this time?

The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted in the record at this time.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 765 to 771, inclusive; 773 to 782, inclusive, and 784 to 799 C" and appear on pp. 4958 through 4983.)

The CHAIRMAN. Who is this gentleman?

Mr. MORRIS. This is Mr. Marks of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl. He is counsel for Mr. Holland and Mr. Carter.

May the documents be numbered consecutively?

The CHAIRMAN. They may be numbered consecutively in order of previous exhibits.

Mr. MORRIS. When Mr. Lockwood appeared, Senator, he authorized me to make the statement that the list is accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I offer you a group of documents together with a list appended thereto. Will you tell us what are those documents and what is that list?

Mr. MANDEL. The documents I hold are taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations or submitted by officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations, of which documents I made an itemized list.

Mr. SOURWINE. The list is that list you made?

Mr. MANDEL. The list is the list I hold in my hand.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that a true and correct list of the documents that you have in that batch?

Mr. MANDEL. It is.

The CHAIRMAN. The list is one thing. The documents are another. The list was made by you?

Mr. MANDEL. The list was made under my direction from the documents.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Are you offering the list, so-called, or are you offering the documents? I take it that you are offering the documents.

Mr. MORRIS. We are going to offer the documents.

Mr. SOURWINE. The list is in fact an inventory of those documents.

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, we are proffering the list also as evidence of what this batch of documents contains.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. That is merely a list that was made by Mr. Mandel or under his direction, but the documents are taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. Are all of those documents taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. All except one, which was prepared by Mr. Holland at our request.

Mr. MORRIS. What is that?

Mr. MANDEL. That is a list of the staff members of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. As of what date?

Mr. MANDEL. Various dates. There is one list from 1936 to 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may we not consider this at this time? That does not belong in there.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is correct. I think that is the best way to handle that.

Mr. MANDEL. The others are all documents from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

**TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, NEW YORK, N. Y., AND
EDWARD C. CARTER, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY
STUART MARKS, ATTORNEY AT LAW**

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, have you had an opportunity to look at the documents that we have now offered for the record?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I have been through that whole list.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you in connection with that group of documents looked at the list that has been compiled by Mr. Mandel?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. The list seems to be complete with the exception of the document you have just removed. I found corresponding documents to each item in the list. I am prepared to identify all of the documents with the exceptions which I will name in a moment as letters or memoranda written by me or received by me in the course of my work with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. What are the exceptions?

Mr. HOLLAND. Three exceptions that I wish to note are: One, a letter which appears to be from me to a man called Harondar, an official of the Soviet council. He was an official of the Soviet council of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Where does that appear on the list?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is item No. 4, I believe, and the point is that it only appears to be the last page of a letter and a copy. It is unsigned and is not a carbon. While it seems to me like a perfectly normal letter, I have no means of identifying what the beginning of the letter was nor do I happen to remember writing this particular paragraph.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, apparently by mistake we have only the second page of this letter, and I move that this be stricken from the list.

The CHAIRMAN. Just do not offer it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe since this is on the list and since Mr. Holland has testified about it, it should not be stricken from the list.

As the chairman suggested, it should be excluded from the offer.

The CHAIRMAN. Just remove it from the offer at this time. You may be able to identify it at a later time.

Mr. HOLLAND. The second exception, which is I think about item No. 15, your exhibit No. 819, is an unsigned memorandum with the initials "W. L. H. and K. M. from E. C. C.," giving background information on the Muslim League in India. This, too, is a letter which I have no recollection of and is unsigned. It appears to me to be a perfectly normal kind of memorandum and one which I might well have seen, but it just so happens that I cannot myself identify it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carter's initials are on there; are they not?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Does he identify or recall it?

Mr. MORRIS. It has now been offered to Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. It has every external appearance of being a photostat of an interoffice memorandum of mine to Mr. Holland and Miss Mitchell. I do not remember it, but it seems to be authentic, and I do not identify who the author is, what the source of the enclosure is.

The CHAIRMAN. How do your initials appear on it; from or to you?

Mr. CARTER. The initials "W. L. H. and K. M. from E. C. C." My signature is not on it. There is a mark here, "Carter," which is not in my handwriting, but I think it is one of the routine information memorandums and while I do not remember it specifically, I should see no reason why it should not be used in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, you say you have a third exception?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have a third one. This is I think about five more items down the list, your file No. 823. This is the one item already mentioned, a free distribution list for a memorandum called Korean Industry and Transport by A. J. G., presumably A. J. Grajdanzev. I have no recollection of this list, and it would appear to be something prepared by someone on my staff, but I do recall the memorandum, and it is perfectly likely that it was distributed in fact to the list indicated there.

The CHAIRMAN. You make no objection to its being attached?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, sir. The remaining exception is the fifth from the last, your file No. 862. This is an original letter from a Chinese by the name of Tseng to S. B. Thomas, and I am prepared to say that this appears to me to be an authentic copy of a letter sent to a junior member of my staff who had apparently requested some documents from a Chinese book agency in Peking.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, you will notice that there is on the letter from Mr. Tseng a pencil notation, "rewrite for Bill to sign," and the Bill presumably is you.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. The following is a letter from me which I acknowledge and identify.

Mr. MORRIS. So even though one-half of the correspondence is addressed to S. B. Thomas, the answer to that was prepared by you?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true. Finally, Mr. Chairman, the list which you just excluded is one which I sent to the committee some weeks ago.

Mr. MORRIS. Let me finish this other thing first.

Mr. Chairman, in view of Mr. Mandel's testimony and Mr. Holland's testimony in connection with these documents, may they all be received in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. They may all be received into the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit Nos. 800, 802, 804 to 866," and appear on pp. 4984 through 5031.)

The CHAIRMAN. You are going to have to be very careful about identifying these documents because you are putting them in in clusters, and each one of them should have a serial number.

Mr. MORRIS. They do, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is why I am asking that the list in each case go in. The documents themselves have been physically examined individually by the witnesses who are testifying with respect to the list, which is an accurate list of the documents, and the testimony of Mr. Mandel and of Mr. Holland, who said he had checked it, is simply to save the time of the committee and to shorten this hearing. If the list goes in and also the documents, I believe we will have a clear record on it.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand the testimony, first, as to Mr. Mandel, saying that these are copies of instruments found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Secondly, Mr. Holland identifies each and every one of these as being instruments that were in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Am I correct in that?

Mr. HOLLAND. Subject to the qualifications which I have just indicated.

The CHAIRMAN. Subject to the qualifications that you made.

Mr. HOLLAND. Finally, Mr. Chairman, just so that there will be correspondence between the typed list and the documents, I notice two or three typographical, minor errors. On your file No. 807 it should read "to W. L. H. from E. C. C." At present you have it reversed. On your file No. 818 it should read "to W. L. Holland from William T. Stone" and not William T. Johnstone as you have it in your list.

On your item 837, apparently a slip in the carbon copy—it may not appear on the original—it should read "to William L. Holland from Schuyler Wallace." My copy has only S-c-h-u-y-l.

Finally on item 839, missing date figure, "to Schuyler Wallace from W. L. Holland," the correct date should be April 12, 1944. I think it is the carbon that reads March 12, 1944. Otherwise that list seems to be correct.

The CHAIRMAN. As to those corrections suggested by Mr. Holland, it might be well for you to make the corrections on the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. In other words, evidently an error has crept in as to these small items. That should be corrected. It is not an exception taken by the witness. It is just a suggested check, and his suggestion should be followed up to see that he is correct and the instrument corrected accordingly.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the list describing the documents which we have been discussing will be corrected in view of the recommendations made by Mr. Holland.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, I offer you four documents, and ask you what they are.

Mr. HOLLAND. These documents are lists of the staff members of both the Pacific Council and the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations for various periods, namely, 1936 to 1943; 1937 to 1943, 1944 to 1951, and 1944 to 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. I think I have a fifth one, Mr. Holland.

Mr. HOLLAND. And a fifth entitled "IPR Staff Members," submitted by W. L. Holland, date October 10, 1951. All of these documents, Mr. Chairman, were prepared under my direction at the request of the subcommittee some weeks ago, the latest date here being October 10, 1951, and to the best of my belief and according to our personnel records, they present the true facts regarding the lists of employees and dates of employment of the persons who worked for the Institute of Pacific Relations, the staff members.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have access to your personnel records in connection with the preparation of those lists?

Mr. HOLLAND. I had access to them. I did not myself scrutinize every personnel card. The list was prepared under my direction by Miss Ruth Carter, and I have every reason to believe that it is a correct and complete list.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will we insert this in the running record, or should we put this in the appendix?

The CHAIRMAN. Where do you want it? What do you offer them for? Do you offer them for the record?

Mr. MORRIS. I offer them for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I think so. They will be inserted in the record. (The documents referred to were marked Exhibit No. 801 and appear on p. 4987.)

The CHAIRMAN. All that shows is who were the officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations in the respective years mentioned?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show that the stenographer in the outer room closed the door so that the telephoning might go on in the outer room without disturbing the hearing and that the Chair announced that this was an open hearing and anyone who came into the outer room who wished to come in here might come in. This is an open hearing.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I am offering to Mr. Mandel two groups of documents.

Mr. Mandel, are those two groups of documents made up of letters and papers taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. These are documents from or to Mr. E. C. Carter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. They are either the original documents or photostats thereof.

The CHAIRMAN. The instruments are true and correct photostats of documents found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And every one of the documents and papers in those two groups is so classified?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Namely, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mr. Mandel, what are those two lists?

Mr. MANDEL. From these documents I have authorized a list to be prepared itemizing each document and describing them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you have there a list which constitutes an inventory of the documents which you have just identified and which you hold?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. There are two lists, Mr. Chairman; one with each group.

Mr. CARTER. have you had an opportunity to look at the documents so identified by Mr. Mandel and described in the list accompanying those documents?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, I have had the opportunity of hurriedly going through them.

Mr. MORRIS. Do they appear to you to be authentic documents?

Mr. CARTER. I do not challenge the authenticity of any. There are some that I don't particularly recollect, but those I will point out when I go through the list.

Mr. MARKS. You do not mean "recollection." You mean you do not identify because you do not have personal knowledge of them.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MARKS. But you do not challenge the authenticity.

Mr. CARTER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you want to make any particular comment as to any document on either of those two lists?

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand, those minutes were made of conferences. If Mr. Carter after having examined those minutes says that they appear to him to be true and correct, that is about as far as he can go unless he made them himself.

Mr. MARKS. That is perfectly true.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you want to make any comment on any of the documents in these two groups?

Mr. CARTER. One such case is item 978, a discussion on collective security.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the nature of that document, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. It was a discussion on collective security in 700 Jackson Place, Washington. I did not prepare the minutes. I don't know who they were prepared by, but I remember the meeting, and they look like a reasonably accurate job.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where is 700 Jackson Place? Is that the corner of Jackson Place and Pennsylvania Avenue alongside of the Blair House?

Mr. CARTER. That is where the Carnegie Endowment Library has been for many years.

This is to Edward C. Carter from MC, undated.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right under the exhibit No. 980?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. I cannot think who MC is. I don't identify the handwriting either, and it is in connection with a letter to Mr. Dollard. This is a mimeographed study of Attitudes of American Soldiers in the Berlin District Toward Our Allies. It is not mine, and it was originally marked as restricted, but the classification has been canceled, so it was an open document.

The CHAIRMAN. What point do you make in regard to it?

Mr. MARKS. Nothing at all, except I do not exactly know whether we are authenticating this document as put out by the research library of the information-education division. We acknowledge it was in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations if that is what you want.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said the classification is canceled. You mean it shows on its face by proper authority there has been an official cancellation of the security classification?

Mr. MARKS. Yes. Our only point is if you want us to say what it is, we will say it was taken from the files. We did not prepare it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it received by you as indicated?

Mr. MARKS. Oh, yes. We have no objection to that.

The CHAIRMAN. What is next?

Mr. CARTER. There is a handwritten note of mine here, and it is marked underneath "Dear Kate" in brackets "Enclosure, July 19 note." It should be July 17 notes. It is perfectly routine.

Mr. MARKS. One other point on that. We don't understand why it says "Enclosure." The list says "enclosure." We do not understand why, but it does not make much difference, I guess. The list says, Senator, "(Enc. July 19 notes)" and the list should be July 17. We do not understand what the enclosure reference is, but I do not think it is very significant.

Mr. CARTER. With your permission I will let Mr. Marks do this.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right.

Mr. MARKS. Item 984. This is a report of conference of March 9. Mr. Carter acknowledges that it is a fairly accurate statement of what went on, although he did not himself prepare the report.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just at that point, you say he acknowledges that it is fairly accurate. Does he take exception to it on any point with regard to accuracy?

Mr. MARKS. On those I do not think we ought to be bound because we had to read those at a terrible clip. If we have to stop now to examine this page by page, it will keep us here indefinitely. We would like to reserve comment and check on these things. Mr. Carter spent just a few minutes to go through this thing and to construe it to see whether each thing is a fair statement would require a lot more time, and I don't think he at this time can state more than I have already stated. I want to suit your purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Is the instrument found where it was found? It is admitted that it was found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What it sets out is not a matter for your construction nor for anyone else's just now. It is a matter for the committee's construction.

Mr. MARKS. Fine. That is perfectly acceptable to us.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if the Chair will permit, since I understand that Mr. Carter is adopting Mr. Marks' statements as his testimony, is that right, sir?

Mr. CARTER. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to this particular document it might save time in the future if I ask Mr. Carter a question now.

Mr. Carter, you have had an opportunity to examine that briefly; is that correct?

Mr. CARTER. Very sketchily.

Mr. SOURWINE. From the examination which you have made of it, does it appear to you to be a report which was prepared under your direction or at your behest?

Mr. CARTER. I was present at the meeting. It does not show who recorded it. The handwritten bits of editorial alterations are not in my handwriting, and I could not swear who the author or editor

was. It may have been Mr. W. W. Lockwood. Let me see whether he was there. Yes; he was present.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I am trying to get at is: Was that prepared by someone who did so as a part of his duties as an official or employee of the IPR?

Mr. CARTER. Not necessarily, because in the list of attendees there is typed "W. W. Lockwood, Princeton," and then inserted in handwriting after Lockwood's name, "ACIS." That would be the American Committee for International Studies. That might indicate that he was there in his capacity as an executive of the American Committee of International Studies, which has no connection with the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge as to how this found its way into the files of the IPR?

Mr. CARTER. I have no knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge as to whether this was prepared for the files of the IPR?

Mr. CARTER. I have no knowledge one way or the other on that.

Mr. MARKS. The next item is 988. This is a memorandum of the meeting of the Arctic Institute, April 9, which was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, but not prepared by Mr. Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter, do you know by whom it was prepared?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. With reference to this meeting of the Arctic Institute, I note that there were present FD and HM. FD is Faith Donaldson and HM is Harriet Moore. Either one of them might have prepared the record of the meeting. I don't know which. There is nothing written, straight typing, and I have no idea which one of them prepared it or whether they prepared it jointly and submitted it to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. One of those alternatives?

Mr. CARTER. One of those alternatives.

Mr. MARKS. The next item is 993. This is a memorandum of an interview with Mortimer Graves, December 7, 1933, at which Mr. Carter and Mr. Joseph Barnes were present. I think Mr. Carter will state that either he or Mr. Barnes prepared this memorandum. He doesn't remember which.

Mr. CARTER. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask a question about that. Is Mr. Barnes' style so similar to your own that you cannot tell them apart when you look back over them?

Mr. CARTER. This is statistical. It was in 1933.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think in fairness to you that should be explained here. It is not a document that is likely enough to make it identifiable; is that the point?

Mr. CARTER. It is very short. It is statistical, and there are no flourishes of authorship or rhetoric in it.

Mr. SOURWINE. The point was if it had been prepared by you we know you would be prepared to say it was absolutely true and correct; is that right?

Mr. CARTER. It makes sense to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. On that basis since you cannot tell whether it is yours or Mr. Barnes, I assume you are still able to say that it is true and correct.

Mr. CARTER. It strikes me thoroughly as a correct compilation.

Mr. MARKS. The next item is 1005, a meeting of the presidium of the Soviet branch of the IPR. Mr. Carter will state that the report was prepared either by Harriet Moore or Kate Mitchell. Do you know which?

Mr. CARTER. I have no idea.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Kate Mitchell take shorthand?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Harriet Moore did not?

Mr. CARTER. Not with the same precision. I don't remember whether Harriet Moore actually used shorthand or her own shorthand system.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Faith Donaldson had no shorthand system at all?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. She, if I remember correctly, had sort of a debutante shorthand.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought you had testified here once—it is an unimportant point—that Faith Donaldson did not write in shorthand.

Mr. CARTER. I remember describing her as a champion skier. I don't remember referring to her shorthand capacity.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she a typist?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes.

Mr. MARKS. The next item is 1008. This is a photostat of what purports to be a letter from E. V. Harondar to Kathleen Barnes, June 20, 1935, which Mr. Carter will say was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, but it was not a letter received by him nor written by him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any recollection as to whether you ever saw that letter before the committee presented it to you for identification?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember having seen it before. I may have or I may not. I don't recall it now.

Mr. MARKS. Item 1009 is a letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Motylev. The list shows the date "3/4/35." It should be "5/4/35."

Mr. SOURWINE. Speaking of Mr. Motylev, we have a number of documents in the file including some of these summaries wherein his name is spelled M-o-t-i-l-e-v; is that not correct? It is the same person, is it not?

Mr. CARTER. That is correct.

Mr. MARKS. The next item is 1010. This is a carbon copy of a document entitled "Extracts From Letter From Harriet Moore to E. C. Carter" of March 20, 1935. Can you tell who prepared this?

Mr. CARTER. I cannot discover who typed or prepared this copy, who selected the extracts. There is no initial or other identifying mark. It would all depend on who made the extracts as to what its significance is, I should assume.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember having seen the document before or a copy of it?

Mr. CARTER. I can't at this moment say that I do recollect it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is from the files of the IPR?

Mr. CARTER. So Mr. Mandel shows me.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mean, do you have any knowledge on that point?

Mr. CARTER. Not other than Mr. Mandel's certification.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course, that is not a matter of your knowledge.

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MARKS. Item 1011 appears to be a duplicate of 1009.

Item 1013, "Moscow meeting in Motylev's," the date should be "3/31/36." That is the date shown by the document. It should be that instead of "3/21/36" shown by the list. The document itself purports to be a report of what happened at the meeting.

Mr. CARTER. This concerns the administrative problems of the institute and, among others, there were present Harriet Moore, Charlotte Tyler, and Faith Donaldson as secretaries, but which one of them, whether all three collaborated in writing out this one page, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Their assignments were such that any or all of them might have worked on it?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may we go off the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. On the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, with regard to the remainder of the documents on this list I believe an acceptable formula has been worked out which will cover the identification so far as Mr. Carter is able to make. Is that correct, Mr. Marks?

Mr. MARKS. That is correct, Mr. Sourwine. May I state the nature of this arrangement?

Mr. SOURWINE. Please.

Mr. MARKS. Mr. Carter states that all of the documents listed——

Mr. SOURWINE. From this point on.

Mr. MARKS. From this point on of the two lists referred to——

The CHAIRMAN. And "from this point on" means what? What is the point?

Mr. SOURWINE. From the point following the last document identified in this record and discussed.

The CHAIRMAN. Referring to the numbers in the list that you prepared?

Mr. MARKS. Yes; that is right. There are two lists which I think Mr. Mandel has already referred to, the last two lists that Mr. Mandel referred to. These are lists setting forth documents which have just been presented to Mr. Carter for identification.

The CHAIRMAN. And were taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations according to the testimony of Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And have been numbered serially under the direction of Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MARKS. Up to the point of 1019, and after that there are no numbers, and we understand they will be numbered serially from there on.

Mr. MORRIS. That is correct.

Mr. MARKS. From this point on Mr. Carter states that the documents which purport to be letters or memoranda to him, or copies of such letters and memoranda, or letters or memoranda from him or copies of those, are genuine. On the list there are a number of other documents which are prepared by other persons and which do not in-

dicating whether or not they were sent to Mr. Carter or sent by him to anybody.

As to these, Mr. Carter has no personal recollection of whether or not they do come from the IPR files, but he has no reason to raise any question about it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MARKS. That is sufficient.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may they therefore be admitted into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. They may be admitted under that agreement.

(The documents were marked "Exhibits Nos. 977 to 1007, 1009, inclusive; 1011 to 1031, 1032 to 1068, inclusive; 1070, 1071, 1073 to 1080, inclusive; 1082 to 1090, inclusive; 1092, to 1095, 1097 to 1112, 1114 to 1122, inclusive, and appear on pp. 5083 through 5197.)

Mr. SOURWINE. This order includes the two lists which have been referred to and the documents which have been included on those lists?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The lists are merely identification by serial numbers?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has Mr. Carter had an opportunity to examine the documents which we are now discussing?

Mr. MARKS. Mr. Carter has had a chance to examine the documents now under discussion and identifies them all with certain exceptions which I shall now enumerate.

Mr. SOURWINE. And applies them as either documents that were received by him or which he wrote?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

This list does not bear exhibit numbers, and I am going to give the item number as I count down.

Mr. SOURWINE. Give the item number and the title.

Mr. MARKS. All right. This is the fourteenth item on the first page of this three-page list. It is to WLH from ECC. The date is given as March 20, 1940. I think it should be March 30, 1940. The file number is 191.87.

The next is to Philip C. Jessup from Edward C. Carter, with the file number of the committee 191.37. The date is given as December 19, 1943. I think it should be December 19, 1942, subject to your check.

The next one purports to be an original of part of a note to "Dear Dr. White." It does not bear any date or any signature. It is on the second page of this list under your No. 172.1. I don't know what Mr. Carter wants to say about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter, up to this point do you adopt Mr. Marks' statements as your testimony?

Mr. CARTER. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to the document which has just been handed to you by Mr. Marks what do you want to say about it?

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. White is the name?

Mr. MARKS. It is addressed to "Dear Dr. White," no address.

Mr. CARTER. I have no recollection of either side of this page.

Mr. MORRIS. It is not your handwriting?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. I move it be stricken from the list of documents.

The CHAIRMAN. It will just not be inserted.

Mr. SOURWINE. It remains on the list, but you withdraw the offer of the document?

Mr. MORRIS. I do.

Mr. MARKS. The next item is a memo handwritten which appears on your list immediately below the item, the offer of which has been withdrawn. I hand it to Mr. Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what that is, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. It's in pencil. I don't identify the handwriting. There is a note regarding treatment of a book written for the IPR at one time. There is nothing I object to. I simply don't know who the author was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any reason to believe it did not come from the IPR files?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MARKS. The next item is to W. L. Holland from C. F. Remer, dated March 17, 1942, your No. 119.121.

Mr. HOLLAND. I have read this letter and identify it as having been received by me. There is also the original of this same letter—this is a carbon copy—in the collection which I have previously identified.

Mr. MARKS. The final item is a mimeographed copy of what perhaps is a telegram from Edward C. Carter to Lauchlin Currie, bearing the date, mimeographed, September 17, 1941. This appears under your file No. 119.13. It is listed on the third page of the list.

Mr. MORRIS. That is a copy we made of the original. We should have the original rather than the stenciled copy. We will withdraw the offer.

Mr. MARKS. Those are all the remarks and exceptions that we have to make to that list.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which you previously generally identified?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you adopt as your testimony all the statements of Mr. Marks in connection with these lists?

Mr. CARTER. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. May these be inserted in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted in the record with the same numbers.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 1136, 1145, 1203, and 1231," and appear on pp. 5204, 5210, 5245, 5259, respectively.)

Mr. SOURWINE. So that the record may be clear with regard to this document, this is the document which was previously mentioned as the "Dear Dr. White" letter or document, the offer of which was withdrawn. This is a document, which on the one side, which I shall designate as face, is marked with an F in ink and has a typed paragraph, "Dear Dr. White: I understand from Irving S. Friedman," and so forth, ending with the words "until the end of the current month."

On the other side in pencil, handwritten, is, "Dear Malik: I understand that Mr. Friedman," and so forth, closing with the words "at any time convenient to you. Sincerely yours," and it is unsigned. Mr. Carter, you state that you do not recognize that handwriting?

Mr. CARTER. I do not recognize the handwriting. I would like to comment for the record that Malik was the Indian official in New York. It is not the Soviet.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you do not recollect it?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know which Malik is referred to?

Mr. CARTER. Isn't there some reference here to Friedman? Friedman was an employee of the Indian Government in New York working under Malik.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you spell it?

Mr. CARTER. M-a-l-i-k.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you are saying really is because you know of Friedman's connection you assume that was Malik the Indian rather than the Russian?

Mr. CARTER. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you renewing your offer on that now?

Mr. MORRIS. I now offer it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well; it will be inserted in its proper place in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1202," and appears on p. 5245.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have a third envelope which Mr. Carter was not able to finish reading last night, and I wonder what we can do with respect to having those received.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have a suggestion, if the Chair please.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Chair please, I propose to ask Mr. Mandel to identify these papers as coming from the files of the IPR and to identify the list.

The CHAIRMAN. Let Mr. Mandel identify them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, I hand you a number of documents or what purports to be a list or inventory of documents. Will you please identify them?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here an inventory of documents taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The sheet begins with a document to ECC and ends with one to A. Hiss. The documents all come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that list a correct inventory of those documents and prepared under your direction?

Mr. MANDEL. It is; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask the permission of the Chair to hand this list and the documents in question to Mr. Carter and to ask that at his early convenience he go through these and examine them and then furnish the committee with a statement in affidavit form with regard to them along the lines of the statements he has previously made.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Do you want them inserted in the record now, to be followed by what you request?

Mr. SOURWINE. I would request, sir, that the documents be put in the record at this point, but that the affidavit which Mr. Carter furnishes also go in at this point in the record when he furnishes it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; is that satisfactory?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, it is, Senator

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 1269 to 1291, inclusive; 1293 to 1312, inclusive; and 1314," and appear on pp. 5272 through 5303.)

Mr. SOURWINE. I hand you additional groups of documents and ask you if you will identify those.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here an inventory of documents from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations beginning with one marked "Atomic Energy and U. S. Int. Policy," and ending with one addressed to "Secretary, Lithuanian Legation," which is an inventory of documents from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and a second batch which is headed "A Second Batch," of which the inventory begins with a document to E. C. Carter and ends with one to E. C. Carter. This is an inventory of documents from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, in each case does the list represent an inventory of the actual documents to which it is attached?

Mr. MANDEL. It does.

Mr. SOURWINE. The inventory was prepared under your supervision?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the documents themselves are all from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. They are.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they, or are they photostatic copies?

Mr. MANDEL. They include originals, carbons, as taken from the files, and photostats.

The CHAIRMAN. Photostats of instruments in the files; is that right?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The photostats were made under your direction?

Mr. MANDEL. They were.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the reasons for the recurrence of the photostats are many. In most cases the reason for it is that we have gone through the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on Fifty-fourth Street and taken out certain documents there. We returned the original documents to the Institute of Pacific Relations, but had them photostated before returning them. That is the reason for the photostating.

The CHAIRMAN. The photostats were not themselves taken from the files? The instrument was taken from the files and photostated, and the photostats are here; is that right?

Mr. MORRIS. In almost every case. I think in some cases there were photostats in the IPR files.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask in regard to these two groups of documents and the list attached thereto that Mr. Mandel has most recently identified they be offered to Mr. Carter with the same stipulation as the earlier one.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be inserted in the record and offered to Mr. Carter with the same stipulation as to his making an affidavit.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit Nos. 889 to 903, inclusive; 905 to 954, inclusive; 956 to 964, inclusive, and appear on pp. 5031 through 5083.)

Mr. SOURWINE. I hold in my hand a file of material which was offered for the record during Mr. Bogolepov's testimony. The Chair

ruled that it would be accepted and inserted in the record, but there was the proviso that it be offered to Mr. Carter for identification. I would like to ask has this ever been offered to Mr. Carter and has Mr. Carter had an opportunity to examine it?

Mr. MARKS. No, he has not. He just got it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that these documents, which I shall briefly identify, the first headed "Confidential, not for distribution outside the office," under date of August 10, 1934—

The CHAIRMAN. Where do they come from?

Mr. MORRIS. They have been identified by Mr. Mandel at an open session of the hearing as having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and they were admitted by you provisionally on their being recognized by Mr. Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. I simply thought, Mr. Chairman, that since the record at this point does not specifically identify what we are handing Mr. Carter there should be this identification: Under date of August 10, 1934, headed "Memorandum of Personnel on Soviet Studies." The next item is called "Confidential, not for distribution outside the office, Report on Soviet Relations with the Institute of Pacific Relations." The next is to Frederick V. Field from Edward C. Carter under date of January 16, 1935. The next is headed "Meeting, April 9, Institute of Oceanography; ECC; OL; HM, Harondar."

The next is headed "Report of the Visit of the Secretary General to Moscow, December 20-31, 1934." The next is a letter or what appears to be a letter, under date of April, 1934. It is headed "Communist Academy, Volkhonka, 14 Moscow, U. S. S. R." The next is a letter, and the date is Hotel Richemond, Geneva, September 12, 1934, and it begins "Dear Owen."

Then there is a letter to Senator McCarran under date of March 24 from Carlisle Humelsine and the attachment thereto.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carter would have nothing to do with that last.

Mr. SOURWINE. The attachment, sir, is the one which raises the question as to whether Mr. Carter can add anything by way of identification.

The CHAIRMAN. These are to be made available to Mr. Carter for his comment and his affidavit?

Mr. SOURWINE. Along the same lines with regard to any identity he should make, and he should have the privilege if he cares to include in that affidavit any voluntary statement or comment about it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The documents referred to were previously marked "Exhibit No. 58" and appear on p. 262, pt. I. For the other documents, see exhibits 749, 758, 759, 760, 761, 763, respectively.)

Mr. MARKS. With reference to comment, it is obvious from the record that we have not made any comments on the contents of these.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is correct. It is not completely correct because in the instance of Malik he had a comment to make.

Mr. MARKS. You are right there.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to any others he has not made a comment. He is not bound, but if he wants to make comment as to these submitted for study, he is to have the right to include in that affidavit any comment he desires to make.

Mr. MARKS. We would like to reserve whatever rights we have to comment on the others.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland or Mr. Carter, are you going to offer any documents to be inserted into the record at this time?

Mr. CARTER. If I may have your permission, Mr. Chairman, on April 23 I mailed you in Washington, A Personal View of the Institute of Pacific Relations, by Edward C. Carter, and in my letter to you I promised to send a second statement on clarification and correction. This I now hand you with a covering letter, and here is a copy of my letter to Senator McCarran for Mr. Morris.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to these documents, Mr. Carter, have they been prepared by you?

Mr. CARTER. They have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you offering them as part of your testimony, that is, that the material in here is true to the best of your knowledge and belief where it is stated to be on knowledge and belief, and if not so stated it is true?

Mr. CARTER. That is my position.

Mr. MARKS. Just one moment, Mr. Sourwine; I am not sure that Mr. Carter understood the import of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not mean to take advantage of him in any way.

Mr. MARKS. I understand that, but I think as to everything he states it is true to the best of his knowledge and belief. He is not using a pleading style and stating upon information and belief thus and so, but he is doing his best to represent the facts. Is that all right?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter has handed here a document of over 50 pages, nearly 60 pages, including the appendix, headed "Amplification, correction, and clarification of testimony." Obviously if Mr. Carter is going to amplify, correct, and clarify his testimony, he has to do it under oath.

Mr. MARKS. I am sure that Mr. Carter will say that this shall have the same status as if these things were read orally or stated orally at any committee hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Under oath?

Mr. MARKS. Under oath; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does he make an affidavit to this?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, sir, that is another point. There is no jurat on this. Whatever the form is immaterial, but the record should show that Mr. Carter fully adopts this statement, the main text of 49 pages and the appendix of 7 pages, as a sworn statement presented before this committee.

Mr. CARTER. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. The committee staff of course has had no opportunity to see this until this moment and has of course had no opportunity to cross examine Mr. Carter with regard to it. I cannot state what the staff might desire in that regard.

Mr. CARTER. Might I ask, Mr. Sourwine, Mr. Chairman, whether my first statement was received?

Mr. SOURWINE. The statement has been received, but has not been offered in the record. You are referring to "A Personal View of the Institute of Pacific Relations." I think it should be under the same stipulation, that you were offering it as your sworn testimony.

Mr. CARTER. I would be agreeable to making the stipulation now so that it is all formally in your hands.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Carter is stating, as I understand it, that he offers as his sworn testimony at this hearing his statement entitled "A Personal View of the Institute of Pacific Relations," which he transmitted to the chairman in his letter of April 24.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I think the regular way and most orderly way would be to have Mr. Carter present when the committee considers that and let him then swear to it. I think you are doing this by a long-distance operation here. I do not particularly like it, but we can determine that when we get to it. We can call Mr. Carter and have him go over his two statements, the one he sent before and this one, and make any comment on them and then be examined on them if you want to and let it go in the record. I think that is the clearer and more satisfactory way. I do not like to insert his first statement in the record now with a kind of an offhand saying that he swears to it.

I think it would be best to have him present and swear to it at the proper time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the Chair's ruling also with regard to this document which has just been handed in?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I amend Mr. Sourwine's list of documents included in the material introduced during Mr. Bogolepov's testimony. I have been informed by Mr. Mandel—it is a letter from Carlisle Humelsine and so described in Mr. Sourwine's testimony—that it should not have been included in that list.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean that material submitted by Mr. Humelsine is not such that Mr. Carter would be able to shed any light on?

Mr. MORRIS. That is correct, and it may be excluded from the documents.

Mr. Mandel, that got erroneously in this file [indicating] when it should be in this [indicating]?

Mr. MANDEL. That is right.

Mr. CARTER. I accept it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Morris has a few other documents to be offered for the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have received an answer from Carlisle Humelsine dated April 11, 1952, in reply to your letter of April 2 to the Honorable Dean Acheson of that date. May that go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. That may go in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1315-A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1315-A

APRIL 2, 1952.

HON. DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We have examined carefully the letter of March 19, 1952, from Mr. Carlisle Humelsine in reference to a conference which took place at the State Department October 12, 1942, between Mr. Sumner Welles, Mr. Earl Browder, Mr. Robert Minor, and Mr. Laughlin Currie. In this connection, we should like to have the full State Department records on this conference precisely as they appeared.

We should also like to know the steps by which this conference was arranged, who was responsible, and the correspondence that was exchanged in connection therewith.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT No. 1315-B

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, April 11, 1952.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I refer to your letter to the Secretary of April 2 in which you request Department of State records on the conference "which took place at the State Department, October 12, 1942, between Mr. Sumner Welles, Mr. Earl Browder, Mr. Robert Minor, and Mr. Lauchlin Currie." You also request information regarding "the steps by which this conference was arranged, who was responsible, and the correspondence that was exchanged in connection therewith."

As I stated in my letter to you of March 10, the Department's investigation into the history of this meeting reveals little more than the fact that Mr. Welles did meet with Mr. Browder on October 12, 1942, at which time Mr. Welles handed Mr. Browder a memorandum concerning U. S. policy in the Far East. Although the Department cannot locate a verified copy of this memorandum, our files do contain several letters in response to request for copies of this memorandum in which was stated that "a verbatim text of the memorandum, as given by Mr. Browder to the press, appeared in the October 18 [16], 1942, issue of *The Worker*." I enclose two such replies.

A thorough search of the Department's files does not reveal whether either Robert Minor or Lauchlin Currie, or both, attended the Welles-Browder conference on October 12, 1942; any invitations to Mr. Browder or to anyone else to attend this meeting; any correspondence in regard to calling the meeting; any memorandum of conversation or record of the meeting; or any record of who drafted the memorandum handed by Mr. Welles to Mr. Browder.

Since these may be of interest to you, I am also enclosing copies of the following letters which bear on the Welles-Browder meeting: (1) letter from Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Mr. Sumner Welles, dated September 26, 1951; (2) reply from Mr. Welles, dated October 10, 1951; (3) letter from Mr. Rusk to Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, dated May 19, 1950; and (4) reply from Dr. Hornbeck, dated June 7, 1950.

I regret that the Department is unable to provide further information in regard to the conference to which this letter refers.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE,

EXHIBIT No. 1315-C

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C., November 13, 1942.

MR. ARNOLD B. HARTLEY,
Radio Station WGES, Western at Madison, Chicago, Ill.

MY DEAR MR. HARTLEY: Mr. Welles has asked me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of November 6, 1942, in which you request a copy of the text of a statement issued by him in regard to the questions of national unity in China and other United Nations.

It is thought that you may refer to a memorandum which Mr. Welles gave on October 12 to Mr. Earl Browder in regard to this Government's policy with respect to China. This memorandum, which was referred to in the press, including the *New York Times* and the *New York Herald Tribune* of October 16, has not been published by the Department. However, a verbatim text of the memorandum, as given by Mr. Browder to the press, appeared in the October 18, 1942, issue of *The Worker*.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE ATCHESON, JR.,
Acting Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

EXHIBIT No. 1315-D

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C., October 29, 1942.

MR. MORRIS U. SCHAPPES,
School for Democracy, 13 Astor Place, New York, N. Y.

MY DEAR MR. SCHAPPES: Mr. Welles has asked me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of October 26, 1942, in which you request a copy of the text of a memorandum which he gave on October 12 to Mr. Earl Browder in regard to this Government's policy with respect to China.

The above-mentioned memorandum has not been published by the Department. However, a verbatim text of the memorandum, as given by Mr. Browder to the press, appeared in the October 18, 1942, issue of *The Worker*.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE ATCHESON, Jr.,
Assistant Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

EXHIBIT No. 1315-E

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C., September 26, 1951.

HON. SUMNER WELLES,
Oxon Hill, Md.

MY DEAR MR. WELLES: The Department has under consideration a request from Senator McCarran of Nevada for information concerning a meeting which purportedly took place between Mr. Earl Browder, Mr. Robert Minor, Mr. Lauchlin Currie, and you at the State Department, October 12, 1942, to discuss American policy toward China. Mr. Browder testified before a Senate committee headed by Senator Tydings in May 1950 that you handed him a written statement of the United States Government's views on the Far East at the conclusion of this meeting.

Although a very careful search has been made of the Department's files, we have not been able to locate the statement described by Mr. Browder or any record of your conversation with him. The files do reveal, however, that Mr. Browder released to the press and the *Daily Worker* published October 16, 1942, the text of a memorandum allegedly handed to him by you.

It is realized that it is difficult to recall details of events which transpired many years ago, but it would be greatly appreciated if you could furnish the Department such details concerning this matter as you might have available. In this connection it might be helpful to you to read the enclosed statements by Mr. Browder taken from the *Daily Worker*.

I am most reluctant to bother you with this request, but the absence of sufficient information in the Department's files has led us to seek your assistance.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK,
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.

Enclosures: *Daily Worker*, October 4, 1942, and October 16, 1942.

EXHIBIT No. 1315-F

OXON HILL MANOR,
Oxon Hill, Md., October 10, 1951.

HON. DEAN RUSK,
Assistant Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. RUSK: I have been away from home for some time and your letter of September 26, 1951, has consequently only now been brought to my attention. I regret the delay in replying to your inquiry.

In view of the many years that have passed since the interview of which you refer in your letter, it is unfortunately very difficult for me to recollect in any detail what took place during the course of the interview. Of one thing, however, I am certain, and that is that any memorandum that may have been handed to Mr. Browder at that time was not prepared by myself, but by the Far Eastern Division under the supervision of either Dr. Hornbeck or Mr. Max Hamilton. There is no copy of any such memorandum in my own files.

I also think I am correct in my recollection that some official of the Far Eastern Division was present at the interview and subsequently prepared at my request a memorandum of the conversation that took place.

It occurs to me that it might be helpful to you to consult either Dr. Hornbeck or Mr. Hamilton since their recollection of what took place at the interview and of any documentation that might have been prepared with regard to the interview might be more accurate than mine.

I am very sorry not to be able to be more helpful to you, but neither my memory nor my own files throw much light on the matter.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) SUMNER WELLES.

EXHIBIT No. 1315-G

MAY 19, 1950.

The Honorable STANLEY K. HORNBECK,

2139 Wyoming Avenue NW., Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR DR. HORNBECK: During his recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee under the chairmanship of Senator Tydings, Mr. Earl Browder stated that in October 1942 he called on Mr. Sumner Welles, then Under Secretary of State, to discuss American policy toward China and that Mr. Welles handed to him a written statement of the United States Government's views on this subject. He further stated that, while the Department considered that this statement did not represent any change in United States policy toward China, he did consider it a change in policy and thus an important document. In subsequent debate in the Senate, Senator Knowland referred to this portion of Mr. Browder's testimony and expressed the view that this was an extremely important document since it apparently marked "the turning point of American policy in China." Senator Knowland has not requested the Department to furnish him a copy of the statement, together with any other pertinent documents leading up to the issuance of the statement.

Although a very careful search has been made of the Department's files, we have not yet been able to locate the statement described by Mr. Browder or any record of Mr. Welles's conversation with him. The files do reveal, however, that Mr. Browder released to the press and *The Worker* published on October 18, 1942, the text of a memorandum said to have been handed to him by Mr. Welles. The files also contain memoranda indicating that the matter of Mr. Browder's call and the statement given him by Mr. Welles were brought to your attention.

It is realized that it is difficult to recall the details of events which transpired many years ago, but it would be greatly appreciated if you would furnish the Department such details regarding this matter as you can reconstruct from memory. In this connection, it might be helpful to you to read the enclosed copy of a dispatch from the *New York Herald Tribune* of October 16, 1942, which gives Mr. Browder's version of his call on Mr. Welles.

I am reluctant to bother you with this request, but the absence of sufficient information in the Department's files make it necessary for us to seek your assistance in this regard. Similar inquiries are being made of other officers of the Department then in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs who might have some knowledge of the matter.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK, *Assistant Secretary.*

Enclosures:

1. Excerpt from *The Worker*, October 18, 1942.
2. Excerpt from the *New York Herald Tribune*, October 16, 1942.

EXHIBIT No. 1315-H

2139 WYOMING AVENUE,
Washington 8, D. C., June 7, 1950.

The Honorable DEAN RUSK,
Assistant Secretary of State.

DEAR MR. RUSK. In reply to your letter of May 19 regarding statement recently made by Mr. Earl Browder and a memorandum released to the press

by Mr. Browder and published by *The Worker* on October 18, 1942, and with reference especially to your request that I furnish the Department such details regarding this matter as I can reconstruct from memory.

You will doubtless have been informed by Mr. Sprouse that, after the receipt of your letter under reference, I some days ago spoke with him on the telephone and informed him that, although I clearly recall having known at the time that Mr. Welles talked with Mr. Browder and that Mr. Browder thereafter issued a statement and released therewith the text of a memorandum which he said had been handed him by Mr. Welles, there was little that I could add from memory to what is set forth in your letter and the enclosure thereto. At the same time I offered to come to the Department at any time for the purpose of discussing the matter or seeing what the files disclose, or both.

That Mr. Welles gave Mr. Browder a memorandum there can be no doubt. The account given in that text of the matters to which it relates is, I believe, substantially accurate. How or by whom that text was drafted I am not able to say. There are passages in it which might have been drafted by me or by any one of several officers on duty and concerned with China and relations with China as of October 1942, and there are passages which might have been accepted or approved by me but which would not, I believe, have originated with me. I recall that Mr. Welles communicated with me regarding Mr. Browder's call, and I do not recall at what stage or stages. I believe that he asked in advance for a memorandum for his (Mr. Welles') information and guidance, and, although I do not recall the circumstances of the drafting, I believe such a memorandum was prepared with participation on my part and for *those* purposes. I recall being informed after the call that Mr. Welles had given Mr. Browder a memorandum; and I recall having felt that the text of the memorandum thus given was not entirely such as I would have drafted or recommended for *that* purpose.

More important, in my opinion, that the question of the origin of the memorandum under reference is the question whether there took place in 1942 a "change" in American policy regarding China and whether this memorandum or the facts of the situation to which it related marked a "turning point."

What Mr. Browder may have had in mind when he expressed himself in 1950 to the effect, as stated in your letter, that "he did consider it a change of policy," we need not for present purposes attempt to conjecture.

Looking at the text of the memorandum as copied from *The Worker* of October 18, 1942, I can say: In that memorandum, dealing with and refuting assertions and charges which had been made by Mr. Browder, there was given an objective account of developments in and regarding China and an honest review of what had been and was the official position of the United States with regard to the question of "civil strife" in China. A review of the whole history of American policy in relations to China will show that although the United States had consistently deprecated not only aggression by other countries against China but civil strife—with or without foment or support by other countries—within China, the United States had long been committed to the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries. It will show also that for many years before 1942, and in that year, and for some time thereafter the Government of the United States, in the formulating of official policy regarding China, both kept in mind and respected that commitment and that principle. There was official noting of civil strife in China; there was official giving of advice that civil strife be avoided; there was official collaboration with the Government of China toward strengthening China's effort in the war; but there was with regard to the civil conflict within China no official taking of a position either "against" or for any party or faction. There were on the part of some American nationals some manifestations in some contexts of a tendency to ignore or misinterpret or disregard official policy, but the thoughts and the acts of such nationals in those respects were their own, not those of their Government, and were, incidentally, in most cases favorable to, certainly not "against," the Communists. On the basis of what I then knew and of what I have from subsequent study learned, I find no warrant for an opinion or a conjecture that there took place in 1942 a change in the official attitude and policy of the United States regarding China.

Both "turning point" and "change of policy" came later.

A case could be made for a contention that the "turning point" came at the time of the Teheran Conference (November-December, 1943); a better case, that it came toward the end of the next year, 1944; but search for a clearly discernible and describably "change of policy" leads into and through the year 1945.

It will be recalled that there took place in 1944—and not until then—the first

of a series of reorganizations of the Department of State; that during that year there were substantial shiftings of personnel within and outward from the Department, including, in December, the retirement of Secretary of State Cordell Hull; and that there took place in 1945 the Yalta Conference, the death of President Roosevelt, the San Francisco Conference, the capitulation of Germany, the capitulation of Japan, the Potsdam Conference, the conclusion (with American encouragement) of an Agreement between the Soviet Union and China, the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and, in December, announcement by President Truman of a "United States Policy toward China" which was then and thereafter declared to be a "new" policy.

It was then, in the year 1945—and not before then—that the Government of the United States, first having taken action inconsistent with tradition and commitment in regard to China, embarked upon what became a course of intervention in regard to the civil conflict, the conflict between the National Government and the Communists, in China. It was then that words and action of the Government of the United States began to be expressive of an "against" and a "for" attitude; then and thereafter that the Government of the United States brought to bear pressures, pressures upon the National Government, pressures which were not "against" the Communists but were on their behalf, pressures not to the disadvantage of the Communists, but, in effect, to the disadvantage of the National Government.

To the circumstances of the "change," to the content and purport of the policy devised in 1945, proclaimed on December 15 of that year, and given expression in word and in deed since then, and to the gross and the net consequences thereof, there is no need for attention in the present context. There is however, in my opinion, great need that in the context of present American involvement as a leading participant, in a third global conflict, wherein "Communist" totalitarianism is making war both "cold" and "hot", on all States, Governments, peoples, institutions, organization and persons disinclined to accept domination by it, there is urgent need that the Government of the United States give solicitous attention to the question: Must the United States follow to the bitter, tragic and discrediting end the downward path, in relations with China, on which its feet were set in the fateful year of military victories and diplomatic vagaries and vitiations, 1945?

I should welcome an opportunity to talk with you on the implications of query.

Yours cordially and sincerely,

[s] Stanley K. Hornbeck
STANLEY K. HORNBECK.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a copy of a letter, Mr. Chairman, you sent to the Secretary of State dated May 1, 1952, wherein you renew your demand for the handwritten notes of Alger Hiss taken at the Yalta Conference in 1945. May that go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Was there an answer to that?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. That may go in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1316" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1316

MAY 1, 1952.

The SECRETARY OF STATE,

The State Department, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On February 21, 1952, I wrote to you asking that the handwritten notes of Alger Hiss taken at the Yalta Conference in 1945 be made available to the Internal Security Subcommittee.

In my letter of February 21st it was pointed out that a witness before the Subcommittee, Dr. Edna Fluegel, an employee of the State Department from 1942 to 1948, testified that, in the course of her official duties in the Department, she dealt with and handled the penciled notes of Mr. Hiss.

This letter is written to determine what action has been taken on my request of February 21, 1952, to you.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

Mr. SOURWINE. The original request is already in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; and this is the renewal.

These will be made available, Mr. Holland, if you want to see them.

The next will be a copy of a letter by you, Senator McCarran, addressed to Rear Adm. Robert L. Dennison, dated May 1, 1952, in connection with a request that the Forrestal diaries and papers be made available to this committee. May that go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. That may go in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1317" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1317

May 1, 1952.

Rear Admiral ROBERT L. DENNISON,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR ADMIRAL DENNISON: My attention has been called to the story appearing in the New York Times today concerning the intention of the White House not to make available to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee the diaries and papers of the late James Forrestal.

As you know, on December 3, 1951, a subpoena was served on the New York Herald Tribune directing that it make available the papers and diaries of Mr. Forrestal. It is my understanding these are the property of the New York Herald Tribune. The Subcommittee has been assured by the New York Herald Tribune that as far as it is concerned it has done everything possible to comply with the demands of the subpoena. The staff of the Subcommittee contacted you about this matter because it was understood you were holding these papers for the owners.

The New York Times story referred to above, which credits a White House source, treats this matter as though the documents in question were Executive papers and wholly subject to Presidential control.

If for any reason you have decided to refuse to make these subpoenaed papers and diaries available to the Subcommittee, it is requested you directly inform me, as Subcommittee Chairman, of the position you choose to take.

Kindest personal regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

Mr. MORRIS. We have a letter from Mr. Edwin O. Reischauer dated September 26, 1951, which he requested to go into the record. This was discussed before. We held it up on the grounds that we had hoped possibly that we might have a sworn statement by Mr. Reischauer, but, in view of the fact that we are a little pressed, will you accept this letter?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, it is the opinion of counsel that this letter is distinguishable and should be distinguished from an offer of proof which is not made in affidavit form, since this letter is a recital which does not appear to be at variance with the facts; is that correct, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; it will go in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1318" and is as follows):

EXHIBIT No. 1318

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
DEPARTMENT OF FAR EASTERN LANGUAGES,
Boylston Hall, Cambridge 38, Mass., September 26, 1951.

The Honorable PAT McCARRAN,
Senate Judiciary Committee, United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: I understand that my name was cited before your committee yesterday as one of a group who had taken a pro-Chinese Communist stand at a three-day meeting called by the Department of State in October 1949. I am certain that any examination of the record of those meetings or of my various writings before or after that time will reveal nothing which could be called pro-Chinese Communist or in favor of communism in any form. As I recollect the meetings, my chief role was to present, at the request of the State Department, a statement on the situation in Japan. I took this opportunity to urge the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan as soon as feasible, in part on the grounds that this was an important step in our efforts to halt the spread of Communism there. This opinion subsequently became a generally accepted view in the U. S. Government, and the peace treaty which Mr. Dulles and Mr. Acheson so ably brought to successful completion was in part based on such a point of view.

I am sending you this statement so that the records of your committee will not contain false testimony uncorrected and so that the committee may be warned of the unreliability of some of its witnesses, such as Professor Kenneth W. Colgrove, who is quoted as being responsible for the statement in question.

Yours sincerely,

[s] Edwin O. Reischauer,
[t] EDWIN O. REISCHAUER,
Professor of Far Eastern Languages.

SEPTEMBER 28, 1951.

Prof. EDWIN O. REISCHAUER,
Harvard University, Department of Far Eastern Languages,
Boylston Hall, Cambridge, Mass.

DEAR PROFESSOR REISCHAUER: I have your letter of September 26, 1951, which will be inserted in the public record of our proceedings.

Sincerely,

PAT McCARRAN, *Chairman.*

Mr. MORRIS. This is a reply the staff has received in connection with a compilation. Perhaps this was done by Mr. Mandel. Will you identify that?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a reply from the Library of Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date?

Mr. MANDEL. It is dated March 12, 1952. We had asked for information regarding the activities and career of Madame Sun Yat-sen. The letter is signed by Ernest Griffith, director of the Legislative Reference Service. It is a reply to a request from me.

Mr. MORRIS. Will that go in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. That will go in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1319," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1319

Legislative Reference Service

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
Washington, D. C., March 12, 1952.

SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
(Attention: Miss Walker.)

GENTLEMEN: With respect to your request concerning Madame Sun Yat-sen's cooperation with the Communists, we submit the following information. It is

based largely on the articles on Madame Sun in *Current Biography*, 1944; the *New York Times Magazine*, August 11, 1946; *New York Herald Tribune*, March 7, 1950.

Madame Sun was active in the Chinese revolutionary movement during the period of the "first united front" in China (1924-27) when the Communists and Nationalists cooperated under the initial leadership of her husband, Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

Madame Sun left China in 1927 after the split in the revolutionary movement. Living abroad, first in Moscow and then in Berlin, Madame Sun was critical of the National Government under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. She returned to China in May 1929, to attend to the removal and reinterment of the remains of her husband.

After the Japanese invasion of China in 1931, Madame Sun urged a united effort against the Japanese. In 1938, she accepted a seat on the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. She had been elected to the post *in absentia* in 1929, but refused until this time to lend her prestige to the party. However, she continued to criticize what she termed the "reactionary minority within the leadership" of the Kuomintang "which has forgotten the teachings of Sun Yat-sen."

When the Chinese Communists took Shanghai in May 1949, Madame Sun remained in the city. In the early fall of 1949 she became a "non-Communist" member and vice chairman of the "People's Political Consultative Council" in the newly formed "People's Republic of China."

Since that time Madame Sun's name has appeared as author of several articles attacking the motives and policies of the United States. Such attacks have contained references to the "peaceful" intentions of the "Great Soviet Union" led by the "mighty Stalin" and similar terminology.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Ernest S. Griffith

[t] ERNEST S. GRIFFITH, *Director*.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might revert to the offer of the letter by you to Admiral Dennison, through error for which counsel is responsible, the document is not here physically at this hearing. There is in the files of the committee in Washington a letter addressed to Mr. Morris from Charles Murphy, administrative assistant to the President, with regard to the Forrestal diaries. I ask the Chair to order that that letter may be inserted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I know of that letter, and it may be inserted in the record. It has to do with my request for the Forrestal diaries.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1320," and filed for the record.)

EXHIBIT No. 1320

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, April 28, 1952.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,

*Counsel, Subcommittee on Internal Security, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR Mr. MORRIS: It is understood that you have been in touch with Admiral Robert L. Dennison, the President's Naval Aide, concerning the possibility of having made available to the Subcommittee on Internal Security certain papers of the late James V. Forrestal, which are now in the custody of the White House.

I have been requested by the President to advise you that in his judgment the disclosure of these papers would not be in the public interest.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Charles S. Murphy

[t] CHARLES S. MURPHY,
Special Counsel to the President.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a reply made by Mr. Charles Murphy of the President's staff.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Chairman please, it is in a sense not a reply because the committee had made no request of Mr. Murphy or of the President.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, but he is making the reply, is he not?

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a letter stating that the President has directed him to inform the committee the President does not feel the committee should have the Forrestal diaries.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I offer you a group of letters and a list. I ask if you will identify the letters and the list.

The CHAIRMAN. Take the list first.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a list prepared under my direction of letters, memoranda, and documents from or to Mr. E. C. Carter as taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that list an inventory of the documents and papers which have also been handed to you at this time?

Mr. MANDEL. It is in fact an inventory of these documents.

The CHAIRMAN. You better tie them into the record a little bit by some identification. There are so many that we are handling here rather loosely. I think you better identify them.

Mr. MANDEL. This list begins with A. Von Trott and ends with E. C. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there numbers of serials?

Mr. MANDEL. The documents are numbered and dated.

The CHAIRMAN. And the list sets forth the numbers and the dates?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were the documents themselves taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. They were.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have these documents been shown to Mr. Carter?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, they have, Mr. Sourwine.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked Exhibits Nos. 1123 to 1139, inclusive; 1141 to 1182, inclusive; 1184 to 1223, inclusive; 1125 to 1229, inclusive; 1231 to 1240, inclusive; 1242 to 1254, inclusive; 1256 to 1260, inclusive, and appear on pp. 5198 through 5272.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Alfred Kohlberg was the object of certain statements made by a witness before this committee, Mr. Owen Lattimore, and he has written in demanding the right to be heard. The committee has rejected a statement that he gave to the committee on the theory that it was not a sworn statement.

At the suggestion of the committee he has now made this a sworn statement. May that be received into the record at this time? He has presented it in the form of an affidavit.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it the same in substance that he made before he took an oath to it?

Mr. MORRIS. Previously he was introducing certain letters and certain material which the committee felt were self-serving and they were rejected. In lieu of that Mr. Kohlberg has submitted this affidavit.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I believe it would be clarifying if the Chair also ordered printed in the record at this point the correspondence in the committee file between Mr. Kohlberg and the committee on this subject. That would explain it.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be the order, and this will be inserted in the record together with the correspondence of the past.

(The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 1321-A, B, C, and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1321-A

MARCH 28, 1952.

Senator PAT McCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: As proposed in your letter I enclose affidavit for inclusion in the record of your Hearings.

Briefly it states:

1. References to me by witnesses before you Committee as the China Lobby, etc.
2. My background and interest in the Far East.
3. Letters from Air Marshal Bishop and Assistant Secretary of Navy Gates attesting my interest in opposing totalitarianism.
4. Service in Civil Air Patrol.
5. Wartime trip to China and discovery of apparent treasonable activities.
6. Study of IPR and publication of findings November 9, 1944.
7. Answer by four trustees.
8. My answer of December 28, 1944.
9. Special meeting of IPR—my letter to members and defeat of my resolution for investigation.
10. Formation of American China Policy Association in 1946 and letter of Congresswoman Clare Booth Luce, October 11, 1945, revealing attitude of Directors.
11. My appearance before Senate Committees and acquaintance with members of Foreign Relations Committee of Senate.
12. My connection with Senator McCarthy.
13. Admiral Nimitz, General Marshall, and IPR.
14. Letter to IPR Trustees, March 13, 1952.
15. Letter to Dr. Roscoe Pound.
16. Closing statement.

Very sincerely yours,

[s] Alfred Kohlberg

[t] ALFRED KOHLBERG.

1 West 37th Street, New York, 18, N. Y.

EXHIBIT No. 1321-B

APRIL 9, 1952.

Mr. ALFRED KOHLBERG,
 1 West 37th Street,
 New York 18, N. Y.

DEAR MR. KOHLBERG: I have your affidavit of March 28, 1952, which contains extraneous clippings and supplementary letters.

For inclusion in the record of the Internal Security Subcommittee what you submit should be all in affidavit form.

Kindest regards,

Sincerely,

PAT McCARRAN, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT No. 1321-C

(Mr. Alfred Kohlberg's affidavit of April 16, 1952:)

STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York, ss:

Alfred Kohlberg, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

That I reside in New York, my office address being 1 West 37th Street, New York 18, N. Y.

That Professor Owen Lattimore referred to me three times in his statement read to the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate,

generally referred to as the McCarran Committee. That in addition Professor Lattimore referred to me several times in his verbal testimony; that I was likewise referred to numerous times by other witnesses before the McCarran Committee; also by Professor Lattimore and other witnesses before the Tydings Committee in March, April, May and June 1950; also by Senators Morse and McMahon during the Joint Committee hearings on the dismissal of General MacArthur; and on the floor of the Senate by Senators Lehman, Connally and others.

That beginning in April and May 1950, after Professor Lattimore's statements to the Tydings Committee, articles and editorials appeared in the Washington Post, St. Louis Dispatch, New York Post, New York Compass, New York Daily Worker, New York Times, The Nation (a weekly), the New Republic (a weekly). That I was mentioned 17 times in Owen Lattimore's book "Ordeal by Slander."

That the testimony and articles stated that I was the "China Lobby," that I was the "man behind McCarthy;" that "McCarthy's charges were nothing but a rebash of the irresponsible charges of Kohlberg;" that I was probably secretly in the pay of the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek; that I had connections with a so-called Christian-front, with fascists, with anti-semites; and an editorial in the Washington Post entitled "Kohlberg's Klan" suggested further disreputable connections.

That I have written evidence that in April 1950 one, Robert W. Barnett, formerly Secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and in 1950 Chief of the Economic Section of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, advised certain reporters of the above alleged facts about me and further advised them that more details could be obtained from an organization in New York called The Friends of Democracy, headed by Rev. Leon Birkhead; and that Friends of Democracy had prepared a three page statement entitled "The Case Against Alfred Kohlberg."

That the facts concerning my interest and activities in opposing Communism, and opposing the Chinese Communists, are as follows:

I have been engaged in the import textile business for more than 35 years, having offices and agents at various times in China, Japan, Iran, France, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. At no time have I ever done any business with or had any financial transactions of any character with the Government of the United States or any foreign Government, or any subsidiary thereof (with two exceptions), except for the payment of customs dues and taxes. When I refer to any business or financial transactions, I include myself personally and any and all corporations with which I have been actively connected. The exceptions referred to above were (1) a period of 2 or 3 years during which one of my corporations acted as agent for the Amtorg Trading Corp. for Russian linens in the late 20's or early 30's; and (2) the purchase of some surplus navy jackets, after V-J Day, from the United States Government.

During these more than 35 years in foreign trade, I came to understand the wisdom of the now-abandoned Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door Policy. The Monroe Doctrine was designed to prevent the possibility of the building up of a European empire on this continent, with its resulting constant threat to our security. The Open Door Policy was designed to prevent any military empire from adding to its power the resources and manpower of the Chinese Empire, with a resulting threat to our security in the Pacific.

Therefore when Japan began her all-out war on China in 1937, I contributed to relief work and addressed some open letters to Congress on America's interest, as I saw it. At the beginning of that war I learned that the Soviet Union extended aid in military supplies and a Russian-manned airforce to the Republic of China. Being in China in the summer of 1938, I learned that the Soviets had ceased their aid and that Russia had reached agreement with Germany and Japan. This agreement, which was finally made public as the Hitler-Stalin Pact of Aug. 23, 1939, I reported in an interview in the New York Times of Nov. 25, 1938. During the course of said interview I stated, and the New York Times reported, that Russia, Germany, and Japan had arrived at an agreement by which Russia "either joined the German-Japanese alliance, or, if she did not go so far, made peace with Japan and Germany. The arrangement called for cooperation with Russia by Japan and Germany rather than antagonism, and provided for withdrawal of Russian support to Chinese forces."

After the war started in Europe the following year, and after the replacement of Neville Chamberlain by Winston Churchill convinced me that Britain would really fight the Hitler-Stalin-Japanese alliance, being a licensed airplane pilot, I went to Canada in May 1940 to volunteer, but was rejected because of age.

The following month, after the fall of France, I wrote to Wing Commander Homer Smith of the Royal Canadian Air Force, offering to volunteer, with my airplane, to fly a suicide mission into any German objective selected by them. On July 2, 1940, Air Marshal W. A. Bishop wrote me "Wing Commander Smith has shown me your letter and I wanted to take this opportunity of telling you how much we appreciate your offer of service, and the offer of your machine. At the moment, however, the age limit makes it impossible for us to accept your services, but should this at a later date change, I will get in touch with you."

Thereafter I volunteered to fly a similar suicide mission for the Australians, the British, and the Chinese; but was refused.

Finally, after Pearl Harbor on December 9, 1941, I wrote Artemus Gates, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, stating in part:

"In May 1940 I volunteered for the R.C.A.F. at Ottawa but was turned down on account of age. In July 1940 I volunteered to fly any old trainer loaded with explosives into a troop transport, warship or any other objective. This offer was refused. In April 1941 I repeated this offer. This last offer is still being considered, but the Air Attaché of the British Embassy in Washington still has no final decision from London, but is not hopeful of a favorable answer, as the regulations provide for no such service."

"I now make this offer to you * * * Can you use me? Rank and pay are no object, but I would like two weeks to wind up my affairs. This letter, of course, is strictly confidential."

On Jan. 8, 1942, Mr. Gates wrote:

"I have your offer very much in mind, in fact, I have not been able to forget it since you wrote me early in December, but to date I just don't know where such 100 percent unselfish services can be used. Perhaps the opportunity will develop but I think our battle on the Pacific is going to be a long war."

"Incidentally, a number of officers in the Bureau of Aeronautics have been acquainted with your sacrifice."

Failing to obtain such a commission, I finally served with the Civil Air Patrol in the antisubmarine patrol in the Gulf of Mexico in the latter part of 1942, and hold Certificate of Honorable Service of the Department of the Air Force.

I refer to this service and attempted service as an answer to charges and implied charges, referred to above, that I was a Fascist or sympathetic to fascist-minded groups, with none of whom have I ever had any association whatsoever.

Meantime I had become a Director and in 1941 Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors of the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China. In the Spring of 1943 ABMAC and United China Relief, of which it had become a part, received unfavorable reports from their staff men in Chungking about graft and incompetency in the Chinese Army medical services, which we were aiding. Mr. E. C. Carter, of the IPR, had become head of the United China Relief Committee that allocated funds to the various agencies in China, and had recommended for appointment most of the employees of United China Relief.

I flew to China in June 1943 at my own expense to investigate. Shortly before leaving for China, Mr. Lauchlin Currie phoned New York and asked me to see him before going, in his offices in the State Department. He told me at considerable length of reports being received from China, of incompetence, corruption and the inability and lack of will on the part of the Chinese to fight. He told me I could check with Americans in Chungking, and that he would be pleased to hear my impressions on returning. On arrival in China Dwight Edwards, head of UCR there, Dr. George Bachman, head of ABMAC, and various other Americans including some in our Embassy confirmed the reports of corruption and incompetence.

As none of them had been in the field, I asked their sources, which they protested were confidential. I therefore felt it necessary to check in the field, which I did against their advice. After traveling through five provinces by truck, ambulance, rail, air and horse-back, including 8 days in the 6th War Area, I found the itemized charges either completely untrue or greatly exaggerated.

On returning to America I complained to Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, Political Adviser to the Secretary of State on the Far East, and Joseph Ballantine, Director Far Eastern Division of the State Department, in a lengthy interview. I protested that the untruths were making Chinese-American cooperation difficult, if not impossible, with resultant benefit to the Japanese enemy and unnecessary loss of both Chinese and American lives.

They professed to be unable to do anything about it; Dr. Hornbeck saying: "When I see the people that this Department is sending to China, I shake in my shoes."

It was not until early 1944 that I began to realize that the lies about the Chinese Government and Army were Communist propaganda; and that the main source for spreading them in this country was the Institute of Pacific Relations. Although I had previously been a member of the Finance Committee of the IPR and helped raise funds for them, and had previously recognized that some of the employees were pro-Communist, I had not suspected the scope of the infiltration. As I had foolishly thrown away all back copies of their publications, unread, I went to their offices to rebuy such back copies. They told me that they were out of print.

I therefore went to the public library and from about April to October 1944, read all articles they had published on the Chinese *military and/or political situation* from 1937 to that date. I then read the articles in the *New Masses*, an official Communist weekly, and *The Communist*, an official Communist monthly, on the same topics, for the same years.

From these I prepared an 88 page study (frequently referred to in the McCarran hearings) and sent it with a covering letter to Mr. E. C. Carter and to each of the Trustees of the IPR and such members and other persons interested in the Far East as were known to, or suggested to me. (Later the IPR in their so-called analysis which Mr. Dennett testified was prepared by Mrs. Maxwell S. Stewart, and not by the Trustees, and in other testimony, charged that my study contained extracts from only 2 percent of their articles published between 1937 and 1944. This may or may not be literally true, but is irrelevant as I studied and extracted only their articles on the military and/or political situation in China. To the best of my memory my extracts covered all or practically all of their articles in those two fields. I did not attempt to analyze their articles on other countries than China (even including the U. S. and Canada), nor on other topics such as economics, industry, transportation, finance, agriculture, folklore, family life, shipping, missionary activities, fisheries, etc., etc.)

In my covering letter to Mr. Carter, dated Nov. 9, 1944, I said in part:

"Last June I received from United China Relief a copy of a booklet issued by your IPR entitled 'War-Time China' (IPR Pamphlet No. 10). In a recent advertisement, Rosamund Lee, your Publications Secretary, referring to this pamphlet states. 'What is the true situation between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang as explained by Maxwell S. Stewart in War-Time China.'

"Frankly, I was shocked at this pamphlet. From start to finish, it seemed to me a deliberate smear of China, the Chinese and the Chinese Government. I was especially shocked by the following: 'They (the American, British and Soviet Governments) have, however, limited their economic and military assistance because of fear that any supplies they send might be used in civil strife rather than against the Japanese.'

"The statement seems completely at variance with the many statements made by our President to the effect that all possible aid is being given to China and will continue to be given to China.

"Three or four years ago, you may recall, I resigned after a dozen years membership in IPR. You asked me the reason for my resignation and I told you frankly that I thought you had too many Communists on your staff. You asked me if I thought you were a Communist, to which I, of course, replied 'No.' You then told me that you did not question your staff as to their political beliefs: whether they were Democrats, Republicans, Socialists, Communists, or what not; that you investigated their qualifications and judged them by their work. This seemed to me at the time a very businesslike attitude and I withdrew my resignation.

"After reading the above referred-to booklet, I decided to look into the IPR publications further. As a result of this reading, I now attach hereto a lot of clippings from your publications, along with clippings from 'The Communist' (Official organ of the Communist Party in the U. S. A.) and 'New Masses' (another Communist organ), also a few other clippings that seem to bear on the same issues. If you will go through these, I think you will find that your employees have been putting over on you a not-too-well-camouflaged Communist line. Your staff publications follow the 'New Masses' line exactly but not quite so frankly and the 'New Masses' articles are much better documented. In selecting these, I have had to clip and clip to keep to reasonable length, but I believe that what is left of each article fairly represents the article as a whole, as far as same touches on the subjects covered

"This study poses the question: What are the Soviet Union's aims in the Far East? Is there a sinister purpose behind this Communist inspired campaign to discredit China? Only Marshall Stalin can answer this question.

"But another question has been bothering me as I made this study. This question is: Is it treason? Does the publication of untruthful statements give 'aid and comfort' to our enemy, Japan, in its attempt to break Chinese unity under Chiang Kai-shek? This question I propound to your Board of Trustees.

"Look over these clippings and see if you do not think it is time for a house-cleaning in the IPR. The economic articles (not quoted) sounded to me very much like undergraduate studies, compiled from studies of Chinese economists and lacking any practical business background.

"If you agree that a house cleaning in the IPR is long overdue, I will be happy to help. My suggestions would be:

"1. Fire all the Reds, because the truth is not in them.

"2. Adopt a policy of presenting facts rather than opinions. Identify the sources of your information.

"3. Name a responsible body to determine policy.

"This last point is suggested to me by what I missed in going through your last 7 years' publications. I found:

1. No criticism of Japan in those 7 years, except of her rural land system;
2. No single criticism of Communist China; and

3. No single criticism of the Soviet Union; whereas I found:

4. Severe criticism of the Chinese Government, alternating with praise, closely following the alternations of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and of the Communist press.

"A responsible committee controlling and vouching for your policy would be very reassuring to the members of, and contributors to your Institute."

This letter was answered, not by Mr. Carter, but by Messrs. Robert G. Sproul, Chairman; Robert D. Calkins, Dean, Columbia University; G. Ellsworth Huggins, Treasurer, and Philip C. Jessup. In their answer they said:

"At its December 11 meeting the Executive Committee of the American Council reviewed Mr. Kohlberg's charges and demands. It desires to report the following:

"The Executive Committee and the responsible officers of the American Council find no reason to consider seriously the charge of bias. The character of the personnel associated with the Institute, the long history of its research activities, and the demonstrated value of its research testify to the fact that it has properly fulfilled its function to conduct impartial research on important issues even though they are controversial. The Committee believes a full presentation and discussion of such issues is desirable, even in wartime.

"The Institute of Pacific Relations has, and always has had, a responsible body to determine policy. The Pacific Council, with which Mr. Carter is associated, is directed by representatives from the National Councils and that body, made up of these representatives, determines its policies.

"The general policy of the American Council, which is one of the ten constituent bodies in the Institute, is determined by the Board of Trustees. The Executive Committee acts on behalf of the Board of Trustees, when the Board is not in session.

"The research conducted by the American Council is under the direction of its Research Advisory Committee, to which research planning and policy have been delegated by the Executive Committee. This Committee formulates and approves research programs, and it approves the research personnel who are engaged for their competence to undertake the special assignments required in the research program. Having hired competent research workers, it is not the policy of the Committee or of the American Council to censor this findings, but to publish them as the research results of the authors themselves."

This answer of the 4 trustees, I answered Dec. 28, 1944. My answer follows (in part):

"The issue presented to Mr. Carter by my letter of Nov. 9 is:

"Have the publications of the I. P. R. (both American Council and Pacific Council) closely followed the Communist line in alternate praise and abuse of the Chinese Government? i. e.

Prior to the Hitler-Stalin pact of Aug. 23, 1939.....	PRAISE.
Then until June 22, 1941 (Hitler invasion of Russia).....	ABUSE.
Then until Summer of 1943.....	PRAISE.
Since Summer of 1943.....	ABUSE.

"The issue presented to your Board by my letter of Nov. 9 is: Are these publications treasonable, inasmuch as they are calculated to give 'aid and comfort' to

our enemy, Japan, in its attempts by propaganda to break the faith of the Chinese people in the Government of Chiang Kai-shek?

"Neither of these issues is touched on in your letter of Dec. 19. Whether they were discussed at your meeting of Dec. 11 is not stated.

"Your letter states that, having selected competent employees, you let them publish what they wish, without censorship. Do you consider yourselves responsible bodies and if so, do you, or do you not, assume responsibility for those publications by your staff?

"As a member, may I ask your Research Advisory Committee for the qualifications as 'experts' of the following staff members who write your articles on whether, including dates of their visits to China, cities and provinces visited, and whether you feel their impartiality is attested to, or questioned by, their acceptance as authorities by, and contributors to, the American Communist press:

Maxwell S. Stewart

T. A. Bisson

L. K. Rosinger

Y. Y. Hsu

"As a member, I would be interested to know who elected or appointed to your Board and to your Executive Committee, Mr. Frederick V. Field, Generalissimo of the White House pickets until their liquidation, Sunday, June 22, 1941, and now featured writer on China for the 'Daily Worker,' 'The Communist,' and 'New Masses', I would also be interested to know what makes him an 'expert' on China.

"In my letter of November 9, I called attention to the fact that in reading your publications for the past 7 years, I found no criticism of Japan, Communist China, or the Soviet Union, but alternating praise and abuse of the Chinese Government.

"Since that time I have received scores of letters, many from outstanding American authorities on the Far East. None was critical, some were non-committal, the majority were commendatory of my study. A number were from ex-members of your Institute who resigned because they felt the Institute had become the not-too-well-camouflaged agent of a foreign power whose way of life and world-wide fifth column infiltration are antagonistic to the interest of these United States.

"From that correspondence I attach a letter written to you Oct. 8, 1942, by Mr. Miller Freeman, Seattle publisher. Mr. Freeman tells me his letter was neither answered nor acknowledged. Maybe he, too, should have cleared it privately with Mr. Carter.

"Before closing, one more quotation—this from signed statement of Upton Close:

"'A few days prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, Mr. Trammell' (head of NBC) 'himself received a letter from E. C. Carter, head of the Institute of Pacific Relations, demanding that I be dropped from the air because I was "anti-Japanese".'

"One of the questions most commonly asked is: 'What are IPR's motives for their current attacks on China.' Possibly your Boards would like to make a statement on this, explaining why all your articles on the current complicated situation are written by staff members, none of whom has been in China for years, while contrary statements by such liberals as Pearl Buck and Lin Yutang are ignored, and articles from your own Chinese Council are rejected. May I also ask Mr. Carter whether he personally presented your public criticisms to Chiang Kai-shek, Ho Ying-chin, Chen Li-fu and Sun-fu in Chungking last year and what were their answers?"

I then asked for permission to circulate my fellow members. This was granted by letter from Mr. Raymond Dennett. But when I sent a secretary by appointment to copy the names, they withdrew permission. I filed suit for the membership list, which after various court vicissitudes was settled by agreement by the IPR to address on their machine under my inspection any one mailing I might choose to send their members.

In said mailing, dated March 18, 1947, I included a printed resolution appointing an impartial committee of investigation and a proxy to vote for same. Also one article from the New Leader and one from Plain Talk, both about the IPR and wrote my fellow members of the IPR in part as follows:

"By order of the supreme court of the State of New York, this letter is being mailed to you by the American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.

"Early in July 1943 I was told by several Americans in Chungking that 'the Chinese Government was hoarding tanks and guns given them under lend-lease

to use against the Japs.' Late in August, having spent six weeks traveling through Szechuen, Kweichow, Kwangsi, Hunan and Yunnan, I called on Brig. Gen. Arms, U. S. Army, Commander of the Infantry Training School in Kunming. Among other items I asked why we permitted such hoarding. He laughed and said he'd heard some good ones, but this took the cake. He said that up to that date all the arms and ammunition that had come in had gone to him and to the artillery training school; that they were not fully equipped as yet and, until they were, nothing would be flown in (the air route over the hump to Kunming being the only route in) for any other force except the air force whose minimum requirements were the first priority. He explained that nothing but air-force supplies had come in since May, due to the monsoons. After the monsoons ended, he expected the resumption of his equipping; and after that was completed, he explained, General Stilwell was to get full equipment for two of his divisions, and then, after that, 50% was to go to Stilwell and 50% to the Chinese Army—sometime in 1944. At that moment, he said, not one tank or gun or rifle or bazooka or cartridge had been turned over to the Chinese Army under lend-lease—hence none could be hoarded.

"On returning to the United States, I spoke of this and other reports with some heat and was told by friends that the IPR was the chief culprit in the spreading of lies about China, and that the motivation back of it was Communism. I had been a member of the IPR since 1928, but like most businessmen and (as I later learned) like most of their Board of Trustees, I seldom read the literature they sent me, and like most people knew nothing about Communism.

"To check on these charges, I read through the FAR EASTERN SURVEY and our quarterly PACIFIC AFFAIRS from 1937 to that date (summer of 1944). In my reading I read every article on the political and military situation in China and skipped nearly everything else. Then, to learn the Communist line, I read all the articles on the political and military situation in China in the NEW MASSES (weekly) and THE COMMUNIST (monthly), both being Communist Party official publications.

"In the course of this reading I learned that the IPR and the Communist publications had switched their attitude or 'line' on the situation in China several times between 1937 and 1944; both IPR and Communists making the same switches at the same time. Further I noticed that to some extent they interchanged writers and both quoted the same authorities; that they were both lyrical in their reviews of the same books; but that, of the three, the NEW MASSES (possibly because it was franker and more open in taking sides) had the best documented articles. In fact, if the IPR had disregarded whatever information sources it had (if any) and relied only on the NEW MASSES, it would have omitted little that it published on the Chinese military and political scene.

"After completing my study, I published extracts from the IPR and the Communist press in an 88-page booklet and sent it with a letter to Mr. E. C. Carter and each of our Trustees and to personal acquaintances interested in China. (You may have a copy of this and later correspondence for the asking.)

"At that time I thought that Mr. Carter, who was then President of Russian War Relief, was so busy that he had let some Reds on the staff run off with the Institute. I called on him and the Trustees to fire these Reds and exercise a real control over their publications. (That was November 1944.) The answer of the Executive Committee was to issue a letter stating that they did not think my charges 'merited serious consideration.' (Two of them told me later that they had not read the study.) They then turned the charges and study over to the staff (against whom the charges were filed) to be studied and answered. By April 1945 the staff had prepared a 52-page answer of which I only learned in 1946 and of which even the Chairman of the Trustees couldn't get a copy to give me. I finally obtained a copy by court order in October 1946.

"Since 1944 I have learned much more about the IPR; its apparently completely Communist or pro-Communist staff; that all articles on Far Eastern politics are written by Communists or pro-Communists (some articles on economic, scientific, geographic questions are not); and that it has ties through interlocking directorates or staff with various Communist or pro-Communist organizations.

"Through its influence in the staffing of the State Department, Army and Navy Intelligence, and Far Eastern Divisions; of UNRRA, of OWI, and even General MacArthur's staff, our Institute has put considerable numbers of Communists and pro-Communists where they could and have done the most possible harm

and spread the most confusion. How far they have succeeded is strikingly illustrated by comparing the present confusion in our attitude to China with the statement handed to Ambassador Nomura on November 26, 1941, which laid down the terms on which we would restore peaceful relations with Japan (ruptured by the blockade declared July 25, 1941). Hull's essential demand was:

"4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any Government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking."

"To attempt to prove my statements is impossible in this letter. They are proven in part by the study and correspondence referred to above, which will be sent you on request.

"My attempts to arouse Mr. Carter and our Trustees to investigation and action have failed. Several Trustees, including several of the Executive Committee have resigned, claiming that they were worried by the charges of communism, but had no time to look into them so thought they'd better get out. Our Board of Trustees (47) scattered all over the country never meets. The Executive Committee (10) is chairmanned by a Californian who never attends. The connections of the others are as per attached sheet. Most of our Trustees are, of course, not Communists and furthermore don't take Communists very seriously. Their attitude is very similar to that of a witness before the Senate Atomic Committee, as reported in the New York Sun February 22, 1947, as follows:

"'Cameron said that he roomed with Hart and knew that his roommate held Marxist views, was sympathetic to Russia, and read the Daily Worker, Communist paper, but did not know that he was a Communist.'

"If our Institute is to be saved for the useful work it can and should do in soundly and objectively posting American scholars, teachers, and writers on the Far East, we, the members, will have to do the job. The first step is to appoint a Board of Investigators to listen to my charges and dig out the facts. Some of the gentlemen named in the enclosed proxy are known to me, some are not, but all bear reputations as good Americans informed on the Far East. I have not asked them if they will serve and cannot do so until I hold sufficient proxies. I have no doubt that enough will accept to make up a satisfactory board.

"In order to keep this letter within reasonable length, I have omitted going into the following:

"1. Many of the staff and writers have no real claim to scholarship in the fields they cover.

"2. Much of the material published is plagiarized for the above reasons.

"3. Our staff and officers were instrumental in forming the violently pro-Communist 'Committee for a Far Eastern Democratic Policy.'

"4. Our staff and officers were instrumental in maintaining the pro-Communist 'Japanese American Committee for Democracy.'

"5. Our staff and officers conducted a pressure mail campaign to force NBC to continue the wartime 'Pacific Story'—a Communist-angled dramatic half hour.

"6. Our staff and officers have sponsored and published books and articles by such known Communists as Abraham Chapman, Jos. S. Allen, Harriet L. Moore, Philip Jaffe, Anna Louise Strong, Frederick V. Field.

"7. Members of our Board of Trustees and our staff managed to get control of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, UNRRA and OWI, where they loaded all three with pro-Communists. Two of them, Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, accompanied Henry Wallace to China in 1944 and talked that adolescent into reporting to Roosevelt that 'we were backing the wrong horse in China' and that 'Chiang Kai-shek's government would collapse within 90 days.' Just prior to that much heralded trip of that great friend of the common man, IPR published a booklet by Henry Wallace, Our Job in the Pacific, which they knew he had not written.

"8. Four of the six persons arrested in the Amerasia case were connected with the IPR.

"I no longer believe the officers and Executive Committee can clean up the Institute.

"After such an Investigating Committee has completed its investigation and reported, action will then be up to us. Our Trustees will not act and if we wait until Congressional investigation reaches us, it may be too late to save our institution and even our good reputation."

At the meeting, April 22, 1947, the tellers advised me that they had over 1,100 proxies against the resolution for an investigating committee. I presented 86 but they disqualified about 20, though they refused to show me their proxies. In the meeting I read my proposed resolution and then stated:

"It would be my intention to present first to this Investigating Committee witnesses, and by witnesses I mean more than one, who would testify that the Institute of Pacific Relations is considered by the National Committee of the Communist Party to be one of its organizations and that certain of the Executive Committee of the American Institute are members of the Communist Party.

"In addition to these witnesses who would testify to that effect, I would expect to show that committee that there have been certain misstatements of fact in the publications of the Institute, that these misstatements of fact follow a pattern, that the publications of the Institute have been free of criticism of Japan up to Pearl Harbor except for criticisms of the Japanese rural land system, and that they have been free of criticisms of Russia up to date, both Japan and Russia—that is, Siberia—falling within the area covered by the Pacific Institute.

"I would call attention to the fact that although the Institute has referred to many documents and in books and pamphlets issued by it has published many pertinent documents, four of the most pertinent documents referring to the Far East have always been omitted, and as far as I have been able to find by an examination of the publications, have never been either printed in full or referred to by the Institute.

"Those four documents are the Tanaka Memorial, the Resolutions of the Colonies and Semi-Colonies adopted by the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, the program of the Comintern adopted by the same Sixth Congress, and the note of Secretary Hull to Ambassador Nomura of November 21, 1941.

"I would also expect to show to that same committee that many of the writers are not qualified and that there are much better qualified people in certain of the fields on, for example, the Philippines, Hawaii, than the writers in the publications of the Institute. They are not qualified, and qualified writers are available, and, in fact, members of the Institute.

"I would also call to the attention of that committee that American policy for the Pacific has been a consistent policy and in a traditional policy. That policy is the policy of the Open Door, proclaimed in 1899 and further confirmed in the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, and that policy calls for the Open Door, for the independence and the territorial integrity of China, and that the publications of the Institute, although they have published vast amounts of material on China, seldom, if ever, have referred to this policy and its implications.

"I believe that if the opportunity is presented, I can prove each of those statements and also the charges with which you are familiar from the letter sent you March 20."

Mr. Arthur H. Dean, Vice Chairman of the IPR, presided in the absence of the Chairman, Robert G. Sproul. He answered my statement, saying that the IPR was lily-white (not red) and he could vouch for it. The vote cast by the nearly 100 present, was unanimous against the resolution. A few days later, by letter, I resigned from the IPR, since which time I have devoted little attention to it.

Just about a year previous to the above meeting, Mr. J. B. Powell, dean of the American correspondents in China, and Miss Helen Loomis, a former missionary teacher in China, had called a small meeting at Miss Loomis' apartment to form a committee to warn the country of the dangerous policy we were following in China. From this meeting came the American China Policy Association, Inc., of which Mr. Powell was President until his death in 1947, when he was succeeded for one year by former Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce, and Miss Loomis was Secretary-Treasurer. I was elected Vice President and later Chairman of the Board. By resolution the American China Policy Association, Inc., limited its members to persons of American citizenship and provided that only Americans could be brought as guests to its Board meetings, so that America's interest, only, should be presented for consideration.

Meantime also, I had become publisher and sole financial backer of the magazine Plain Talk, published from October 1946 to May 1950, as a monthly, and now merged with The Freeman, a fortnightly.

During these years, and continuing to the present, I have written numerous open letters to various persons, including Government officials, numerous articles for magazines, and letters to newspapers, on the general topic of our struggle with World Communism. I have also made speeches on numerous occasions. In all cases I have refused to accept monies, from any source, either for

articles, speeches or traveling expenses, or as contributions. All expenses have been paid by me personally or by one of the corporations controlled by me and interested in these matters.

I have five times appeared at public hearings before Committees of the Congress—twice on behalf of the American China Policy Association, Inc., and three times as an individual. Three of the hearings were before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and two before the Appropriations Committee of the Senate.

Other than these appearances my visits to Washington have been mostly seeking information as to what was going on in the labyrinth of apparent absence of over-all policy which has led to such disastrous results for America and the Free World. The only members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee whom I have ever met are Senators Brien McMahon, H. Alexander Smith, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Owen Brewster. These were chance meetings. The only members of that Committee on whom I have ever called are Senators H. Alexander Smith and Owen Brewster. When Senator Smith returned from the Far East in 1949, I sent my card in to the Floor and he came to the Senate Lobby and told me of his impressions. I called on Senator Brewster in New York once when he was en route to Europe and presented him with copies of three important Comintern documents.

Sometime in March 1950 one of Senator McCarthy's assistants got in touch with me and I supplied published material on the Far East and on persons connected with American policy in the Far East. Subsequently, I met the Senator for the first time. Thereafter Drew Pearson broadcast the statement that I was backing Senator McCarthy financially. Up to that moment it had not occurred to me that Senator McCarthy had to pay his staff, as I presumed they were supplied by the Senate. So I wrote Drew Pearson as follows:

"Your broadcast suggested that Senator McCarthy has been put to heavy expense in his patriotic work of exposing the traitors who have controlled our policy in Asia. I think Americans should join in helping pay some of Senator McCarthy's expenses, so I am going to send him a small check today and hope others do likewise."

Some days, or a week later, I sent a check for \$500 to Senator McCarthy. He returned it with a polite letter saying that charges that I was the China Lobby made it inadvisable for him to accept the contribution. Since then, Senator McCarthy has not suggested, nor have I offered or made a further contribution; nor had I ever previously offered or made any contribution to Senator McCarthy.

In the course of my studies (which were those of a businessman with some background, but not those of a trained student of international affairs), I learned from persons in a position to know, that at all times for more than 10 years the Communists have maintained control of the Executive Committee of the IPR and of the staff; and that the few changes made, under pressure of public exposure, have not altered this control. About 5 years ago an investigator for the State Department spent two days in my files, and after investigation elsewhere filed a report on the IPR which must have revealed to the State Department the true facts. In spite of which our Far Eastern destiny still lies in the hands of IPR-connected officials.

At about the same time an investigator for ONI called on me, said Admiral Nimitz had been invited to become Chairman of IPR; that he had asked ONI to report, and they were making a routine check. Admiral Nimitz did not become Chairman or a Trustee, but thereafter General Marshall became a Trustee, in spite of the previously filed report of the State Department investigator.

In a speech to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, February 29, 1952, I called on those Trustees of the IPR (of whom some were present) who were neither Communist nor pro-Communist to rehabilitate themselves with their fellow Americans by coming forward and publicly revealing who pulled the strings and who had induced them to lend their protection to the Communists. On March 13, 1952, I wrote to the Trustees in part as follows:

"To Messrs. Jos. P. Chamberlain, Arthur H. Dean, W. F. Dillingham, Brooks Emeny, Huntington Gilchrist, W. R. Herod, and Philip C. Jessup:

"In March 1947 I proposed a Resolution for investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations, to be voted at a special meeting on April 22, 1947.

"In seeking proxies to oppose my Resolution, a public letter (March 17, 1947) issued by all of you, denied that there was any need for investigation of the Institute. Among various inaccurate statements, you said:

"The Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees has investigated Mr. Kohlberg's charges and found them inaccurate and irresponsible."

"Raymond Dennett, your then secretary, has now sworn before the McCarran Committee that the above statement was untruthful, and known to you to be so.

"To Messrs. Eugene Staley, Herbert Eloesser, Galen M. Fisher, Mrs. Frank A. Gerbode, O. C. Hansen, Mrs. E. H. Heller, Rene A. May, Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin, Mrs. Harold L. Paige, Robert Gordon Sproul, Lynn White, Jr., and Ray Lyman Wilbur (all of California) :

"On March 31, 1947, you issued a public letter of the same general tenor as the above, seeking proxies to oppose my Resolution for investigation.

"To Knight Biggerstaff of Cornell; John K. Fairbank, of Harvard; Harold H. Fisher of the Hoover Library; Kenneth Scott Latourette, of Yale; Raymond Kennedy, of Yale; Wm. W. Lockwood, of Princeton; Donald G. Tweksbury of Columbia :

"You signed statements in the same proxy fight, exonerating the I. P. R. of the slightest Communist bias.

"To Messrs. Edward W. Allen, Raymond B. Allen, Christian O. Arndt, J. Ballard Atherton, E. C. Auchter, George T. Cameron, Edward C. Carter, D. C. Clarke, Arthur G. Coons, George B. Cressey, Lauchlin Currie, John L. Curtis, Len de Caux, K. R. Duke, Clarence A. Dykstra, Rupert Emerson, Frederick V. Field, Charles K. Gamble, Carrington Goodrich, Henry F. Grady, Mortimer Graves, R. P. Heppner, John R. Hersey, Paul G. Hoffman, Benjamin H. Kizer, Daniel E. Koshland, Lewis L. Lapham, Owen Lattimore, Herbert S. Little, Boyd A. Martin, Charles E. Martin, Abbot Low Moffat, Donald M. Nelson, David N. Rowe, Gregg M. Sinclair, D. B. Straus, Donald B. Tresidder, Juan Trippe, Sumner Wells, Brayton Wilbur, Heaton L. Wrenn, Louise L. Wright and J. D. Zellerbach :

"You were the remaining members of the Board of Trustees of the IPR at the time my Resolution for investigation was voted on April 22, 1947. Not one of you voted for my Resolution to investigate.

"Since that time numerous qualified witnesses have testified under oath before the McCarran Committee that :

"1. Your organization constantly and deliberately followed the Communist line in its publications.

"2. Some espionage activities were carried on.

"3. More than forty of your staff, Trustees and writers were actual Communists, or espionage agents, or both, and others leaned that way.

"4. That activities in infiltrating our government by such people were carried on both officially and unofficially in your name.

"The balance of this letter is addressed only to those of you who are not Communists, or pro-Communist in your sympathies. I suggest that you explain to the McCarran Committee your defense of the conspiracy in your midst; stating names of persons who induced you to protect the guilty, and reasons given; and reasons for neglecting the duty incumbent on you as Trustees. For example, which of you inveigled General Marshall into joining your Board?

"Such confession is the atonement for past injury to our country made by Louis Budenz and the other ex-Communists who testified. I hesitate to think you have less regard for our country's welfare than they."

Thereafter I received a letter from Dr. Roscoe Pound, dean emeritus of the Harvard Law School, and at present, visiting professor at the School of Law, University of California at Los Angeles, dated March 18, 1952, in which he said :

"Many thanks for your statement of date March 14 which I am rejoiced to have. One of the worst offenders in my experience is Professor J. K. Fairbank of Harvard. He is beyond redemption, but I take pleasure in showing him up on every occasion. I ran into him first in Nanking where the State Department information office was a fountain of misinformation."

I further state that the testimony on page 1085 of the MacArthur hearings of last May by Senator Knowland and General Bradley to the effect that we have no objectives in Korea; and the statement near the bottom of page 1556 of Part 5 of the McCarran hearings by Ambassador George Kennan to the effect that we have no over-all foreign policy, not even the Open-Door Policy and the Monroe Doctrine any longer, is conclusive proof either of incompetence on the part of the State Department, or neglect of America's interests by that Department.

ALFRED KOHLBERG.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 16th day of April 1952.

[SEAL]

PASQUALE J. FENICO,

Notary Public, State of New York.

Commission Expires March 30, 1954.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify those documents, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here nine groups of photostats that are stapled together, and they come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they photostats of instruments found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. These actual photostats as they are now were found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. They were found in photostatic form?

Mr. MANDEL. In photostatic form and stapled as they are now. For purposes of identification I will read one cover sheet. It reads: "Department of State, Office of Research and Intelligence," marked "Restricted," No. 3024.3, Economy of Communist North China, 1937-45; Land Policy, Description, Analysis of the Chinese Communist Agrarian Policies and of the Results Obtained From These Policies in Communist-Controlled Areas, Washington, D. C., March 8, 1946," and then there is a rubber stamp in the photostat, "Department of State, Reference Division, Received January 14, 1947," and another rubber stamp, "Division of Geography and Cartography, May 13, 1946, Department of State."

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you think that identifies it adequately?

Mr. MANDEL. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you made up copies of the first sheets of every one of those documents?

Mr. MANDEL. I have made up copies of nine cover sheets.

Mr. MORRIS. May we offer for the record Mr. Mandel's copies of the cover sheets of these documents rather than the documents themselves? In other words, the significance of this offering is the nature of the documents found rather than the contents of the documents. Because of their great bulk I do not recommend that they be put into the record, but that Mr. Mandel's copies of the cover sheet in each case be introduced into the record after Mr. Marks, Mr. Holland, and Mr. Carter have had an opportunity to make comment on them.

Will you accept that?

Mr. MARKS. We have not checked those cover sheets.

Mr. MORRIS. We will get a ruling first.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it now, the cover sheets were copied by Mr. Mandel; is that right?

Mr. MANDEL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And you want to offer the cover sheets?

Mr. MORRIS. We are going to offer the cover sheets, thereby describing the nature of the documents found.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the cover sheet reflect the nature of the document?

Mr. MANDEL. It does.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you are offering is the cover sheet of the document; you are not offering Mr. Mandel's copy. The documents are here, and you are offering the cover sheet of the document of the record in each case; is that right?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. MARKS. Mr. Mandel has his own copy.

The CHAIRMAN. He has a copy of the photostats.

Mr. SOURWINE. The photostats themselves are physically in Mr. Mandel's hands, and I am simply suggesting that we disregard the question of any copies that he may have made and that the Chair's instruction be that the cover sheets of each of these groups of photostatic documents be put into the record.

Mr. MARKS. Fine.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is ordered into the record is the cover sheet itself if the Chair so rules.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, could you tell us precisely in what files they were found? Is that information possible?

Mr. MANDEL. I could not tell you what cabinet or class of cabinet it was found in.

Mr. MARKS. Do you think they came from Lee, Mass., or do you think they came from the files you examined here in New York?

Mr. MANDEL. I am positive they came from the files of Lee, Mass.

Mr. MARKS. I am just trying to locate these things. Did you notice these things before? I know you have had a lot of papers. Are these recent discoveries?

I am going to say frankly right now that Mr. Holland and Mr. Carter will state that they do not recall having seen those, and I am just trying to figure out just what did happen.

Mr. MANDEL. As I recall, they were in a drawer loosely, not in any particular folder, and due to the bulk they were withheld pending further examination and questions to the State Department. It is correspondence with the State Department regarding these, and that is why they have not come up until now.

Mr. MARKS. Do you recall any correspondence in those boxes about these boxes or any kind of covering letter?

Mr. MANDEL. No, I do not.

Mr. MARKS. And there is no staff memorandum or anything, just saying that we received these?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. MARKS. Perhaps Mr. Morris would like to ask you whether you or Mr. Carter can identify these.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, do these documents suggest anything at all to you?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you had an opportunity to examine them?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; not every page, but I have examined the covers of each one, and I have a general idea of the nature of the documents. I have no knowledge of ever having seen this document before, and no knowledge of its being in the Institute of Pacific Relations' files. I wish, Mr. Chairman, to note that in the inventory listing of this document, it is given a committee serial number 500.28, and I wondered whether from that Mr. Mandel might be able to locate a little more precisely where in the files he found it.

Mr. MANDEL. The designation was made in the last few days and covers only the documents that we did not have in our ordinary file and had to classify roughly for purposes of this hearing.

Mr. SOURWINE. I might say to Mr. Holland if it is important for him to know how the committee operates in its classification numbers that that is more in the nature of a library classification. It does not have a reference back to the source of the document in the IPR files,

but refers only to the evaluation or the tentative evaluation by the committee staff.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, my purpose in asking for information about the location in the files is because the dates on these documents I think all relate to late 1945 up to I think either January or May 1947. To the best of our knowledge the files in Lee did not include material after 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. On that point, the files would of course speak for themselves.

Mr. HOLLAND. Sure. I explain this is the only reason for my asking for some clarification if it can be provided.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, can you recall whether there have been other documents in the IPR files of a date as late as 1947?

Mr. MANDEL. That point has not come up.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Sourwine, would it be proper for me to testify on this of my own recollection?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want to make a statement or sworn testimony?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MORRIS. I do.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT MORRIS, SUBCOMMITTEE COUNSEL

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this question has come up, and I have a vivid and unmistakable recollection of this very question because it was my understanding when I first began to examine the files last February and March that the documents contained only letters up to and including 1945. The first or the second day that I began to examine the files I found letters in there subsequent to that date.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you called that to my attention at that time, did you not?

Mr. MORRIS. I did, Mr. Sourwine. They number, I would say, at least in the hundreds in that description. Some of them have been put in the record. I was pointing that out to Mr. Holland yesterday, and one I could think of offhand was a letter describing a conference between Mr. Carter and Mr. Robert T. Miller, which was introduced in the record the first or second day of our open hearings. There have been others, and my recollection is that it is at least in the hundreds. It came as a surprise to me, and I have an unmistakable recollection on that score.

Mr. MANDEL. I might add, Mr. Chairman, that there were two classes of documents, those taken from the files at Lee, Mass., and those taken from the New York office. If these had come from the New York office you would have had photostats of all of them because that was the arrangement.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As far as that goes, the committee staff in its handling of these documents has kept the items which came from the New York office and those which came from the Lee barn in such a way that there has been no possibility to be confused.

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct. They are designated as coming from the New York office.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, do these appear to you to be based on reports made by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I have no indication of that. Yesterday when I was speaking to you informally I said it might, but on subsequent looking at them I don't find any sign that they are based except insofar as they contain footnote references to published materials by the institute. The other comment I wish to make is that in our New York office here and subsequent to 1945 after the end of the war, the institute like a number of other research organizations has received from the State Department a number of declassified documents, some of which resemble this, but so far as I am aware none of them have been in this photostat form. They have all been mimeographed or done on one of these ditto form things, and that is why I am extremely surprised to have this brought to my attention, because it is the kind of thing which I myself would be expected to know because of its subject matter, but, as I say, I have no knowledge or recollection of having seen it before or knowledge of its being in the institute's files.

Mr. MARKS. Do the declassification documents received always show on the document that they have been declassified?

Mr. SOURWINE. I cannot answer it. It should be obvious that it is possible to have in one's possession a document which does not show any declassification stamp and which has in fact been declassified, because if you had a document in your possession at a time when it was classified and retained it in your possession until after it was declassified, it would be a declassified document.

Mr. MARKS. I understand that, but I think the practice is sometimes to declassify by a covering letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Perhaps you are sufficiently familiar to testify on that point.

Mr. MARKS. From Mr. Holland's experience, and I would like him to testify on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you consider Mr. Holland is able to testify with regard to Government practices?

Mr. MARKS. Just his own experience in regard to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. HOLLAND. From our own experience, Mr. Chairman, in one or two cases we have received documents subsequent to 1945 from the State Department in sending along with a group of documents, most of which had the usual stamp "declassified by order of," and then the signature of the person—one or two documents did not have this stamp, but the document was identified in a covering letter transmitting it to us, saying, "We are herewith sending you the following document."

Nevertheless, this does not—

Mr. MARKS. You have not completed that sentence, I don't think. Is that all the letter said?

Mr. HOLLAND. Of course, I cannot remember the exact title, but indicating the title on the document, which on subsequent examination we have found did not include the usual stamp.

Mr. MARKS. But the letter talks about classification. What is it?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can't speak from direct recollection, but I do know we have one or more letters in our files with inventory documents being transmitted to us, and in that inventory are items which on subsequent examination we found referred to documents which did not include on the cover the usual declassification stamp.

Mr. MARKS. Did the letter refer to those documents as declassified, or was it completely silent?

Mr. HOLLAND. That I can't say.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have the testimony here of Mr. Mandel that these photostats were actually found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations in photostatic form as they are presented to the committee now; is that correct?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your offer?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I offer the cover sheets of each one of these documents and ask that they be admitted into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. After the Chair rules on that point and if Mr. Marks has finished his cross-examination of Mr. Holland, I have a question I want to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to cross-examine now?

Mr. SOURWINE. I would simply like to ask Mr. Holland this: Since you did remember such a letter, do you remember who wrote it?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, because it was not addressed to me. I ascertained this information by speaking to our publications secretary yesterday.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it an official State Department letter, or merely from someone in the State Department?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, it was an official State Department letter which I can produce. It does not refer to this document because when I asked for this information, I said, "Have we any record in our file of a document with this title and serial number?" And it is not there.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask that Mr. Holland be directed to furnish to the committee the letter he speaks of and any other letter he speaks of, to wit, letters which contain in terms transmittals of documents which at the time were on their classified list and also that he indicate which of the documents on that letter so transmitted were in fact on their classified list.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Your request is that these cover sheets be inserted?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(Mr. Mandel, after a subsequent examination of his files, testified at a hearing held on May 13, 1952, that he had been in error in testifying that the photostats were found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. See pp. 4616 and 4617, pt. 13.)

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit Nos. 1322 to 1330, inclusive," and are as follows:)

181101 3

EXHIBIT No. 1322

(Handwritten:) 097.3
44 Z1092R
no. 3024.1

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INTERIM RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH

R & A No. 3024.1

ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST NORTH CHINA, 1937-1945: AREAS OF ECONOMIC CONTROL

DESCRIPTION

This study, the first of a series, outlines the territorial basis of the economy of Communist North China.

Date: 23 November 1945.

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 USC 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

COPY No. _____

Restricted.

EXHIBIT No. 1323

Department of State, Intelligence Reference Division. Received, Aug. 12, 1946.
(Handwritten:) R

097.3
Z1092
no. 3024.5

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE

No. 3024.5

ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST NORTH CHINA, 1937-1945: STANDARDS OF LIVING

DESCRIPTION

Analysis of wages, food, clothing, shelter, health care, and other aspects of standards of living in Communist North China.

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 15, 1946.

Restricted.

EXHIBIT No. 1324

(Handwritten) R
29 097.3
Z1092
no. 3024.6

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE

No. 3024.6

ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST NORTH CHINA, 1937-1945: LABOR

DESCRIPTION

A study of labor policies, labor force, wages and hours, and labor unions in Communist North China.

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 25, 1946.

Restricted.

EXHIBIT No. 1325

Handwritten: 097.3
22 Z1092
#3024.8
1946

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ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST NORTH CHINA, 1937-1945: COOPERATIVES

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH REPORT

OCL-3024.8

JUNE 30, 1946.

A study of the historical background, types, organization, and development of cooperatives in Communist areas of North China.

Distributed by OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION AND LIAISON (OCL).

Restricted.

EXHIBIT 1326

(Handwritten) 097.3
38 Z1092
#3024.2/45

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INTERIM RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE: RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH

R. & A. 3024.2

ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST NORTH CHINA, 1937-45: SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC POLICIES

DESCRIPTION

A summary of the economic policies of the Chinese Communists as analyzed in further detail in the forthcoming parts of the Economy of Communist North China, 1937-45.

11 DECEMBER 1945.

Restricted.

(80380)

EXHIBIT No. 1327

(Handwritten:) 097.3
47 Z1092
No. 30243

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE

No. 3024.3

ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST NORTH CHINA, 1937-1945: LAND POLICY

DESCRIPTION

Analysis of the Chinese Communist agrarian policies and of the results obtained from these policies in Communist-controlled areas.

WASHINGTON, D. C., 8 March 1946.

Restricted.

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EXHIBIT No. 1328

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Illegible initials
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RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE

No. 3024.4

ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST NORTH CHINA, 1937-1945: LAND AND FOOD

DESCRIPTION

Analysis of the topographic and agricultural regions, land utilization, and crop production of Communist North China.

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 12, 1946.

Restricted.

EXHIBIT No. 1329

RESTRICTED

Handwritten: 097.3
27 Z1092
#3024.7/46

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE

No. 3024.7

ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST NORTH CHINA, 1937-1945: INDUSTRIES AND MINING

DESCRIPTION

A study of the nature and extent of industrial development, types of industrial activity, and geographic distribution of industries in Communist areas.

WASHINGTON, D. C., August 20, 1946.

Restricted.

EXHIBIT No. 1330

Handwritten: #3024.9/46. Other handwritten figures crossed out.
24

RESTRICTED

ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST NORTH CHINA, 1937-1945: FINANCE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH REPORT

OCL-3024.9

AUGUST 26, 1946.

A study of money and banking and the operation of taxation systems in Communist Areas.

Distributed by OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION AND LIAISON (OCL).

Restricted.

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Mandel recently referred apropos of letters allegedly in the Lee files after 1945. There were two sources of the Senate subcommittee's IPR documents, one at Lee and one in the New York office. I think I might have pointed out before, Mr. Chairman, that in the barn at Lee was a three-drawer wooden cabinet of my personal papers. Those were taken to Washington at the same time, and it is conceivable that some of these 1945 and subsequent letters were in my personal file, not in the IPR files.

I do not think that is particularly material, but there is that possibility.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you say whether these photostats were in your personal files?

Mr. CARTER. My testimony on them is identical with that of Mr. Holland, that until I saw them in Davis Polk's office yesterday I didn't remember ever having seen them before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then, you cannot testify whether they were or were not in your personal files?

Mr. CARTER. No. It was not apropos of that, but to establishing the date of what the Lee files covered. I thought that in my personal files there might have been some IPR letters. The thing that recalled it to me was Mr. Mandel and Mr. Morris's comment with reference to the Miller letter which was of a date later than 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that Miller letter in your personal files, or do you know?

Mr. CARTER. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, can you say whether the so-called personal files of Mr. Carter were separately identified?

Mr. MANDEL. They were not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there has come up for attention part of the testimony, Mr. Owen Lattimore's, testimony that he did not clearly understand the testimony of Mr. Barmine with respect to a certain conversation Mr. Barmine had with General Berzin. Mr. Chairman, I feel our public record is clear and unmistakable on this point, particularly if you read two or three pages, and it comes to the very point.

In reading through the executive session testimony of Mr. Barmine taken on May 5, 1951, several months prior, the thing is even more clear and more precise. For the sake of clarity I ask that pages 21

and 22 of Mr. Barmine's executive session testimony be introduced into our public record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, since that obviously requires a ruling by the committee to release executive session testimony, I would ask Mr. Morris if he would amend his request to be that the chair at an appropriate time lay before the full committee the question of inserting in the record such portions of the executive session testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is the correct attitude to take. I think it should be presented to the subcommittee. At that time let the subcommittee release it from its executive position.

Mr. SOURWINE. The chair could order included at this point in the record such portions of the executive testimony of Mr. Barmine as the subcommittee rules may be released from the executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be the order.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 1331 and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1331

* * * * *

Mr. BARMINE. * * *

In this connection with General Berzin and one of his assistants, we were discussing possible personnel.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was his assistant?

Mr. BARMINE. He was chief of the second section, Firin.

So there was discussion about the personnel at least and Firin was called to the discussion and there were exchanges about the possible people among the Military Intelligence personnel who were at that time in China or had knowledge of Chinese affairs, and would it be possible to use them.

Several names of Russians, Chinese, Americans, Czechoslovakians, French, were mentioned.

Now, I want to make the statement that that conversation was in 1935, sixteen years ago, and I only can tell these conversation were carried by hours and for weeks. There were so many other problems in our work in the export of arms, things that you are interested in, it was a very casual and incidental part of it.

I had my hands full of other things, so probably only I can tell to the best of my recollection whatever remains in my memory.

Mr. MORRIS. What did he say about the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BARMINE. Several names were named of men working for the apparatus of Military Intelligence there, and suggested, not even suggested, but discussed the possibility. Two of them were Americans, Lattimore and Joseph Barnes.

* * * * *

Executive Session, Volume 21, May 5, 1951.

Testimony of Alexander Gregory Barmine, pages 21-22 of transcript.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandell, will you identify these two letters, please?

Mr. MANDELL. I have here three photostats which I personally obtained from the files of Ray Lyman Wilbur at the Stanford University.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have those photostats made?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean from the files of Ray Lyman Wilbur, or from the files of the Ray Lyman Wilbur Library or some other library?

Mr. MANDEL. They were files of Ray Lyman Wilbur.

Mr. SOURWINE. Personal files?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes. They were obtained from the Hoover Library at Stanford University.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the first of these purports to be a letter signed by Mr. Edward C. Carter, dated December 30, 1933, to the members of the American council:

It gives me great pleasure to announce that at the board of trustees meeting on December 20 Mr. Joseph Barnes was unanimously selected my successor as secretary to the American council.

I offer this to Mr. Carter and ask him if he can recall having written that letter. Does that look like a photostatic copy of a document sent by you, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Does he recall having sent the original of that?

Mr. CARTER. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a photostatic copy of your signature?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here photostatic copies of correspondence between Mr. Eliot Wadsworth and Mr. Edward C. Carter dated November 25, 1941, and November 26, 1941. I offer you that, Mr. Carter, and ask you if those documents recall such an exchange of correspondence that you had?

Mr. CARTER. They appear to be one sent by me and the other received by me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is one of those in fact a letter which you sent and signed?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it a photostatic copy?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. The signature is not there on either letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a photostatic copy of a letter dated November 26, 1941, typed and addressed "Dear Eliot" and is a letter which in fact you dictated and sent?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next document is headed "American Red Cross" and is dated November 25, 1941, to Mr. Edward C. Carter and signed "Eliot Wadsworth." Is that a copy of a letter you received?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. May they be received in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. They will be received in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 1332, 1333, 1333-A, and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1332

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

129 East 52nd St., New York City (top floor)

Telephone PLaza 3-4700. Cable, INPAREL, New York

DECEMBER 30, 1933.

To the MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL:

It gives me great pleasure to announce that at the Board of Trustees meeting on December 20th Mr. Joseph Barnes was unanimously elected my successor as Secretary of the American Council. He will take office on January 1st, 1934.

For the past two years Mr. Barnes has been a member of the Research staff of the American Council. He was the editor of the series of studies in Conflict and Control which were presented as the American Council data papers at the Banff Conference. He wrote Government Promotion of Foreign Trade in the United States in that series. In 1932, in collaboration with Mr. Frederick V. Field, Mr. Barnes wrote two of the American Council's most widely circulated pamphlets, Conflict in the Far East, 1931-1932, and Behind the Far Eastern Conflict. He is the author of several of the American Council's Fortnightly Memoranda.

At the 1933 annual meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mr. Barnes read a paper on The Tactics of the Third International, and at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association he presented a paper on Military Communism. In March 1934, Doubleday, Doran are publishing a symposium which has been planned by Mr. Barnes and written by ten members of the American Council. The title of the forthcoming book is "Empire in the East."

After being graduated from Harvard and completing a period of study at the London School of Economics and in the Soviet Union, Mr. Barnes joined the staff of the Chase National Bank. From the Chase Bank he returned to Russia for a further period of study, at the end of which he went to the Far East as a member of the American Group at the Shanghai Conference in 1931. He joined the staff of the American Council at the end of that year. In addition to the highest research qualifications, Mr. Barnes has shown pronounced executive ability. He assumes office with the unqualified support of the officers of the Council.

In connection with my new work as Secretary General of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mrs. Carter and I leave San Francisco for Honolulu and the Far East on January 26th.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Edward C. Carter,
[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1333

AMERICAN RED CROSS,
Washington, D. C., November 25, 1941.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 East 52d Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR NED: Thanks for your letter of the 21st with a most interesting report as to the varied activities of the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

You certainly have been playing checkers and almost rival Felix Frankfurter in his reputed activities in recommending young men for positions.

I am certainly glad that you put aside the crown and stuck to your old job which must be more important all the time.

Enclosed is check for \$50, which I am glad to send.

Sincerely,

(Signed) ELIOT WADSWORTH.

EXHIBIT No. 1333-A

NOVEMBER 26, 1941.

ELIOT WADSWORTH, Esq.,
American Red Cross, Washington, D. C.

DEAR ELIOT: It was great to get your prompt and generous response to our appeal. Enclosed is the Assistant Treasurer's receipt.

As you can well imagine, it is satisfying to find that we have been lucky in developing both a system and an appeal which draws exceedingly able young people to our staff, whose services subsequently appear invaluable to various governments.

Allen Wardwell has just spoken very appreciately of Andrew Grajdanzev's article on Russia's War Potential in the Far Eastern Survey of November 17, and four departments of the Government have indicated that his article on the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Problem of Soviet Supply in December *Pacific Affairs* is the most authoritative and useful treatment of this all-important railway which has been prepared in this country.

Again many, many thanks.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. With respect to these others, they do not require the presence of these gentlemen here, but they are perfectly willing to

stay on. I suggest that they do stay on because they may be of interest to them. The only thing is your time.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is coming up right now. I have an appointment. When would we go on again?

Mr. MORRIS. We can do it in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be better.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before we conclude this hearing, I would like to ask one question of Mr. Carter and Mr. Holland. Do each of you adopt as your testimony the statements here made in your behalf by Mr. Marks?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do.

Mr. CARTER. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. We have two statements from Mr. Carter which have been submitted to the committee today. I have not seen either one of those, but the question comes up, Suppose those statements are based on letters that are not now in our records; will they be able to be received in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. They are not admitted in the record of this committee yet. If you need those letters, you can call on Mr. Carter to produce them.

Mr. MORRIS. On several occasions I have invited Mr. Marks and Mr. Holland and Mr. Carter and others in the Institute to put into our record, if they feel it is necessary in the sake of justice and fairness, if we have, for instance, introduced a letter of a certain nature, the reply to that letter. I was hoping that today they might have some of those things that might go into our record at this time.

Mr. HOLLAND. The selection of those letters is one of the things why Mr. Carter is working in New York. We do have a few and, as I recall, Mr. Carter has one section, the appendix to one of his statements, and we will have others that we wish to submit fairly soon.

Mr. SOURWINE. With the knowledge of the shortage of time that the chairman has, it seems perfectly clear there is going to have to be one more session. Could we recess subject to the call of the chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p. m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

EXHIBIT No. 765

To—	From—	Date	Type of Document	File Number	Exhibit Number
ECC and CP	WWL	1/ 5/37	Carbon	191.9	765A
FVF	WWL	1/ 5/37	"	131B. 113	766
Fred V. Field	W. W. Lockwood, Jr.	11/15/37	"	119. 40	767
Maxwell M. Hamilton	Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr.	12/ 1/37	"	191. 100	768
BL	WWL	1/ 4/38	Photostat	119. 146	769
WLH	WWL	9/19/38	"	105. 244	770
Owen Lattimore	Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr.	10/10/38	Carbon	100. 26	771
W. W. Lockwood	George V. Blue	1/ 5/40	Original	191. 98	773
E. C. Carter	Wm. W. Lockwood	7/12/40	Photostat	191. 2	774
W. W. Lockwood	Bob Lynd	3/21/41	"	100. 385	775
ECC, MSF, WIW, HM, CP	WWL	4/15/43	"	"	775A
Prof. G. Nye Steiger	Wm. W. Lockwood	12/10/41	Carbon	131B. 42	776
Wm. W. Lockwood	Lt. Col. B. B. McMahon	12/19/41	Original	131B. 61	777
ECC	WWL	12/23/41	"	119. 120	778
Wm. W. Lockwood	Roger S. Greene	1/16/42	Copy	105. 202	779
Arthur H. Dean	Wm. W. Lockwood	2/12/42	Carbon	119. 75	780
Wm. W. Lockwood	Joe (8-page memo attached)	3/ 3/42	Photostat	191. 197	781
KB, GET, WLH, et al.	WWL	3/27/42	Carbon	131B. 110	782
W. L. Holland	C. F. Reimer (COI)	3/17/42	Original	"	783
W. W. Lockwood	Maj. Hardy C. Dillard	4/21/42	"	131B. 77	784
ECC	WWL	6/15/42	Photostat	105. 322	785
Wm. W. Lockwood	Jesse I. Miller (War Dept.)	10/21/42	"	131B. 117	786
Robert W. Barnett	W. W. Lockwood	10/21/42	"	500. 1	787
ECC	WWL	11/16/42	Original	191. 45	788
Dr. S. K. Hornbeck	W. W. Lockwood	11/ 6/42	Carbon	191. 45	789
Benjamin H. Kizer	W. W. Lockwood	11/19/42	"	105. 27	790
(Attached: Partial list of U. S. Delegation to Mont Tremblant conf.)					
W. A. M. Burden	Wm. W. Lockwood	11/19/42	"	131B. 63	791
Lt. Col. John W. Coulter	Wm. W. Lockwood	11/27/42	"	131B. 13	792
Wm. Lockwood	Robert N. Magill	12/ 3/42	Photostat	131B. 44	793
Laughlin Currie	Wm. W. Lockwood	12/28/42	"	500. 2	794
Anthony Jenkinson	Wm. W. Lockwood	4/17/43	"	131B. 149	795
ECC, WLH, RWB	WWL	9/16/42	Carbon	131B. 57	796
Wm. W. Lockwood	Wm. S. Culbertson, Lt. Col.	10/12/42	Original	"	797
"	"	10/ 1/42	"	"	798
Lt. Col. Wm. S. Culbertson	Wm. W. Lockwood	10/ 9/42	Carbon	"	799
Maxwell S. Stewart	Wm. W. Lockwood	12/29/47	"	500. 18	799-A
W. W. Lockwood	Wm. Mayer, Col.	12/26/42	"	131B. 68	799-B
(Enc. letter to Col. W. W. Pettigrew from Wm. W. Lockwood dated 12/21/42)					
Philo W. Parker and others	Wm. W. Lockwood	12/ 2/42	Original	131B. 2	799-C

EXHIBIT No. 765-A

WWL to ECC and CP:

Miss Grace Simons, 4122 42nd Street, Long Island City, Apt. 3K, came in to inquire about a job. She would like to do some kind of writing and research, but is equipped and willing to do secretarial work.

Miss Simons returned from the Far East a year ago. During her five years residence in China her experience was as follows:

One year as secretary to Leighton Stuart at Yen-ching; Two years as secretary to Messrs. Hogg and MacKay at the National City Bank in Shanghai; and a year and a half with Havas in Shanghai doing rewrites and translations from French. During the past few months, she has been doing secretarial and library work in the New York office of Havas but is now without employment. I should judge that she is about 35 years old.

The most intriguing thing about Miss Simons is the fact that she is the sister of Rahna-Trone of Vincent Sheehan fame.

(Hand written)

REFERENCES

Grace Simons, 4122 42nd St., Long Is. City, Apt. 3-K.

American—Chi—sister of Rahna-Trone, Yenching, sec. to Stuart, Shanghai—1932-37.

Sec'y—Hogg & MacKay, Nat. City Bank.

Havas 1½.

Rewrite & translation French.

NYC—Havas—Editorial & Library work.

Secretarial work equipped writing & research.

EXHIBIT No. 766

JANUARY 5, 1937.

WWL to FVF:

Re: Study of the U. S. Navy.

While in Chicago I talked with several people, especially with Quincy Wright, concerning a research project on the Navy. Wright expressed himself as very much in favor of the proposal, and was unable to recall very much that has been done in this field. He thought that the subject would require some prolonged digging in Congressional hearings, navy reports, etc.

As to persons who know something about the subject, I learned of two. Wright mentioned Mr. Robert P. Lane, now director of the New York Welfare Council, 122 East 22d Street. He once did a good deal of work (at Chicago, I think) on the navy during the first phase of the modern era—1884-1898. This work might be made available to us. The second person is John Ross, of the Institute of International Studies at Yale. He is said to be working on various aspects of the navy in connection with the Yale studies in American foreign policy. Another person with an academic interest in the Navy is Joseph P. Baxter, of Harvard. Doubtless these people, and perhaps others, should be consulted.

At the present stage, my suggestion would be to proceed as follows:

(1) Secure for *Pacific Affairs* from some competent person an analysis of the naval building program since 1933, and especially of the construction and enlargement of naval and air bases in the Pacific. This could be primarily an analytical study of the economic and strategic factors. It might be confined to Pacific bases, which the navy people reckon as second only to ships as an element of sea power. (Some experts claim, I believe, that the building of bases in the Western Pacific would make the fleet something like 50% more effective, and that the money spent on one battleship might better go into the building of bases). This article we might secure from some young naval officer who knows what he is talking about. The editor of the *Proceedings of the Naval Institute* might be approached for suggestions. Incidentally, we should subscribe to this publication.

(2) Have Hall continue his present bibliographical work with a view to preparing for *Pacific Affairs* a bibliography on the U. S. Navy (appropriations, building programs, operations, strategy, etc.) and a more extensive bibliography for office reference.

(3) With the knowledge gained from this bibliographical work, we can discuss with Walter Millis, and also perhaps with Stone of the F. P. A. and the above-mentioned Ross, Lane and Baxter the possibility of an extended study of the Navy. If we could arouse the interest of Millis in doing the job, it would be relatively easy, would it not, to secure funds to finance the project.

Copy to WLH.

EXHIBIT No. 767

NOVEMBER 15, 1937.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
San Francisco.

DEAR FRED: Probably by this time you have given up the American policy pamphlet in despair. Here is another draft. Will you please read it at once and return your comments by air mail? I am unwilling to have it go to press without your criticisms.

As a matter of fact as things have turned out it is unfortunate that we did not publish your original draft of this pamphlet weeks ago. I am afraid that the best opportunity has already passed, although it is still worth while to get out something. If we have missed the boat I am afraid that it is my responsibility. When I consented to undertake the job I had no idea of the number of things which would delay and interrupt its completion or of the difficulties I would encounter in this rather unfamiliar field. However, I have learned a good deal about the subject even though it has been a little expensive for the American Council and a little trying for Jinny, whose apartment has been littered up with mountains of clippings for weeks.

I hope that you are finding material to do a first-class job for the SURVEY on shipments of war supplies to China and Japan. We should have had a thorough discussion of this topic before this. So far as the China trade is concerned I have made a few casual inquiries around here but have been unable to learn

anything definite. San Francisco should be a good place to find out about whatever stuff is going from Pacific Coast ports. Some stuff, however, may be going via Europe. I notice that the nineteen planes were loaded on a train headed east several weeks ago. Another story told of DuPont shipments of TNT by way of Germany.

Eliot Janeway, with whom Chen and I have had several long talks recently, is convinced that an embargo on American shipments to Japan, even if undertaken without the cooperation of other powers, would be a very serious blow to the Japanese. He says, for example, that this high-test aviation fuel which the Japanese have recently bought in large quantities is a special kind of gas which cannot be procured elsewhere. Without it Japanese planes would be crippled both in respect to speed and efficiency. Janeway says, furthermore, that American machinery and machine tools now going to Japan cannot be easily replaced. In the case of industries equipped with American machinery constant replacements are required in the form of parts which are manufactured best in this country. Japanese steel production, he says, is deficient particularly in various kinds of alloy steels (manganese, nickel, etc.) and they rely heavily on American supplies. How much weight should be attached to this point I don't know. It is difficult to believe that the Japanese are as dependent as Janeway believes and that they could not carry on readily even though with some difficulties if they can no longer secure American stuff. This is a technical question on which we are not very well qualified to pass judgment. It would be interesting to get the opinion of businessmen who know the oil and machinery trades thoroughly.

I have agreed tentatively to tackle the subject of Japan's economic problem in North China for the SURVEY. Whether there is enough reliable information to make possible and satisfactory a job remains to be seen. Have you any suggestions as to how the thing should be tackled and where the best information is to be found? Pepper says that he went to great efforts to collect information on this subject and made little headway. Even the best informed people in North China did not know what was going on.

In response to a letter of mine, Joe Jones, who is now an economic specialist in the Far Eastern Division, writes that he is now contemplating a study of a similar nature. He thinks that the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Mines can be enlisted to help. He is willing to supply us with information for this study but is not yet sure how quickly it can be carried through. He offers to let me see the basic diplomatic and consular reports on the economic resources of North China. I shall go down to Washington one of these days and go over the matter with him.

That reminds me that I am sending a copy of this American policy manuscript to Maxwell Hamilton with the request that he or someone else in the Division go over it for us.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, JR.

EXHIBIT No. 768

DECEMBER 1, 1937.

MR. MAXWELL M. HAMILTON,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. HAMILTON: I am most grateful to you for the suggestions concerning the manuscript *America and the Far Eastern War* conveyed with your letter of November 30th. Some of the suggested corrections I am now unfortunately unable to make because the printing of the pamphlet is already far advanced, but I appreciate very much this help which you have very kindly given us.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, JR.

EXHIBIT No. 769

JANUARY 4, 1938.

BL from WWL:

IPR Representative in Washington

If, as your letter indicates, the proposal for an IPR Washington representative has come up for discussion, there are a few suggestions I might offer as to the functions which such a person might perform. Obviously it is important to have rather definitely in mind what our representative could most usefully do before laying any plans, even though it is true that a resourceful and energetic person would naturally create his own job to a large extent.

As for Washington "society," I never made much use of the black or white tie in Washington and I don't know what the possibilities really are. Doubtless there are potential contributors there, but I see little reason to suppose that we should set out to cultivate directly the elderly dowagers of Washington any more than the social set of any other city.

Nor is it likely that Washington is a particularly opportune place for a local educational program. Outside of the comparatively small circle of government people, Washington is a rather provincial town with a good deal of the lethargy of a huge bureaucracy hanging over it, and with so much "public affairs" as its daily business that it is bored with the whole thing and is rather unresponsive to lectures, dinners, discussion groups, etc.

The really important contacts in Washington are as follows:

- (1) administrative officials and legislators
- (2) news men
- (3) private educational agencies (League of Women voters, National Council; FPA, WIL, etc.)
- (4) Embassies, especially Chinese and Japanese, and Filipino delegation
- (5) universities

It would be the job of our representative there to work with these groups, first, to extract from them the information, aid, and support which they can give to our national program, and, second, demonstrate the value of the IPR and of himself to them in a variety of ways.

Given our present program and set-up it should be recognized, I think, that the value of a Washington office would be somewhat limited. It would become invaluable, however, as our program develops along new lines, as it is likely to do. The present limitations in this regard are threefold. First, as long as our chief and almost sole current publication is the Survey, we have little practical use for the political information for which Washington is the preeminent source, both its officials and its newsmen. If we did get the hot dope from the State Department, what would we do with it?

Second, as long as our publications deal mainly with the general course of events in China and Japan rather than with the specific American angle of such events or with American affairs which have some relation to the Far East, Washington contacts are also of limited aid. Excepting for the Embassies—and this is a doubtful exception—I doubt if one can get in Washington a great deal of news from the Far East which is not available here. Its preeminence is as a source of information on what is going on in the United States, and the value of an IPR agency there would depend in part on how much we propose to concern ourselves with American shipping, investments, education, public opinion, etc.

Third, our value to the people in Washington and the welcome we would receive depend on what we can give them in the way of information as to events, publications, and what not in the Far East. It would hinge on whether our contacts through our international set-up enable us to offer anything of distinctive value. At present the IPR is so loosely knit and our contacts in the Far East so haphazard that we have little to offer in Washington through the continuous personal relationship which an IPR man might have there. The people there already have access to most of our sources of information and more besides. We can offer them a limited educational outlet and the support of our research program such as it is, it is true, and in this way we can enlist the interest and support of persons anxious to enlighten public opinion. On the whole, however, an IPR man starting out in Washington today would find himself in the position of going hat in hand for information and assistance rather than bringing something the people there are eager to get.

There are a good many things an IPR agency in Washington could do and it might be a swell job for someone to tackle. If there are limitations such as I have described and if they should be overcome, one way of contributing to this end would be for someone to start in down there. Some of the possibilities are as follows:

(1) The Washington bureaus—agriculture, commerce, tariff, maritime, etc., are stuffed full of information on all aspects of American economic life and of economic developments abroad. Moreover, for most subjects of this sort with which we deal there are men who have spent their lives cramming up on the data and they are usually quite willing to cooperate with outsiders. I should say that roughly a third of the Survey should be devoted to American-Far Eastern topics and that such studies can be done in Washington better than anywhere else. One obvious function of an IPR agency, then—although not the most important one—would be to serve as a branch of the New York research staff for the execution of certain projects. Moreover, the ideas and information picked up in Washington through this broadened contact might help to shape our whole program more realistically.

(2) Our Washington man would doubtless have to spend a great deal of time drifting around among officials, Congressmen and newsmen developing personal contacts and making himself a person to whom individuals might turn when an issue of Pacific relations and policy arose. (Bill Stone has done this rather successfully, especially as regards armaments and naval policy.) The importance of the Washington newspaper corps ought to be emphasized in this connection. The Washington correspondents are the most influential group of reporters in the country. Moreover, they have a wide editorial leeway in their despatches. Also, they are fairly close knit and accessible as a group since their offices are practically all in one building, and since Washington is a comparatively small place. An able IPR man could make himself useful feeding them stuff, prompting various stories, securing Washington releases on IPR studies, etc.

As regards Congressmen, we should have to be quite wary. Under no circumstances do we want to engage in lobbying. By slow personal contact, however, a relationship with the IPR which is now totally lacking might be built up informally. It is not difficult to imagine that under the circumstances of the last six months this contact might be valuable. The same, I think, can be said of relationships with administrative officials, and especially with the junior group who do most of the real brain work in Washington. This part of the job ought to be thoroughly enjoyable providing it was not aimless, and in the end it would be helpful all around.

The value of such contacts with Congress, the State Department, and the correspondents would depend in part, I should think, on whether we plan to go into the field of political journalism. If we do, an agency in Washington would be just as indispensable for us as for the FPA. I doubt that we want to go very far in this direction, but as matters now stand we lack channels for effectively using the political information to be had in Washington. If we should eventually take over Amerasia or if we should start a mimeographed news sheet for American Council members, or something like that, it would be different. In any case if we expand along the lines of regional educational activities, a Washington bureau might be helpful in a variety of ways.

(3) The universities in Washington are rather poor on the whole, and there is no use looking to them for a lot of good research in our field (Brookings stands in a somewhat different category). Nevertheless, there is a good deal of educational effort in the field of public affairs and a growth of specialized training for government work. Our man might be able to associate himself with these activities through doing some teaching, taking part in discussion groups, etc., but this sort of thing would not add up to a great deal in its value to the IPR.

(4) Another minor phase of the opportunity in Washington is a closer relationship with a handful of private agencies, including the ones named above, with the Embassies, and with such offices as the ILO, etc. This need not be rated very high in the scale, for such contacts can be maintained from New York, but it would be all to the good if we had a man on the spot.

(5) One more function of the IPR representative, and doubtless a fairly troublesome one, would be to trundle foreign visitors around.

Thus the job suggests a combination of research and of contact work, both to secure and supply current information and to pick up leads for our general national program. I dare say it would be something of a gamble at the start, but it seems to be a logical step in expansion. This step is especially impor-

tant—in fact, it is essential—if we are to move further and further away from a strict research program appealing only to the academic world. It goes without saying that the individual chosen for the job would have to know his onions and be able to make his way as a person; otherwise he can do us a lot of damage.

Incidentally, as a measure of economy it might be possible for the IPR representative to share the office and secretarial services of the FPA in Washington.

EXHIBIT No. 770

SEPTEMBER 19, 1938.

WLH fram WWL:

Several of us had lunch today with Mr. R. Kano, who is a friend of Tsuru of Harvard and who came in to inquire about the possibility of work in connection with the Secretariat Inquiry. I referred him to you, of course, and suggested that he telephone tomorrow or Wednesday to make an appointment. Kano left Japan three years ago, having involved himself in sufficient difficulty with the authorities to make it difficult or impossible for him to continue his university work at Shizuoka. He spent two years at Chicago, receiving his A. B. degree. Last year he studied economic history at the Sorbonne, and he has just come over from Paris, hoping to find some opportunity which will enable him to support himself in academic work. Tsuru had written him, he says, that he (Tsuru) might be doing some work on the Secretariat Inquiry, and suggesting that Kano might assist him. Meanwhile, Tsuru returned to Japan for a brief visit this summer, and Kano, hearing nothing further from him, has come over anyway.

Kano makes a good impression in terms of personality and intelligence. He is somewhat leftist—how far I don't know—and his particular interest is in the economic history of Japan in modern times. He and Tsuru are translating a Marxist interpretation of the rise of Japanese capitalism, and hoping to publish it, possibly under assumed names (this is confidential). He says that he can still go back to Japan, but that he might be denied any university connection, and for for this reason he prefers, if possible, to remain here for the time being. He is now awaiting the return of Tsuru, on September 26th, and can be reached at 73 Martin Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

EXHIBIT No. 771

NEW YORK, N. Y., *October 10, 1938.*

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
6 Middleton Court, *Paddington Road,*
Homeland, Baltimore, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: This will introduce to you Arthur L. Pollard, of Knoxville, Tennessee. Mr. Pollard, a successful engineer and businessman who has had a lot to do with the fertilizer program in the Tennessee Valley, is arranging for a trip to the Soviet Union next May. He is anxious to talk with you about certain phases of his plans, and I am sure that you will be glad to make his acquaintance.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

EXHIBIT No. 773

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 5, 1940.

In reply refer to RP.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
Research Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, New York.

MY DEAR Mr. LOCKWOOD: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of December 21, 1939, in which you request copies of certain documents.

There are enclosed copies of publications containing the texts of the documents to which you refer, with the exception of the document described as "Letter from Department of State to registered manufacturers and exporters

of aircraft, July 1, 1938." A summary and partial quotation of the letter of July 1, 1938, will be found in the enclosed copy of *The Department of State Bulletin*, August 12, 1939, page 121.

Sincerely yours,

George V. Blue,
GEORGE V. BLUE,
Acting Assistant Chief,
Division of Research and Publication.

Enclosures:

1. Senate Document No. 55, 72d Congress, 1st Session.
3. Publication No. 296.
3. Conference Series, No. 37.
4. Press release no. 706 of December 20, 1939.
5. The Department of State Bulletin (Publications Nos. 1359, 1363, and 1404).

EXHIBIT No. 774

AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
Princeton, New Jersey, July 12 1940.

MR. E. C. CARTER,

Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52 Street, New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: In talking yesterday (Thursday) with Joe Jones in Washington, I found that he is very much interested in the whole conception of a Pacific bloc as we discussed the subject recently at Lee. If you are getting out a report on those discussions, he would like to see a copy and would also appreciate the chance to talk to Fred Alexander the next time the latter is in Washington. It's Joseph M. Jones, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, State Department.

Jones, by the way, gives an optimistic impression as regards the possibilities of future American aid to China. He is very guarded in what he says, but I rather inferred that he was thinking of monetary cooperation through the Treasury and perhaps also a tightening embargo against Japan. Alger Hiss, on the other hand, fears that the appeasement move is gaining a good deal of ground south of Forty-second Street. Hiss, by the way, is probably one of the few genuinely liberal men in the State Department—that is to say, he sees the direct connection between effective national defense and a strong New Deal policy at home. A Republican victory in the Fall, he believes, will be the prelude to an appeasement program, a "back-to-normalcy" movement, and the danger of internal disintegration.

As you have learned from other sources, the State Department was anything but pleased with the O'Ryan mission and with the President's interview with the General. I gather that the official introductions given by the mission are not going to be very helpful to them, and that Mr. Grew will not be very cooperative.

I spent most of yesterday scouting around in the Latin-American field, trying to find out what the government proposes to do. When the President issued his public statement about a hemisphere cartel some weeks ago, they really had no plan, as a matter of fact, and a good deal of discussion since then has thus far failed to produce one. There is wide disagreement, with the Department of Agriculture taking the lead in favoring drastic efforts to reorient and control trade and currency relations, with the Treasury lukewarm, and with the State Department divided but inclined on the whole to be cautious and skeptical. If you would like to see an enthusiastic set of proposals along this line, write to the American Council on Public Affairs, 1721 Eye Street, for a pamphlet entitled, "Total Defense." This is the work on a committee headed by Clark Foreman. It has had such a response in Washington that Foreman and Joan Raushenbush are now producing a book on the subject. There is the same kind of feverish activity around Washington now that used to characterize it during the early days of the New Deal. By comparison, I must confess that the universities I have been visiting seem like medieval monasteries.

Although innocuous enough, this isn't quite the kind of letter I like to leave lying around, so will you kindly toss it in the waste basket?

Sincerely yours,

Bill, WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

WWL/mn.

EXHIBIT No. 775

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

MARCH 21, 1941.

DEAR BILL: I guess it's too late, but why the devil don't you have Joe Barnes do a book on the Soviet Union rather than Germany? I'd rather read him on the S. U. than any man I know of. Or he could compare certain aspects of both Germany and Russia, e. g.:

Relation of economic to political power in each country.

The social structuring of life of the common people at grass roots in each country.

The freedom allowed the individual in each.

Tolerance of diversity.

Citizenship literacy and devices (press, etc.) serving effective participation as citizen.

Etc.

Joe is unique in that he knows both Russia and Germany well. Other men can write on the economic structure of Germany (an important job) but Joe, better than anyone else, could bring us Americans a comparative sense of the social strengths and weaknesses of the two systems.

What we need on both countries is not books pro and con, but candid appraisals of strengths and weaknesses.

I don't know Hartshorne—only that he has been working on case studies of Nazis.

Yours,

BOB (LYND).

(Handwritten) To W. W. Lockwood.

EXHIBIT No. 775-A

APRIL 15, 1943.

To: ECC
MSF
WLH
MM
CF

From: WWL

Max Stewart called me on Tuesday to say that Peggy Snow had been in to express to him her concern over the prevailing and increasing lack of knowledge among even informed people concerning current developments in China. She felt this very strongly in Washington, and felt that something ought to be done about it. She wondered whether some new organization and/or journal should be started to circulate at least within a limited group the information brought back by people coming from Chungking.

Max doesn't like the idea either of a new organization or of a new journal, but agrees with her diagnosis of the situation and wonders whether the IPR can do something about it. He suggested to Peggy Snow, I believe, that she come in and see Harriet Moore and Mr. Carter.

Two possibilities suggest themselves:

(1) That we make an effort to include more current material on China in the *Survey* and in our pamphlets, and

(2) That we redouble our program of meetings in Washington and New York, taking steps to bring in more non-members from organizations, the press, etc.

EXHIBIT No. 776

DECEMBER 10, 1941.

PROFESSOR G. NYE STEIGER,
Simmons College, Boston, Massachusetts.

DEAR STEIGER: I am wondering whether I may call on you for assistance in meeting an emergency demand from the Public Relations Bureau of the War Department.

That Bureau, under Colonel Benkema, whom you probably know, is arranging for an educational program on the international position of the United States, to be carried forward in the army camps this winter. Colonel Benkema has asked the American Council to cooperate in the supply of materials, including one item which we would like very much to get you to do.

This is a series of three lectures which are to be prepared within the next month, printed or mimeographed, and distributed to a large number of officers in charge of camp programs. These officers in turn will themselves deliver the lectures in series, and use them as a basis for questions and discussion. It is proposed that the three lectures be divided chronologically as follows: (1) The period 1931 to 1934, with some preparatory background; (2) the internal situation in China and Japan during the period 1934 to 1937, the international setting of the two countries at this time and events leading up to the outbreak of hostilities in the latter year; and (3) the last four years culminating in the present war.

Each of the lectures is to be about seventeen pages, double spaced. They should be simple, factual, as graphic as possible, and directed at an audience of a high-school level.

The War Department is in a position to pay the author an honorarium of \$10 per day for time expended in their preparation.

There is no one I can think of who could do this job more admirably than you. You have a thorough command of the facts and a wide experience in writing for high-school and college readers. You could also give the papers the character which would be necessary for effective oral delivery.

Within a day or two I can give you further particulars. I have only just learned of this over the telephone, but a member of our staff is talking with Benkema this afternoon and will be back tomorrow with the details.

I hope very much that you will be able to join us in this cooperation with the government in an exceedingly important enterprise.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

(Handwritten:) WLH.

EXHIBIT No. 777

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,
Washington, D. C., December 19, 1941.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
*Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 129 East 52nd Street, New York City,
New York.*

DEAR BILL: Colonel Bratton's office appreciated most highly the receipt of the three publications sent me by you.

Question: May we keep them, or are they to be returned to your office?

In addition, Bratton would especially like to have "British Rule in Eastern Asia" and "Malaya in War Time." And, to finish this skimpy letter, Colonel Bratton wishes that you would look in on him the next time you come to Washington. Come to my office, 3502 Munitions Building, and I will take you around to meet him.

Thanks again, Bill. Arrange to have at least a meal at the house when you hit Washington.

Sincerely,

B. B. McMahon,
Lieut. Col., General Staff Corps, Coordinating Section.

(Handwritten:) ED War Dept.

(Handwritten:) ED—Would you write Bratton. I think Bill saw him Friday. He intended to.

EXHIBIT No. 778

12/23/41.

To: ECC.

From: WWL.

In response to your inquiry, here is a little more dope on the organization of the Economic Defense Board (now the Board of Economic Warfare).

Charles Rayner, Assistant Executive Director, is heading the Far Eastern Division, at least for the time being. All I know of him is that he was once with the Standard Oil at Singapore, but left in 1917. Apparently he has had no more recent Far Eastern experience.

Ralph Turner, formerly of the University of Pittsburgh, is Assistant Chief of the Far Eastern Division. He was taken over from the old Office of Export Control research unit, where I worked with him last summer. Turner is also no Far Eastern specialist. However, he is a fellow of some ability, particularly in seeing the larger outlines of a problem. He also knows that he doesn't know much about the Far East and is eager for assistance.

Jim Shoemaker, the third person with Far Eastern responsibility, came to the Office of Export Control last summer from Brown University. He spent some years teaching in Japan, and has returned there in recent years for occasional visits.

Shoemaker told me two things in confidence last week:

1. There are a half dozen rather highly paid jobs still open in the Far Eastern Division. Shoemaker himself, however, and perhaps the others, too, are reluctant to raid the IPR. (It is interesting that several agencies seemingly take this view at present.) He raised the question of part-time or short-term consultative appointments for IPR staff members, and I assured him that of course we would do every thing we could to cooperate.

2. Rupert Emerson may undertake, on behalf of the Board, a sizeable study of America's economic stake in the Far East as affected by the war, and post-war prospects. Apparently Emerson is restless over the fact that he has been given little to do thus far in his present job as expert in the Office of Inter-American Affairs. This office—that is its economic section—is closely linked with the Board of Economic Warfare. It is possible that Emerson may now be shifted to the Far Eastern Division for this special job. If it is undertaken, our staff may be asked to make certain contributions.

Cc: WLH

RWB

KB, CP, MSF, MG

EXHIBIT No. 779

ROGER S. GREENE,
348 LINCOLN STREET,

Worcester, Massachusetts, January 16, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
American Council,

Institute of Pacific Relations,

129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: Before the next annual meeting, that is the 1943 meeting, will you not consider changing the method of submitting nominations to the Board of Trustees of the IPR by presenting a larger number of names than the number of vacancies to be filled? The present system gives the members no chance to express their preference except by a highly organized electioneering process which few if any members would care to undertake.

For example, while I have had a high opinion of Fred Field's personal character, his judgment during the past two years has been so strange that it seemed to me that he must be almost in a psychopathic state. If a man like that is to be nominated surely one ought to have a chance to pick an alternate instead of him. When Chinese of a not particularly conservative type think that too many of the IPR staff are too much under Russian Soviet influence, as I know that they do, it would appear to be time to be more cautious. I am not objecting so much to radical views on political, economic and social subjects, on which radical views may be called for, but to the tendency to follow a party line, and to flop suddenly from one side to the other in accordance with a party directive. The latter habit is the reverse of encouraging to intellectual freedom.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) ROGER S. GREENE.

EXHIBIT No. 780

FEBRUARY 12, 1942.

Mr. ARTHUR H. DEAN,
48 Wall Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. DEAN: In February 1941, when you last contributed to the American Council, the United States was technically at peace with the world. Today we're fighting a world war, and initially suffering grave reverses on the vast and little-understood Pacific front.

I think you will agree that the war strikingly confirms a basic thesis of the Institute of Pacific Relations—that the Pacific is vital to America. As a member, you will be interested in a brief report on the services of the I. P. R. in the war crisis.

Since December 7 the I. P. R. has handled a growing stream of inquiries from business houses, publishers, newspapers, radio commentators and teachers. There have been urgent requests from the Army, Navy, and other government departments for special reports and for the loan of I. P. R. studies still in manuscript or proof. I. P. R. books will be found in constant use on scores of Washington desks today. Large special editions of our pamphlets are being provided at cost to meet the Army's urgent need for reliable educational materials in its camps. We are also supplying the War Department with basic lectures on the Far East for its educational program.

The importance of the Institute as a training center for Far Eastern experts in recent years is also shown by the number of former I. P. R. staff members promptly called into important government work. Owen Lattimore, as you know, is serving, on the nomination of President Roosevelt, as personal advisor to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; Ch'ao-ting Chi is Secretary-General of the A. B. C. Currency Stabilization Board; others are in a dozen key agencies in Washington.

Government agencies have turned to our staff experts for special studies of the Japanese economy and of the carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway. United China Relief has drawn extensively on I. P. R. personnel for planning its China relief program. The American Council on Education has asked our help in extending and improving teaching on the Far East in the schools of America.

Few persons realize that it would have been impossible for the I. P. R. to respond to these national needs so quickly had the Institute not long been planning for such an emergency. In our research program, for example, that meant launching some years ago a wide-ranging set of long-term inquiries into the basic problems and conditions of the Far Eastern countries. Many of these studies (see our recent catalog) are just coming off the press as they are vitally needed for the war effort of the United Nations.

Recognizing the importance of Southeast Asia in world politics, the I. P. R. five years ago initiated a series of studies on the governments, resources and development of those areas. As a result we are now issuing the only up-to-date, authoritative books on Thailand, Malaya, Formosa, Burma, as well as new studies of Indo-China and the Netherlands Indies. Every one of these urgently needed studies would not have to be made under immense difficulties by defense agencies if the I. P. R. by its foresight had not done the job.

Other volumes, too, take on a new war significance. What is the industrial staying power of the Japanese Empire and the Japanese-controlled areas of China and Indo-China? This question, now so vital to the war effort, has been the subject of continuous I. P. R. study. The latest results are now being published in *The Industrialization of the Western Pacific*, in *Japan's Industrial Strength*, and in *Industry in Southeast Asia*, not to mention earlier studies of the Far Eastern economies.

What is the strategic and economic importance of the Soviet Far East for the war plans of the United States today? The best available information on this subject is contained in a forthcoming I. P. R. report on *Soviet Policy in the Far East*, begun in 1939.

What Russian, Japanese, Chinese, and Dutch maps of the Far East are easily available in American libraries? *Pacific Area Maps* gives the answer.

What about aviation in the Pacific area after the war with its vast expansion of aircraft production capacity? An indispensable preliminary for any such inquiry is the I. P. R. monograph just published as *Air Transport in the Pacific Area*, begun eighteen months ago.

Since Pearl Harbor the demands upon the I. P. R. have doubled and trebled. We see an even bigger opportunity ahead. Both nationally and in cooperation

with its sister Councils in the ABCDR war partnership, the American Council ought now to throw all its accumulated resources into the war and postwar effort of the United Nations in the Pacific.

To help meet this opportunity we are asking you to make your 1942 membership contribution at the present time. If possible, we would greatly appreciate your increasing it over the sum of \$100 which you gave last February.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD.

WWL:JL.

EXHIBIT No. 781

(Handwritten:) Joe Jones. M. S. F. What would you think of a Werner pamphlet right away? Return to W W L file. Sent to Carnegie Endowment & returned.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 3, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
*American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, New York.*

DEAR BILL: There is enclosed a copy of a memorandum which I have prepared setting forth the most significant conclusions which I drew from the discussions at Princeton last week end.

I am not sure how many agree with me, but I was especially impressed with Mr. Werner and his contribution. I fear that many who have not read his books and who were not; therefore, predisposed in his favor may not have been able properly to understand and appreciate him. In my memorandum I have tried to place him in his proper setting and to give the essence of his views. So many people here have been instantaneously impressed by his views that I venture to send you a copy of my memorandum for whatever use you may wish to make of it.

Alger Hiss has suggested that it would be exceedingly useful if you could put out a pamphlet on the conference within the next few days or weeks, stressing Mr. Werner's contribution, as well as his background and writings. I think that might be a very good idea. Meanwhile, I am doing all that I can to popularize Mr. Werner's views in the Department, elsewhere in the Government, and with appropriate Chinese, including T. V. Soong. It doesn't seem to be a very difficult job either because they have seemed to appeal to everyone as extremely sensible. The surprising thing to me is that they are new. Werner is coming down to Washington this week and I hope to be able to take him around.

I want to say again that I found the conference not only enjoyable but exceedingly useful, and I think that additional conferences of that nature would be of considerable usefulness in the near future. All of our ideas are in a state of flux as they have never been before and for that reason now as never before a group discussion should help clarify our views. I would appreciate it if you would convey these views to Mr. Carter. Incidentally I think he did a magnificent job of running the conference.

I have used and am using Mr. Werner's name freely in connection with his views, while maintaining the rule of secrecy with respect to the views of other people at the conference. Mr. Werner being a publicist, and his private views being no different from his public views, I have not thought it necessary to follow the conference rule. If you do not agree with me please let me know.

Sincerely,

JOE.

Enclosure.

MARCH 2, 1942.

The week-end conference at Princeton on February 28 and March 1, held under the auspices of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, was well attended (a list of those participating is attached) and in my opinion the discussions were well conducted and arrived at significant conclusions. Without reference to the printed agenda I set forth below the most significant conclusions which I drew from the discussions.

I. STRATEGY

The principal contribution to the discussions of strategy was made by Mr. Max Werner, author of *Military Strength of the Powers and Battle for the World*. Mr. Werner was born in Russia and has lived a considerable part of his life in Germany and France and elsewhere on the European Continent. He is thoroughly familiar with the military literature of the world and writes with great logic and brilliance. His most recent book, *Battle for the World—The Strategy and Diplomacy of the Second World War*, was published in April 1941 prior to the German attack on Russia and, of course, to our entry into the war. This book is nevertheless exceedingly fresh when read now, even after the events of 1941. His judgments and evaluations both in regard to diplomacy and strategy have been proved in the year subsequent to the publication of his book nearly one hundred percent accurate. He has an understanding of strategy, facts, the mentalities of the general staffs and political leaders in the various countries in Europe and Asia which is most impressive. His knowledge and interpretation of Russian military strength, strategy, and diplomacy is particularly impressive, and his correctness has been demonstrated by events. His opinions, therefore, in my opinion, merit closest attention.

I summarize briefly below Mr. Werner's analysis of the current situation and his suggestions as to policy, with the addition of a few supplementary factors brought out by other persons at the Conference which fit into Mr. Werner's general plan:

War between the United States and Japan has traditionally been conceived as a naval war whereas in fact the Japanese have employed, in blitzkrieg tempo, land armies, using mechanical equipment as far as possible, and supported by airplanes. Japan's successes in Southeastern Asia have made it exceedingly difficult for us to deal with the situation without confronting the Japanese with equivalent or superior land forces using the proper equipment and supported by superior air power. The concentration of American industry for the most part in the eastern regions of the United States, the vast distances between our west coast and Southeast Asia, and the shortage of shipping space makes it an extremely difficult matter to accomplish that end. Japan must be defeated by a superior land army using modern equipment and air power. Who has in the Far East an army equipped with modern weapons and supported by air power? The Soviet Union. The Russian Army is strategically situated near vulnerable Japanese home bases, is large, well-equipped, and capable of the job of handling the Japanese. Moreover, war between Japan and the Soviet Union is inevitable within the next few weeks, months, or years and both the Japanese Government and the Soviet Government realize it. The conflict of interests between Japan and the Soviet Union is fundamental and the situation is explosive.

We must conceive of the present war as a global war and plan our strategy along global lines. The Soviet Union is fighting desperately in Europe and it must at an indefinite time in the future fight in the Far East. We are at war both with Germany and Japan. It would be an economical division of labor, which would have great potentialities of reducing the length and cost of the war, and if we could induce the Russians to employ their Far Eastern army against Japan while we aid Russia in Europe where transportation and supply problems are easier for us to solve. Indeed, this may be the *only* way in which we can win the war.

How can we induce Russia to employ its Far Eastern army in the common interest?

(1) By opening up a new front in the West (Mr. Werner did not elaborate on this point but indicated the front might be in Africa, Italy, or elsewhere, the main idea being to engage German troops and equipment. He suggested that thirty British Divisions and thirty American Divisions properly equipped could handle this matter, with another sixty Divisions in reserve);

(2) By furnishing Soviet armies on the European and Asiatic fronts with from two to three thousand planes monthly and from two to three thousand tanks monthly (this contribution would be a joint British and American contribution);

(3) By concentrating air and submarine power in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands and coordinating an attack with the Russian attack;

(4) By equipping Chinese armies in North China as fully as possible for a coordinated attack in North China and Manchuria.

The foregoing program of course, implies cooperation between the Soviet Union and the British and American Governments on a full and frank basis.

The Conference generally stressed the necessity of such cooperation. It is possible to achieve such cooperation. The Russians tried desperately to achieve a system of collective security in Europe. After Munich they tried sincerely to obtain some binding alliance with France and Great Britain. The British and French would neither arm themselves adequately against the German danger (the strength of the Germans and the pitiful weakness of the British and French were well-known to the experts) nor would they ally themselves with the Soviet Union. Accurately judging German strength, and despairing of the British and French, the Russians decided to rely upon themselves alone, signed an agreement with the Germans in August 1939 and proceeded to increase their armaments as fast as possible and to improve their strategic situation by absorbing the small Baltic States and by attacking Finland. The Russians will now be impressed and moved not by words but by the strength which we are prepared to exert in the common cause.

II. EMPLOYMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR POTENTIALS OF COLONIAL PEOPLES

It is frequently said that this war is a war of four-fifths of the people of the world against one-fifth, that it is a peoples' war, a war for freedom. It is more accurate to say, however, that it is a war of one-fifth against one-fifth of the world with the remaining three-fifths of the world indifferent. This remaining three-fifths of the world consists of Colonial peoples who are insufficiently interested and prepared to defend their own territories against attack. We have seen that the people of Malaya aided the Japanese rather more than they aided Britain; that the Burmese are aiding the attacking enemy; that the peoples of the Netherlands Indies (the action of the people of Java remains to be seen) are insufficiently developed, both spiritually and materially, to defend their lands. Will the peoples of India aid the British in the defense of India, or will they be indifferent, will they aid the attackers?

How can the morale of China be improved further that resistance might be continued at the highest possible level? (It was recognized that China was not a colonial country and that China has, of course, been defending herself with great tenacity; nevertheless, it was recognized by the Conference that there are many things which the United States and Great Britain can do in order to strengthen the morale of the Chinese peoples and increase their fervor for a continuation of the peoples' war.)

With respect to *India* it was agreed that in the interest of common defense and of winning this desperate war the Indians must be given a considerable measure of independence, that their nationalism must be aroused and inspired to self-defense, and that India's economic war potentialities be fully developed with outside aid.

With respect to *China* it was suggested that steps be taken to accept China fully and frankly as a full-scale partner in this war and accord her a full voice in the conduct of the war. She is still being treated as somewhat of an outsider. It was suggested that steps should be taken at once, as a part of the war effort, to abolish extraterritoriality in China, to return Hong Kong to China legally, and to abolish the discrimination against China in our immigration law. The cause of the "peoples' war" might be greatly enhanced by taking these steps.

Australia and *New Zealand* should be admitted into a fuller participation in the conduct of the war. They are at present represented in the Pacific War Council in London but they feel that in some way they should be represented in the councils at Washington.

(It was commented upon widely how much greater had been the participation of the Philippine people in the war than in other areas where a less liberal colonial policy had been followed.)

It was the general feeling in the Conference that the old order in Asia was completely gone and would never be restored; that the peoples of Asia must be permitted and assisted to become masters in their own houses; that British and American superiority must give way to cooperation on a level; and that both in the conduct of the war and the organization of peace it is imperative that the peoples of Asia be given a greater voice.

III. ORGANIZATION FOR THE CONDUCT OF WAR (AND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE)

This subject was only partially discussed, and no conclusions were reached. It was, however, generally recognized as an important problem which merits careful consideration in the future. Considerable dissatisfaction was expressed with

the existing set-up with a British-American Chiefs of Staff Group functioning in Washington and a largely British, largely advisory Pacific War Council operating in London. It was felt that the smaller nations were too far removed from decisions taken in Washington, although it was recognized that a diversity of voices in the Central War Council may lead to confusion.

SR : Jones : MJK/HNS.

EXHIBIT No. 782

MARCH 27, 1942.

To : KB
KRCG
MSF
CP

From : WWL.

The newest government project calling for study of the Far East is a School of Military Government being organized under auspices of the War Department. This is to be located at the University of Virginia under the direction of Major H. C. Dillard and J. I. Miller. These two gentlemen called on me Tuesday to ask the cooperation of the I. P. R. in advice on materials, personnel and curriculum. The purpose of this school is to train officers in the techniques and problems of military government in areas taken over from the enemy.

As the war progresses, and as the military forces are successful large areas will be freed from Axis domination and will require provisional military administrations. In many respects the policies followed in this interim period may set the mold for long-term postwar economic and political readjustment.

It is proposed to provide a selected group of officers with general background and training for this job. The first course will begin in June and run for approximately three months. The curriculum will include elementary training in the organization of the Army and the War Department and legal procedural problems, and historical experience where it seems applicable. As men are ticketed for various areas they will be given intensive background courses in the history, geography, resources, economic and political organization of the area in question.

Dillard and Miller would like our assistance at several points. Immediately they would like suggestions on Far Eastern personnel available and competent to give instruction, at least for this first summer period. I would be glad to have suggestions as to historians, political scientists, geographers, etc. who might be considered in this connection.

In the second place they want help in building up a library of teaching materials. On looking over my shelf of recent I. P. R. books, they decided that they should have virtually all of our books, periodicals and reports. I am sending them a complete list, eliminating only those things that clearly are not useful, and in addition including suggestions regarding non-I. P. R. materials.

The headquarters of the School of Military Government at present are in the new Armory Building, 10th and B Streets, SE., Washington, D. C. (War Department Extension 71951).

(Handwritten :) ECC.

(Handwritten :) ECC: MG—return to ECC.

EXHIBIT No. 784

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE SCHOOL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT,
Washington, April 21, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR Mr. LOCKWOOD: Many thanks for your letter of April 17, which reached us prior to the interview with Mr. Holland.

Mr. Holland made a very favorable impression all around. We are, however, definitely troubled by the citizenship business. Indeed it is our understanding that present regulations forbid us to employ on our regular staff a noncitizen. The matter is one we are now investigating.

Even if our tie-up with the I. P. R. does not mature this time, there is of course the possibility that it will in the future. Hence I feel that Mr. Holland's trip was not by any means a fruitless one.

We deeply appreciate the interest you have shown.

Yours very sincerely,

[s] Hardy C. Dillard

HARDY C. DILLARD,

Major, AUS, Director of Instruction.

EXHIBIT No. 785

JUNE 15, 1942.

Copy

ECC from WWL:

In response to your request I have hastily jotted down a number of suggestions for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I believe we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice—say that of Currie, Barnes, and Jessup—on elimination. This list runs too much in the regular groove as regards non-government people. So far as Washington is concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key positions.

GOVERNMENT:

Gruening, Ernest H., Governor, Alaska.
 Bean, Louis, Board of Economic Warfare.
 Perkins, Milo, Board of Economic Warfare.
 Riefler, Winfield, Board of Economic Warfare.
 Shoemaker, James, H., Board of Economic Warfare.
 Stone, W. T., Board of Economic Warfare.
 Wallace, H. A., Vice President, BEW.
 Staley, Eugene, Bureau of the Budget.
 Barnes, Joseph, Coordinator of Information.
 Bunche, Ralph, Coordinator of Information.
 Fahs, C. B., Coordinator of Information.
 Hayden, J. R., Coordinator of Information.
 Wheeler, Leslie, Department of Agriculture.
 Ropes, E. C., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Trade.
 Berle, A. A., State Department.
 Davies, Joseph, State Department.
 Grady, Henry, State Department.
 Hiss, Alger, State Department.
 Hornbeck, S. K., State Department.
 Sayre, Francis B., State Department.
 Stinbower, L. D., State Department.
 Vince, Jacob, Treasury Department.
 White, H. D., Treasury Department.
 Gulick, Luther H., National Resources Planning Board.
 Emerson, Rupert, Office of Price Administration.
 Nathan, Robert, War Production Board.
 Currie, Lauchlin, White House.
 Lubin, I., White House.

OTHERS:

Bassett, Arthur, American Red Cross.
 Bates, Searle, International Missionary Council.
 Beukema, Col. Herman, West Point.
 Binder, Carroll, Chicago Daily News.
 Clapper, Raymond, Washington Columnist.
 Cowles, Gardner, Des Moines Register & Tribune.
 Dennett, Tyler, Historian.
 Dollard, Charles, Carnegie Corporation.
 Emeny, Brooks, Foreign Affairs Council, Cleveland.
 Field, Frederick V., New York.
 Herod, W. R., International General Electric.
 Jessup, Prof. Philip C., Columbia University.
 Kizer, Benjamin H., Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission.
 Lochhead, Archie, Universal Trading Corporation.

Luce, Henry, Time, Inc.
 Molyneaux, Peter, Texas Weekly.
 Moore, Harriet L., American Russian Institute.
 Schwellenbach, Judge Lewis B., U. S. District Court, Spokane, Wash. (ex-Senator).
 Sproul, Allan, Federal Reserve Bank, New York.
 Sweetland, Monroe, National CIO Committee for American and Allied War Relief.
 Voorhis, Jerry, House of Representatives.
 Wilkie, Wendell, Attorney.
 Willits, Joseph H., Rockefeller Foundation.
 Wilson, C. E., General Electric.
 Yarnell, Admiral H. E., U. S. N., retired.
 (Handwritten:) conference.

EXHIBIT No. 786

WAR DEPARTMENT,
 SERVICES OF SUPPLY,
 OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL,
 Washington, October 21, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
*Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.,
 129 East 52nd Street, New York City, New York.*

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: I appreciate very much your visit yesterday and the willingness to cooperate in the War Department's Program for Military Government to which it bore evidence.

Pursuant to our agreement that I would supplement the statement contained in the "Synopsis of War Department Program for Military Government", copies of which were furnished you yesterday, the following supplemental statement is made.

The reservoir of technical and advisory personnel referred to in the "Synopsis" is the group toward the recruitment of which you have volunteered the services of your organization. There is, of course, no immediate need for this personnel; on the other hand, it will not do to await the need before attempting to recruit them. Consequently, it is the intention of the War Department to select this group at once and commission them in the Army Specialist Corps in a status of leave without pay. This will permit these persons to continue in their present useful civilian employment until such time as a need arises for them, when they will not only have been selected, but will be immediately available for service.

It is planned, however, after some substantial numbers have been enrolled in this reserve to ear-mark them for specific areas and then to send them, in groups, to certain colleges and universities for a brief training period, not to exceed four weeks, in which they will be given some insight into the principles of military government, and some background instructions in the areas for which they have been ear-marked. No effort will, of course, be made during this training period to instruct anyone in the functional activities for which he has been selected since the selection of each will have been premised upon the fact that he is already specially qualified in his own profession. Inasmuch as the recruitment of this personnel must be accomplished with an eye to the Selective Service regulations, no person can be enrolled in the Army Specialist Corps unless he is either over forty-five years of age, or if under forty-five, has been classified in Class 3A or in more deferred classifications under the Selective Service administration.

Your efforts in assisting the War Department in compiling lists of available personnel for the foregoing purposes will be greatly appreciated, and some early activity in this direction on your part will be most helpful.

With best wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours,

JESSE I. MILLER,
 Acting Chief, Military Government Division.

EXHIBIT No. 787

OCTOBER 21, 1942.

ROBERT W. BARNETT,

*Institute of Pacific Relations,**700 Jackson Place NW., Washington, D. C.*

DEAR BOB: The interviews with conference invitees yesterday were quite successful on the whole. Remer and Bunch definitely will come unless O. S. S. policy prevents. Despres makes the same reservations; also he is not yet sure of being able to get away for that time. Coe and Stone accept tentatively, although uncertain about whether they can get away for the full period. Emerson doubts very much that he can free himself to attend. Coe and Stone have agreed to take up the question with Perkins, and have hopes that he will attend for two or three days, though no longer than that. Other possibilities developed in discussion, and these I'll take up with you later.

Meanwhile there are one or two specific things I'd like you to do.

Harry White is in London, I am told, though I didn't call his office. I am mailing a formal invitation to him, and suggest that you call his secretary to say that this is something about which we should like to talk with White on his return.

I also invited *Lon De Caux*, C. I. O. publicity director and editor of the *C. I. O. News*. He immediately gave his tentative acceptance. I got a very favorable impression from conversation with him, and Michael knows him.

De Caux suggested *Boris Shuskin*, of the A. F. of L., as another good labor person for the conference. He is the research director, I believe. If the Nominating Committee approves, I'd like you and Michael to see him at the Washington headquarters and extend an invitation. Before doing this, however, you had better wait for further word from me.

In the opinion of *Hiss*, Coe, and Despres, we ought to try to get *Berle* or *Dean Acheson*, or both. More about this later, too.

(Handwritten:)

One important gap in the present line-up is India. The Washington possibilities are Paul Alling, now political adviser and formerly chief of the State Department's Near Eastern Division; Wallace Murray, present chief; Eric Beecroft, and Norman Brown. From what I learned of the two State Department men, neither would be very useful to us. As between Beecroft and Brown, I'd like your opinion and Michael's. Despres says that the written work of Brown's section is first rate—imaginative and pointed. He doesn't know Brown's qualifications as a conference participant. Bremer thinks well of Brown as more than the conventional academician. In his favor are not only his position, but also his academic standing. Although we are paying little attention to this consideration in making up the American group, it would be desirable, other things being equal, to include at least one person with senior rank, among scholars in the Asiatic field. But this shouldn't decide the matter unless on other grounds as well Brown is the best nominee.

Another possibility we might consider is someone from Knox's office or Stimson's. Coe and Hiss mentioned *Adlai Stevens* (sic), one of Knox's special assistants. Hiss also suggested with some approval *Harvey Bundy*, former Assistant Secretary of State and now special assistant to Stimson. Then there is General Little, a Marine general formerly in China, now retired (?). Also General Magruder, whereabouts unknown. Despres suggested Admiral Hart, saying that it wouldn't be a bad idea to have someone who would give a pretty forthright and orthodox Navy view, as this view will greatly influence the post-war settlement.

Still other suggestions include Robert Sherwood, head of the O. W. I.'s Overseas Section, and Gardner Cowles.

Ben Kiser probably will write Congressman Coffee a personal letter, and leave it to us to follow up with an interview.

In a day or so I'll send a revised list indicating where we now stand on invitations and acceptances.

Reed Hager, by the way, would like very much to see you, and took down your telephone number. He has been with Rupert Emerson in the office of the O. P. A. Regional Administrator handling Territories and Possessions. Next week he probably will shift to the civilian staff of the Munitions Assignments Board. This will put him in a key position, as a member of the group working for Hopkins in this field. His home address is 2031 Huidekoper Place.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 788

NOVEMBER 16, 1942.

WWL to ECC

Barnett writes, apparently quoting Hiss, that Hornbeck warmly supports the invitation to Yarnell, but feels that it would be improper for him to take any initiative in approaching Secretary Knox, as I suggested he do. Hornbeck's opinion apparently is that the best procedure would be for you to write directly to Welles. Attached is a carbon of my letter to Hornbeck, in case you wish to use the same form with Welles.

You may want to tell Welles that the American Council has issued conference invitations to Hornbeck, Hamilton, and Pasvolsky.

Hiss added that Hornbeck and Hamilton would be very glad to have their expenses paid. I see no reason for us to do this, and I imagine you will agree.

EXHIBIT No. 789

NOVEMBER 6, 1942.

Dr. STANLEY K. HORNBECK,
State Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR HORNBECK: The American Council is eager to include Admiral Yarnell as a member of the American group at the Mont Tremblant Conference in December.

Admiral Yarnell has expressed a keen interest in attending, and suggested that we write the Secretary of the Navy requesting official approval.

If you think it advisable, we would very much appreciate your taking up the question with Secretary Knox, supporting our request and indicating the importance of the Conference.

Sincerely yours,

W. W. LOCKWOOD,
Executive Secretary.

EXHIBIT No. 790

NOVEMBER 19, 1942.

Mr. BENJAMIN H. KIZER,
*Old National Bank Building,
Spokane, Washington*

DEAR BEN: Things have moved so fast that I haven't been able to keep you posted on every development in the assembling of the conference group. In any case, I know that you wanted us to go ahead on our own initiative.

Enclosed is the list as it stands. Everyone on it has given his final O. K. for at least part-time attendance. The exception is General Strong, who hopes and expects to be present, however.

We now run the risk of finding ourselves with a larger group than we wanted. There are still several people to be heard from—for example, Gideon Seymour, a Minneapolis journalist, John B. Cook, a Chicago businessman, John Coffee, and Max Hamilton of the State Department. This results from the fact that two weeks ago we became alarmed by the lack of response and stepped up the number of invitations. In the past few days a number of people have come through.

Considering the circumstances, I believe that we have a good group—good in the sense that it is diversified and includes a number of able people. The problem now will be to produce some degree of unity and coherence in the American presentation at Mont Tremblant. Don't you agree that the American group as such ought to have a number of meetings of its own?

Hastily yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD,
Secretary.

Copies to: Harriet L. Moore
Philip C. Jessup

NOVEMBER 19, 1942.

Confidential

PARTIAL LIST OF UNITED STATES DELEGATION
 Mont Tremblant Conference, December 4-14, 1942
Institute of Pacific Relations

BROWN, W. Norman, British Empire Section, Office of Strategic Services.
 BUNCHE, Ralph J., British Empire Section, Office of Strategic Services.
 COE, Frank, Assistant to the Director, Board of Economic Warfare.
 CURRIE, Lauchlin, Administrative Assistant to the President.
 DE CAUX, Len, Publicity Director, Congress of Industrial Organizations.
 DENNETT, Tyler, former President, Williams College.
 DESPREES, Emile, Chief, Economic Section, Office of Strategic Services.
 EARLE, Edward M., Institute for Advanced Study.
 EMBREE, Edwin R., President, Julius Rosenwald Fund, Chicago.
 EMENY, Brooks, Director, Foreign Affairs Council, Cleveland.
 FIELD, Frederick V., Chairman, Editorial Board, *Amerasia*.
 HORNBECK, Stanley K., Political Adviser, Department of State.
 JOHNSON, Luther A., Congressman, Sixth District, Texas.
 KIZER, Benjamin H., Chairman, Northwest Regional Planning Commission.
 MCCOY, General Frank R., President, Foreign Policy Association.
 MOORE, Harriet L., Secretary, American Russian Institute.
 PASVOLSKY, Leo, Chief, Division of Special Research, Department of State.
 REMER, C. T., Chief, Far Eastern Section, Office of Strategic Services.
 SCHWELLENBACH, Lewis B., Judge, U. S. District Court of Appeals, Spokane.
 SHISKIN, Boris, Research Director, American Federation of Labor.
 STONE, William T., Assistant Director, Board of Economic Warfare.
 STRAIGHT, Michael, Editor, *The New Republic*.
 STRONG, Major General George V., Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2), Department of War.
 THOMAS, Elbert H., Senator from Utah.
 VINER, Jacob, University of Chicago.
 WILBUR, Brayton, President, Wilbur-Ellis Company, importers, San Francisco.
 YARNELL, Admiral Harry E., U. S. N., retired.

EXHIBIT No. 791

(Handwritten:) W. L. H.

NOVEMBER 19, 1942.

Mr. W. A. M. BURDEN,
Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. BURDEN: I note with interest the press report of your speech the other day on air transport in the Arctic. This prompts me to ask your advice and assistance on one or two aspects of our present I. P. R. program.

Early next month the Eighth International Conference of the Institute will convene at Mont Tremblant, Quebec. Delegates from Britain, the Dominions, India, China, the Netherlands, and other I. P. R. countries are coming together for a ten-day round-table session on *Wartime and Postwar Cooperation Among the United Nations in the Pacific*. A number of studies are being prepared for this conference, which in turn will set the stage for a large-scale I. P. R. inquiry during the next two or three years into the terms and conditions of postwar reconstruction in this vast area.

One of the key questions, of course, is the potential role of air transport, in relation both to military security and to economic development. Although this is bound to figure in the Mont Tremblant discussions, we have not yet documented the subject in any special I. P. R. paper.

I wonder whether by any chance you would be willing to prepare a brief article on the subject, with special reference to the North Pacific, for publication in the *Far Eastern Survey*. In order to make it available for the conference, we should have to have the manuscript not later than December 1. Even if this were out of the question, we should like very much to publish such an article in the *Survey*.

In the second place, I wonder whether, in your opinion, we ought to endeavor to arrange for a more extensive study in this field for later publication—say, in pamphlet form. One difficulty, of course, is that much of the new technical

information necessarily is secret for the time being. If this would not preclude our arranging for an interesting and useful report on the future of air transport in the Pacific, do you have anyone in mind who might be competent and available for the job?

As you may recall, last year the I. P. R. published a monograph by Sydney B. Smith, formerly of the State Department, on *Air Transport in the Pacific Area*. If you haven't a copy, I'd be glad to send you one. It was a pre-Pearl Harbor study, and therefore is now only of historical interest in its account of the prewar development of air lines. It might, however, be the basis of a further report which would take up the question as of the present date, and would deal somewhat more speculatively with the future. You may be interested in a conference paper on *The North Pacific International Planning Project*, just issued by the American Council. It is a memorandum on the future development of Alaska, the Yukon and the Pacific Northwest, by the chairman and staff of Region Nine, National Resources Planning Board.

Sincerely yours,

WM. F. LOCKWOOD,
Secretary.

WWL:wm

EXHIBIT No. 792

NOVEMBER 27, 1942.

Lieutenant Colonel JOHN W. COULTER,

Room 2C766, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR COLONEL COULTER: In response to your letter of November 24 inquiring regarding the Eighth International Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, December 4-14, 1942, at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, may I suggest that you consult my letter to Major General George V. Strong, dated November 11? This letter with its enclosures gave full particulars.

Mr. Robert W. Barnett, the Institute's Washington representatives, can give you further information if you wish it. His office is at 700 Jackson Place (telephone National 3428).

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

WWL:MS.

EXHIBIT No. 793

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES,
Washington, D. C., December 3, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM LOCKWOOD,

*American Council Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City*

DEAR BILL: Mr. Remer thanks you for the copy of Mr. Barnett's interviews with Chinese leaders which you sent him on October 22nd. We have much of this material on file in the office, so I am returning this copy to you.

I trust that the Mont Tremblant Conference was highly successful.

Best regards,

Bob
ROBERT N. MAGILL.

EXHIBIT No. 794

Copies to ECC and WHL.

DECEMBER 28, 1942.

Mr. LAUCHLIN CURRIE,

Room 228, State Department Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR LAUCH: Enclosed herewith is a staff memorandum on the high points of the Mont Tremblant Conference. You may feel free to use the memorandum confidentially in any way you wish.

Brief summaries of this sort never succeed in conveying the color and vitality of the round table process, but I hope you may nevertheless find this of some value.

The IPR now has the job of building on the foundation of this post war discussion. In this connection we ought presumably to establish contracts with Governor Lehman's office—both to insure that full use is made of whatever value there may be in the Conference documentation and discussion, and also to see what further IPR work would be most useful for the purpose of Governor Lehman's program. After the first of the year we would like to discuss this with you.

In a few days I will send you under separate cover a new set of IPR school books on the countries of Asia. They are just out and are already getting an enthusiastic reception. One wishes that the State Department's Cultural Relations Division and the Office of Education could see their way to assisting substantially in developing work of this type. The Rockefeller Foundation has now decided not to go extensively into this field, thus leaving pretty flat for the moment the ambitious plans of the IPR and American Council on Education for capitalizing on the new interest in the Far East among school authorities.

One other matter—Wilma Fairbank has just written to say that she does not feel that she can accept our offer to her of the Washington IPR secretaryship. If you happen to think of anyone who might be a candidate, we would welcome nominations.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 795

APRIL 17, 1943.

Mr. ANTHONY JENKINSON,
16 West 12th Street,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR TONY: Fred told me the other day that you saw the notice in the paper about the film, KNOW YOUR ENEMY. This announcement startled us, too, for we are still in the preliminary stages of negotiation.

We are probably going to cooperate with the Princeton Film Center, however, in producing this documentary film on Japan. The producer seized on this title as a good one though the film narrative itself will be somewhat more general in character than the contents of the pamphlet. The Navy has been sending us endless forms to sign in connection with the pamphlet order. Once the payment comes through we will immediately forward a check to you on the arrangement proposed some weeks ago.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD,
Secretary.

cc: TGS
ECD & MPF

EXHIBIT No. 796

SEPTEMBER 16, 1942.

WWL to : ECC WLH RWB

I understand that W. S. Culbertson, formerly a draft commissioner, is now creating an office and program in G-2 with the aim of developing certain general studies of a geopolitical character. He is particularly interested in making use of the scholarly resources of private research institutes and universities.

(Handwritten :) Please return to WWL.

(Handwritten :) WLH ECC RWB 10/19/42.

EXHIBIT No. 797

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,
Washington, 2431 Munitions Building, October 12, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
*American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: Thank you very much for your letter of the 9th instant. It will be entirely satisfactory to me to have the proposed Round Table Conference on India postponed until after the first of the year. I hardly think we could do an adequate job before that time anyway. In the meantime I hope to have an opportunity to talk the whole matter over with you and to explain the procedure and technique of Round Tables which I have in mind.

With personal regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

WILLIAM S. CULBERTSON,
Lt. Colonel, GSC., Chief, Geopolitical Section, MIS.

EXHIBIT No. 798

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,
Washington, 2431 Munitions Building, October 1, 1942.

Mr. W. W. LOCKWOOD,
*Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 E. 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: In part as a result of our conversation a short time ago and in part as a result of a conversation which I had with Dr. Earle of Princeton, I desire to raise the question whether a Round Table group, in line with the procedure which I am developing under this Section, might be sponsored by the Institute of Pacific Relations. The suggestion which I have in mind is India. If you should think well of this idea, I shall be glad to confer with you or with Mr. Barnett.

I shall be in New York next Tuesday and continue on to Boston where I will be for two or three days. I will be back in Washington October 12.

With personal regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

WILLIAM S. CULBERTSON,
Lt. Colonel, GSC., Chief, Geopolitical Section, MIS.

EXHIBIT No. 799

c. c.: WLH-ECC, RWB, with copy Culbertson to WWL 10-1-42.
(Handwritten :) War Dept.

OCTOBER 9, 1942.

Lt. Col. WILLIAM S. CULBERTSON,
*Chief, Geopolitical Section, Military Intelligence Division, G-2,
General Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
2431 Munitions Building.*

DEAR COLONEL CULBERTSON: In reply to your letter of October 1, I wonder if you would explain in a little more detail what you have in mind in regard to the proposed conference on India.

Would you like to have the Institute take charge of arrangements for the meeting, selection of personnel, preparation of the agenda, etc.? Do you have in mind a week-end discussion in which both government officials and private individuals would take part?

If it involved a good deal of organizing work for us here, I doubt that we could take it on before the end of the year. Until that time, we happen to be pretty well occupied with plans and arrangements for a big IPR conference to be held in Canada in December.

It would be possible now, I believe, to assemble a group of experts, chiefly from Washington and the New York area, who together might be able to clarify the Indian picture in a very useful way. At the moment, however, our staff is so overloaded with work that we hardly see how we can take on the organizing responsibility at present.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 799-A

(Handwritten:) File Lockwood.

[Copy]

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY,
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY,
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
December 29, 1947.

MR. MAXWELL S. STEWART,
*American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.,
1 East 54th St., New York 22, N. Y.*

DEAR MAX: My reactions to Arthur Bisson's pamphlet manuscript on Japan are as follows:

It is a well-written and clear exposition of the outcome of the postwar elections, in terms of the success of the parties and some of the factors influencing their success. I learned a lot from it.

Nevertheless, I feel that its political assumptions and value judgments raise the whole issue of IPR pamphlet policy. A pamphlet carries institutional sponsorship of its point of view unless it is one of a number of divergent views presented—which would not be the case here. The question, therefore, is whether the American Council should sponsor strong political judgments on current controversial issues. In my own view it should avoid doing so unless in a non-partisan round-table fashion. This limitation is implicit in its whole set-up, and failure to recognize this clearly is responsible for many present IPR difficulties. It is a real limitation, of course, but it still leaves room for a useful and important program.

Accordingly, I would question publication of the manuscript as it stands. Now I'll try to be a little more explicit.

The manuscript defines political progress strictly in terms of the triumph of the Communists and left-wing Socialists. The "new democratic forces" are equated with the Communist and Socialist parties on p. 26, but earlier the right-wing Socialists are excluded from the "true progressives" (p. 24) and are lumped with the old guard (p. 13). The latter are blamed for the lack of a united Communist-Socialist front (p. 12), and to this is ascribed the deplored Liberal-Progressive victory in 1946 (p. 14).

It happens that I also believe that democracy in Japan is linked with the fortunes of the Social Democrats (though I'm more skeptical about the united front with the Communists). But I'm in doubt whether the IPR should argue this doctrine on either point, especially when the pamphlet presents no factual evidence for this definition of democracy or for labelling the Liberals and Democrats as the useless and objectionable old guard. A reader is certainly entitled to ask what about totalitarianism on the left, what are these Japanese parties really after, what kind of political system can Japan with her traditions be expected to adopt, etc. Instead, he gets here a very specific standard of judgment, assumed *ex hypothesi*.

As for SCAP policy, MacArthur is sharply criticized for failure to conduct sweeping purges and to do a good many other things, especially in the first six months. With some of the criticisms I would certainly agree. But I would make more allowances for lack of preparation, shortage of staff, the inevitable confusion of the earlier period, failure to estimate the depth of the problem, etc. And, aside from that, it would seem to me that we have faced a basic dilemma in overall policy which is not recognized here. We were committed to indirect govern-

ment, probably for good reasons. We were also committed to encouraging self-government by democratic procedures, in a situation where defeat did not itself bring revolution. Arthur argues for a policy of sweeping intervention which would have run the danger (1) of our having to administer Japan from top to bottom and (2) of our installing a set of left-wing puppets lacking real strength in the Japan of 1945-47. He has much more confidence than I in the possibilities and the desirability of totalitarian (i. e. military) force operating from the outside and at the top to democratize Japan. He is therefore more disappointed in the outcome to date.

But again I don't object to the pamphlet because I disagree; Arthur has a much closer knowledge of the facts than I (though I question a few statements like the one on p. 17 ascribing Japanese support of the Emperor's retention to SCAP). Rather, I question whether the IPR should sponsor what is in a rather summary, *ex parte* judgment on an operation which has been exceedingly delicate in character and one where good democrats can honestly differ in evaluating the goals and the progress toward them. Most Americans will reject the tests of success which he applies and will feel correspondingly less dissatisfied with the MacArthur record.

Perhaps these objections could be overcome by some alterations in balance, emphasis, and phraseology. For example, the conclusions on democratization presented by Maki and Steele in recent IPR publications are not open to objection on the issue I have raised. For examples of other articles on Japan which are valuable and also entirely appropriate for IPR publication, see those by Sansom and Ladajinsky in *Foreign Affairs* for January 1948.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Bill,
WM. W. LOCKWOOD,
Assistant Director.

EXHIBIT No. 799-B

(Handwritten:) Note made HRH.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE,
Washington, December 26, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York, New York.

MY DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: Your letter to Colonel Pettigrew, dated December 21, has been referred to me during Pettigrew's absence on a rather prolonged trip.

Our office is very much interested in the proceedings of the IPR conference and would like to get at least two and preferably five complete sets. Our Far Eastern Group is divided into five branches, and I believe it would be advantageous for us to have one copy on file with each branch.

I expect to get in touch with Mr. Barnett today and ask him if he could spare us some time, with the object of giving us a first-hand picture of the proceedings. Your kind cooperation is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM MAYER,
Colonel, GSC, Acting Chief, Far Eastern Group.

(Handwritten:) original sent to ED.

DECEMBER 21, 1942.

Colonel M. W. PETTIGREW, G. S. C.,
Chief, Far Eastern Group,
Military Intelligence Service,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR COLONEL PETTIGREW: In answer to the request stated in your letter of the third, I believe we can arrange to provide your office with a full set of reports from the Mont Tremblant IPR Conference.

We were sorry that the pressure of affairs in Washington prevented the attendance of someone in Military Intelligence Service. The Conference proved to

be a remarkably interesting discussion of almost every phase of the War effort and postwar possibilities in the Far East. The British, Chinese, Australians, New Zealanders, Indians, Canadians and others were ably represented, and the discussion was quite frank and illuminating. If you would like a personal report on what went on, may I suggest that you get in touch with Robert W. Barnett, our Washington representative, who can be reached at 700 Jackson Place (National 3428). I believe he could give you a very interesting and informative account of the whole proceedings.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 799-C

DECEMBER 2, 1942.

MR. PHILO W. PARKER,
Standard-Vacuum Oil Company,
26 Broadway, New York City.

DEAR MR. PARKER: The War Department has asked the American Council to assist in compiling a list of technical and advisory personnel who might be enlisted to take part in its program of military government in occupied areas.

This is to ask whether you could help us in meeting this important request by forwarding to me nominations of persons qualified in your opinion for the type of work specified.

The War Department's specifications and general plans in this field are outlined in the attached letter and memorandum. To facilitate you in scanning the material, I have underlined certain passages.

As you will see, the Department is looking for men experienced in such fields as industry, raw materials, banking and fiscal operations, public health and sanitation, public utilities and relief administration.

Candidates must be over 45 years of age or, if under 45, must be in one of the deferred classifications of the Selective Service.

According to the original plan, these men were to be commissioned in the Army Specialist Corps. With the abolition of that Corps, recently announced, they will probably be given commissions in the U. S. Army. They will be allowed to continue their present civilian employment until called up for service. A brief training period, not to exceed four weeks, is envisaged.

The Council is particularly interested in submitting nominations of persons of Far Eastern experience but would be glad to forward suggestions regarding other specially qualified personnel.

Any help you can give us will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

Letters of identical text, as the one sent to Mr. Philo W. Parker, Standard-Vacuum Oil Company, 26 Broadway, New York City, were sent to the following: Mr. Boies C. Hart, National City Bank, 55 Wall Street, New York City
 Mr. Randall Gould, Starr, Park and Freeman, Inc., 101 Fifth Avenue, New York City

Dr. Henry Heleney, 60 Gramercy Park North, New York City

Mr. Joe Mickle, International Missionary Council, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York City

Mr. W. S. Roberson, American and Foreign Power Company, Two Rector Street, New York City

Mr. Julian Arnold, 262 Arlington Avenue, Berkeley, California

Mr. William P. Hunt, Hunt Engineering Company, 150 Broadway, New York City

Dean Robert Calkins, School of Business, Columbia University, New York City

President Everett N. Case, Colgate University, Hamilton, New York

Mr. Lennig Sweet, United China Relief, 1790 Broadway, New York City

Dr. Eugene L. Opie, Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, York Avenue and 66th Street, New York City

Dr. Reginald Atwater, American Public Health Association, 1790 Broadway, New York City

Mr. G. Ellsworth Juggins, 79 Worth Street, New York City

Mr. George R. Coleman, 50 Church Street, New York City

Mr. E. E. Barnett, Y. M. C. A., 347 Madison Avenue, New York City

EXHIBIT No. 800

To—	From—	Date	Type of Document	File Number	Exhibit Number
PROGRAMS FOR MR. W. L. HOLLAND'S STAY (office memo).....		Oct.....	-----	-----	-----
IPR Staff Members.....		Nov.....	Original.....	131B. 11	" 800A
1936-1943.....		-----	Original.....	500. 3	801
1937-1943.....		-----	".....	-----	-----
1944-1951.....		-----	".....	-----	-----
1944-1951.....		-----	".....	-----	-----
All years.....		-----	Carbon.....	-----	-----
E. C. Carter.....	Research Secretary	9/26/34	Carbon.....	105. 95	802
Harondar.....	W. L. Holland	10/1/35	Copy.....	100. 43	803
E. C. Carter.....	WLH	10/4/35	Carbon.....	100. 157	804
W. W. Lockwood.....	Research Secretary	3/25/39	Photostat.....	191. 258	805
ECC.....	WLH	5/10/40	Carbon.....	191. 89	806
WLH.....	ECC	7/5/40	Original.....	-----	807
Phil.....	W. L. Holland	7/5/40	Carbon.....	104. 52	808
Carl F. Remer.....	W. L. Holland	12/1/41	Photostat.....	100. 384	809
W. L. Holland.....	James P. Baxter	3/18/42	Carbon.....	119. 123	810
Maj. G. A. Lincoln.....	W. L. Holland	4/2/42	Carbon.....	131B. 41	811
Geo. H. Kerr.....	W. L. Holland	4/3/42	Carbon.....	131B. 40	812
Wm. Holland.....	Geo. H. Kerr	4/2/42	Original.....	131B. 40	813
Wm. Holland.....	Chester R. Vail	7/25/42	Original.....	119. 24	814
Wm. Holland.....	Philip C. Jessup	7/31/42	Photostat.....	131B. 165	815
W. L. Holland.....	Wm. T. Stone	9/2/42	Original.....	119. 29	816
Wm. T. Stone.....	W. L. Holland	7/6/42	Carbon.....	"	817
W. L. Holland.....	Wm. T. Johnstone	7/11/42	Original.....	"	818
WLH KM.....	ECC	3/1/43	Photostat.....	131B. 160	819
(Attached: Background Information—The Strength of the Muslim League in India, Mr. Jinnah's position—164/No. 4/2/1/43.		-----	-----	-----	-----
Hugh Borton.....	W. L. Holland	4/21/43	Carbon.....	119. 15	820
Mr. Holland.....	A. Grajdanzev	1/17/43	Original.....	"	821
W. L. Holland.....	"	7/22/42	"	"	822
Free distribution list for "Korean industry and transport by AJG:		-----	-----	-----	-----
Preface, Grajdanzev.....	W. L. Holland	4/19/43	Carbon.....	"	823
Hilda Austern.....	W. L. Holland	5/19/43	Carbon.....	"	824
Owen Lattimore.....	W. L. Holland	7/20/43	Photostat.....	500. 4	825
Wilma Fairbank.....	W. L. Holland	2/21/44	Photostat.....	500. 5	826
W. T. Holland.....	Edward L. Barlow	12/7/43	Carbon.....	191. 59	827
Dr. Wm. T. Holland.....	" " "	12/6/43	Original.....	131B. 3	828
Wm. T. Holland.....	" " "	12/1/43	Original.....	"	829
Wm. Holland.....	" " "	12/3/43	"	"	830
Lauchlin Currie.....	W. L. Holland	3/2/44	"	"	831
Wm. Holland.....	Mrs. Wilma Fairbank	3/11/44	Carbon.....	131B. 5	832
T. A. Bisson.....	" " "	2/18/44	Original.....	191. 57	833
Wilma Fairbank.....	W. L. Holland	3/20/44	"	"	834
Prof. Schuyler Wallace.....	" " "	3/22/44	Carbon.....	"	835
Wm. L. Holland.....	Schuyler.....	3/23/44	Carbon.....	131B. 10	836
Wm. Holland.....	Schuyler C. Wallace	4/14/44	Original.....	131B. 9	837
Schuyler C. Wallace.....	W. L. Holland	4/12/44	"	"	838
Wm. Holland.....	Schuyler C. Wallace	4/12/44	Carbon.....	"	839
W. L. Holland.....	Philip C. Jesup	4/8/44	Original.....	"	840
W. L. Holland.....	Philip C. Jesup	3/27/44	Original.....	191. 13	841
W. L. Holland (note attach).)	Irving S. Friedman	4/10/44	Original.....	131B. 23	842
Irving Friedman.....	W. L. Holland	5/1/44	Photostat.....	131B. 23	842A
Wm. L. Holland.....	Alice B. Foy	4/12/44	Original.....	131B. 22	843
Alice B. Foy.....	W. L. Holland	4/17/44	Carbon.....	"	844
W. L. Holland.....	Lt. L. H. Chamberlain	4/25/44	Original.....	131B. 21	845
Eleanor Lattimore.....	W. L. Holland	5/17/44	Carbon.....	107. 3	846
W. L. Holland.....	Louis Dolivet	6/19/44	Original.....	109. 2	847
W. L. Holland.....	Douglas A. MacLennan	3/23/46	Photostat.....	112. 57	848
Douglas MacLennan.....	Wm. L. Holland	3/25/46	"	112. 51	849
W. L. Holland.....	Philip J. Jaffe	4/29/48	"	109. 9	850
Edw. C. Carter.....	Wm. L. Holland	4/30/48	"	109. 10	851
W. L. Holland.....	Wm. L. Holland	1/25/50	"	500. 6	852
E. Herbert Norman.....	Herbert.....	1/ 5/50	"	"	853
W. L. Holland.....	E. H. Norman	2/13/50	"	500. 8	854
Charles Loomis.....	W. L. Holland	4/26/50	"	101. 55	855
Sir George Sansom.....	Wm. L. Holland	5/17/50	"	112. 50	856
Holland.....	Harondar	7/ 6/35	Cable.....	100. 46	857
Dean Rusk.....	Wm. L. Holland	9/12/50	Photostat.....	500. 10	859
Pacific Council Officers (attachment).)		9/16/50	"	500. 11	858
Justice Wm. O. Douglas	Wm. L. Holland	12/12/50	"	100. 354	860
S. B. Thomas.....	W. L. Holland	2/ 1/50	Carbon.....	500. 12	861
V. G. Tseng.....	V. G. Tseng	3/22/51	Original.....	500. 14	862
Geo. J. Beal (2 attach.)	Wm. L. Holland	4/ 5/51	Carbon.....	"	863
W. L. Holland.....	Wm. L. Holland	4/12/51	Photostat.....	500. 15	864
Edw. C. Carter.....	Geo. J. Beal	4/10/51	"	"	865
	Wm. L. Holland	3/14/51	"	500. 16	866

EXHIBIT No. S00-A

PROGRAMME FOR H. E. L. HOLLAND'S STAY

Monday, October 25th.

10.45 a.m. Mr. Hubbard and Mr. Gull.

until 12.15 p.m.

1.00 p.m. Anglo-French Group.

until 2.30-3.00 p.m.

4.00 p.m. Staff Meeting.

Tuesday, October 26th.

1.00 p.m. General Meeting, Mr. Curtis.

until 2.30-3.00 p.m.

Wednesday, October 27th.

10.45 a.m. Staff Meeting continued.

1.00 p.m. Private Discussion Meeting, "The Future of Colonial Territories in Africa" H. E. Zepie, Governor of Chad, July 1941-December 1942.

until 2.30-3.00 p.m.

Thursday, October 28th.

2.30 p.m. Beginning of the Combined Course.

5 p.m. Dinner. 7.00 p.m. Fine 32 Stephens Place.

Friday, October 29th.

9.30 a.m. Combined Course.

Saturday, Sunday, October 30th & 31st.

Oxford 1

Monday, November 1st.

10.45 a.m. Anglo-French Group.

1.00 p.m. Reconstruction Committee.

4.30 p.m. I.P.R. Committee.

Tuesday, November 2nd.

1.00 p.m. Annual General Meeting.

Wednesday, November 3rd.

1.00 p.m. Far East Group.

Handwritten notes on the right side of the page:

- Under Thursday, October 28th: "Handwritten note about the combined course, possibly mentioning 'The Future of Colonial Territories in Africa'."
- Under Friday, October 29th: "Handwritten note about the combined course, possibly mentioning 'The Future of Colonial Territories in Africa'."
- Under Saturday, Sunday, October 30th & 31st: "Handwritten note about the combined course, possibly mentioning 'The Future of Colonial Territories in Africa'."
- Under Monday, November 1st: "Handwritten note about the combined course, possibly mentioning 'The Future of Colonial Territories in Africa'."
- Under Tuesday, November 2nd: "Handwritten note about the combined course, possibly mentioning 'The Future of Colonial Territories in Africa'."
- Under Wednesday, November 3rd: "Handwritten note about the combined course, possibly mentioning 'The Future of Colonial Territories in Africa'."

EXHIBIT No. 800-A—Continued




EXHIBIT No. 801

Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations—Staff members, 1936–1943

NOTE.—This list includes paid personnel only. No regular record is available as to volunteer assistance. Personnel serving in clerical capacity for a few months only are not all listed. Years listed do not necessarily indicate that individual was a member of the staff during the entire year.

Began	Name	Years	Position
1933...	Edward C. Carter.....	1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943.....	Secretary-General.
1933...	Hilda Anstern.....	1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943.....	Assistant Treasurer.
1933...	Joseph Barber, Jr.....	1936.....	Publications.
1933...	Annette Blumenthal.....	1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942.....	Distribution Manager.
1933...	Chen Han-seng.....	1936, 1937, 1938, 1939.....	Research Associate.
1935...	Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley.....	1936, 1937, 1938, 1939.....	Assistant to Secretary-General.
1929...	William L. Holland.....	1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943.....	Research Secretary.
1934...	Owen Lattimore.....	1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941.....	Editor, Pacific Affairs.
1934...	Liu Yu-wan.....	1936.....	
1933...	Kate L. Mitchell.....	1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940.....	Assistant to Secretary-General.
1934...	Harriet L. Moore.....	1936, 1937.....	Research Associate.
1934...	Catherine Porter.....	1936, 1937, 1938.....	Managing Editor, Pacific Affairs.
	Richard L. Pyke.....	1936, 1937, 1938.....	Publications Secy.
	Charlotte Tyler.....	1936, 1937.....	Research Associate.
	Elizabeth Downing.....	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942.....	Secretary and Publications.
	Eleanor Fabyan.....	1937.....	Secretary.
	F. Max.....	1937.....	Research Associate.
	Nagaharu Yasuo.....	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940.....	Research Associate.
	Hugh Borton.....	1938, 1939.....	Research Associate.
	Rilma Buckman.....	1938.....	Secretary.
	Ruth D. Carter.....	1937, 1938, 1938, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943.....	Secretary.
	Ch'ao-ting Chi.....	1938, 1939, 1940.....	Research Associate.
	Irv ng S. Friedman.....	1938, 1939.....	Research Associate.
	Helen Kellogg.....	1938.....	Secretary.
	Philip E. Lilienthal.....	1938, 1939, 1940, 1942.....	Editorial and Research.
	Elodie Moerman.....	1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942.....	Clerical.
	Elizabeth Raymond.....	1938, 1939.....	Secretary.
	Jack Shepherd.....	1938, 1939, 1940, 1941.....	Research Associate.
	Katrine Parsons.....	1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943.....	Secretary.
	M. Young.....	1939, 1940, 1941.....	Secretary.
	F. Mangahas.....	1939.....	Research Associate.
	Barbara Messer.....	1939, 1940, 1941.....	Clerical.
	Patricia Glover.....	1939, 1940.....	Research.
	Marjorie Austern.....	1939.....	Clerical.
	John Leaning.....	1939, 1940, 1941.....	Editorial.
	Percy E. Corbett.....	1940.....	Research Associate.
	Vera Dodds.....	1940, 1941, 1942.....	Secretary.
	M. Matsuo.....	1940, 1941.....	Research Associate.
	Michael Minarovich.....	1940, 1941, 1942.....	Shipping clerk.
	Lillian Peffer.....	1940, 1941.....	Research Associate.
	Russell G. Shiman.....	1940, 1941.....	Research Associate.
	Ellen van Zyll de Jong.....	1940, 1941.....	Research Associate.
	Kurt Bloch.....	1941.....	Research Associate.
	John De Francis.....	1941.....	Research Associate.
	Andrew J. Grajdanzev.....	1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943.....	Research Associate.
	Michael Greenberg.....	1941, 1942.....	Managing Editor, Pacific Affairs.
	C. Y. Hsiang.....	1941.....	Research Associate.
	Y. Y. Hsu.....	1941, 1942, 1943.....	Research Associate.
	Isabel Ward.....	1941, 1942.....	Secretary.
	Robert W. Barnett.....	1942.....	Research Associate.
	Winnifred Clark.....	1942, 1943.....	Secretary.
	Mary F. Healy.....	1942, 1943.....	Secretary.
	Bruno Lasker.....	1942, 1943.....	Research Associate.
	Renee Stern.....	1942, 1943.....	Clerical.
	T. A. Bisson.....	1943.....	Research Associate.
	Edith Bykofsky.....	1943.....	Clerical.
	Grace Caravello.....	1943.....	Clerical.
	Frances Friedman.....	1943.....	Secretary.
	Augusta Jay.....	1943.....	Receptionist.
	Harriet Levinthal.....	1943.....	Switchboard.
	Laura Mayer.....	1943.....	Secretary.
	Elizabeth Neal.....	1943.....	Stenographer.
	Betty Skrefstad.....	1943.....	Clerical.
	R. Winslow.....	1943.....	(?)
	Clara Spidell.....	1943.....	Secretary.

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations—Staff members, 1937–1943

[See note at end of table]

Began	Name	Years	Position
1929	Frederick V. Field	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940	Executive.
1929	Helen Wiss	1937, 1938, 1939	Secretary.
1930	Hilda Austen	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941	Assistant Treasurer.
1934	Kathleen Barnes	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940	Research associate.
1933	Annette Blumenthal	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942	Subscription manager, Far Eastern Survey.
	Elodie Shinkle	1937, 1938	Clerk-typist.
	Mary E. Harrell	1937	Secretary.
1926	Catherine Porter	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943	Secretary, research associate editor, Far Eastern Survey.
	Ernest Hauser	1937, 1938	Research associate.
	Anita Archer	1937	?
	Ruth Earnshaw	1937	Librarian.
1929 on and off.	Bruno Lasker	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1943	Research associate.
1927	Jeanette Randolph	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943	Librarian.
	Joseph Barber, Jr.	1937	Promotion.
	Inez Campbell	1937	
	Josephine Metcalf	1937	Secretary.
	J. Murphy	1938	
	B. P. Schoyer	1938, 1941, 1942	Membership and radio.
	Margaret Taylor	1938, 1939, 1940	Membership and finance.
	Isabel Ward	1938, 1939	Secretary.
1933	Russell G. Shiman	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941	Editor, Far Eastern Survey.
1935?	William W. Lockwood	1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943	Research secretary and Executive.
1934	Miriam S. Farley	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943	Research associate and pamphlet Editor.
	Michael Minarovich	1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943	Shipping clerk.
	John Stewart	1938, 1939, 1940	Research associate.
	Emily Twaddell	1938, 1939, 1940	Secretary.
	Katrine R. C. Greene	1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943	Secretary.
	Elizabeth Raymond	1939	Secretary.
	Kurt Bloch	1939, 1940, 1941, 1942	Research associate.
	E. Todd	1939	
	Frances Rifchin	1939, 1940	Secretary.
	Ann Warson	1940, 1941	Secretary.
	M. Taussig	1940, 1941	Secretary.
	Robert W. Barnett	1941, 1942	Research associate.
	Rose Landres	1941, 1942	Assistant treasurer.
	Tillie G. Shahn	1941, 1942, 1943	Assistant treasurer.
	Janet Leifert	1941, 1942	Secretary.
	Elizabeth Downing	1941, 1942, 1943	Membership and Publications.
	Nancy Wilder	1941, 1942, 1943	Secretary.
	A. Holtman	1941, 1942	
	Mary Rolfe	1941, 1942, 1943	Secretary.
	Dorothy Borg	1941, 1942	Education secretary.
	Vera Dodds	1942, 1943	Secretary.
	Rose Yardumian	1942, 1943	Secretary, library.
	Wilson Morris	1942	Secretary.
	Rita Zagon	1942, 1943	Clerk-typist.
	Harriet Holmes	1942, 1943	Secretary.
	Judith Daniel	1943	Secretary, Washington office.
	Theresa Gerathy	1943	Secretary, Special Project.
	Mildred Gilliam	1943	
	Harold J. Greenberg	1943	
	Josephine Owen	1943	
	Robert Powell	1943	Secretary.
	J. O. M. Brock	1943	Special project.
	Homer H. Dubs	1943	
	Wilya G. Ilus	1943	Secretary.
	Dorothy Israel	1943	Secretary.
	Alice Jayson	1943	Public relations.
	William C. Johnstone	1943	Director, Washington office.
	Mildred Klein	1943	
	Rosamund Lee	1943	Promotion secretary.
	Harriet Levinthal	1943	Switchboard operator.
	Dorothy Mayo	1943	
	Frances Moldauer (until 1946, Sharpe)	1943	Superintendent public distribution (1 week December 1948 as typist).
	Harriet L. Moore	1943	Acting Executive Secretary.

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations—Staff members, 1937–1943—Con.

[See note at end of table]

Began	Name	Years	Position
1934....	Frieda Neugebauer.....	1943.....	Stenographer.
	Sallie Ornitz.....	1943.....	Secretary.
	Maggie Smith.....	1943.....	Acting librarian.
	Marguerite Stewart.....	1943.....	School secretary; administrative secretary.
	Elnora Walker.....	1943.....	

NOTE.—The above list includes paid personnel only, and a few clerical workers who served for 1 or 2 months only may not be listed. A list of volunteers is not available. Years do not necessarily mean that individual worked for the Institute for the entire year. If 1 month only, year is enclosed in parentheses (). Personnel employed locally by regional offices are not listed.

American Institute of Pacific Relations

[Staff members, 1944–1951]

NOTE.—This list includes paid personnel only, and a few clerical workers who served for one or two months only may not be listed. A list of volunteers is not available. Years do not necessarily mean that individual worked for the Institute for the entire year. If one month only, year is enclosed in parentheses ().

Name	Years	Position
Nina Balfour.....	1944.....	(?) Clerical.
Edythe M. Banks.....	1944, 1945, 1946.....	Stenographer.
Beatrice Benjuya.....	1944.....	(?) Clerical.
Mary Jane Bowen.....	1944, 1945.....	Library consultant (pttime).
J. O. M. Broek.....	1944.....	Research project.
Esther Brown.....	(1944).....	(?) Clerical.
Jewell Carroll.....	(1944, 1945).....	(?) Clerical.
Miriam Chesman.....	1944, 1945, 1946.....	Subscription clerk.
Lillian Cunningham.....	(1944).....	(?) Clerical.
Raymond Dennett.....	1944, 1945, 1946.....	Executive Secretary.
Homer H. Dubs.....	1944.....	Research (?).
Miriam S. Farley.....	1944, 1945, 1946, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951.....	Research Assoc.; Pamphlet Editor, Ed., F. E. Survey.
Margaret Fischl.....	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947.....	Secretary.
Wilya Gallus.....	1944.....	Secretary.
Marie Godby.....	(1944).....	(?) Clerical.
Josephine Golembost.....	(1944).....	(?) Clerical.
Rose Greenberg.....	(1944).....	(?) Clerical.
Dorothy Israel.....	1944.....	Secretary.
Alice Jayson.....	1944.....	Public Relations.
Louise Jenkins.....	(1944).....	(?) Clerical.
Shirley Jenkins.....	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948.....	Research Assoc.; Assoc. Editor, F. E. Survey.
William C. Johnstone.....	1944, 1945.....	Director, Wash. office.
Carolyn A. Kizer.....	1944, 1945.....	(?) Clerical.
Mildred Klein.....	1944.....	(?) Clerical.
Beatrice Krasnow.....	1944.....	(?) Clerical.
Bruno Lasker.....	1944, 1945, 1946.....	Research Associate.
Eleanor Lattimore.....	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947.....	Research Associate.
Ruth Lazarus Turbin.....	1944, 1945, 1946.....	Secretary.
Ilse Lederer.....	(1944).....	(?) Clerical.
Rosamund Lee.....	1944, 1945.....	Promotion Secretary.
Harriet Levinthal.....	1944, 1945, 1946.....	Switchboard operator.
Rhoda Lewis.....	(1944).....	(?) Clerical.
Dorothy S. Ludwig.....	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948.....	Asst. Bookkeeper.
Adrienne Maurer.....	(1944).....	(?) Clerical.
Jean May.....	1944.....	(?) Clerical.
Dorothy Mayo.....	1944.....	(?) Clerical.
Harriet Mills.....	1944, 1945.....	Administrative Asst.
Frances Sharpe Moldauer.....	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947.....	Publications Distribution.
Harriet L. Moore.....	1944.....	Acting Exec. Secretary.
Betty Morita.....	1944.....	(?) Clerical.
Marion Morris.....	(1944).....	(?) Clerical.
Hilton Morseley.....	(1944).....	(?) Clerical.
Frieda Neugebauer.....	1944, 1949.....	Stenographer.
Harry A. Nelson.....	(1944).....	(?) Clerical.
David Soyer.....	1944, 1945.....	Clerical Asst.
Clara Nerenberg.....	1944, 1945.....	(?) Clerical.
Helen E. Nitka.....	(1944, 1945).....	(?) Clerical.
Zelda Ormont.....	(1944).....	(?) Clerical.
Sallie Ornitz.....	1944.....	Secretary.
Harriet H. Parker.....	1944, 1945.....	Secretary.
Catherine Porter.....	1944.....	Editor, F. E. Survey.
Ruth Resnick.....	1944.....	(?) Clerical.
Rhoda Rothman.....	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947.....	Billing clerk.
Laurence E. Salisbury.....	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948.....	Editor, F. E. Survey.
Sophie Schneer.....	1944.....	(?) Clerical.
Tillie G. Shahn.....	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951.....	Assistant Treasurer.
Rita Shavelson.....	(1944).....	(?) Clerical.
Maggie Smith.....	1944, 1945, 1946.....	Acting Librarian.

American Institute of Pacific Relations—Continued

[Staff members, 1944-1951]

Name	Years	Position
Maxim Snyder	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Marguerite Stewart	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947	School Secy.; Admin. Secy.
Masha Switzer Wise	1944, 1945, 1946	Stenographer
Marie Talkington	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Frances Tendetnick	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Janet Taylor	(1944), (1946)	Stenographer.
Elmira Walker	1944	(?) Clerical.
Henrietta Wentholt	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Nancy Wilder	1944	Secy; Editorial Asst.
Caroline Woods	1944	Librarian.
Rose Yardumian	1944, 1945	Secy; Librarian; Secy., Washington Office.
Marguerite E. Bear	(1945)	Stenographer.
Robert S. Bialos	(1945)	Shipping Clerk.
Jeanne Chalfin	(1945)	(?) Clerical.
Mike Coffey	(1945)	(?) Clerical.
Elizabeth A. Converse	1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951	Asst. Editor, F. E. Survey.
Salvatore De Leonardis	1945, 1946	Shipping Clerk.
Jean Elson	(1945)	Typist.
Ethel E. Ewing	1945, 1946, 1947	School Secretary.
Rita Frucht	(1945)	(?) Clerical.
Lillie Gerber	1945, 1946	Stenographer.
Rita Kahane	(1945)	Stenographer.
Dorothea Keil	(1945)	(?) Clerical.
Hiroyo Kiyaba	1945	Stenographer.
Bernice Kennedy	(1945)	Stenographer.
Ellen B. Levy	(1945)	Temporary Secretary.
Miyaho Matsuo	(1945)	Stenographer.
Michael E. Minarovitch	1945, 1946	Shipping Clerk.
Wilson Morris	1945, 1946	Asst. Editor-Pamphlets.
Eugene Newman	1945	Clerical.
Sylvia Rosenfeld	(1945)	(?) Clerical.
Rima S. Rogers	1945	Secretary.
Jerome Shishko	1945	Clerical.
Elizabeth Ussachevsky	1945, 1946	Secy-Washington Office.
Lola Brice	(1946)	Clerk-Typist.
Ruth D. Carter	1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1951	Secy.; Admin. Asst.
Melvin A. Conant, Jr	1946	Research Assistant.
Lillian Covelle	(1946)	Washington Office.
Elizabeth Crawford	1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950	Switchboard Operator.
Sonja Dahl	1946	Los Angeles Office.
Lionel C. Delgado	1946	Shipping Clerk.
Helen Dimitry	1946, 1947	Stenographer.
Elba Aileen Dodson	(1946)	Secretary (Wash. Office).
Florence Englander	1946	Stenographer.
Dorothy M. Freist	(1946)	Stenographer.
Bernice Fischman	1946, 1947	Acting Librarian.
Gloria Gordon	(1946)	Typist.
Rence J. Guthman	1946, 1947	Branch Secretary, Washing- ton Office.
Sally R. Hawkins	1946, 1947	Secretary, Wash. Office.
Callie M. Hickey	1946, 1947	Secretary.
Sonia Kramer	1946, 1947	Secretary.
Betty Lee	(1946)	Stenographer.
Sony Lipton	(1946)	Stenographer.
Regina Marks	1946, 1947	Stenographer.
Abe J. Millman	1946	Stenographer.
Benjamin Millman	1946	Stenographer.
Angelina Morrison	(1946)	Stenographer.
Frank Pelan	1946, 1947	Shipping Clerk.
John A. Pollard	1946	Director, Wash. Office.
Jane Radom	(1946)	Stenographer.
Gwendolyn Robertson	1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951	Subscription Clerk.
Constance Root	1946, 1947	Promotion Assistant.
Barbara B. Smith	1946	Clerk-Typist.
Louise B. Serot	(1946)	Secretary.
Rhoda Serot	(1946)	(?) Clerical.
Louise H. Schatz	1946, 1947	Promotion Secretary.
Maxwell S. Stewart	1946, 1947, 1948	Pamphlet Editor.
Esther Taylor	1946, 1947	Stenographer.
Yoshi Uehida	1946, 1947	Membership Clerk.
Dolores Van Buren	(1946)	Stenographer.
Ella S. Waller	(1946)	Stenographer.
Abraham Barnett	(1947)	Shipping Clerk.
Pearl C. Christian	1947, 1948, 1949, 1950	Clerk-Typist.
Daniel F. Doyle	(1947)	Shipping Clerk.
Margaret M. Dunn	1947, 1948	Secretary.
Rhoda Goldenberg	1947	Secretary.
Deborah Grigsby	(1947)	Secretary.
Marguerite F. Hill	(1947)	Secretary.
Gerard P. Kok	1947	Chinese Language Instr.
Pao-Ch'en Lee	1947	Asst. Chinese Lang. Instr.
Celestine G. Mott	1947, 1948	Secretary (Executive).

American Institute of Pacific Relations—Continued

[Staff members, 1944–1951]

Name	Years	Position
Belzy M. Parker	1947	Stenographer.
Anna Reinhold	(1947)	Secretary.
Marjorie Baum	(1948)	(?) Clerical.
Charles Cherubin	1948	Shipping Clerk.
Gladys Edwards	(1948)	(?) Clerical.
Katrine R. C. Greene	1948, 1949, 1950, 1951	Assistant Secretary.
Rosalind Greenwald	1948, 1949, 1950	Secretary.
Patricia Hochschild	1948, 1949	Acting Librarian.
Clayton Lane	1948, 1949, 1950	Executive Secretary.
Philip E. Lillenthal	1948	Acting Editor, F. E. Survey.
Hilda Mayer	(1948, 1949)	Clerk-typist.
Lawrence K. Rosinger	1948, 1949, 1950	Research Associate.
Francis Dick Wanderman	1948	Secretary.
Chia-ling Bumgardner	(1949, 1950)	Clerk-typist.
Elaine Douglas	(1949)	Clerk-typist.
Irene Conley Chang	1949	Acting Librarian.
Lolita W. Smith	(1949)	Typist.
Lucrecia Suguitan	1949	Typist.
Elizabeth Yates	1949, 1950	Acting Librarian.
Anita Ehrlich	1950	Clerk-typist
Wei-ta Pons	1950, 1951	Acting Librarian.
Ruth V. Stein	1950, 1951	Secretary.
Sadie Winston	1950	Secretary.
Betty E. Buchsbaum	1951	Secretary.
Robert Hasse	1951	Clerk-typist.
Ora Leak	(1951)	Typist.
Gladys Nusbaum	(1951)	Typist.
Leslie Morgan	1951	Editorial Assistant.
Ann Stopp	1951	Secretary.
Melvin Anderson	1951	Shipping clerk.
Robert Bruce	1951	Shipping clerk.
Edward A. Fujima	1951	Acting librarian.
Jack Gerson	1951	Bookkeeper.
George Kawata	1951	Asst. Librarian
Marjorie Montana	1951	Receptionist.
Edward C. Carter	1946, 1947, 1948	Executive Vice Chairman.
William L. Holland	1950, 1951	Executive Vice Chairman.

The above list includes only personnel paid by the national office. It does not include personnel employed locally by regional offices.

Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations—Staff members, 1944–1951

NOTE.—This list includes paid personnel only. No regular record is available as to volunteer assistance. Personnel serving in clerical capacity for a few months only are not all listed. Years listed do not necessarily indicate that individual was a member of the staff during the entire year. If one month only, year is enclosed in parentheses ().

Name	Years	Position
Hilda Austern	1944, 1945	Asst. Treasurer.
Horace Belshaw	1944, 1945, 1946	Research Secretary.
T. A. Bisson	1944, 1945	Research Associate.
Joan Bramley	1944, 1945, 1946	Clerical.
Grace Leah Butts	(1944)	Clerical, Wash. office.
Edith Bykofsky	1944, 1945, 1946	Subscription clerk.
Frances Pietrowski Capps	1944, 1945	Bookkeeping Asst.
Grace Caravello	1944, 1945, 1946	Clerical.
Edward C. Carter	1944, 1945, 1946	Secretary-General.
Ruth D. Carter	1944, 1945, 1946, 1949	Secretary.
Olga Field	1944, 1945	Research Associate.
Frances Friedman	1944	Secretary.
Andrew J. Grajdanzev	1944, 1945, 1946	Research Associate.
Augusta Jay	1944	Receptionist.
Virginia Mack	(1944)	Washington office.
William L. Holland	1944, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951	Secretary-General.
Yung Ying Hsu	1944, 1945	Research Associate.
Wilhelmina Masselman	1944	Res.
Elizabeth Neal	1944	Stenographer.
Ruth M. Parsons	1944, 1945, 1946	Secretary.
Rose Pietrowski	(1944)	Clerical.
Laura Rosenthal	1944, 1945, 1946	Secretary.
Florence E. Sanders	(1944)	Secretary.
Betty Skrefstad	1944, 1947	Clerical.
Clara Spidell	1944, 1945	Secretary.
Elizabeth Ussachevsky	1944, 1945	Secretary.
Robert Vernon, Jr	1944, 1945	Shipping clerk.
Nellie Wright	1944	Clerical.
Joyce Wagner	1944, 1945	Clerical.
Michi Yasumura	1944, 1945	Asst. Librarian.

Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations—Staff members, 1944-1951—
Continued

Name	Years	Position
Elizabeth A. Bates.....	1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949.....	Distribution Mgr.
Helen E. Russell.....	1945, 1946, 1947.....	Secretary.
Rae Solomon.....	(1945).....	Shipping clerk.
Elaine Annall.....	1946.....	Receptionist.
Elizabeth Bryant.....	1946, 1947.....	Clerk-Typist.
Donald Fine.....	1946.....	Shipping Clerk.
Mary F. Healy.....	1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951.....	Publications Secy.
Anne O. Hooker.....	1946.....	Secretary.
Anita Issen.....	1946, 1947.....	Secretary.
Mary J. Kilpatrick.....	1946, 1947.....	Assistant Treasurer.
Philip E. Lilienthal.....	1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951.....	Editor, Pacific Affairs.
Ruth Marcusson.....	(1946).....	Secretary.
Gloria Mitchell.....	1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951.....	Receptionist, Bookkeeper, Secy.
Helen Schneider.....	1946, 1947, 1948, 1949.....	Business Manager, Pacific Affairs.
Alice M. Togo.....	1946.....	Librarian.
Rose Alfino.....	(1947).....	Secretary.
Marguerite Anderson.....	1947.....	Secretary.
Edward Bierman.....	(1947).....	Shipping clerk.
Thelma Chargar.....	1947, 1948, 1949.....	Billing clerk.
Charles Cherubin.....	1947, 1948, 1949, 1950.....	Shipping Clerk.
Stanley Ferber.....	(1947).....	Shipping Clerk.
Filmore Gluck.....	1947.....	(?).
Martin Gluck.....	(1947).....	(?).
Ruth Gorgas.....	1947.....	Clerical.
James Green.....	(1947).....	Shipping Clerk.
Raymond Greenberg.....	(1947).....	Shipping Clerk.
Gertrude Greenidge.....	1947, 1948, 1949.....	Clerical.
Robert Haulsey.....	(1947).....	Shipping Clerk.
Ayaka Murota.....	1947.....	Secretary.
Joan St. George.....	1947, 1948.....	Secretary.
Gladys H. Edward.....	(1948).....	Secretary.
Rosaline Greenwald.....	(1948).....	Secretary.
Deborah Grigsby.....	1948, 1949.....	Secretary.
Wei-ta Pous.....	1948.....	Librarian.
Tillie G. Shahn.....	1948, 1949, 1950, 1951.....	Asst. Treasurer.
Ruth A. Velleman.....	1948.....	Secretary.
Aminadau Aloric.....	(1949).....	Shipping Clerk.
Kazuko Kay Fujii.....	1949, 1950.....	Secretary.
Barbara Harrison.....	1949, 1950.....	Secretary.
Kathryn Hayes.....	(1949).....	Typist.
Martha T. Henderson.....	(1949).....	Secretary.
Frances P. Landau.....	1949.....	Secretary.
Chiya Oshima.....	1949, 1950, 1951.....	Distribution Mgr.
Unsoon Park.....	1949.....	Typist.
Lillian Rosberg.....	1949, 1950, 1951.....	Subscription clerk.
Lolita Smith.....	(1949).....	(?).
Evelyn M. Darrow.....	1950.....	Secretary.
Myra M. Jordan.....	1950.....	Secretary.
Mary A. McCrimmons.....	1950.....	Receptionist.
Kazu Oka.....	1950, 1951.....	Secretary.
Marjorie Ota.....	(1950).....	Secretary.
Albert A. Weidon.....	1950, 1951.....	Shipping Clerk.
Melvin T. Anderson.....	1951.....	Shipping Clerk.
Robert Bruce.....	1951.....	Shipping Clerk.
Edward A. Fujima.....	1951.....	Asst. Librarian.
Jack Gerson.....	1951.....	Bookkeeper.
George Kawata.....	1951.....	Asst. Librarian.
Marjorie Montana.....	1951.....	Receptionist.
Mary C. Spillum.....	1951.....	Secretary.

IPR staff members

[Submitted by W. L. Holland, 10/10/51]

Name	Started	Resigned	Position	Salary
Alfino, Rose	2/47	3/47	Secretary	\$20/wk.
Aloric, Aminadau	6/49	7/49	Shipping clerk	
Anderson, Marguerite	4/47	6/47	Secretary	
Anderson, Melvin T	5/51	Present	Sh. clk.	
Armali, Elaine	4/46	9/46	Recep.-typist	
Austern, Hilda	1930?	11/45	Asst. Treasurer	
Balfour, Nina	3/44	6/44		
Banks, Edythe M.	9/44	8/46	Stenographer	
Barnett, Abraham	7/47	8/47	Shipping clerk	
Bates, Elizabeth	6/45	6/49	Distribution mgr.	
Baum, Marjorie	6/48	7/48		
Bear, Marguerite E.	2/45	3/45	Stenographer	
Belshaw, Horace	9/44-12/44	11/45-7/46	Research Sec'y	
Belshaw, Michael	5/46	8/46	Shipping clerk	
Benjuya, Beatrice	5/44	9/44		
Bialos, Robert S.	11/45	12/45	Shipping clerk	\$30.20/wk.
Bierman, Edward	1/47	2/47	Shipping clerk	
Bisson, T. A.	6/43	9/45	Research Associate	
Blumenthal			Clerk-typist	
Bowen, Mary Jane	8/44	9/45	Library consultant part time	
Bramley, Joan	6/44	7/46	Clk-typ	
Brice, Lola	5/46	6/46	Clerk-typist	
Broek, J. O. M.	1/44	5/44	Special research project	
Brown, Esther		2/44		
Bruce, Robert	1/51	Present	Sh. clk.	
Bryant, Elizabeth	9/46	6/47	Clerk-typ	
Buchsbaum, Betty E.	9/51	Present	Secretary	
Bumgardner, Chia-Ling	12/49	1/50	Clerk-typist	
Burt, Virginia	11/43	11/43		\$110/mo.
Butts, Grace Leah	7/44	8/44	Clk-typ	
Bykofsky, Edith		4/46	Subscrip. clerk	
Capps, Frances Pietrowski	9/44	8/45	Bookkeeping asst	
Caravello, Grace	1/44	2/46	Clerk-typist	
Carroll, Jewel	12/44	1/45		
Carter, Edward C.	1933	2/46	Sec'y General	
Carter, Ruth D.	1937, 38-41	42-4/46	Secretary	
	5/49	10/49	Secretary	
	3/46	12/49	Secretary	
	2/51	Present	Administrative Ass't	
Chalfin, Jeanne	8/45	9/45		
Chang, Irene Conley	2/49	10/49	Librarian	
Chargar, Thelma	12/47	4/49	Billing clerk	
Cherubin, Charles	12/48	12/48	Shipping clerk	
	12/47	7/50	Shipping clerk	
Chesman, Miriam	4/44	4/46	Subscription clerk	\$400/mo.
Christian, Pearl C.	10/47	4/50	Clerk-typist	
Clark, Winifred H.	(?)	1/43	Temp. secretary	
Coffey	1/45	2/45	Temporary clerk	
Conant, Melvin A., Jr	6/46	8/46	Research Assistant	
Converse, Elizabeth A.	3/45	3/51	Assistant Editor FES	
Coville, Lillian	1/46	3/46	Washington Office	
Crawford, Elizabeth	8/46	3/50	Switchboard Operator	
Cunningham	12/44	12/44		
Curtis, Aileen	11/43	3/44	Clerical	
Dahl, Sonja	2/46	9/46	Los Angeles Office	
Darrow, Evelyn M.	4/50	7/50	Secretary	
Day, Augusta	5/44	8/44	Receptionist	
De Leonardis, Salvatore	2/44	9/46	Shipping clerk	
Delgado, Lionel C.	9/46	12/46	Shipping clerk	
	12/46	1/47	Shipping clerk	
Dennett, Raymond	2/44	2/46	Executive Secretary	\$400/mo.
Dickinson, Edna C.	(?)	1/43	(?)	
Dimitry, Helen	11/46	8/47	Stenographer	
Dodson, Elba Aileen	5/46	6/46	Secretary (Wash. Office)	
Douglas, Elaine	5/49	6/49	Clerk-typist	
Doyle, Daniel F.	8/47	9/47	Shipping clerk	
Dubs, Homer H.		6/44		
Dunn, Margaret M.	10/47	3/48	Secretary	
Edward, Gladys H.	8/48	8/48	Secretary	
Ehrlich, Anita	1/50	3/50	Clerk-typist	
Isen, Jean	4/45	4/45	Typist	
Englander, Florence	8/46	9/46	Stenographer	
Ewing, Ethel	9/45	6/47	School secretary	
Farley, Miriam S.	11/34 to 1/46	12/48 to present	Res. Assoc; Pamphlet Editor; Editor, Far Eastern Survey.	
Ferber, Stanley	7/47	8/47	Sh. clk.	\$400/mo.
Field, Olga	6/44-8/44	12/44-6/45	Research assoc.	
Fine, Donald	2/46	5/46	Shipping clerk	
Fischl, Margaret	9/44	4/47	Secretary	
Fischman, Bernice	9/46	10/47	Acting Librarian	
Freidman, Frances	10/43	6/44	Secretary	
Freist, Dorothy M.	9/46	9/46	Stenographer	

IPR staff members—Continued

[Submitted by W. L. Holland, 10/10/51]

Name	Started	Resigned	Position	Salary
Frucht, Rita	10/45	10/45		
Fujii, Kazuko Kay	8/49	1/50	Sec'y	
Fujinima, Edward A	9/51	Present	Librarian	
Gallus, Wilya		9/44	Secretary	
Gerber, Lillie	12/45	6/46	Stenographer	
Gerson, Jack	9/51	Present	Bookkeeper	
Gibson, Eulalie	6/46	7/46	Clerk-typist	
Gluck, Filmore	4/47	6/47	(?)	
Gluck	6/47	6/47	(?)	
Godby, Marie	12/44	12/44		
Goldenberg, Rhoda	1/47	10/47	Secretary	
Golembosti, Josephine	10/44	10/44		\$30.20.
Gordon, Gloria	4/46	5/46	Typist	
Gorgas, Ruth	10/47	12/47	Clk-typ	
Grajdanzev, Andrew	1/43	12/43	Research Associate	
	7/44	12/44		
	1/45	1/46	Research Associate	
Green, James	8/47	8/47	Shipping clerk	
Greenberg, Raymond	2/47	3/47	Shipping clerk	
Greenberg, Rose	12/44	12/44		
Greene, Katrine R. C	1/48	1/51	Assistant Secretary	
Greenidge, Gertrude	6/47	4/49	Clerk	
Greenwald, Rosalin	5/48	6/48	Secretary	
Greenwald, Rosalind	8/48	6/50	Secretary	
Grigsby, Deborah	12/47		Temporary secretary	
	1/48	7/49	Secretary	
Gutlman, Renee J.	5/46	9/47	Branch secretary (Washington Office)	
Harrison, Barbara	1/49-1/50		Secretary	
Hasse, Robert	5/51	9/51	Shipping clerk	
Haulsey, Robert	9/47	10/47	Shipping clerk	
Hawkins, Sally R	10/46	7/47	Secretary (Washington Office)	
Hayes, Kathryn	1/49	1/49	Temp. typ	
Healy, Mary	2/43-10/43	4/46-present	Publications sec'y	
Henderson, Martha T.	4/49	4/49	Temp. sec'y	
Hickey, Callie M	10/46	7/47	Secretary	
Hill, Marguerite F	4/47	4/47	Temporary secretary	
Hochschild, Patrick	10/48	5/49	Librarian	
Holland, W. L.	1931-32, 1933		Research sec'y	
	1933-1944		Editor, Pacific affairs	
	1946	Present	Sec'y general	
Hooker, Anne O	1/46	5/46	Secretary	
Hsu, Ying Yung	(?)	9/45	Res Assoc	
Israel, Dorothy		3/44	Secretary	
Issen, Anita	6/46	4/47	Secretary	
Jayson, Alice		7/44	Public relations	
Jenkins, Louise	10/44	11/44		\$30.20.
Johnstone, William C		12/45	Director, Washington office	
Jordan, Myra M.	1/50	5/50	Secretary	
Kahane, Rita	1/45	1/45	Stenographer	
Kawata, George	3/51	9/51	Librarian	
Keil, Dorothea	10/45	10/45		
Kennedy, Bernice	8/45	4/45	Stenographer	
Kilpatrick, Mary J	1/46	8/47	Asst. treas	
Kiyaba, Hiroyo	5/45	8/45	Stenographer	
Kizer, Carolyn A	10/44	2/45		\$40/wk.
Klein, Mildred		4/44		\$30.20.
Kok, Gerard P.	2/47	5/47	Chinese Language Instructor	
Kramer, Sonia	12/46	8/47	Secretary	
Krasnow, Beatrice	3/44	11/44		\$30.20.
Landau, Frances P	1/49	3/49	Secretary	
Lane, Clayton	10/48	7/50	Executive Secretary	
Lasker, Bruno		9/43	Research Associate	
		1/46	Research Associate	
Lattimore, Eleanor	5/44	6/47	Research Associate (Washington Office)	
Lazarus, Ruth J.	12/44	8/45	Secretary	
(As: Ruth Turbin)	1/46	8/46	Secretary	
Leak, Ora	2/51	2/51	Typist	
Lederer, Ilse	3/44	4/44		
Lee, Betty	9/46	10/46	Stenographer	
Lee, Pao-Ch'en	2/47	5/47	Asst Chinese Language Instructor	
Lee, Rossmund		11/45	Promotion secretary	
Levinthal, Harriet		8/46	Switchboard operator	
Levy, Ellen B.	11/45	12/45	Temporary secretary	
Lewis, Rhoda	2/44	2/44		\$22/wk
Lilienthal, Philip E.	10/48		Editor, Far Eastern Survey	
	1/46	Present	Editor, Pacific Affairs	
Lipton, Sony	9/46	11/46	Stenographer	
Ludwig, Dorothy S.	3/4	4/48	Asst. Bookkeeper	
Mack, Virginia	6/44	7/44	(?)	
Marks, Regina	10/46	8/47	Stenographer	
Masselman, Wilhelmina	2/44	4/44	Res	
Marcusson, Ruth	4/46	5/46	Secretary	

IPR staff members—Continued

[Submitted by W. L. Holland, 10/10/51]

Name	Started	Resigned	Position	Salary
Matsuo, Miyaho	5/45	4/45	Stenographer	
Maurer, Adrienne	3/44	3/44		
May, Jean	4/44	9/44		
Mayer, Hilda	12/48	1/49	Clerk-typist	
Mayer, Laura		9/43	Typist	
Mayo, Dorothy		6/44		
McCrimmons, Mary A.	7/50		Temp. typ.	
Millman, Abe J.	3/46	5/46	Stenographer	
Millman, Benjamin	5/46	7/46	Stenographer	
Mills, Harriet	9/44	2/45	Administrative Asst.	
Mitchell, Gloria	1/47	10/51	Secy-bkpr	
	7/46	9/51	Asst. bookkeeper; scy	
Minavonitch, Michael E.	12/45	4/46	Shipping clerk	
Moldauer, Frances (until 1946—Sharpe)		10/47	Supur. pub. distrib. (1 wk. 12/48 as typist)	
Montana, Marjorie	3/51	present	Receptionist	
Moore, Harriet L.		2/44	Acting Exec. Secretary	
Morgan, Leslie	6/51	present	Editorial assist.	
Morita, Betty	8/44	12/44		
Morris, Marion		1/44		
Morris, Wilson	2/45	3/46	Assistant Editor—Pamphlets	
Morrison, Angelina	10/46	10/46	Stenographer	
Morseley, Hilton	11/44	12/44		
Mott, Celestine G.	1/47	3/48	Executive secretary	
Murota, Ayaka	4/47	11/47	Secretary	
Neal, Elizabeth	4/43	12/44	Steno-type	
Nelson, Harry A.	12/44	12/44		
Nerenberg, Clara	9/44	1/45		
Neugebauer, Frieda		6/49	Stenographer	
Newman, Eugene	2/45	6/45	Clerical assistant	
Nitka, Helen E.	12/44	1/45		
Nusbaum, Gladys	3/51	5/51	Typist	
Oka, Kazu	8/50	3/51	Sec'y	
Ormont, Zelda	4/44	4/44		
Ornitz, Sallie		5/44	Secretary	
Oshima, Chiye	7/49	2/51	Distr. Mgr.	
Ota, Marjorie	4/50	9/50	Sec'y	
Park, Unsoon	7/49	9/49	Temp. typ.	
Parker, Bely M.	4/47	7/47	Stenographer	
Parker, Harriet H.	2/44	1/45	Secretary	
Parsons, Katrine	(?)	11/43	Sec'y	
Parsons, Ruth M.	9/44	2/46	Secretary	
Pelan, Frank	12/46	8/47	Shipping clerk	
Pietrowski, Rose	11/44	11/44	Clk-typ.	
Pollard, John A.	4/46	7/46	Director, Washington Office	
Pons, Wei-ta	1/48	11/48	Librarian	
	9/50	3/51	Assistant librarian	
Porter, Catherine		4/51	Res. Assoc.; Editor, Far Eastern Survey	\$400/mo.
Radom, Jane	1/46	10/46	Stenographer	
Reinhold, Anna	4/47	4/47	Temporary secretary	
Resnick, Ruth	2/44	4/44		
Robertson, Gwendolyn	6/46	present	Subscription clerk	
Rogers, Rita S.	2/45	12/45	Secretary	
Root, Constance	12/46	7/47	Promotion Assistant	
Rosberg, Lilian	4/49	Present	Subscript. clerk	
Rosenfeld, Sylvia	1/45	1/45		
Rosenthal, Laura	11/44	5/49	Secretary	
Rosinger, Lawrence K.	9/48	10/50	Research Associate	
Rothman, Rhoda	3/44	10/47	Billing clerk	
Russell, Helen E.	2/45	2/47	Secretary	
St. George, Joan	7/47	3/48	Secretary	
Salisbury, Laurence E.	10/44	5/48	Editor, FAR EASTERN SURVEY	
Sanders, Florence E.	8/44	9/44	Secretary	
Schneer, Sophie		10/44		
Schneider, Helen	4/46	4/49	Bus. Manager	
Sebatz, Louise, H.	1/46	5/47	Promotion Secretary	
Serot, Louise B.	9/46	10/46	Secretary	
Serot, Rhoda	10/46	12/46		
Shahn, Tillie G.	(?)	9/51	Asst. Treas.	
Shavelson, Rita	4/44	5/44		
Shishko, Jerome	3/45	5/45	Clerical assistant	
Skrefstad, Betty	11/43	11/44	Clerk-typist	
	5/47	6/47	Clerk-typist	
Smith, Barbara B.	1/45	9/46	Clerk-typist	
Smith, Lolita W.	7/49	7/49	(?)	
	6/49	7/49	Temporary typist	
Smith, Maggie	3/44	10/46	Acting Librarian	
Snyder, Maxim	6/44	8/44		
Solomon, Rae	9/45	10/45	Shipping clerk	
Soyer, David	6/44	6/45	Clerical asst.	
Spidell, Clara	11/43	12/45	Clerk	
Spillam, Mary C.	10/51	Present	Sec's.	
Stein, Ruth V.	8/50	3/51	Secretary	
Stewart, Marguerite		5/47	School scy; admin. sec'y	

IPR staff members—Continued

[Submitted by W. L. Holland, 10/10/51]

Name	Started	Resigned	Position	Salary
Stewart, Maxwell S.	2/46	2/48	Pamphlet Editor	
Stopp, Ann	2/51	Present	Secretary	
Suguitan, Lucrecia	6/49	12/49	Typist	
Talkington, Marie	1/44	2/44		
Tandetnick, Frances	2/44	2/44		
Taylor, Esther	12/46	3/47	Stenographer	
Taylor, Janet	10/44	10/44	Stenographer	
	2/46	3/46		
Togo, Alice M.	1/46	8/46	Librarian	
Uchida, Yoshi	9/46	7/47	Membership clerk	
Ussachevsky, Elizabeth	8/44	9/45	Secretary	
	9/45	9/46	Secretary, Washington Office	
Van Buren, Dolores	3/46	4/46	Stenographer	
Velleman, Ruth A.	4/48	12/48	Secretary	
Vernon, Robert Jr.	10/44	4/45	Shipping clerk	
Wagner, Joyce	9/44	8/45	Clerk-typist	
Walker, Elmore		3/44		
Waller, Ella S.	9/46	10/46	Stenographer	
Wanderman, Francis Dick	3/48	5/48	Secretary	
Weldom, Albert A.	8/50	1/51	Sh. clk.	
Wentholt, Henrietta		2/44		
Wilder, Nancy		12/44	Sec'y.; edit. assistant	
Winston, Sadei	6/50	9/50	Secretary	
Wise, Masha Switzer	12/44	7/46	Stenographer	
Woods, Caroline		7/44	Librarian	
Wright, Nellie	3/44	6/44	Clerical	
Yardumian, Rose	7/42	10/45	Sec'y.; librarian; sec'y., Washington office.	
Yasumura, Michi	10/44	9/45	Asst. librarian	
Yates, Elizabeth	10/49	2/50	Acting librarian	

EXHIBIT No. 802

SEPTEMBER 26, 1934.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I was greatly interested in reading a copy of your letter to Wellington Liu inquiring whether there was any possibility of securing the services of Chen Han-seng for permanent work in the I. P. R. It is an excellent suggestion and I hope you will keep pushing it. Chen is a first-class researcher with the good knowledge of Russian, French, German, and English as well as one or two Chinese dialects and reading knowledge of Japanese. He is a hard worker and one of the few Chinese researchers whose eyes are not blinded to the real conditions of rural China. While of course he could render great service to the China Council as a colleague working with Liu, I believe from many points of view it would be worth your while appointing him to the Secretariat as my colleague. I shall certainly be glad to make drastic economies in my own budget in order to secure Chen.

As you probably know by now, Chen is living here in Tokyo completing a study of rural conditions in South China and also working over some materials on Chinese economic history at the Oriental Library in Tokyo. He has taken a house here with his wife and will return here again in December after making a short trip back to China in order to get field work started on his I. P. R. study of standards of living in tobacco-producing regions in China.

One reason why I think it is worth your while to push the question still further is that Chen's relations with the Sun Yat-sen Institute and especially with Academia Sinica are not very happy. He is much too close to the radical elements in China to suit the Nanking authorities and I understand that for the time being it is better for Chen's political health to be out of China. I shall be seeing him in a day or two before he goes back to Shanghai and I shall endeavour to sound him out as discreetly as possible on his views about working for the I. P. R.

Sincerely yours,

_____, *Research Secretary.*

WLH: MI
 Copy to Mr. Loomis.
 Copy to Mr. Liu.

EXHIBIT No. 804

MEMORANDUM W. L. HOLLAND TO E. C. CARTER

OCTOBER 4, 1935.

With reference to Harriet Moore's list of discussion questions of Soviet national policy, I suggest that we write to all the other Councils immediately after the Lee Conference, making it clear that "national policy" is being used in a very different sense in the Round Table on Soviet Policy. I would strongly support Harriet's plea for changing the word from "national" to "nationality."

All this is assuming that we would want to limit the Soviet Round Table to the two questions of economic development and policy towards minor nationalities and dependent peoples. There ought to be rather careful discussion of this point to make sure first of all how much of a limitation this really is, and, second whether the Soviet Council would be unwilling to broaden the discussion program to include more general and political aspects of Soviet policy in the Far East.

As you know, I would like to have the broader interpretation so that the Round Table would be more in line with the other Round Tables on Japanese, American, and Chinese national policy. While the Soviet policy towards minor nationalities in its Far Eastern territories is certainly a major element in the total Soviet Far Eastern policy, it would be unfortunate if the discussion went too deeply into the details of cultural autonomy, the language question, et cetera, when there will be nothing comparable in the discussions on other questions, and when most of the other delegates will not be in a position to participate in the discussion for want of detailed knowledge. (Incidentally, I wonder if you have thought of suggesting to Crawford at the University of Hawaii that you and Keesing might invite a Soviet expert to the Conference on Government and Education in Dependent Territories. A Russian could make a real contribution, and would certainly throw a lot of monkey wrenches which ought to be thrown.)

W. L. H.

EXHIBIT No. 805

Copy to F.

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, March 28, 1939.

DEAR BILL: I apologize for not having sent you an earlier answer to your letter of March 13th. In the meantime, however, I have sent formal invitations to Miss Dietrich and Hayden for the Secretariat Inquiry monographs. After consultation with Carter I decided to offer Hayden \$150 and to give him the opportunity to make the report 20,000 to 25,000 words. I have asked Fred to send on to you copies of both letters.

I also took up with Carter the question of having authors' names printed on the cover and title page of Inquiry reports and he has now agreed to make this a general practice.

I am glad to have the news about Riesenfeld and have told Fred that I certainly approve paying him the necessary \$50. In fact, I should be prepared to pay \$75 if necessary. To avoid complicating our bookkeeping I have suggested to Fred that this amount should be paid out of the available funds which the American Council now has and that any necessary additional payments from the International Research Fund should be made later this year.

In Washington I had quite a long talk with Saugstad who was extremely cooperative. The reason for the slightly mysterious tone in his letter to you was that the person he recommends for the shipping study is Mr. Henry L. Deimel, Jr., Assistant Chief in the Division of Trade Agreements (private address 4414 Macomb Street NW., Washington). Deimel, whom I met briefly, has apparently done a good deal of work on shipping and has at various times worked in association with Henry Grady who, incidentally, is his father-in-law. The reason for Saugstad's mysterious phraseology is that (confidentially) Sayre is probably being sent out soon to the Philippines as High Commissioner, and Deimel is being asked to go as his economic advisor. There would be a possibility, however, that Deimel would get leave of absence for about four or five months during the summer before going out to Manila, and during this period he would be willing and in a very good position to prepare a report for the I. P. R.

The State Department would raise no objections to such a procedure and Deimel would also be willing to collect additional information on the way out to Manila. In the meantime he would be able to get access to a great deal of more or less confidential information in Washington.

Deimel impressed me as a capable and well informed person, but I have too little evidence to judge whether he is the best possible person we could get. On the whole, however, I am inclined to offer him the job partly because it might be an extremely valuable way of making use of State Department and other governmental material, and incidentally of working in closely with the State Department. I emphasized to Deimel the fact that the report would have to be of an international character and not merely present American policy and point of view.

In the meantime I should be glad to have your comments on the scheme, and also any other information about Deimel or about the shipping project generally. I shall not make any move until I hear from you.

Meanwhile Hubbard has just sent you a copy of the Imperial Shipping Committee's report on British Shipping in the Orient which is being sent to you. It is better than I had expected and provides a good deal of the information we should want. It is obvious, however, that there is still room for a great deal of work along the lines of more systematic analysis of the problems from an international point of view and quite certain that we should go ahead with the I. P. R. study.

I did not call on Gates in the Civil Aeronautics Commission, chiefly because Saugstad had already warned me off him because Gates apparently, being a fighting young lawyer, has become identified with an anti-Pan-American group and is interested in nothing but ways of reducing the monopolistic power of Pan-American. It also appears that the State Department which has to handle most of the foreign negotiations has more or less unconsciously found itself lined up against Gates as an advocate of Pan-American. Saugstad also emphasized the fact that the State Department has all the information available to the Civil Aeronautics Commission, and in fact is better informed on the international aspects. His recommendation was, therefore, that if we wanted to get any profitable cooperation from people in Washington, it would be much better to do it through the State Department, and he said that he would be prepared to see that we did get the necessary cooperation. Apparently they already have one or two capable young men working on the problem. Obviously there is a little bureaucratic jealousy here, but I think there is a good deal in what Saugstad says, and unless we find strong evidence to the contrary, I should be inclined to take his advice. Here, again, however, I should be glad to have a word from you before I write again to Saugstad.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

W. W. LOCKWOOD Esq.

_____, *Research Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 806

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Amsterdam—London—Manila—Moscow—New York—Paris—Shanghai—Sydney—Tokyo—
Toronto—Wellington

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

GIANNINI FOUNDATION,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
Berkeley, Calif., May 10, 1940.

ECC from WLH:

I was somewhat startled to receive your wire saying that Andrew Ross was waiting for me to write him about a supplementary chapter to Levy's report, but on looking through my files I find a slip of paper with the name Andrew ROTH of 3150 Rochambeau Avenue, written on it. So I am afraid I have clearly been negligent in forgetting all about him. I enclose herewith a note which you might send on to him if it seems suitable. The amount of writing to be done cannot be very great and if Levy's manuscript is only just going to the press there need be no delay in its final appearance. If you or Kate or Jack have

any doubts about the present letter, don't hesitate to scrap it and write Roth directly. (Incidentally you had better find out whether his name is really Ross or Roth.) I apologize sincerely for having slipped up on this matter.

I should not think it was necessary to get Levy's formal permission for this supplementary chapter, but presumably you ought at least to notify him that we are getting it done.

I note that no Inquiry funds will be available for Lockwood's suggested study by Quigley on the Open Door. The study is not within the present field of the International Research Committee and I don't think it would interest Lockwood's committee, although a related study of the Open Door as a cardinal factor in American policy might. I would not regard the suggested Quigley study as of major importance, though it might come on the list of new studies to be undertaken if we get additional Inquiry funds. The subject might be better treated as one chapter of a larger study of new diplomatic machinery for the Far East. How would it be to consult two or three people like Blakeslee, Willoughby, Hornbeck and Quincy Wright, as well as Quigley, about the possible scope and importance of the study? It might also be possible to have the subject treated in a PACIFIC AFFAIRS article and expanded later if it seemed worthwhile.

I agree with so much of what you say in your letter of May 8 about Japanese Trojan Horses in the bosoms of various influential people (a vastly intriguing metaphor when you consider what would have to be done to let the soldiers escape from the Trojan Horse) that I don't propose to do anything further about a possible visit by Alsberg to Japan, particularly as Galen Fisher's visit will be a sufficient goodwill gesture.

If it is convenient I should like to look at "Contemporary International Politics" by Sharp and Kirk, the latter of whom is doing an American Council study on electrical communications in the Pacific. If it seems worthwhile, I shall write a brief review on the Far Eastern sections of the book. Among your suggested reviewers for Morgan Young's book, "The Rise of a Pagan State," I should be inclined to mention Colegrove, but we had probably better not bother him until he finishes his present assignment for us. Would you also send me Lowe's "Japan's Economic Offensive in China," as I may want to review this myself or, perhaps, ask George Taylor to do it.

I am very interested to hear that the Japan Council have translated "Agrarian China." I am delighted that they have done so but so far as I remember this is the first we have been told of it, although it is a Secretariat book. I should like to have two of the copies, if possible. The book should be listed under its Japanese title in the next issue of PACIFIC AFFAIRS, but I don't think it need be reviewed separately. To the best of my recollection we have not yet reviewed "Agrarian China" in PACIFIC AFFAIRS but you might check on this; and if I am right you might get Wittfogel or Cressey or Rossiter of the Department of Agriculture to write about 300 words.

WLH
W. L. H.

EXHIBIT No. 807

MAY 10, 1940.

WLH from ECC:

Jessup rang up just now and says that he fears it was you rather than he who slipped the cog with reference to the Levy supplement. He has just checked with Pepper and I have condensed his message into the following Day Letter:

"Regarding Levy supplement Jessup says he, Pepper, arranged for Andrew Ross see you, that Ross says you promised write him. He is eager and ready and according to Pepper anxious and qualified to go ahead and has been awaiting daily your letter."

I explained to Jessup how terribly rushed you were with a million things just before your departure. Under the circumstances, I assume that you will want to go ahead and have Ross go to work, though I suppose you are still free to cancel your tentative proposal to Ross.

Somehow or other both Jessup and Pepper have the idea that Ross saw you before you left New York. His address is: care the Chinese Department at Columbia.

In the view of Jessup and Pepper his knowledge of French and of France and of the Far East qualify him to do a good job.

EXHIBIT No. 808

BERKELEY, July 5, 1940.

DEAR PHIL GAFFE: The Hollands are duly touched and awed that our offspring should have made such an impact on 129 E. 52nd St. If you want to indicate that Amer and Asia are separated by an ever-renewed body of water, then Patricia is certainly an apt symbol. Photographs a priori and a posteriori will be forthcoming soon.

I should have no objections to putting Owen's article in Amerasia and in some ways I think it would be better to print it immediately rather than have it delayed. It's a difficult topic and I think Owen has made a gallant effort, but I have a slight feeling that he has tried to find too many historical roots for the current, and obviously important, connection between Germany and Japan. Moreover there is singularly little account of the role the U. S. has played and of the fears of the U. S. S. R. regarding the intentions of both Germany and Britain. I should like to see the article end with a more outright plea that only by direct pressure on Japan from the U. S. and by a rapprochement between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. can the Axis powers now be checked.

I hope Amerasia will have a blast against the latest wave of appeasement and Lippmannism favouring a deal with Japan.

My regards to Kate and the rest of the Amerasia bunch.

Yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Copy to CEE, I mean ECC.

EXHIBIT No. 809

Copy for ECC

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., December 1, 1941.

Mr. CARL F. REMER,

*Office of the Coordinator of Information,
Library of Congress Annex, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR REMER; You have probably already heard of this matter through Fans or Fairbank, but I understand that the publishers of the Japanese magazine CHUO KORON wrote sometime ago that they had had to discontinue mailing the periodical to the United States as the United States authorities had been confiscating it as propagandist literature. The United States action may have been quite justified in some cases, but it seems very probable that the Customs authorities have acted as precipitately here as they did formerly with important Soviet magazines which were urgently needed by libraries and research institutions in this country.

If the matter has not already been attended to, it might be worth while for your group to communicate, perhaps through Archibald MacLeish or Mortimer Graves, with the Customs authorities to see that confiscations are handled intelligently and not to the detriment of legitimate research institutions and libraries.

I enclose a circular in Japanese from CHUO KORON.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND, *Research Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 810

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION,
Washington, D. C., March 18, 1942.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,

*Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.*

MY DEAR MR. HOLLAND: The research work of the Institute of Pacific Relations has been directly useful to the Office of the Coordinator of Information in its efforts to meet the urgent demands created by the war. Certain unpublished studies of the Institute have been made available to us during the preparation of reports and you have, yourself, found time to serve as consultant and adviser to our sections dealing with the British Empire and the Far East.

I am sending this brief acknowledgment in the hope that it may be useful to you in making plans and securing funds for the coming year. I think you will agree with me that full informal cooperation must be the basis of the effective use of the limited number of persons with adequate research training to deal with the Far East. The Office of the Coordinator of Information is looking forward to the continuance of such cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES P. BAXTER, 3RD,
Deputy Coordinator.

EXHIBIT No 811

(Pencilled initials) NLH

129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y.,
April 2nd, 1942.

Major G. A. LINCOLN,
*Director of Orientation Course,
Bureau of Public Relations, War Department,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MAJOR LINCOLN: Since I have a certain general responsibility for the publication program of the Institute of Pacific Relations, I have had occasion to learn from Miss Downing your sudden decision to cancel the War Department's order for 10,000 copies of *An Atlas of Far Eastern Politics*. I want to reinforce Miss Downing's reply to you by saying that this Institute has acted in all good faith and has in fact gone to considerable trouble to meet the request originally made by Colonel Beukema, e. g., in getting paper especially manufactured and having the maps rephotographed, etc.

Your action in announcing your dissatisfaction with parts of the book and cancelling the order at this late date without giving us any previous warning comes as a considerable shock, particularly as nothing in our correspondence indicated that your office would require further revisions. Had you mentioned this problem some weeks ago when we were waiting for the paper to be manufactured we should, of course, have done our best to meet your wishes.

I therefore hope that you will carefully consider Miss Downing's suggestion of having a revised edition even now. If you cannot accept this suggestion I hope that you will at least indicate a procedure whereby we can be compensated for the losses we shall suffer through your failure to notify us soon. The direct losses will probably total about \$1,600, and we have not included in this figure any charge for the considerable amount of time which the office staff here has devoted to the problem.

We are genuinely anxious to assist you in your important work. We would therefore like to be given an opportunity to provide the kind of material you want. The only thing we ask is that you give us reasonable notice in the sudden changes of your plans.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 812

129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y.,
April 3rd, 1942.

Mr. GEORGE H. KERR,
*Military Intelligence Division, War Department,
Room 2628, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. KERR: Thank you for your letter of April 2nd about Grajdanzev's report on Formosa. Under separate cover I am sending you an advance copy of the book which is now being bound. I have already sent copies to Remer in the Office of the Coordinator of Information, and to Bisson on the Board of Economic Warfare.

Both Grajdanzev and I would be glad to have your comments and if there are any points which you think should definitely be corrected I would suggest that you let me know in the next day or two as we may want to insert an errata slip in the book. The book itself is unfortunately a makeshift piece of manufacturing because we had to work with an incomplete and unsatisfactory set of proofs.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 813

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2,
RM 2628, MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, April 2, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.

MY DEAR MR. HOLLAND: I regret that my sudden coming to Washington in February precluded further talks with you about Formosa, to say nothing of further writing.

Some weeks ago there came to our M. I. D. files—and my Formosa section—a set of galley sheets of Dr. Grajdanzev's extraordinary good work, which I first saw briefly in your office and now have read thoroughly. No covering letter came with it to me and so it is not clear whether this is a loan or a final gift to our files. If it is not a loan I shall be free to divide it according to subjects and distribute it among my folders. If it is a loan I shall keep it intact and forward it to you as soon as some of the statistical material can be digested. We live very largely on loans these days.

Please tell Professor Grajdanzev that it will give me great pleasure some day to talk with him. His work is certainly excellent. There are only a few minor suggestions I might make, none of first importance.

Have the added chapter or chapters on strategy been set up? I would not be free to add anything attributable to my sources here, but I would be glad to read through the chapter again to make sure that some errors in judgment have not crept in. Needless to say, such checking must be done anonymously.

With every good wish.

[s] George H. Kerr.
GEORGE H. KERR.

My residence address: 2700 Wisconsin Ave., NW.

EXHIBIT No. 814

BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Washington, D. C., July 25, 1942.

In reply refer to: OW-6-RHS.

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: Thank you for sending us the article on the organization of the Chinese Government, which will be most useful to our Far Eastern Division.

Very sincerely yours,

[s] C. R. Vail,
CHESTER R. VAIL,
Acting Chief, Economic Intelligence Division.

EXHIBIT No. 815

Joseph P. Chamberlain, Chairman, Professor of Public Law; Lyman Bryson, Professor of Education; Carter Goodrich, Professor of Economics, Chairman, Governing Body, I. L. O.; Luther H. Gulick, Eaton Professor of Municipal Science and Administration; Carlton J. H. Hayes, Seth Low Professor of History; Charles Cheney Hyde, Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy; Huger W. Jervey, Director, Institute of International Affairs, Professor of Comparative Law; Philip C. Jessup, Professor of International Law; Grayson Kirk, Associate professor of Government; Arthur W. Macmahon, Professor of Public Administration; Wesley C. Mitchell, Professor of Economics; Nathaniel Pepper, Associate Professor of International Relations; Lindsay Rogers, Burger Professor of Public Law, Assistant Director, I. L. O.; J. Russell Smith, Professor of Economic Geography; James T. Shotwell, Boyce Professor of the History of International Relations

Consultants: Dr. Frank G. Boudreau, Director, Mulbank Memorial Fund; Joseph Hyman, Executive Vice Chairman, Joint Distribution Committee; General Frank R. McCoy, President, Foreign Policy Association; Clarence E. Pickett, Executive Secretary, American Friends Service Committee; George L. Warren, Executive Secretary, President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

COMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PROGRAM OF TRAINING IN INTERNATIONAL
ADMINISTRATION

Professor Schuyler C. Wallace, *Director*
Room 513 Fayerweather Hall
University 4-3200, Ext. 188

JULY 31, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.

DEAR BILL: Our arrangements for the course are coming along. Broek will arrive on the 20th of August for the six weeks period. I told him in my letter that you and Lockwood had waived the I. P. R. claims for those six weeks, and that arrangements with the Rockefeller people were feasible. Can you take the initiative with the Rockefeller people, or will he do that, or can I help?

Keesing will come up from the Office of Strategic Services in a consultative capacity one day a week for the first six weeks.

We want very much to have you come up for a few introductory lectures. What we thought you might be willing to do would be to come on August 18, 19, and 20 to give three one-hour lectures, which would do the following:

1. Provide a general introduction to the Pacific area, just touching the high spots as to the divisions of the region, the peoples, etc. Some of the men will be well informed, others may be quite blank about it.

2. A bibliography lecture on materials bearing on the Pacific and Far East, which would include a description of the inquiry series.

3. A talk on the available sources in the New York area, so that the men would know where to go after we assigned them research projects. This would include an indication of what you have at the I. P. R., and references to such other places as the American Museum, the Geographical Society, etc.

We can offer you the modest honorarium of \$150.00 for this series of lectures.

In addition, we hope that you would be willing to contribute some of your time to sitting in with a committee which we are forming on the Pacific area, to plan out our whole curriculum. The committee will include Keesing, Broek, Clare Holt, and Arthur Schiller.

I hope that we can count on your help in these ways.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Phil.
PHILIP C. JESSUP.

PCJ: es.

EXHIBIT No. 816

BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Washington, D. C., Sep. 2, 1942.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street,
New York, New York.

DEAR BILL: I think you will be interested in seeing the enclosed copy of an article by the Vice President on "Economic Warfare—The War Behind the War," which appears in the current issue of the *Army and Navy Journal*. It is the first broad public statement about the work of the Board of Economic Warfare.

Sincerely yours,

[s] BILL
WILLIAM T. STONE, *Assistant Director*.

Attachment.

EXHIBIT No. 817

JULY 6, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM T. STONE,
Board of Economic Warfare,
Department of Economic Warfare,
Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C.

DEAR BILL: You may be interested in these reports of Stein's.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 818

BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Washington, D. C., July 11, 1942.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: Many thanks for your note of July 6, enclosing the radio letter from Guenther Stein. This service is most interesting, and the Board will appreciate receiving the reports regularly as they come in.

Do look me up the next time you are in Washington.

Sincerely yours,

[s] BILL
WILLIAM T. STONE, *Assistant Director.*

EXHIBIT No. 819

MARCH 1, 1943.

KM from ECC

The private document prepared in Washington on the Strength of the Muslim League has come into my hands. It is not available for quotations, nor should any reference be made to it. I thought, however, that you might be interested in seeing it, so I have had copies made. I don't think that it covers the ground, but it does contain one or two interesting points.

164/No. 4/2/1/43

Background information

THE STRENGTH OF THE MUSLIM LEAGUE IN INDIA

MR. JINNAH'S POSITION

Mr. Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League has recently been carrying on a vigorous political drive.

His visit to the Punjab showed the extent to which he has secured contact with the Muslim masses. It can no longer be argued that because at the General Elections it was not able to secure a majority of the Muslim votes in any Province, the Muslim League has no following among the masses. Since 1937, accession to the Muslim League's and Mr. Jinnah's strength has been tremendous. Almost every bye-election in Muslim constituencies has been won by the League and the number of Muslim League members in the various Provincial Legislatures has increased manifold.

The number of Muslim Ministers who now owe allegiance to the League is considerable. The latest accession has come from Sind. Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, who succeeded Mr. Allah Bux, has joined the League and his example has since been followed by all the Sind Muslim Ministers. Here is a survey of the Muslim League position in the Muslim majority Provinces:

PUNJAB

The total number of Muslim members in the Punjab Legislative Assembly is 89. Only one out of these was elected on Muslim League ticket in the General Elections of 1937. The number of Muslims elected on Unionist tickets was 77. All Muslim members of the Unionist Party are, however, now members of the Muslim League under what is known as the Sikander-Jinnah Pact of 1938. The main terms of the Pact were that the Unionist Party's leader, the late Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, with all his Muslim followers in the Assembly should join the League and promise support to it in all Indian constitutional questions. Mr. Jinnah agreed on his part that the Muslim members of the Unionist Party would have freedom in Provincial matters and would be free to pursue the Unionist Party program.

The political complexion of the Punjab made it necessary for the late Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, the Punjab Prime Minister, not to form a Muslim League Government but a Unionist Government in coalition with Hindu and Sikh groups. In all Provincial matters he pursued a more or less independent line and, though professing allegiance to the League and Mr. Jinnah, his policy on all-Indian questions was at times embarrassingly independent of the League. On the other

hand, Sir Sikander never openly flouted any League mandate and he resigned from the National Defence Council when required by the League.

The *Civil and Military Gazette* of Lahore recently wrote: "What is consistently ignored is the fact that Mr. Jinnah and Sir Sikander are mutually dependent; their common fundamental purpose must over-ride differences arising from the admitted diversity of their 'spheres of influence.' Whatever their personal predilections, circumstances must force the Muslim League President and the Premier of the Punjab (so long as he is a Muslim) to run in double harness until India's future is hammered out; and that Constitution may conceivably effect even closer cooperation between them."

Mr. Jinnah's recent Punjab tour monopolised public attention, not only because of his public utterances on topical questions, but also because of the object underlying his visit. Recent attempts made by the Punjab Premier to settle the communal problem in that part of the country on a Provincial basis irrespective of an all-Indian agreement, must doubtless have caused anxiety to Mr. Jinnah. The formula favored by Sir Sikander, according to most reports conceded self-determination to the Hindu and Sikh minorities in the event of a Muslim plebiscite deciding in favor of secession in a post war settlement. The minorities may form a separate State or join the main Indian Union. Negotiations went on for some time amongst the various parties but ultimately broke down or were adjourned because it was said that he Hindus wished to consult the Mahasabha.

Soon after, Mr. Jinnah arrived in the Punjab and in his first public utterance made a pointed reference to the main basis of the scheme without naming it and condemned the move to give the right of self-determination to "Sub-National" groups like the Hindus and the Sikhs in the Punjab and the Muslims in the United Provinces. He further tried to win over the Sikhs to his conception of Pakistan by reassuring them that their interests would be safe under a Muslim State. This failed, but Mr. Jinnah succeeded in scotching the "mischievous idea, as he described it, of a purely Provincial settlement of the communal problem and laid down that "no settlement is worth the paper on which it is written either in the Punjab or elsewhere, so far as Muslims are concerned, except with the Muslim League."

Later, Mr. Jinnah in another speech said that he had not referred to the Sikander formula, which he had not even studied in his earlier speech. This enabled Sir Sikander Hyat Khan to make a rapprochement with Mr. Jinnah and declare himself to be a loyal supporter of the Muslim League. If there were any differences between Sir Sikander and Mr. Jinnah, it was explained, they related more to the method than to the policy and program of the Muslim League and were intended solely to further its aims and ideals.

Attempts have lately been made to show that the Sikander formula is in accordance with the League's resolution on Pakistan which visualised territorial adjustments. The formula allowed this in accordance with the desires of the communities concerned and to that extent unintentionally conceded the right of self-determination to the Hindus and the Sikhs. However, the problem is no more a live issue. Mr. Jinnah has applied the damper and as a result of his visit to the Punjab he is back again in the position he occupied prior to Sir Sikander's attempt.

The death of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan on December 26th was regarded by the New York Times correspondent (N. Y. T., Dec. 29) as considerably strengthening Mr. Jinnah's position by removing the only Muslim figure important enough to challenge him.

BENGAL

Out of a total of 123 Muslim members in the Bengal Assembly and 30 in the Legislative Council, 43 and 11 members, respectively, follow the Muslim League.

Mr. Fazlul Haq, the Premier of Bengal, who had been a member of the Muslim League since 1918, resigned in 1940 when disciplinary action was threatened against him for accepting membership of the National Defence Council, from which, however, he resigned. The Muslim League expelled him on December 11, 1941, for having formed a coalition Ministry in Bengal without its sanction.

Some unconfirmed reports have appeared in the press that Mr. Fazlul Haq had met Mr. Jinnah recently in Delhi. Another report said that Mr. Haq had rejoined the Muslim League. On this the Bengal Premier made the following statement: "The news published by *Independent India* (Mr. M. N. Roy's Delhi paper) about my rejoining the Muslim League raises an irrelevant issue. I maintain I was never out of the League, I am still in the League. Therefore,

the question of my rejoining does not arise. As regards Mr. Jinnah, I have never been at war with him, nor do I intend to be so. I am not at war with anybody. I am at war with untruths."

SIND

Out of 35 Muslim members in the Sind Assembly, only 13 were elected on Muslim League ticket. With the return of Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah as Premier of the Province in October last, a number of M. L. A.'s have joined the League. Sir Ghulam and all his Muslim Ministers are now members of the League, and the strength of the League party is now 26 out of 35.

Sir Ghulam resigned from the Muslim League when Mr. Allah Bux took him into his Cabinet two years ago. His rejoining the League has been prompted by a desire to strengthen the Ministry that he formed on Mr. Allah Bux's dismissal.

ASSAM

Out of 34 Muslim members in the Assam Assembly, originally only 3 were elected on Muslim League ticket. But, a few months after the General Elections 30 members signed on as a Muslim League Party. The Premier, Sir Mohammad Saadullah Khan, has been strictly following Muslim League discipline. He resigned from the National Defence Council when required by the League to do so. On recently assuming office he claimed that his Cabinet was representative of Assam's people. No mention was made of the party affiliations of the Muslim members of his Cabinet. In all his public utterances since assuming office, he has refrained from mentioning the Muslim League.

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

Out of 38 members in the N.-W.F. Province Legislative Assembly, only 12 belong to the League Party. The only sign of a weakening of the Congress Party in the Province has been the resignation of Arbab Abdul Ghafoor Khan, M. L. A., ex-Parliamentary Secretary, from the Congress Party and the Red Shirts, but he did not join the Muslim League. He formed a new organisation called the Pashtoon Jirga. It aims at an independent Pathan State, run in accordance with the laws of the Shariat. In a statement, Arbab Abdul Ghafoor Khan said that an alliance with the Congress was harmful as the Pathans were gradually losing their identity and drifting away from religion.

	Total Muslim Members of leg- islatures	Total Muslim League members
Punjab.....	89	78
Bengal.....	1 123	1 43
	2 30	2 11
Sind.....	35	26
Assam.....	34	30
North West.....		
Frontier Province.....	38	12
Totals.....	349	211
Percent.....		60.45

¹ Lower House.

² Upper House.

IMPORTANT NOTE.—It is important to remember in using the above figures that they show the strength of the Muslim League among the Muslim members of the Legislatures of Muslim majority provinces; they do *not* show Muslim League strength in Hindu majority provinces (these figures will be released later when available).

JH: MC.

EXHIBIT No. S20

(Pencilled note) Same letter to Bisson, Moser, Shoemaker, Bloch, Orchard, Remer, Fahs.

Dr. HUGH BORTON,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR HUGH: Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of "Korean Industry and Transport" by Grajdanzev. We would appreciate having your comments on this.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. S21

(Handwritten letter.)

GRAJDANZEV, *Sunday, Jan. 17, 1943.*

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: Since Tuesday I am working in the B. of E. W. on Japanese materials and will finish work on Tuesday, 5:30 p. m., so that I shall be back in the office Wednesday morning. I believe that my stay here is useful, because I think I shall be able to prepare 3 articles—

- (1) Japan after December 7, political
- (2) Japan after December 7, economic
- (3) Japanese policy in the occupied areas.

Of course, the picture is far from complete, but I believe that those who do not have access to special sources of information will be glad to read my story. Whether you will approve all these three articles and whether to publish them in the F. E. S. or elsewhere—it will be, of course, up to you. I shall prepare the articles in the shortest possible time, let us say—the first one may be ready in one week after my return.

Yours sincerely,

[s] A. GRAJDANZEV.

P. S. But I may stay here even Wednesday, if not all will be finished.

(Handwritten letter)

EXHIBIT No. S22

A. GRAJDANZEV,
July 22, 1942.

To the SECRETARY OF RESEARCH,
 I. P. R.,
 W. L. HOLLAND

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: I read the letter of Mr. Norman's and the outline of the research project on industrialization of the Soviet Asia, prepared by A. Yugon. I have to make the following comments on this project.

(1) I do not know whether it is good for the Institute to finance the work of a person who is a noted political figure, so long as the Institute has the Soviet Union council as a member and so long as the Soviet Union government is not over thrown by German and Japanese arms.

As you may see from the curriculum Vital he was the editor and head of the ec. department of Sotsialistichemyi vestnik since 1923—a magazine of Russian Men'sheviki, published abroad, and his part, so far as I know, was larger than that. The Soviet representatives may not protest now, when they are hard pressed; but they may have a certain feeling about that.

If the Institute finds that such work is a necessity, why not entrust it to such a person as, say, Mandel of the A. R. I., who is able, acquainted with Russian literature and language, and, probably, would be acceptable for the Soviet and American circles?

(2) I have no honor of being acquainted with Mr. Yugon; but I read his books and I think that all of them are superficial, including his last one, Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace. Of course, this is my personal opinion and it is worth just so much.

(3) I was of the opinion that we have no materials and studies enough for a serious-book on the Soviet Asiatic regions. I am of the same opinion now. But in so far as many stupid and empty books on this or other regions are

written (an example, "Russia and Japan," by Maurice Hindus), I think a fairly tolerable book of that type can be written and be reasonably informative.

(4) The sources presented by Mr. Yugon are not new to those who study Russia; it is clear that they do not go much beyond 1937 or even 1936, though the chief ec. development took place in Siberia after that date.

(5) Some of the points of the outline are bordering on nonsense.

"(a) Superindustrialization as the fundamental idea of the Five-year plan." Superindustrialization was not the fundamental idea of any of the Five-year plans.

B 4, c—"Forest industries of Buryat-Mongolia." That is the only place in outline on Western and Eastern Siberia where forest industries are mentioned, though it is not in Buryat-Mongolia primarily (which contains so much of the steppe) that forest industry is developed in Siberia.

B 5, f—"Hunting of fur-bearing animals" under the general title the industrialization of Soviet Asia!

(6) Distortion and mutilations of Russian words go beyond the permissible misprints. Could not Mr. Yugon spend a few minutes in going over these names and giving us something actual instead of mythical "Sahalimsk" and many other places like that?

(7) In the sources I see many books included presumably for the increase of the number of titles.

What relation can have "Stenographic Report of the Shakhtinsky trial, 1935"? The trial was related to Don. Cas. production, and not to Siberia. Why then are omitted recent trials?

What is there useful for this book in Tugan-Bavanovsky, The Russian Factory, where there is nothing about Siberia.

The book of Kabo about Tannu-Tuva republic?

Miller's History of Siberia, which ends, as far as I remember, in the seventeenth or eighteenth century?

Shulpin—Sea hunting?

Sergeyer, The Soviet Pacific Islands?

Gapanovich, Russia in Northeast Asia?

Burthold, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion, bibliography!!!
and other not less striking examples.

The decision is, of course, up to you. I only point out to certain things which deserve your attention.

Yours sincerely,

[S] A. GRAJDANZEV.

EXHIBIT No. 823

FREE DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR "KOREAN INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT" BY AJG

For Comment (with the Compliments of WLH) :

Hugh Borton, Department of State, Washington, D. C.

T. A. Bisson, 353 Willard Avenue, Chevy Chase, Maryland

Dr. C. K. Moser, Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C. (Far Eastern Section)

James Shoemaker, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C.

Kurt Bloch, Fortune Magazine, Time and Life Bldg., Rockefeller Center, N. Y.

Mrs. Dorothy Orchard, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C.

Carl Remer, Office of Strategic Services, Library of Congress Annex, Washington

Charles B. Fahs, Office of Strategic Services, Library of Congress Annex, Washington

With the Compliments of WLH :

G. Nye Steiger, Simmons College, Boston, Mass.

George Taylor, Room 3313, Social Security Bldg., 4th & Independence Ave., Washington

Owen Lattimore, Office of War Information, 111 Sutter Street, San Francisco, Calif.

American Council (3 copies)

Margaret Cleeve, Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, London, S. W. 1, England (2 copies)

W. D. Berrie, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 369 George Street, Sydney

F. L. W. Wood, Victoria University College, Wellington, W. 1, New Zealand
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 700 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.

Kilsoo Haan

Food Research Institute, Stanford University, California

Ben Dorfman, Tariff Commission, Washington, D. C.

Mrs. Vera M. Dean, Foreign Policy Association, 22 East 38th Street, New York

Col. M. W. Pettigrew, Chief, Far Eastern Unit, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington

J. B. Condliffe, Carnegie Endowment, 405 West 117th Street, New York

League of Nations Secretariat, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N. J.

International Labor Office, 3480 University Street, Montreal, Canada

G. E. Voitinsky, Institute of World Economics & Politics, Academy of Science, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

Sir George Sansom, British Embassy, Washington

Douglas MacLennan, Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 230 Bloor St., West Toronto, Canada

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Department of State, Washington, D. C.

Shannon McCune, BEW, 2501 Q Street NW., Washington, D. C.

EXHIBIT No. 824

PREFACE

This preliminary report is part of a larger study on Modern Korea to be published later by the International Secretariat of the IPR. Other sections of this book were submitted as documents for the Mont Tremblant Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in December 1942, one entitled "Memorandum on Korea's Agriculture and Resources" and the other "Memorandum on Politics and Government in Korea."

The author and the IPR Secretariat will welcome readers' comments and suggestions for improvements to be made in the final version of the book. The author alone is responsible for statements of fact or opinion expressed in this report.

For convenience in following the author's references herein to other chapters in the book, some of which are included in the above-mentioned memoranda and some are still only in manuscript, the following table of contents of the whole book may be useful.

- I. Introduction (partly included in Agriculture and Resources)
- II. General Information (partly included herein)
- III. Historical Sketch
- IV. Population (included in Agriculture and Resources)
- V. Agriculture (included in Agriculture and Resources)
- VI. Forestry and Fishing (included in Agriculture and Resources)
- VII. Power and Mineral Resources (included in Agriculture and Resources)
- VIII. Industry (included herein)
- IX. Communications and Transport (included herein)
- X. Money and Banking
- XI. Public Finance
- XII. External Trade
- XIII. Government (included in Politics and Government)
- XIV. Courts, Prisons, and Police
- XV. Health, Education, and Religion
- XVI. Problems of Korean Independence (included in Politics and Government)
- Statistical Appendix Bibliography

W. L. HOLLAND,
Research Secretary.

NEW YORK, April 1943

EXHIBIT No. 825

MAY 19, 1943.

Miss HILDA AUSTERN,
Assistant Treasurer's Office.

DEAR HILDA: This will be your authority to remit the sum of \$183 by cable through the bank of China to Mr. Guenther Stein in Chungking (c/o Press Hostel). This is an advance payment for reports he is to send by radio and mail on current developments in Free China. This should be charged under the above title to reserve fund in the current International Research Budget.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 826

JULY 20, 1943.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
*Office of War Information,
111 Sutter Street, New York City.*

DEAR OWEN: The enclosed extract from my letter to Norine about his book on Sinkiang is self-explanatory. I would greatly appreciate it if you would do what you can to interest the University of California Press in publishing it for us.

I was sorry that you could not find time to do the review of the Russian book, but I realize that it is a considerable chore. We will definitely count on it for our December issue, and I suggest that you make it into a review article in essay form. I hope you can complete the job by the middle of September at the latest.

What do you think about Bisson's article on China in the current Far Eastern Survey? As you can imagine, it has caused a considerable storm among some of the official Chinese here. While I disagree with some of Bisson's terminology I think the article is fundamentally sound and says a lot of things that many people feel ought to have been said before this. I suspect it would have been better tactics to emphasize the possibilities of reform within the Kuomintang and under the leadership of the Generalissimo and the younger members of the party rather than to play up the contrast with the Communist areas. C. L. Hsia is of course very angry and says it will seriously harm the IPR both here and in China. We have offered them an opportunity to reply or submit another article, but I am not sure whether they will accept.

Carter and I have been told to be ready to leave around the end of this month, although there is still no assurance that we will get our priorities. If you are going to be in Washington about that time, please be sure to let us know, as we would both very much like to get your advice on whom to see and how generally to behave in China.

All the best.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 827

FEBRUARY 21, 1944.

Mrs. WILMA FAIRBANK,
*Division of Cultural Relations,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR WILMA: Under separate cover and at John's request, I am sending you a package of Chinese manuscripts which were erroneously sent here with some other material which John brought back from China. They seem to have been sent by Lowdermilk for somebody in the Library of Congress. I told John about them on Friday and he asked me to return them to you.

With reference to your note to Art Bisson with reference to Chien's article on local government in China, you have probably noticed that it was published in the December 1943 issue of Pacific Affairs. At Chien's instructions, I have paid the fee to Professor Pei in this country together with an additional \$200 - representing part payment for the larger study of China's Government and Politics which Chien is now doing for us. I am anxious to find some way of remitting another \$400 to him during the next few months. I would greatly

appreciate it if you could suggest some way of doing this. I have already sent a message to Bob Barnett requesting his help, but I doubt if he can manage more than about \$200 for the present. Incidentally, I should greatly appreciate if it you could let me know privately, perhaps through Rose Yardumian at our Washington office, when John Davies is likely to be going back. I have one or two personal messages which I should like him to take.

Best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 828

KKA

DECEMBER 7, 1943.

Dr. WILLIAM T. HOLLAND,

*Research Director of the International Council Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR DR. HOLLAND: The material which you were so kind as to loan to this office has been most helpful. Thank you for putting it at our disposal for the last week.

The address by Chou En Lai at Yen-an, the disposition of Japanese and puppet troops in China, and the Report from Yen-an on Communist and Kuomintang effort in the War are being returned at this time. The "Situation in China" and An Answer to Chinese Comments, by V. Rogev are being used at the present time. They will be returned to you this week if that is agreeable to you.

Thank you again for allowing this office to make use of the timely and valuable reports listed above.

[s] E L Barlow,

EDWARD L. BARLOW,

Lt. Colonel, G. S. C., Chief, NY Office, MID.

EXHIBIT No. 829

8th Floor

1270 Sixth Avenue

New York, N. Y.

Telephone: Circle 6-4250

DECEMBER 6, 1943.

In reply refer to: KKA:sms

Dr. WILLIAM T. HOLLAND,

*Research Director, International Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, Fourth Floor, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: The enclosed report on "The Situation in China," by Mr. V. Rogev, has aided the work of this office. Thank you for your cooperation in making this report available.

"The Situation in China" and "An Answer to Chinese Criticisms", by Mr. V. Rogev, are being returned at this time.

[s] E. L. Barlow,

EDWARD L. BARLOW,

Lt. Col., G. S. C., Chief, N. Y. Office, MID.

Enclosures : 2 Reports

EXHIBIT No. 830

8th Floor

1270 Sixth Avenue

New York, N. Y.

Telephone: Circle 6-4250

DECEMBER 1, 1943.

In reply refer to: AAL:med

Dr. WILLIAM T. HOLLAND,

*Research Director of the International Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54 Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: This is to acknowledge receipt of material, which you turned over to Miss Francis of this office, as follows:

1. "Situation in China." By V. Rogev. (Translation from the Russian journal War and the Working Class.)
2. Answer to Chinese Comments. By V. Rogev. (Translation from the Russian journal War and the Working Class, September 1943.)
3. Address by Chou En Lai at Yen-an.
4. Disposition of Japanese and puppet troops in China. (Original with some Chinese characters and partial carbon copy without Chinese characters.)
5. Report from Yen-an on Communist and Kuomintang effort in the war.

This material will be returned to you at the end of this week.

Thank you for your assistance in making these documents available to this office.

[s] E. L. Barlow,

EDWARD L. BARLOW,

Lt. Colonel, G. S. C., Chief, N. Y. Office, MID.

EXHIBIT No. 831

8th Floor

New York, N. Y.

1270 Sixth Avenue

Telephone: Circle 6-4250

In Reply

Refer To:

DECEMBER 3, 1943.

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,

1 East 54th Street, New York City, N. Y.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: We are returning herewith the following material which you so kindly loaned to this office:

- The Progress of Indian Industries during the War, by D. N. Ghose, No. 10295.
- 2 Issues of the People's War, newspaper of Indian Communist Party, No. 10295.
- 2 Issues of The Student, journal of the All India Students' Federation, No. 10295.
- 2 Pamphlets from Oxford Pamphlets on Indian Affairs, series, No. 10295.
- 4 Pamphlets, publ. by Peoples Publishing House, Bombay, No. 10295.
- 5 Pamphlets, publ. by the New India Planning Groups, No. 10295.

Your kind cooperation and interest in making this available is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ E. L. Barlow,

EDWARD L. BARLOW,

Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.

By hand

16 items

edm

EXHIBIT No. 832

MARCH 2, 1944.

Dr. LAUGHLIN CURRIE,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR DR. CURRIE: This is just to let you know that I have filed my application for final citizenship papers. The application is dated March 1 and the Serial Number of my first papers (Declaration of Intention) is D22-108175. The application has been filed at the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 70 Columbus Avenue, New York 23.

Admiral Yarnell has written my draft board supporting Carter's application for my deferment on occupational grounds. Apparently President Wilbur, of Stanford, and President Sproul, of the University of California, have also written in similar vein. I have told Carter, however, that even if he gets deferment for me I shall want to take a Government job which is more directly connected with the war, and that I shall stay on only for three or four months until Carter can find a successor to me.

At the moment the most promising openings in Washington seem to be a Navy job in the Bureau of Occupied Areas, where there seems to be some hope of my getting a Commission, or a job in O. S. S. The latter would probably be more to my taste, as it would be concerned with the India-China-Burma theater. However, it is almost impossible to get a deferment for a civilian job in O. S. S., and it is therefore a question of whether O. S. S. can also get a Navy commission for me, since Army commissions are now practically unobtainable.

I should be most grateful if you can do anything to speed up my naturalization. I apologize for inflicting this chore on you when you are so busy, but I don't know anyone else who would be in a position to help me in this way.

Best wishes.

Yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 833

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 11, 1944.

Informal

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
*Institute of Pacific Relations,
 1 East 54 Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: With reference to your letter of February 21, 1944, I am glad to hear that Chien's article on Local Government in China was published in the December 1943 issue of Pacific Affairs. For my records, and because the manuscript was transmitted through the Department, would you let me know what the fee on this was and to whom it was paid [penciled: Yes \$100.] (Chou, Pei-yuan?) Are there reprints of this article for Chien? We might be able to send two or three to him by pouch. In the case of other manuscripts placed here through our office we have also offered to distribute reprints to a list of persons in this country to be designated by the author.

I trust that Rose gave you my message regarding John Davies' departure and the transmission of funds.

Sincerely yours, '

Wilma Fairbank.
 (Mrs.) WILMA FAIRBANK.

EXHIBIT No. 834

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 18, 1944.

Informal

Mr. T. A. BISSON,
*American Council,
 Institute of Pacific Relations,
 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR ART: On October 19, 1943 I wrote to you about T. S. Chien's article Wartime Local Government in China which Harriet had told me would probably appear in the December issue of Pacific Affairs.

Can you tell me whether the article has appeared, if there is any honorarium, and if there will be any reprints for him?

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Wilma F.
(Mrs.) WILMA FAIRBANK.

EXHIBIT No. 835

1 EAST 54 STREET, March 20, 1944.

Mrs. WILMA FAIRBANK,
Division of Cultural Relations
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR WILMA: With reference to your letter of March 11, I confirm the fact that we paid Professor Chien \$100 for his article on Local Government in China. This was in accordance with the arrangement I had made with him when I requested the article several months earlier. On Chien's request, the payment was made to Professor Chou in this country. We are not supplying reprints of articles, but I am sending you two copies of the magazine in the hope that you can either send these complete to Chien or tear out the pages containing his article.

Incidentally, if you ever have promising articles on China's social, political, or economic problems, please let me know as we may occasionally be able to use them in PACIFIC AFFAIRS. As a general rule, we don't pay for articles and the payment to Chien was regarded as an advance payment on the larger book he is doing for us. However, we sometimes are able to make modest payments in special cases.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 836

MARCH 22, 1944.

Professor SCHUYLER WALLACE
Columbia University,
431 West 117 Street, New York 27, N. Y.

DEAR SCHUYLER: As you may know, Andrew J. Grajdanzev, one of our Research Associates and our principal expert in the Japanese language, is temporarily on leave getting some teaching experience at Oregon State College. We hope to get him back here in the summer, but Carter and I have promised to find a part-time academic post for him in or near New York. Because of your possible need for people who are pretty well-informed on Japanese language sources and on the economic and social problems of Japan, Korea and Formosa, I wonder whether there is any likelihood of your using him on a part-time basis at the Navy School.

As you may know from Phil Jessup and Nat Peffer, Grajdanzev is apt to be excessively polemical. Moreover, his spoken English, though fluent and pungent, is not always elegant or idiomatic. I am certain, however, that his experience in teaching will have greatly diminished these two faults. He would be particularly useful in lectures to seminars on rather specific and even technical problems relating to industry, trade, transport, shipping, banking and agriculture in the Japanese empire. He is perhaps more intimately acquainted than any other research worker outside Washington with the Japanese materials on these topics. We shall shortly be publishing his big book on Modern Korea and he is now working on a detailed study of Japanese Agriculture. As you probably know, he took his Ph. D. in Economics at Columbia and the Korea book was submitted as the dissertation. Peffer was rightly critical of the language and aggressive style of much of it, but we are editing it pretty severely for publication.

Grajdanzev will probably come back in June and I imagine he would be prepared to do some teaching during the summer if necessary. He is an Assistant Professor at the moment. Let me know if you see any prospect of using him.

As you may have heard, my draft board relented and gave me a six-month deferment, only till about the end of August. I may take a part-time Government job before that time but my main job will still be here.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 837

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
NAVAL SCHOOL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION,
March 23, 1944.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
*Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York, New York.*

DEAR BILL: Could I hold off giving you a definite answer on Grajdanzev for another week or two insofar as summer work is concerned. I am quite sure that we will be very much interested in making use of him on a part-time basis in the fall.

I am delighted indeed that your draft board has given you a six months' deferment and definitely hope that they will renew it at a later period. It seems utterly ridiculous to force you into uniform when you are doing more effective work where you are.

Cordially yours,

SCHUYLER.

ECC (handwritten) Encouraging, ECC.

EXHIBIT No. 838

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
April 14, 1944.

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
*Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, New York.*

DEAR BILL: We are scheduling your lectures for Tuesday mornings beginning with May 2nd as you suggest.

I am leaving in about an hour for a two weeks' holiday and have not yet begun to work on the summer schedule. The more I think about it, I doubt very much whether we will want to have Mr. Grajdanzev do any lecturing during the summer. We might conceivably use him as a consultant in connection with some of the projects if he can be cleared by the Office of Naval Intelligence. I will leave a note asking Jessup to start the machinery going to get such clearance if Mr. Grajdanzev is willing to have the investigation started on the basis of a possibility, not a certainty.

Cordially yours,

Schuyler.
SCHUYLER C. WALLACE.

EXHIBIT No. 839

APRIL 12, 1944.

Prof. SCHUYLER C. WALLACE,
*Columbia University,
431 West 117 Street, New York 27, N. Y.*

DEAR SCHUYLER: Thanks for your note of April 8. If it's not inconvenient, I should prefer Tuesday morning presumably beginning May 2.

Is there any likelihood of your being able to reach and decision in the near future about employing Andrew Grajdanzev? May we assume that you will certainly not require his services for the Summer Session? I ask simply because he has asked us to arrange some lectures before he returns from Oregon.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 840

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
NAVAL SCHOOL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION,
New York 27, N. Y., April 8, 1944.

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York, New York.

DEAR BILL: After looking over the schedule it appears that we can run your series of lectures on either Monday or Tuesday a. m. or Monday at 4:00 p. m. It does not make much difference to us which hour you prefer. If anything, I think Monday morning would be slightly preferable, but only slightly so.

Cordially yours,

Schuler,
SCHUYLER C. WALLACE.

EXHIBIT No. 841

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC LAW AND GOVERNMENT,
March 27, 1944.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: Since you say so, I agree that I undertook to draft some outline for the Far East security organization but I am appalled at the thought. There are dozens of schemes running around and I have been participating in one or two groups that have been dealing with some of them. I think the one to which Bill Johnstone refers must be that which is being developed by a little committee under Phil Nash. I have a recent text of their draft. There is also a draft prepared by the former League of Nations group in London which I also have. I am not sure whether at this stage any particular draft should be selected for the kind of criticism you suggest unless it be the London draft which has a certain authority because of its signatories. I shall turn the matter over in my mind and we can talk about it a little later.

I shall keep in touch with you about the question of your taking another job.
Sincerely yours,

Phil.
PHILIP C. JESSUP.

EXHIBIT No. 842

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 10, 1944.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
Pacific Affairs,
1 East 54th Street, New York, New York.

DEAR BILL: I am inclosing for the information of yourself and Mr. Carter excerpt from letter which I have just received from Adler.

I would appreciate, for obvious reasons, your not showing this around and your not disclosing your source of this information.

Sincerely,

Irving.
IRVING S. FRIEDMAN.

Enclosure.

Do you see the I. P. R. crowd nowadays? If you do, you might inform them that they have completely baffled decent people here by appointing Wellington Liu to the Secretariat of the forthcoming I. P. R. Conference and by allotting him US\$10,000 for research? For some reason or other they don't want to believe what is common knowledge here, namely that Liu is a pretty highly placed member of Tai Li's outfit. I had a talk with Holland on the subject last summer and he seemed to require written evidence to establish Liu's membership in the Secret Service. Since then I have received further evidence—not written but satisfactory to anyone but an ostrich—that such is the case. Of course he will be very well placed from his point of view in the I. P. R. Secretariat.

EXHIBIT No. 842-A

MAY 1, 1944.

Mr. IRVING FRIEDMAN,
United States Treasury, Washington, D. C.

DEAR IRVING: I have been meaning to call on you in Washington to acknowledge your note of April 10 with the excerpt from Adler's letter but I don't seem able to escape from O. S. S. where I am now working every Thursday.

I appreciate knowing about Adler's comment although it contains nothing new. Adler has got things a bit twisted about the I. P. R. research grant, most of which is to be kept here for publication purposes. Another grant of US\$10,000 was made by a Chinese in New York partly for the relief of selected Chinese scholars.

Adler's account of my alleged blindness to Liu's connections with Tai is not very fair. I talked about the matter with him at some length in Calcutta. I would rather you did not pass the information on but the situation is that Liu has a number of personal friends in Tai's organization and he came to the attention of Tai himself some years ago because of his friendship for a Shanghai engineer who unsuccessfully tried to assassinate Wang Ching-wei. Liu has talked to me really frankly about the whole business and gave a very convincing story though I have no means, of course, of proving it. Liu says he had been repeatedly asked by Tai Li to work for him but has always refused largely because his wife and friends have urged him not to accept. One of Liu's closest friends in this country says he is quite certain that Liu is not working for Tai.

Even if the allegation were true, there is not much that Carter or I could do about it as Liu is employed by the China I. P. R., not by us. He is probably coming to New York this summer to put a number of research reports through the press in preparation for our January conference.

One of the incidental advantages of the rumors of Liu's connection with Tai is that it has thus far saved the China I. P. R. from suffering the fate of all similar organizations in China, namely being swallowed up by Kung. To the best of my belief, the funds which the China I. P. R. has recently succeeded in raising have been obtained because of the personal interest expressed by the Generalissimo. What bank or agency actually turned over the funds I don't know but I am pretty sure it was not the usual handout from Kung.

Let's try to have lunch sometime soon. There are several things I want to discuss with you.

Yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 843

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES,
Washington, D. C., 12 April 1944.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
*Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: Will you be good enough to fill out the enclosed form and return it to me. We have put through a request for your appointment as a WOC Consultant. You will get \$10 per diem in lieu of subsistence, and your railroad fare. I have told Personnel that you will be here on April 20.

Sincerely,

/s/ Alice B. Foy

ALICE B. FOY,

Administrative Office, Planning Staff.

EXHIBIT No. 844

APRIL 17, 1944.

Miss ALICE B. FOY,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MISS FOY: Thank you for your letter of April 12 enclosing the Federal Employment form which I return herewith. You will see that I have filled out only some of the questions. Having wasted a great deal of time already filling in a twelve page application form for O. S. S., I am not disposed to repeat the process. Your office is at liberty to answer the remaining questions on the basis of what I have already submitted. If this is done, I should be prepared to consider signing the application form,

If this procedure is likely to prevent your office from employing me on April 20, perhaps you would be good enough to let me and also Dr. Norman Brown know. I am sorry to appear uncooperative but there is a limit to the number of forms I can bring myself to fill in for the Government.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

enc.

EXHIBIT No. 845

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
 NAVAL SCHOOL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION,
New York 27, N. Y., April 25, 1944.

Mr. WM L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York, New York.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: As you perhaps know, Mr. Wallace has been out of town for a few days. Before his departure, he indicated that you had requested that if possible, your class be scheduled on Tuesday mornings. Accordingly, we have made the following arrangements:

Your lecture series on South East Asia will come on May 2, 9, 16 and 23rd, from 9 to 11 in the morning, in Room 302, Fayerweather Hall.

I hope that this arrangement is satisfactory.

Very truly yours,

L. H. Chamberlain
 L. H. CHAMBERLAIN,
Lieut. (jg) USNR, Academic Aide.

EXHIBIT No. 846

MAY 17, 1944.

Mrs. ELEANOR LATTIMORE,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
744 Jackson Place, N. W., Washington, D. C.

DEAR ELEANOR: I enclose three letters to people in Chungking which I should very much like to have delivered by Owen if it's not too inconvenient for him. I know it's a bit of an imposition as he will probably be asked to carry dozens of other messages, but if he can manage to take them I shall be extremely grateful. I certainly wish I were going along. It will be a most interesting and probably critical time in Chungking.

I am just starting to read the first draft of the Wallace pamphlet which looks like a very interesting job.

I am glad you can review the book on the Gobi desert.

Yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

encs. 3.

EXHIBIT No. 847

FREE WORLD

FREE WORLD HOUSE, 144 BLEECKER ST., NEW YORK 12, N. Y.

Telephone: ALGONQUIN 4-0722. Cable Address: FREEWORLD NEWYORK

JUNE 19, 1944.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: It gives me great pleasure to send you under separate cover, a copy of the April 1944 issue of our Mexican edition, MUNDO LIBRE.

In this edition is a reprint of the Round Table Conference, "What to do with Japan," in which you participated and which was originally published in the March 1944 edition of FREE WORLD magazine.

Very sincerely yours,

LOUIS DOLIVET.
 Louis Dolivet.

LD: NB.

EXHIBIT No. 848

CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,

NATIONAL SECRETARIAT,

230 Bloor Street West, Toronto 5, March 23, 1946.

W. L. HOLLAND, ESQ.,
Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: You may not have heard that Fred Poland has been held for weeks in connection with the spy round-up in Ottawa. I enclose a page from the local morning paper.

The C. I. I. A. is ignoring the publicity; our stand is that our membership includes all political parties for purposes of good discussion at meetings, and that the branches can enlist any persons they wish.

Poland has been held without benefit of counsel and his wife is seeking habeas corpus. We have no idea of whether Fred is guilty; I have known about his being held since the third day after the story broke, or thereabouts but I had no proof to substantiate my suspicions until the recent announcement (underline is pencilled).

Yours sincerely,

DOUGLAS A. MACLENNAN, *National Secretary.*

DAM: bm

Copy to Mr. E. C. Carter.

EXHIBIT No. 849

25TH MARCH 1946.

DOUGLAS MACLENNAN, ESQ.,
Canadian Institute of International Affairs,
230 Bloor Street, West, Toronto 5.

DEAR DOUGLAS: I am grateful to you for your note of March 23rd enclosing the clipping on Fred Poland. I had seen a brief reference to the matter in the *New York Times* and got the impression that the habeas corpus request would probably succeed. The whole procedure adopted by the government seems very curious and I should imagine there may be a considerable protest about it in Parliament. I should appreciate it if you would keep me informed of what develops and particularly of any further references to the Canadian Institute or the IPR.

You may be interested to know that Dr. Chen Nan-sang and his wife have just arrived here from India. Chen will be teaching for the next few months at the University of Washington and during the summer may be doing some work for the IPR. For the past three years he has been working in New Delhi at the British Ministry of Information and during the past four months has travelled

widely in India studying the agricultural situation. Although there will not be time for him to visit Canada before he goes to Seattle, it occurs to me that your Victoria and Vancouver branches might want to invite him to speak before them during the next few months.

J. P. Simon of your Victoria branch has asked Carter or me to participate in the annual joint conference of the IPR and the Canadian Institute in Victoria on May 10 to 12. I am inclined to accept this invitation as I may have to visit the Pacific coast about that time. If so I would probably plan to visit Vancouver as well.

With best wishes,
Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Secretary-General.

EXHIBIT No. 850

PHILIP J. JAFFE,
225 Fifth Avenue, New York 10, N. Y., April 29, 1948.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
*Acting Executive Vice Chairman, American Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: For some time now, I have been one of those that believed that in the coming years the most important area in the Far East will be Japan. Up to the present, no detailed study of developments in postwar Japan has appeared in print. I feel strongly that such a study is needed, and that the Institute of Pacific Relations is the appropriate organization to direct it. If you feel that this is the right time to undertake such a study, and if you have a competent person available for this project, I would be very happy to make a financial contribution towards that end.

Would you be kind enough to let me know whether you feel that this project is worthwhile and whether you have the right person available for it; and, if so, approximately how large a contribution would be required from me to make it possible?

Cordially yours,

PHILIP J. JAFFE.
(signed) Philip J. Jaffe.

EXHIBIT No. 851

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,
*Honolulu, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Seattle, Washington, D. C.,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y., 30th April, 1948.*

Eldorado 5-1759

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
*Consultant, ECAFE Secretariat,
106 Whangpoo Road, Shanghai, China.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: With reference to the attached letter from Jaffe of April 29, I might add that he has now decided it would be better for Bisson to continue working on his research project under IPR auspices and hopes that the American IPR will be willing to receive a donation of \$3,000 which can be used to pay Bisson for a continuation of his current IPR research project on the impact of SCAP on Japanese life. We trust the Executive Committee will not object to receiving the money. It will ease Phil's tax problem.

Sincerely,

Bill,
WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Acting Executive Vice Chairman.

P. S.—C. D. Jackson of Time, Inc., phoned Emeny this morning to check on the IPR. Jackson is a member of the Board of Independent Aid, and apparently the Board is seriously considering the IPR's appeal. Emeny took the opportunity to inquire of Jackson what the possibilities of a renewal of Time's contribution would be, and apparently didn't get a negative response. So we shall wait and see.

(Penciled:) Rec'd, May 7, 1948.

(Penciled:) Brooks has now retracted his earlier strong criticism of Rosinger and now recommends him to me in the most glowing terms.

EXHIBIT No. 852

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, New York, January 25, 1950.

Dr. E. HERBERT NORMAN,

Canadian Liaison Mission, c/o Foreign Liaison Section G-2,

GHQ, AFPAC, APO 500, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

DEAR HERB: I was delighted to find your letter of January 5th awaiting me on my return to New York and even more pleased to see a copy of your book. It is an excellent production job despite the unattractive cover and title page. I took the liberty of sending it immediately to Sansom, who tells me that he is reading it with very great interest and admiration—so much so that he is going to write you directly about a number of specific points including probably some disagreements. He has also agreed to review it for PACIFIC AFFAIRS, commenting mainly on the broader social and economic implications of your analysis of Japanese feudalism. At a later date he is keen to write a more detailed and longer review for one of the professional journals, such as the FAR EASTERN QUARTERLY. I shall try to send you a copy of his PACIFIC AFFAIRS review as soon as we receive the manuscript, probably some time within the next three or four weeks.

If you have another copy to spare, I do hope you will send it to Miriam Farley for review in the FAR EASTERN SURVEY. I know she would appreciate seeing it. She has just written a rather long and interesting review article on Sansom's book, *The Western World and Japan*, which we may print in the next PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

Mary Healy has sent you a copy of Sansom's book which I hope you will admire as much as I do. Won't you try to write a review of it for one of the English-language publications in Japan and let me have a copy of your manuscript.

I think there is a good chance that under the joint auspices of the Japan IPR and the Tokyo National University and with some Rockefeller Foundation help Sansom will be able to visit Japan next fall and give a series of eight or ten lectures, which will subsequently form the basis for a book to be published under IPR auspices. In many ways I think it is likely to be a kind of projection of the ideas in his present book into the problems of contemporary Japan. Sansom tells me that he is now planning to work on his "swan song", a rather general book on eighteenth century Japan with numerous incidental comparisons with eighteenth century Europe.

I do hope you are making some headway on your volume, "Essays on Japanese Politics and Society." Knowing how you are apt to be interrupted by the pressure of other work I hope you will try to finish each chapter one by one and send along the revised manuscript as soon as possible rather than keeping the whole book until all the revisions and additional chapters have been completed. Why not make a start with the principal chapters in the earlier mimeographed report? Incidentally let me know if it would facilitate things if I can send you an advance payment of say \$200.00, which you can use to cover incidental clerical or research expenses.

You may be interested to know that Bob Fearey, who is still in the Northeast Asia Division of the State Department, has just completed a 50,000 word supplement to Ed Martin's earlier IPR book, *The Allied Occupation of Japan*. We hope to produce the revised and enlarged edition within the next four months or so.

I would be most grateful to have any news from you on research developments in the Japan IPR. Perhaps you can get Okubo to tell you what is happening and also to remind Matsuo to write me soon about the new projects which I discussed with the Japan IPR people.

All good wishes to Irene and yourself.

Yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, *Secretary-General.*

cc: PEL.
MFH.

EXHIBIT No. 853

CANADIAN LIAISON MISSION,
Tokyo, 5th January, 1950.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.,

*Sec'y, Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street,
New York 2, N. Y.*

DEAR BILL: I presume you have returned to New York by now from your world jaunt. I would very much like to have an opportunity of seeing some of your observations on the countries you visited. I trust that you will write up some aspects of your trip in one of the I. P. R. publications.

I am sending you by the same mail a copy of my work on Ando Shoeki, which was finally published last month. I think Kenkyusha did a respectable job of printing, although I must say that the Asiatic Society format is not the most attractive in the world. On the first day after publication, I hastily picked up some of the misprints I noticed and the printer obligingly struck off a page of errata, which is enclosed with the copy. One or two which I missed I shall take the liberty of correcting marginally. The work, I fear, shows signs of composition at different periods of time but, since it is after all a rather enlarged essay, it may not affect the argument too seriously. I know I shall be open to the criticism that I have magnified the subject out of its proper proportion making Shoeki appear a more original or incisive figure than some might think he deserves. I should be happy to have your frank opinion on this subject and on any other feature of the work on which you feel like commenting. Although I am sending this book to you personally, I should be grateful if you would make use of it by reviewing it yourself or, if you are too busy, have someone else on your staff review it for an I. P. R. publication—preferable Pacific Affairs. I am asking the editor of the Asiatic Society, who is for the current year Don Brown, Civil Information and Education Section, General Headquarters, to mail a few copies to the institutions or publications on Far Eastern subjects.

As you may have noticed, our Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, is coming with a large delegation to Japan at the end of this month after the Colombo Conference and will stay for about four days. Naturally, things will be quite hectic for a while before and after the visit but, unless I am in the very near future given another assignment, which is always possible after the length of time I have been here, I intend to get down to some work on the series of essays which we discussed on Japanese political and biographical subjects.

With all good wishes for the coming year to both Doreen and you,

Yours sincerely,

HERBERT.

EXHIBIT No. 854

CANADIAN LIAISON MISSION,
Tokyo, February 13, 1950.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,

*Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 E. 54th Street, New York 22, New York.*

DEAR BILL: Many thanks for your letter of January 25 in which you acknowledge receipt of my book. I am delighted, of course, to know that Sansom is reviewing it and he wrote me a very kind letter about it. I still have not received his book, "The Western World and Japan," but am naturally looking forward to it keenly. I would be honoured to review it, although I would like to take my time and do as thorough a job as possible.

I must confess that I haven't made much headway on my "Essays on Japanese politics and society," except to continue accumulating fresh material for other sections. It is very thoughtful of you to suggest making an advance of \$200 to assist in clerical and research expenses. For the present, I think I had better decline this kind offer, but may I take a rain check on it so that, when I feel the work is making real progress, then I would have less scruples about taking it? At the present, that time is a little remote although my intention to go on is still as strong as ever.

I have remembered you to the IPR people here.

With kind regards from both Irene and myself.

Yours sincerely,

Herbert.
E. H. NORMAN.

EXHIBIT No. 853

APRIL 26, 1950.

MR. CHARLES LOOMIS,

*American Institute of Pacific Relations, Dillingham Building Annex,
Halekauwila Street, Honolulu 16, T. H.*

DEAR CHARLES: Thanks for your personal note of April 24 enclosing a copy of your note to Clayton Lane. Needless to say there are bound to be some adverse effects on the IPR from all the McCarthy and Budenz charges. On the other hand, it seems pretty clear from the categorical refutations of Budenz which Bella Dodd and Browder are making that the myth about the IPR as a communist organization will be pretty well exploded. While the next 2 months are going to be very difficult for the American IPR, I am confident that it will weather the storm and that the IPR's prospects will then be pretty bright. For your strictly confidential information, I may tell you that the Rockefeller Foundation officers are going to recommend that a special and very exceptional grant be made to both the American IPR and the Pacific Council at the June meeting of the Foundation. Again for your personal information alone, I can tell you that there is a good prospect that the Ford Foundation (which officially has not yet begun to operate) will make a special preliminary grant to the Pacific Council for research on Southeast Asia. I know that our appeal to the Ford Foundation has had the specific and enthusiastic backing of Arthur Bean, Sir George Sansom, Phil Jessup, Dean Rusk, and Huntington Gilchrist.

As you probably know we have had some excellent publicity, notably in the Washington Post, where Alfred Friendly ran a very long article exposing Kohlberg and enthusiastically supporting the IPR (Sunday issue of April 23).

There is always, of course, the chance that Foundation trustees may be panicked by some new spectacular development, but my own guess is that this will not happen and that there is a good chance that the IPR can even benefit in the long run from the present attacks upon it. So I certainly hope you will go ahead vigorously with your Pacific House scheme. I think it is wonderful that you have been able to put this over so well at a time like this, and I only wish the New York office could point to an achievement like yours.

All good wishes.

Yours sincerely,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Secretary-General.

EXHIBIT No. 856

MAY 17, 1950

SIR GEORGE SANSON,

Chandos Lodge, Eye, Suffolk, England.

DEAR SIR GEORGE: As you know, the various charges by Senator McCarthy and Louis Budenz against Owen Lattimore have included references to the I. P. R. as a pro-communist organization or as harboring a communist "cell" in past years. Despite the statements issued by Lane, President Raymond Allen, myself and others, these insinuations are likely to continue as long as the attack on the State Department's Far Eastern policy is kept up. They are being made continually by certain newspaper columnists, notably George Sokolsky in the Hearst press. The latest blast comes from a sheet called "Counterattack" which asserts that the IPR is still employing communists and publishing communist reports. Specifically they complain about the following items in our current international research program: "The Impact of SCAP on Japanese Life" by T. A. Bisson; "Documents on Soviet Far Eastern Policy Since Yalta" by William Mandel; "Philippine Nationalism" by Abraham Chapman; "Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China During the War" by Israel Epstein (this last having been published in mimeographed form last year).

These studies are all under the auspices of the International Secretariat, not the American IPR. Two of them, those by Epstein and by Chapman, were originally started (in 1943 and 1946) by the American IPR with funds given by the American People's Fund (Fred Field's money). After the American IPR Executive Committee, on my recommendation, had appointed Clayton Lane to be Executive Secretary, I explained the background of these two projects to him. Because the projects did not directly concern American policy, and because I wanted him to be free to operate as he wished without being hampered

by any past commitments involving such a controversial figure as Field, I suggested that the two studies be put under the auspices of the International Secretariat. This was done and the unspent portion of the funds was returned to Field.

After some delay Epstein completed his manuscript. After being read and criticized by Lattimore, Fairbank and me, it was edited and somewhat shortened by Lillienthal and then issued in mimeographed form last year. It's a factual study of limited historical interest and has not aroused criticism from reviewers. Any way it's over the dam.

The Chapman study has also been delayed. He promised to submit the complete manuscript at the end of 1949. I phoned him the other day and he told me that the report is about 90 percent finished and that he will definitely submit the whole manuscript before the middle of June. Its quality is hard to predict but I expect it will contain (besides historical background) a great deal of accurate and hitherto not generally available information on Philippine politics and parties. He knows a lot about the Philippine political situation.

Chapman is under attack because, as he readily states, he was elected in 1945 as a member of the New York State Committee of the Communist Party. I think it is almost certain that he is still a communist. As far as I know this is the only case in the IPR research program involving a study by a communist party member. It thus constitutes a good test case of whether we should follow our traditional practice of judging a study on its merits, in the light of comments from qualified critics, or of deciding in advance whether to accept or reject it in the light of the author's communist party membership. My own past policy, and the one I would still recommend despite its unpopularity these days, is to decide on the basis of the manuscript. I've so informed Chapman and have also told him that the manuscript will undoubtedly be read with a very critical eye and that I can give him no assurance it will be accepted for publication. To me it would seem absurd and cowardly at this late date for us to disown the study in advance after it's been on our lists for several years.

My idea would be to have the manuscript read by such people as Claude Buss (Stanford University), Laurence Salisbury, one person on the Philippine desk in the Research Division of the State Department, one qualified Filipino, and one qualified businessman with knowledge of the contemporary Philippine scene. If the comments are generally adverse, and if on the basis of them I conclude that it would not be feasible to get the study satisfactorily revised, I presume we shall drop any idea of publication. If the comments are generally favorable, then I would like your advice on how to proceed. One possibility would be to go ahead with such editorial revision as seems justified in the light of the readers' comments but to postpone final publication arrangements until the matter of policy has been decided by the International Research Committee and the Pacific Council at the Lucknow Conference. Another possibility would be to issue the study in a mimeographed edition for restricted circulation to national councils and research institutions, with a preface mentioning the author's communist party membership, and perhaps including the comments of those who read the first draft.

Admittedly it will be easier to form an opinion on this after we see a few sample chapters, which I may receive in about two weeks. However, the question is complicated by the fact that last January, the American I. P. R. at Clayton Lane's strong insistence rejected (but paid for) an article by Chapman on Philippine politics today, which had previously been requested by the editor of the *Far Eastern Survey*, and which in quality and essential accuracy was judged by all who read it, including Mr. Lane, as acceptable. The ground given for rejection, was Chapman's membership on the executive committee of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, New York, an organization which was listed as "subversive" last year by the Attorney General. The Survey editor was unaware of this fact when she originally requested the article. The American I. P. R. Executive Committee which was asked to rule on this point of policy was divided in its views, but left it to Mr. Lane to decide.

Mr. Lane still feels that no manuscript should be accepted by the I. P. R. (either American or International Secretariat) from a writer who is a Communist or a member of a policy committee of an organization listed as subversive by the Attorney General. (The list is a very extensive one, including the American-Russian Institute of which Mr. Carter and Harriet Moore Gelfan have been leading members, but not the American I. P. R.). Undoubtedly several other members of the American I. P. R. Board of Trustees share Mr. Lane's view,

though the matter has never been put to a vote. Mr. Lane and they would of course respect the views of the international officers and other members of the Pacific Council, but would probably point out that since Chapman is an American, and since the study began under American I. P. R. auspices with a grant from Field's American People's Fund, the publication of the report, even under International Secretariat auspices, would provide further ammunition to those who are already attacking the I. P. R. On the other hand it seems to me unlikely that cancellation of the project now and suppression of the report would do much to make our critics end their attacks, especially when the project has been included on our lists for the last five years, and when both *Pacific Affairs* and *Far Eastern Survey* have previously (in 1946) published articles by Chapman.

As for Bisson, he is now teaching at the University of California and carrying on his study of industrial deconcentration in Japan with the aid of a direct grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. He is not receiving any grant from the I. P. R. but we are committed to helping in the eventual publication of his book. To suggest that, after publishing several of his earlier books and making several grants to him over the past ten years, we should now become apologetic about him or try to dissociate ourselves from him would be ridiculous.

Mandel's project is simply a collection of official Soviet diplomatic documents and Soviet editorial comments. It is now almost finished and in order to make it more useful, I've written to Max Beloff at Oxford asking if he would write an introductory chapter analyzing Soviet Far Eastern policy since 1945, largely by expanding the excellent article he has written on this topic for the June issue of *Pacific Affairs*. Mandel, you will recall, is the author of the Inquiry Series volume on The Soviet Far East and Central Asia.

I'm sorry to inflict all this on you. If it were not for the fact that the American I. P. R., in the public mind, is almost indistinguishable from the International Secretariat, I would say that we should proceed in our traditional way, judging the research manuscripts on their merits, and pay no attention to the McCarthy and similar attacks. What do you advise? I shall await your reply before sending copies of the correspondence to Gilchrist and other Pacific Council officers.

All good wishes.

Yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Secretary-General.

EXHIBIT No. 857

[Cablegram]

3 Moskou 2720 28 5 17 10 CHO
Holland Inspacrel Tokyo

Motylev cabled Carter suggesting meet you Vladivostock July eighteenth Stop No reply Stop Cable whether coming; if yes, which Soviet consulate to issue visa.

HARONDAR

JUL. 6 AM 5 54.

EXHIBIT No. 858

W. L. HOLLAND,
1 East 54th St. (5th floor), New York 22, N. Y.,
September 12, 1950 [6.30 p. m.].

Night letter.

DEAN RUSK,

Department of State, Washington, D. C.

Urgent could you kindly cable Supreme Commander urging him favorably consider permitting Japanese delegation attend IPR conference Lucknow October third to fifteenth? I am advised that influential Washington recommendation is needed to assure clearances. Please phone or wire me collect if you wish. Is there anything more I can do regarding Kahins passport? Urgently need him at Lucknow. Can you now give me names of special American delegates you would like attend Lucknow?

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 859

SEPTEMBER 16, 1950.

Personal

The Hon. DEAN RUSK,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR DEAN: I was sorry not to reach you on the phone in New York as I wanted to ask whether you had found any well-qualified Americans whom you might especially wish to attend the Lucknow conference of the IPR as members of the American delegation. I do hope you'll let me know soon if you have any special candidates. I'm sorry that Sen. Graham couldn't accept our invitation, but I'm hoping now that W. W. Waymack will accept the offer of a grant from the Carnegie Endowment to enable him to go to Lucknow.

Ordinarily we don't include government officials in the American delegation to an IPR conference, but Lane previously wrote Loy Henderson asking him to consider sending someone not in a policy-making position and preferably not a regular foreign service officer. Henderson declined, saying that he disliked making any such distinctions in his staff. I've told him, however, that I'd like to discuss the matter further with him in New Delhi, as it might be possible for us to include one or two specialists, such as cultural or agricultural or information officers of the Embassy in the delegation if you thought it desirable. I'd like your advice on the matter, as it sometimes raises touchy questions with the other delegations. In spite of all we say, I suspect that the Indian delegation, and possibly some of the other groups too, may include people who are at least mainly if not wholly government officials.

May I make an urgent and probably irregular appeal to you to lend your weightiest support to the double IPR financial appeal which is to be considered by the Rockefeller Foundation on September 22. As a Foundation trustee, you probably know better than I that one or two members of the Foundation's Executive Committee have been worried about all the McCarthy and Budenz charges against the IPR. The officers of the Foundation have given us very solid support, but it has been suggested to me that in this abnormal situation their hand would be strengthened if an impressive body of outside testimony and recommendations were sent to President Barnard, including letters from former Foundations officers and trustees. I have accordingly asked such people as Raymond Fosdick, Robert G. Sproul, Stacy May and Sydnor Walker if they would submit letters, and have also asked General Marshall, as an IPR trustee, to do likewise if possible before he officially assumes his new job. Your own position in this question is peculiarly important and Mr. Swope and I would therefore appreciate it greatly if you could see your way to indicate your belief in the importance of the IPR at this time. Your words of support for us to the Ford Foundation were very influential, even though action on that grant has been postponed pending the forthcoming appointment of a director for the foundation.

Yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 860

12-12-50—PACIFIC COUNCIL OFFICERS

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Paul Emile Naggiar (France), former French Ambassador to the United States.

S. Kitadai (Japan), former President, Reconstruction Finance Bank.

A. B. A. Haleem (Pakistan), President, Sind University.

Manuel Elizalde (Philippines), Elizalde & Co., Manila.

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INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, 1 EAST 54 ST.,
NEW YORK, N. Y.

EXHIBIT No. 861

1 FEBRUARY 1951.

Justice WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS,
Supreme Court,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR JUSTICE DOUGLAS: I am sending you an advance copy of a preliminary report on the Lucknow Conference, entitled: ASIAN NATIONALISM AND WESTERN POLICIES, containing the rapporteurs' summaries of the discussions and the opening speech by Prime Minister Nehru. I think you will be interested in many of the points brought out in the discussions.

In view of the widespread publicity which the Lucknow Conference evoked in the press of India, Pakistan, Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, you will be interested to see the enclosed copy of some of the Soviet news dispatches and radio broadcasts on the Conference.

The IPR is now also distributing copies of the recently published volume *Indian-American Relations* which summarizes the discussions at the India-America Conference held in Delhi in December 1949 under the auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations and the Indian Council of World

Affairs. Many passages in this volume have an important bearing on the present day relationships between India and the United States. The volume also provides a useful companion study to the American IPR's previously published book, *India and the United States* by L. K. Rosinger.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Executive Vice Chairman.

EXHIBIT No. 862

Ref. FA132

(Penciled :) WLH

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS,
26, Kuo Hui Chieh, Peking, China, Mar. 22, 1951.

Mr. S. B. THOMAS,
*Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 E 54th St., New York 22, U. S. A.*

DEAR SIR: Your letter addressed to the China Information Bureau has been forwarded to this Press. We noted that you asked for quite a voluminous set of documentary materials pertaining to the local administration of the Republic of China, and also its people's representative organs. As you probably know, this Press has published a lot of those documents in English and other foreign languages and your library has acquired a copy of more of each of these publications. Undoubtedly these cannot meet all your requirements; but we can hardly contribute anything more from our own sources. Of course we will be glad to help you in this connection, but we have to be furnished first with an official letter from your Institute signed by the Secretary-General with which we can more conveniently approach other organisations on your behalf.

Hoping to hear from you again,

Yours sincerely,

V. G. Tseng,
V. G. TSENG,
Circulation Department, Foreign Languages Press.

EXHIBIT No. 863

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y., April 5, 1951.

Mr. V. G. TSENG,
*Circulation Department, Foreign Languages Press,
26, Kuo Hui Chieh, Peking, China.*

DEAR MR. TSENG: In reference to your letter of March 22 to Mr. S. B. Thomas, of the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations, I would like to repeat his request for documentary material on local government in the People's Republic of China. I would be most grateful if you could arrange to send us the texts of important documents (other than those contained in the publications you have already sent us) on the organization, status, and function of organs of local government on the county, municipal, and provincial level.

If the relevant documents have been translated into English or one of the other western languages, we would of course be happy to secure the translated version, but, if not, would very much appreciate procuring the Chinese texts.

Thank you very much for your assistance.

Very sincerely yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Secretary General.

WLH:abs

EXHIBIT NO. S64

APRIL 12, 1951.

Mr. GEORGE J. BEAL,
Office of the Comptroller, *The Rockefeller Foundation*,
49 West 49th Street, New York 20, N. Y.

DEAR MR. BEAL: This is to acknowledge with cordial thanks your letter of April 10 enclosing a check for \$10,000 for the budget of the Pacific Council of the I. P. R.

In accordance with your request I am enclosing a budget for the American I. P. R. for the period October 1, 1950, to September 30, 1951. Since the American I. P. R. budget is normally made up on a calendar year basis, you will understand that we have had to estimate the enclosed statement by taking the actual figures for the last three months of 1950 and combining them with pro rated budget figures for the first nine months of 1951.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Secretary General.

WLH:abs
Enc. 2

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

Budget—Calendar Year 1951

Cash Balance, January 1, 1951----- \$16,330.93

Receipts:

Foundations-----	22,500.00
Membership Contributions-----	44,394.00
Other Income-----	400.00
Far Eastern Survey, subscriptions-----	7,000.00
Royalties-----	500.00

Total----- \$91,124.93

Expenditures:

Administration-----	\$26,202.00
Grant to Pacific Council-----	9,000.00
Far Eastern Survey-----	18,885.00
Library-----	1,650.00
Research-----	6,400.00
Publications-----	5,150.00
Conferences & Meetings-----	3,900.00
Services to Members-----	4,435.00
Promotion-----	2,000.00

Total----- \$77,622.00

Balance to be carried forward 12/31/51----- 13,502.93

\$91,124.93

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

*Budget—Receipts and Expenditures, October 1, 1950–September 30, 1951***

	Rec & Exp Oct–Dec 1950	Budget Jan– Sept 1951	Total re- ceipts & Ex- penditures
Cash Balance, October 1, 1950.....	\$5,946.51		\$5,946.51
Receipts:			
Foundations.....	*15,000.00	\$16,875.00	31,875.00
Membership contributions.....	10,635.00	33,295.50	43,930.50
Other Income.....	10.05	300.00	310.05
Far Eastern Survey, subscriptions.....	2,374.42	5,250.00	7,624.42
Royalties.....	164.38	375.00	539.38
Total.....	\$34,130.36	\$56,095.50	\$90,225.86
Disbursements:			
Administration.....	\$5,844.62	\$19,651.50	\$25,496.12
Grand to Pacific Council.....	4,000.00	6,750.00	10,750.00
Research.....	1,644.73	4,800.00	6,444.73
Conferences & Meetings.....	1,285.07	2,925.00	4,210.07
Library.....	325.02	1,237.50	1,562.52
Services to Members.....	739.56	3,326.25	4,065.81
Publications.....	155.00	3,862.50	4,017.50
Far Eastern Survey.....	3,751.76	14,163.75	17,915.51
Promotion.....	53.67	1,500.00	1,553.67
Total.....	\$17,799.43	\$58,216.50	\$76,015.93
Cash Balance, December 31, 1950.....	*16,330.93		
September 30, 1951 (to be carried forward).....			14,209.93
Total.....	\$34,130.36	\$58,216.50	\$90,225.86

*\$7,500 of this amount earmarked for 1951.

**Oct. 1, 1950–December 31, 1950, receipts and expenditures based on actual figures,
Jan. 1, 1951–Sept. 30, 1951 prorated on basis of budget for the year 1951.

EXHIBIT No. 865

THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION,
49 West 49th Street, New York 20, April 10, 1951.

MR. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
*Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
One East 54th Street, New York 22, New York.*

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: We are enclosing herewith our check for \$10,000, covering the balance available for the period ending December 31, 1951, under appropriation RF 50092 to the Pacific Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, toward the general budget.

We note that the budget for the year 1951 under our appropriation RF 50090 to the American Institute of Pacific Relations totals \$77,622.00. Before making further payments under this grant, we would appreciate receiving a budget for the year beginning October 1, 1950. In connection with your requirements for this period, a check in the amount of \$15,000 was forwarded to you in accordance with the request in your letter of October 3, 1950.

Very truly yours,

GEORGE J. BEAL.

fg

Enclosure—1 Check

EXHIBIT No. 866

AUGUST 14, 1951.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
*The Dodge Hotel,
20 E Street NW., Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: To refresh your memory for the hearing on Thursday, here is my recollection of the memo I wrote you on September 1940 from Berkeley about Phil's forthcoming trip to Shanghai. The Phil, of course, is Phil Lillenthal, at that time my research assistant working with me in Berkeley. We sent him out to Shanghai to supervise the publication of a large number of IPR

studies which we planned to have printed in Shanghai by Kelly & Walsh. In my memo, I was obviously telling you about the manuscripts he would be taking with him.

Morris possibly thinks Phil is either Jessup or Jaffe.

If you are asked why I said secret messages should be sent to Lilienthal in care of Herb Norman in Tokyo, I hope you will say it was a perfectly normal thing and meant only that there might be some question (e. g., relating to the China IPR or to the Inquiry Series) which we didn't want to come to the attention of the Japanese IPR office, which was Lilienthal's ordinary mailing address in Tokyo. At that time, the Japanese were opposing our plan to go ahead with the Inquiry Series and were also criticizing the Secretariat as being too pro-Chinese.

Yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Executive Vice Chairman.

WLH: abs

EXHIBIT No. 889

js.

STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York, ss:

I have examined the documents described in the list annexed hereto as Exhibit Z. While I have a present recollection of only a few of them, I am satisfied that these documents, subject to the comments noted below, are letters or memoranda received by me or photostatic copies thereof, or copies of letters or memoranda sent by me to others or photostatic copies of such copies:

<i>Document</i>	<i>Comment</i>
1. ATOMIC ENERGY AND U. S. INT. POLICY. Summary of a Roundtable Conf. under joint auspices of IPR and S. F. International Center. JAN. 1946. File No. 122.41.	I was not present at the meeting described in this document, nor do I know by whom this document was prepared.
7. Harriet Moore, Edward C. Carter. March 2, 1943. File No. 500.38.	The second page of this document is a memorandum to me from HM. This memorandum appears to have no relation to the first page of this document.
9. W. L. Holland, Edward C. Carter. March 26, 1943. File No. 100.402.	The second memorandum set forth on this document appears to be incomplete.
16. Invitation list of May 8 meeting--	The date of the meeting referred to is May 6.
46. Raymond Dennett (Return to). Report on Washington Office Dec. 1943-March 1945. File No. 122.37.	I do not know whether or not I have seen these documents before. Neither of them was prepared by me or addressed to me.
47. MAS RY (Report) April 16, 1945. File No. 122.37.	

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Sworn to before me this 9th day of May, 1952.

[SEAL]

IRENE R. DONOHUE,
Notary Public, State of New York.

Qualified in Queens County No. 41-6061300. Certs. filed with Queens, Kings, New York, and Bronx County Clerks and Regs. Offices, Westchester & Nassau Co. Clerks Offices. Commission Expires March 30, 1954.

(The documents referred to by Mr. Carter are exhibits Nos. 901, 907, 909, 916, 946, and 947.)

EXHIBIT No. 900

To—	From—	Date	File Number	Exhibit Number
ATOMIC ENERGY AND U. S. INT. POLICY. Summary of a Roundtable Conf. under joint auspices of IPR and S. F. Inter- national Center.		Jan. 1946	122. 41	901
Frederick V. Field	E. C. Carter	1/29/43	500. 34	902
Edgar J. Tarr	E. C. Carter	2/ 3/43	500. 35	903
W. L. Holland and Background informa- tion "The Strength of the Muslim League in India."	E. C. Carter	3/ 1/43	131B. 43	905
Misses Carter	E. C. Carter	3/ 1/43	100. 186	906
Harriet Moore	E. C. Carter	3/ 2/43	500. 38	907
W. L. Holland	E. C. Carter	3/18/43	119. 78	908
W. L. Holland	E. C. Carter	3/25/43	100. 402	909
Mabel Carter	E. C. Carter	4/ 1/43	119. 83	910
Richard J. Walsh	E. C. Carter	4/12/43	107. 55	911
Henry C. Alexander	E. C. Carter	4/12/43	100. 183	912
E. C. Carter	John L. Christian	4/13/43	131B. 29	913
E. C. Carter	M. W. Pettigrew	4/ 1/43		914
Capt. John L. Christian	E. C. Carter	4/ 5/43		915
Invitation list of May 8 meeting				916
E. C. Carter	M. W. Pettigrew	4/29/43	131B. 32	917
E. C. Carter	Alger Hiss	4/30/43	191. 263	918
E. C. Carter	Truman M. Martin	5/ 1/43	131B. 31	919
Col. Truman M. Martin	E. C. Carter	5/ 4/43	131B. 30	920
W. W. Lockwood	E. C. Carter	5/10/43	119. 151	921
E. C. Carter	Wm. C. Johnstone	5/21/43	191. 25	922
Mortimer Graves	E. C. Carter	6/ 7/43	100. 164	923
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	6/ 9/43	119. 118	924
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	6/15/43	500. 39	925
Invitation list of 3rd Collective Security Meeting in the Pacific and Far East and list of those invited with notations.		6/17/43	119. 8	926
Milo Perkins	E. C. Carter	5/26/42		927
E. C. Carter	Milo Perkins	6/20/42		928
Milo Perkins—draft to				929
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	6/28/43	119. 70	930
Constantine Oumansky	E. C. Carter	7/14/43	500. 40	931
Constantine Oumansky	E. C. Carter	6/30/43	500. 42	932
John A. Carter	E. C. Carter	7/18/43	100. 187	933
Mr. & Mrs. Constantine Oumansky	E. C. Carter	7/20/43	500. 43	934
Mrs. Maxim Litvinoff	E. C. Carter	7/20/43	500. 44	935
Eugene D. Kisselev	E. C. Carter	7/20/43	500. 45	936
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter's secretary	8/ 4/43	119. 68	937
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	8/ 1/43		938
E. C. Carter	W. D. "Bill" Carter	8/23/43	119. 30	939
William D. Carter	E. C. Carter	10/15/43	119. 76	940
Dr. Robt. J. Kerner	E. C. Carter	11/ 4/43	105. 174	941
Misses Carter	E. C. Carter	11/ 8/43	100. 185	942
Andrew Grajdanzev	E. C. Carter	11/13/43	100. 163	943
John Carter	E. C. Carter	11/15/43	100. 188	944
Kate Mitchell	E. C. Carter	11/15/43	131B. 161	945
Raymond Dennett (Return to Report on Washington Office, Dec. 1943—March 1945.)			122. 37	946
MAS.	RY (Report)	4/16/45	122. 37	947
Andrews J. Grajdanzev	E. C. Carter	12/13/43	100. 162	948
Secretary, Lithuanian Legation	E. C. Carter	12/22/43	100. 202	949
E. C. Carter	K. C. Li	3/ 7/44	119. 28	950
Selective Service Board #53	K. C. Li	3/ 7/44		951
Notes for Cleveland Speech	Carter	3/31/44	100. 302	952
Speech "Soviet Russia's Contribution to Peace."	Carter	4/14/44	100. 289	953
E. C. Carter	Ray Dennett	1/ 7/45	122. 40	954
Owen Lattimore	E. C. Carter	2/10/45	102. 43	956
Owen Lattimore	E. C. Carter	6/ 6/45	102. 42	957
E. C. Carter	Ray Dennett	6/18/45	500. 36	958
Owen Lattimore	E. C. Carter	6/20/45	102. 39	959
E. C. Carter	Owen Lattimore	6/25/45	500. 41	960
Ray Dennett	E. C. Carter	9/13/45	122. 38	961
Ray Dennett	RDC	9/26/45		962
Notes on Mr. Carter's finances of trip		10/19/45	100. 283	963
E. C. Carter	Ray Dennett	11/19/45	119. 135	964

EXHIBIT No. 901

ATOMIC ENERGY AND UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL POLICY

SUMMARY OF A ROUND-TABLE CONFERENCE

Under joint auspices of Institute of Pacific Relations, 417 Market Street, San Francisco 5, YUkon 1570; and San Francisco International Center, 68 Post Street, San Francisco 4, DOuglas 2273. January 1946

(On December 29, 1945, the Institute of Pacific Relations and the San Francisco International Center held a round-table conference running through the day on atomic energy and its international implications. Attending the conference were physical scientists, some of whom had contributed to the development of the atomic bomb; social scientists, journalists; officers of the United States armed services; and persons active in women's groups, labor groups, and groups interested in international relations. The agenda and a list of participants appear at the end of this summary.)

THE FACTS ABOUT THE BOMB

The moderator opened the discussion by asking whether the scientists present were agreed on the following five points which seemed to him to emerge from what the public had heard about the atomic bomb: (1) that the bomb in its present state of development was capable of enormous destruction and that "improvements" in the future would almost certainly make it very much more destructive; (2) that secrecy at best was only a temporary protection for the United States because other countries would probably develop atomic bombs shortly; (3) that the raw materials necessary for atomic bomb production were readily available to all great powers and many smaller powers; (4) that the cost was not prohibitive; and (5) that no adequate defense against atomic bombs existed at present or was likely to be found soon.

Recently, however, the moderator had read statements attributed to a high military authority that cast doubt on some of these conclusions. The talk about a push-button war, according to these statements, was exaggerated. The people of this country had no need to fear being atomized by a hostile power. Washington, D. C., would not be bombed during the lifetime of most people now living because the United States had the production and engineering know-how to build the bomb, which other countries lacked. These factors were just as essential in the making of the bomb as the scientific contributions. The military authority was said to have declared that the scientists were not engineering experts and therefore were not qualified to judge the time required for other nations to produce the bomb.

A scientist who had contributed to the development of the bomb declared that he agreed with the five points put forward by the moderator. The bomb had tremendous destructive power at present and was susceptible of great development. He suggested the possibility that in the future atomic energy would have other wartime applications than its original use in blasting Japanese cities. Radioactive materials might be used, for example, against personnel and agriculture. To keep the scientific principles behind the bomb from being known in other nations was impossible. Moreover, these principles were the critical elements in its making. The scientists themselves had suggested much of the engineering that went into the making of the bomb. And, since the need for speed was paramount, practically all of the devices and techniques used were taken from other operating industries. Any advanced industrial nation could get the raw materials—uranium and thorium were well scattered over the world—and make a bomb in reasonable time. No effective defense exists now nor seems likely in future.

A second scientist who had contributed to the making of the bomb agreed. In his opinion, quite possibly the present state of the bomb was to its future development as the muzzle-loading cannon was to present-day artillery. A policy of secrecy would only spur on development of the bomb in other countries, now that the United States had proved its production feasible. For the fundamental secret was released when the bomb was dropped—namely, that atomic energy could be harnessed for destruction. Much additional information was contained in the official Smyth report. Several different methods were available at each stage of the bomb's manufacture, and foreign nations would probably not be

forced to make the same mistakes we did in its hurried development in wartime.

Another scientist suggested that in peacetime the development of the bomb might go on faster in the Soviet Union than in the United States. For the U. S. S. R. seems to support its scientists more wholeheartedly than this nation does. Money was no object on a state-supported project, the scientists being given everything they needed to produce the desired results. As for secrecy, that was a hope unjustified by the facts of scientific life.

THE STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION

What is the state of American public opinion about the bomb? the moderator questioned. Are the people fully and accurately informed about the matter, and are they reacting in a way that will eventuate in reaching rational solutions to the problems of the new atomic age?

One word describes the present public mind about atomic energy, a journalist replied, and that word is *fear*. The public may have a fuzzy hope that international peace can be obtained by international agreement, but that feeling is secondary to an almost universal fear—a fear that other powers will get the bomb and will use it. And out of that fear comes an instinctive reaction on the part of the public that we can and should keep the bomb a secret, and through its possession write the world ticket for the future. One of the greatest needs of the hour, he continued, is for a great amount of public education and information, and that as rapidly as possible.

Will public opinion support the cession of a part of our sovereignty in order to make international control of atomic power possible? a scientist asked. There is no indication, a journalist answered, that the public today has even the foggiest notion of what such regulation will do to our sovereignty. Without that understanding, how can the people answer the question of whether they would be willing to surrender a part of it? A physicist commented that, unfortunately, with such a state of public opinion, some of our better Senators, who are constantly asking how much of the wise and decent thing they can "get away with," will not feel constrained to fight very hard for intelligent action.

A social scientist observed that at a closed meeting of business men in New York recently a high official of the army argued for keeping the bomb as a power instrument and the audience had seemed to agree with his arguments. A labor educator queried whether the May-Johnson bill with its reactionary insistence on secrecy and tight national control was still the official policy of the military. Or are the armed forces willing to follow the Moscow agreement, which alters the May-Johnson concepts? There has not been and is not now an official military policy, an officer of the armed services replied. That is a matter for the people of the United States to decide. Another officer concurred. And to aid the people to decide intelligently, it was generally agreed by all present, an immediate national campaign of education on the facts of the bomb and its implications for the future was vitally needed.

THE STATE OF FOREIGN OPINION

The moderator read a newspaper dispatch from Moscow giving "man in the street" interviews on the atomic bomb. A 38-year-old woman, a dressmaker, had said she wished the bomb had never been invented. She was afraid that the attempt of the United States to monopolize it would not be in the interests of the people of the world. And, she added, she hoped the inventors of the bomb would find no peace on this earth! Was this typical of foreign opinion, asked the moderator?

An educator recently back from a United Nations meeting replied that he was afraid it was. All over the world there was a sweeping feeling that peoples and nations must cooperate culturally, politically, and in every way if civilization were to continue. People felt that it was impossible to keep the atomic bomb the secret possession of the United States, and that it would be undesirable if it were possible. For that would lead to suspicion and armed competition, which would be the final disaster. All during the war Europe has been socially as well as politically isolated. We should take immediate advantage of this emotional desire by removing all obstructions from the free interchange of technical, political, artistic and literary ideas. A scientist agreed that one of the most immediate needs was the launching of such a widespread intercultural program to encourage free interchange of all types of information, including information related to potential military weapons.

CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

A labor member stated that he understood we were continuing to make atomic bombs. Why are we still making them, and against whom are we planning to use them, he queried? Is this not a threat to all other nations and to the successful construction of a working international organization?

A scientist replied that it would be a fine thing if we stopped making them immediately. But a college official disagreed. As long as we maintain an army for future wars that army should be as efficient as possible and should have the best tools of destruction available. He remembered that he personally had been against the fortification of Guam before the recent war and had lived to regret deeply his stand. Only with effective international control and policemen would he be willing to see this nation disarm atomically.

An officer of the armed services observed that perhaps international control was not the only solution to the problem. He suggested that the United States could possibly stop future wars by maintaining its superiority in atomic research and by building up such an overwhelming stockpile of atomic bombs that it would be foolhardy for another nation to attack us. One of the principal reasons why gas was not used against us in the recent war, he observed, was that we had more of it than the Germans did.

Disagreeing, a scientist replied that we could not be at all sure that we could continue our superiority in either the research for, or the production of, atomic bombs. The development of science is one of the most unpredictable things on this earth. But even if we did remain superior, this policy would lead straight to an armaments race and catastrophe.

A second officer of the armed services added that if atomic bombs were still being manufactured it should be remembered that they were being made with the explicit approval of the President, who was in a much better position to know about our possible future military needs than anyone sitting in this room. Apparently, a journalist added, the President is supported by public opinion. For the public obviously believes that another war is not only possible but probable, and because of that conviction it demands that we have the best engines of destruction in the world.

Whether this nation should stop making atomic bombs immediately or only after international control has been evolved was a moot question as was the question of revealing or not revealing such "secrets" as we still possess. But there was little doubt in the majority of minds about the need for positive and immediate action in organizing some type of workable international control. As one social scientist put it, this is a time of tragic urgency. Unless we solve this problem now, we shall inevitably drift into an atomic arms race, the catastrophic effects of which are all too foreseeable. Agreed to also was the remark of a physicist that the war just ended was the "last victory" on this earth. In any future major war the great cities on both sides will be destroyed and millions of people will be annihilated. "Victory" will be a purely relative matter, of who has the most survivors and the greatest capacity and will to fight on.

INSPECTION

Granted some form of world organization, is international control of atomic energy, backed by an effective inspection system, technically possible, the moderator questioned?

A scientist replied that he had no doubt about it, if the participating countries honestly attempted to enforce it. Atomic bombs cannot be made in an abandoned cellar. Their manufacture requires elaborate machinery and laboratory equipment, which are readily detectable. But, a journalist added, inspection of atomic energy was not enough. The world is now in a feverish race, not alone in atomic weapons but in all types of new and deadly armaments. Jet planes, gas turbines, supersonic speeds and push-button rockets are all being developed. Consequently, there would have to be inspection of all types of armament. The fundamental problem was to stop the outbreak of war. For once hostilities started, and international control was abandoned, the atom bomb could be made by any major nation and would undoubtedly be used.

A social scientist, who had worked for a number of years with the League of Nations, was of the opinion that the technical problem of inspection would not be too difficult, judging from the experience with the control of opium. One possible safeguard, for example, was a free interchange of information. The refusal of any country to make evidence available could be construed as *prima*

facie evidence of something wrong. The problem was really political, not technical. But because it was political it was perhaps more difficult to solve. Certainly, a tremendous revolution in our ways of thought and action would have to precede or accompany the adoption of a genuine inspection system. For that would mean opening every industrial laboratory and every factory door in the world to the official inspectors. It was obvious that our concepts of secrecy by competitive industries and our theory of patents might offer obstacles to such a development.

A scientist interjected that efficient inspection would have to be in some instances by visit and search. We could no longer rely on the negative safeguard of a scientist's desire to publish. Most of the research done in this country today was done not in the university laboratory where publication always had been and is automatic, except where the government steeped in. But rather it was done in industrial laboratories where the emphasis was upon withholding information from possible competitors. In some instances that condition had greatly changed the traditional concept of freedom in science.

Would the various nations of the world, for example the U. S. S. R., accept international inspection, the moderator asked?

A member who had devoted particular study to the U. S. S. R. replied that in the first international meeting of scientists since the war the Russians held nothing back. The desire of the U. S. S. R. for secrecy is commensurate with their feeling of insecurity. Once the U. S. S. R. feels secure from military invasion, he thought, it will be completely willing to exchange any and all information.

But would not a system of thoroughgoing international inspection mean a drastic change in the Russian way of doing things and be harder for them to accept than for us, a scientist queried?

A military officer thought not. Once the Russian government accepted it, the whole nation would accept it. For the Russians are accustomed to such inspection from above. Private industry in the United States, on the contrary, is not. Even if our government did officially accept such a system, it would meet with great opposition in practice by private corporations throughout the country.

A journalist agreed. If the General Motors Corporation will not open its books to a government committee on prices and wages, it is probable that it will object strenuously to opening its laboratories and factories to foreign inspectors. International inspection clearly means a sweeping change in our ideas about private enterprise and private gain through the use of private information.

But, several members interposed, the information obtained could be held confidential by the international inspectors. After all, we have had inspection by income tax authorities and various government enforcement agencies for a long time. The Department of Commerce regularly gets statistical information from business firms which it agrees not to publish except as industry totals.

Should not the United Nations Organization run some atomic laboratories of its own, the moderator asked? It could invite all the world's leading scientists to work in these laboratories from time to time. In that way the UNO would know more about atomic energy than any single nation in the world, and full disclosure and interchange of new developments would be more assured.

There seems to be no intention to do that, replied an educator just returned from a UNO meeting. For one thing, it would cost too much, and the resulting huge budget would imperil the life of the entire organization. No, the answer lies in world control and inspection. And our willingness, or lack of it, to accept inspection will be a test of whether we are acting in entire good faith in our efforts to build a world dedicated to amity and security for all peoples.

We should be extremely careful about vetoing any proposition aiding control and inspection, even though it concerns what we believe to be our own business, a social scientist added, or it may set a precedent we might live to regret. New Zealand objected to a League committee investigating a local squabble with the natives in one of their mandated territories. On the basis of that precedent the League was barred from investigating the state of things in the Japanese mandated islands of the Pacific.

I am ready to accept whatever changes in our life effective control of atomic power necessitates, a journalist stated. I would much rather welcome a Russian inspector representing the United Nations, than a Russian atomic bomb.

THE PREVENTION OF WAR AND THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

The next question the moderator posed was whether the present structure of the United Nations Organization was adequate to fulfill its mission in an atomic world. Should the veto power reserved by the five great nations be altered? Many people of world importance, including some statesmen, think that the veto power and the control of the atomic bomb are irreconcilable. Some, indeed, feel that we must have a world state now with plenary powers if we are to preserve our present civilization from disaster.

A social scientist answered that it was a proper procedure to place the responsibility for the control of the atomic bomb squarely on the backs of the great powers. The idea that all nations large and small should be given equal representation and power in an international body has come from all the nonsense that has been thought and written about sovereignty. To give a nation of five million inhabitants as much power as a nation with one hundred and seventy-five millions could not be considered democratic. Modern wars are started by conflict between the great powers. And it does not make any difference to an aggressor nation whether it is outvoted four to one or forty to one. The abolition of the veto power would at this time simply enlarge the sphere of possible disharmony among the major nations.

Accepting this as true, a scientist believed that the veto power was necessary under present circumstances. The public, he felt, is not ready to discuss the veto power, because it seemed to be beside the point. What is needed immediately is not new machinery but agreement among the great powers.

A college administrator added that the reason why no one at the meeting was willing to speak for the abolition of the veto was that everyone recognized that our present popular belief in national sovereignty would make it impossible for either the U. S. S. R. or our own Senate to agree to such a step. We have this fixation about sovereignty and we have to live with it at least a little while longer.

RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Throughout the meeting, the moderator had observed numerous references to the U. S. S. R. when the members had speculated on the possibility of keeping the peace. Apparently, in common with many other people in this country, the members of this group felt that the greatest potential danger to the peace of the future lies in the possibility of deteriorating relations between the United States and Russia. The moderator realized that many people in this nation are worried, for example, about the Russian policy toward the smaller states neighboring her. Occasionally there is also a fear expressed in this country that the Red army may take over the control of the Russian state. And these fears of ours are also undoubtedly reciprocated by Russian fears about the policy of the United States. What then can be done here and in Russia to encourage continuing good relations between the United States and the U. S. S. R.?

One of the best ways to quiet our fears, a labor educator suggested, is to study and inform ourselves about the structure and the present condition of the U. S. S. R. If we do, we will know that the Red army comes from the people, is part of the people, and therefore offers no threat of any such military domination of the government. We will also know that there are one million amputees in Russia today who have lost an arm or a leg, and that they together with all the Russian people have but one desire internationally—and that is lasting peace. We should also find out by study that there never have been and are not now any irreconcilable conflicts of interest between this nation and the U. S. S. R.

An officer of the armed forces suggested that perhaps we could use the atomic bomb as a bargaining counter with Russia to get the things we want internationally and to obtain a foolproof international organization. To this a scientist objected that the bomb gives no bargaining power, or very little. Within five years or so the Russians will probably be able to make atomic bombs. In the meantime, we are not going to make war upon them. The people of this country could not be persuaded to enter another war in the next five year by any government, unless we were attacked. They just would not support a war, and the Russian government knows that.

A modification of Russian restrictions on the press would help our relations, a journalist volunteered. There is as much need for international freedom of the press as there is for free world science.

What about looking at our own newspapers, a civic leader interjected, at our own schools, radio, and movies? Depending upon the definition, we may have a free press; but does it express national opinion? Judging from the campaigns of the last three presidential elections, she thought not. It may be free, but it certainly is not a responsible press. Many people want Russia to adopt a free press, but would they want Russia to adopt the policies of some of the newspapers in this country?

Obviously, a scientist added, the United States and the USSR in the future are going to compete for the moral leadership of the world in the name of democracy. They may mean different things by democracy, but neither of them is using anti-democratic propaganda as the Nazis were. That is important, for perhaps one system does not have to swallow the other. Perhaps both will be modified toward a common mean.

Why do they have to be modified to be accepted by each other, an educator asked? Is it not possible that cultural pluralism can exist in the world without war? If we cannot accept the fact of cultural pluralism, then we certainly are on the broad highway to another world war.

This argument was quickly supported by a college official. Reasoning by analogies is dangerous, he admitted, but four hundred years ago most of the civilized world was killing one another because of religious differences. When both sides were convinced they could not win they stopped the killing and accepted the fact of religious pluralism. And types of religion meant as much to the seventeenth-century European as types of economics to the man in the street today.

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE NOW

A few thousand scientists created this problem of atomic energy, the moderator stated, but millions of people all over the world have to participate in solving it. What can be done in the immediate future to dispel their suspicion of one another and to create both the will and the ability among them to answer these many difficult questions which we have been discussing?

For one thing, replied a scientist who had worked on the bomb, our own country can take the lead in allaying suspicion by abandoning production of atomic weapons. (There was no agreement on the timing of this move, some holding that international acceptance of an adequate control system should precede such a step.) Secondly, the scientist continued, we might supply atomic power plants to nations who do not now have the needed power to develop their raw materials. One operating uranium pile in China might be convincing testimony to the Chinese, as well as the rest of the world, that we do not intend to monopolize atomic power for our own selfish national interests.

The National Academy of Science might also further the interests of world peace, a social scientist suggested, by reciprocating Russia's recent gesture and inviting the scientists of the world to a conference in the United States to discuss recent scientific progress and research. Why only science, an officer of the armed forces asked? Why not call a world conference to talk over the whole field of human culture and endeavor?

A college official objected that as an educator, he was dubious about persuading people through intellectual means rapidly enough to solve the great problems confronting us. Through the use of symbols we might work faster and more effectively in the emotional realm. One of the most powerful of our symbols is the flag. Why not start a United Nations flag movement. A flag, together with other types of persuasion, might help to create what we really need—a new area of sovereignty, a world sovereignty.

An officer of the armed forces intervened. One of the most fundamental things we can do in creating an attitude receptive to world organization and enduring peace is to obtain an adequate standard of living for everyone. As we oppose legislation in this nation calculated to assist the rest of the world to increase its capacity to produce and to raise the world standard of living we are opposing world peace. And as we support it we are supporting world peace. An economist signified hearty agreement.

A most essential role in educating the public and in changing public attitudes, a journalist declared, will be played by the scientists. At no time in the past has the prestige of the scientists been higher with the American public. If they remain out of their laboratory shells and continue their activity on the

platform and in the press as they have recently done, the educational job will be far less difficult to perform. They should not confine their remarks to the technical aspects of these questions, but, as in this meeting, take the responsibility of discussing publicly at every opportunity all of the social implications of their discoveries.

A scientist replied that two organizations made up of scientists had already been formed in the state of California to work for the proper world control of atomic power. Other groups of scientists were active in other parts of the country and were federating nationally. An association for the international control of atomic energy, to include both scientists and nonscientists, had recently been launched in this vicinity.

The organization of such small groups all over the nation should be encouraged, a social scientist concluded. It gives the movement for international control a grass roots flavor and is in the great tradition of American democracy. But that is not enough. If these small groups are not organized into a coordinated national movement for education and action, their energies will be dissipated. What is needed today is a national campaign, and indeed a world campaign. There already exist in this nation several strong and active national organizations concerned with the maintenance of world peace. By federating with and supporting these organizations, local groups all over the country can best bring about their desire to harness atomic power for the constructive use of mankind.

GEORGE E. MOWRY,
Rapporteur.

THE AGENDA USED BY THE CONFERENCE

I. THE SITUATION

- A. Testimony of scientists on destructiveness of atomic weapons: on probable time required for other powers to have them regardless of secrecy; on future development possibilities.
- B. Official policy proposals and negotiations to date.
- C. The present state of public opinion, as gauged by opinion polls, by pronouncements of various groups, and in other ways.
- D. Official and unofficial reactions in other countries.
- E. Conclusions: How urgent is the problem posed by the situation thus revealed?

In view of the fact that all participants have by now considerable background information, a relatively brief time will be spent on Topic I.

II. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?

- A. Control of atomic weapons.
 1. National control? Probable consequences of atomic armaments competition.
 2. International control?
 - a. Methods and feasibility of inspection system.
 - b. Political problems, including relation to United Nations Organization.
- B. The prevention of war.
 1. The United Nations Organization. What changes, if any, in the Charter and in United States policy toward the Organization are needed in the light of atomic weapons?
 2. Improvement of relations with other great powers, especially the U. S. S. R. What can be done about the distrust that exists?
 3. The issue of "world government." How and when?
- C. Re-examination of United States military defense policies.
 1. Foreseeable effects of atomic weapons on military strategy and on comparative power positions.
 2. The relation of atomic weapons to such issues as:
 - a. Universal peacetime military training.
 - b. Naval policy and naval bases.
 - c. Scientific research and mobilization of scientists.

III. HOW TO GET DONE WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?

- A. The problem of public support for constructive policies in relation to atomic weapons.
- B. What specific methods are available for education of the public, especially on the West Coast, to the real issues involved and to the needs for positive action?

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Bloch, Felix, Physics Department, Stanford University
 Boardman, T. D., International Center
 Brewer, Leo, Chemistry Department, University of California
 Clark, Mrs. Warner, International Center
 Condliffe, John B., Economics Department, University of California
 Cowell, Mrs. Olive Thompson, Social Science Department, San Francisco State College
 Douglas, Mrs. W. W., League of Women Voters
 Edwards, Paul C., Associate Editor, San Francisco News
 Elkus, Mrs. Charles de Young, Jr., Columbia Foundation
 Elliott, Robert C., San Francisco News
 Greenslade, Admiral John W., USN (ret.)
 Hacke, Mrs. Harold, League of Women Voters
 Isaacs, Lt. Col. Irwin M., USA
 Kirkpatrick, Paul H., School of Physical Sciences, Stanford University
 Kefauver, Grayson N., Department of Education, Stanford University
 McLaughlin, Mrs. Alfred, Institute of Pacific Relations
 McWilliams, Mrs. Robert, International Center
 Merner, Garfield D.
 Mowry, George E. (Rapporteur) History Department, Mills College
 Oppenheimer, Frank, Radiation Laboratory, University of California
 Phillips, Miss Lillian M., Women's Action Committee
 Roberts, Holland, California Labor School
 Tilton, Mrs. L. Deming, League of Women Voters
 Webster, David L., Physics Department, Stanford University
 Weinberg, Joseph W., Physics Department, University of California
 Wheeler, Oliver P., Director of Research, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
 White, Dr. Lynn, Jr., President, Mills College
 Wickett, Fred A., Institute of Pacific Relations
 Wickett, Walton A., California Laboratories
 Wilbur, Brig. Gen. Wm. H., USA

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EXHIBIT No. 902

129 EAST 52ND ST., NEW YORK CITY, *January 29, 1945.*

MR. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
16 West 12th Street, New York City.

DEAR FRED: This is to thank you most sincerely for your extraordinarily helpful letter of January 26th. I think I agree with practically every one of the criticisms that you have made. If we could have managed to shape the conference in advance along the lines which we now in retrospect see would have been desirable, the results would, I believe, have been even more substantial. The analysis that you have made means that we must now in the series of continuation conferences and discussion groups which we are now planning and which you suggested at Mont Tremblant endeavor to achieve some of those things which we failed to achieve at Mont Tremblant. In this we will be looking to you for constant suggestion and leadership.

Thanks to your excellent suggestion, yesterday we had Castro to lunch. Lockwood and Holland and I all found him most charming, stimulating and intelligent. We are giving him letters of introduction to friends in Delhi and Chungking and arranging for him to meet a number of Chinese in New York and Washington and in addition a circle of Americans who know China in both cities.

He has made excellent suggestions for multiplying our contacts in Mexico itself. Be sure that I meet Tolefano when he comes to New York.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 903

129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK CITY,
February 3, 1943.

MR. EDGAR J. TARR,
Chateau Laurier, Ottawa, Canada.

DEAR TARR: On Wednesday evening, February 10th, subject to your approval, I am planning to take you to a dinner to the great Mexican labor leader, Vincenta Lombard Toledano who is one of the most forceful, intelligent, and liberal leaders in Mexico and is President of the Confederation of Latin American Workers. The dinner is sponsored by the C. I. O. It will give you opportunity of meeting someone who would be essential in building an I. P. R. in Mexico. It will also give you an opportunity of seeing at first hand, progressive New York City workers en masse.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 905

MARCH 1, 1943.

WLH.

KM from ECC:

The private document prepared in Washington on the Strength of the Muslim League has come into my hands. It is not available for quotation, nor should any reference be made to it. I thought, however, that you might be interested in seeing it, so I have had copies made. I don't think that it covers the ground, but it does contain one or two interesting points.

164/No. 4/2/1/43

Background information

THE STRENGTH OF THE MUSLIM LEAGUE IN INDIA

MR. JINNAH'S POSITION

Mr. Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League has recently been carrying on a vigorous political drive.

His visit to the Punjab showed the extent to which he has secured contact with the Muslim masses. It can no longer be argued that because at the General Elections it was not able to secure a majority of the Muslim votes in any Province, the Muslim League has no following among the masses. Since 1937, accession to the Muslim League's and Mr. Jinnah's strength has been tremendous. Almost every bye-election in Muslim constituencies has been won by the League and the number of Muslim League members in the various Provincial Legislatures has increased manifold.

The number of Muslim Ministers who now owe allegiance to the League is considerable. The latest accession has come from Sind. Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, who succeeded Mr. Allah Bux, has joined the League and his example has since been followed by all the Sind Muslim Ministers. Here is a survey of the Muslim League position in the Muslim majority Provinces:

PUNJAB

The total number of Muslim Members in the Punjab Legislative Assembly is 89. Only one out of these was elected on Muslim League ticket in the General Elections of 1937. The number of Muslims elected on Unionist tickets was 77. All Muslim members of the Unionist Party are, however, now members of the Muslim League under what is known as the Sikander-Jinnah Pact of 1938. The main terms of the Pact were that the Unionist Party's Leader, the late Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, with all his Muslim followers in the Assembly should join the League and promise support to it in all Indian constitutional questions. Mr. Jinnah agreed on his part that the Muslim members of the Unionist Party would have freedom in Provincial matters and would be free to pursue the Unionist Party program.

The political complexion of the Punjab made it necessary for the late Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, the Punjab Prime Minister, not to form a Muslim League Government but a Unionist Government in coalition with Hindu and Sikh groups. In all Provincial matters he pursued a more or less independent line and, though professing allegiance to the League and Mr. Jinnah, his policy on all-Indian questions was at times embarrassingly independent of the League. On the other hand, Sir Sikander never openly flouted any league mandate and he resigned from the National Defence Council when required by the League.

The *Civil and Military Gazette* of Lahore recently wrote: "What is consistently ignored is the fact that Mr. Jinnah and Sir Sikander are mutually dependent; their common fundamental purpose must override differences arising from the admitted diversity of their 'spheres of influence.' Whatever their personal predilections, circumstances must force the Muslim League President and the Premier of the Punjab (so long as he is a Muslim) to run in double harness until India's future is hammered out; and that Constitution may conceivably effect even closer cooperation between them."

Mr. Jinnah's recent Punjab tour monopolised public attention, not only because of his public utterances on topical questions, but also because of the object underlying his visit. Recent attempts made by the Punjab Premier to settle the communal problem in that part of the country on a Provincial basis irrespective of an all-Indian agreement, must doubtless have caused anxiety to Mr. Jinnah. The formula favored by Sir Sikander, according to most reports, conceded self-

determination to the Hindu and Sikh minorities in the event of a Muslim plebiscite deciding in favor of secession in a postwar settlement. The minorities may form a separate State or join the main Indian Union. Negotiations went on for some time amongst the various parties but ultimately broke down or were adjourned because it was said that the Hindus wished to consult the Mahasabha.

Soon after, Mr. Jinnah arrived in the Punjab and in his first public utterance made a pointed reference to the main basis of the scheme without naming it and condemned the move to give the right of self-determination to "Sub-National" groups like the Hindus and the Sikhs in the Punjab and the Muslims in the United Provinces.

He further tried to win over the Sikhs to his conception of Pakistan by reassuring them that their interests would be safe under a Muslim State. This failed, by Mr. Jinnah succeeded in scotching the "Mischievous idea," as he described it, of a purely Provincial settlement of the communal problem and laid down that "no settlement is worth the paper on which it is written either in the Punjab or elsewhere, so far as Muslims are concerned, except with the Muslim League."

Later, Mr. Jinnah in another speech said that he had not referred to the Sikander formula, which he had not even studied in his earlier speech. This enabled Sir Sikander Hyat Khan to make a rapprochement with Mr. Jinnah and declare himself to be a loyal supporter of the Muslim League. If there were any differences between Sir Sikander and Mr. Jinnah, it was explained, they related more to the method than to the policy and program of the Muslim League and were intended solely to further its aims and ideals.

Attempts have lately been made to show that the Sikander formula is in accordance with the League's resolution on Pakistan which visualised territorial adjustments. The formula allowed this in accordance with the desires of the communities concerned and to that extent unintentionally conceded the right of self-determination to the Hindus and the Sikhs. However, the problem is no more a live issue. Mr. Jinnah has applied the damper and as a result of his visit to the Punjab he is back again in the position he occupied prior to Sir Sikander's attempt.

The death of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan on December 26th was regarded by the New York Times Correspondent (N. Y. T. Dec. 29) as considerably strengthening Mr. Jinnah's position by removing the only Muslim figure important enough to challenge him.

BENGAL

Out of a total of 123 Muslim members in the Bengal Assembly and 30 in the Legislative Council, 43 and 11 members, respectively, follow the Muslim League.

Mr. Fazlul Haq, the Premier of Bengal, who has been a member of the Muslim League since 1918, resigned in 1940 when disciplinary action was threatened against him for accepting membership of the National Defense Council, from which, however, he resigned. The Muslim League expelled him on December 11, 1941, for having formed a coalition Ministry in Bengal without its sanction.

Some unconfirmed reports have appeared in the press that Mr. Fazlul Haq had met Mr. Jinnah recently in Delhi. Another report said that Mr. Haq had rejoined the Muslim League. On this the Bengal Premier made the following statement: "The news published by *Independent India* (Mr. M. N. Roy's Delhi paper) about my rejoining the Muslim League raises an irrelevant issue. I maintain I was never out of the League, I am still in the League. Therefore, the question of my rejoining does not arise. As regards Mr. Jinnah, I have never been at war with him, nor do I intend to be so. I am not at war with anybody. I am at war with untruths."

SIND

Out of 35 Muslim members in the Sind Assembly, only 13 were elected on Muslim League ticket. With the return of Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah as Premier of the Province in October last, a number of M. L. A.'s have joined the League. Sir Ghulam and all his Muslim Ministers are now members of the League, and the strength of the League party is now 26 out of 35.

Sir Ghulam resigned from the Muslim League when Mr. Allah Bux took him into his Cabinet two years ago. His rejoining the League has been prompted by a desire to strengthen the Ministry that he formed on Mr. Allah Bux's dismissal.

ASSAM

Out of 34 Muslim members in the Assam Assembly, originally only 3 were elected on Muslim League ticket. But, a few months after the General Elections 30 members signed on as a Muslim League Party. The Premier, Sir Mohammad Saadullah Khan, has been strictly following Muslim League discipline. He resigned from the National Defence Council when required by the League to do so. On recently assuming office he claimed that his Cabinet was representative of Assam's people. No mention was made of the party affiliations of the Muslim members of his Cabinet. In all his public utterances since assuming office, he has refrained from mentioning the Muslim League.

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

Out of 38 members in the N.-W. F. Province Legislative Assembly, only 12 belong to the League Party. The only sign of a weakening of the Congress Party in the Province has been the resignation of Arbab Abdul Ghafoor Khan, M. L. A. ex-Parliamentary Secretary, from the Congress Party and the Red Shirts, but he did not join the Muslim League. He formed a new organization called the Pashtoon Jirga. It aims at an independent Pathan State, run in accordance with the laws of the Shariat. In a statement, Arbab Abdul Ghafoor Khan said that an alliance with the Congress was harmful as the Pathans were gradually losing their identity and drifting away from religion.

	Total Muslim Members of Legislatures	Total Muslim League Mem- bers
Punjab.....	89	78
Bengal:		
Lower House.....	123	43
Upper House.....	30	11
Sind.....	35	26
Assam.....	34	30
North West.....		
Frontier Province.....	38	12
Total.....	349	1211

¹ Or 60.45 percent.

IMPORTANT NOTE.—It is important to remember in using the above figures that they show the strength of the Muslim League among the Muslim members of the Legislatures of Muslim majority provinces; they do *not* show Muslim League strength in Hindu majority provinces (these figures will be released later when available).

JH: MC.

EXHIBIT No. 906

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y. March 1, 1943.

The Misses CARTER,
31 Bartlet Street, Andover, Mass.

DEAR MABEL AND HARRIET: Thank you for all your kindness, thoughtfulness, and love, and for this delicious loaf of bread.

I looked everywhere in the station and on the train for Zita, but I guess she probably decided to take a later train.

Under separate cover I am sending you the four American Council booklets. They are all good, but I think you will find the one on the Soviet Union the most interesting and timely.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 907

MARCH 2, 1943.

Copies to WWL
 WLH
 HA
 ED

HM from ECC:

Going up to New England last week I read "The Land of the Soviets" for the first time. I was immensely impressed with it and feel that it is a most skillful and timely job. It is going to have a very big sale in the secondary schools, but I would like to see a similar sale amongst the general reading public.

If you agree that this is desirable, I am wondering what you and your colleagues would think of cooperating with Webster in getting it out as a bound volume that would sell at \$1.50 or \$2.00, and go out in a big way for getting it reviewed and promoted. So long as it is in its present Binding it will probably fail to make the review columns of the more serious book review editors.

Could you also check with *Fred Myers* and *Rose Gandel* to see whether it has been taken up by the merchandising department of RWR and whether there are any large possibilities there either in the present edition or in a bound volume, where there could be a considerably larger national distribution.

At the right time I would like to see the present or the new edition go with personal letters from me to any of the following who have not received it:

Litvinoff
 Gousev
 Kolokoff
 Gromyko
 Davies
 Standley
 Faymonville
 Hopkins
 Hazard
 the whole RWR Board
 McLean and some of the leaders of the Canadian Aid to Russia Fund
 Welles
 Some of the more outstanding members of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees in Congress
 A select list of people in the Army headquarters
 T. V. Soong
 Some of the Indian Leaders
 To Chiang Kai-Shek and some of his colleagues
 Motylev

ECC from HM:

Here is a possible type of invitation that might work on the Russians.

It would be necessary to tell Litvinov what it was and urge him to send as many of his people as possible, if he can't come himself. Likewise it would be well to get from Jessup, Currie, Harold Ickes, Henry Morgenthau the names of their assistants who should be invited, if we don't already know. Also Lukashev should be urged to let some of his people come.

EXHIBIT No. 908

MARCH 18, 1943.

WLH from ECC.

The talk with Veatch revealed the following:

1. Governor Lehman and Mr. Sayre were very enthusiastic about our talk and very eager to have the IPR undertake the assignment.
2. The areas to be covered in approximately the following order are:

Burma
 Malaysia
 Netherlands Indies and, in fact all Southeastern Asia except that we need give little attention to the Philippines (I imagine Sayre will do that himself)
 China
 Korea, Japan, and Manchuria

Veatch will send us today or tomorrow such general outlines and directives as they have already worked out for other areas, but they do not want us

to be too much guided by these. They want us to make our own analysis and put forward our own project.

They would hope that we could send them an outline of our proposed plan within the next four or five days; that after a month we could present a first draft, and that some of us could take it to Washington for a full day's discussion with them and a few Far Eastern experts from various Government departments. Then the gaps could be filled and a redraft made and the whole thing submitted by the middle of May.

I asked Veatch whether they were thinking of a six- or ten-thousand-dollar job, and he said that they had been thinking in smaller terms, that he felt pretty sure that they could get an appropriation to cover the cost of one \$6,500 man for two months and then the money could be used in whatever way we thought best. But if this is inadequate they would make every effort to get a larger appropriation. I should say that we could count definitely on about \$1,100 with a fair chance of making a case for \$2,200 or \$2,500.

I told Veatch that professionally we couldn't afford to submit a poor piece of work.

EXHIBIT No. 909

Copy.

WLH from ECC.

MARCH 26, 1943.

I was a bit sad when I discovered in *Pacific Affairs* page proof that you had secured a review from Norman Thomas, but I decided to say nothing to anyone.

Today however without having mentioned the matter to her I received the enclosed from Harriet Moore. Please return it at your convenience.

The case of Roy is different, I assume ILO submitted his paper and that we had to accept it.

Copy.

ECC from HM.

Rec'd MARCH 26, 1943.

It is probably unnecessary for me to add this P. S. to the memo in re the talk with Litvinov, but I believe it should be born in mind. It does not help the standing of the International Secretariat with the Soviets to use people like Norman Thomas and Roy of India. Good capitalists are ok with them but Social democrats are poison—especially of the Thomas variety who remain the one group in the U. S. who oppose the war. This opposition even comes out in a piece like his review in the current *Pacific Affairs* though somewhat disguised—"It is the failure of most American liberals to understand and discuss openly these facts which warrants grave doubts concerning the success of our struggle now." It would be one thing for one of the national councils to select these people—but it is a little different when it is the international secretariat.

In the case of Roy their reaction is probably that the IPR is pretty ignorant about India if they pick Roy to write about the labor movement there. I know very little about it, but my impression is that Mr. Roy's labor movement is something minute and doesn't represent anything of real significance. Of course Mr. Roy is incidentally an ex-communist, expelled I believe for "rightist" tendencies. If we were to pick a minority party in India, it would be more to the point today to pick the Communists themselves who apparently are co-operating in the war effort and trying to push the Congress into a settlement. The British have even let most of them out of jail as their program is constructive for the general war effort. But best of all, the IPR should stock to major movements and to articles on large groupings first, before it goes in for the Roys.

I am sure that this position will not be accepted by either the secretariat or many of the individuals connected with the IPR, but as you know it is hard for the Soviets to cooperate with an organization whose policy it cannot identify * * *.

EXHIBIT No. 910

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 1st April 1943.

In pencil (Copy to P. K. C.).

MISS MABEL M. CARTER,
31 Bartlet Street, Andover, Massachusetts.

DEAR MABEL: Herewith my check for \$225. I was in Washington on Monday and so got a little behind with my correspondence.

While in Washington, among others, I called on and had interesting talks with Dr. T. V. Soong, Foreign Minister of China; Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles; Secretary of the Interior Ickes; John Hazard, of Lend-Lease; and Michael Greenberg, of Lauchlin Currie's White House office. In the evening I participated in a United Nations discussion at Constitution Hall. The other speakers were: W. L. Batt, of the War Production Board; Gardner Cowles, of the OWI, who went to Russia with Willkie; Maurice Hindus; and Sir Bernard Pares, of the London School of Slavonic Studies. We dined beforehand at the home of Mrs. Robert L. Bacon and then went back to her house at 10:30 for an hour and a half further discussion and a number of speakers, Senators, Congressmen, press, and others. It was a full and useful day.

Affectionately yours,

EXHIBIT No. 911

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, April 12, 1943.

MR. RICHARD J. WALSH,
Asia Magazine, 40 East 49th Street, New York City.

DEAR DICK: The Dies Committee is after T. A. Bisson, who for the past year has been working for the BEW. Bisson desires a few of his friends to write letters testifying to his loyalty as an American citizen, adding anything that the writer feels free to say.

Enclosed is a copy of what I have written. Would you feel free to write directly to Honorable John H. Kerr, Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., sending a copy of your letter to T. A. Bisson at 383 Willard Avenue, Chevy Chase, Maryland.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 912

129 EAST 52ND STREET, New York, N. Y., 12th April 1943.

HENRY C. ALEXANDER, Esq.,
23 Wall Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR ALEXANDER: From your reading of LAND OF THE SOVIETS I am afraid you may have got a wrong impression of the Institute of Pacific Relations. In the hope of correcting such an impression, I am venturing to send you for your personal library a few of our publications which may aid in rounding out the picture.

During the past year the Institute has published in North America more than fifty books and pamphlets. In this entire list the only one which has been criticized as soft and sentimental is LAND OF THE SOVIETS, which was written especially for high-school students and which now, happily, is being revised. Much more representative of the Institute's solid work are such studies as:

BANKING AND FINANCE IN CHINA.

JAPAN SINCE 1931.

THE MAKING OF MODERN NEW GUINEA.

I am therefore sending copies of these to you under separate cover.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 913

WAR DEPARTMENT,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE,
Washington, April 13, 1943.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
*c/o Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter having reference to the Princeton Conference. I am glad to have the tentative agenda, which I think is well prepared. I have read Mr. Holland's article in the Far Eastern Survey of March 5th; it seems to be an excellent statement.

I am taking the liberty of inviting Colonel Boekel, who is shortly going to India in charge of civilian affairs on General Stilwell's Staff. I do this in the belief that he will find a great deal in the discussions which will be of value to him in his work. I have checked with Dr. Johnstone and he thinks it is an excellent proposal. I realize there isn't time for a reply from you, but unless you send me a wire to the contrary, I shall bring Colonel Boekel.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ JOHN L. CHRISTIAN,
Captain, A. U. S., Southern Asia Branch.

am

EXHIBIT No. 914

Penciled notations: KP

WAR DEPARTMENT,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE,
Washington, April 1, 1943.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
*Secretary, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: Your letter to Colonel Mayer with respect to the I. P. R. meeting on India, scheduled for Princeton, April 17-18, has been received. We shall be pleased to have Captain John L. Christian of the Southern Asia Branch, attend this private meeting.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ M. W. Pettigrew
M. W. PETTIGREW
Colonel, G. S. C., Chief, Far Eastern Unit.

EXHIBIT No. 915

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, April 5, 1943.

Captain JOHN L. CHRISTIAN,
*Military Intelligence Service,
War Department, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR CHRISTIAN: We were delighted to hear from Colonel Pettigrew that you will be able to attend the Princeton Conference on "India in the United Nations' War Effort," April 17 and 18. As soon as it is ready we will send you the draft agenda.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 916

In pencil (ECC invited 4/28/43)

MAY 6 MEETING, WASHINGTON, REVISED INVITATION LIST

Sir Girja S. Bajapi, Indian Agency General, 2633 16th Street NW, Washington, D. C.

Hugh Borton, Department of State, Washington

H. B. Butler, British Embassy, Washington

(penciled in-Carter)

Frank Coe, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C.
 Geoffrey Cox, New Zealand Legation, Washington
 J. M. Elizalde, Resident Commissioner of the Philippines, 1617 Mass. Ave.,
 Washington
 James W. Fulbright, House Office Building, Washington
 Morris Greene, 2117 Woodland Drive NW, Washington
 Dr. G. H. C. Hart, 1620 Belmont Street NW
 Alger Hiss, Esq. Department of State
 (penciled in-Holland)
 Luther A. Johnson, House Office Building
 (penciled in-Johnstone)
 Dr. Walter Judd, House Office Building
 Dr. Kan Lee, China Defense Supplies, 1601 V Street NW
 (penciled in-Lockwood)
 Howard J. MacMurray, House Office Bldg.
 T. M. Martin, Col., G. S. C.-Chief, Japan Section, M. I. S. the Pentagon
 William Mayer, Col., G. S. C.,-Chief, China Section, M. I. S., the Pentagon
 John W. McCormack, House Office Building
 Karl Mundt, House Office Building
 M. W. Pettigrew, Col., G. S. C.,-Chief Far Eastern Section, M. I. S. the Pentagon
 L. B. Pearson, Minister-Counsellor, Canadian Legation, Washington
 MomSeni R. Pramroj, Royal Thai Legation, 2300 Kalorama Road NW, Washington
 Mr. A. P. Tixier, Delegation du Comite National Francais, 729 15th Street, NW
 Alan Watt, Australian Legation, Washington, D. C.

SUPPLEMENTARY LIST

Mahindra
 Someone from Navy
 Bruce Turner
 Rotor

EXHIBIT No. 917

WWL

Penciled notations: (K. P. on Monday ask WWL & WLH whether it's okay to
 invite both of these?) ECC

WAR DEPARTMENT,
 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE,
 Washington, April 29, 1943.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you very much for your invitation to attend the
 I. P. R. round-table discussions on the problems of collective security in the
 Pacific and Far East, commencing Thursday, May 6. I shall make every effort
 either to be there or to delegate someone to represent the Far Eastern Unit.
 I think that the two agencies listed below might also be interested in the
 discussions:

Brig. General C. W. Wickersham, Commandant, School of Military Govern-
 ment, Charlottesville, Virginia.

Colonel Dallas S. Townsend, Chief, Military Government Branch, Civil Affairs
 Division, Office, Chief of Staff, War Department.

Very truly yours,

[s] M. W. Pettigrew
 M. W. PETTIGREW,
Colonel, G. S. C., Chief, Far Eastern Unit.

(Penciled notation: How about shoemaker, too? Lt. Col. Gaines H. Office of
 Provost Marshal Gen., Service of Supply, Room 2805, Munitions Bldg., War
 Dept., Wash., D. C.)

EXHIBIT No. 918

Penciled notation: Hiss, yes

3415 VOLTA PLACE,
Washington, D. C., April 30, 1943.Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52 Street, New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: This is to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of April 28 in which you were so good as to ask me to attend a small private discussion on May 6 to discuss the tentative outline which was enclosed with your letter.

I shall be very glad to attend this meeting, subject, of course, to some last-minute call of duty which frankly I do not now foresee.

Yours sincerely,

ALGER HISS.

EXHIBIT No. 919

Penciled notation: Martin, Yes.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE,
Washington, May 1, 1943.

Penciled notation: K. P. By all means come on this basis—ECC

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have received your letter of April 28, 1943, inviting me to join a small private IPR round table discussion on the problem of collective security in the Pacific and the Far East, to be held in Washington on May 6.

I am glad to have a copy of the tentative outline prepared by Mr. Johnstone, and I should like to have the privilege of attending the discussion if I am not expected to participate.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Truman M. Martin
TRUMAN M. MARTIN,
Colonel, G. S. C., Chief, Japan Branch.

EXHIBIT No. 920

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, May 4, 1943.COLONEL TRUMAN M. MARTIN, G. S. C.,
Chief, Japan Branch, Military Intelligence Service,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR COLONEL MARTIN: We will of course be glad to have you come to the Thursday evening meeting as an observer.

Sincerely Yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 921

MAY 10, 1943.

WWL from ECC:

I had a long talk with Jane Plimpton yesterday about becoming the IPR representative in Washington. I think she would take the job like a shot if she wasn't partially committed to going to work for Gulick in the Lehman office.

She has agreed to hold up until Wednesday morning taking any final action with Gulick. This is to give you time to see her on Tuesday and do the final job of salesmanship on behalf of the IPR.

Miss Plimpton was an honors graduate of Vassar, and throughout her term at Vassar has shown an unusual interest in the study both of American domestic problems and of foreign relations. She has been very active in the student move-

ment, was editor of the Vassar paper, and held several other high positions in student life.

She could do, I think, a remarkably good job for Bill Johnstone and for our other Washington study groups because she has already had a lot of experience in summarizing similar meetings. For several weeks, for example, at 700 Jackson Place, she has been rapporteur of the Washington study group of the Commission to Organize Peace.

Of incidental value is the fact that she has intimate friends in the White House and is a born promoter as well as a good scholar. Once she was given a definite assignment, I would have no hesitation in sending her to Welles Hornbeck, Harry White, or anyone in our government or any other government with whom we wanted to make an IPR contact.

I think you can render a great service to Amco and Pacco by persuading her to become our Washington representative. So far as Pacco is concerned I would be prepared to recommend an appointment for the rest of the year.

She knows her way around government offices, having been an interne in the Bureau of the Budget where she has made the necessary grade. She does not know shorthand, but she types rapidly and well.

You can reach her in Room 250 of the State Department building, though that particular room is a Bureau of the Budget room. She lives at 3913 Huntington Street, N. W.—Telephone: Ordway 6370.

You may want to send her a wire today as to when and where to meet you.

EXHIBIT No. 922

MAY 21, 1943.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,

Institute of Pacific Relations.

129 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: As regards the invitation list for May 27 I suggest adding Sir George Sansom, and Kan Lee. I presume that you have invited Hiss. I shall be glad to have a talk with Alger Hiss about the meeting. I still think if we go ahead on the agenda that it can be a good discussion. I will be on hand to have dinner with you before the meeting if that is possible or to see you ten or fifteen minutes before the meeting at 700 Jackson Place.

I will be perfectly willing to preside if you think it best, although you do a much better job than I can. Please let me know if there is anything further you would like done before the meeting.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM C. JOHNSTONE,
Dean of the Junior College.

EXHIBIT No. 923

Penciled in (copy to HM)

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York 22, N. Y., 7th June 1943.

MORTIMER GRAVES, Esq.,

American Council of Learned Societies.

1219 Sixteenth Street N. W., Washington, D. C.

DEAR MORTIMER: On my return I received your little yellow inquiry about a center of information in Washington. Part of the problem, of course, is finance; and part is personnel. I think you ought to get Harriet Moore's advice. I wish we could see our way clearer and am wondering whether we ought to wait until we can have the Ickes-Litvinoff-Graves-Moore-Carter dinner that I spoke of.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 924

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York 22, N. Y., 9th June 1943.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE, Esq.,

*Executive Office of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR CURRIE: Some time ago you asked me for a list of Chinese personnel. I am now able to send you a copy of a list prepared by Lenning Sweet of UCR together with a supplementary list which he has also prepared. This, I assume, will be used in its present form or revised in the report that Lockwood is making for Governor Lehman. If this is of any use to you, would you have a copy made for your files and return the enclosed to me in due season?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 925

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York 22, N. Y., 15th June 1943.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE, Esq.,

*Executive Office of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR CURRIE: Sweet of UCR has compiled the enclosed list of foreign personnel that might be of use in relief and rehabilitation positions in China. If there is anything of use to you in it will you make a copy for your files and return this copy to me in due course.

Col. Evans Carlson, as you doubtless know, is back from the Pacific with new and characteristically valuable experience behind him. He leaves tonight for Washington and will be at the Army and Navy Club for the next two days in case you want to see him. I assume he will be seeing the President.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 926

INVITATIONS FOR THIRD MEETING ON COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC AND
THE FAR EAST

In ink—June 17, 1943.

In pencil—6/10/43.

(Hand written:)

No—Sir Girja S. Bajpai: Indian Agency General, 2633 16th St. NW.

Dr. Hugh Borton: Special Division, Department of State.

Yes—Nicholas A. J. deVoogd: 1620 Belmont Street NW.

Yes—Morris Greene: Australian Legation.

Yes—Alger Hiss: Department of State.

Yes—M. R. Seni Pramoj: Royal Thai Legation, 2300 Kalorama Road NW.

Lt. Col. James W. Shoemaker: 1729 Q Street NW.

No—Captain Vaughn F. Meisling: Military Intelligence Service, War Department.

Yes—John Alexander: British Embassy.

No—Philippe Baudet: French National Committee, 1420 16th Street NW.

Yes—Frank Coe: Board of Economic Warfare.

(?)—L. B. Pearson: Canadian Legation.

Yes—The Honorable Frances P. Bolton: 2301 Wyoming Ave. NW.

Yes—The Honorable Howard J. McMurray: House Office Building.

No—The Honorable James W. Wadsworth: House Office Building.

G. S. Cox: New Zealand Legation.

No—The Honorable J. W. Fulbright: House Office Building.

Yes—The Honorable Walter Judd: House Office Building.

Yes—Kan Lee: China Defense Supplies, Inc., 2311 Mass. Ave., Washington 8.

Alan Watt: Australian Legation.

Harry B. Price: China Defense Supplies, Inc., 2311 Mass. Ave., Washington 8.

Yes—J. M. Elizalde: 1617 Massachusetts Avenue NW.

Col. William Mayer: Chief, China Section, MIS, War Dept., Pentagon Bldg

No—Sir George Sansom: British Embassy.

Y. R. C. James Yen: % Chinese Embassy.

No—Bruce Turner: New Zealand Legation (6/14/43) in pencil.

No—W. W. Lockwood.

Yes—W. L. Holland.

Yes—William C. Johnstons.

Yes—Edward C. Carter.

(In ink) Walter Laves: Organization Services Division, Office of Civilian Defense, Dupont Circle Bldg.

Yes—Grayson Kirk: Department of State.

*Eugene Dooman: Department of State.

*William Y. Elliott: War Shipping Administration.

*Read Hager: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Munitions Assignment Board.

*List of those invited to collective security in the Pacific and the Far East,
700 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.*

(in ink)

[I—Invited. Acc.=Accepted. Arr.=Attended. N=Did not attend or regretted]

	May 6, 1943	(In ink) May 27, 1943	June 17, 1943
John Alexander		I, Acc., Att.	I, Acc., Att.
Sir Gijja Bajpai	I, Acc., Att.	I. (sorry), Hot Springs.	I. (sorry), away.
Philippe Baudet	I. (sorry), New York.	I, Acc., Att.	I. (sorry), New York.
T. A. Bisson		I, Acc., Att.	
Frances P. Bolton	I. (sorry), engaged	I, Acc., Att.	I, Acc., Att.
Hugh Borton	I, Acc., Att.	I, Acc., Att.	I. (very sorry), busy.
H. B. Butler	I, England		
Evans F. Carlson			I, Acc., Att.
Edward C. Carter	I, Acc., Att.	I, Acc., Att.	I, Acc., Att.
Frank Coe	I, Acc.	I, Acc., Att.	I, Acc., Att.
G. S. Cox	I. (try attend), Turner	I, Acc., Att.	I. (no reply).
N. A. J. de Voogd	I, Acc., Att.	I, Acc., Att.	I, Acc., Att.
Eugene Dooman			I. (sorry).
J. M. Elizalde	I. (sorry) engaged	I. (sorry), Hot Springs	I. (hopes to come) N.
William Y. Elliott			I, no reply.
J. F. Engers			I, Acc., Att.
Miriam S. Farley	I, Acc., Att.	I, N	
J. W. Fulbright	I. (sorry) engaged	I, Acc., Att.	I. (sorry) engaged.
Andrew Grajdanzev			I, Acc., Att.
Morris Greene	I, Acc., Att.	I, Acc., Att.	I, Acc., Att.
Read Hager			I, Acc., Att.
G. H. C. Hart	I, West Coast		I. (sorry), New York.
Alger Hiss	I, Acc., Att.	I, N	I, Acc., N.
W. L. Holland	I, Acc., Att.	I, N	I, Acc., Att.
Luther Johnson	I. (sorry), engaged	I, N	
William C. Johnstone	I, Acc., Att.	I, Acc., Att.	I, Acc., Att.
Walter Judd	I. (sorry), engaged	I, N	I, Acc., Att.
Grayson Kirk			I, Acc., N.
Walter Laves			I. (very much interested).
Kan Lee	I	I. (sorry), Hot Springs.	I, Acc., Att.
W. W. Lockwood	I, Acc., Att.	I. (try)	I, N.
Col. T. M. Martin	I, Acc., Att.	I, Acc., Att.	
Col. William Mayer	I. (sorry suggests Meisling).	I, N	I. (no reply).
John W. McCormack	I, N		
Howard J. McMurray	I. (sorry), engaged	I, Acc., N	I, Acc., Att.
Capt. Vaughn F. Meisling	I, Acc., Att.	I, Acc., Att.	I, N.
Martha Mooney		I, Acc., Att.	
Harriet Moore	I, N		I, N.
Karl Mundt	I. (sorry), engaged	I. (sorry), engaged	
L. B. Pearson	I. (try), N	I. (sorry), Hot Springs	I. (try), N.
Col. M. W. Pettigrew	I. (try or send someone).	I, N	
Catherine Porter		I, Acc., Att.	
M. R. Seni Pramoj	I, Acc., Att.	I, Acc., Att.	I, Acc., Att.
Harry B. Price		I, Acc., Att.	I, Acc., Att.
Sir George Sansom		I, Acc., Att.	I. (sorry) Baltimore.
James W. Shoemaker	I, Acc., Att.	I, N	I. (no reply).
Capt. J. P. Taylor			I, Acc., Att.
A. P. Tixier	I, London		
Dallas Townsend	I. (sorry) engaged		
Bruce Turner	I		I, N., regrets.
James W. Wadsworth	I. (sorry) engaged	I. (sorry) engaged	I, N.
Alan S. Watt	I	I, N	I. (sorry).
Urbano Zafra	I, Acc., Att.	Hot Springs.	(?), N.

*Special letter.

EXHIBIT No. 927

WLH NWL HA (Pencilled initials)

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, May 26, 1942

MILO PERKINS, Esq.

*Executive Director, Board of Economic Warfare,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. PERKINS: In early September the Institute of Pacific Relations is planning a small private study conference to make an over-all appraisal of the factors to be considered in the waging of the war in Asia and the Pacific, and to stimulate creative thinking on immediate postwar problems.

We expect able representation from China, India, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Soviet Russia, and the Netherlands East Indies.

We regard it as most essential that you be present and participate in our discussions. I want very much to talk with you in the near future as to some of the personnel whom we should invite from other countries. I am wondering whether you would have a quarter of an hour free to discuss this matter with me on Tuesday, June 2nd. I could see you any time from early morning to late at night except between two and three-thirty.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 928

Penciled Note: ECC Ark July 3

BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Washington, D. C., June 20, 1942.

Office of the Executive Director

Penciled note: TARR

HOLLAND
LOCKWOOD
JESSUPMr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
*Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: I appreciate your invitation to attend the September meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations to discuss problems of war and reconstruction in the Far East. Your enterprise in promoting such discussion is useful. If circumstances permit, I shall be happy to participate; otherwise I shall ask James H. Shoemaker of the Far Eastern Division to attend.

I am sorry that I could not get in touch with you before June 2. Might I suggest that the next time you come to Washington you see Mr. William T. Stone and Dr. Shoemaker about the persons to be invited to attend the meeting. I have asked them to consider this matter now so that your discussion with them may be as helpful as possible.

Sincerely yours,

[S] MILO PERKINS, *Executive Director.*

EXHIBIT No. 929

DRAFT TO MILO PERKINS

DEAR MR. PERKINS: We deeply appreciated your letter of June 20 indicating that if circumstances permitted you would be happy to participate in the forthcoming Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

In deference to the wishes of our Chinese colleagues we have decided to hold the Conference in December instead of September as originally proposed. The Chinese cabled that they could send a very much more representative group if the later date were chosen.

Enclosed is a copy of the draft agenda. Mr. Lockwood has already followed your suggestion and talked to Mr. Stone and Mr. Shoemaker about our plans.

EXHIBIT No. 930

129 EAST 52D STREET,
New York 22, N. Y., June 28, 1943.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE, Esq.,
*Executive Office of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR CURRIE: For your private information I enclose a description of some of the Chinese who arrived in this country a few weeks ago. This was prepared for me by Harry Price. I am sure he would have no objection to my sharing it with you.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 931

JULY 14, 1943.

CONSTANTIN OUMANSKY,
*Embassy of the U. S. S. R.,
Merida 18, Mexico City, Mexico:*

Planning see you early Thursday afternoon fifteenth.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 932

129 EAST 52D STREET,
New York 22, N. Y., June 30, 1943.

HIS EXCELLENCY, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR,
*Embassy of the U. S. S. R.,
Mexico City, Mexico.*

DEAR OUMANSKY: If you are unlikely to visit the United States this coming month I am wondering whether you could spare a half a day to talk over many matters with me if I found it possible to visit Mexico in the third or fourth week of July?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 933

COPY OF UNFINISHED HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM EDWARD C. CARTER TO
JOHN A. CARTER

ALOFT—MEXICO CITY TO FORT WORTH, TEX.,
Sunday, July 18, 1943.

DEAR JOHN: Mexico City is about the same altitude as your birthplace, Simla. Unlike Simla it is flat. Like Simla it is surrounded by mountains. But Mexico's mountains though impressive are not as high or extensive as the vast bulk of the Himalayas. The climate of Mexico City is unlike Simla. It has cool nights and warm days all the year round. Some people feel the altitude. I didn't. The city is a mixture of Rome, Paris, New York, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Mexican Indian and I suppose of Madrid and Lisbon (which I've never visited). It reminds one alternatively of Manila (the Spanish influence, palm trees, sunshine, a primitive hinterland and an emotional people who can act with great ability but who sometimes find great oratory a substitute for practical action. They both can exert themselves when music bids them dance.

I mentioned Detroit's influence. There is apparently no gas or rubber shortage. The city is jammed with American cars—mostly Mexican licenses but a scattering of Texas and Arizona licenses. The hotels are full of American tourists. I had wired ahead for a room but had to try six hotels after arrival before I could get located. Luckily Oumansky (who has just arrived from Moscow as the Soviet Ambassador) sent one of his staff in the Embassy car and she (Miss Alexandra Nicholsky) drove me around until she found a hotel that would take me in.

After a wash and shave at the Hotel Gillow, she drove me to Embassy for lunch. Oumansky greeted me most cordially but said quickly, "Don't say anything about it to Mrs. O." Luckily I knew what he meant. Five days before leaving Moscow for Mexico their only child, a 15-year-old daughter who was their greatest joy and interest in life, was killed in an accident in Moscow. She had been at school

in Washington, was developing great charm, brains, versatility, and they had all three been planning together their next great adventure—the flight to Mexico and life in a totally different civilization. They buried her and 2 days later got into the great plane that flew them, their files, and the Embassy staff (four or five people) across Siberia to Fairbanks, Alaska, where I am happy to say the U. S. Army received them most cordially (lots of generals helping) and on orders from Washington a big Army transport plane flew them from Fairbanks via Seattle to Los Angeles when they travelled by American Airlines to Mexico City.

Mr. and Mrs. O. and I had a very nice lunch preceded by a little vodka and caviar that they had brought. Mrs. O. was in black and you could see how overwhelmed she is with her sorrow. Several times when I was with O. alone he told of his anxiety for her and showed how terribly he, too, is suffering. But he has his work that absorbs so much of his time. She is reading and clipping American newspapers for him but the mails are awfully slow and that is hardly a full-time job. I am going to ask Ruthie if she will send Mrs. O. some clippings from time to time so that Mrs. O. will have more to do and also so that they can get stuff of value that they wouldn't otherwise get. Mrs. O. has sent Alice and Ruthie, by me, some little gifts of Mexican silver.

Oumansky and I spent many hours during my 3 days in Mexico discussing IPR and the world in general. Motylev has gone to the front and has been succeeded by G. N. Voitinsky as head of the USSR IPR. V. is a very good man—he was long in China and the Far East. The food situation in Russia for civilians is terribly bad but the Soviet press says little about it for fear of giving comfort to the enemy.

With O. I met some of the leaders of the Mexican RWR. Castro Leal, a great Mexican history and university professor.

(Penciled notation: If he has time ECC may finish this later—RDC.)

EXHIBIT No. 934

JULY 20TH, 1943.

Mr. and Mrs. CONSTANTIN OUMANSKY,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R.,
Merida 18, Mexico, D. F.

DEAR MR. AND MRS. OUMANSKY, This is to thank you both for your very kind hospitality while I was in Mexico City. I enjoyed every minute of the 3 days and I cannot tell you how pleased I was to renew our old acquaintance.

The new secretary of the Mexican aid to Russia committee came to see me Sunday morning and we had a long and useful talk.

I arrived at La Guardia Field yesterday (Monday afternoon) about 1:30.

I have already given your greetings to several of your friends and will be seeing more in the course of the week. I tried several times to reach Mrs. Litvinoff on the phone yesterday afternoon, but there was no answer. So I went to her apartment at 6:00 and discovered she had been away for a few days. At the apartment house they did not know precisely when she would return, but I will see that she gets Mrs. Oumansky's letter just as soon as she returns.

Mrs. Carter and Ruth were delighted with Mrs. Oumansky's presents and with all the news I was able to bring them.

I will be writing you again in two or three days on several matters.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 935

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York 22, N. Y. July 20th, 1943.

Mrs. MAXIM LITVINOFF,
301 East 38th Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MRS. LITVINOFF: Yesterday I arrived by air from Mexico City where I had spent 3 days. I saw a great deal of Mr. and Mrs. Constantin Oumansky, who sent you their warmest greetings and the enclosed package. On my arrival yesterday afternoon I phoned your apartment several times but got no answer. So I went to the apartment about six in the evening and discovered that you were away for a few days. So I thought I better send this package by mail rather than leaving it with the elevator man.

The Oumansky's are settling in to life in Mexico City very well. They have made many friends already and are clearly very well liked. They are both terribly crushed by their daughter's death. He is most considerate of her and is doing everything in his power to help her to overcome her profound grief. His life is, of course, more filled with activity than hers so he does not have as much time for sadness. But he is terribly crushed by the calamity. He is naturally eager for her to have as many things to do as possible. I suggested to her a number of things that she can do for Russian war relief in Mexico.

If you could possibly manage to go there for a visit, you would be doing the Oumanskys a very friendly service. Incidentally, you would find much in Mexico to interest you. It is a fascinating mixture of Europe, the Orient, and of Mexican Indian life and culture. There are interesting people in Mexico from all over the world and the cultural and aesthetic life would interest you very, very greatly. The climate is salubrious and the vegetables and fruit, the clear air and the sunshine are to be had in great abundance. There is little external evidence of the war and no rationing of rubber, petrol or coffee. Do go if you possibly can.

There is a chance that I will be flying to Chungking about the first of August. I do hope that I can have a talk with you at least on the phone before I go, if I do go.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Copy care Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

EXHIBIT No. 936

Copy to: Oumansky.

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York 22, N. Y., July 20th, 1943.

EUGENE D. KISSELEV, Esq.,
Consul General of the U. S. S. R.,
7 East 61st Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. KISSELEV: This is to inform you that I have recently received a cablegram from Moscow signed by Voitinsky reading as follows:

"Volumes Mont Tremblant Conference Papers Received Many Thanks."

May I thank you most sincerely for your kindness in dispatching the volumes so promptly.

I will have another consignment of books to send to Voitinsky in another week or two. May I enlist your help in sending this second instalment also?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 937

129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.,
August 4th, 1943.

LAUCLIN CURRIE, Esq.,
Executive Office of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CURRIE: Dad was very grateful to you for sending him the letter of recommendation which he found awaiting him at the Mayflower on Monday night. He was sorry to miss having a last word with you. If there is anything which you would like to communicate with him you can send it to the Embassy in Chungking.

He is wondering whether you would feel free to cable John Fairbank that he is on the way?

Sincerely yours,

Secretary to Edward C. Carter.

EXHIBIT No. 938

AUGUST 1, 1943.

Sent from 331 East 71st Street, N. Y. C.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
*Executive Office of the President,
 White House, Washington, D. C.:*

If you think a general letter of recommendation would be helpful for me on my journey could I get it at your office nine-thirty Tuesday morning?

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 939

THE UNITED STATES,
 OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION,
54 Queensway, New Delhi, India, August 23, 1943.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
% American Embassy, Chungking.

DEAR DAD: The following cable came from Bill Holland, which I am passing along through the pouch.

"Extension AMCO relief studies requested confidential basis hope you Carter can report briefly from Chungking, extensively following return; also secure several studies qualified Americans special aspects 500 dollars available stop Can you also arrange survey correspondents India Australia Harriet More."

I hope things are going well, and that the trip was not too adventurous.

Affectionately yours,

[s] BILL.

(Penciled note: W. D. Carter.)

EXHIBIT No. 940

129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.,
15th October 1943.

Letter #25

WILLIAM D. CARTER, Esq.,
*U. S. Office of War Information,
 A. P. O. 885, Postmaster, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR BILL: Here is another part of the September PACIFIC AFFAIRS which you requested. I hope it gets to you soon.

You may be interested to know that Kay Greene is now, as far as we know, somewhere in the northern part of the continent on which you landed before flying to your present post. She started out with a job with Lehman's organization, which I believe Phill Jessup got for her. I think Margaret is going to use some of her furniture for her new apartment. Kay had left it for Rose Yardumian and Mary Healy to use. But as Rose has now gone to Washington for the IPR and as Mary will soon be joining Beecroft, they gave up their plans for taking an apartment here so the furniture was going begging.

Love.

EXHIBIT No. 941

1 EAST 54TH STREET,
4th November, 1943.

Private & confidential.

Dr. ROBERT J. KERNER,
University of California, Berkley.

DEAR KERNER: As you know, W. L. Holland and I were in China in September. Holland saw your former student and great admirer, Chen Han-seng. Holland discovered that because of his honest, liberal views and progressive attitude, Chen Han-seng was in danger of being spirited away by some underground right-wing group. We all regard him as one of the soundest students of China's agrarian economy and a true Chinese patriot. We conferred with both Chinese and American friends in China as to how best to save Chen Han-seng for future

usefulness to his country. It is a matter that has to be handled with extreme delicacy.

All of our advisers say that the best insurance would be an invitation from one of the three or four leading American universities to Chen Han-seng to come to the United States either as a temporary research professor or associate or for a special course of lectures. This apparently would be a greater safeguard than an invitation from the IPR.

Knowing how familiar you are with Chen Han-seng's work, Holland and I are venturing to inquire whether you could act in the matter. If funds should prove the only difficulty, we would be prepared to find the necessary money for the journey and, say, a three-months appointment.

In confidence, today I have received through the State Department the following confidential message from Chungking:

"Confidential: Please tell Mr. Carter that latest from the Kweilin consul indicates that Chen Han-seng is in an increasingly precarious position, and that Sa Kung-liao, the liberal writer who was arrested there this summer, is now incommunicado; Chen may well be next, and IPR would be well advised to act suddenly and soon if they want to get him out."

Would you wire me whether you would be in a position to act swiftly and affirmatively in this matter?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 942

(Handwritten note:) Copies to JAC
PKS
WDC

1 EAST 54TH STREET,
New York 22, N. Y., 8th November 1943.

The Misses CARTER,
31 Bartlett Street, Andover, Massachusetts.

DEAR MABEL AND HARRIET: Letters from each of you have arrived. We are glad to hear from you both and to read the interesting clippings that you have sent.

I finished my work in Moscow just as Hull, Eden, Harriman, and their staffs arrived. I had an invitation to go to the airport to meet them, but at the same time I had an important engagement with a Russian expert on China whom I had been trying to see ever since I arrived, so I spent three hours with Rogoff instead of going to the airport to see the celebrities arrive. The reception for them was very impressive I was told. The American planes came in and landed their passengers fifteen minutes ahead of the British, so first Mr. Hull inspected the Guard of Honor and then Mr. Eden. The Guard of Honor were all in fancy uniforms and impressed everyone profoundly. I did not bother Hull or Eden after their arrival because I knew they were fully occupied with the preparations for what proves to have been one of the most historic meetings in our generation. A great many of the things that we have all worked for for years are beginning to be realized.

We are not going to Nashville to see Jill because John is staying on at Fort Sill as an artillery instructor for a month or two at least. His address is: Lt. John A. Carter O1184470, Battery E, 32nd Battalion, 8th Training Regiment, F. A. R. T. C., Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Alice and I are going to Lee this afternoon so I can get a little further sleep and relaxation before I plunge into active work next week.

Ruth and I have just spent two days in Washington. I had talks with Secretary Morgenthau, Ambassador Davies, Lauchlin Currie, Governor Lehman, Phil Jessup, Selskar Gunn, General Faymonville, Jane Plimpton, Stanley Hornbeck, Elizalde, Fox of the President's War Relief Control Board, and a few others.

I was very tired when I arrived owing to the strenuous character of the last week in Russia, but I am now back in my old form.

You will note we have moved into new offices which are going to be a little more commodious and convenient than our rabbit-warren at 129 East 52nd Street.

With much love, I am

Ever affectionately yours,

EXHIBIT No. 943

NOVEMBER 13, 1943.

AG from ECC:

When I asked you to translate Rogoff's article I did not know about the part of it which appeared in the September issue of *Amerasia*. I hope this will reach you in time so as to prevent your doing the entire translation if part of it has already been done in *Amerasia*.

I was sorry that I did not get as far to the east as Irkutsk.

EXHIBIT No. 944

1 EAST 54TH STREET, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.,
15th November, 1943.

Lt. JOHN A. CARTER O1184470,

Battery E, 32nd Battalion, 8th Training Regiment,
Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

DEAR JOHN: It was wonderful to hear your voice on the phone at Lee Friday evening. Mother, Ruth and I were very excited.

I got your good letter of November 3rd a few days before. Your present temporary assignment of teaching men survey must, as you say, be both interesting and instructive to you. I am sure it is also interesting and instructive to your pupils.

You certainly have a wide variety of subjects to cover in the Field Artillery.

You would have been immensely interested to have visited with me the great "German War Trophies Exhibition" at the Park of Culture and Rest in Moscow. Here, spreading over many acres is a vast but systematically organized collection of armament and equipment captured from the Germans. There are special sections for each classification—tanks, planes, trucks, artillery, uniforms, mines, bombs, etc. The evolution, for example of tanks and artillery, are vividly shown. The Russian Major General who personally conducted me had special technicians elaborating details in each section; i. e., one for howitzers, another for heavy siege guns, another for light but terribly powerful antitank guns, another for various types of anti-aircraft guns. The different technicians explained the differences in German and Soviet equipment and indicated how much more mobile a great deal of the Russian equipment is.

Yes, the Moscow conference was one of the most significant gatherings of our generation. As I was in Russia for the fortnight before the conference began, I was aware on every side of the determined efforts the Russians were making to ensure the success of the conference. The intellectual and documentary education had been very extensive. In addition the Russians thought up a thousand different acts of hospitality and friendship not only for Hull and Eden but for all of their staff including all of the members of the crews of every one of the British and American planes that flew the two staffs into Moscow.

It was, I suppose, necessary for Churchill and Roosevelt to have all of those two-some conferences of theirs, but it did begin to look to all the rest of the world as though a secret, closely knit Anglo-American hegemony was emerging to control the world.

The Moscow conferences dramatize to the world that the four countries—Britain, China, U. S., and U. S. S. R.—must and will work together. Of course, there are innumerable problems to be faced still, but the machinery for facing them is now at long last being set up.

I am sure that all of the public criticism of Hull as being anti-Soviet has been worth while. It probably needled him into bolder and more friendly action than he might otherwise have taken.

With you, I think that the reports of the travelling Senators were not as thoughtful as they should have been. A British Parliamentary Mission of the same sort would have compared notes and agreed on making a more unified impact on the public on their return.

With you I also question the wisdom of the line which *TIME* is taking regarding air bases abroad. There is bound to be an immense expansion of aviation after the war, but we will become one of the most bated nations if we try to scoop other nations in attempting monopoly of postwar commercial aviation.

It is too early to say whether Wavell will establish a new India or not. Thus far he has shown no sign of holding out the olive branch to those in prison. He

has, however, publicly acknowledged that there is famine in India by going personally to Bengal, which his predecessor failed to do.

I will try and send you copies of any letters or reports that might develop further my ideas resulting from the trip.

I enclose a hurriedly dictated report on certain aspects of my visit to the Soviet Union. This is just a first draft and will be revised later. Will you please send it on to Polly and the Andover Aunts and ask them to return it to me.

Affectionately yours,

EXHIBIT No. 945

1 EAST 54TH STREET, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.,
15th November 1943.

MISS KATE MITCHELL,
Amerasia, 225 Fifth Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR KATE: May I congratulate you on the September issue of AMERASIA. I do hope that you managed to send a number of copies into China itself. If you have not done so already, may I venture to suggest that you tear off the cover and send by air mail to their appropriate APO addresses one copy each to:

General Stilwell
General Chennault
General Stratemeyer (New Delhi)
John Davies and Jack Service (Both on Stilwell's staff)
George Merrell (American Mission, APO 885, Postmaster, NYC)
William D. Carter (U. S. O. W. I., APO 885, Postmaster, NYC)
Mac Fisher (Chungking)

You might also send one by ordinary air mail to Liu fu-wan, P. O. Box 98, Chungking.

It may help matters with the Indian and Chinese censorship if you refrain from mentioning that you are sending these at my request. It may also help if the envelope which carries them is simply marked with your new address without mentioning AMERASIA, 52nd Street, or the IPR.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 946

(Pencilled:) RD San Francisco, 417 Market St.
(Pencilled note:) Return to RD

REPORT ON WASHINGTON OFFICE, DECEMBER 1943-MARCH 1945

Under the joint auspices of the American Council and the International Secretariat the Washington offices of the Institution Of Pacific Relations were reopened at 744 Jackson Place NW., in November 1943 with Professor William C. Johnstone, Dean of the School of Government at The George Washington University, as Director of the Washington Study Program and Miss Rose Yardumian as Washington Representative. During the past year several research associates have been added on a part-time basis including Miss Virginia Thompson, Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore and Dr. Rockwood Chen. (Miss Thompson moved to San Francisco in October where she is now associated with the Office of War Information.) In August 1944 Mrs. Elizabeth Ussachevsky joined the staff of the Washington Office. A small library including a full set of IPR publications and a number of reference texts on the Far East has been set up and made available to members and people working in the field. The Washington Office sells the publications of both the American Council and the International Secretariat for the convenience of members in the local area.

The IPR in Washington has been in a favorable position through its international and private character to simulate informal discussion among Far Eastern experts temporarily stationed in Washington from the various countries for off-the-record meetings either at the IPR offices or at the Cosmos Club Assembly Hall. Informal meetings at the IPR office—of which there have been 17 in the course of the past year—have included such speakers as Mr. Edmund Clubb of

the Department of State; Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Minister of Information in Chungking; Col. Victor Purcell, a British colonial administrator with long experience in Malaya; Dr. J. S. Kennard, a missionary recently returned from China; the Hon. Walter Nash of New Zealand who discussed the ILO conference; several Chinese professors visiting this country under the program of cultural relations of the Department of State; Mr. John Service of the Department of State; Sir Frederick Eggleston, Minister to the United States from Australia; Mr. Kumarappa, Director of Social Sciences of the Tata Institute, India; Mr. George Yeh, China, Ambassador Naggiar, France, Mrs. Pandit, India, Mr. Siva Rao, India, delegates to the Hot Springs Conference of IPR; Senator Carloss Garcia, a Filipino guerrilla leader from Leyte; Gunther Stein, British correspondent from China; and Mr. John Emmerson of the Department of State who described plans of the Japanese Emancipation League in Yanan.

General meetings to which all members in the local area are invited have taken place about every two months usually in the Cosmos Club Assembly Hall. Attendance at these meetings ranges from 75 to 100 people. The first meeting of this kind was held in December 1943 to give the members of the IPR an opportunity to hear Mr. Edward C. Carter, Secretary-General of the IPR and Mr. William Holland, Research Secretary, discuss their trip to China. The response to this meeting was so enthusiastic that it was decided to include such meetings as part of the regular program. Eight such membership meetings have been held in the last 16 months. Other speakers have included H. Foster Bain, repatriated from the Philippines on the second *Gripsholm* trip, who described some of the effects of Japanese occupation on the Philippine economy; Dr. Tsiang Tingfu and Dr. Mackenzie Stevens who discussed the role of cooperatives in Asia; Dr. Henry De Young, Mr. Youngjeung Kim, and Mr. Ilhan New who discussed Korean affairs; Lt. Com. Nelson Spinks, Dr. William C. Johnstone and Mr. Wilfred Fleisher who participated in a panel discussion on What To Do With Japan under the chairmanship of Admiral Harry Yarnell; Mr. Obaidur Rahman and Mr. John Fischer on U. S.-Indian economic relations. In December 1944 a joint meeting was held at the home of Mrs. Gifford Pinchot with the local branches of Americans United and Indusco participating on recent developments in Chinese affairs—Mr. Lewis Smythe and Mr. Owen Lattimore were the speakers. Early in March, 1945, Representative Mike Mansfield of Montana reported on his mission to China to the IPR membership in a Cosmos Club meeting.

Special functions have included a luncheon for press members to hear Mr. Carter and Mr. Holland give an off-the-record account of their trip to the Far East, a dinner for members of Congress and administration officials for the same purpose. (Penciled note—An informal luncheon discussion led by Mr. Carter for Army and Navy officials responsible for educational work was held about a year ago to acquaint officers with IPR materials particularly our pamphlet program.) A luncheon was held for Owen Lattimore on his return from China in the summer of 1944 when he accompanied Vice-President Wallace on his trip to the Soviet Far East and China. At this meeting Mr. Lattimore discussed the treatment of minorities by the Chinese and Russians. In December 1944 a sherry party honoring Sir Frederick Eggleston, Minister from Australia to the U. S. was held at the Mayflower Hotel.

Following the ninth international conference of the IPR held at Hot Springs, many parties were held in Washington to honor the foreign delegates visiting in Washington. Highlighting these was a tea given by the Hon. Frances Bolton, Representative from Ohio, for conference delegates to meet members of Congress as well as Army, Navy, and Administration officials. A small cocktail party was given for the press by the IPR to meet the chairmen of the various delegations.

Under Dr. Johnstone's chairmanship a number of small study groups were formed on various topics sponsored by the American Council in some cases and by the International Secretariat in others. In one case the American Council of the IPR and the China Council sponsored jointly a number of meetings on Postwar U. S.-Chinese Economic Relations. Under the auspices of the American Council study groups met on Trade and Investment Policies in Southeast Asia, Treatment of Japan and Postwar U. S.-Chinese Economic Relations. The International Secretariat has sponsored two groups, one on Treatment of Japan, and the other on Economic Recovery in Pacific countries. A great part of the discussions on Japan have been included by Dr. Johnstone in his forthcoming book, *The Future of Japan*, soon to be published by the Oxford University Press under the sponsorship of the American Council of IPR. Plans are under way for another study group under the auspices of the American Council on the general topic of Dependent Territories in the Pacific area.

It is interesting to note that as a result of greatly increased interest in the Pacific area and therefore in the work of the IPR generally, membership in the Washington area has almost doubled in the last eighteen months since the reopening of the Washington offices. (Check with TGS on exact figures believe we have picked up 85 members in the past year bringing our membership up to 200 approximately. This does not include about 35 non-Americans interested in the work of the IPR whom we invite to general membership meetings.)

EXHIBIT No. 947

(Pencilled note:) Ray—Some rough notes for Peggy on my vague ideas on program. Thought you might like to see a copy. RY

(Pencilled note:) Return to R. D.

To: MAS.

From: RY.

APRIL 16, 1945.

During the present phase of the Pacific war and until its final successful conclusion and for several years thereafter the interest of the American people in Far Eastern affairs will increase tremendously. The job before the IPR will be to build this interest in a constructive way toward the education of an enlightened American people. The IPR is uniquely organized and favorably equipped to assume leadership in this task. Through a carefully planned program of activities integrating the school program, pamphlet and research programs, and through an expanded circulation of *Far Eastern Survey*, *Pacific Affairs* and the other research publications of the International Secretariat, the IPR should be able to go forward building and broadening the base of its membership. The greatest obstacle before the American Council at present is the lack of integration between work already done, current program and a future program. This can be overcome only with the appointment of a mature qualified and experienced Program Director with a background in Far Eastern affairs if possible.

In my work in Washington I have found that not all people interested in IPR are interested in all phases of its work. For example, press and radio people are far more interested in the *Far Eastern Survey* than in general meetings or study group activities. The good job already begun on getting the *Far Eastern Survey* before influential newspapermen and radio commentators with appropriate releases should be continued. We have found that government people are more interested in the program of study groups than in any other single activity. The international character of IPR bringing together experts for informal discussion on Far Eastern problems has interested many government people who after participating in one of these groups usually become members. It may be that this kind of activity can be expanded throughout the United States; in areas where non-Americans interested in Pacific affairs are present, the international character could be organized for people with Far Eastern background. It may be that this phase of our activity should be planned in cooperation with local FPA's, Carnegie Endowment groups, Americans United, etc. While I strongly favor cooperation with all groups to avoid duplication, outside of study group activity I would urge that the IPR set up an independent program wherever possible.

Organized groups and clubs (including women's groups, international and national organizations interested in international relations, church groups, labor groups, and other) are attracted by general membership meetings. An arbitrary figure of six such meetings a year might be planned for all active branches. While we have been able to plan only one meeting ahead in Washington we hope in the future to have plans made a little farther ahead. It is not always possible to do this, of course, because people come unexpectedly and sometimes stay only briefly. These groups mentioned above who will form the broader base which we hope to build are also very much interested in the popular pamphlet program. It may be that the general meetings and new pamphlets could be coordinated in some way. The Army and Navy can be included in the above group, generally speaking. We had one special luncheon in Washington for Army and Navy leaders in orientation work about a year ago to acquaint them with our work, particularly our pamphlet program. Perhaps another one should be planned soon.

There has been no demand in Washington for the business luncheons which have worked so successfully in New York. However, we have had a number of small informal sherry parties beginning at 5:30 and lasting about an hour for foreign officials, U. S. government officials, newspapermen, etc., just back from the Far East. To these meetings we invite approximately 35 people, mostly members and some nonmembers whom we wish to interest in membership. The talks are usually off-the-record and brief, with a long question period. We have had 17 such meetings in the course of the past 12 months. They are an excellent technique for building membership in Washington as well as for giving us the reputation for being closely in touch with the latest visitors from the Far East. People often call up to ask what's going on at IPR? (We don't tell them all, of course!) Slightly modified to fit the special branches these meetings could be more generally used throughout by our branches.

Not a small part of our office time is taken up with requests for information, not only on IPR publications and others but on substantive material. We have handled this business very spottily in Washington. When I have time, I work up bibliographies, investigate Mme. Chiang Kai-shek's life, etc., but often these requests must be answered very generally by reference to a pamphlet or article. This is one specific instance where coordination between a branch and the national office is bad. There are lots of special bibliographies in the file in New York (Bruno has worked up many), and somehow when this is done branches should get copies. It would be desirable to have copies of those already drawn up. Another criticism which I would like to make is that, unless I come to New York to find out specifically what each of you is working on, I am apt to be very loosely informed. (Don't stop the New York trips thought.) For instance, I had heard from someone down here that we were putting out a pamphlet by Pearl Buck but didn't know anything about it until I got to New York. Each department head or the Secretary should assume responsibility for keeping branches informed about all work in preparation. This would be a big help.

We have recently decided in Washington that we would try to build up our relations with the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committees. In connection with these plans which have already been in operation, a few of us invited Congressman Mansfield to dinner, and plans are in process to invite Congresswoman Emily Taft Douglas for lunch. Getting the IPR better known on the Hill will be one of our chief aims for the next six months. (I might add, Peggy, that I am scared to death of this kind of work.) I have asked Ruth Lazurus to keep me informed about forthcoming issues of *FES* so that I can use special articles as a springboard for discussion on IPR.

Finally, on the question of big money raising, I have done nothing in this field whatsoever. The question is a complex one, I know, but the branches should be informed of what is being done in the various areas and how. The national office should assume leadership in this job but with some direction; perhaps the branches could help share the burden.

The fact that Washington has almost doubled membership figures since the reestablishment of our Washington office is a concrete indication of the interest of many kinds of people in our work. (Check with Tillie. I believe we've added over 85 members and have approximately 200 now.)

EXHIBIT No. 948

1 EAST 54th STREET,
NEW YORK 22, N. Y.,
13th December 1943

ANDREW J. GRAJDANZEV, Esq.,
Office.

DEAR ANDREW: I am giving a small private dinner for several Soviet friends in Washington on Tuesday, December 14th, to report on my impressions of the Soviet Union.

I would be delighted if you would join us. The dinner will be held in Suite 237 at the Hotel Mayflower at 8:00 p. m. tomorrow night. Business suits will be worn.

Would you let me know whether, in spite of this short notice, you will be able to attend.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 949

22ND DECEMBER, 1943.

Private & Confidential.

The SECRETARY,
Lithuanian Legation,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: Yesterday I received the enclosed unsigned letter, pamphlet, and news bulletin in the enclosed envelope.

I have scanned this material and am now returning it to you because I am not able to write to the anonymous sender, and furthermore I ought in all frankness to say that I am sure that this is not the moment for friends of Lithuania to attack the Soviet Union. From a realistic point of view it seems clear that Lithuanians in Europe will have a better opportunity of working out their own salvation by forgetting the grievances of the past centuries and seeking to understand and cooperate with the people of the Soviet Union. It would seem to me that along these lines there is a greater chance for peace in Europe and prosperity in Lithuania than along the lines of the enclosed documents.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 949-A

STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York, ss:

I have examined the documents described in the list annexed hereto as Exhibit I. While I have a present recollection of only a few of them, I am satisfied that with the following exception they are letters or memoranda received by me or photostatic copies thereof, or copies of letters or memoranda sent by me to others or photostatic copies of such copies:

12. Ray Dennett RDC Sept. 26, 1945.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Sworn to before me this 9th day of May 1952.

[SEAL]

IRENE R. DONOHUE,
Notary Public, State of New York.

Qualified in Queens County, No. 41-6061300.

Certs. filed with Queens, Kings, New York, and Bronx County Clerks and Regs.
 Offices, Westchester & Nassau Co. Clerks Offices.

Commission Expires March 30, 1954.

(The document referred to by Mr. Carter is exhibit No. 962.)

EXHIBIT No. 950

K. C. LI, WOOLWORTH BUILDING, NEW YORK

EL RUNCHOKEE,
El Paso, Texas, March 7, 1944.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,

Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street,
New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Your letter of March 1 has been forwarded to me and I am enclosing copy of a letter I have written to the Draft Board in Richmond, California.

I approve of your assuring Mr. Holland that the IPR for the next two years will make up the difference between any salary he may receive in government service and his present IPR salary. It is only fair in view of the reasons you give.

I hope Holland is deferred, as he is indeed indispensable in preparing for the important 1945 Meeting. I am leaving here but expect to be back in New York by the 15th.

With kindest personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) K. C. Li.
 K. C. Li.

KCL:efm
 (Enclosure)

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EXHIBIT No. 951

K. C. LI, WOOLWORTH BUILDING, NEW YORK

MARCH 7, 1944.

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD #53,
Richmond, Calif.

GENTLEMEN: I have just learned that Mr. W. L. Holland, a registrant of your Board, has been classified as 1-A. May I respectfully suggest reconsideration of this classification for the following reasons:

1. Mr. Holland is International Research Secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations which is the leading research organization devoted to Pacific problems.

2. Because the Institute has lost so many of its staff to Government service, Mr. Holland has literally become indispensable. Besides being research secretary, he is also editor of its magazine, "Pacific Affairs."

3. The 1945 Conference of the Institute is regarded as very important, and preparations for it are in the hands of Mr. Holland. The work of this Conference will be valuable to the State Department as well as to members of the United Nations.

4. Mr. Holland is frequently being consulted by representatives of the War, Navy, and Treasury Departments.

5. Should the registrant be inducted, he will no doubt, because of poor eyesight, be assigned to limited service. I believe he is of greater value to his country and the cause of the United Nations in his present position than he can be in uniform.

For the above reasons, I recommend that Mr. Holland be deferred for 1 year.

Sincerely yours,

K. C. LI,

Chairman, International Finance Committee, Institute of Pacific Relations.

EXHIBIT No. 952

3/27/44.

NOTES FOR CLEVELAND SPEECH, MARCH 31, 1944

The peoples and leaders of the United Nations generally believe that they will win the war. But many thoughtful people in the various nations are not so sure of the peace. This misgiving is on balance a healthy sign. It derives in part from a greater degree of political consciousness than that which existed amongst the Allies in the midst of the First World War. It is true that some hundreds of people in the United Kingdom, the British Dominions, the United States and other countries were studying problems of world organization during the last war. But where there were hundreds engaged in this task then, there are now thousands, probably tens of thousands. Indeed one of the most striking results of the last war and the Paris and other peace conferences was the creation of scores of important national and local organizations whose central purpose was: "It must never happen again." Among the many such non-governmental organizations that came into being at that period are the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, The Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangere in Paris, the Institute of History and Economics in Copenhagen, the Foreign Policy Association and the Council on Foreign Relations in the United States. In 1925 men and women from several of the Pacific countries, meeting in Honolulu, formed the Institute of Pacific Relations as a regional expression of this broad movement. For it was felt that most international organizations had their headquarters in Europe and were inadvertently tending to take the position that if European problems were solved the problems of the world as a whole would disappear. Many Europeans and Americans, if they looked to the Far East at all, seemed to be looking that way with a telescope in reverse. The founders of the IPR were acutely conscious of a whole world of dynamic forces in the Pacific area which had menacing possibilities and which cried out for immediate study. The Institute aimed to study the problems of the Pacific from a world point of view and the problems of the world from a Pacific point of view. National Councils of the Institute came into being in eleven countries bordering on the Pacific or having vital interests in that area. When Japan raised the curtain on the Second World War by occupying Manchuria in 1931, the foresight of the founders of the Institute was justified. In

1933 the Institute chose Mr. Newton D. Baker as Chairman of its international governing body, the Pacific Council and he gave rare insight to the leadership of the Institute until his death. Recently an eminent American, closely in touch with the efforts of the United Nations, following Hongkong and Pearl Harbor, to prepare themselves for the war in the Pacific, remarked: "I would hate to think of where we would have been if it had not been for the scholarly research of the Institute of Pacific Relations."

In addition to the national and international organizations which I have just mentioned there have grown up in this and other countries local and regional societies of similar purpose such as the Cleveland Council on World Affairs and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. These still further register the growing conviction that the study of foreign affairs was as urgent a concern of the masses as domestic issues. The contribution of such councils to public enlightenment has been great.

But the Second World War has come and by history's severest test the efforts of us all will have to be described with the one word: "failure."

The challenge today is how can we profit by this collective failure to help in solving now the overwhelming problems of world organization? Do we now accept Newton D. Baker's prophecy that if the nations did not organize after the first world struggle, the war would have to be fought over again on a vaster scale and that the United States would return to the ideal of world organization which it had rejected?

Although the governments of the world and the peoples through unofficial organizations like the Cleveland Council on World Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations have failed, they have increased substantially the possibility of avoiding the grievous mistakes of the past generation. Balked and frustrated as we are by the caution of our governments, the leaders of the United Nations and their respective publics are much further advanced in previsioning the future than they were at this stage in World War I.

Both governmental agencies and unofficial organizations have done and are doing quantitatively at least a vastly greater amount of study on the future organization of the world than they had done in preparation for the Paris Conference. In the United States alone every week sees the appearance of some new book, plan, or monograph on world organization. The Protestant Churches, under the leadership of John Foster Dulles, have advanced their views. The international lawyers, under the leadership of Manley O. Hudson of Harvard and the Permanent Court of International Justice, after a long period of careful study, have made six postulates and twenty-three proposals for the organization of the proposed community of nations and prescribing details for the operation of its machinery. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, under the leadership of James T. Shotwell, has published a flood of memoranda on almost every aspect of the postwar world. The United States Chamber of Commerce's Committee on Post War Problems has called for the immediate formation of an international commission to draft a world peace plan based on the Moscow 4-Power Declaration. This committee, headed by Harper Sibley of Rochester, has made six brief but pertinent proposals which, if adopted, might usher in a new era. The Committee of Economic Development under Paul G. Hoffman of the Studebaker Corporation has a nation-wide net of study groups working on the internal problems of American adjustment to the postwar situation. In this field many other organizations such as the Brookings Institute, the Twentieth Century Fund, the National Industrial Conference Board, the Chamber of Commerce, the A. F. of L., and C. I. O. through a joint committee are busily at work. Many of the great universities have created institutes of international affairs which are turning out thoughtful memoranda on the postwar world. The National League of Women Voters, the American Association of University Women, the National Federation of Women's Clubs are similarly engaged. In the periodical field, FORTUNE magazine is conspicuous for its continuing publication of articles on America and the future. This magazine has already published five major articles dealing with relations with Britain, with the Pacific, with Europe, and also with reference to the American domestic economy and the United States government. The Institute of Pacific Relations has the cooperation of its Councils in ten countries in carrying out a long-range and very fundamental series of studies on the war and postwar problems of the Pacific area. The interim volume "WAR AND PEACE IN THE PACIFIC," being a report of the Mont Tremblant Conference, sketches the main outlines of the problems and indicates the studies which still must be undertaken. The Inter-

national Labour Office in Montreal and the Secretariat of the League of Nations in Princeton are hard at work.

Within the State Departments and Foreign Offices of the United Nations work on these problems from the governmental angle is proceeding on a much greater scale in volume at least than during the first world war.

Both the public and governments of the principal United Nations will have an immense volume of material with which to face the future. But while recognizing the value of all this preparatory work, the publics are haunted by several misgivings.

First, they fear that statesmanship, though adequately documented, will fail because the statesmen are tired, overworked, overcautious, and so fearful of their internal political opponents that they are unequipped to give that creative leadership on which the world waits.

Second, they fear that isolationism with its reactionary and appeasing qualities will rise up to defeat creative statecraft if it emerges.

Third, the people of Britain, China, Russia, France, and Italy fear that if America's leaders move constructively to implement the Moscow declaration, the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms in cooperation with the other Powers that the American Congress will repeat history and defeat American statesmanship at the end of this war.

It is precisely at this point that the role of organizations like the Cleveland Council on World Affairs emerges as of transcendent importance.

At the first conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Honolulu in 1925 at the opening session the Chairman asked the members to list the problems of the Pacific. The very first spokesman rose and said, "The United States is the problem of the Pacific." There were many in other countries who asserted that the United States, because of its growing strength and its refusal to cooperate with the League of Nations, the International Labour Office and the World Court, was an anarchical influence in the Pacific and in the world in general.

Facing the new and vastly more complex world situation today there are many responsible Americans who hold that the problem of the postwar world is the United States. For if it does not use its sovereignty to implement a world collective system, the third world war will be infinitely more devastating than anything mankind has yet known.

There is a tendency among other Americans to fear that the application of the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter will be defeated not by the United States but by the British and the Dutch in their colonial world and by the British in their acquiescence in an unjust settlement in eastern Europe. There is a further American belief that the forming and successful operation of a world organization will be thwarted by the age-old conflict of the European nations and the reemergence of Britain's ancient balance-of-power policy. There are other Americans who admit these dangers but who affirm that they will only be realized if the United States withdraws from the theatre of world cooperation. Certainly it is not the duty of the Cleveland Council on World Affairs or the Foreign Policy Association or the Council on Foreign Relations to dictate to our European or Asiatic allies. It is rather to concentrate on the colossal task of so informing the American electorate that its representatives in Congress will voice an overwhelming and intelligent American mass opinion on behalf of effective and daring cooperation in world machinery and affairs.

Although the various public opinion polls reveal a growing American approval of international cooperation, they do not yet ensure that when the generalities are brought down to the concrete issues of "vital interests", the American public is prepared to go the whole way. In this decade we have seen the great Republic of France collapse because for 150 years there have existed two Frances which hated each other. Within this country the lines do not appear to be as clearly drawn as in France. But there are menacing movements and attitudes which are growing in strength. In spite of much that is encouraging, attitudes toward the Negro, the Jew and even the North American Indian make it inappropriate for Americans to throw stones at the British for their treatment of colonial peoples. The attitude of certain American groups toward progressive movements in organized labor, among farmers, and the public generally hold the seeds of future devastating conflict. Usually those who take these antisocial attitudes are precisely those who still appear to regard the Nazis and the Japanese more tolerantly than they regard our British, Russian, and Chinese allies.

America today is in debt—deep debt—to China, Britain, and the USSR. To China because she was the first to see the nature of aggression and take up arms against Japan. To England because if she had lost the Battle of Britain the Nazis would have lunged into the Atlantic and been able to drive further into Russia before they were stopped. And to the Soviet Union for her early foresight in knowing that war was coming and for her brilliant and stupendous war effort.

I would hate to think of how much further Japan would have gone if the Chinese had not contained from three-quarters of a million to a million Japanese troops on the mainland of Asia for nearly seven years. Australia, India, Alaska, and parts of the United States Pacific coast would have been endangered.

If England had lost the Battle of Britain, Canada and the United States would have become a war theatre instead of arsenals of democracy. Latin America would undoubtedly have been used by the Nazis as a springboard for bombing Dallas, New Orleans, Atlanta, and Washington.

If the USSR had not accepted Hitler's challenge, Germany and Japan would have met in India and all southern Asia would have fallen to the enemy. China's position would have become well nigh hopeless and most of Africa would have been in the hands of the Nazis and Fascists.

China's losses have been vaster than those of Britain and America combined. They have been equalled only by those of Russia, for to date the Red Army has killed more Nazi troops than the armies of all the United Nations put together. The magnitude of the Soviet effort is indicated statistically when I remind you that the published totals of American Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel is still under forty thousand dead as compared with an estimate of three million in the Soviet Union.

The comradeship in arms of China, Britain, Russia, and the United States has naturally led to a measure of collaboration in staking out the broad outlines of the peace. The Moscow agreements commit these four Powers to participate in a new international order. This commitment implied that the four Powers would police our enemies and substituted four Power collaboration for the old formula of a balance of power among the strongest states.

Probably a majority of thinking Americans accept the Moscow thesis that a nuclear alliance of the four Powers is a precondition of an ordered world. They agree with the Moscow conference leaders that provision should be made for the cooperation of all peace-loving states with the Big Four. Public opinion in the United States broadly accepts the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms partially because of an incorrigible American habit to accept broad and idealistic generalities. But the re-educational job with which we are confronted is as follows:

First, to define what these mean when applied to the American scene; Second, to understand the degree to which they can be applied nationally and internationally by the other Powers; Third, to aid our government in stating the issues so concretely and constructively that they will be supported by the people and the Congress and provide a basis for mutual cooperation with the other Powers.

One of the many dangers in current American thought is the persistence of the idea that the United States is the most powerful country in the world. Even more sinister is the belief that we are the most moral people in the world. And finally, there is emerging from many platforms the assertion that the cultural and intellectual center of the world has moved from the European continent and the British Isles to North America. "Let him that thinketh he standeth, take heed lest he fall."

In industrial and agricultural production and social organization the Soviet Union may outstrip the United States in our lifetime. Out of the ruins of continental Europe there may emerge a daring intellectual vigor surpassing that in the United States. There are those who believe that the leaders in the realm of art and thought who will set the pace for the civilized world will emerge from the vast area that stretches from the Volga to the Yangtze.

Certainly our failure following the Paris conference and our failure to understand the implications of Japanese, Italian, Spanish, and German aggression sprang in part from the American feeling of overwhelming superiority in power, social organization, and intellectual leadership. The war has shown that we are members one of another, that we are strong only as we are united with other nations.

Recently Mr. Walter Lippmann in his "U. S. FOREIGN POLICY" has convinced many Americans that we have never had a coherent world policy. More recently Mr. Joseph M. Jones in his "A MODERN FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES" has made an on-the-whole useful critique of our own State Department and at two points has advanced ideas which call for widespread study on the part of the American public. He lists some of the main operating concepts of American foreign policy in the past and affirms that there is scarcely one that has not been either demolished by the impact of world events or riddled by the implications of modern warfare. This is what he says:

"(1) Isolation, avoidance of alliances, avoidance of commitments, diplomacy by 'parallel action' and 'cooperative effort'—demolished by our inevitable involvement in two devastating world wars in one generation.

"(2) Verbal championing of high principles of international law and conduct while continually declaring that our action in support of any and all principles would stop 'short of war,' thereby delivering our diplomacy over to any foreign nation that could trump our highest card—destroyed by Japanese bombs at Pearl Harbor.

"(3) Nonintervention in the affairs of sovereign states—a fraud that was exposed in all of its essential absurdity in Spain in 1937.

"(4) Rights of neutrals—two world wars have shown conclusively that they are respected *only* to the extent that it is convenient and expedient for warring powers to do so.

"(5) Freedom of the seas—to a large extent made irrelevant by the growth of civil and military air power.

"(6) National self-determination—proved inadequate as it fails to protect the rights of individuals and minorities.

"(7) Limitation and reduction of armaments—a policy proved dangerous to the nation's security in the absence of international organization for policing, inspection, enforcement, and for mitigating the economic causes of war.

"(8) Concept of international law as applying only to *states* and not to individuals, thus permitting atrocities *within* states that shock and offend the world's conscience and lead to war—direct bomb hit.

"(9) Nondiscrimination and equality of treatment in commercial relations—still valid, but inadequate in a world in which economic *expansion* and a rising standard of living are conditions of peace and democracy."

Mr. Jones proceeds to sketch the framework of a modern foreign policy as follows:

"I. The first major requirement of a modern American foreign policy is that it shall perpetuate after the war the close association of the four major United Nations—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China—as a nucleus of world order, strong and above challenge.

"II. The second important requirement of American foreign policy is that it shall be based upon, protect, and extend the principle of freedom in the world.

"III. The third essential requirement of American foreign policy is that it shall make adequate provision for international control over civil and military air power everywhere in the world; and for placing at the disposal of a United Nations organization a sufficient margin of air power to deal efficiently and effectively with aggression or threat of aggression anywhere in the world.

"IV. The fourth major requirement of American foreign policy is that it shall promote, wherever in the world it is desired, steady expansion of economic activity, a rising standard of living for the masses, and expanding programs of public education, health, and nutrition as indispensable to democracy and peace."

In spite of certain limitations I would urge all of you who are here today carefully to study these two volumes. In addition I venture to suggest study of the volume "POST WAR WORLDS" by Percy E. Corbett and "WAR AND PEACE IN THE PACIFIC" for those concerned for international relationships in that half of the world. To this latter group I recommend the volume "WINNING THE PEACE IN THE PACIFIC" by S. R. Chow, an eminent Chinese scholar, and another volume "THE FUTURE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA" by an Indian leader, K. M. Panikkar.

The Institute of Pacific Relations in common with other organizations is engaged in an effort to fill up the vast gaps in the world's knowledge of the Pacific area. The American Council of that Institute has published recently a sheaf of pamphlets on several of the countries of the Pacific which are being used widely in the American Army and in American secondary schools. Everyone here who has a relative in the Armed Forces in the Pacific or a child in an Ohio school will wish to familiarize themselves with this invaluable series.

This vast Pacific world, almost unknown to Americans before Pearl Harbor, is now being visited by a rapidly increasing stream of American men and women in the Armed Forces. For a few it is a kind of Cook's tour. But for the majority it is the mud of a South Pacific fox-hole, the fever of the Burmese jungle, the heat of the Indian plains, and the frustration of life in wartime China. A "must" for all patriotic Americans is to see that their men and women in these areas are supplied with background material on racial and national cultures and economic interests so that they can adjust themselves intelligently to their role of comrades in arms and comrades in peace with their Pacific allies. There remains the common task of examining the military, political, and economic policy which the United States and other United Nations should adopt in this far flung Pacific area. Here more attention has been given to the treatment of Japan than to any other single topic. But if we think that the resolving of the problem of Japan means the solution of all the problems of international cooperation in the Pacific area, we will deceive ourselves. For all around that greatest of oceans new dynamic and divisive forces will emerge which must be faced on a regional and global basis.

Let us address ourselves first, however, to the treatment of Japan. I am not familiar with any more comprehensive analysis of this problem than that contained in an article in the current *PACIFIC AFFAIRS* by my colleague, T. A. Bisson. Recognizing that the treatment of Germany will give some pointers for the treatment of Japan, Mr. Bisson, from whom I will quote at length, writes as follows:

"In his Christmas Eve broadcast, President Roosevelt expressed the general principles underlying the political attack on Germany in most careful and exact terminology. The conferees at Teheran, said the President, 'were united in determination that Germany must be stripped of her military might and be given no opportunity within the foreseeable future to regain that might. The United Nations have no intention to enslave the German people. We wish them to have a normal chance to develop, in peace, as useful and respectable members of the European family. But we most certainly emphasize that word "respectable"—for we intend to rid them once and for all of Nazism and Prussian militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they constitute the "master race."'

"Against the background of the final military assault on the European fortress, three simple principles are laid before the Germany people: (1) Germany's military power will be crushed and not permitted to revive; (2) the old leadership must go; and (3) on these bases, the German people will again be accepted as normal members of the European community. The uncompromising nature of this program is perhaps its most striking feature. Even with respect to the second principle, there is no call to the Germans to throw out their old leaders. The words used—'we intend to rid them'—place the responsibility on the United Nations for this drastic action. They are an implied threat to those Germans who support the old leaders, and an implied promise to those Germans who would like to see them overthrown. Cooperation of the German people in this overthrow would obviously be welcomed, but it is neither urged nor suggested.

"In the same broadcast, President Roosevelt also made reference to two basic elements which must enter into the making of peace with Japan. These comprise first, 'the restoration of stolen property to its rightful owners'—a restatement of the Cairo pledge that Japan will be stripped of all territories gained by aggression since 1895; and secondly, the peace will ensure 'the permanent elimination of the Empire of Japan as a potential force of aggression.' It is noteworthy that these two pronouncements, taken together, do not go beyond the first principle as stated for Germany. They constitute a blunt affirmation of the intention of the United Nations to fight the war against Japan to a finish, somewhat analogous in this respect to the 'unconditional surrender' demand voiced at Casablanca. It might have been assumed that further statements on Japan, covering the scope of the last two principles set forth for Germany, would have to wait upon victory in Europe and the mounting of the final assault against Japan. At this point, however, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in a New Year's message to the Chinese Army and people, went far to close the gap. Revealing a hitherto unreported passage at the Cairo conference, he made the following statements:

"In intimate talks I had with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Cairo we considered steps for mutual cooperation and agreed upon certain plans for prosecution of the war.

"We also agreed upon the question of the disposal of the enemy after the war. One important problem in this connection concerns Japan's form of government.

When President Roosevelt asked my views I frankly replied, "It is my opinion that all Japanese militarists must be wiped out and the Japanese political system must be purged of every vestige of aggressive elements. As to what form of government Japan should adopt, that question can better be left to the awakened and repentant Japanese people to decide for themselves."

"I also said, 'If the Japanese people should rise in revolution to punish their warmongers and overthrow their militarists' government we should respect their spontaneous will and allow them to choose their own form of government.' Mr. Roosevelt fully approved of my idea."

"Assuming that these statements reflect a common approach to the peace settlements in Europe and the Far East, it is already possible to sketch the type of peace to be made with Japan. A few of the outlines are even now sharp and clear; others must be drawn on the basis of given suggestions in the light of objectives which seem desirable.

"The peace with Japan will be a harsh one in many of its aspects, notably those affecting territories, disarmament, and possible reparations. When the costs and sacrifices of defeating Japan's ruthless aggression are placed in the reckoning, nothing less should be expected or desired. These terms of the peace will, in some cases, be setting right old wrongs that have endured for a generation or longer. They are also required to limit Japan's power to engage in a second adventure in aggression.

"Obviously, these terms presuppose the existence and continued maintenance of unity between members of the United Nations and the emergence of a strong and effective international organization. Continued agreement and firm cooperation, at least among the United States, Great Britain, the U. S. S. R. and China, are indispensable in order to enforce the terms of peace against Japan initially and then to see that they are upheld. Given this degree of unity, the harsher aspects of the peace can be mitigated somewhat by measures which will indicate clearly to the Japanese people that the settlement is dictated not by a policy of revenge, nor with an intention to enslave. The line is not so difficult to draw as might appear. A vengeful peace can be defined as one aimed at keeping Japan in a state of lasting subjection, political or economic. Any such policy would be self-defeating. Sir George Sansom has rightly declared that the existence of 'a nation of over 70 million desperate and frustrated people would ruin any plan designed to bring prosperity and peace to Asia.' The principle enunciated by President Roosevelt for the German people must also be taken as applying to the Japanese people—they will be given 'a normal chance to develop, in peace, as useful and respectable members' of the world community.

"What is stated here really amounts to a process of postwar development. It looks toward the emergence of a healthy Japan, which can in time reenter the society of nations as a member in full standing. The process makes serious demands on the United Nations, as well as on Japan. They must assist her to develop along peaceful lines on both the political and economic levels; they must assume direct responsibility for the type of political and social structure established in Japan after her defeat. United Nations guidance will be required in greater or lesser degree, to make it certain that the old autocratic system is not reestablished, but that a new system is inaugurated in which the democratic aspirations of the Japanese people find real expression. Full opportunity must also be given Japan to raise the living standard of her people by the processes of normal international trade. The new world organization must have not only the strength to maintain collective security but also the economic statesmanship to eliminate trade barriers and develop the colonial areas of the world by measures for improving the social and economic welfare of the inhabitants on a basis of nondiscriminatory international cooperation. This process will provide the most dependable safeguard against renewed Japanese (or German) aggression. The enemy nations must be restored to health and then must be fitted into a constructive system of international collaboration."

Whatever the fate of the Royal Family, it is clear that whatever remains of the Japanese Navy must be surrendered. Munitions and aircraft must be destroyed or surrendered. Munitions plants must at least be converted into production of civilian goods. For a considerable period Japan will be prevented from maintaining military and naval forces. A civilian police force alone will be allowed. The punishment of the Japanese leaders of totalitarian aggression, whether naval, military, or industrial, must be complete. On the

matter of reparations the experts disagree. The Chinese are expected to inherit such parts of the large industrial plants in Manchuria and Formosa as are not destroyed by military action or a scorched earth policy. In these factories and in the coal and iron of Manchuria, China will add significantly to her heavy industry. If, as declared at Cairo, China regains all her lost territories there would seem to be but little need of insisting on a long drawn-out period of reparation payments which might promise more discord than they are worth. Confined to the slender area of her own islands, Japan will face a perplexing problem of self-support. With the security issue settled, intelligent people in other countries will assert that Japan's economic rehabilitation will be advantageous to other countries. Mr. Bisson rightly affirms:

"Extension of disarmament into the factory, a necessity under modern conditions, still treats the symptoms, not the disease itself. The key issue in the degree of success attending the United Nations' dealings with a defeated Japan is not how well the country is disarmed but how greatly its outlook and motivations are changed. In the last analysis, what is required is a thorough recasting of Japan's political and social leadership. Addressing himself to Germany, President Roosevelt declared in the statement already quoted: '* * * we intend to rid them once and for all of Nazism and Prussian militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they constitute the "master race."' In much the same terms, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stated that 'all Japanese militarists must be wiped out and the Japanese political system must be purged of every vestige of aggressive elements.'"

As to those who ask, "Can we expect to impose democracy on Japan?" one answer is that if the United Nations do not concern themselves we will find the militarists and secret societies back again in their old places of power. Others will answer that the Japanese people may do a good part of the job themselves. Without staking Japan's future on the so-called "liberals" we do know that there have been relatively able opposition movements in Japan. If the United Nations' political warfare and postwar policy is sound, it will appeal to the Japanese on the ground that there are stronger material, social, and emotional satisfactions than those deriving from the ideology of conquest and master race. Confidence must be created in the faith that construction can follow destruction. If the United States role in United Nations' policy is to be positive in revolutionizing the psychology of the Japanese, the American people must steer a courageous and realistic course toward cooperation with the masses of Japan by avoiding appeasement and collaboration with the militarists and the great cartels which have never refused to profit from the expansionist policy of the militarists.

As indicated above while the problem of Japan is central it is not the only one in the Pacific area. A few of those that must be faced are the foreign trade, investment, airlines, merchant marine, and immigration policies of the United States. Another is the problem of British relations with India, Burma, Malaysia, and China. Internally China has tensions and problems that are as baffling as those within the United States.

Though Soviet Russia was the first great power to aid China substantially in her war with Japan, the role of Russia in the Pacific is still obscure to many citizens of China, India, the Netherlands, the United States and the British Commonwealth. This results in large measure to two factors: First and principally because of the generation of mutual suspicion between these powers and the Soviet Union and the fact that but few citizens of these countries have ever taken the trouble to inform themselves on the rational character of Soviet policy in Asia and the Pacific. It results to a lesser degree from a failure to recognize the validity of the position of the combined Chiefs of Staffs that Russia's supreme contribution to the global war is to continue her devastating blows against the Nazis. No United Nations citizen in his right mind could ask that at this moment the Soviet Union take on a second front war which would incidentally cut off the great flow of lend-lease supplies for the defeat of Hitler that now safely cross the Pacific. But in the postwar period whether Russia enters the Pacific war or not, the other Pacific nations will have to recognize Russia as a major Pacific power. The future peace of the Pacific will depend in part on whether the powers that heretofore have regarded Russia with suspicion can so thoroughly inform themselves as to Russian policy as to be able to accept at its face value Russia's overwhelming commitment to the world collective system.

CLEVELAND LECTURE, MARCH 31, 1944

In Georgia, in the Atlanta Constitution, Mr. Henry Ford proclaimed that the war will end in two months. Mr. Ford was not in a position to reveal the inside information on which his prediction was based. The period in which we will have to wait in order to verify his accuracy is so brief that I shall not take your time today to speculate on its truth or falsity. I mention it merely to advance another speculation and that is that Mr. Ford in common with some other Americans may believe that the collapse of Germany automatically and simultaneously means the end of the war with Japan.

I do not hold this view. It seems to me to spring from several wrong assumptions (1) a throw-back to the pre-Pearl Harbor underestimation of Japanese power; (2) a belief that there is a Pacific war and a European war rather than a global conflict; (3) that once the Nazis are subdued the United Nations can quickly deal the mortal blow to Japan.

But for the moment let us have an end of speculation. Looking across the Pacific one sure factor emerges. The way in which the United Nations deal with Japan and all the areas which Japan has occupied will be one of the determinants of the issues of war and peace in the world for coming generations.

Undoubtedly the collapse of Germany will have profound repercussions in Japan. The Japanese will receive the news with mixed feelings. It will spell ultimate doom. At the same time many Japanese, angry with Hitler's failure at Moscow, Stalingrad and in the Caucasus and exasperated by the arrogant behavior of their German colleagues in Japan and China, will secretly rejoice that the German master race is eating the dust of defeat. The Japanese command will undoubtedly seek to minimize the meaning of Hitler's downfall. With his collapse will come two important opportunities—the first on the military; the second on the political and psychological front. If the latter is as inchoate as in the past United Nations political warfare in Africa and Europe has been we may yet win the war in the Pacific but lose the peace.

EXHIBIT No. 953

APRIL 14, 1944.

SOVIET RUSSIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE

(By Edward C. Carter, Secretary-General of the Institute of Pacific Relations)

The Red Army has killed more Nazi soldiers than the armies of all the rest of the United Nations put together. Surely this is a primary contribution to the future, for until the Nazi army is destroyed there will be no peace.

If the USSR had not accepted Hitler's challenge, Germany and Japan would have met in India and all southern Asia would have fallen to the enemy. China's position would have become well nigh hopeless and most of Africa would have been in the hands of the Nazis and Fascists.

By what means did Russia emerge as the greatest effective military power in the world in the winter of 1943-44? By what alchemy did the Russia of 1914-17 transform herself in a short generation? Remember that Germany knocked Czarist Russia out of the First World War while Germany was still at war with the entire British Empire, the United States, France, Belgium, Italy, China and Japan. There is no single answer. The process represents a vast complex of historical and economic forces. Here we have the paradox of a great people who sought primarily the good life. That was the first aim. Supreme military power emerged as a by-product of that objective. In other words, Russia's second contribution to the peace is the unity of her people and her progress in social and economic organization, looking forward to a genuine democracy as the ultimate goal.

The Russians, the British, the Chinese, and indeed many Americans are still guessing as to the future international role of the United States. Under these circumstances it is inevitable that people in the other countries should be guessing about Russia's future role. This results in part from a generation of mingled suspicion and ignorance which has blinded many of us to the fact that through the years Russia has had a rather exceptionally consistent foreign policy.

No student of current affairs can be blind to the serious effects on present thinking in many countries on the future role of the Soviet Union as a result of nearly twenty years of mutual misunderstanding between Russia and other countries. There is not time tonight for me to list those trends—some real,

some imagined—in the early days of the revolution which caused misgivings abroad. Those early years provoked a profound and burning suspicion of things Russian.

To the Russians the behavior of the other nations seemed equally grim. Suspicion in Russia of the capitalist countries resulted from foreign intervention in Russia following the revolution. On the advice of Secretary of War Winston Churchill in 1918 London despatched materials and troops into northern Russia under Major General Poole and later under Major General Ironside. These forces at their maximum numbered more than eighteen thousand British and five thousand Americans. They disposed of the Soviet government at Archangel and set up a provisional white government. In eastern Siberia, British, French, American and Japanese forces marched in. The Czechs controlled western Siberia and Admiral Kolchak with British aid established a provisional regime at Omsk. You are familiar with the aid which the Allies gave to Generals Yudenich ———. You will remember that in 1921 the French General Weygand played a major role in Poland's war against Russia. For a long time it was not easy for Russia to forget the foreign intervention of 1918, the Allied blockade of Russia in 1919, or the credit blockade that extended into the 1920's.

From the moment of Litvinov's first arrival in Geneva, the Soviet government went on record as committed to a world collective security system. Neither the United States, France, nor Great Britain were really committed to that system. Englishmen and Frenchmen assure Americans that it was impossible for their governments to make this commitment because of American isolationism.

The Powers regarded Russia's commitment to the collective system cynically, and the temporary Moscow-Berlin agreement in 1939 was the direct result of the policies of Chamberlain and Daladier in the Munich period.

It behooves Americans to resurvey the whole history of 150 years of relations between Russia and the United States, both under the Czar and under the Bolsheviks. In this period of 150 years the United States has been at war at one time or another with Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Never throughout this period has the United States been at war with Russia. Misunderstanding have arisen from time to time between the United States and both Czarist and Bolshevik Russia, but they have never issued in war between the two countries. The economic and foreign policies of the two countries have been parallel. Their broad interests have been largely identic. Both have been more concerned with the maintenance of peace than advancing their fortunes by wars of aggression.

On both sides there is much to forget. Happily, there is a general, though not yet universal, desire to face forward and profit by the grave mistakes of the past. Since June 22nd, 1941, immense progress has been made in the task of liquidating distrust and forging new ties of genuine understanding.

The growing awareness of Russia's indispensability as a member of the family of nations derives from several causes:

First, a frank recognition of the fact that if the USSR had not resisted the Nazis the other United Nations would still be fighting a losing war;

Second, fresh and ever increasing knowledge of the military, industrial and social strength of the Soviet Union;

Third, a recognition that Soviet geography, natural resources, and commitment to a steady rise in the standard of living both demand and make possible Russia's announced and reiterated commitment to a strong world collective security system.

At the recent Moscow and Teheran conferences Russia gave unequivocal evidence of her commitment to a world collective security system. This is so clearly in Russia's self-interest that only a defection by London and Washington can again precipitate Russia's withdrawal.

Mr. Hull has indicated clearly that one of the foundations of United States war and peace policy is the complete destruction of the Nazi system which plunged us into war. There can now no longer be any question in any informed person's mind as to the complete commitment of the Soviet government and the Russian people to the destruction of the Nazi system. In view of the Soviet war effort the consistent prediction of certain writers of a separate deal between Stalin and Hitler appears ridiculous. Though the Moscow and Teheran declarations have been criticized as indefinite, few can ignore the significance of the declarations regarding complete agreement as to the scope and timing of military operations.

In the political field the Moscow declaration's fourth point recognized "the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization—for the maintenance of peace and security." Cooperation of the

great Powers is such an indispensable precondition of substantial advance that this must be regarded as a step forward. Moscow and Teheran were also significant in that they were the occasion for the first meetings of the Foreign Ministers and the government heads of the three great Powers.

There is a cluster of declarations and agreements which throw a good deal of light on the interests, intentions, and broad ideals of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union: The Atlantic Charter, the United Nations Declaration, the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of May 1942, and the mutual aid agreements concluded by the United States with other countries. The Moscow and Teheran statements to a large extent implied general approval of the foregoing declarations and agreements. In some cases they stood for concrete and binding commitments. In other cases they represent ultimate goals toward which progress will be gradual. In other words, the Moscow and Teheran statements underlined in clear terms the Soviet Union's commitment to a broad program of cooperation for peace and security.

As might be expected, the Bolsheviks with their growing appreciation of the continuity of Russian history have long assumed that the recovery of Russia's lost territories was a legitimate aim.

The Russians have made it abundantly evident that they regard the reacquisition of the Baltic States, Bessarabia, and parts of Karelia as desirable and historically defensible. They have announced that at the right time they are prepared to negotiate with a responsible and representative government of Poland on the general basis of the Curzon line. They have not dogmatically insisted on the Curzon Line as unalterable, but they have stated frankly that it should form the basis for negotiation.

The Russians have affirmed their wholly friendly and cordial interest in the reestablishment of the Czechoslovak state. They have entered into a strong and binding twenty-year agreement with Great Britain. They have made clear their attitude to the French National Committee of Liberation. They have stated their attitude to the Badoglio government.

The Soviet authorities have declared that they do not intend to annex Rumanian territory or to alter the Rumanian social structure.

The Soviet government, together with Great Britain and the United States, has notified the Austrians, the rest of Europe, and the whole world of their intention that their goal is that Austria become independent and free. The Austrians are assured of support in their efforts to find economic and political advantage through understandings with "those neighboring states which will be faced with similar problems." In other words, the world organization will not in theory stand in the way of regional arrangements in the Danube Valley.

A measure of regionalism was foreshadowed by the creation at Moscow of the Advisory Council for Italy and the European Advisory Commission.

The Soviets clearly wish to look forward to a hundred years of peace. I venture to guess that they would prefer to see western Europe emerge from the war quickly into a long era of peace and progress under liberal, democratic, capitalistic, and friendly governments than to be torn in twain by long-drawn-out chaos resulting from inconclusive communist revolutions.

Vis-à-vis Japan, the USSR does not seek a two-front war. The strength of the Soviet Far Eastern armies is such as to immobilize a Japanese army of approximately three-quarters of a million in Korea, Manchuria, and North China. While not seeking war with Japan, one may surmise that the Russian Army does not fear Japan. Very recently the negotiations regarding Sakhalin and the fisheries question reveal that Moscow is fully aware of the fact that her strength is greater than that of Japan. In discussing the war in the Pacific, Soviet writers invariably refer to Japan as the aggressor and China, Britain, the United States, and other countries as the victims of aggression.

In her relations with China, Russia is reported to have taken a scrupulously correct position. The Chinese remember that before Pearl Harbor, when the United States and British countries were aiding Japan with abundant war materials, Russia was aiding China with substantial credits and supplies.

With reference to British India, a study of Soviet publications indicates that the Russians are failing to follow the practice of certain American liberals in lecturing Britain about her relations with India.

At Teheran the three leaders recognized the common responsibility of making "a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples." There was the promise to seek the cooperation of all peoples "dedicated to the elimination of tyranny." There was the welcome to such peoples to come "as they may choose into the world family of democratic nations." The

concert of three made clear their dedication to the cause of free lives to nations and individuals and their repudiation of the role of three-power dictatorship. There still awaits clarification of the fourth point of the Moscow declaration mentioned above regarding the necessity of establishing a general international organization. This was to be open to all peace-loving states for the maintenance of peace and security. Pending the completion of this organization the three Powers and China promised to consult with one another and, as occasion required, with other members of the United Nations.

The foregoing and other declarations point in general terms to the regulation of armaments and the inauguration of a system of general security.

Moscow and Teheran did not completely blueprint the future. They did, however, point the way to many forms of international cooperation which are of self-evident importance to all nations. Neither the British nor the Americans who participated in those conferences have provided their publics with any information to controvert the theory that Stalin and Molotov were any less sincere in their declarations than the leaders from the other nations.

The Soviet government has participated in the United Nations Food Conference and is also participating in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. A Soviet delegation recently came to the United States for preliminary bilateral talks on postwar international currency stabilization with U. S. Treasury officials. These discussions, which were paralleled with talks with the British delegation and similar negotiations with thirty other governments, are paving the way for a United Nations Monetary Conference toward the end of this year or in 1945. The press has hinted that the subject matter of the Beaverbrook-Berle conversations in London regarding international problems of postwar aviation have been communicated to the Soviet authorities.

The Soviet government's policy towards its own diverse nationalities contains lessons both for Europe and for the colonial areas alike of Europe, the Americas and Asia. These are lessons that can be learned and applied with necessarily adopting socialism as the exclusive government policy. Some of these lessons are:

1. In order to be independent and strong, substantial economic power is an essential. This is best achieved if there is an effective balance of industrial and agricultural development. This does not preclude high specialization in the internal economy.

2. When there is an integration between internal economic policy and foreign policy the risk of cultural or social domination of one nation by another is substantially reduced.

3. Nation-wide education and public health are indispensable to a rising standard of living and the development of self-government. These, however, cannot be achieved unless there is an intelligent and dynamic economic and social motivation on the part of the rank and file of the population.

4. Racial and national antagonisms and prejudices can be reduced by a combination of education, compulsion (i. e. punishment of all overt forms of discrimination and vilification) and economic practices which in fact provide equality of opportunity.

The Russians' self-confidence in their way of life and in their strength permit them to work for practical compromises with other nations and other systems. This is a new development in Soviet foreign policy beginning about 1933 at the time of the second Five-Year Plan. Before this, they relied more heavily on hortatory appeals to the rest of the world and other devices showing some lack of internal self-assurance. Those who have followed the progressive efforts of the Soviet government to give their many minorities and nationalities a more indigenous and richer culture of their own, while steadily according them greater and greater responsibility for political and economic matters, were not surprised with the Russian announcement recently that the 16 Soviet Republics were hereafter to have a say in Army and foreign policy. The minorities were to participate in the State's highest responsibilities—the issues of peace and war. This latest move was not in my view a hastily fabricated device for giving the Soviet Union more votes in a future world council than the British Empire or the Pan-American republics, or General Smuts' British countries plus Western Europe. It was rather a logical development of Stalin's policy of according to every major racial or nationality group within the Soviet Union the fullest share in the complex and abounding life of the Soviet Union and, concurrently, a new place in the affairs of the family of nations.

In October last I had the privilege of visiting one of the 16 Republics—Uzbekistan. Here, in half a generation, a medieval, predominantly Mohammedan

state has been inducted into full participation in the mass production techniques of the 20th Century. Accompanying the industrial and agricultural leap over five centuries there has been a corresponding lightning evolution from feudalism to a political and social structure that has made a backward people heir to the education, science, and the aesthetic satisfactions of the modern world. None of these rapidly developing 16 Republics have any urge to participate in wars of aggression. Their vital interest is in the maintenance of peace and the most friendly relations in trade and culture with all their neighbors. Their vested interest in peace is as great as that of every one of the forty-eight states of the American union.

EXHIBIT No. 953-A

215 EAST 72D STREET,
New York, N. Y., May 26, 1952.

MR. ROBERT MORRIS,
Room 424, Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: When you brought to New York recently a large number of documents for identification, one was a mimeographed or photostated article entitled "Soviet Russia's Contribution to Peace." I remember that there was no clue as to where the article appeared.

I now find that it appeared in volume 234 of July 1944, in *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, edited by Dr. Ernest M. Patterson, professor of economics at the University of Pennsylvania. The title of the volume was "Agenda for Peace."

In addition to my own, papers were contributed by Bruno Lasker, Francis B. Sayre, Percy E. Corbett, F. Cyril James, C. J. Hambro and Samuel S. Fels.

Reviews in the volume, among others, covered books by A. Whitney Griswold, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Count Sforza, Stuart Chase, H. M. Kallen, Albert Shaw.

I thought that if you are planning to print this article of mine in the records of the hearings, you would want to indicate under what auspices the article was published.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

ECC:ftw

EXHIBIT No. 954

(Penciled note:) "MAS scan & return to EC."

JANUARY 7, 1945.

ECC from RD:

Apart from Kohlberg, Hearst & Co. there has been [penciled note "No?"] direct criticism of the school material put out by Amco except as follows:

1. Julian Arnold has been carrying on a one-man crusade against the Syllabus prepared by George Harris for some years. This criticism is largely against the relative amount of attention paid in the material to the modern political aspects of China's development rather than to any misinterpretations or factual errors. Arnold feels that relatively more attention should have been devoted to Chinese history. (Penciled note "anti-Brit?")

2. Kenneth Colegrove took sharp exception to the use of Kate Mitchell (penciled note right of paragraph: "I'd never heard of this. I know we *slaved* with Kate & Komar to make it objective") and Komar Goshal as editors of the pamphlet texts on India. He wrote me a strong note asserting that Mitchell's bias had been so evident and so proved that we were doing a disservice in using her and Goshal. He stated that he felt that the pamphlet was biased. The correspondence is in the files. I have an impression that Lennox Mills joined with Colegrove's criticism, but I am not certain.

3. Leland Goodrich told me verbally that IPR pamphlet texts had been subject to attack in the Cambridge school system, and that some one had talked with him on the phone about them. My memory is vague on the subject, and at any rate no direct word reached the office while I was in charge. Again, I have the impression that the attack—if that is what it was—merely mentioned IPR material along with other stuff used in Cambridge.

(Penciled note:) "This was a question raised by a Catholic group. Later the pamphlets were adopted in Cambridge."

MAS may know of any comments directly to her from school superintendents as they did not normally come to my attention.

For your private information, Huggins has raised questions several times in Executive Committee meetings about the educational program. He has not been enthusiastic about Mrs. Stewart, and as a member of a school board has voiced some reluctance to go along with the program. McConaughy and Jessup have regularly risen to MAS's defense and to the defense of the whole educational program of Amco.

(Penciled note:) "This is very helpful to know. I'd be grateful to learn Mr. Huggins' criticisms of our school program, for we do want it to be the best ever. I can't help wondering, however, how he can judge the school program as no report of it has ever been made by me. It may be, however, that my departure from the staff will satisfy his criticism."

(Penciled note with line from next to last paragraph:) "I've had only one—from Great Neck, L. I., where *Land of the Soviets* was attacked by the Catholic Church on the grounds that the pamphlet attacked the R. C. church. When the high school teacher (who is an ardent admirer of the IPR & the pamphlet series) called on the priest & pointed out the only the Russian Orthodox Church was mentioned in the pamphlet, the opposition ceased and the series is still being used in Great Neck."

EXHIBIT No. 956

10TH FEBRUARY 1945.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,

Roland View Road, Ruxton 4, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: With immense profit, delight, and admiration I have just finished reading SOLUTION IN ASIA.

It is a marvelous postscript to Hot Springs. I only wish that I had seen the manuscript or page proofs in advance and I would have made a special trip to Little, Brown & Co. to see whether they couldn't strike off a hundred advance copies to serve as the principal data paper for the Conference. If every member had had and read SOLUTION IN ASIA before the Conference began, the discussions would have been on a much higher creative and responsible level.

Personally, I feel deeply indebted to you for writing the book. I believe that the whole IPR and the leaders of the United Nations will profit immensely by its publication.

With all good wishes and my warmest congratulations, I am,

Gratefully yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 957

6TH JUNE 1945.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,

Roland View Road, Ruxton 4, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: Ernest Simmons, of Cornell, at the meeting of the American-Russian Institute Board yesterday, told me he hoped you were not going to take Max Eastman's article in the Reader's Digest lying down. He asserted that Eastman could not have read the book and that all he had read was the publisher's blurb. I am eagerly looking forward to seeing you on the evening of June 13th.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 958

JUNE 18, 1945.

ECC from RD:

In answer to your memorandum of June 14, I certainly have no objection to your approaching William Morris, John Hersey, and Mrs. Maurice T. Moore for contributions to the American Council.

In view of the letter from DeWitt Wallace, of the Reader's Digest, a copy of which is attached, I am talking to I. F. Stone about the best approach to Marshall Field. Field is about to come east to talk to PM about the espionage

case, and there is a reasonable possibility that, with the Wallace letter as bait, I might be able to interest Field in seeing that the IPR did not suffer from this kind of an attack.

I have also learned that Harpers Magazine is embarrassed by its prophets and, through Jack Fisher, I am making arrangements to see Cass Canfield when he returns from Europe within the next two weeks to investigate the possibilities of a large contribution from them.

EXHIBIT No. 959

20TH JUNE, 1945.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,

Roland View Road, Ruxton 4, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: Enclosed is a review for PACIFIC AFFAIRS just received from Chen Han-seng. I would deeply appreciate it if you would read it and let me know whether it should go into PACIFIC AFFAIRS as it stands or whether you would recommend a few changes.

In the latter event could you in your own inimitable way take your pen in hand and do the kind of editing that will enable Chen Han-seng's review to represent his and your best thought? As he will be shortly coming to this country to join the Secretariat and to lecture at the University of Washington, I am particularly eager that in all of his published writings he puts his best foot forward.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 960

THE WALTER HINES PAGE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., June 25, 1945.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,

1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR CARTER: I have several letters from you to acknowledge.

First, I am glad to have your authority for scrapping the old *Pacific Affairs* correspondence.

Second, I shall shortly send you all available back issues of *Pacific Affairs*, at the same time giving you details on the bound issues that I need.

Third, I am returning herewith the copy of the draft letter with Bisson's notes. You now have alternative wordings for dealing with the Manchuria-Russia aspect.

Fourth, I am returning herewith the Chen Han-seng review, with editorial suggestions. It so happens that I had been reading the Normano book myself for the purpose of writing a review for another journal. By and large I agree with Han-seng, as I usually do; but I think that as frequently happens, his talent for twisting the knife in the wound has run away with him a little. It would be a good thing to submit my proposed revisions to someone like Bisson, in order to be sure of being fair to Han-seng as well as to Normano.

Sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL:ec

EXHIBIT No. 961

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,
Park Lane Hotel, London, 13th September, 1945.

RAYMOND DENNETT, Esq.,

*5th Floor, 1 East 54th Street,
New York 22, N. Y.*

DEAR DENNETT: The pace has been such that any general report on my progress to date will have to wait my return. I have been sending rather inconsequential

scraps to Corbett and some of my colleagues in the office, but I have been so long out of personal touch with our colleagues on this side of the world, and I am trying to use every possible moment seeing people instead of writing reports.

I have, of course, had hours and hours with our various friends at Chatham House. They are deeply cast down by Amco's failure to accept their invitation for a visit to London in September. Most of their reasons for desiring the visit would be acceptable to all shades of Amco thought, but some of them would, as you suspected, be challenged by everyone.

Just before I left you made some cryptic remark to me about Willits. Airmail me a letter here at this address as to what it was all about.

Also do let me know how you have come on with your Labour troubles and above all please write me fully as to failures and successes on Finance.

I was both shocked and pleased to discover that under the auspices of Lady Cripps and with an introduction by the Master of Balliol, Max Stewart's pamphlet on China has been given a large circulation in the United Kingdom completely independent of Chatham House.

Austern will be glad to show you the list of the faithful who turned out for the luncheon which Lord Astor gave me at Chatham House a few days after my arrival. It was most sporting of many of them to come under the circumstances, especially as some of them had to interrupt the first vacation they had had for a long time, in order to be present.

When I return I will endeavor to give you and members of the Amco Board and Staff an oral off-the-record account of my impressions of the prospects of the Institute in France, Holland, Britain and the U. S. S. R.

By the way, I know your Executive Committee cannot have reached a decision as to the year and place of the next I. P. R. Conference. I would, however, like to have your own personal, though necessarily tentative answer, as you will have to handle the donkey work for Amco wherever and whenever the Conference is held. Specifically, what is your personal answer to the following questions:

1. Should the next Conference be held in 1946 or in 1947?
2. As to place, which would be your personal preference as between (a) Canada (b) United Kingdom (c) China (d) India (e) Philippines?

Sincerely yours,

Edward C. Carter
EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 962

SEPTEMBER 26, 1945.

RD from RDC:

Mr. Carter sent me a letter addressed to you asking that I type it up and hand it on. This I have done.

He asked me to change the dateline from the letterhead on which he wrote it to the Park Lane Hotel. I note, however, that in one of his paragraphs he asks that you write him "at this address".

The address to which I think you should send your reply is:

% Mitrany, Unilever House, Blackfriars, London, E. C. 4, England.

I have no idea whether, on his return from France and the Netherlands, he will be staying at the Park Lane Hotel or not. Therefore, I think it would be safer to use the above address.

EXHIBIT No. 963

10/19/45

NOTES ON MR. CARTER'S FINANCES IN CONNECTION WITH RECENT TRIP

On July 27, 1945, Mr. Carter left New York in possession of \$1,500 worth of express checks, \$1,000 of this was provided by Pacco and \$500 by ASRR. In addition he had \$130 in cash. On his return October 16, 1945, he had \$100 in express checks, \$43.00 in dollars and £2. Mr. Carter also had a check on a New York bank for \$50.00, an accommodation to a G. I. officer who wanted the equivalent in francs.

Mr. Carter's personal expenditures were principally as follows:

1 Hat £2-8-11	\$9.93
French perfumery 720 francs	14.40
2 pair gloves £1-15-0	7.11
Cigarettes	9.85
Shaves, laundry, cocktails, theatre (1)	17.25
	<hr/> \$58.54

Transportation from Great Falls, Montana, and throughout the Soviet Union and on to Berlin was provided free by the Soviet authorities. From Berlin to London, Mr. Carter paid ATC \$84.94. From London to Paris he paid Air France (£7-10-0) \$30.45.

At the request of the Dutch Embassy in Paris the RAF flew Mr. Carter from Paris to the Hague free. Mr. Carter questions whether we will ever be billed for this.

At the request of the American Embassy, KLM flew Mr. Carter from Amsterdam to London. A letter from the American Embassy to KLM indicated that Mr. Carter would be personally responsible for the payment of the passage but no bill has been received as yet. Pacco should keep in its reserve approximately £8 (\$24.48) in case a bill for this passage should ultimately turn up.

In making out the expense account Mr. Carter will charge the IPR for nothing from New York to and in Russia and on to Berlin except for IPR cables and postage from Moscow. He will charge ASRR $\frac{1}{2}$ of the air travel cost from Berlin to New York and will bill ASRR $\frac{1}{2}$ of the London Hotel bill during his second stay in London.

Miss Nora Ford Smith incurred many pounds worth of expenses for air mail postage and cables. She will send Mr. Carter a total bill. Instead of paying that bill the amount of it is to be regarded as available for purchase here for the Professor of IPR books and food packages.

The American Export passage of \$663.75 from Foynes to LaGuardia was paid by the New York office. In addition Mr. Carter paid £11-10-0 (\$46.69) from Croydon to Foynes.

A gift package of cigarettes handed to Mr. Carter by Sverdin in Moscow was an expensive gift. To get it into England Mr. Carter had to pay duty amounting to and then because it weighed too much to bring home across the Atlantic, Mr. Carter had to pay the American Express Company 10s-6d (\$2.14) to pack and send it over and presumably Mr. Carter will have to pay duty on it when it arrives.

Conversion rates:

England—£24-13-0 equals \$100. (Approx. \$4.06 per £.)

Belgium—\$1.00 equals 2.66 cronen.

Holland—1 guilder equals approx. \$.40.

France—approx. 2 cents per franc.

Summary of hotel bills:

Park Lane, London, 8/29-9/4/45, £28-14-4	\$116.59
Park Lane, London, 9/5-14/45, £37-8-6	151.94
Park Lane, London, 9/26-10/2/45, £33-19-1	137.86
Park Lane, London, 10/3-9/45, £28-11-3	115.96
Park Lane, London, 10/10-13/45, £16-8-7	66.70
	<hr/> \$589.05
Hotel Mitre, Oxford, 10/6-7/45, £1-5-0	5.08
Hotel Lancaster, Paris, 9/14-20/45, 8405 francs	168.10
Hotel Des Indes, Hague, 9/22-25/45, 44.60 guilders	17.84
	<hr/> 780.07
Cables and Postage, London, £2-12-9½	10.71
Books, £1-9-1	5.86
	<hr/> 796.64

EXHIBIT No. 964

NOVEMBER 19, 1945.

To: ECC.
From: RD.

Herewith is a draft of the Research section of the Annual Report. It needs considerable redrafting as to style, but I would appreciate your comments on contents.

Several questions occur to me at once:

1. On pages three and four, should there be more extended discussions of the Wittfogel and Broek projects, similar to that in *IPR in Wartime*, so that their significance would be immediately apparent to readers of the present report?

2. Page 7: Should this discussion on research plans be extended to include the Indian project and others? The difficulty is that it is hard to predict what the Research Committee will approve and hence there is some danger of running ahead of the Committee in including this in a report.

3. Page 8: Are we at liberty to reveal our Army and Government contracts?

4. Should we not include the names of the individual staff people who were taken on by the Government?

5. Pages 9-10: Is quite frankly a pet of mine which I may be writing too heavily in this report, and perhaps it should be deleted entirely.

EXHIBIT No. 977

To—	From—	Date	Type of Document	File Number	Exhibit Number
F. C. Carter. (Attached: Photostat Hand-drawn map, Photostat N. Y. Times Map). Discussion on Collective Security & Far East (Chairman, Carter). E. C. Carter	Eppy-----	8/7-----	Photostat	107.33	977A
E. C. Carter	-----	5/6/43-----	Photostat	600.1	978
E. C. Carter	Oumansky-----	(Stamped 7/8/45).	Photostat	600.2	979
E. C. Carter	CD (Charles Dollard). MC	1/3/46 Undated	Original Original	131B.38 131B.38	980
ECC. (Enc. letter to Edward Carter from AP of June 12, 1946, and LIST BUSINESS & NON-COMMERCIAL HOLDINGS IN JAPAN OF U. S. & AMERICAN COMPANIES HAVING PATENT LICENSE OR TRADEMARK AGREEMENTS WITH COMPANIES IN JAPAN PROPER). ECC. Kate. (Enc. July 17 notes). Report of Conference of March 9th. E. C. Carter. ? Pencilled list names on yellow paper. Memo: Meeting Arctic Institute, Apr. 9. E. C. Carter. (Attached ECC to JP, April 17, 1933, and F. V. Field from E. C. Carter, March 27, 1933). L. T. Chen. (Attached ltr. to L. T. Chen from E. C. Carter dated June 28, 1933). Stanley Hornbeck. E. C. Carter. Memo of Interview with Mortimer L. Graves. Individual Travel Expenditure for past few years. Finance 1936, Document 7. Selskar M. Gunn. Conversation between Mr. Arosev, Pres. VOKS, Mr. Carter and J.B. Barbara Wertheim. Fred V. Field. E. C. Carter (Memo). E. C. Carter. Harriet Moore. Harriet Moore. A. Kantorovitch. F. V. Field. Galen M. Fisher. Meeting of the Presidium of the USSR IPR draft. M. E. Cleeve (Madge). William Holland	RJG-----	Undated	Original	131B.67	981
ECC.	CP	Undated	Original	105.123	982
E. C. Carter	Edward	7/17	Copy	131B.4	983
E. C. Carter	Felix Frankfurter	?	Photostat	119.91	984
E. C. Carter	Edward	1/11	Original	119.63	985
E. C. Carter	Edward	8/6	Original	104.7	986
E. C. Carter	Edward	8/6	Original	191.101	987
E. C. Carter	-----	Undated	-----	100.27	988
E. C. Carter	J. B.	4/10/33	-----	100.247	989
E. C. Carter	E. C. Carter	6/28/33	-----	100.195	990
E. C. Carter	E. C. Carter	7/13/33	-----	100.110	991
E. C. Carter	J. B.	11/29/33	-----	100.135	992
E. C. Carter	J. B.	12/7/33	-----	100.129	993
E. C. Carter	-----	-----	-----	-----	994
E. C. Carter	E. C. Carter	2/13/34	-----	100.122	995
E. C. Carter	E. C. Carter	5/21/34	-----	100.237	996
E. C. Carter	E. C. Carter	7/18/34	-----	105.82	997
E. C. Carter	E. C. Carter	9/25/34	-----	101.26	998
E. C. Carter	KB	10/22/34	-----	100.1	999
E. C. Carter	Harriet Moore	11/22/34	-----	100.53	1000
E. C. Carter	E. C. Carter	12/15/34	-----	100.375	1001
E. C. Carter	E. C. Carter	12/25/34	-----	100.31	1002
E. C. Carter	E. C. Carter	12/26/34	-----	100.104	1003
E. C. Carter	E. C. Carter	1/4/35	-----	100.168	1004
E. C. Carter	E. C. Carter	1/3/35	-----	100.314	1005
E. C. Carter	E. C. Carter	1/18/35	-----	100.167	1006
E. C. Carter	Ned	2/23/35	-----	100.169	1007

To—	From—	Date	Type of Document	File Number	Exhibit Number
Extracts from ltr. fr. Harriet Moore to E. C. Carter.		3/20/35		100.158	1010
V. E. Motylev	E. C. Carter	5/4/35		100.56	1011
V. E. Motylev	Edward C. Carter	9/10/35		100.287	1012
Moscow Meeting in Motylev's office.		3/31/36		100.64	1013
ECC	FVF	5/18/36		100.100	1014
E. C. Carter	V. E. Motylev	6/11/36		100.28	1015
E. C. Carter	Stanley K. Hornbeck	7/18/36		133.2	1016
F. V. Field	Edward C. Carter	10/19/36		131B.52	1017
Stanley K. Hornbeck	Edward C. Carter	1/5/37		131B.90	1018
(Attached letter from Stanley K. Hornbeck to Edward C. Carter dated 1/30/37.)					
Edward C. Carter	V. E. Motylev	1/15/37		100.332	1019
Extract from letter, San Francisco, to Catherine Porter from Owen Lattimore.		4/18/35		600.4	1020
E. C. Carter	Harriet	1/15/37		100.294	1021
Clipping from San Francisco Chronicle.		1/27/37		100.321	1022
E. C. Carter	W. L. Holland	2/10/37		100.118	1023
Harry Emerson Fosdick	Edw. C. Carter	3/1/37		100.303	1024
James G. McDonald	Edw. C. Carter	3/2/37		100.323	1025
H. B. Elliston	Edward C. Carter	3/2/37		100.363	1026
H. B. Elliston	Edward C. Carter	3/2/37		100.282	1027
Hall Borovoy	Edward C. Carter	3/3/37		100.395	1028
Edward C. Carter. (Enc. FVF from ECC dated March 8, 1937, and letter to Edward Carter from J. P. Chamberlain.)	F. R. Scott	3/4/37		100.403	1029
William L. Holland	Edward C. Carter	3/5/37		100.387	1030
Joseph P. Chamberlain	E. C. Carter	3/2/37		100.291	1031
FVF	ECC	3/8/37		100.319	1032
Kate	Edward C. Carter	3/8/37		100.308	1033
Kate Mitchell	Edward C. Carter	3/11/37		100.309	1034
EVF (and others)	ECC	3/21/39		107.19	1035
Kate Mitchell	Edward C. Carter	4/20/37		100.310	1036
E. C. Carter	Y. P. Bremman	5/15/37		100.335	1037
V. E. Motylev	Edward C. Carter	5/27/37		100.330	1038
Joseph Barnes	Edward C. Carter	5/31/37		100.389	1039
Kate Mitchell	Edward C. Carter	6/18/37		100.311	1040
SUPPLEMENTARY AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN USSR, IPR & THE SEC. GEN., MOSCOW.		8/17/37		100.333	1041
Frederick V. Field	Edward C. Carter	8/20/37		100.126	1042
V. E. Motylev	Edward C. Carter	9/7/37		100.326	1043
Owen Lattimore	Edward C. Carter	10/18/37		100.278	1044
Edward C. Carter	R. S. Bratton, Lt. Col.	11/5/37		131B.156	1045
Edward C. Carter	Joe (Joseph Barnes)	11/10/37		100.374	1046
Fred V. Field	Edward C. Carter	12/23/37		119.129	1047
Virginia Burdick	Edward C. Carter	2/24/38		100.143	1048
Constantine Oumansky	Edward C. Carter	2/25/38		100.368	1049
Names for membership, including Alger Hiss.	Edward C. Carter	2/25/38			1050
W. W. Lockwood	F. V. Field	3/17/38		112.61	1051
Mrs. Edward C. Carter	Philip J. Jaffe	3/31/38		105.328	1052
Edward C. Carter	C. Oumansky	3/29/38		100.59	1053
Owen Lattimore	Edward C. Carter	3/31/38		105.196	1054
Joseph P. Chamberlain	E. C. Carter	3/31/38		100.144	1055
Dr. John H. Finley	Edward C. Carter	4/2/38		100.149	1056
Russell Shiman	Edward C. Carter	4/16/38		191.145	1057
Copy of memo attached from Div. of FE Affairs, Dept. of State.		4/14/48			1058
Copy of letter to Joseph W. Ballentine.	ECC	4/15/38			1059
E. C. Carter	A. W. Dulles	4/22/38		100.151	1060
Virginia Burdick	Edward C. Carter	5/9/38		116.13	1061
I. F. Wizon	Edward C. Carter	5/23/38		119.60	1062
Edward C. Carter	I. F. Wizon	5/21/38			1063
Snyder Walker	Edward C. Carter	6/30/38		191.131	1064
Maxwell M. Hamilton	Edward C. Carter	6/16/38		191.247	1065
Carter	Robert S. Lynd	12/15/38		100.34	1066
Dr. Robert S. Lynd	Edward C. Carter	12/14/38			1067
E. C. Carter	Dr. Robert S. Lynd	6/20/38			1068
Lawrence R. Salisbury	Edward C. Carter	6/16/38		191.254	1070
Edward C. Carter	Maxwell M. Hamilton	6/27/38			1071
Owen Lattimore	Edward C. Carter	7/19/38		106.28	1073
Edward C. Carter	J. Leighton Stuart	7/20/38		191.148	1074
Frederick Field	Edward C. Carter	7/23/38		105.169	1075
W. L. Holland	E. C. Carter	8/23/38		105.326	1076
E. C. Carter	Jessica Smith	9/1/38		100.226	1077
E. C. Carter	Chen Han-seng	9/28/38		119.56	1078

To—	From—	Date	Type of Document	File Number	Exhibit Number
Felix Frankfurter	Edward C. Carter	9/29/38		119.58	1079
Owen Lattimore	Edward C. Carter	10/11/38		100.189	10-0
Frederick V. Field	Edward C. Carter	10/16/38		105.161	10-2
Irving Friedman	Edward C. Carter	10/17/38		119.62	10-3
Frederick V. Field	Edward C. Carter	10/20/38		100.153	10-4
Edward C. Carter	M. G. Shippe (Asia-ticus).	5/28/38		105.150	10-5
N. Hanwell	ECC	11/1/38		131B.86	1086
Frederick P. Keppel	Edward C. Carter	11/4/38		116.16	1087
Chen Han-seng & Knight	Biggerstaff ECC	11/9/38		100.145	1088
Harriet Moore	Edward C. Carter	11/9/38		100.409	1089
Frederick V. Field	Edward C. Carter	12/15/38	Carbon	100.414	1090
Owen Lattimore	Edward C. Carter	12/15/38		102.30	1092
Win. L. Holland	Edward C. Carter	12/20/38		119.117	1093
C. Oumansky	Edward C. Carter	1/10/39	Telegram	100.18	1094
Grenville Clark	Edward C. Carter	1/10/39	Telegram	100.60	1095
Constantine Oumansky	Edward C. Carter	1/18/39	Telegram	100.61	1097
Edward C. Carter	Herbert S. Little	1/23/39		100.411	1098
Constantine Oumansky	Edward C. Carter	2/2/39		103.296	1099
N. H. Hanwell	Edward C. Carter	2/13/39		105.193	1100
Harriett Moore	Edward C. Carter	2/21/39		119.113	1101
Constantine Oumansky	Edward C. Carter	3/14/39		100.295	1102
E. C. Carter	John H. Oakie	3/23/39		100.264	1103
Owen Lattimore	Edward C. Carter	3/28/39		131B.95	1104
Margaret R. Taylor	Edward C. Carter	4/19/39		191.195	1105
Dr. V. E. Motylev	Owen Lattimore	4/21/39		100.288	1106
Kate Mitchell	E. C. Carter	5/20/39			1107
Motylev	Edward C. Carter	6/29/39		100.299	1108
Sherwood Eddy	Edward C. Carter	7/3/39		100.271	1109
E. C. Carter	Sherwood Eddy	6/24/39			1110
Owen Lattimore	Edward C. Carter	7/11/39		100.268	1111
Philip J. Jaffe	Edward C. Carter	7/11/39		104.66	1112
E. C. Carter	Philip J. Jaffe	8/11/39		104.9	1114
Philip Jaffe	Edward C. Carter	8/24/39		105.7	1115
V. E. Motylev	Edward C. Carter	9/8/39		100.6	1116
V. E. Motylev	Edward C. Carter	9/11/39		100.299	1117
Philip C. Jessup	Edward C. Carter	9/15/39		191.270	1118
Edward C. Carter	Evans F. Carlson	9/21/39		106.49	1119
Frederick V. Field	Edward C. Carter	10/1/39		101.45	1120
Constantine Oumansky	Edward C. Carter	12/3/39		100.293	1121
Kenneth Durant	Edward C. Carter	12/11/39		100.211	1122

EXHIBIT No. 977-A

52 SMITH TERRACE,
Stapleton, S. I., August 7.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,

Institute of Pacific Relations, New York.


DEAR MR. CARTER: The enclosed rough sketch gives the situation today as it looks on a larger map on which I have been moving pins carefully since my arrival. There are no actual maps from China more recent than V-J day, and the boundaries of areas are therefore proximate and arrived at by linking together the respective known points (generally district towns) marking the limits of control of the two parties. The only accurate *boundary* is that of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia region (west of the Yellow River, with Yen-an at the center) which has been a stable administrative entity for some years.


The tendency at present (and the situation is changing rather rapidly) is for the Central (KMT) troops to push through along the railway lines. However, there is also a tendency on the part of the Communist-led forces to filter back and take railway points *behind* the extreme points of KMT advance. Thus the Communists are back in several stations of the Tsingtao-Tsinan and Taiyuan-Tungkwan (South Tungpu) railways, with the result that what were once KMT salients are now KMT pockets. These situations change *daily* as both sides sometimes withdraw from points where they are threatened with encirclement and then come back, very soon afterwards, when they have been reinforced and feel that their communications are secure. The enclosed map, however, gives the *over-all* situations along the railways accurately, as it is quite obvious that, even though the Eighth Route may withdraw from the 15-20% of any given railway line that it holds to block KMT traffic, it will at once seek to reoccupy other places representing an equal fraction of the line, though in a different and currently more vulnerable place.

The actual area of Communist *influence* is greater than shown, because where regular forces have been withdrawn to avoid being pinned down, or to reinforce more important points, the local guerillas and their organization remain. An attempt has been made to show such an area in the cross-hatched red lines south of Shanghai and Nanking, where no regular New Fourth Army troops remain. Other such areas exist both north and south of Hankow along the Pinghan and Canton-Hankow lines, notably around Changsha. The long diagonal red pocket between Sian and Ichang represents the line of breakthrough of the formerly surrounded Hupeh-Anhwei-Honan border pocket, once closer to Hankow. This "floating kidney" will tend to move north, toward a junction with the Eighth Route Army in the region of Yen-an, or perhaps that south of Taiyuan, depending upon where a KMT weak spot is found,

Sincerely,

EPPY.







CHINA, showing Kuomintang and Communist areas

WHERE ARE WE HEADING?

BY

SUMNER WELLES

EXHIBIT No. 978

DISCUSSION ON COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC AND THE FAR EAST

May 6, 1943, 8:15 p. m., 700 Jackson Place, Washington

Carter, Chairman.

Present: Mrs. Alexander, Sir Gurj Bajpai, Hugh Borton, de Voogd, Farley, Greene, Hiss, Johnstone, Lockwood, Martin, Meisling, Pramoj, Shoemaker, Zafra.

Mr. Carter stated that the purpose of these meetings was to stimulate thinking around the problems of collective security which appear to be different for the Pacific area and the Far East, compared with those that exist in Europe. These questions should be considered now because so much international political action has been Europe-centered or concerned with the American hemisphere that relatively little attention has been paid to the problems of collective security in the Far East. The Far East has tended to be ignored in most of the scholarly efforts on postwar organization. It is thought that the discussion might form a basis for an essay by one of the members.

It was decided that a few minutes should be spent on the statement on the first page of the agenda, to see whether there is general consensus that it is a reasonable forecast.

There was some discussion of paragraph 2 and the meaning of the word aggression as used in the last sentence. Mr. Carter suggested that for purposes of this discussion it should be limited to armed aggression or military occupation. Shoemaker suggested that one of the most likely dangers would be that trouble might arise between two sections of China, with Russia coming into the picture and making claims China would not want to recognize. Bajpai suggested that there ought to be someone at these meetings qualified to speak for Russia.

Shoemaker thought it was almost certain that Russia would desire a Pacific outlet and Dairen is a logical one. This would be a point of conflict with China, as would be Inner and Outer Mongolia and the Communist elements in China.

Pramoj suggested border difficulties between Thailand and French Indo-China. Mr. Cordell Hull statement on restoring the French Empire was brought up at this point. Hiss said that the statement was made a long time ago and it was a statement of intention with reference to a particular action, not a promise having in mind action regarding Pacific colonies. As it was worded it had to do with the "integrity" of the French Empire.

Lockwood said that one general comment on the statement in the agenda is that if it is intended as an inclusive statement on security as a whole a little more attention should be given to general economic and social setting of postwar development. The problem of establishing the basis of security will be a matter of what machinery can be elaborated for dealing with these issues as well as what is going to be done about the economic future of Japan or economic rivalries in the Pacific or the future of the open door and access to the resources of Southeast Asia, or problems of economic and social reconstruction in China.

There was further discussion of the possibility of minor or major border disputes breaking out between Pacific countries, and the likelihood of American or Soviet forces interfering in these. It was more or less agreed that there would be no large-scale hostilities in the immediate years after the war.

There was some discussion of what kind of a settlement or security system would be set up—emergency or short-term—carefully planned and long-term.

Hiss said that we ought to distinguish between a perfect paper settlement and a more viable day to day arrangement that might grow out of developments during the war and the early stages of the peace. Good will will make possible the satisfactory handling of a good many problems that could not be met without it in spite of all careful preparations. In the Pan-American system this is a pertinent point. The Inter-American agreements mentioned in the agenda are important primarily because they stated something that had already largely been worked out and accepted as a basis of relationship.

Lockwood said the Pan-American agreements work because there is peace rather than there being peace because there are agreements.

There was inconclusive discussion of the applicability of the points on page two to the Far Eastern Situation.

Johnstone said that granted we want a collective security system in the Pacific, whether on a regional or world bases, what could be the basis for agreement among the nations interested in the Pacific for such a system? Is it just a

simple agreement that we are going to act to prevent aggression, or is something more necessary? One would assume that you can't have a system unless it is an agreement. It is quite possible that there will be a general agreement for the joint use of bases and employment of force in the Pacific, immediately after the war. When more normal conditions are restored and troops moved back within their own boundaries, many people will feel that it may not be necessary to continue joint use of bases. At that point when the period of large-scale use of occupation forces comes to an end more suitable arrangements will have to be made. Unless some machinery is set up fairly soon after hostilities end it may be very difficult to do so later.

Bajpai asked if there were any common interests among the Pacific countries.

Hiss said it was a question of various periods of time. He hoped there would be an effort to secure an increasing community of interest; that present and developing military collaboration would bring an increasing marking out and finding of common interests. Every effort should be made toward reaching an agreement today. This ought to be supplemented or incorporated in further agreements.

Bajpai said that of course everyone recognizes that it is impossible at this stage to envisage all those points either of agreement or clash of interest, making for association or separation hereafter. Would it be correct to say that the United Nations are all interested in the maintenance of peace in the Far East to the extent that they would collaborate with one another to use force against aggression in the Far East?

Hiss said that you could not say at the present time that they are.

It was agreed that the United Nations would have to have a community of interest before they could maintain peace in the Far East and this question should be the first one explored at the next meeting.

EXHIBIT No. 979

MEXICO CITY, July 8, 1945.

Dr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Russian War Relief, New York, N. Y.:

Will be delighted to see you here any day at your convenience. Am sure Russian War Relief leaders in Mexico would welcome opportunity discuss with you their problems and take advantage your great experience. Eye, too, will be glad to discuss same problems with you, since they come under my present jurisdiction, and to renew our personal contact. Warmest regards.

LOUMANSKY.

EXHIBIT No. 980

CHARLES DOLLARD, *Executive Associate*

CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK,
522 FIFTH AVENUE,
New York 18, N. Y., January 3, 1946.

(Handwritten:) M. C.: Do you know whether the Army did any testing later than the enclosed? EC, Jan. 24/46.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR CARTER: I think these are the reports referred to in your note of December 27. If not, please try me again. While both of them are technically in the clear, I think it would be well to clear with Buck Lanham before using any of the data in anything that you may prepare for public consumption.

You are welcome to keep these for your files.

Sincerely,

DOLLARD.

CD: RN
ENC.

ECC:

These "attitude" surveys appeared in a publication called "What the Soldier Thinks." I remember seeing that magazine in January 46 and I feel sure it

will be continued on a limited scale. Surveys were of considerable value. Shall I try and get a more recent copy dealing with the East?

M. C.

RESTRICTED

Classification cancelled by authority of Brig. Gen. Paul W. Thompson Theater Chief, Information and Education Theater Service Forces, European Theater, by -----

Lt Col C. D. LEATHERMAN,

(Name and Grade of officer cancelling classification and date of cancellation) : Oct 4, 1945.

ATTITUDES OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN THE BERLIN DISTRICT TOWARD OUR ALLIES

(Based on a sample of 700 men surveyed 22-25 August 1945 in the Berlin District.)

Research Branch, Information and Education Division, Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, European Theater, September 1945

Report No. E70-93

Copy No. 24

FOREWORD

1. The information upon which this report is based was collected in a survey of a sample of soldiers in the Berlin District during the period 22 to 25 August 1945.

2. The sample includes representative units from Headquarters troops in the Berlin District as well as a cross section of men in the S2d Airborne Division and attached troops. Within each unit selected, a random sample was drawn so that all types of men had a proportional chance of being included in the survey.

3. As in previous Research Branch studies, the men who filled out questionnaires were assured of anonymity. No names or serial numbers were placed on the questionnaires, and it was explained to the men that the purpose of the survey was simply to secure their frank and honest opinion.

4. It is important to keep in mind that the findings presented here do not purport to be indicative of attitudes held by troops in other areas. As a matter of fact, the Berlin District is a unique situation for our troops in the European Theater.

5. Data have just been returned from the field and have been tallied from a sample that is representative of the entire theater. When these data are compared with attitudes of a cross section of men in the ETO in late April, it is found that attitudes toward the English and Russians have not changed appreciably; however, attitudes toward the French were much less favorable in August than in April. Troops in Berlin express somewhat more favorable attitudes toward the English, and also toward the Germans, but slightly less favorable attitudes toward the French than do troops in the entire theater. Also, the Berlin troops express considerably more skepticism about how we shall be able to get along with Russia in the future than do a cross section of American troops in the European Theater.

MAIN FINDINGS

1. A large majority of the American soldiers (85%) in the Berlin area say they have a favorable attitude toward the English. A smaller proportion, but still a substantial majority (61%), report favorable attitudes toward the Russians. Less than half of them (42%) say they have a favorable opinion of the French.

2. Most of our soldiers who have contacts with Allied soldiers say they get along very well or fairly well with them. Twenty-three percent said they had no contact with English soldiers, 28 percent said they had no contact with Russian soldiers, and 48 percent said they had no contact with French soldiers. Of those who have contact with Allied soldiers, 91 percent say they get along fairly well or very well with English soldiers; 75 percent say they get along fairly

well or very well with Russian soldiers; and 60 percent say they get along fairly well or very well with French soldiers.

3. Those who have known some English, Russian, and French soldiers personally are slightly more favorable in attitude toward the English, Russian, and French people and soldiers.

4. Educational status seems to be only slightly related to like and dislike for the various Allies.

5. Men who have had combat experience are somewhat more favorable toward the Russians and somewhat less favorable toward the French than are noncombat men. The two groups do not differ in their opinion of the English. Combat men are no more nor less favorable toward the Germans than are noncombat men.

6. There is a widespread feeling of confidence that we shall be able to get along well with England from now on, more than 90 percent of the men expressing this attitude. A substantial majority (65%) say that we will get along well with France in the years ahead. There is considerable skepticism as to how well we shall get along with Russia and only 30 percent of the men say they think that we shall get along well with her; a substantial minority anticipate war with her sometime in the next 25 years.

7. The overwhelming majority say they expect England (80%) and the United States (93%) to cooperate with other nations to settle disputes peaceably. Only half of them (51%) think Russia will cooperate.

8. The better educated men and those less well educated differ only slightly in their attitudes on international relations.

9. Men who have been in combat do not differ appreciably from the noncombat men in their attitudes on international relations.

10. As might be expected, those who have a generally favorable attitude toward the Russian people are also more likely to be more optimistic about the possibility of working out good international relations with Russia and to express more confidence in the Russian government's intentions.

DETAILED FINDINGS


ATTITUDES OF PERSONAL LIKES AND DISLIKES

General Attitudes

A large majority of the American soldiers (85%) in the Berlin area say they have a favorable attitude toward the English. A smaller proportion, but still a substantial majority (61%), report favorable attitudes toward the Russians. Less than half of them (42%) say they have a favorable opinion of the French.

For comparison, the same question was asked about Germans. About three men in every five (59%) reported a favorable attitude toward the Germans.

Question: "What sort of opinion do you have of the English (Russian, French, German) people?"¹



¹ In interpreting these replies it must be kept in mind that in general, the contacts with the English, French, and Germans have been of longer duration and have included civilian contacts while the Russian contacts have been shorter and limited to Russian soldiers and displaced personnel.


The replies of the men in the Berlin area are more favorable toward the English and less favorable toward the French than were those of a cross section of ETO troops surveyed in April 1945.²

	Cross section survey, April 1945	Berlin area survey, August 1945
Percentage saying they were very favorable or fairly favorable to—	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
English.....	72	85
French.....	68	42

Most of our soldiers who have contacts with the Allied soldiers say they get along very well or fairly well with them.

In answer to the question, "How well do you get along with the English (Russian, French) soldiers?": 23 percent said they had no contact with English soldiers, 28 percent said they had no contact with Russian soldiers, and 48 percent said they had no contact with French soldiers.

Of those who have contact with Allied soldiers, the following percentages say they get along:



Those who have known some English, Russian, and French soldiers personally are slightly more favorable in attitude toward the English, French, and Russian people than are those who have not.

In the case of the Russians, the relation between personal acquaintanceship and attitude is greater than it is in the case of the English or French.

	Among men who have known—	
	No soldiers personally	Some soldiers personally
Percentage of men who have very favorable or fairly favorable opinions of—	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
The English people.....	81	89
The Russian people.....	59	71
The French people.....	41	46

Similarly, those men who know some Allied soldiers personally are more likely to say they get along with English (Russian, French) soldiers very well or fairly well.

² Comparable data are not available on the Russians or the Germans.

	Men who have known—	
	No soldiers personally	Some soldiers personally
Percentage of men who say they get along with—		
English soldiers.....	89	92
Russian soldiers.....	72	84
French soldiers.....	51	69

This relationship does not necessarily mean that getting to know Allied soldiers personally *causes* a more favorable attitude though this is probably true in many instances. It is also likely that getting to know other soldiers is itself an indication of a previously existing favorable attitude.

It is important to recognize that while personal acquaintanceship is related to favorableness of attitude, mere length of time the soldier was stationed in England, France, and Berlin has no relation to what men say their attitudes are toward the English, French, and Russians. The only attitudes studied which seem to be related to time spent in the Berlin area are those toward the Germans. The men who have been in the area for a month or more are somewhat less favorable toward the Germans than are those who have been there less than a month.

It is also interesting to note that educational status seems to be only slightly related to the attitudes reported above. High school graduates are no more nor less favorable than are those with less education.

Men who have had combat experience are somewhat more favorable toward the Russians and somewhat less favorable toward the French than are non-combat men. The two groups do not differ in their opinions of the English. Combat men are no more nor less favorable toward the Germans than are non-combat men.

SPECIAL LIKES AND DISLIKES

In addition to rating the degree to which they were favorable or unfavorable in attitude toward the various Allies, the men were asked to state what special things they like or dislike about them.

The following is a summary of the most frequently mentioned things which they like or dislike.

Like About the English

About half of the men mentioned some characteristics that they disliked about the English people. Most frequently mentioned were:

1. Friendly, hospitable, generous, kind, etc.
2. Courage, guts, self-confidence, see things through, etc.
3. They are a lot like we are.

Dislike About the English

About half of the men mentioned some characteristics that they disliked about the English. Most frequently mentioned were:

1. Superior, conceited, stuck-up, reserved, unfriendly, etc.
2. Traditionalism, unprogressiveness, etc.
3. Take too much credit and give us too little credit for winning the war.

Like About the Russians

About half the men mentioned one or more characteristics they liked about the Russians. The things most frequently mentioned were:

1. Friendly, good hearted, etc.
2. Jolly, care-free, happy-go-lucky, etc.
3. Good fighters, courage, fight for their country, guts, never-say-die spirit, etc.

4. Sturdy, vigorous, full of vitality, hard working, etc.
5. Treat the Germans rough like they said they would and as they should be treated.

Dislike About the Russians

About half the men listed something about the Russians which they disliked. Those most frequently mentioned were:

1. Dirty, sloppy, ill-kempt appearance, etc.
2. Ignorant, stupid, uneducated, etc.
3. Crude, uncultured, rude, ill-mannered, etc.
4. Arrogant, conceited, think they won the war alone, etc.
5. Brutal, excessively cruel to Germans, rape, etc.
6. Steal, loot.

Like About the French

About a fourth of the men listed something they liked about the French people. The most frequently mentioned are:

1. Friendly, hospitable, etc.
2. Cheerful, easy-going, know how to have a good time, etc.
3. Helped all they could, tried to do their share in winning war, etc.

Dislike About the French

About two-thirds of the men listed one or more characteristics they disliked about the French. Most frequently mentioned are:

1. Dirty, filthy, unsanitary, etc.
2. Mercenary, grasping, want to get something for nothing, etc.
3. Lazy, backward, no ambition, no spirit, etc.
4. Undependable, irresponsible, etc.
5. Loose morals.

Like About the Germans

About half of the men listed one or more things they liked about the Germans. Most frequent items were:

1. Clean, neat, orderly, etc.
2. Industrious, good workers, etc.
3. Intelligent, educated, resourceful, etc.
4. Friendly, good manners, treat you well, etc.
5. Look and act like Americans in many ways.

Dislike About the Germans

About two-thirds of the men mentioned something they disliked about Germans. The most frequent items were:

1. Dishonest, two-faced, treacherous, etc.
2. Fascistic, militaristic ideas, still believe Hitler had right idea, etc.
3. Easily led, can't think for themselves, etc.
4. Superiority complex, arrogant, etc.
5. They don't accept any responsibility or guilt for the war.
6. Self-pity, whining, complaining, fawning, all to get sympathy.

ATTITUDES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The general picture which one gets from the men's replies is that many of them are in doubt and suspicious about Russia and a substantial minority anticipate war with her sometime in the next 25 years. In contrast there is a great deal of confidence that we shall be able to get along well with England and only slightly less confidence about our relations with France.

How Will We Get Along With Other Nations?

Four men in every ten say they are either in doubt as to how we will get along with Russia (26%) or that they expect we will fight Russia sooner or later (14%). Only about one man in ten expresses this opinion regarding England and France.

Question: "How do you think we will get along with England (France, Russia) from now on?"

Percentage answering:

<u>Answers:</u>	<u>Russia</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>England</u>
We will get along very well . . .	9%	13%	42%
We will disagree about some things but manage to get along	30%	52%	39%
We will have some serious disagreements but we won't fight each other	18%	22%	6%
We will very likely fight each other sooner or later	14%	1%	9%
Undecided	26%	2%	3%
No answer	3%		

When asked, "Do you think the United States will get into another big war within the next 25 years?" 23 percent said, "yes"; 38 percent said, "undecided"; and 37 percent said "no". Two percent did not answer.

In addition, the men were asked, "If you think the US will be in another big war, who do you think the US will be fighting against?" Twenty-nine percent of the men named one or more countries. Twenty-five percent of the men named Russia. The highest percent of mention any other nation received was Japan, mentioned by 3 percent of the men.


Cooperation in Settling Disputes

The overwhelming majority say they expect England (80%) and the United States (93%) to cooperate with other nations to settle disputes peaceably. Only half of them (51%) think Russia will cooperate.

Question: "Which do you think the US (England, Russia) is most likely to do about international problems in the future?"

Answers:

Percentages answering:




Confidence in the English and Russian Governments

The men express much less confidence that the Russian government will be "on the up-and-up" in dealing with the US than will the English government.

Question: "How much confidence do you have that the English (Russian) government will be on the up-and-up in dealing with the US?"

Answers:

Percentages answering:




The better educated man and those less well educated differ only slightly in their attitudes on international relations.


Men who have been in combat do not differ appreciably from the non-combat men in their attitudes on international relations.

As might be expected, those who have a generally favorable attitude toward the Russian people are also more likely to be more optimistic about the possibility of working out good international relations with Russia and to express more confidence in the Russian government's intentions. The following charts will illustrate this relationship.

Question: "How do you think we will get along with Russia from now on?"



Question: "Which do you think Russia is most likely to do about international relations in the future?"



Question: "How much confidence do you have that the Russian government will be on the up-and-up in dealing with the US?"

Among those who have . . .

Percentage saying . . .	Favorable attitudes toward the Russian people	Unfavorable attitudes toward the Russian people
A great deal of confidence	33%	
Some confidence	46%	11%
Not much confidence or no confidence at all	20%	37%
No answer	4%	48%

It cannot be assumed from these data that by changing soldiers' attitudes in the direction of greater personal favorableness toward Russian people that one will effect change in their international attitudes. However, it is very likely that such personal attitudes are likely to be accompanied by a greater willingness to view the problems of our relations with Russia in a less prejudiced, more pudicious frame of mind.

Soldiers Suggestions for Improving Allied Relations

The men were asked to write out any suggestions they had for improving relations among Allied soldiers in the Berlin area. About six men in every ten offered one or more suggestions.

By far the most frequent type of suggestion centered around the idea of increasing opportunities for friendly contact with individuals in other Allied forces. Typical of these suggestions were:

"More mixing of all Allied troops in sports, joint recreational activities."

"Have facilities like clubs, canteens, etc., where men can meet."

"Have dances and other social events of interest to all troops."

"Give men more freedom and facilities for transportation to visit soldiers in the other forces."

"Have joint classes, discussion groups, speakers at meetings open to all interested Allied soldiers."

Less frequently mentioned were:

"Decrease contacts with Allied soldiers, let each keep to his own area."

"Have a more uniform policy in Berlin and let all Allied forces follow it."

"More control of Russians."

CHANGES IN ATTITUDES OF SOLDIERS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER TOWARD OUR ALLIES FROM APRIL 1945 TO AUGUST 1945

(BASED ON A COMPARISON OF 2 CROSS-SECTIONAL SURVEYS: SURVEY 1: AMONG 3,795 ENLISTED MEN QUERIED 25 APRIL TO 5 MAY 1945. SURVEY 2: AMONG 2,981 ENLISTED MEN QUERIED 14 TO 24 AUGUST 1945)

(Research Branch, Information and Education, Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, European Theater, September 1945)

Report No. ETO-102
Copy No. 8

HOW THE STUDY WAS MADE

1. Information on men's attitudes and opinions was secured by means of anonymous questionnaires filled out by two representative cross sections. One

survey was conducted during the period from 25 April to 5 May 1945 among a cross-section sample of 3,795 white enlisted men. The other was conducted during the period from 14 to 24 August 1945 among a sample of 2,981.


2. Each sample was designed to give proper representation to all arms and services and types of outfits. Men in Air Forces, Field Forces, and Service Forces units were included in the proportions found in the Theater as a whole. Within each unit selected, a random sample was drawn so that all types of men had a proportional chance of being included in the survey.

3. As in previous Research Branch studies, the men who filled out questionnaires were assured of anonymity. No names or serial numbers were placed on the questionnaires, and it was explained to the men that the purpose of the survey was simply to secure their frank and honest opinions.

OVER-ALL OPINION GI'S HAVE OF ENGLISH AND FRENCH PEOPLE

In the four months following VE-day a considerable shift took place in soldiers' attitudes toward the French. During the same period no appreciable changes took place in attitudes toward the English.

QUESTION: "What sort of opinion do you have of the English people?"
"What sort of opinion do you have of the French people?"



Whereas just prior to VE-day as many soldiers said they thought as well of the French people as of the English (about 7 in every 10 said they felt "very" or "fairly" favorable toward them), in August, 75% of the soldiers thought favorably of the English but only 45% thought well of the French.


The fact that there was a smaller proportion of soldiers who indicated that they thought favorably of the French in August as compared to April is not the result of the changing composition of the Theater during the elapsed period of time but rather is a true reflection of differences in men's attitude between the two dates.¹

¹ In this as well as in other comparisons of April and August findings appearing in this report, detailed analysis shows that differences are not the result of a changed composition of the Armed Forces in Europe in August as compared with April, except insofar as time in Army and time overseas is concerned where, of course, the 4-month lapse of time must be taken into account.

OVER-ALL OPINION OF FRENCH NO BETTER THAN OF GERMANS


The two charts below indicate that, in general, the expressed opinion is no more favorable toward the French people than toward the German and that attitudes expressed toward both French and German people is considerably less favorable than toward English people.

QUESTION: (August Survey) What sort of opinion do you have of the (English, French, German) people?



QUESTION: Leaving aside for the moment the fact that they are our enemies or our allies, which one of the following do you like best just as people--the French people, the German people, or the English people?

Answers →



The types of reasons men gave for disliking the English or French were the same for both surveys (report of April findings—Research Report No. E-125—lists chief reason soldiers mention). Reasons men advance for liking or disliking the Germans, along with other data on attitudes toward Germans, are presented in Research Report No. E-134.

EFFECT ON ATTITUDES OF TIME SPENT IN COUNTRY

Men who have spent considerable time in all three countries have substantially the same attitudes toward the people of each of the three countries as do all soldiers surveyed. As was pointed out in the report of the April survey there is no evidence to support the theories that better-educated men have more favorable attitudes toward our Allies or that the longer men are overseas, the worse their attitudes toward our Allies become. On the other hand, there is some evidence to suggest that the longer men remain in a particular country the more favorable their attitude becomes to the people of that country. This holds for Germany as well as for France and England.

For example:

ATTITUDE TOWARD ENGLISH PEOPLE ...

<u>Time spent in England</u>	'Very favorable'	Fairly fav.'	'Rather unfav.'	'Very unfav.'	No ans.
No time	18%	53%	13%	13%	
Less than 4 mos	18%	56%	18%	6%	...2%
4 to 8 mos	14%	53%	20%	7%	...1%
Over 8 mos.	28%	55%	12%	4%	...1%

ATTITUDE TOWARD FRENCH PEOPLE ...

<u>Time spent in France</u>	'Very favorable'	'Fairly fav.'	'Rather unfav.'	'Very unfav.'	No ans.
Less than 4 mos.*	5	35%	33%	20%	7
4 to 8 mos.	6	41%	31%	21%	...1%
Over 8 mos.	8	44%	31%	15%	...2%

*Includes a very few men surveyed who reported spending no time in France.

Attitude toward German people seems to be even more closely related to time spent in the country than patterns shown above for Britain and France.

Among men who spent *no time* in Germany 34 percent say they have a favorable opinion of German people.

Among men who spent *less than 4 weeks* in Germany 42 percent say they have a favorable opinion of German people.

Among men who spent *between 4 and 8 weeks* in Germany 54 percent say they have a favorable opinion of German people.

Among men who spent *over 8 weeks* in Germany 59 percent say they have a favorable opinion of German people.

Although time spent in country and attitude toward people of the country are related, analysis reveals no appreciable relationship between time in one country and attitude toward people of *other* countries. For example, time spent in Germany (for men who have also spent some time in England and France) does not appear to appreciably affect attitudes men have toward the English or the French.

DECREASE IN FEELING THAT WE SHOULD HELP ALLIES GET BACK ON THEIR FEET

In the August as well as in the April survey, more soldiers were favorable to the idea of helping to feed our Allies after the war than the proportion who felt we should help our Allies by sending them money and materials. However, a slightly *smaller proportion* of men in August as compared to April thought we should send help along these lines.


These two questions were asked the men:

1. "After the war, *some of our Allies* will need help in feeding their people.

Do you think the United States should send *food* to these countries even if it meant that we would have to keep on rationing food in our own country for a while to do it?"

2. "After the war, *some of our Allies* will need *money and materials* to help them get back on their feet.

Do you think we should let them have money and materials to help them get back on their feet, even if it meant that we should have to pay higher taxes to do it?"



Consistent with findings shown above is the small decline in proportion of men who feel we should do everything we can to help France get back on her feet. Men were asked to tell whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement:

"We should do everything we can to help France get back on her feet as soon as possible."

In April: 60% of men surveyed AGREED with statement.

In August: 51% of men surveyed AGREED with statement.

OTHER SHIFTS IN ATTITUDES TOWARD FRENCH

Some Change in Belief That France Will Again Be A Strong Nation. More men in August than in April felt that French nation is too weak and split up to ever amount to anything again.

Men were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "The French nation is so weak and split up that it will never amount to anything again."

In April: 73% of men surveyed DISAGREED with statement.

In August: 62% of men surveyed DISAGREED with statement.

Fairly Large Change In Belief That French People Sincerely Like Americans.

Men were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "Most French people sincerely like Americans."

In April: 73% of men surveyed AGREED with statement.

In August: 52% of men surveyed AGREED with statement.

APPRAISAL OF ALLIES' WAR EFFORT UNCHANGED

About the same proportions of men feel that our major Allies—Britain and Russia—have done as good a job as possible of fighting this war. Even as regards France, who suffers in other respects a decline in favorable attitudes, there is no appreciable decrease since April in soldiers' respect for her contribution in war effort.

Statement: "Considering everything, the (specified people) have done as good a job as possible of fighting this war."

Specified People—

*Russians—*More than 19 men in every 20 surveyed AGREED with statement in both April and August surveys.

*British—*More than 16 in every 20 surveyed AGREED with statement in both April and August surveys.

French—About 10 men in every 20 surveyed AGREED with statement in both April and August surveys. (In April, slightly more than half the men agreed. In August just slightly less than half—but the difference is too small to be significant.)

AIMS OF OUR ALLIES REMAIN UNCHANGED IN EYES OF SOLDIERS

In August just as in April most men had faith in the war aims and the future course of action that England and Russia are likely to take. In each survey about as many men expressed faith in Russia as faith in England and no change in the level of these attitudes took place between the two dates.

Statement: "(Specified country) is more interested in dominating or controlling the world than she is in building a truly democratic world."

In April and in August about 7 in every 10 men surveyed DISAGREED with this statement as it applies to both Russia and to Britain.

Statement: "The (specified country) will try as much as possible to work out a just and lasting peace."

In April and in August about 8 in every 10 men surveyed AGREED with this statement as it applies to both Russia and to Britain.

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND ENGLAND AFTER THE WAR

No changes have taken place in the 4-month period between surveys, in soldiers' attitude toward our postwar relations with Russia and England.

Question: "How do you think we will get along with (specified country) after the war?"

	<u>Russia</u>		<u>England.</u>	
	<u>April 1945</u>	<u>August 1945</u>	<u>April 1945</u>	<u>August 1945</u>
"We will get along very well"	16%	17%	17%	18%
"We will disagree about some things but manage to get along"	37%	39%	55%	53%
Undecided *	15%	16%	7%	8%
"We will have some serious disagreements but we won't fight each other"	19%	19%	17%	18%
"We will very likely fight each other sooner or later"	13%	9%	4%	3%

In the April survey comparable questions were also asked about France and China, but these were not repeated in August. (See Research Branch Report # E-125.)

*Includes a few men who did not answer the question.

EXHIBIT No. 981

ECC from RJG:

I am at present having a card file made of all corporation prospects. By now I have accumulated eight or ten lists, many of which have duplications. Each card will give the name of the corporation, source, and individual to contact. When it is completed I thought you and I could go over it to decide what method of approach to use on each one. Some few you will probably want to contact personally. Others should get a letter and others we probably won't bother with at all for awhile. But it seemed a simpler approach to have all the information in one place.

If you would like to give this list back to me I will include the names on it with the rest of the names I have. I know there are some on this list which I already have on other lists.

(Pencilled note:) Have carded all of these along with our other corp. prospects 6/21/46.

R. J. G.

(Pencilled note:) RJG: Note & Return to ECC who hasn't seen it yet.

AMERICAN COUNCIL,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,
June 12, 1946.

Washington Office, 744 Jackson Place NW., Washington 6, D. C. Telephone District 8665

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
IPR, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Attached are two lists which I spoke of yesterday when you were here and which should be useful in campaigning among big corporations interested in the Far East.

You will be interested, I think, in the opinion of Mr. Blair Bolles, of the Foreign Policy Association, on the outlook for the IPR here. He thinks it will take six or seven months' hard work to lay the base for a sound job of membership expansion and enlargement of program. He does not believe that the IPR should hope or expect to get all its financial support in Washington for the local office. The FPA here gets about \$2,500 a year from its membership and the rest from the New York office, which the Washington unit exists to serve. I judge that the total budget of the Washington-FPA is above \$15,000 a year. Bolles said that a staff of four people is the minimum he thinks either FPA or IPR needs in order to do a first class job. He says you have to plug very hard to get the information you need in order to serve outside offices; no automatic flow system from government sources will work. He adds that he thinks IPR can and should do more community service here than FPA can do.

Sincerely,

[s] I. A. P.

*Business and noncommercial holdings in Japan of United States organizations
(total value of interest is as of December 1, 1941)*

Name	Address	Value
All America Radio, Inc.....	67 Broad St., New York.....	\$8,494
American Foreign Insurance Association.....	80 Maiden Lane, New York.....	38,801
American Magnesium Metals Corp.....	800 Ohio St., Pittsburgh.....	327,600
Associated Merchandising Corp.....	1440 Broadway, New York.....	11,231
American President Lines.....	311 California St., San Francisco.....	4,036
American Trading Co., Inc.....	96 Wall St., New York.....	460,526
Anderson, Clayton & Co.....	Cotton Exchange Bldg., Houston.....	33,554
Associated Press.....	50 Rockefeller Plaza, New York.....	5,721
Baker & Co., Inc. (precious metals).....	113 Astor St., Newark 5, N. J.....	118,266
Carrier Corp.....	900 S. Geddes St., Syracuse.....	67,308
Commercial Pacific Cable Co.....	67 Broad St., New York.....	8,129
Dorr Co., The (engineers).....	570 Lexington Ave., New York.....	114,149
Eastman Kodak Co.....	343 State St., Rochester.....	213,424
Ford Motor Co. (2 units in Japan).....	Dearborn, Mich.....	5,403,873
General Motors Corp.....	3044 West Grand Blvd., Detroit.....	2,614,973

*Business and noncommercial holdings in Japan of United States organizations
(total value of interest is as of December 1, 1941)—Continued*

Name	Address	Value
Goodrich, B. F., Co.	500 S. Main St., Akron, Ohio.	\$334, 080
Gosho Co., Inc. (Cotton agents)	c/o Alien Property Custodian, 1577 Mercan- tile Bank Bldg., Dallas, Texas.	138, 555
Hanovia Chemical & Mfg. Co. (2 units)	233 New Jersey Railroad Ave., Newark 5, N. J.	84, 414
Hanson-Van Winkle-Munning Co. (electro- plating & polishing)	Matawan, N. J.	37, 008
International Automatic Electric Corp.	1033 W. Van Buren St., Chicago.	6, 111
International Business Machines Corp.	Madison at 57th, New York.	318, 375
International Nickel Co.	67 Wall St., New York.	3, 896
International Standard Electric Corp. (7 units)	67 Broad St., New York.	2, 645, 245
Irwin-Harrisons-Whitney, Inc. (tea).	50 S. Front St., Philadelphia.	405, 887
Loew's, Inc.	1540 Broadway, New York.	513, 493
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Co.	1540 Broadway, New York.	65, 296
National Cash Register Co. (2 units)	Main & K Sts., Dayton, Ohio.	925, 507
National City Bank.	55 Wall St., New York.	12, 636
Nichibei Securities Co., Ltd.	c/o Office of Alien Property Custodian, 417 Montgomery St., San Francisco.	
Otis Elevator Co.	260 Eleventh Ave., New York.	349, 164
Paraffine Co., Inc.	475 Brannan St., San Francisco.	154, 101
Paramount Pictures, Inc. (2 units)	New York.	571, 619
RCA Communications, Inc.	66 Broad St., New York.	5, 342
RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.	1270 Sixth Ave., New York.	246, 274
Sales Affiliates, Inc. (beauticians' stuff)	730 Fifth Ave., New York.	5, 733
Singer Sewing Machine Co.	149 Fifth Ave., New York.	2, 323, 195
Standard Brands of Asia, Inc.	595 Madison Ave., New York.	18, 877
Standard Oil Co. (N. J.).	30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York.	2, 181
Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. (3 units)	26 Broadway, New York.	5, 580, 812
Tide Water Associated Oil Co.	17 Battery Place, New York.	1, 549, 613
Titaa Co. (titanium products) 2 units	111 Broadway, New York.	249, 852
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.	444 W. 56th St., New York.	284, 899
United Artists Corp.	729 Seventh Ave., New York.	37, 520
United Engineering & Foundry Co.	First National Bank Bldg., Pittsburg.	1, 571, 177
United Press Associations.	220 E. 42nd St., New York.	14, 823
Universal Pictures Co., Inc.	1250 Sixth Ave., New York.	150, 942
Warner Brothers-First National Pictures.	321 W. 44th St., New York.	270, 932
Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society.	124 Columbia Heights, Brooklyn.	43, 023
Western Electric Export Co.	195 Broadway, New York.	87, 172
William Wrigley, Jr., Co.	410 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago.	23, 400

AMERICAN COMPANIES HAVING PATENT LICENSE OR TRADE-MARK AGREEMENTS WITH
COMPANIES IN JAPAN PROPER

Ajax Electrothermic Corp., Ajax Park, Trenton 5, N. J.
 Ajax Electric Furnace Corp., 1108 Frankford Ave., Philadelphia, Pa.
 American Cyanamid Co., 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y.
 American Magnesium Metals Corp., 800 Ohio St., Pittsburgh, Pa.
 Baker & Co., 113 Astor St., Newark 5, N. J.
 Bendix Aviation Corp., 11th floor, Fisher Bldg., Detroit, Mich.
 Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp., 1400 Lafayette Bldg., Detroit 26, Mich.
 California Institute of Technology, 1201 E. California St., Pasadena 4.
 Carrier Corp., 900 S. Geddes St., Syracuse, N. Y.
 Chemical Construction Corp., 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y.
 China Electric Co., Ltd., 67 Broad St., New York, N. Y.
 Douglas Aircraft Co., Santa Monica, Calif.
 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Wilmington 98, Del.
 Gasoline Products Co., 26 Journal Square, Jersey City, N. J.
 General Cable Corp., 420 Lexington Ave., New York, N. Y.
 General Railway Signal Co., 801 West Ave., Rochester, N. Y.
 B. F. Goodrich Co., Akron, Ohio.
 Gray Processes Corp., 26 Journal Sq., Jersey City, N. J.
 Hanovia Chemical & Mfg. Co., 233 New Jersey Railroad Ave., Newark 5, N. J.
 Hooker Electrochemical Co., Buffalo Ave. & 47th St., Niagara Falls, N. Y.
 International General Electric Co., 570 Lexington Ave., New York, N. Y.
 International Standard Electric Corp., 67 Broad St., New York, N. Y.
 Kidde, Walter & Co., Inc., 675 Main St., Belleville, N. J.
 Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., Nicholas Bldg., Toledo, Ohio.
 Eli Lilly & Co., Indianapolis, Ind.
 Merco Nordstrom Valve Co., 400 N. Lexington Ave., Pittsburgh, Pa.
 Merrill Co., 582 Market St., San Francisco, Calif.

Northern Equipment Co., 1945 Grove Drive, Erie, Pa.
 Radio Corporation of America, Rockefeller Center, New York, N. Y.
 Saint Regis Paper Co., 230 Park Ave., New York, N. Y.
 Sperry Gyroscope Co., Inc., 40 Flatbush Avenue Extension, Brooklyn, N. Y.
 Stanco, Inc., 216 W. 14th St., New York, N. Y.
 Standard Oil Co. (N. J.), 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y.
 Standard Oil Development Co., 26 Broadway, New York, N. Y.
 Stewart-Warner Corp., 1826 Diversey Parkway, Chicago, Ill.
 Texaco Development Corp., 26 Journal Square, Jersey City, N. J.
 Titan Co., 111 Broadway, New York, N. Y.
 Universal Oil Products Co., 310 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill.
 Western Electric Co., Inc., 195 Broadway, New York, N. Y.
 Western Electric Export Co., Ditto.
 Westinghouse Air Brake Co., Wilmerding, Pa.
 Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., Pittsburgh, Pa.
 Weston Electric Instrument Corp., 614 Frelinghuysen Ave., Newark 5, N. J.

 EXHIBIT No. 982

(Pencilled note:) URGENT.

MR. CARTER: The attached article on the CIC is to appear in the September 22nd Survey. Its history is as follows: Hugh Deane submitted a short, which KB and Bob Barnett wanted Hugh to rewrite a little more objectively, giving a little more on the other side of the question. Hugh's second piece also fell short of what was required, so I secured Hugh's OK on KB's rewriting the article, the final piece to be signed by both KB and Hugh. Hugh has seen the article in its present form and has just wired that he is returning it special delivery with his comments, and he added the phrase "en garde" which may suggest that he is unwilling to sign it in its present form. We shall presumably have his comments tomorrow morning.

In case Hugh is unwilling to sign the piece, KB is also unwilling to sign it. I therefore suggested some such device as this: indicating that the article had been written by the staff of the American Council, on the basis of sources given in the text and of first-hand material supplied by Hugh Deane. I will suggest this formula to Hugh after I have heard from you.

Do you approve the piece as it stands? If we cannot have the the double signature, do you approve my suggestion about authorship? (Pencilled note:) Please let me have your answer Friday morning.

CP.

The piece has gone to the printer and galleys should be here tomorrow afternoon (*Friday*). I am sorry to have to bother you with the matter at this late date, but the possibility of a hitch about authorship makes it necessary.

CP.

Thursday p. m.

 EXHIBIT No. 983

(Handwritten:)

SEISLIN, July 17.

DEAR DEAR KET: Well I have been to Manchukuo and got in & out alive. I place our invitation to the Emperors Garden Party on the top of my (your) office bag at every frontier & where every Japanese gendarme can see it & though the questions continue they are in a mellow atmosphere. In one Manchurian city in an important Govt. office—the Japanese chief was called out of the office to the phone. His Chinese assistant quick as a flash took a piece of paper out of his pocket & wrote "Don't believe a word they tell you." Then a moment later on another piece he wrote "I can't talk." When I looked straight into his eyes as you have seen me some time "intense sympathy" he wrote again "Meet in front of Station at 6.30. He appeared at 7—driving along a side street in a half-covered Russian Troika—I walked alone for two blocks down a side street and then stepped into the Troika & we zigzagged first to a Russian Restaurant where I dropped him & drove on. Then I joined him at a Chinese Restaurant across the street—we talked & talked & talked. I'll tell you all when

we meet. When we started back to my Hotel—Air raid drill was on sirens blew—the streets filled with amateur patriots with arm bands who began wildly putting out shop lights, bicycle light, & fairly leaped on our driver & blew out his coach lights—later gendarmes insisted that we alight & we walked on until a block from my hotel he said goodbye. I wonder whether he was agent provocateur or Chinese patriot—I think the latter. Don't mention this I beg of you until we meet. I don't want to get the lad shot. (You can tell this to John.) After leaving him—I had a devil of a time in the hotel—the lights were out because of the air raid drill & I had to pack in the dark, paying bill in the dark, drive to the station in a lightless taxi & catch my train in a station that was dim & where you first bumped into luggage coolies, next excited passengers, next the muskets of hurrying soldiers & got into a train with an armed & armoured engine & an armed & armoured caboose. It was one more hectic and amusing get away as I had only about 20 minutes and had to get two bags out of the handgepack.

Much love,

EDWARD.

JULY 19.

Well, here I am in Vladivostok harbor—what a contrast with Korea! It is cool & there is a little mist hanging over the lovely hills that are much like the Korean Hills & not unlike the Japanese sea—I am guessing which is Bremman of those on the dock. The *Siberia Maru* is a very comfortable ship. It does a regular triangle or quadrant every ten days, Tsuruga, Seislin, Raslin, Vladivostok. I am the first foreign passenger in a long time to board the ship at Seislin. There are many who board it at Tsuruga. There were two Soviet women attached to the Embassy in Tokyo and two Japanese F. O. men on board, one going to Berlin the other to be consul general in Vladivostok.

Later: I am now on shore in the same hotel with Bremman.

EXHIBIT No. 984

REPORT OF CONFERENCE OF MARCH 9TH

A conference of leaders in the academic field was held at the Institute of Pacific Relations on March 9th to devise a scheme for meeting the emergency demand for people with unusual qualifications, primarily in the language field, without unduly dislocating the academic system or disrupting future sources of supply.

WHAT ARE THE MAIN GOVERNMENT NEEDS IN THIS RESPECT

1. *Intelligence officers for all forces.*—Requirements: all-round knowledge of the language in question, especially reading script and printed matter, and military knowledge.
2. *Economic analysis.*—Requirements: ability to read the language, and knowledge of the economic situation of the country in question.
3. *Interpreters with troops.*—Requirement: ability to speak the language.
4. *Diplomatic advisers.*—Requirements: ability to read the language, and knowledge of the political situation.
5. *Communications Intelligence.*—Requirements: ability to read script and printed matter and speak the language, and a thorough general knowledge of the country.
6. *Propaganda.*—Requirement: ability to read, speak, and write the language, and a thorough knowledge of the country and the people.
7. *Censorship.*—Requirement: ability to read all forms of writing of the language.
8. *Reserve category,* including those engaged in basic or special studies, and those working on long-term government projects or on research related to government needs.

NOTE.—Since it will be impossible for some time to find sufficient personnel in the above categories who combine all the necessary qualifications, the functions of each category could be divided. (For example, the work of economic analysis could be shared between economics and linguists.)

HOW IS THE GOVERNMENT AT PRESENT RECRUITING SUCH PERSONNEL?

The government is already taking some people with a knowledge of Russian, Chinese, and Japanese from academic sources, but so far chiefly from the periphery. There is a danger, however, that its demands will soon involve dislocation of the academic system.

The present method of recruiting varies with the different departments. Thus the Army may encounter difficulties in recruiting specialists under existing regulations. On the other hand, the F. B. I., the Marines, and the Navy are freely enrolling them as the need arises.

The supply of those with a knowledge of Russian and Chinese is still sufficient to meet the present demand without seriously affecting academic organizations. But in the case of Japanese, the supply is already practically exhausted.

WHAT ARE THE NONACADEMIC SOURCES FROM WHICH THE GOVERNMENT'S NEEDS MIGHT BE MET?

1. *Japanese language*.—(a) Second-generation Japanese. The government is still reluctant for political reasons to use this group. Moreover, few of them can read Japanese; and even those who speak the language frequently speak only patois. Those who can read and speak well have usually received their training in Japan and are therefore under suspicion. However, the latter are one of the few groups who could read script.

(b) *Businessmen*.—Very few are able to read and write Japanese. Those with speaking knowledge would be valuable if they could be used on active service, but most of them are above the age limit for such work. However, their speaking knowledge could be made use of in the fields of Communications Intelligence and Propaganda.

(c) *Missionaries*: Some have reading and writing, as well as speaking, knowledge of the language; and although the majority would be over-age for active service, this group might be an important source of supply. However, it is doubtful how many would be willing to work against Japan in view of their connections with that country and of the fact that by so doing they would probably be unable to continue their activities in Japan after the war was over.

Missionaries with knowledge of Chinese, on the other hand, could learn to read Japanese fairly quickly and would not be subject to the same scruples as the missionaries from Japan.

(d) *White-Russian émigrés* from Manchuria and Koreans knowing Japanese. It is probable that few would be able to read or write the language; and the political allegiance of both groups would be suspect.

(e) Chinese could possibly be used to read and write Japanese.

2. *Chinese language*.—The supply is still adequate to meet the present demands of the government. If the demand grows, Chinese could be used.

3. *Russian language*.—The supply is plentiful; and, if necessary, new personnel can be trained comparatively quickly.

4. *Siamese and Malay languages*.—Missionaries are at present the chief source of supply, but there are not enough of them to meet possible demands. However, since the reading and writing problem is not great in the case of these languages, the training of new personnel would not be difficult. Another possible source of supply would be British Malaya.

5. *Dutch language*.—No problem.

6. *Political and economic analysts*.—The chief problem here is to utilize the present supply with a minimum of wastage, and to conserve the present facilities, and develop new ones, for training additional personnel. Newspapermen, State Department officials, and students and research workers abroad would be a valuable source of supply in this category. Steps should be taken to ensure that such people will be available in the case of emergency and not interned abroad.

Conclusion.—As regards languages, the situation is already acute only in the case of Japanese. However, there is no machinery for making the best use of available personnel in all the above categories; and there is no adequate organization for the training of new personnel. For two reasons, therefore, it is essential that the academic world, in cooperation with the government, should devise some scheme to meet these deficiencies. First because its cooperation is essential to the efficient working out of such a scheme, which is of vital importance to the whole national defense organization; and secondly because, in the absence of such a plan, the whole academic system would be dislocated by the haphazard extraction of teachers and students for government service.

PROPOSALS FOR THE MORE EFFICIENT UTILIZATION AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN THE ABOVE FIELDS

A committee representing the various academic institutions, learned societies, etc. should be set up to offer its services to the government in the task of working out a well integrated plan on a national scale. The first step in the drawing up of such a plan must be to compile a list of available personnel in the above fields and to classify them according to their special ability. The questionnaire already issued by the government with a view to creating a national roster in this connection is just beginning to get under way. This roster will do the mechanical work satisfactorily; but it cannot show initiative in selection, and it cannot sell its services to the departments.

Thus, when the preliminary listing and classifying have been completed, a scheme must be devised by which the personnel can be utilized with the maximum efficiency. Both as a means of conserving the limited supply of specialists and as an aid in coordinating the work of the various government departments, it would be desirable, in the case of the kind of work that lends itself to such treatment, to set up a central information bureau, possibly through the agency of the National Resources Planning Board. Without such centralization the available supply of specialists would soon be exhausted, and the present practice of duplication of work in the various departments would be perpetuated. A possible nucleus for such a central information bureau in the Far Eastern field already exists in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

In coordination with the above scheme for the most efficient utilization of existing personnel, machinery should be devised for the training of new personnel in languages and the social sciences. The establishment of some kind of National Training School would preserve intact and even extend the existing teaching facilities and would guarantee a continued supply of new personnel. It would also enable those doing important research work to continue their studies or to undertake special studies in accordance with government needs.

Such a school could either be centralized or decentralized. If it were centralized at Washington, where members of government departments could attend after office hours, the government might be more inclined to provide the necessary funds. On the other hand, centralization would disorganize the training centers already established; and the value of part-time study in the present emergency situation, particularly in the case of the Japanese language, is doubtful. (In the latter connection, the question of organizing evening classes wherever the necessary facilities exist was also discussed, and it was agreed that the matter should be further investigated.)

The teaching facilities for such a National Training School are adequate, except in the case of the Japanese language, which presents a special difficulty. (Similar problems will arise if the government should require specialists in such languages as Malay, Turkish, and Arabic.) Limited facilities exist for the teaching of the reading and writing of Japanese print and script in this country. And in the case of spoken Japanese, students could be sent to Hawaii; or missionaries and second-generation Japanese might be used for training purposes, though few are trained teachers. It was agreed that a conference of all teachers of Japanese should be held to discuss the problem.

THE PROBLEM OF DOCUMENTS, DICTIONARIES, ETC.

Steps should be taken to lay in a stock and to ensure the future supply of documents, newspapers, periodicals, etc. from potential enemy countries and from countries with which communications are likely to be blocked. The chief deficiency at present is in Russian and Japanese materials. In the former case, inquiry needs to be made as to what agencies or governments are holding up such materials. In the latter case, the deficiency should be made up by increased purchases from Japan. The Institute of Pacific Relations has already increased its purchases of such materials slightly and is attempting to organize delivery through neutral countries in the event of war. It was suggested that the Japanese section of the American Council of Learned Societies, and some of the universities, should take similar steps on as large a scale as possible; and that the Library of Congress should be encouraged to increase its activities along these lines.

A special problem arises in the case of Japanese dictionaries, textbooks, etc., the supply of which in this country is already practically exhausted. Since they would be extremely costly to reproduce, an adequate number should be

ordered from Japan immediately. Such purchases could best be made through the State Department. It was agreed that the problem would be taken up immediately by the Japanese teachers at the conference.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

It was agreed that Mr. Mortimer Graves should be entrusted with the task of taking all necessary steps, with the assistance of anyone he thought fit, for the implementation of the above proposals. It was suggested that the aid of Mr. Philip Moseley should be enlisted in connection with the drawing up of a new national roster; and that, as the essential first step, all the proposals put forward at the conference should be taken up with Washington as soon as possible.

NOTE ON FAR EASTERN INSTITUTE AT CORNELL

A two months intensive course in Chinese and Japanese is being given at Cornell this summer. This course, for which scholarships are available, will be the equivalent of a normal one-year course. In view of the emergency need for Japanese linguists, students should be encouraged to attend this summer school.

The conference was attended by :

Knight Biggerstaff, Cornell
Kurt Bloch, I. P. R.
Hugh Burton, Columbia
E. C. Carter, I. P. R.
Samuel N. Cross, Harvard
Carrington Goodrich, Columbia
Mortimer Graves, A. C. L. S., Washington
W. L. Holland, I. P. R., Berkeley
Elizabeth Jorgensen, I. P. R.
George O. Kennedy, Yale
Owen Lattimore, Johns Hopkins
John Leaning, I. P. R.
W. W. Lockwood, A. C. I. S., Princeton
John Marshall, Rockefeller Foundation
Harriet Moore, A. R. I.
E. O. Reischauer, Harvard
G. T. Robinson, Columbia
David N. Rowe, Princeton

EXHIBIT No. 985

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, D. C., Jan. 11 1129A.

EDWARD C. CARTER :

Delighted to see your son Tuesday 11 : 30 at the Court.

FELIX FRANKFURTER. 1130.1151A.

EXHIBIT No. 986

(Handwritten :)

AUG. 6.

It is difficult to answer your very thoughtful letter re office space because I don't know yet whether Chen Han N-seng will have returned to China as Holland desires or whether he will still be in N. Y. The problem is simplified through Bill Holland's not coming. The Amerasia space, i. e., beyond Amerasia seems a solution.

(Inserted here is a sketch of the office layout, with the following initials and names : EFC

Orrick

McDonald

KM ECC)

If Chen returns before I do I guess we can manage to squeeze into our present space. I don't think card tables will do. I think you should continue in my office—I would rather like to work in yours.

We are having a peaceful crossing. Bremman is a store house of information. I am also lucky in that your friend & Tommy White's is in the next compartment—Col. Faymonville. He has been out in Vladivostok for the visit of the U. S. Asiatic Squadron. If every American had his wise and comprehensive outlook on the U. S. S. R. there would be great possibilities of cooperation between U. S. and U. S. S. R.

This carriage is very wobbly. I have run out of stationery as you see—so I am afraid my letters will bother and bore you because of their sloppiness. I envy you your clear distinguished handwriting & your lovely blue writing paper.

AUG. 7.

It has been hot but today is lovely and cool. I hope when I get to Moscow to be able to reach you by cable or phone. Bremman and I got up at 4 a. m. to get your cable at Irkutsk but every one there swore there was no cable from you anywhere in the city. I saw a lovely sunrise over Baikal but that hardly made up for the lack of a cable from you.

This is our longest and I hope our last separation.

Love,

EDWARD.

CARTER,

Tourist Bureau, Harbin.

Cable care Stationmaster, Birobidjan, whether leaving as planned.

No answer.

EXHIBIT No. 987

Arthur Paul, Daisy Paul, reserved

Hrepilad Fall

N. Y.

Crm.

Wash.

Harriman

pro court Liberty

Thurman Arnold

Abe Fortas, 50,000 income

RS: Albert Friendly, Post

William Cochrane, Balt., wife

Mary Gresham, Govt. Folk good.

Robert Lamb

C. I. O. now Williams

Al.

Miss Nathausen

Pub. Rel.

Lincoln Bld.

Don't mention Vluz

Camincho

Bus Ma for Roosevelt

Smith Boat

Clifford Durr

Able friend

FCC South Conf

Little money

Raymond Swing

Chi

I. P. R.

Anne Wheeler

F. E. State

Balting daylete

2 children

Balt.

EXHIBIT No. 988

MEETING; ARCTIC INSTITUTE; APRIL 9; ECC; OL; FD; HM; SCHMIDT; MOTILIEV
HARONDAR

Schmidt is head of all the work north of the 62nd parallel, it is about one-third of the U. S. S. R.

The first thing that had to be developed in the Arctic was science. This began in 1917, but since 1929 the development has been very rapid. Every region of the north has its permanent arctic station, where work is carried on during the whole year.

The second thing to be developed was transportation. This is the key to the arctic. The aim is to get a route across the north sea. In 1932 the *Sibiryakov* made the first complete trip in one season. In 1933 was the Cheliuskin expedition in 1934 the *Litka* got through and in 1935 they opened a regular route for commercial vessels, four ships made the trip. In 1936 six will go from West to

East; two from East to West; 6 as far as the Kolyma; 8 to the Lena and 40 to the Yennisea. More than 300,000 tons of cargo will be carried.

River transportation is very important. The basin of the Lena is larger than Western Europe and this has to be developed. Since 1933 ships have gone to the mouth of the Lena. Now they have their own shipbuilding wharf on the Lena.

The next thing is the geological survey in order to begin the production of minerals. There is zinc and lead and nickel. There is rock salt near the Taimir peninsula. This is very important because there is no salt in the Soviet Far East. They have had to get salt for the fishing industry from Odessa and from Western Siberia. In 1938 there will be 5,000 workers there and they will produce 150 tons per year.

The Yennisea is navigable for ocean ships as far as Igarka, 450 km. from the mouth. Last year many foreign steamers came there for timber, which is shipped down the river from Western and Eastern Siberia. One even took timber to South Africa. River transport on the lower Yennisea has existed since before the Revolution.

There is no need to colonize the north, because there is better land to be settled elsewhere in the U. S. S. R. There they plan to have more machines than men. There is one labor camp on the Yennisea, but there is not much use for criminal labor there, everyone wants to work in the Arctic. The population in the asiatic part of the north, north of 62nd parallel is 900,000 of which 150,000 are the native tribes.

Aviation has been widely developed. There is regularly daily, all-year service down the great rivers, the Ob, the Yennisea, the Lena, etc. There are occasional services East and West between the rivers to the fur centers or to the mines. They find it cheaper to transport the men and equipment for the mines by air. The airplanes also help with the navigation, to locate the ice flows, etc.

At present they have a general rough geological survey of the whole region and on a basis of this they are doing more specialized surveys. In 1936 there will be 12 geological expeditions to different parts of the North.

In 1935 the most important product of the region was timber. This is shipped from the interior. In 1936 they expect that minerals will be the most important. The Lena and the Yennisea are open about 4 or 4½ months for shipping.

The native peoples are helped by the Institute of Northern Peoples. Every tribe has its schools and at present they are concentrating on training teachers from the native peoples. There are already native technical experts, ship captains, wireless operators, etc.

When Schmidt was in the U. S. he found everyone very friendly to him. Roosevelt was interested in his work and questioned him very carefully on all the details.

Conditions in Alaska are better than in the North here. The climate is not as severe. But in the north of Canada they are worse.

The Soviet weather forecasts, based on their observations in the North, are very good and far ahead of other countries. The U. S. should establish similar stations for this purpose in the north of Canada.

Reindeer are to be increased for meat production, but they will not be used more widely in transportation. At present there is agriculture in the north, in Igarka and Franz Joseph Land. It is just for raising vegetables. In the next few years they plan to have agriculture for fresh vegetables in all the places where there are people. There is no grain grown there.

The work in the mines goes on all the year.

At present there is a 50-60 percent increase in transportation facilities every year. The growth of transportation over the next twenty years will depend on the development of mining.

EXHIBIT No. 989

APRIL 19, 1933.

ECC from JB:

OWEN LATTIMORE

You will remember that when Lattimore was first suggested as a member of the American Council I was inclined to support the proposal. It is true that he is not an economist, but the following reasons would weigh very heavily in my mind in favor of inviting him: (1) as far as I know, he is not reputed to be in

the pay of any government; (2) he has a remarkable background of personal experience in Manchuria and China; (3) he has written what is perhaps the best book in existence on Manchuria; (4) although he is not an economist, he is thoroughly familiar with what the economists are interested in. In other words, he understands the nature of the pressures which impinge on the Far East, and although I myself think that he overweights the cultural or Spenglerian analysis, he never loses sight of reality; (5) he has a very understanding and sympathetic attitude toward the Soviet Union, and (6) our job at the Banff Conference is not only to break political issues down into their economic units, but also to put them together again. In this second job, Lattimore would have a very great deal to contribute.

APRIL 17, 1933.

ECC to JB:

I wrote Fred saying that Lattimore had offered to be a member of the American Group at Banff but that we had misgivings as to whether it was more important to have him than some of the others who we felt would help more on our economic program.

Now I have the following cable from Fred dated Honolulu, April 14:

"MATUKATA: I STRONGLY RECOMMEND LATTIMORE."

This would mean more if you also joined in the recommendation. What is your reaction? Attached is a copy of the letter I sent Fred.

MARCH 27, 1933.

Mr. F. V. FIELD,
*Institute of Pacific Relations,
Honolulu, Hawaii.*

DEAR FRED: Owen Lattimore is coming home from Mongolia and Manchuria across Canada just at the time of the Banff Conference, and he is very eager to attend. This news came to us after the Selection Committee had met, and it looks as though we were going to have the very greatest difficulty in keeping down the American group to 25. So it will be hard to find a place for Lattimore. But before the Selection Committee finally passes on his name, we should like to know whether you feel strongly that he should be secured, even though that might mean increasing the size of the American group. Please send a full statement of your views as to the importance or otherwise of having him, at the earliest possible moment.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 990

JUNE 28, 1933.

Mr. L. T. CHEN,
*China Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
123 Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai.*

DEAR MR. CHEN: Here is a copy of a letter of introduction which I have given at his request to General Yakhontoff. The General is very eager to get the backing of the Institute of Pacific Relations in making a study of Communism in China. He felt that his wide contacts in Russia and in the Far East fitted him uniquely to make such a study and that he might be employed jointly by the China Institute, the American Council and the Pacific Committee of the I. P. R. in the U. S. S. R.

We have told him that the I. P. R. was not in a position to sponsor his study. We do not know where the funds would come from.

A further difficulty is that we do not think that General Yakhontoff stands in the first rank as a scholar. He is more in the class of a popular lecturer than a research worker of high qualifications.

I think it would be a friendly act for you to see him when he calls and talk with him about his plans, but I do not think there is any reason for you to go out of your way to render him special favors or give a great deal of time to him.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

ECC: W

JUNE 28, 1933.

Mr. L. T. CHEN,
*China Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
123 Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai.*

DEAR MR. CHEN: This is to introduce General Victor Yakhontoff, who hopes to visit China in September and October to get material for lectures and for a book on Communism in China. He was formerly a General in the Russian Imperial army; later he was an attaché in the Russian embassy in Tokyo; after the Revolution he was an emigre and settled in America. More recently he has re-established friendly relations with people in Moscow interested in the study of foreign affairs. He is the author of "Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East." He recently became an American citizen.

Inasmuch as General Yakhontoff lectures quite widely before men's women's clubs in America and is making a serious effort to continue as an objective student of Far Eastern affairs, any help that you can give him will be deeply appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

ECC:W

EXHIBIT No. 991

JULY 13, 1933.

PERSONAL.

Dr. STANLEY K. HORNBECK,
State Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR HORNBECK: As you know, a group of scientific workers in the U. S. S. R. who have specialized on a study of the economic, ethnic, cultural, and political problems of the Far East has been definitely organized as the Soviet Group of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The head of this group was elected unanimously at the Shanghai Conference as the Soviet member of the Pacific Council, the international governing body of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Sir Robert Borden, the Honorable Newton W. Rowell and Vincent Massey, the outstanding leaders of the I. P. R. in Canada, are exceedingly anxious to have a Soviet representative at the Banff Conference. Unfortunately the official attitude of the Canadian Government is such that it is illegal for members of the Communist Party to visit and live in the Dominion of Canada. Prime Minister Bennett, however, is so interested in the success of the Banff Conference that he has privately informed the Honorable Newton W. Rowell that the Canadian immigration officers at all points of entry in the Dominion will be instructed to facilitate the arrival and departure for Banff of all accredited members of the Institute of Pacific Relations en route for the Banff Conference. Some months ago he gave a personal assurance of this to Mr. Rowell after Mr. Rowell raised the question of the legal and administrative obstacles that might arise in the case of a Soviet representative.

To make doubly certain that there is no embarrassment and unfortunate incident accompanying the arrival of a Soviet representative, Mr. Rowell has again reopened the matter with Prime Minister Bennett. As a result, I am able to send to you herewith a copy of a letter just received from Escott Reid, the Secretary of the Canadian Institute, conveying to me formally a copy of a recent letter from Prime Minister Bennett to the Honorable Newton W. Rowell.

It so happens that it would be of the greatest value to the American Council in developing its program of studies of Russian practice and policy in the Far East if it were possible for us to get permission from the State Department to ensure that the Soviet member of the Banff Conference was able to visit New York for conference with the officers and staff of the American Council both before and after the Banff Conference.

If the Institute of Pacific Relations group in Moscow is finally able to send a representative to Banff, the chances are three to one that they will send as the sole member or as Chairman of a group of two or three, Karl Radek whose article in Foreign Affairs a few months ago you must have read. He is a member of the Communist Party and, as you know, he has been specializing for some time on Soviet policy in the Far East.

I would like to inquire from you what steps the American Council should take in order that we might be able to cable Karl Radek that if it is possible for him

to visit New York on his way to and from Banff, the State Department will attend to the necessary formalities.

I do not know sufficiently the present policy and division of responsibility in the State Department in such a matter but have wondered whether it will be possible for you to discuss the question with Mr. Phillips and enlist his interest in finding a solution to the problem which confronts the American Council. There is no one in Washington better qualified than you to explain to Mr. Phillips the purpose and importance of the scientific studies of the Institute of Pacific Relation. If any personal reference would help, you might remind Mr. Phillips that I was a classmate of his at Harvard and that our fellow classmate, Charles Dana Draper, whom he knows, is my brother-in-law.

If some formal communication from the American Council addressed to the Secretary of State is called for, will you kindly let me know what sort of letter I should send in place of this purely personal inquiry.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

ECC/NH

EXHIBIT No. 992

NOVEMBER 29, 1933.

JB to ECC:

The following men at Harvard should be interested in the Russian field:

Cross, Samuel A.—Professor of Russian, working in the medieval period. An expert on the Chronicles. Former commercial attaché, with, I think, chemical training. Pretty anti-Soviet personally, but a good American citizen. Said to be really good at the language. You will remember that Elisieff spoke very highly of him, and of the six or eight young men, including one of the Coudert boys, who are working for him.

Fainsod, Merle—Young, married a classmate of Betty Field's, took his Ph. D. in Government two years ago. Spent last year in Russia, working on the Third International, and is preparing a monograph for publication on this. Thoroughly intelligent, a protégé of Holcombe's personally, at present a tutor in government.

Langer, William—Modern European history. One of the best men in this field in America. Teaches History 30, Archie Coolidge's old course, and therefor partly inheritor of Coolidge's Russian tradition. Has no special competence in Russian, but an interest in it. Works for Foreign Affairs, and is the special friend of Mosely's. On the board of the Fletcher School.

Holcombe—You know.

Elliott, W. Y.—Government, at present titular head of the department. A special colleague of Lowell's, expert on the British empire, on which he has written a big book.

Emerson, Rupert—Government, relatively young. Has married a Russian, his own Russian background uncertain. Said to have spent the past year in the Far East. Recommended by Cross. Spoken well of by Moseley.

Blake, Robert—Head of the library. A very important fellow in Harvard politics. Knows only a little Russian, but knows Georgian, Armenian and about twenty other peripheral languages. Dug up Mount Athos with Kirsopp Lake. Very much interested in the Russian field.

Pope—Fine Arts. The greatest master of Persian art alive, and personally said to be an advance Bolshevik. Went through Russia two years ago with Eddie Warburg, who has told me that he knows no Russian but is sold on the Soviet Union. Knows quite a lot about icons, and might be interested from the point of view of Russian art.

Hopper, Bruce—You know. Away on a sabbatical in Russia.

EXHIBIT No. 993

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW WITH MORTIMER L. GRAVES

Thursday, December 7, 1933

Present: Edward C. Carter and Joseph Barnes.

Speaking from memory Mr. Graves said that the expenditure budget for the Harvard Summer School of Chinese Studies was as follows:

24 assistances @ 125 and 62.50-----	\$2,500
3 inst. P \$800-----	2,400
2 sub. @ \$400-----	800
22 spec. lect. @ \$50-----	1,100
Adm. 40 @ \$5-----	200
	<hr/>
	\$7,000
	<hr/>

Income budget was as follows:

Tuitions 40 and 45-----	\$1,800
Harvard Yenching-----	1,850
Society of Japanese Studies-----	850
Carnegie Corporation and American Council Learned Societies-----	2,500
	<hr/>
	\$7,000

There were forty students registered; sixteen paid their way entirely, twenty-four were assisted, eight at \$62.50 per person and sixteen at \$125 per person. The charge for board and room for six weeks ranged from \$70 upward according to accommodation. The tuition fee was \$45 for the six weeks.

Graves expressed delightful desire that the American Council of Learned Societies was not to have the credit for taking the initiative for the proposed Russian Language School but expressed a deep and sincere desire to cooperate to the full with the I. P. R. in putting the school across.

EXHIBIT No. 994

Finance 1936
Document 7

INDIVIDUAL TRAVEL EXPENDITURE FOR THE PAST FEW YEARS

I—ADMINISTRATION

1934

Edward C. Carter

Left New York January 1934, visited Toronto, Winnipeg and San Francisco prior to sailing for Honolulu. Left Honolulu, after a two weeks' visit, for Japan. After a four weeks' stay in Japan, he sailed from Kobe to Manila for a short visit. He returned to China early in April and visited the following cities: Canton, Shanghai, Nanking, Tientsin, Peiping, and Ting Hsien. He left for Moscow early in May, visiting Hsinking en route. He left Moscow the end of May and visited Amsterdam, The Hague, Leyden, Paris, Geneva and London and returned to New York the end of June.

He remained in the United States until the fall with the expectation of visits to Toronto and Montreal in July and October.

Early in November he purchased a round-the-world trip ticket via London, Marseilles, Bombay, Hongkong, Shanghai and San Francisco in order to take advantage of the saving possible on purchasing a round-the-world ticket. Re-

mained in London from the middle of November until early in December. He then visited Paris, Amsterdam, The Hague and Moscow, returning to London January 2, 1935.

Total Expenditure, \$4,777.48.

1935

After a week's stay in London and a brief visit in Paris he sailed from Marseilles to Bombay. Remained in India from January 24 to February 7 visiting Bombay, Delhi, Nagpur and Wardha. Traveled to Shanghai via Hongkong. He remained in China until April 2 visiting Hankow, Nanking, Tientsin and Peiping. Left for Japan to attend the interim research conference in Tokyo. On May 14, he sailed from Japan to Honolulu where he remained until June 3rd. He sailed from Honolulu to Australia, arriving in Sydney on June 18. In Australia he visited Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane. Left Australia on July 5 for New Zealand where he remained until July 27, visiting Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, Dunedin, Invercargill, Oamaru, Hastings, and Napier. He left New Zealand for Los Angeles spending August 5th in Honolulu. He visited Los Angeles, San Francisco and Yosemite. He reached New York late in August.

During the autumn he visited Washington, D. C., Seattle, Portland, Vancouver, Edmonton, Regina, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Toronto and Montreal.

Total Expenditure, \$5,077.30.

1936

He visited Washington, D. C., Cleveland, Chicago, San Francisco, and returned to New York to sail for London on March 11. He visited Amsterdam, The Hague and Leyden, Moscow, Geneva, Paris, and returned to London. Sailed for New York on May 7th.

At the end of May he visited Ottawa to attend the meetings of the Canadian Institute Studies Conference. June and July spent on work in connection with preparing for the Yosemite Conference at Lee, Mass.

In July he received a \$500 advance toward his Yosemite travelling expenses.

Total Expenditure, first 7 months, \$1,996.35.

Kate Mitchell

Miss Mitchell accompanied Mr. Carter on all of the above mentioned visits with the exception of his visits to the west coast and Canada in 1935 and his visits to Chicago, San Francisco, Amsterdam, The Hague, Leyden, and Moscow, and Ottawa in 1936.

No expense to the Institute was involved in Miss Mitchell's travel.

Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley

Miss Cholmeley joined the Secretariat staff on January 9, 1935, and accompanied Mr. Carter on his visits to India, China, Japan, Honolulu, Australia, New Zealand, and returned to the United States, visiting Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Yosemite. She did not accompany Mr. Carter on his trips to the west coast and Canada during 1935.

No expense to the Institute was involved in Miss Cholmeley's travel during 1935.

The details of Miss Cholmeley's travel during 1936 will be found under item VI—Staff and Staff Exchange.

II—PACIFIC AFFAIRS

1934

Owen Lattimore

Mr. Lattimore left New York in September 1934 for Peiping, visiting Honolulu en route.

Total Expenditure, \$1,200.00.

1935

Mr. Lattimore's travel in China during 1935 was paid for by a grant from the International Research Fund.

1936

Left Peiping in March, visited Moscow, Amsterdam, London, and returned to New York in May.

Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore were given travelling grants to enable them to attend the Yosemite Conference.

Total Expenditure, first 7 months, \$2,034.39.

III—RESEARCH

1934

W. L. Holland

Early in 1934 he visited Toronto and Winnipeg en route to Japan where he established his headquarters in Tokyo. He also visited China during 1934.

Total Expenditure, \$568.98.

1935

In March 1935 he travelled to Shanghai to meet Mr. Carter and participate in staff conferences with Mr. Carter, Mr. Lasker, Mr. Lattimore, Miss Tylor and Miss Mitchell in Shanghai, Nanking and Peiping as well as to confer with members of the China Council. In June 1935, he visited Manila, Hongkong, Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping, Tientsin, and Dairen. He left Japan in July and spent some time in Honolulu, returning to New York the end of August; since which time his headquarters have been in New York and Stockbridge.

In December he paid a short visit to Toronto.

Total Expenditure, \$892.98.

1936

Mr. Holland visited Ottawa in May 1936 to attend the Canadian Institute Studies Conference. He has also been given a travelling grant in connection with attending the Yosemite Conference.

Total Expenditure, first 7 months, \$280.25.

1935

Carl L. Alsberg

Dr. Alsberg was given a grant towards his travelling expenses in connection with attending the interim research conference in Tokyo in April.

Total Expenditure, \$300.00.

1936

Pardoo Lowe

Incidental travel and travelling grant in connection with attending Yosemite Conference.

Total Expenditure, \$191.06.

VI—STAFF AND STAFF EXCHANGE

1935

Richard Pyke

Mr. Pyke was given a grant of \$150 toward his expenses in connection with coming to the United States. He visited Toronto, Montreal, and Ottawa in December.

He was given a grant of \$1,000 to purchase a round-trip ticket from New York to Shanghai.

Total Expenditure, \$1,226.58.

1936

Mr. Pyke visited Toronto early in 1936 in connection with arranging for his readmission to the United States.

He left for the Far East in February visiting Seattle, Vancouver, and Honolulu en route. He spent 3 weeks in Japan visiting Tokyo, Nagaya, Kobe, Kyoto, and Mara. He spent about 8 weeks in China visiting Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping, and Tientsin. He spent a week in Manchuria visiting Hsinking, Mukden, and Dairen. The advance of \$1,000 given Mr. Pyke during 1935 practically covered all his travel to and in the Far East and return.

Total Expenditure, first 7 months, \$63.54.

1935

Charlotte Tyler

Miss Tyler left the United States in the fall of 1934 and visited London. Left London for the Far East via Singapore, Siam, and Indo China. She spent some time in Shanghai and accompanied the Secretary General to Nanking and Peiping where she maintained her headquarters until March 1936.

Total Expenditure, \$1,000.00.

1936

She returned from Peiping via Moscow, and London to attend the Yosemite Conference.

Total Expenditure, first 7 months, \$306.25.

NOTE.—Miss Tyler's salary and travel is paid from a special earmarked grant from the Payne Fund.

1936

Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley

Miss Cholmeley visited Canada in January 1936 for purposes of readmission to the United States.

Total Expenditure, first 7 months, \$97.02.

1936

Harriet Moore

Miss Moore left New York on March 11 and paid short visits to London and Amsterdam, and accompanied Mr. Carter to Moscow where she remained until the latter part of May. She then returned to the United States to assist in conference preparation.

Total Expenditure, first 7 months, \$600.00.

EXHIBIT No. 995

FEBRUARY 13, 1934.

SELSKER M. GUNN, Esq.,

Rockefeller Foundation,

49 West 49th Street, New York City.

DEAR GUNN: It is impossible to tell you how highly we all appreciated the information and the insights which you and Mrs. Gunn gave us here. We only wish we could have pumped you for 10 weeks instead of 10 hours.

I am hoping that you will have a long talk with Barnes and Holland almost immediately after you arrive in New York, for Barnes is leaving for Russia and Siberia a few days after your arrival, and similarly Holland about the first of March is leaving New York for the Pacific Coast, Honolulu, and Japan.

First of all I hope you can in confidence sketch to Barnes and Holland your general plan for China. It is of the utmost importance that they get as full a picture of your analysis of China's needs as you so vividly gave to me. To understand what is in your mind will be invaluable to Holland when he goes to the Far East, and to Barnes when he goes to Russia. I know you want to discuss with them the Standard of Living study, particularly with reference to China.

I hope you and Mrs. Gunn can go over to the Fifty-second Street office and more generally give the background of your studies, not only to Barnes and Holland but also to Lattimore, Miss Tyler, and Lasker.

Any help that any of them can give you in return will be gladly given.

I don't think I told you that, when we saw Kerakhan in Moscow in 1931, he told us that the Institute's researches in China and Japan would be equally valuable whether the Far East remained capitalist or became communist. He affirmed that these basic researches on food and population, trade, tariffs, industrialization, and farm management must form the basis for any socially valid public policy. Similarly I have the feeling that your program of education and research for rural reconstruction in China will prove equally indispensable whether China goes communist or not. I think this is an important point for you to bear in mind, for it may be that some of your trustees will want to veto your proposals because they think that China is going communist.

Holland and Barnes you must see soon after your arrival, as they will be leaving the city very soon. A little later, when your initial rush is over, I hope

you can give a little time to Miss Tyler to tell her what you know of the Basic English situation in the Far East.

If there are any memoranda that would be of use to me in China, I hope that you will send them to me in care of the China Institute of Pacific Relations, 123 Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai. I wish now that I had been forehanded enough to get from you a list of the twenty or thirty Chinese whom you found the wisest and most promising. If you could possibly spare the time to send me the names and cities and a brief "Who's Who" regarding the people I ought to see without fail. You would be rendering the I. P. R. a great service.

With deepest appreciation for all that you did for us here, and with kindest regards from us all to you both, I am

Very sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

ECC/H

EXHIBIT No. 996

CONVERSATION BETWEEN MR. AROSEV, PRESIDENT OF VOKS, MR. CARTER, AND J. B.,
INTERPRETER

MAY 21, 1934.

Mr. Carter began by explaining that this was his third trip to the Soviet Union. On each of his previous trips, he had made every effort possible to work out arrangements for cooperation between the I. P. R. and Soviet social scientists interested in the Pacific area. The results of these efforts were by no means insignificant. The degree of cooperation actually achieved today was far higher than when he first came here in 1929. On the other hand, he was equally convinced that it did not yet begin to correspond to the volume and importance of the work being done here or of that with which the Institute is familiar outside the Soviet Union. The main purpose of his present trip was to try to improve these arrangements, if possible, through a better organization of Soviet representation in the I. P. R.

Mr. Arosev began by saying that he wished to be entirely frank and open with us. As he had told JB previously, the question was unfortunately not one simply of scientific cooperation. From what he had been able to learn of the Institute, it was obvious that it was at least in large part a political institution.

Mr. Carter explained that this was only partly true. The subject matter of the Institute's research is political, but its own organization and activity is entirely nonpolitical. The Institute is a research organization which works through the scientific bodies and workers of different countries, and must consequently take into account the political situation of those bodies and scholars, but it is not itself a political body.

Mr. Arosev replied that in the Soviet Union there were no private bodies or individuals. The nearest exception to this rule is VOKS, which is organized on the same lines as TASS, the Soviet News Agency. But even with these, we must understand, it is inevitable that any activity carried on by anyone in the Soviet Union in cooperation with other nationals has a political significance. It was for this reason that he himself was eager to straighten out the question. The inclusion of Dr. Petrov's name on the Pacific Council, whatever the misunderstanding as to his action in accepting election three years ago, was today merely an empty formality, and both sides would profit by clearing the question up. The very misunderstanding, by which Dr. Petrov feels that he accepted the position as President of VOKS while the record shows that he did so as an individual, is representative of the situation here and indicates the need for a clear understanding of the Soviet position *in principle*, an understanding which could be worked out only in responsible quarters when the question had the wide political significance which is inevitable in joining officially the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Carter agreed completely with the desirability of arriving at such an understanding, and stated that it was the principal reason for his visit to Moscow. He pointed out that in reality it was the substance of cooperation which interested him, and that the form or formula, although it was important to straighten out, was after all of secondary importance. The increase of

direct contacts between other research institutions and those of the Soviet Union, and a wider exchange of documents and materials are the real desiderata which the Institute had in mind.

Mr. Arosev expressed his gratitude for this statement, which left him in a better position to understand the motives of the Institute. For these purposes, VOKS was the ideal organization in the Soviet Union. It is independent, it is responsible to no one and it unites in its contacts with foreign countries all the organizations of the Soviet Union in the arts and sciences.

The main question at the moment, he felt, was to secure the understanding in principle about which he had spoken. If that decision, which under the circumstances could be made only by very responsible people, should be favorable, he would find no difficulty at all in the Soviet Union. He had been in his new post only 25 days, but he was convinced that VOKS could be made a significant link between the Soviet Union and foreign scientists. In regard to the Institute, he and other officials had lacked hitherto any concrete idea of what the Institute wanted.

Mr. Carter stated that we are now in a position to supply such a statement in written form, if desirable, as a formal outline of the aims and objectives of the Institute and the part which the Soviet Union would be desired to play in their attainment. He wondered if Mr. Arosev would care to advise him as to the form and method of presenting such a statement.

Mr. Arosev said that he would try as quickly as possible to secure, on the basis of the large amount of information which they now had as a result of our visit, a definite ruling on the question in principle. He hoped to be able to secure this by May 26th, when he wished we would telephone him. Then we could submit such a concrete statement as we had mentioned, and he could guarantee that if the decision in principle should be favorable, we would find every aid and cooperation in carrying out our plans.

Mr. Carter then described in some detail the history of the Institute's relations with the Soviet Union. In 1929, through the warm interest of Commissar Litvinov, Mr. Alexandre Romm of TASS was sent to the Kyoto Conference as an observer. In 1931, Vice Commissar Karakhan spoke with cordiality of the research work of the Institute, and of the keen interest in it which was felt by Soviet scientists, and assured a responsible group of Institute representatives that individual cooperation on the part of Soviet scientists was entirely acceptable to the government authorities. At that time he recommended that VOKS be used as the agency, and in the same year Dr. Petrov who was then President of VOKS accepted his election to the Pacific Council of the Institute. This formal representation of the Soviet Union in the Institute had not developed as might have been hoped. In other ways, however (Mr. Carter referred to JB's presence in Moscow for the past two months, the survey he had made of research societies in the Soviet Union, and to the last number of *Problemyi Kitapa*, which contains the translation of an I. P. R. data paper) we have been successful in working out larger and more fruitful cooperation than we have ever had before.

He concluded by repeating his assurances that he was only too eager to conform to any suggestion which might be forthcoming as to the formula of cooperation. He would wait until the 26th for the decision which Mr. Arosev had promised, particularly since he planned to be in Moscow again in the fall.

JB added personally, since he knew Mr. Arosev from a previous meeting, that he wished to assure him that the invitation was by no means a political gesture. The persistence and zeal of Institute representatives in Moscow in attempting to work out some answer to this problem reflected no desire on the part of any nation or group to use the Soviet Union for political purposes. It reflected rather our increasing conviction of the importance of Soviet studies, as witnessed by the fact that some of us have learned the Russian language and spent considerable periods here, and also to some extent the impossibility of securing any sort of really definite answer from Soviet authorities. If Mr. Arosev could secure a definite answer, even if it should be negative, it would probably be an assistance to the substance of what we want to secure.

Mr. Arosev, concluding, assured Mr. Carter that he had no desire to continue "feeding us with empty promises." While we were here, we should feel free to commend VOKS in any way possible. If the answer is in the affirmative, VOKS will officially bend every effort to advance our projects here. If it is in the negative, however, VOKS will still be only too happy to help us in any way possible that does not commit it to our policies. He reminded us that it would be hard to convince anyone in the Soviet Union that the Institute is not political. Any organization in which England, Japan, China and the United States are working,

because of the delicate relations between those countries, is of necessity political. In this case, political significance is like the fat in which a cutlet is fried. It may be butter fat, or sunflower seed oil, but you can't fry a cutlet without fat.

Mr. Arosev took a list of Banff Conference members, and asked a few additional questions concerning the central headquarters of the Institute and the role of Pacific Council members. He had already been given a pretty complete sheaf of documents, including Pacific Affairs, a list of A. C. members, Empire in the East, a check list of publications, the Harvard Summer School circular, etc.

EXHIBIT No. 997

JULY 18, 1934.

MISS BARBARA WERTHEIM,
129 East 52nd Street, New York

DEAR MISS WERTHEIM: This is to formalize the invitation that I have already given you orally to go to Tokyo this autumn for one year to act as Research Assistant to W. L. Holland, the Institute's International Research Secretary and S. Uramatsu, Secretary of the Japanese Council of the I. P. R.

You would thus be serving both the Pacific Council and the Japanese Council and the division of your work would be made by a three-cornered understanding between Mr. Holland, Mr. Uramatsu and yourself. At the time of your arrival Mr. Holland and Mr. Uramatsu will be occupying offices in the same building. As they are working together in the closest collaboration there will be no difficulties whatsoever in working out your program so that your work for Mr. Uramatsu and Mr. Holland will be complementary.

In order that you may know just what has transpired since first I talked with you I now wish to quote my cable to Holland. It reads as follows:

"Cable could you Uramatsu use Barbara Wertheim one year from November volunteer research worker. Shiman Barnes endorse."
It was sent on July 12. On July 14, Mr. Holland cabled me from Tokyo in reply, as follows:

"Wertheim valuable and welcome."

At your convenience would you please let me know whether you would prefer to sail some time in October, or whether you would prefer to wait until early November?

Mr. Barnes informs me that the American Council will be willing to give you leave of absence for the period of your sojourn in Japan and also six to eight weeks' leave this summer as soon as you have completed your current assignments.

In the autumn before you go I would be glad to make suggestions for a short period of reading and work, preparing to assuming responsibilities in the Tokyo office.

With kindest regards, I am
Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 998

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, September 25, 1934.

MR. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Office.

DEAR FRED: Would you let me know whom of the following you would like to meet before I sail? Sooner or later, under the most easy and natural auspices, I assume that you will want to establish personal contacts with all whom you don't know already.

Arthur W. Packard
Robert M. Lester
Frederick P. Keppel
Raymond B. Fosdick
Henry Allen Moe

David H. Stevens
Henry S. Haskell
Miss Ella Crandell
Edwin R. Embree
Richard Walsh

Stanley K. Hornbeck
Henry R. Luce
Maurice Wertheim
Martin Egan
James D. Mooney

If there are other people not listed above whom you would like me to establish contact with for you, please do not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 999

KB to ECC:

This memorandum, which contains my ideas of what may be accomplished by the Institute in the Soviet Field, falls into two parts:

I. Long-term objectives.

II. The immediate steps necessary in order to accomplish I.

I. The long-term objectives embody an ideal state of things which is admittedly impossible of accomplishment for many years. I would like to see all activities which have been proved of value by one national council incorporated in the work of the other councils with such modification as the peculiar needs and situation of each may necessitate. Keen interest by all national councils in the work carried on in the other countries, with active cooperation in such work would be an integral part of this Utopian picture. A description of this picture from the Soviet angle falls into the following three divisions:

A. The Soviet Council in relation to the other member countries.

B. The Pacific and National Councils in relation to the Soviet Union.

C. Activities impossible without the active support of the Soviet and other national councils.

A. 1. The Soviet Council must ultimately be as active on the International committees, in the preparation for the conferences and in the conferences themselves as any other council. This will take a long time to bring about, due to financial, political and geographic reasons. But there seems to be no reason why these difficulties should be insurmountable once the Soviets are convinced of the advantages accruing to their own research and scholarship from such active cooperation. This conviction can only be given by actual requests for information and studies and by the reciprocal rendering of concrete assistance to the Soviet workers in the Pacific field.

2. Under the auspices of the Soviet Council, a survey should be made in the Soviet Union of the facilities afforded research workers to acquire the languages of the other members of the Institute. Should the survey show that facilities are provided, adequate to the building of a body of research workers equipped to function in the various fields, no further action would be necessary. Should the opposite be the case, action should be taken to remedy the situation.

3. Coordination of the studies carried on in the Soviet Union of the problems of the other member countries should be one of the functions of an active Soviet Council.

4. The Soviet Council should possess an up-to-date record of organisations and personnel interested in the problems of the Pacific area.

5. The Soviet Council should investigate whether a need exists in the Soviet Union for the issue of periodical, timely information on the problems of the Pacific Area. It is possible that the magazines already published absorb all demand for such information. On the other hand, some such service as the American Council is giving in its biweekly memoranda might fill a real lack in providing a section of the population of the USSR, which would not otherwise be reached, with authoritative accounts of Pacific incidents and situations.

B. Before going into detail on B and C, I would like to recapitulate the situation of the various national councils as I know it re the Soviet Union.

Australia—Lack of interest coupled with suspicion. Lack of research workers in the Soviet field and even of people acquainted with the Russian language.

New Zealand—Ditto but even stronger.

Canada—Ditto. Feeling towards the Soviets reminiscent of 1920.

Netherlands—Admittance of possible value of Soviet material in their work, but unable to use it through lack of people acquainted with the language and unwilling to through general fear of communism.

Great Britain—Luke-warm attitude towards Soviet Affairs. However, something is being done in the Soviet field, e. g., in Birmingham, and people can be found in Great Britain who handle the language.

China—Language facilities exist, but people found in possession of Soviet literature are in extreme danger during the periodic anti-communist drives.

Japan—Keen interest on the part of some members of the Council exists but there is a lack of language facilities and it is practically impossible to import Soviet literature.

U. S. A.—Interest is present. Language can be handled. Soviet literature is importable and causes no embarrassment to possessor.

Such being the case, a considerable period of time will have to be spent in arousing interest and waiting for political obstacles to disappear. Granted such a period of time, it would be desirable to have in each member country the following:

1. Facilities for acquiring the Russian language, so that a body of research workers could develop, capable of handling Soviet and Russian materials.
2. A coordinating center for all Soviet Studies and the institutions and personnel concerned.

The Pacific Council of course would act as originator of such plans, with due regard for national autonomy, and would receive reports as to progress in their achievement. It would seem logical, moreover, that the compiled lists of Soviet studies, interested institutions, and research personnel should be sent to the Pacific Council which would then be in a position to keep all national councils informed as to the state of Soviet studies in the membership as a whole. Care would have to be taken in setting up the machinery that it did not become so cumbersome and the process so lengthy that the information would be out of date before distributed.

C. Under activities requiring active support of the Soviet and other councils we can list:

1. Exchange of books and publications. The American Council has for some time been exchanging books and periodicals with various institutions in the Soviet Union. This can be continued in the same fashion as before or through some central agency set up by the Soviet Council. This central agency would of course carry on exchange arrangements with the other National Councils. The extent to which this exchange would develop would depend on how B. was carried out. It is obviously useless for a library to be collected if it is unused through lack of interest or ability.

2. Exchange of research workers such as has existed between the American Council and the Japanese and Chinese should be extended. It would be of great value if ultimately such exchange could function between the Soviet and all the other national councils.

3. A bibliographical service such as is now being contemplated, inevitably will demand the cooperation of all countries concerned. In the far future a similar service covering Japan, China, the Soviet Union and the English and Dutch speaking countries should be set up in each of the member countries of the Institute.

4. The Soviet and other councils could be of valuable mutual assistance if they kept each other informed of the progress of their various activities without waiting for the inevitably longer procedure of communicating through the Pacific Council.

II. Immediate steps necessary in order to accomplish I. divide into two parts:

- A. In the Soviet Union.
- B. In other member countries.
- A. In the Soviet Union.

1. From the point of view of terminology, it might be as well to suggest that the Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R. should be known as the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

2. Membership on International Committees. The necessary documents should be presented to the Soviet Council which will acquaint them with the activities of the various committees: Program; Research; Publications; Education. They should be urged to appoint a representative on each committee. Perhaps, to begin with, one person might do for all, preferably the person who might conceivably come to the next conference so as to increase the chance of the Soviet representative actually meeting the other members of the committees.

3. An associate editor for Pacific Affairs should be appointed and asked as his first job to check up on the articles promised by Voitinsky, Abramson, and Radek.

4. Data Papers. The Soviet Council has already announced five studies that they intend to publish before the next conference as well as two collections of articles. As these all deal with subjects pertinent to the general subject matter for data papers for the next conference as determined at Banff, these publications may very well be counted enough.

5. Standard of Living Studies. All relevant material such as the International Research Program 1933-35, FVF's report on the progress of the American Council in the Standard of Living Studies and any other reports the Secretary General may get from other council visits, should be shown

to the Soviet Council. They should be asked to draw up a report on what has been published and on what projects are now under way or being contemplated on the subject of Standard of Living in the Soviet Union, HM can be offered as assistant or collaborator. They should be informed that all countries are making such a report to the International Research Committee early next year and be asked to send their report in at the same time. Suggestions how the studies in each country might further progress, or what new ones might be originated, in order best to coordinate all the work, will then be sent out. As for the cultural side of the research program, I understand that that is still under discussion. Concrete suggestions as to just what "cultural relations" signifies will be sent to the Soviet Council later.

6. The question of translation of Soviet studies should be discussed as it affects both the data papers and the projects connected with the Research program of the Institute.

7. The report of JB made last spring on Soviet Institutions concerned with the problems of the Far East is so confidential in character that no reference should be made of it to the Soviet Council or to any of the Institutions concerned. (N. B. to IIM.) The Soviet Council should be told that in the American Council we are attempting the coordination of Soviet and Far Eastern Studies. They should be urged to compile a report of all Soviet organisations interested in Pacific Relations with a description of the type of work each carries on. Such a report, they would realize would be of value not only to themselves but to all Soviet-minded research workers. If they demur owing to lack of time or personnel, HM could be offered as the person to undertake it, in so far as her other activities permit, with the Soviet Council as sponsor and guide.

8. Exchange of books and periodicals. Some machinery should be set up within the Soviet Council which could arrange for exchange of books and periodicals. Obviously this would be feasible as far as the publications of the nine institutions embodied in the Soviet Council are concerned. Would it be equally feasible for the Soviet Council to act as the clearing house for arrangements with other Soviet Institutions?

9. The possibility of exchange of research workers should be broached. The preliminary trial of such an arrangement would seem logically to take place between the American or the Pacific Council and Moscow. An ideal arrangement would be for Kantorovich to come over here in 1936, after he has got the data papers published, and stay through the Conference. He could be attached to the staff of either the Pacific or the American Council and paid a salary in dollars while in exchange some member of the Pacific or American Council staff could be sent to the Soviet Union and the Soviet Council made responsible for his or her room, cooperative cards, supply of rubles etc. Whether a foreigner would be willing to live in Moscow without an additional valuta income, of course, is doubtful, but something could be worked out.

10. What cooperation is asked from the Soviet Council in connection with the bibliographical service depends on what decision is reached about the service itself. This matter has already been broached to several people in Moscow, I believe. I feel that they would be keenly interested in the prospect of a similar service in English and Dutch books being set up some time.

11. Attendance at the next conference should be put forward as being desirable in order to convince the national councils of the Soviet Council's real desire to cooperate. It should be stressed, however, even more highly for the value it would have in facilitating research work and cooperation. If the suggestion in point 9 should be feasible, the aim would be to some extent accomplished. Any large representation of the Soviet Union at the next conference can hardly be expected.

12. In order to give the Soviet Council a picture of what other councils are doing, national council reports such as the present one of FVF to the American Council should be shown along with any other documentation possible, such as Cross's report on the Harvard Russian Language School. Out of the latter could develop a discussion of what are the facilities for language study in the Soviet Union.

13. In connection with points 7, 10, and 12, a suggestion might be made to the Soviet Council that they publish a periodic memorandum on work in Pacific problems in the Soviet Union for dissemination among the member councils of the Institute. This might appeal to them strongly.

14. Finance. On the question of the Soviet Council contribution to the Institute, I feel that some contribution should be made if only nominal. In all financial matters, it must be remembered that the Soviets are intensely proud. Direct subsidy from abroad, I believe, would not be acceptable, nor would they wish to be in the position of the only national council not contributing financially. Exchange relations, both for research workers and materials, will have to be arranged with the minimum of international money payments.

In taking up the above points with the Soviet Council, the Secretary General will have to be constantly on the alert to see how much load they seem willing to carry and will have to stress the points correspondingly. If necessary, emphasis could be merely laid on Data papers and Studies of Standards of Living. After all, such research work as would be represented in them and the making of it available to the other countries by means of translation is the main objective of the Institute. Also the Secretary General must observe to what extent the Soviet Council is liable to be an integrated unit with functions of its own, and to what extent it tends to leave everything to the initiative and activity of the institutions out of which it is made. All discussion of plans with the Soviet Council will have to be tempered by whichever of the above cases is true.

B. 1. The Secretary General in his forthcoming tour should endeavour to discover the exact status of Soviet Studies in each country visited, both as regards interest and actual accomplishment. My own impressions of what exists I have stated earlier. If they are correct, the only thing to be done seems to be to discuss with the few persons interested ways and means of utilizing the existence of the Soviet Council.

2. The Secretary General could present to Moscow requests for help in Mackenzie's Status of Aliens coordination, his Communications project and the navalism project of the American Council. There also could be presented with a request for suggestions as to broadening or otherwise improving, a statement of the exchange relations between the American Council and various Soviet Institutions. Any other concrete requests for assistance should be gathered from the countries visited for presentation to Moscow.

3. It should be stressed to the national councils that the Soviet Council is now in existence and eager to cooperate.

NOTE.—The activities of the Pacific and the American Councils re the Soviet Union have become intermingled in the past. The library that is being built up in the office of the American Council, for example, obtains many of its periodicals in exchange for Pacific Affairs. The fact that J. Barnes when Secretary of the American Council acted likewise as representative of the Secretary General before the latter's arrival in Moscow, also added to the confusion in Soviet minds. It has been unavoidable owing to personnel reasons, and for the immediate future the distinction of activities will be hard to make at least to the Soviet Council. In the ideal future, of course, each council will have its staff worker able to handle Soviet materials, and the intermingling of activities will cease. Until then, it may be as well not to confuse the Soviets by attempting too much to disentangle the Pacific and American Councils.

OCTOBER 22, 1934.

EXHIBIT No. 1000

Moscow, November 22, 1934.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Chatham House, St. James Sq., London, S. W. 1.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have now been in Moscow twelve days and am more or less settled. I am sorry that I have not been able to write to you sooner but I have been separated from my typewriter for some days.

As soon as I arrived I went to VOKS and they arranged for me to see Voitinsky. He was very nice to me and offered to help me in every way possible, but of course, he referred all Institute matters to Kantorovitch. Unfortunately it took me almost a week to make arrangements to see him. Immediately after my interview with him I sent you the following cable:

"Send complete list Institute publications. Have asked me for specific answers to questions sent to you. Especially interested in exchange of publications and afraid you uninterested. General answer desirable now and details when you arrive."

As soon as I met Kantorovitch, he got down to the business of the Institute. He first wanted to know if I was empowered to give him specific answers to the ques-

tions which the Russian group addressed to you this summer. I, of course was not able to give him these answers. The question that interested him most was that of the exchange of publications. He asked if the Institute had its own publication establishment and I told him that we had books printed through commercial firms. He asked if books prepared by the separate National Councils appeared under the imprint of the Central Office. I said that apart from the conference papers this generally was not the policy. He inferred from the fact that you had not answered him specifically on the possibility of exchanging publications that you were not interested in doing so. I told him that, as I understood the situation, you were very interested in making some such arrangement and were waiting to make the definite arrangements after you arrived here.

In the course of the interview he asked many questions about the organization and functions of the National Groups. I am keeping a full record of these conversations for you to see on your arrival. He asked to see the Memoranda. I have given him a few of my copies which I had with me. If it is possible, I think it might be wise to send copies here for a certain period. If you do not wish to do that officially, I will continue to give him mine.

Both Kantorovitch and Voitinsky are very anxious to hear about new books published in America on this general field. Voitinsky asked specifically for one. He was not sure of the exact title but thought it was some Annals on the United States Policy in the Pacific. Perhaps you know what book he is referring to. I shall try to discover the exact title and if it is convenient for you, you might bring it when you come. I shall also write Kathleen Barnes and ask her to keep me posted on all new books and to send me any that she considers particularly important.

The Institute Office is in the office of the Soviet World Atlas. Kantorovitch is usually there and his secretary speaks perfect English, having lived in England for several years. She is taking care of the arrangements for me. There is a small library for the Atlas and they are able to get books for me from other libraries. They have also given me letters to two other places which may have more of the books which I need. Kantorovitch has offered to let me have a desk in the Institute Office and in a few more days I think that I will work there most of the time.

As you undoubtedly know, the Pacific Ocean Cabinet of the Institute of World Economics and Politics of the Communist Academy is publishing a new magazine of the Pacific Ocean. It is a quarterly. At the moment I am in the process of reading it and hope to be able to tell you all about it when you arrive. Among other things, it has a long review of Empire in the East and a short statement about the IPR in Russia.

At present I am giving a great deal of time to studying Russian, which you, of course realise is very important for me. I am starting working on the National Minorities, because I have no idea where to begin on the Standards of Living. I hope that you will be able to bring with you an outline of Gregory's book on Standards of Living and of any others that have been started. I am also very eager to hear from Bill Holland in answer to your questions about the National Minorities.

Just before I left London I heard that in November a new book was to be published on the National Minority policy in the U. S. S. R. This is number 7 of the New Soviet Library, published by Gollanz, Ltd. 14 Henrietta St., Covent Garden. The title of the book is "the Soviet State and the Solution of the Problems of Nationalities," By Victor Dimanstein. He is a Russian Authority on the subject and it is very important for me to have this book. Could you bring it when you come or have it sent?

In London I received from you two files of material in relation to Russian participation. One was supposed to contain the Preliminary Survey of Soviet Research Institutions Specializing in the Siberian and Far Eastern Field, prepared by Joe this Spring. On the folder it is marked that I already have this. Although I saw the first draft of it here in Moscow, I have never had a copy. If you think it is advisable, you might bring me a copy.

In your letter of October 31st, you asked me to advise you where it would be most convenient for you to stay when you are here. At present, I would certainly advise the National again or the Metropole. Both are in a central position and near the Institutions in which we are interested. As soon as you know definitely when you are arriving and how many are coming with you, I will make the arrangements here for you.

In my opinion the Soviet group of the Institute is a very serious and business-like group. We will get cooperation from them in proportion to the cooperation we are willing to give to them. For this reason it is most important that I be kept

informed on all the latest Institute news and any changes in policy, etc. As you know, I have been away from the office for over a year and there are probably many things which you take for granted but which are news to me. I will continue to cable you for specific information, but if you have any general information on the work being done by the various National Councils, I would be very grateful to be kept informed about it.

I think it will be best if you continue to send my mail to Intourist, as it is less likely to go astray. However in cases it is necessary to reach me some other way, my address is

Moscow
Savelevski Pereulok
Dom 2, Kv. 4
Sincerely

HARRIET MOORE.

EXHIBIT No. 1001

AMSTEL HOTEL,
Amsterdam, December 15, 1934.

Miss HARRIET MOORE,
Hotel Metropole, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR HARRIET: There are no special instructions for our visit. It was thoughtful of you to ask me for further suggestions.

The principal purpose of the visit is twofold—First, to be of every possible assistance to the new Soviet IPR as it develops its program. The second is to have the maximum time with you is conferring about your work and in loading you with IPR ammunition so that you can be of the greatest consultative value to Kantorovich is the weeks following our departure. I want, of course, to talk fully with you regarding your work when you have finished your present Moscow assignment.

Subordinate to those two purposes is the desire to give my three colleagues a favorable opportunity of seeing something of important influences in the U. S. S. R. as revealed in Moscow. For five hours each day all of them will be engaged on immediate IPR duties, but all of the rest of the time can be given to studying and observing the various aspects of Moscow life. All of this can be easily arranged after we have arrived. These purposes can be in part realized in connection with the main object of the visit, for example a couple of hours spent by us at the Institute of Minor Nationalities would serve many purposes.

One incidental matter which I will want to discuss with you, and if you and Kantorovich advise it, is this. How can scholars from abroad who obey the Soviet law fare nearly as well as those who violate it?

As a result of your letter to Kate we got the coffee and can opener that you requested in Paris.

We will drive straight from the flying field to the Metropole on our arrival on the night of the 20th. Did I tell you that Simon Wingfield-Digby will, because of his luggage come by train, arriving in Moscow a little before noon on the 21st? I have just received two friendly letters from Kantorovich in one of which he indicates that advancing my visit by a few days is equally convenient for him. I hope that on the 21st we can have a long conference with him and then on the 22nd or 23rd a meeting of the Soviet group, if that is regarded by Kantorovich and yourself as a possible and desirable thing to do.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

We want first of all a long talk with you.

EXHIBIT No. 1002

W. L. H from ECC

HOTEL METROPOLE, MOSCOW,
December 25th, 1934.

A. KANTOROVITCH,
20, Razin Street, Moscow.

DEAR KANTOROVITCH: In my conversation with you on December 24th, I mentioned two projects which have formed part of the International Research program of the Institute of Pacific Relations since the 1931 conference. These are, (1) an international survey of *Communications in the Pacific Area*, and (2) an international survey of the *Legal Status of Aliens in Pacific Countries*.

This letter constitutes a formal request from the Pacific Council and the International Research Committee to the U. S. S. R. Council of the I. P. R. to contribute a section to each of these two studies.

On December 24th I handed you the British paper on Communications, the Australian paper on the Status of Aliens, and four pamphlets dealing with the Status of Aliens in Canada, from which the final Canadian paper will be compiled. These papers will serve to show you the general form which the Research Committee would like you to follow, but, of course, the details as to the method of treatment and the scope of the study would be left entirely to your discretion.

If the U. S. S. R. Council agrees to contribute a chapter to each of these studies, these should be in manuscript form and mailed to the International Research Secretary, W. L. Holland, 306 Osaka Building, Tokyo, by April 1st, 1935. A copy of the manuscript should be sent to Professor Norman Mackenzie, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada. Professor Mackenzie has been selected by the International Research Committee to act as final editor and complete the report on both these studies for publication.

As you will note from the sample sections which I have given you, the material is almost entirely factual. Each study will be published as a small reference handbook, in which statistics and terminology will have been made as nearly uniform and comparable as possible. Professor Mackenzie has not decided as yet whether he will write an interpretive analysis of the material presented. If he does so, he will circulate it to all the National Councils before the final publications of the two reports.

At present Professor Mackenzie has on hand papers on the *Status of Aliens* from the following countries:

Japan	China	Australia
United States	Canada	France
Philippines	Holland	
New Zealand	Great Britain	

He is not planning to edit more than is absolutely necessary. His introduction will emphasize the similarities and the differences in treatment of aliens in the countries of the Pacific.

With regard to the study of Communications, Professor Mackenzie has received papers from every member country of the Institute with the exception of Australia and the Philippines. He hopes to receive these papers in the near future.

The details as to the publication of these two studies have not been decided, pending the completion of the final manuscript.

Both the Pacific Council and the International Research Committee feel that it is of the utmost importance that information from the U. S. S. R. on both these questions be secured if possible. I hope, therefore, that the U. S. S. R. Council of the I. P. R. will be able to respond favorably to this request for a Soviet contribution to each study.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1003

Copies to Holland, Moore

Moscow, December 26, 1934.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR FRED: As Leonard Wu is coming to Moscow I would strongly recommend that you urge him seriously to consider reaching here before Harriet Moore leaves. The reception that we have had from Motylev and Kantorovich and the other members of the Soviet Council could not have been more cordial or useful. In no country has any group made more precise and more adequate arrangements for the fulfillment of the purposes of our visit than the offices here.

For the sake of continuity there would be very great advantages in Wu's arriving before Miss Moore leaves. She could be of the greatest assistance to him, and he could perpetuate the wonderful tradition that she is establishing here.

Could you and Kathleen talk this over with Wu to discover what his plans are, what he particularly wants to study when he gets here, what his dates are,

and then write Harriet very fully. It would be better if he got here when Harriet was in Moscow, rather than when she was in the Buriyat Mongolian Republic.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1004

Mr. W. L. Holland: For your information.

CHATHAM HOUSE, 10, ST. JAMES'S SQUARE,
London, S. W. 1, 4th January 1935.

GALEN M. FISHER, ESQ.,
347 Madison Avenue,
New York City.

DEAR GALEN: The enclosed from Lasker would seem to indicate that he has got a garbled idea of the proposed Bibliographical Service. I wonder whether he has received one of your American or international letters on the subject?

I will be writing you more fully about the attitude of the four countries recently visited. Briefly it is as follows:

In England, those who know Russian, Chinese, or Japanese think the proposal important. Those who do not know any one of these three languages seem to question its value.

In France, Boyer, Bonnet, Dennerly, and Lavey all thought the service would be of very great value.

In Holland, the entire I. P. R. Council thought that the Service would be very important, but it would have to be started and an exhibition given of its value before any large number of people would recognize its importance and subscribe to it.

In the U. S. S. R. several very important items came out, regarding which I will write you more fully later.

1. The I. P. R. Group wants immediately from America and, if possible, from London, a description of what the I. P. R. people, for example in New York, feel are the really important books and articles on the Pacific in the English language. The listing of such books supported by good reviews that may appear in other journals not necessarily prepared for the I. P. R. would serve their purpose.

2. Our friends in Moscow at the moment are not terribly impressed by the scientific quality or the indispensability of much of the literature that is being published in China and Japan.

3. Although they do not say so, it is quite apparent that we will have to be careful not to lump Russia, China, and Japan together as in a similar category when we are dealing with our Russian colleagues. At that moment when the Bibliographical Service includes English language publications, then the danger of Soviet leaders thinking that the Service is lumping Soviet Russia with China and Japan as Asiatic countries will disappear.

It is difficult for our Soviet colleagues to envisage a Service conducted from London or Washington by a staff that will be predominantly capitalistic, describing either Soviet or other books in a manner that would be regarded as objective by Communist and capitalist readers.

Here is one of the central difficulties facing us, not only in the Bibliographical proposal, but from now on in "Pacific Affairs" and any other I. P. R. publications. We have worshipped at the shrine of objectivity, but nearly all of the worshippers heretofore have been non-Communist. The coming of the Soviet I. P. R. into not only formal but active, wholehearted, and generous co-operation with the I. P. R. involves a complete rethinking of our entire programme of research, conference, and publication. Each one of us who is working for the Pacific Council is now a servant of an organisation in which the Communist outlook on politics and economics must organisationally be regarded as deserving the same consideration as the capitalists.

Translating this into terms of the Bibliographical problems facing us, suggests among others three possible plans: (1) a note of each book and articles in the Bibliographical Service from both a Communist and non-Communist; (2) an attempt at a description that would be regarded as equally objective by Communists and capitalists; (3) capitalist reviews of Communist books and articles and Communist reviews of capitalist books and articles.

As I say, I hope to write you a little more fully on this matter later, but I wanted to send you immediately this advance report on my discussions in four European countries.

You have doubtless already appraised the value of the International Bibliography of Historical Sciences. I would like to have you write me fully as to what extent you feel that this meets the need that we have all had in mind. The fact that it does not come out until about 18 or 20 months after the year under review militates against it slightly, though I suppose we might find ourselves from six to nine months behind the wishes of our constituency. Do you know whether the fact that a book or article is listed in this Bibliography persuades people that books and articles in their field are indispensable to them? The intrinsic importance of each book and article seems to be the principal criterion of selection. How widely does the scientific world accept the judgment of those who make the selection as final?

The letter from Hughes, the Chinese expert at Oxford, is significant as an example of the reaction of one who knows Chinese. The letter from Webster is significant as coming from one who does not know any of the three languages, so also is the formal letter from Arnold here at Chatham House.

Duyvendak, the great sinologist at Leiden, is very keen on the Bibliographical Service, and believes that both he and several of the Netherland institutions can cooperate. Rade, the Japanologist at Leiden, is also ready and eager to help. Duyvendak goes to Columbia very shortly. It is of the utmost importance that you see him on arrival. You should talk with him as to the desirability of considering once a year the review of the very important Dutch publications on the Pacific.

I am sending copies of this letter to Lattimore, Lasker, and Holland, with the request that they should not distribute it to others, as it is only a hurried interim report. I would ask that you share it immediately with Field and Kathleen Barnes, and that you three send me individually or collectively your best reaction to the problem raised by Soviet cooperation with the I. P. R.

At this point I perhaps ought to add that I believe that the Soviet Group is going to make a very substantial contribution both to scholarship and realism in the I. P. R.

I am enclosing a copy of Miss Harriet Moore's private memorandum on the Bibliographical Service. This was written after she had listened in on the preliminary discussions which Miss Mitchell and I had with the Praesidium of the Soviet I. P. R.

Appended is a list of those who were present at the Luncheon discussion and the Afternoon Conference at Oxford. At both of these meetings the Bibliography was discussed. The attitude of those who knew Chinese and Russian was such as to convince nearly all those present as to the importance of the I. P. R. proposal. Zimmern, for example, does not know Russian, Chinese or Japanese, yet he felt that the project was of the utmost importance.

I ought to add that our colleagues in the Soviet Union will cooperate superbly in whatever plan we finally decide to inaugurate. The resources of the Soviet I. P. R. Group are very great indeed. They will be able to command the active collaboration of the principal Russian scholars throughout the Soviet Union on any plan which we finally work out which thoroughly commends itself to us and to them.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1005

Draft

20, RAZIN STREET,
Moscow, 3rd January, 1935.

MEETING OF THE PRAESIDIUM OF THE U. S. S. R. I. P. R.

Present.—V. E. Motylev
A. Kantorovitch
G. Voitinsky
Edward C. Carter
Harriet Moore
Kate Mitchell

Mr. Carter had prepared an Agenda for the Meeting, a copy of which is attached to this Report. It was agreed that the points listed should be taken up in order.

1. *Organisation of I. P. R. Conferences.*—Mr. Carter explained that the various international committees of the I. P. C. listed under item 7 on the Agenda, held their Meetings for two or three days before and after the Conference. The Conference itself is devoted entirely to education and research work. Mr. Carter then described the "Round Table" technique. He explained that at I. P. R. Conferences, papers are read by the members in advance of the Conference and that the discussion begins as soon as the Conference opens. The Conference is divided into four or five Round Table groups, with from 35 to 40 members at each. Discussions begin at 9 o'clock in the morning and ordinarily last until 12 p. m. The afternoons are given up to informal discussion amongst small groups of Conference members. The Conference meets as a whole, every two or three days, and at this time Reports are read by either the Chairman or the Secretary of each Round Table, thus enabling the Members to follow the course of discussions at Round Tables other than their own.

Mr. Motylev asked whether discussion at the Round Tables was organised.

Mr. Carter explained that each Round Table had a Chairman and a Secretary who were responsible for guiding a discussion in such a way that all points of view were presented. The object of the Round Table technique is to ensure both a free and informal discussion and at the same time to make sure that each member of a Round Table is given an opportunity to make his special contribution. In dividing the Members of the Conference among the Round Tables, the Programme Committee consults with the National Secretaries and attempts:—

(a) To see that national groups are divided equally amongst the Round Tables, and

(b) To see that the division brings together men and women of similar interests or fields of knowledge.

Every effort is made to avoid the formation of national blocs on any question under discussion. Mr. Carter explained that this description was, of course, a "Council of perfection," but that he hoped that in the next Conference the Round Tables would be organised better than they had ever been before, and that this standard of perfection would be more nearly attained than in former years.

Mr. Motylev asked how the Round Table topics were divided amongst the different groups.

Mr. Carter explained that all the Round Tables discussed the same topics at the same time. The equal division of time amongst the five Round Tables topics had not yet been decided. Presumably the first two days would be spent on topic (a) "Japanese Economic Expansion in World Markets." The next two days on "The United States Recovery Programme;" three days on the "Soviet Union"; two days on "China"; and three days on the final topic, "The Changing Balance of Political Forces in the Pacific."

Mr. Motylev expressed satisfaction with this plan of organisation. He explained that it would be something new in Russian experience but that he felt that it had a distinct advantage in that it created a chance for every member of the Conference to express his opinion on the subjects under discussion.

Mr. Motylev then discussed the points raised in the letter sent by the Secretary General to the members of the Institute from Amsterdam, December 18th, 1934. In general he was in full agreement with the provisions contained therein. With regard to the specific points, he felt that the American Consul's proposal for changing topic (e) was not sound. The Soviet Union has no special interest in Manchuria and, therefore he did not see that the question of Manchuria's status could properly be discussed in connection with the topic concerning the Soviet policy in the Far East. It might, of course, be considered in connection with the topic dealing with China, but he felt that it would be better to leave it under topic (e).

Mr. Carter said that he was very glad to have this expression of Soviet opinion.

Mr. Voitinsky said that he felt topic (e) was very well formulated and should prove valuable in summarising the problems brought out during the discussion of the first four topics.

With regard to the daily papers which the Union intends to contribute to the Conference, Mr. Motylev explained that the Council had decided to combine Nos. 4 and 5.

This paper will deal not only with the economies, but also with the political struggle in the Pacific and will therefore furnish the Soviet data for the final Round Table. Mr. Motylev raised the question as to whether the National Councils were still to be allowed to prepare an official paper as stated in the Secretary General's Memorandum of June 21st. Mr. Carter said that this provision still held good and that his December 18th Memorandum in no way superceded the

provisions of the former Memorandum. Mr. Motylev explained that the Soviet group had not decided on any additional paper, but wished to be free to contribute one if international conditions should make it necessary.

Mr. Kantorovitch added that the Soviet Council would see that a definitive list of papers were sent to the Secretariat by April 1st, 1935, and a partial list of probable Soviet members by December 1st, 1935.

2. *Interim Research Conferences.*—Mr. Motylev explained that before he could give Mr. Carter a definite answer with regard to Soviet attendance at the proposed Conference in Tokyo in April, the Soviet Council would have to discuss the question of standards of living studies with various specialists in that field. This would be done during the next few weeks and he would then send to Mr. Carter and to Mr. Holland, the Soviet Council's views on the question of possible research projects in this field within the Soviet Union. With regard to Mr. Carter's invitation to him to attend the Conference in person, Mr. Motylev explained that his teaching duties would ordinarily occupy him until June and that it might be difficult for him to leave Moscow by April 1st. He asked whether the Conference was to be a general one confined to Members from the Far Eastern countries.

Mr. Carter explained that the original plan had been for a Regional Conference, but that information which he had received while in America and Moscow had led him to feel that it was of the utmost importance that the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States should be represented there. The principal task of the Conference will be to try and work out a common methodology for all future work in the field of standards of living and for this reason it is desirable that it should be as international in character as is possible at this short notice.

Mr. Motylev said that although Soviet representation might not be possible, the Council would send a Memorandum setting forth their views on this question.

The Meeting then took up items 3 and 4 on the Agenda.

With regard to the exchange of staff, Mr. Motylev said that he was thoroughly in agreement with the principle involved. In this connection he might say that the financial aspect need not prove the handicap which Mr. Carter evidently feared. The Soviet Council could, if it desired, send students at its own expense as it had been given a certain endowment in valuta. The working out of principle might, however, take time as the Soviet Council would first have to attract research workers and students interested in the idea of such an exchange.

Mr. Kantorovitch expressed his gratitude at the invitation of the American Council for him to spend a period of months in the New York Office. It was, of course, impossible for him to accept at present, but it might be arranged at a later date.

Mr. Carter said that he understood that Mr. Kantorovitch would be very occupied in Moscow for the next few months, but that the invitation was a standing one which he hoped could be accepted later on.

Mr. Motylev expressed regret that Miss Moore had not asked for more help from the Soviet Council. He explained that his Institute had a special department for securing all necessities in the way of materials for his staff, and he hoped that Miss Moore will make full use of it. He also hoped to arrange any special consultations with experts in various fields which would be useful for Miss Moore in carrying out her proposed study. With regard to the possibility of Miss Moore visiting Buriat, Mongolia, he was a little doubtful, but promised to do everything he could to help her in arranging this, should she wish to do so. Miss Moore expressed her appreciation of this offer and explained that the reason she had not hitherto asked for more assistance was because she had been concentrating upon her study of the language and had not as yet begun much actual work on her research project.

5. *An English Edition of the Great Soviet World Atlas.*—Mr. Carter felt that it would be a very valuable contribution to the work of the I. P. R. if such an edition could be arranged, as English was the first or second language for the majority of the member countries.

Mr. Motylev promised to inform the Editorial Council of Mr. Carter's proposal and expressed the hope that a favourable decision would be possible.

6. *Language Problem.*—Mr. Carter explained that one of the most difficult problems now facing the I. P. R. was that of the language barrier amongst its different members. As one step in attacking this problem the American Council of the I. P. R., in collaboration with Harvard University, had put on a Summer School during 1934, for an intensive study of the Russian language.

This experiment had proved so successful that it is to be repeated at Columbia University in the summer of 1935. Mr. Carter also mentioned that Mrs. Barnes had consulted with Tolokonoky, the Soviet Consul-General in New York, concerning the possibility of securing a Russian instructor for the school. Tolokonoky had suggested writing direct to Arosev for his suggestions. Prince Mirsky's name had been mentioned as a possibility and Mr. Carter wished to find out from the Praesidium their reaction to this proposal. Mr. Motylev asked what the terms would be. Mr. Carter explained that Professor Patrick at the University of California had been secured for the first part of the school and that Mirsky would be requested to take the second half, from approximately July 22d to August 30th. His travelling expenses would be paid and he would receive \$800 in addition. The Praesidium appeared to feel that there was no reason why Mirsky should not be approached if it seemed advisable.

Mr. Carter next mentioned the question of Basic English, explaining that the I. P. R.'s interest in Basic was entirely as a method of learning English in a much shorter length of time. He told of his conversations with Litvinova and showed Mr. Motilev the clippings from Pravda which dealt with the matter of language teaching in the U. S. S. R. Mr. Motilev expressed great interest and promised to get into touch with Litvinova at once. He agreed that the present teaching of English in the Soviet Union was far from satisfactory and was eager to learn more about Basic as a simpler and more effective method.

7. *International Committees.*—Mr. Carter explained that the Soviet group was entitled to representation upon all the International Committees of the I. P. R. The Praesidium agreed to take up this question with the Council and to inform Mr. Carter as to their nominations for the various positions.

8. *Studies in Standards of Living and Culture.*—Under this topic the hope was merely left that, if possible, Mr. Motilov himself should attend the Research Conference in Tokyo, at which time he could convey the views of the Soviet group with regard to possible studies in this field, and that if his attendance was impossible, a memorandum embodying these views should be sent.

9. *Exchange of Books.*—This had already been worked out with Kantorovich and no further discussion appeared necessary at this time.

10. *Catalogue in Russian of all books on the Far East.*—Mr. Carter asked whether the catalogue of all books in Russian dealing with Far Eastern questions which the Soviet Council was planning was to be made available in England as well. Mr. Kantorovich explained that this would be a very expensive proposition but that the catalogue would be available in the Soviet Council office and that Miss Moore could select such items from it as she considered important for translation into English.

11. *Finance.*—Mr. Carter stated that contributions to the Pacific Council were not obligatory, but there were two factors to be considered. First, that the Pacific Council always needed money, and second, that if the Soviet Union made no financial contribution, some countries might feel that the Soviet Union was not fully taking part in the Institute's work. Mr. Carter himself, of course, did not share this feeling, but he knew that the Soviet Council would understand that such an attitude might be held.

At Mr. Motilov's request, Mr. Carter quoted the contributions which each of the National groups had given over the last few years. He also explained the financial situation of the International Research Committee and the method by which grants from the International Research field were used to stimulate local financial support for research work.

Mr. Motilev said that so far the I. P. R. had not proved itself in the Soviet Union sufficiently for him to be able to guarantee a definite financial contribution. He said, however, that it was only a question of time and not of principle; that the Soviet Council wants and can participate fully in the work of the I. P. R. and that the question of financial contribution will be discussed with all the institutions represented in the U. S. S. R. Council.

12. *Publicity.*—As an example of the type of publicity which the I. P. R. sought for its publications, Mr. Carter displayed a copy of a review of the economic handbook of the Pacific area which had appeared in the New York Times. He explained that the Institute preferred to have its work speak for itself rather than go in for more direct methods of publicity and propaganda.

13 & 14. *Chatham House Report and Report of Federation of British Industries Mission to Manchuria.*—At the request of Mr. Carter six copies of the Chatham House Annual Report had already been received by Mr. Kantorovich. A copy of the report of the F. B. I. Mission to Manchuria will be sent at once.

15. *Publication of Soviet I. P. R. studies in English.*—Mr. Kantorovich explained that the first instalment prepared by the Soviet Council should be ready for publication by June 1935, and Mr. Carter promised to take up the question of its publication with a publisher either in London or New York.

16 & 17. *Soviet Report, etc., and contribution to Pacific Affairs.*—Mr. Kantorovich promised to send a regular contribution for I. P. R. Notes, and also to get into touch directly with Mr. Lattimore on the matter of Soviet articles and reviews for Pacific Affairs. He also requested Mr. Carter to supply the Soviet office with a full set of all back numbers of Pacific Affairs.

18. *A possible bibliographical service.*—With regard to the possible bibliographical service already described by Mr. Carter, Mr. Kantorovich again expressed the opinion that what the Soviet Council would value most would be a list sent at regular intervals from America, and, if possible, from London, of what the I. P. R. groups in both countries feel are the really important books and articles on the Pacific appearing in the English language. A list of such books together with a brief descriptive comment as to which might be the most important and also such reviews as might appear in other journals, would serve their purpose adequately. It was obvious that the Praesidium felt that in a bibliographical service conducted from London or Washington by a staff that would presumably be predominantly capitalistic, it would be difficult to describe either Soviet or other books in a manner which could be regarded as objective by both communistic and capitalistic readers. It was also obvious that the Soviet Council did not welcome the idea of being grouped with China and Japan as Asiatic countries. Unless the bibliographical service included English language publications, it would not be greeted with any very enthusiastic support. It also appeared that they are not particularly impressed with the scientific quality or the indispensability of much of the literature now being published in China and Japan.

19. *Status of Aliens and Communications.*—Mr. Kantorovich reported that the Soviet Council would undertake to prepare a section for the International studies on the status of aliens and on communications in the Pacific, as requested by Mr. Carter and by the International Research Committee.

DECEMBER 30, 1934.

AGENDA

1. Organisation of I. P. R. Conferences.
2. Attendance at Tokyo Research Conference.
3. Exchange of staff and research workers.
 - (a) Invitation to Kantorovich to visit New York.
 - (b) Exchange of research workers (e. g., Miss Moore).
4. Miss Moore's research plans.
5. A request that an English edition of the new great Soviet World Atlas be considered.
6. Language problems in the I. P. R.
 - (a) Advisability of securing D. S. Mirsky for the I. P. R.-Columbia Russian Language School.
 - (b) Experiments with Basic English.
7. International Appointments:
 - (a) Pacific Council.
 - (b) National Secretary.
 - (c) Research Committee.
 - (d) Publications Committee.
 - (e) Finance Committee.
 - (f) Pacific Affairs Correspondent.
 - (g) Program Committee.
8. Studies in Standards of Living and Culture.
9. Exchange of books.
10. Catalogue in Russian of all books on the Far East.
11. Finance.
12. Publicity.
13. Chatham House Report.
14. Report of Federation of British Industries Mission to Manchuria.
15. Publication in English, in England or America, of Soviet I. P. R. studies.
16. Soviet report, quarterly, to I. P. R. Notes.
17. Regular Soviet contribution to PACIFIC AFFAIRS.
18. A possible bibliographical service.
19. Status of aliens and Communications.

EXHIBIT 1006

ON BOARD SS. "CHITRAL," *January 18, 1935.*

Miss M. E. CLEVE,
10 St. James Square, London, England.

DEAR MADGE: In looking over our notes on the Moscow visit, I have discovered that I have failed to pass on one question raised by Kantorovich. I do not know whether you have heard from him at all and, if so, whether he mentioned to you this matter.

It is this. He would like to have the Chatham House publications on the Far East and on the Pacific on an exchange basis. In addition he wanted me to inquire whether you could consider an exchange arrangement by which you would send him the more important English books on the Far East in the economic and political field in return for Soviet publications on the Soviet Far East and Pacific.

Mr. Field has arranged to send to Moscow not only everyone of the I. P. R. publications from the very beginning but in addition a substantial number of American and Canadian publications on the Far East and the Pacific. In return for these Kantorovich has already dispatched to New York a big shipment of Soviet publications. Enclosed is the list of those that have already gone.

I fully appreciate the nature of the difficulties which Sir Hageburg Wright has raised in connection with exchanges of English and Soviet publications. While I have not met him personally, I am acquainted with friends of his in London and Paris. I am told that he feels that English books of high quality are sent to Moscow and Soviet books of inferior quality are sent to London in return. Part of the difficulty is due to two different sets of values. One in Moscow, another in London. It would not be surprising to discover that some Russian scholars do not regard as final some English writing.

If you and your colleagues share Sir Hageburg's skepticism with reference to the importance of contemporary Soviet Publication, I would not advise your attempting at this stage any substantial exchange arrangement.

If, however, there is at Chatham House any considerable group of people like E. H. Carr and Miss Makower who feel that it is of the highest importance that English students acquaint themselves fully with what Soviet leaders themselves regard as important, I should advise you to explore the possibilities of a substantial measure of interchange. It may be that you will find that it will not be worth while to do this until you have on the Chatham House staff some member who not only has a mastery of the Russian language but also a mastery, through living and studying in the Soviet Union, of some one aspect of contemporary Soviet life.

I would be grateful if you would share this letter with Arnold.

Very sincerely yours,

E. C. CARTER.

Enclosure.

Copies to W. Holland, Miss Moore, and Mrs. Barnes.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

EXHIBIT No. 1007

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HONOLULU, HAWAII

SS. "CARTHAGE," *Feb. 23, 1935.*

WILLIAM HOLLAND,
123 Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai.

DEAR BILL: You have very kindly sent me a copy of your letter of Feb. 5th to Kantorovich in which you rebuked the Soviet Group for proposing the Paper by Dimantshtein.

In view of the fact that we were to meet within a fortnight, I wish to record my regret that you did not see fit to delay your rebuke until we could meet. With my colleagues of the Soviet Group I went over the proposed list of Papers for the next Conference. Without consulting me and within precisely five weeks of the Secretary General's Moscow visit you take a line that in Moscow might be

regarded as evidence of a breach between the Secretary General and his Research Secretary. No such breach exists. It is a pity to give Moscow such a false impression.

Sincerely yours,

[s] NED.

(Handwritten:) Please don't take this letter too seriously. Please hand me as soon as possible a copy of Kantorovich letter to you of Jan. 13.

EXHIBIT No. 1010

EXTRACTS FROM LETTER FROM HARRJET MOORE TO E. C. CARTER OF MARCH 20, 1935

I was glad to receive a copy of your letter to Bill Holland about the Dimanshtien paper. I understand unofficially from Harondar that the group here was rather taken aback by the letter. This matter, of course, arose over a misunderstanding in terminology, a thing for which we are really to blame, since correspondence has to be carried on in English, due to our ignorance of other languages. Here "National Policy" always means policy in regard to (minor) nationalities.

As a matter of fact, I don't understand why there is any objection to this paper, since the original list of proposed papers for the USSR group, as it appeared in the IPR Notes of October, listed a. *Economic and Social development in Siberia and the Soviet Far East*. The list that the USSR group proposed divided this group into two papers: *The first and second Five-Year plans in the Soviet Far East*, for the economic development; *The National Policy in the Soviet Far East* for the social development. It is true that they do not provide a paper on their foreign relations in the Far East, as was proposed in the original outline. That, however, could be an additional paper and need not exclude Dimanshtien's.

You did not ask me for any comments on this matter, but I am giving them for two reasons; first, because Dimanshtien, as you know, is the authority on this subject and his paper ought to be good; and, secondly, because I feel that this question has a bearing on the agenda and even more on the research problem of cultural relations (Incidentally, if it has no bearing, my Buriats also are a bit extraneous).

The next question is the "Suggestions for Round Table Agenda." As I understand it, the six points listed here would all be taken up in each of the first four major round tables, as announced in your letter of December 18th. For the fifth round table on "Changing balance of political forces in the Pacific" a different agenda would be worked out later.

I would suggest adding one or two topics under several of the headings. Under 3, *Social Policy*, I would add Social Insurance, in general. Under 4, *Foreign Trade and Tariff Policy*, I would add "Manipulation of value of currency." Perhaps this is covered by "Foreign Exchange Policy," but it should be clearly stated. Under 6, *National Defence Policy*, it would be interesting to get an idea of the meaning of "Defense," as the term is used in each country: e. g., how far U. S. defense extends to defending the Monroe Doctrine; offense as defence; etc.

Another question I would raise is in regard to the inclusion of "Class consciousness" under *Social Policy*. I think it is fair to say the USSR is the only country that has the development of class consciousness as part of its social policy. Other countries tend to foster patriotism, nationalism, or racial consciousness. I think this question is very interesting, but that some other term should be found to cover class consciousness and all the others, something that would mean "THE policy in regard to fostering some type of social psychology or mass attitude." Perhaps "Mass attitudes" would serve though it would need a certain amount of explanation.

The first three points in the agenda could be considered matters of primarily domestic importance, while the last three are directly international in their effects. In view of the fact that the topics for the round tables in your letter of December 18 emphasises the international effects of the respective national policies. I think it might be advisable to stress this in the agenda by putting under each of the last three points, 4, 5, 6, a definite topic on "International repercussions of, or reactions to, "The Foreign trade policy, Monetary policy, and Defence Policy, * * *.

EXHIBIT No. 1011

Copy for W. L. Holland.

IMPERIAL HOTEL,
Tokyo, May 4, 1935.

Dr. V. E. MOTYLEV,
20 Razin Street, Moscow.

DEAR DR. MOTYLEV: This is to confirm our recent interchange of cables as follows:

"Tokyo, April 22nd.

"Cable whether coming Orient if so dates arriving China, Japan."

"Moscow, April 23rd.

"Trip Soviet Far East definitely scheduled June. Possibility visiting China, Japan, Korea decided late May. In case positive decision arriving July."

The object of this letter is to inquire whether, in the event of your visiting China, Japan, and Korea, you would like me to arrange for Mr. W. L. Holland to meet you on or about the 1st of July, either in Peiping, Dairen, or Changchun (Hsinking). Mr. Holland is writing to Kanterovitch at this time very fully with reference to the recommendations which we are passing on to the National Councils in the light of the discussions at the Tokyo conference. They involve a substantial change in the program as adopted at Banff. In addition to the correspondence between Holland and Kantorovitch it would facilitate cooperation between the Pacific Council and the Soviet Council if it were possible for Mr. Holland to meet you personally. Among others there would be three advantages in such a meeting; 1) mutual acquaintance between yourself and Holland, and discussion of the I. P. R. research program, 2) you could tell Mr. Holland of the latest developments in the U. S. S. R. I. P. R., 3) Mr. Holland could assist in putting you in touch with I. P. R. and other leaders in China and Japan so as to make your visits as fruitful as possible from the point of view both of the I. P. R. and of the other purposes you have in mind in coming to the Far East.

If you are not able to visit China and Japan but would like to have Mr. Holland spend a couple of days with you, he could meet you either at Manchouli or Vladivostok on or about the fifth of July.

If you desire it Mr. Holland would be glad to spend a week with you in the first half of July either in China, Manchuria, the Soviet Far East, or Japan. It would be a tremendous education for Holland to have the privilege of meeting you. I realize, however, that your engagements in the Soviet Far East may make such a meeting impossible.

As you know, I shall be in Honolulu from May 22nd to June 3rd. Would you please cable me, CARTER, INPAREL, HONOLULU, as soon as possible after my arrival in Honolulu as to whether you would like to have Holland meet you, and, if so, when and where.

Holland himself has to leave Yokohama for Honolulu on either July 9th or July 19th. He can easily stay in the Far East until July 19th if this permits of meeting you. He is transferring his Far Eastern headquarters from Tokyo to Shanghai at the end of this month. His forwarding address throughout June will be % The China Institute of Pacific Relations, 123 Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai; cables; HOLLAND, INPAREL, SHANGHAI.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1012

Copy for Miss Austern.

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Mass., 10th September, 1935.

Dr. V. E. MOTILEV,
20, Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR DR. MOTILEV: You will be receiving a formal acknowledgment from Mr. F. C. Atherton, the Treasurer in Honolulu, of the Soviet Council's very generous contribution of \$2,000 (American) to the budget of the Pacific Council. I want,

however, to add my own personal and official thanks, through you, to the Soviet Council, for this substantial aid in financing the international work of the I. P. R. It means a great deal, that the newest of the national member groups should make so generous a contribution within a year of its formation.

With kindest personal regards,
I am, sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1013

MOSCOW—MEETING IN MOTYLEV'S OFFICE, 12-2:30

MARCH 31, 1936.

Present: Motylev, Harondar, Carter, Lattimore, Moore, Tyler, Donaldson.

To be discussed at a future conference: The Administrative problems of the I. P. R., and the problems of the Pacific Area.

Motylev said that he would arrange conversations with individuals who were primarily interested in Mongolia, for Mr. Lattimore in particular; and the Far East in general, for Mr. Carter.

Lattimore wanted to see all the reports and books on Mongolia available. Motylev stated that these were almost entirely in Russian, but if some could be found in Mongolian these would be produced for Lattimore, otherwise Moore could help L. with the Russian texts.

Motylev said that his report was ready for the Yosemite conference, and that he had collected immense wealth of material. All reports Harondar would translate.

Exchange of Literature.—Carter requested that more literature be sent to New York dealing with the internal development of the Soviet Union.

Pacific Affairs to be discussed at a future conference.

Organisational questions.—Questions were to be formulated to be answered at a future conference, in conversation not in writing.

Motylev said that he was ready to discuss contradictions and interrelations in the Pacific, Britain's role in the Pacific, etc.

Carter desired that his staff should have the Atlas shown and explained to them.

German-Japanese alliance.—Motylev stated that a German-Japanese alliance was only feasible from a military point of view. Japan could not possibly hope to wage a war against the Soviet Union single-handed. Germany is strong in the air, Japan is not. From an economic standpoint the alliance is ridiculous. Neither party can expect to gain anything. Both are deficient in raw materials, both export finished goods. In fact, they are economic rivals.

Soviet Far East industrialization was predetermined and inevitable without Japanese aggression. Naturally since 1931 it has been influenced by military considerations. The direction remains the same, but the tempo has changed. Japanese action has necessitated acceleration.

EXHIBIT No. 1014

MAY 18, 1936.

ECC from FVF:

In reply to your letter of May 12th regarding the allocation of Harriet Moore's services to the Pacific Council for the next year or two, the matter rests of course almost entirely with her. The work which the American Council would like her to do would, I think, fit easily into your own plan for using her. Specifically, she is now at work on the translation of Kantorovich's book on American policy in China, in collaboration with Kathleen Barnes. We would like to have this job finished as soon as possible. She is also engaged in the preparation of an article for the FAR EASTERN SURVEY scheduled for publication at the end of June or early in July. We would of course also like to have this job completed. We would further like to have her contribute occasionally to the FAR EASTERN SURVEY during the next year or two, and we would like to feel somewhat free in asking her cooperation on the various things in which she is a specialist.

But all these projects, as I have mentioned, fit as well into your scheme of things as into ours, so that I cannot see that it makes a great deal of difference to us whether she carries on under your banner or under ours. One additional fact

should be mentioned, namely that the American Council probably cannot afford the luxury of two Russian experts, and we would welcome having the Pacific Council take over the services of one of them.

EXHIBIT No. 1015

COUNCIL OF THE USSR,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
20, Razin Street, Moscow, June 11, 1936.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd Street, New York.

DEAR CARTER: I take this opportunity to express once more my regret that I was not able, as promised, to send you our recommendations for the modification of the Yosemite agenda to London. This delay was caused by the absence from Moscow of several members of our Council which prevented us from arranging a general meeting of the Council for the discussion and approval of these amendments.

Bearing in mind that because of the short time left at your disposal you would not be able to communicate our comments to other member countries, we decided to confine them exclusively to Round Table programme No. 3 (Economic Development and Nationality Policy of the Soviet Union).

We would offer the following suggestions:

(1) We proposed to omit entirely from Round Table No. 3 agenda item 29; or, at least, to reformulate it radically. The original wording ("privations suffered by the entire population under the First 5 Year Plan") reminds one of the unfair anti-soviet statements one can still find in some foreign papers. We are confident that you would prefer to avoid the unfavourable impression which would inevitably be produced here should such a statement appear in a questionnaire published by a serious scientific organization.

(2) Item 30 should read: "the peasants as compared to the proletariat; collective farmers as compared to individual farmers" instead of "opposed." The use of the word "opposed" could result in an absolutely wrong conception of the situation which in no way corresponds to the actual relations between the peasantry and the proletariat in the U. S. S. R.

(3) In item 40 (page 21 IPR NOTES) the question "If so, would she be willing to and would the other powers allow her to?" should be omitted. Reply to such a question could naturally not be given by the Soviet delegation and it is up to the delegates of corresponding countries to answer it.

(4) We consider unnecessary the inclusion of item 44 as all questions treated therein are covered fully by the two preceding items.

(5) In items 40 and 45 the relations between the USSR and Sinkiang are presented as a special separate problem. These relations should really be discussed simultaneously with Sino-Soviet relations as a whole.

(6) Referring to item 46, we were surprised to see that the Soviet nationality policy could be characterized as "offensive." The application of this term seems so irrelevant that we would prefer not to see it in the agenda.

(7) It would seem more feasible to transfer discussion of item 47 to Round Table No. 1 (USA). The same refers to item 49. The problems covered should be discussed in Round Table No. 5.

These are the essential minimum changes which, we believe, should be introduced into the agenda.

At the same time I would like to point out that in our estimation the programme of discussion in Round Table No. 5 does not give adequate consideration to the problem of determining the aggressor in the Pacific. On the contrary, some of the questions are evidently intended to present this problem in a form as vague and indefinite as possible. As an example, question No. 4 could be indicated.

Once more I repeat that to my regret I am not in the position to offer our criticism of other Round Table topics as I perfectly realize that before introducing any change you would have to communicate with the respective countries, which is impossible in view of the short time left.

Sincerely yours,

Motylev,
V. E. MOTYLEV.

EXHIBIT No. 1016

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 18, 1936.

Unofficial and Confidential.

DEAR CARTER: Referring to your letter of July 8.

It was a pleasure to me to see you and to make the appointments which you requested in connection with your recent visit to Washington.

With regard to the question which you ask in relation to the text of a mimeographed memorandum on Far Eastern policy a copy of which you enclose:

First of all a bit of narrative. Early in April I attended, by invitation, a luncheon where foreign policy was to be under discussion. I was seated beside a very intelligent woman whom I met for the first time who is active in the work of women's clubs. In the course of our conversation this woman asked whether I had seen a memorandum which was being circulated by the "Cause and Cure of War", on American Far Eastern policy. I said that I had not. She produced from her pocketbook a copy of the memorandum to which she referred, with which the copy you give me now is identical. I glanced through that copy and remarked on the fact and that she considered it outrageous that such materials were circulated thus anonymously; she went on to say that she had received this paper along with a number of other papers in an envelope of materials sent her from the office of the Cause and Cure of War in New York, and that she thought that all the other papers had some indication of source or authorship or both. She inquired whether I considered the presentation given in this memorandum of our Far Eastern policy in its actuality a fair presentation; also whether I would care to express myself (to her) with regard to the suggestions offered in the latter part of the text.

In the light of the above, you will realize that it is very interesting to me to have the account which you give of the origin of this document. You do not ask the same questions which were asked of me on the occasion to which I refer; and I shall not now make the same comments that I made (to her) at that time. You state, however, that now you and Mr. Field would like to have from me "a full personal criticism of this statement"; and you expressly ask, "To what extent does the . . . statement represent various schools of thought now current in the United States?"

Before addressing myself to this request and enquiry, may I take the liberty of making the observation that any attempt which I might make to respond to the request of criticism of the statement under reference would in my opinion be of far greater value to all concerned had the enquiry and the response been made before the memorandum was circulated—in January 1936. I believe that it is regarded as axiomatic that when statements have been made and there are later made statements in criticism or correction thereof, the latter never catch up with the former.

I am sure that both you and Mr. Field must realize that it is not possible for me to discuss Far Eastern policy or statements made with regard thereto on a purely "personal" basis. I am in an official position; I am an official; I have as an official some knowledge of and constant connection with the question of American Far Eastern policy; and I cannot separate what I learn, what I know and what I think as an official (and in relation to public matters) from what I know and what I think as a private person. It does not seem to me that any very useful purpose would be served by my attempting—especially at this time—to set down in writing something purporting to be a "personal" criticism of the statement of policy under reference. Moreover, I have reached that point (age?) where the exercise of criticism gives no pleasure and little if any gratification; and, in addition, "life is short" and there is paucity of time, I shall, nevertheless, take time and make an effort to make some comments—because you ask it and because I hope that it may be helpful.

To begin with, let's forget the authorship and the circumstances of origin of the memorandum. Let me treat the matter wholly impersonally and on the basis solely of what appears in the memorandum.

To the express question asked in the last sentence of your letter, quoted above, I can answer readily that the statement seems to me clearly to set forth what are the concepts and views of some "schools" of thought now current in the United States. Going further, I may say that it does *not*, in my opinion, accurately portray or adequately take account of the reasoning, the conclusions and the courses of action of the American Government (whether in the past or now).

The author sets out to state, "First, what our Far Eastern policy actually is."

In that connection, in the first paragraph he makes it appear that the building up of our Navy is intended "to make enforcement" of our policy "possible in the future." He makes it appear that it is a part of our policy to "maintain" equal trading opportunities for all foreigners in China and to "maintain" China's territorial and administrative integrity. I am not aware that it is the thought or intent of the American Government to "enforce" its views or to "maintain" a particular situation in the Far East. It has been, it is, and I think it will continue to be the policy of the *United States* to pursue in and with regard to the Far East *objectives* similar to or identical with those which it pursues in other parts of the world. Important among these objectives are enjoyment by American nationals, American ships, and American trade of equal opportunities and fair and nondiscriminatory treatment; and, enjoyment by free peoples of rights of sovereignty and independence within the territories which are theirs. But—to *seek* and to *advocate* constantly the acceptance and application of certain principles is one thing; to *insist* (up to and by threat or use of force) upon the application of those principles is quite another thing.

The *primary* purpose of the present building up of the American Navy is, as I understand it, not to enforce upon others the views of this country or of the existing Administration but to diminish the likelihood of resort by others to methods and instruments of force in such assaults upon American nationals or interests as, if made, would tend to lead to war; and, if war should come, to ensure as far as possible against hostilities being brought to our own shores or onto our own soil and against a final victory over us by the armed forces of the assaulting nation. In other words, the naval program is designed for the purpose of *keeping this country out of war*. (There are, of course, and there can be differences of opinion with regard to the efficacy of armament as an instrument or agency for keeping its possessor out of war. There is less room for difference with regard to the soundness, in the event of war, of the view cited by Voltaire that "God is always on the side of the heaviest battalions.")

The author's treatment of the subject of our Far Eastern policy makes it appear that he considers that the activities of the American Government in and with regard to the Far East have been and are directed almost entirely and almost exclusively to the protection and promotion of American *business interests*. This is, in my opinion, altogether too narrow a concept. American policy and American action in and with regard to the Far East have for more than a century revolved around and been concerned with at least three things: protection and promotion of American trade*; protection and promotion of American cultural efforts and influences (especially in the field of missionary activities—evangelistic, educational, philanthropic, etc.); and advancement of certain political concepts which prevail among the American people, especially the concept that independent nations have the right to remain independent and that international relations should be regulated by processes of discussion and agreement rather than processes of war.

It is by no means certain that "China remains one of the greatest, if not the greatest, future market of American commodities and capital."

It is absolutely erroneous, in my opinion, to say that, "Traditional American Far Eastern policy is based strictly on commercial interests. The present Far Eastern policy of the Government is ultimately based on nothing more nor less than commercial interests." American Far Eastern policy, in line with American foreign policy in general, has rested and still rests on a far broader basis than merely that of "commercial interest", trade, or investments.

Not accepting, as you can see very clearly that I do not, the author's account of what the policy of the United States "actually is," I feel that it would be futile for me to discuss the suggestions which he makes for change of policy. I may say, however, that I do not regard the building up of the Navy or the maintenance in Far Eastern waters of American ships (and at some points in China of small contingents of American landed forces) or the development of American aviation in the Pacific Ocean as intended "to defend American imperialistic interests in the Far East" or for "the military protection of American investments and business abroad."

The subject under discussion is too big for compression into any satisfactory discussion within the limits of the seven pages of the memorandum under reference or the limits of a letter such as I am now taking time to write. No one can, in my opinion, say in a *few* words and categorically what American policy is,

*And, of course, protection of the lives and various rights (general) of American nationals.

than to avoid disseminating statements which, purporting to be statements of what it *is*, declare it to be that which it *is not*.

It is the policy and the effort of the American Government in any administration to safeguard and promote the interests of the United States. In different administrations and at different moments there will be differences in methods resorted to and instrumentalities employed; but by and large each administration reflects the fundamental thought and attitude of the American people. Are the American people solicitously interested in the idea of protection by their Government to the *n*th degree of American "business interests" in the Far East? Do they desire, would they support resort by this country to arms to "enforce" the principle of the "open door" in China or to "maintain" China's administrative or territorial integrity? Our Far Eastern policy is a part of our foreign policy in general. We use certain *methods* and certain instruments in connection with certain problems and certain situations in the Far East because those problems and situations are peculiar. But the *objectives* of our action in that connection are neither peculiar nor unique. And a changing of the methods and the instrumentalities would by no means signify or effect an alteration of the objectives.

I am going to give you for your and Mr. Field's confidential information a copy (herewith enclosed) of a memorandum which I wrote sometime ago which relates to one part of our many problems in connection with the general question of operations or course of action in connection with the Far East. When you have perused this, *please be so good as to return the copy to me*. You may make of the thoughts expressed in it any use which you may see fit short of quoting it with any attribution as to source. If you really care to make a careful study of what I believe to be the essential principles of our foreign policy, I shall be glad to send you upon request therefor, for your confidential consideration, a copy of the talk which I gave at the Army War College last December on that subject.

With cordial regards and all best wishes—always, I am,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) STANLEY K. HORNBECK.

Enclosure: Memorandum.

EXHIBIT No. 1017

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, 19th October 1936.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
New York City.

DEAR FRED: This morning I received your round-robin with the copy of Alsberg's important letter of October 8th to Holland and Holland's letter of comment to you of October 13th. I agree heartily with Alsberg that it would be a grand thing for the IPR if it got into the position not of asking the S. S. R. C. for funds but of telling it where it ought to head in in research.

Of the various proposals before me I would personally be inclined to put in the first category Holland's proposal with reference to the economic and political status of the Philippines and your own with reference to the American Navy in the Pacific. How the other questions were rated and broken up you and your colleagues, Alsberg and Holland, should determine better than I. One problem is to get questions into manageable proportions. If the continuation of Remer's work could be done without too great an expenditure it would clear up several important questions. The study of American shipping and shipping policies is of considerable importance and if the study of this problem went ahead concurrently with the study of the American Navy each might throw a little light on the other.

Of course a full length study of the American Stake in the Far East is a major item on the agenda of the American Council. If a very able far-reaching scholar could be put to work on this problem by the S.S.R.C. he would profit enormously by the work that you have already done and might add substantially by way of verification and supplement.

I am all for going ahead at the full steam with Alsberg's excellent suggestion and I am glad that you and Alsberg and Holland have the framing of the project in hand.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER,

Copies: Alsberg
Holland

EXHIBIT No. 1018

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, 5th January, 1937.

DR. STANLEY K. HORNBECK,
State Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR HORNBECK: A temporary member of the Institute's International Secretariat is making for us at this time a study of Germany's position in the Far East. In connection with his studies he has run across the question of the German-Japanese Alliance, news of which was published in Moscow, Paris, Shanghai and Budapest in the first part of 1919 as having been concluded in Stockholm in 1918. Most of the news items trace back to a message in cipher which it was stated was sent by Major Slaughter of the United States Army from Siberia to Washington. According to these dispatches Major Slaughter was an observer with the Allied Intervention Forces in Siberia and got the Treaty and a note on the occasion of the occupation of Perm by Admiral Kolchak.

I do not know whether you are in a position to answer any of the questions which my colleague wishes me to put, but, if you can answer any or all of them, I shall be grateful. Here they are:—

a. General Graves mentions Major Slaughter but does not describe his duties, particularly while at Perm. Do you know what these were.

b. Did Major Slaughter really send a message in cipher regarding the alleged German-Japanese Treaty? If so, from what place and by what cable service?

c. Did Major Slaughter ever report as to how he got the document? Were there any middlemen involved, for example, Chinese or White Russians, or did he find the document himself?

d. Was the original document sent subsequently to Washington? If so, in what form was it and in what language?

e. Reports in Paris, perhaps circulated by the Chinese Delegation to the Peace Conference, state that the document was a part of a correspondence between the Soviet Government and the Soviet Ambassador to Berlin. Is there any explanation of why the document was left in Perm by the Soviets? Did Major Slaughter give any evidence to the effect that the Bolsheviks left the document in Perm by design?

f. When Senator Lodge on July 15, 1919, inserted the dispatches regarding the Treaty in the United States Senate Documents was there any formal protest made by the Japanese Embassy in Washington? Did the State Department have any answer sent to Senator Lodge or to the Senate regarding the authenticity of the Treaty?

g. Is it known whether Senator Lodge was in possession of any other information besides these dispatches of which the United States Government also had knowledge? For example, was Major Slaughter back from Siberia and was he permitted to give information to Senator Lodge or to other private persons?

Do the files on the matter give any evidence as to whether Senator Lodge discussed the matter formally and directly either with the United States Army or with the Department of State?

h. If there are any clippings or references in your files relating to the matter, would it be possible for you to have someone in your office send us the titles and dates to aid in our study of this question?

I do not know whether any of these questions are out of order, but I know you will not hesitate to let me know which, if any, of the questions you are in a position to answer.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Handwritten:) Unofficial.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 30, 1937.

E. C. CARTER, Esquire,
Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, New York.

DEAR CARTER: Referring to your letter of January 5 laying before me, on behalf of an unnamed temporary member of the Institute's International Secretariat, certain questions,—

I am able to give informally answers to some of the questions as follows:

(a) Major Slaughter, formerly Assistant Military Attaché in Russia, was assigned to duty with the Siberian Expeditionary Force in September 1918. General Graves immediately directed Major Slaughter to proceed wherever necessary in Siberia to maintain contact with both Czech and Russian Headquarters, and to keep the American Commanding Officer informed in regard to developments. Major Slaughter was in effect Liaison Officer and Military Observer with both Czech and Russian Armies as General Graves' representative for the United States Army from September 1918 until January 1920.

(b) In November 1918, probably about November 20, a Bolshevik Commissar, well known to Major Slaughter, informed him that such a treaty was known to exist and that the treaty and all pertinent facts had been published in the "Rote Fahn," communist publication of Hamburg, on or about November 8, 1918, and that it would also be published in the Moscow *Izvestiya* immediately. A few weeks later, probably about December 20, the same Commissar informed Major Slaughter that he had been to Moscow and showed Major Slaughter a copy of the *Izvestiya* containing the alleged treaty but declined to surrender the paper. On the capture of Perm, Major Slaughter proceeded at once to that place to go over the copies of the *Izvestiya* required by law to be kept in court and public offices. Copies were made under court direction and given to Major Slaughter. Because Major Slaughter declared this news dispatch to have little or no value, the Commissar stated that he would secure photostat copies of the treaty. Early in February 1919, the Commissar showed what purported to be a photostat copy of the treaty in German and in Japanese. There was also said to be an unofficial initialed copy in French. The Commissar declined to surrender the copy without substantial payment, and in view of lack of authentication Major Slaughter declined to purchase the copy.

An interpreter, who translated the alleged treaty as published in *Izvestiya*, later, on arrival in Peking, gave a copy to a North China newspaper, and this was published with many apparent factual details intended to give weight to the story of the existence of the alleged treaty.

(c) No.

(d) Answered above.

(e) Answered above.

(f) Question.

(g) No. No. Question.

(h) Question.

You will note that I have not attempted to answer those portions of questions (f), (g) and (h) which relate to the Department's files. A preliminary examination of the files indicates that we have not a great amount of material on the subject of this alleged treaty; also, that publicity of one kind or another was given at many points in Europe, at the time, to stories with regard to the alleged treaty. In view of the fact that the whole matter seems to have rested on foundations of mere affirmation and allegation, I am reluctant to ask that anyone in the Department give much time to a study of it. It is clear that the Department did not give credence to the stories that such a treaty had been concluded.

Could you give me an exact reference to the U. S. Senate document or documents in which "Senator Lodge on July 15, 1919, inserted the dispatches regarding the Treaty"?

It should be understood, of course, that, in any use which may be made of the information given above, there should be made neither reference to nor attribution to the Department of State or the undersigned.

With all best wishes, I am,

Yours sincerely,

STANLEY K. HORNBECK.

EXHIBIT No. 1019

COUNCIL OF THE U. S. S. R.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Moscow, January 15, 1937.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York.

DEAR CARTER: First of all I want to thank you for sending us the manuscript of the Soviet chapter of "PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC 1936." Having carefully studied its contents I note with satisfaction that in general it renders a correct summary of the discussion at the Conference. In view of that I was quite surprised to read the first preliminary paragraph. This literary introduction to the subject is so queer, not to say offensive, that I simply cannot make up my mind to see how a statement of that kind could be incorporated in the report. I sincerely believe that the author intended to say something different. I would request you to omit it altogether and begin the chapter from the second paragraph as the first one is entirely inadmissible from the viewpoint of the Soviet Council.

Passing to our comments on the report as such, I would like to offer the following suggestions:

For the purpose of permitting the readers a more objective and comprehensive study of the problems involved we believe it would be desirable to introduce some corrections and additions:

(1) To begin with, I would request you, insofar as possible, to quote my statements instead of rendering their summary. This does in no way mean that we are discontented with the summary as given in the report, but we would rather prefer to see those statements printed in full as we believe them to be of significance as a matter of principle.

(2) Every time mention is made of separate statements made in Round Tables, the manuscript invariably refers to "an English member," "an American member" and so forth. We fully realize that the disclosure of the names of those who participated in Round Table discussion might unfavourably affect the frankness of their statements at future Conferences. However, we believe it is possible and would well serve our common purposes if some discrimination was introduced here for stressing the importance of the statements made by the heads of the delegations. This could easily and conveniently be done by saying "a leading member of the British delegation," or "a distinguished American member," etc. In particular we believe it would be necessary to resort to such a method of stressing the importance of some statements on pages 20-22 of the manuscript covering the German-Japanese alliance.

(3) Two further remarks are of utmost importance from our viewpoint. The first concerns the German-Japanese agreement. On page 21 of the manuscript it is stated that "the French members were only partially satisfied with the Japanese denial of the existence of such a treaty, since it did not extend to the future possibilities." As you probably remember, Mr. Sarraut's second statement was followed by Mr. Yoshizawa taking the word for the second time and saying that he did not admit such an agreement could be concluded even in future. We believe this second statement should be included in the report for the purpose of adequate presentation of such an important problem. This would also throw light on the existence of difference of opinion on the same question between members of the delegation of one and the same country; while in Moscow, you mentioned this was one of the main objectives of I.P.R. Conferences. In this particular case this would be of primary importance as it would reveal the fact that there are influential circles in Japan, which are not agreeing with the aggressive attitude in Japan's foreign policy.

(4) The second remark concerns Mr. Takayanagi's statements. We believe it would be essential to include Mr. Takayanagi's outburst and our full reply (my statement at Round Table "B" session on Aug. 19), of course excluding

those parts of the latter which were presented on the preceding pages of the report. As a result the two different trends in Japanese public opinion—a manifestation of which could also be found, as you know it, in the statements of the Japanese delegates—would be embodied, at least superficially, in the report. On the other hand this would be an explanation of the firm reply given by the Soviet delegation to Mr. Takayanagi, and would at the same time supply an answer to the question as to the reasons justifying the location of considerable Soviet forces in the Far East. Otherwise the report is offering no answer to this question.

(5) On page 24, where my words are extensively quoted, a sentence concerning Germany has been omitted. I would request you to include it.

(6) I would further like to direct your attention to two more items. On page 2 of the manuscript we read about "the absence of expansionist tendencies in the Soviet Union in the immediate future." Insofar as I can remember the words "near future" have been mentioned at the Conference in connection with Soviet exports and not with eventual war. A mention of these words in a different connection might be misleading.

The second remark concerns our understanding of classless society as presented on page 3 of the manuscript. The report failed to convey a correct interpretation of our idea. Instead it would be much better to quote paragraphs 4, 11, and 12 of the new Soviet Constitution.

(7) Moreover, I have a number of suggestions to offer purely concerning the matter of wording.

On page 7 instead of the words "socialists maintain" we should have: "Soviet delegates maintain."

On page 10 the sentence: "One should call the U. S. S. R. a directed rather than a planned economy" is of no real importance from the viewpoint of the report as such. However, it is absolutely inadmissible to Soviet representatives. The Soviet economy is a socialist economy and the above sentence, as we understand it, confuses a socialist economy with fascist methods of directing national economy. As you perhaps remember, this has been specially emphasized by Comr. Stalin in his interview given to Roy Howard. I think that the report would in no way suffer if that sentence were simply eliminated.

On page 11 we find reference to the "so-called dumping" "disturbing certain markets." It seems to me that the use of such misleading words is hardly feasible.

On page 18, when speaking about commodities the U. S. S. R. would have to secure abroad, I would like you to add that we had in mind such commodities "as for example bananas."

On page 26 (second line from the bottom) it seems to me that my own words are attributed to the Japanese delegate.

On page 36 I found traces of considerable hesitation on the part of the editor as to the manner in which Mr. Lattimore should be presented to the reader. We would find no objection to his being called "an outstanding expert on Mongolian problems."

On page 32 (last lines) my statement to the effect that China should be allowed to work out its own destiny without foreign interference is badly located. An impression could be thereby created that my statement was directed against collective security, which of course is absurd. Please have this statement of mine transferred to some other place or omit it entirely.

On page 43 it is stated that "the U. S. S. R. thought it possible to accept this offer and agreed to create a *demarkation commission*." This is probably a bad misprint, as in the statement I issued on this problem, which has been handed to the Secretariat in writing, I used the word "*redemarkation*." As you know, we consider this difference to be politically of essential importance. I would like the editor of the book to bear this in mind.

On page 45 terrorist activities of certain Japanese fascist officers are referred to as related to Marxian ideology. This is such an unbelievable libel, that nothing more absurd could be invented. You will greatly oblige me by eliminating this passage. I believe this could be done easily as the corresponding words are not quoted but rendered in the form of a summary.

Finally, I would suggest to supplement the report by an appendix, in which be printed the main statements of the Chairman of delegations presented at plenary sessions; it would be worth while to include the most interesting pronouncements of other leading delegates (for example Mr. Bisson's) at the same sessions. I believe that such a supplement would be of real value to serious students of the problems of the Pacific.

I have to stress here that under no circumstances would I want to create any kind of inconvenience to you in connection with adopting my suggestions outlined in items (2), (3) and (4). Will you kindly accept them in that case only if that can be done without any difficulties or complications. *However, I would insist on eliminating altogether the introductory paragraph on page 1, as I believe this is quite necessary.*

As a whole I note with considerable satisfaction that the present report is *very favorably differing from that published in I. P. R. NOTES.* From the political viewpoint, the standard of presentation of all questions is *high and they are objectively interpreted.*

I am awaiting with great interest the publication of this volume.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) V. E. Motylev
V. E. MOTYLEV.

EH

P. S. (handwritten) Manuscript herewith returned. G. H.

EXHIBIT No. 1020

ECC

EXTRACT FROM LETTER DATED SAN FRANCISCO, APRIL 18, 1935, OWEN LATTIMORE
TO CATHERINE PORTER

I find around here that the knowing Mr. John Thompson of the San Francisco Daily News has an explanation of the Moscow trials which is widely accepted. It is simply that Stalin is getting rid of all the people "who knew him when" so as to monopolize control of the political machine. To me this simply does not make sense because even from the little I know of the personalities of 1917, 1918, it is clear that a number of the people who have since come to be classified as Old Bolsheviks did not properly belong to the famous closely welded core of the Communist Party. On the contrary, many of them were radicals who belonged to the fringe of the Party and many of them had already been known for years of obstinate partisans of one or another variant theory.

As a reader, I should like to find a good article on the Who's Who of the Old Bolsheviks, sorting out who was really a close follower of Lenin and who was a more or less loosely harnessed sidekick whom only Lenin's genius could keep pulling in the traces. As an editor, I don't know whether I should prompt anyone to write such an article at the present time.

EXHIBIT No. 1021

JANUARY 15, 1937.

DEAR MR. CARTER: In re the Hazard article, I would say that he has done a fine job. In answer to your questions specifically, I think:

- a. His account is very thorough and well documented.
- b. His article in no way reveals his point of view. He is presenting the Soviet analysis, with no apologies or comments. His article, however, does reveal a thorough understanding of the theory of Marxism. This means nothing in particular, since no student in a Soviet field is permitted to escape without this.
- c. I likewise do not think it possible to judge much about his imaginative qualities from this article, as it is a straight-forward factual account. I think the article is quite well arranged, and, except for unavoidable condensation of large fields of law, it is written in a comprehensible and easy-reading style. I may be a poor judge of this, however, as at the moment I am extremely interested in the subject.

Thank you for sending me the reprint, as I might not have taken the time to read it, just from its title. I will appreciate your sending me any other articles on the Soviet Union that you happen to see in out-of-the-way places.

In re Richard's letter to Motylev: I wonder if it might not also be suggested that Richard find out how a decision is reached in the U. S. S. R. to translate foreign books and whether there is some one institution where we should send our books immediately with this purpose in mind.

Motylev is likely to raise the whole question of getting Soviet material published abroad. Insofar as we have anything to say on this point, I hope we

will remind him that the question of editing Soviet translations is of paramount importance to us, if we are to sponsor any such publications. If we should make any arrangements with them about this, I expect we will run into difficulty on this point. Perhaps Motylev's experience in regard to the Data Papers has shown him what we mean. He is not unaware of the work we had to put in on them, and he also probably knows that it did improve them.

I would not be surprised if Motylev wanted to know more about how and why the proceedings were written as they were. This is just a matter of information but I think Richard had better be prepared for it.

In that letter I sent you from Harondar you will see some indication of the type of question he may ask. It might be a good idea for Bill to write him about the general principles on which it is done, to save Richard the explanation.

Incidentally, I don't think that Motylev will be particularly helpful in regard to increasing the circulation of our books in the USSR. It might be a good idea if Richard asked to be put in touch with the institution which handles the import of foreign books. He might be more successful in dealing directly with them, as they are the ones who publish lists, etc. and keep in touch with all the libraries. Moreover, I think that it is through them that all purchases must be made and it might be possible to establish some sort of an agency with them, as they are the ones who publish lists, etc., and keep in touch with sort of thing. He might also try to see the main libraries, such as the Communist Academy Library, which have special funds for the purchase of foreign books.

You probably have heard that in the last Tikhii Okean there is an article by Voitinsky on the conference and on Whyte's article. If you don't know the contents I could make you an outline, or a translation, as you prefer. There is also an article by Motylev in Pravda on the position of Japanese workers and peasants as revealed in the big Mitsubishi book.

I will be in the ARI office Saturday morning, if you want to talk to me about any of these things. At the moment I can't think of anything else which Motylev might ask Richard.

HARRIET.

EXHIBIT No. 1022

"ROMM WIDELY KNOWN IN U. S. FOR PEACE EFFORTS

"Vladimir Romm, who has 'confessed' that he was the contact man between the Trotskyite conspirators in Russia and Trotsky himself, is widely known to the press fraternity in the United States and was an active participant at the Institute of Pacific Relations conference at Yosemite last summer.

"Mr. Romm's confession of personal participation in something which never happened and in which it would have been physically impossible for him to have played the part to which he has confessed," said Chester H. Rowell, editor of The Chronicle, who was a delegate to the Yosemite meeting, 'is only one more chapter in the unsolved mystery of these Russian conspiracy trials.'

"Romm, with his colleague, Dr. V. E. Motylev, famous geographer and director of the Institute of the Great Soviet World Atlas, had an important part in the conference at Yosemite, said Rowell.

"These two,' he said, 'were probably the hardest-working members of the institute, laboring with documents far into the night and frequently all night.

"On account of his better knowledge of English, the brunt of the running discussions in the round tables fell on Romm, though the major written statements were usually made by Motylev.

"Romm collaborated in their preparation. He made brilliant analyses of the Soviet economic and governmental structure, and defended with the orthodox arguments even the ambiguous provisions for the freedom of the press in the new Soviet constitution. He was an accomplished linguist, speaking Russian, German, French, English, and Japanese, and an extremely capable newspaper man.

"I first worked with Mr. Romm in Japan, where I learned to know him as a newspaperman who I lived up to the highest standards of his profession

"Personally, from many contacts with him, some of them close and continued, all over the world, I became very fond of Romm.'

"Rowell described Romm as one of the most important Soviet foreign correspondents and much the best known in America. He formerly represented 'Tass', the Russian Associated Press, first in Europe and later in Japan. He was then transferred to America as the Washington correspondent of the Moscow 'Izvestia,' of which Karl Radek, another of the 'confessed' conspirators, has long been editor.

"Romm was the first Russian observer accredited to the Institute of Pacific Relations at its conference in Kyoto, Japan, in 1929, and was one of the two regular delegates at the institute conference at Yosemite. He also reported the national conventions of the two parties last summer and commented to friends that the procedure in Russia was far more democratic and less steam-rolled than these American conventions."

(Source: San Francisco Chronicle, January 1, 1937, p. 2.)

EXHIBIT No. 1023

STANFORD, Feb. 10, 1937.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd St., New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have gone over all Motilev's revisions and find I am in full agreement with all the changes you and Harriet suggest. I'm sorry about the misunderstanding over the opening para. I did not realize that Harriet desired and expected it to be left out. I certainly have no objection to omitting it.

I agree entirely to having Motilev's reply to Takayanagi quoted directly and fully in Harriet's chapter, and footnoted to the Takayanagi statement in Chapter II. I am reluctant to give the Takayanagi statement in direct quotation as I had to reconstruct his words from two not completely identical records, and I feel that the present form is fuller and more accurate in substance than if I tried to quote disjointed parts of the recorder's notes.

In the footnote on page 39 of my chapter I now suggest adding the following words at the end of the note:

"where the Soviet member's reply to the Japanese statement is directly quoted."

In the paragraph beginning near the foot of Page 39 of my chapter I see no reason to make any changes, but I am quite ready to accept any amendments from Harriet or you.

I have generally adopted Motilev's idea of using suitable adjectives to indicate the importance of speakers and will make further changes of this sort where it seems advisable.

I accept your suggestion of quoting from the Constitution in a footnote.

My only other comment is on Motilev's wish to cut out the passage about Japanese officers being actuated by Marxian ideology. I agree it seems an absurd libel, but it was said in all seriousness by a responsible Japanese, and if some Japanese think that, I suppose it is not without significance. My own inclination would have been to leave Harriet's text as it is but add a sentence saying that to the Soviet and many other members such a statement seemed incredible. However, I don't really mind if the passage is omitted and will gladly accept Harriet's and your judgment.

You are right in thinking that wherever possible we are including in the text the relevant and important parts of the national chairmen's statements. I don't think it practicable or advisable to reproduce them all in an appendix, even if we could afford the space. Many of them, you recall, are already printed in IPR Notes.

All in all, Motilev's comments are sound and very reasonable. It's a nice letter, and I'm glad you decided to send him the MS. I'm keeping the copy of his letter and returning the MS by air mail herewith. Do you think I should send him a note personally thanking him for having read and revised the chapter so carefully? If you don't think it necessary, please be sure to add my thanks to those of Harriet and yourself when you write.

I have had your wire in answer to my travel inquiry. I shall await further definite word from you as to whether you are booked for the Empress of Japan on March 26, before I decide anything. Will you please wire or air mail me as soon as you know. I had the idea you preferred Dollar accommodations to C. P. R., and in fact I have the impression that in tourist class Dollar ships are better, even in the older ships like the Taft. However, either line will suit us perfectly well. My slight preference for staying here till March 20 was mainly because we are liking it so well here, not because of any important IPR reasons.

Sincerely,

W. L. HOLLAND.

P. S.—Alsberg and I talked briefly to Wilbur about the Lapham scheme. He thought it an excellent scheme and said he would be glad to speak in support

of the plan to Lapham senior, who is one of his trustees I gather. The Bay Region is to hold an Executive Committee meeting on the 16th. I am invited and will relay to you any news you want. Wilbur leaves today for Chicago where he can be reached on the 13th and 14th c/o Palmer House. If Alsberg goes to Europe next June, Wilbur will grant him leave of absence with pay.

EXHIBIT No. 1024

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, March 1, 1937.

DR. HARRY EMERSON FOSDICK,
*The Riverside Church,
Riverside Drive, New York City.*

DEAR HARRY: One of the functions of the Institute of Pacific Relations is to confront thoughtful people with points of view that are radically different from their own. It has recently occurred to me that it might be useful if you were to invite Bishop McConnell and eight or ten equally intelligent and open-minded clergymen to meet for a long discussion Constantin Oumansky, the present Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. An immediate reason for such a meeting would be the perplexity in the minds of a considerable section of the American public with reference to the recent Moscow trials. Some Americans seem to be delighting in the Trotskyist attack on the U. S. S. R., in ignorance of the fact that in supporting Trotsky they are probably supporting a war maker. I am convinced that for our generation at least Stalin is an asset for peace.

Oumansky has long been a colleague of Radek and others who figured in the recent trials, and, now that the verbatim record of the court proceedings is available, could clear up certain points which have been a matter of concern to American liberals.

Recently I took the initiative in asking Oumansky whether he would be willing to meet you and a few other liberal clergymen. He said that he would be glad to do so. He normally comes to New York about once a fortnight so a date convenient to you and him could be easily arranged. I may add that Oumansky said that if desired he would be glad to answer questions with reference to the status of the Christian Churches in the U. S. S. R.

We are leaving New York for the Far East on Friday, so it might be better if you communicated with me by letter or phone before I go but if this is not feasible my colleague Miss Mitchell could communicate with Mr. Oumansky in case you wished to act on my proposal. Or you could write him direct at the Soviet Embassy, 1119 16th Street, Washington.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1025

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, 2nd March 1937.

MR. JAMES G. McDONALD,
*New York Times, Times Square,
New York City.*

DEAR McDONALD: Knowing Romm as you did in Kyoto, Washington, Yosemite and Geneva, you must have been particularly interested in the recent Moscow Trials. You doubtless knew Radek also.

The Trotskyists in America are doing so much to play into the hands of Americans who are anti-Soviet that I thought you would want to have the text of the public trial. I have at last succeeded in securing a few copies of the verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, January 23-January 30, 1937. I am sending you a copy under separate cover because I know you will want to read it. It is barely possible that you will want to comment on it editorially.

It is certainly a most amazing record and seems to be very definite evidence of a widespread counter-revolutionary movement organized by Trotsky, Trotsky's denials not withstanding.

If you already have a copy I would be grateful if you would return the one I have just sent you as they are difficult to get.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1026

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, 2nd March 1937.

Mr. H. B. ELLISTON,
Christian Science Monitor, Boston, Massachusetts.

DEAR ELLISTON: So many journalists as well as others have been perplexed by the recent Moscow Trials that I have thought that possibly you would like to have a fuller background than has thus far come through on the wires from Europe.

I have recently managed to secure a few copies of the verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, January 23-January 30, 1937, and I have just sent a copy to you thinking that it was the kind of thing that you would want to read. At least you will want to read all that Radek and Romm said. Knowing them both personally their testimony in Moscow came to me at the time of the Trial as a complete surprise. Now, as I think over my relationships with them, I realize something of the struggle they have had and the depth of their convictions at certain periods that Trotsky, not Stalin, had the right way for the world.

The Trotskyists in this country are doing so much to play into the hands of Americans who are anti-Soviet that the appearance of this book is most timely. It looks to me as though those Americans who are delighting in the Trotskyists attack on the U. S. S. R. are ignorant of the fact that in supporting Trotsky they are supporting a war maker, Trotsky's denials notwithstanding.

May I now turn to another matter? Are you likely to become an American citizen? The reason for my question is this: Your name is repeatedly proposed for membership in the American Council of the I. P. R. Unfortunately, the Constitution limits the membership to American citizens. The American Council is losing a great deal through your not being a member. How do things stand?

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Copies of the verbatim report of the 1937 Moscow Trial sent to:

Hon. Newton D. Baker, Cleveland
Mr. Carroll Binder, Chicago
Mr. Edward C. Carter, New York
Professor Joseph P. Chamberlain, Columbia University, New York
Dr. J. . Defoe, Winnipeg, Canada
Mr. H. B. Elliston, Boston
Frederick C. Field, New York
Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, New York
Mr. James G. McDonald, New York
Miss Kate L. Mitchell, New York
Mr. Chester H. Rowell, San Francisco
The Hon. Newton Howell, Chief Justice of Ontario, Toronto, Canada
Professor Frank R. Scott, Montreal, Canada

EXHIBIT No. 1027

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, 2nd March, 1937.

Mr. H. B. ELLISTON,
*Christian Science Monitor,
Boston, Massachusetts.*

DEAR ELLISTON: So many journalists as well as others have been perplexed by the recent Moscow Trials that I have thought that possibly you would like to have a fuller background than has thus far come through on the wires from Europe.

I have recently managed to secure a few copies of the verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, January 23-January 30, 1937 and I have just sent a copy to you thinking that it was the kind of thing that you would want to read. At least you will want to read all that Radek and Romm said. Knowing them both personally their testimony in Moscow came to me at the time of the Trial as a complete surprise. Now, as I think over my relationships with them, I realize something of the struggle they have had and the depth of their convictions at certain periods that Trotsky, not Stalin, had the right way for the world.

The Trotskyists in this country are doing so much to play into the hands of Americans who are anti-Soviet that the appearance of this book is most timely. It looks to me as though those Americans who are delighting in the Trotskyists' attack on the U. S. S. R. are ignorant of the fact that in supporting Trotsky they are supporting a war-maker, Trotsky's denials notwithstanding.

May I now turn to another matter? Are you likely to become an American citizen? The reason for my question is this: Your name is repeatedly proposed for membership in the American Council of the I. P. R. Unfortunately, the Constitution limits the membership to American citizens. The American Council is losing a great deal through your not being a member. How do things stand?

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1028

[Telegram]

MARCH 3, 1937.

HALL BOROVY,

Soviet Consulate General,

7 East 61st Street, New York City:

Can you lunch with me Hotel Ambassador room four eleven one o'clock today.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1029

McGILL UNIVERSITY,
FACULTY OF LAW,
Montreal, March 4th, 1937.

EDWARD C. CARTER, Esq.

c/o Institute of Pacific Relations,

129 East 52d Street, New York, N. Y., U. S. A.

DEAR CARTER: I am much obliged to you for taking the trouble to send me the report of the Moscow Trials. I shall read it carefully when it comes, and will let you know how the trial appears to me. I shall also see that others in Montreal have a chance to look at it.

There is no doubt that the effect of the trials is very serious for those who wish to see our society develop a form of economic planning based upon social ownership.

Yours sincerely,

[s] F. R. Scott
F. R. SCOTT.

MARCH 8, 1937.

FVF from ECC:

Enclosed for your information and that of Mrs. Barnes are copies of letters from Joseph P. Chamberlain of Columbia and Professor Scott of McGill.

I wish to reiterate the seriousness of the effect in this country of the most recent Moscow Trial. Your suggestions that steps be taken now with reference to the next trial are most fundamental. I hope you can act on this matter. I am inclined to think that the American Council of the I. P. R. is in a much better position to do this than the American Russian Institute.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
510 Kent Hall, March 4, 1937.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER
*Institute Of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52d Street, New York City.*

DEAR NED: Thank you for sending me the proceedings of the Soviet court in the recent Moscow trials. I have not had time to read it carefully, but I hope to get a chance to do so shortly.

I have personally been anti-Trotsky, because, if for no other reason, I read his book and became convinced that Stalin was right and he was wrong in regard to the organization of the Soviet Union. Trotsky, according to his own book, was a very brilliant person who did not believe in the organization of the state but opposed the bureaucracy and was for world revolution, while Stalin recognized that a great job of construction had to be done, that it had to be done by a bureaucratic organization and that Russia could stand on its own feet, if organization and internal discipline were provided.

Furthermore, I have always felt that it would be quite improper for me to join a society for the defense of Leon Trotsky, for the reason that I do not like to join committees whose object would appear to be to attack the government of a state at peace and amity with the United States, especially where I knew as little as I did about the truth of the situation.

I hope you have a very good trip. I am sorry that I have not had a chance to see you and Mrs. Carter.

Very sincerely yours,

[s] J. P. Chamberlain
J. P. CHAMBERLAIN,

C:S

EXHIBIT No. 1030

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, 5th March, 1937.

MR. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND
*Food Research Institute,
Stanford University, California.*

DEAR BILL: You will, I think, be able to help people who have been perplexed by the recent Moscow Trials to realize that they make sense by loaning them a copy of the verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, January 23-January 30, 1937. I have just managed to secure a few copies and I am sending one to you under separate cover, as I know you will find it fascinating and will want to read it all the way through.

I think also that the very able law professor whom Alsberg so greatly admires will want to read it also.

The Trotskyists in this country are doing so much to play into the hands of Americans who are anti-Soviet that the appearance of this book is most timely. It looks to me as though these Americans who are delighting in the Trotskyists attack on the U. S. S. R. are ignorant of the fact that in supporting Trotsky they are supporting a war-maker, Trotsky's denials notwithstanding.

When the volume has been read by those whom you and Alsberg think would most appreciate it, it should be put in the library of the I. P. R. in San Francisco.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1031

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, 2nd March, 1937.

Professor JOSEPH P. CHAMBERLAIN,
Columbia University, New York City.

DEAR JOSEPH: As a friend of Kurovia and as a student of the Soviet Union you must have followed with some interest the newspaper accounts of the recent Moscow Trials. In view of the fantastic interpretations appearing in many newspapers I have been eager to see whether I could get a copy of the record

of the public trial. At last I have been able to secure a few copies of the verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, January 23-January 30, 1937, and I am sending you one of these under separate cover. I am rather anxious to have your opinion as a lawyer on what appears here. The first 150 pages would furnish a pretty fair sample though you may be intrigued by the whole record as it unfolds from section to section.

As the number of copies available in this country seems limited, it may be that you will want to share this with one or two of your friends who may be especially interested and who would not ordinarily have easy access to this report. It is most interesting to see how the Trotskyists in America are using this Trial to fool anti-Soviet Americans into believing that Trotsky is a peace-maker.

Alice and I are off on Friday for a long absence in the Far East, I only wish you were going along too.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1033

EN ROUTE NEW YORK-SAN FRANCISCO,
March 8th, 1937.

DEAR KATE: If it meets with your approval, I wish you would order from "SOVIET RUSSIA TODAY," 824 Broadway, N. Y., the requisite number of copies of the 5-cent pamphlet—"At the Moscow Trial" by D. N. Pritt, so that you can send it with individual letters to each of those whose names appear at the bottom of this letter. Your letter to them might read somewhat as follows:

"Just before sailing from San Francisco, Mr. Carter asked me to order and send you a small pamphlet by D. N. Pritt, K. C., M. P. This is his comment on the Moscow trials of last August. Mr. Pritt was in Moscow at the time and attended the public trial. He seeks, in the light of his own knowledge of English court procedure to explain the differences between the English and the Soviet Courts.

Though Pritt's pamphlet describes the August trial, the procedure was presumably the same at the trial in January, the report of which Mr. Carter recently sent to you. That report and this pamphlet may serve as a useful background for the impending trial of Bukharin and Rykoff and others."

When you are ordering the Pritt pamphlet, please order six extra for me; 3 can be sent to Tokyo and 3 to Shanghai. It will be interesting to see whether they all arrive.

Gratefully yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER,
BEN CHERRINGTON,
HERBERT LITTLE,

We miss you Kate—A. C.

Hon. Newton D. Baker
Mr. Carroll Binder
Professor Joseph P. Chamberlain
Dr. J. W. Dafoe
Mr. H. B. Elliston
Mr. Chester H. Rowell
The Hon. Newton Rowell
Professor Frank R. Scott

EXHIBIT No. 1034

HOTEL SIR FRANCIS DRAKE,
San Francisco, 11th March 1937.

MISS KATE MITCHELL,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52d Street, New York City, N. Y.

DEAR KATE: It was good of you to send me Baker's letter about the Verbatim Report, and the extra copies. I am privately sending a copy to Oumanski and wish that you would show copies of Baker's letter to me, to Fred, Kathleen, and Harriet.

I expect to see Bill and Alsberg this afternoon and will try and raise all of your questions with them. Now I am just starting out to make a round of financial calls with Esberg.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1035

MARCH 21, 1939.

Confidential.

FVF WLH KM CTC IF EFC,
From ECC:

For your private information I enclose a copy of a letter from a friend in Peiping dated February 21st. Under no circumstances must this letter be circulated or the identity of its author disclosed. Please return it to me when you have read it.

EXHIBIT No. 1036

IMPERIAL HOTEL,
Tokyo, 20th April, 1937.

Miss KATE MITCHELL,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR KATE: Purely for your private information I enclose this purely personal letter from Holland. I had insisted that he and Doreen move from second to first class from Honolulu to Yokohama, that is the point of the last part of the letter.

Bill and Doreen are in grand form and have received a very warm welcome back to Tokyo. The Japanese Council would now appreciate it enormously if they would spend a year instead of only a week in Tokyo.

This is to acknowledge with thanks your letter of March 29th congratulating the staff on the output between San Francisco and Honolulu.

The point about living on a high intellectual level in my review of the Moscow trial was simply this: The substance of the dialogue in the Verbatim Report revealed not only high intellectual development on the part of many of the participants, but seemed to reveal also that they were living as members of social groups where discussion was carried on at a level of mental development not easily duplicated elsewhere. I cannot remember the record of any court proceedings in the United States for many years in which the level of examination and reply averaged as high as that in the January Moscow Trial.

Thank you for forwarding me this copy of Tarr's letter to me of March 23. I will write him direct to London in a few days and send him a copy.

You will be interested to know that Elisabeth Downing made a highly favorable impression during her brief working visit. Both the Japanese I. P. R. and the Grews and the Andrews spoke of her with enthusiasm. You might pass this on to her mother.

Affectionately yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1037

COUNCIL OF THE U. S. S. R.,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
20 Razin Street, Moscow, May 15, 1937.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
c/o China Institute of Pacific Relations,
123, Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai, China.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Upon receipt of your letter of April 11, we cabled you as follows:

"Regret delay answering re trip myself or Bremman Far East. Stop. Expect decide within few days will immediately advise by cable.

MOTYLEV."

We very deeply regret that such a considerable delay occurred in finally settling our plans for arranging a visit with you to the Soviet Far East. This

was caused by the fact that Mr. Motylev wanted to accompany you personally and was endeavouring to schedule correspondingly his obligations connected with the work on the Great Soviet World Atlas. However, recent developments of his work are such that it does not seem likely he would be able to leave Moscow at the time of your proposed visit. As we did not want to further delay this matter, it was finally decided that I would spend a fortnight in July and August with you in the Soviet Far East. Consequently, we immediately cabled to you:

"Deeply regret unable personally go Far East looking forward see you Moscow. Stop. Bremman will spend fortnight with you Soviet Far East assisting your studying region. Stop. Your visa providing stay Far East granted Soviet Consulate General Shanghai instructed correspondingly. Stop. Please cable exact date arrival Vladivostok."

The necessary formalities for arranging such a trip also required some time because, as you probably know, Intourist does not take care of rendering accommodations for trips in this region.

I am greatly looking forward to meeting you in the District. As I did not have an opportunity of visiting the Soviet Far East in recent years, I am sure this trip will prove most interesting to both of us. We will try to avoid spending too much time on conferences and instead will endeavour to see the maximum of what it is possible to see on a visit of short duration.

I sincerely hope that this delay did not put you to too much inconvenience and did not interfere with the elaboration of your further plans.

Would you kindly advise us in advance of the exact date of your arrival so as to enable me to be in Vladivostok a few days ahead of you. That would give me the possibility of making all necessary arrangements beforehand and no time would be wasted on trying to find people whom we want to meet and making appointments.

Sincerely yours,

Y. P. Bremman,
Y. P. BREMMAN,

YB/eh

EXHIBIT No. 1038

Copy to KM.

123 BOULEVARD DE MONTIGNY, SHANGHAI,
May 27, 1937.

Dr. V. E. MOTYLEV,
Pacific Institute, 20 Razin Street, Moscow.

DEAR DR. MOTYLEV: This is to acknowledge with thanks your cablegram of May fifteenth reading as follows: Deeply regret unable personally go Far East. Looking forward see you Moscow. Stop. Bremman will spend fortnight with you Soviet Far East assisting your studying region. Stop. Your visa providing stay Far East granted. Soviet Consulate General Shanghai instructed correspondingly. Stop. Please cable exact date arrival Vladivostok.

I was in Nanking at the time and so was delayed in replying. On my return here on May twenty-first, I cabled you as follows: Many thanks will arrive Vladivostok July nineteenth or twenty first. Will cable exact date May thirtieth. Stop. Barely possible Holland could accompany me Soviet Far East only cable frankly whether easy arrange or whether better not ask for permission now.

The reason for uncertainty as to the date of my arrival in Vladivostok is due to the fact that the Sovtorgflot S. S. *Saver* is now under repair in Shanghai and it is not known whether she will be repaired in time to resume her regular schedule.

In view of this uncertainty, it will probably seem best for me to take the Japanese steamer *Siberia Maru*, leaving Seishin (Korea) July eighteenth and arriving in Vladivostok at 8:00 a. m. on July nineteenth.

I am exceedingly glad that Bremman can meet me and that we will find you in Moscow on our arrival.

My present plan is to depart for Moscow on the train which leaves Vladivostok on Thursday, July twenty-ninth. (I suppose we would join the train at Khabarovsk or west of Khabarovsk.) My plan is to have the train at Karymskaya on Sunday, August first, and stop over there for two days until the train from Manchouli arrives, on which Mrs. Carter, my daughter Ruth, and Miss Nan Smith will be traveling from Manchouli to Moscow. By joining the train at

Karymskaya, I could take the long journey across with them. I would hope that Mr. Bremman could travel with us, as this would give us such a splendid opportunity of conversation day by day, discussing the significance of our visit to the Far East and preparing for our visit to Moscow.

This means that we would all arrive in Moscow at 15:30 on Sunday, August eighth.

Miss Smith has to go on from Moscow after a week or ten days, but I am planning to remain, if you think it desirable, from August eighth until August twenty-sixth, when I shall probably have to leave for western Europe.

The time between August eighth and August twenty-sixth I will be prepared to spend under your direction, staying all the time in Moscow or going to one, two or three other places, as you think best. There is one short trip that I would like to make if it is convenient, and that is to go to the industrial city of Kolumna. I visited Kolumna in 1931. I would tremendously appreciate the privilege of going there again so as to compare Kolumna then and now.

With reference to the clause in my cable about Mr. Holland, the situation is this. Long-postponed work on his book, "The Effect of the Depression on the Far East," and the fact that the Pacific Council is not to meet in Europe this year, have decided him to remain in the Far East until he goes to Australia and New Zealand next November. He would, however, like to accompany me to the Soviet Far East in July, provided it is perfectly easy for you to get the necessary permission and also provided transportation arrangements are such that Mr. Bremman can arrange for two of us to travel about from place to place with him instead of one.

Neither Mr. Holland nor I wishes to inconvenience you or Mr. Bremman with this proposal, so we hope that you will feel perfectly free to cable vetoing Mr. Holland's accompanying me. He will visit the Soviet Union next year after the meeting of the Pacific Council in China next April, and could go to Moscow then by way of the Soviet Far East if it is not possible for him to go there this year.

Owing to the fact that Mr. Holland cannot go to Moscow this year, we will probably arrange for Miss Kate Mitchell to be in Moscow when we are there, in order to confer with you, Voitinsky and me regarding the research program. She is handling the supervision of a good deal of the research work in collaboration with Mr. Holland and is particularly anxious to have a long talk with you about the Economic Handbook, a large responsibility for which has been delegated to her.

Will you continue to address me here, care of the China Institute of Pacific Relations, 123 Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai. I am going to Manila on June fifth, but Shanghai continues to be my best forwarding address for mail and cables.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Very sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1039

123 BOULEVARD DE MONTIGNY,
SHANGHAI, CHINA,
May 31st, 1937.

JOSEPH BARNES, Esq.,
New York Herald Tribune Bureau,
Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR JOE: Our present plan is to reach Moscow on August 8th. I spent about a fortnight before in the Soviet Far East with Bremman.

I wonder whether you would be willing to give me a little travel tip. Is the Hotel Metropole still presumably the most logical place for us to stay or has some new Hotel arisen which has all the advantages of the Metropole and is a little less gloomy?

I wish the newspapers of China and Japan would buy your Moscow despatches. Misinformation in these two countries regarding the Soviet Union is pretty discouraging.

Ever sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1040

BAY VIEW HOTEL,
Manila, 18th June, 1937.

Miss KATE MITCHELL,
New York City.

DEAR KATE: Yesterday evening the delayed clipper arrived with your very welcome airmail letters of June 7. I cannot tell you how grateful I am to you for arranging to send me Mrs. Barnes's latest article on the Soviet Union in the Far East. This should give me just the kind of pointers that I want. I hope that you and she and Harriet will include any questions for which you wish me to seek the answers. Thank you also for sending me the clipping from the Times about the "Spy Scare."

Yes, I got your May 11th letter but it was delayed in reaching me owing to my absence for a week in Szechwan. By now you have received the copy of my letter to Motylev of May 27, in the next-to-last paragraph of which you will find Bill Holland's reasons for deciding that you visit Moscow in order to represent him in going over with Voitinsky and Motylev the entire research program. You have also by now, I hope, received by letter of the 30th of May in which, in addition to giving Bill Holland's reasons, I mentioned the necessity of starting work on the semifinal draft of the Budget toward the end of August or early in September.

In accordance with your request for a cable, which I am sending for fear my earlier letters may have been delayed in reaching you, I am cabling you today as follows:

"MITCHELL, Inparel, New York:

"Staying Metropole, Moscow, until August twenty-sixth. Satisfactory if you arrive ninth. Stop. Holland self think your visit important. Stop. If, however, very difficult arrange meet me Berlin August Twenty-eighth cable. Stop. Ask Dorothea, Ruth, or Martha cable family news this week end.

"CARTER."

Your tentative schedule calling for leaving on the "Washington" on July 28, reaching Paris on the 4th, Berlin on the 7th and Moscow on the 9th, is satisfactory to me, except that I wish that you might have a day or two longer in Paris to relax after your arduous schedule throughout July in New York.

I am told that Catherine Porter's Survey article was widely quoted in the Philippine papers. Tell her that yesterday we met Mrs. Traynor, who was Gladys Plunkett of the Inquiry staff. She is now a most sedate matron. We were delighted to find that Annette's very vivid and attractive sister, Miss Mayer, is living here at the Bay View.

I have decided to return to Shanghai by steamer from Hongkong so all the letters that you have sent to Shanghai will reach us automatically, and anyhow, in Wellington's absence, Elizabeth Downing is attending to the forwarding of all our mail.

The future of the Philippine Council hangs in the balance. I wonder whether if you go to Washington before you sail, you could have a really frank talk with Conrado Benitez, who may have left or may stay on in Paredes' place.

Affectionately yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1041

SUPPLEMENTARY AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN U. S. S. R., IPR, AND THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, MOSCOW, AUG. 17, 1937

1. Memorandum from Chatham House dated August 3rd, 1937.
2. What steps will be taken to insure intelligent and significant reviews of Great Soviet World Atlas in principal countries. How secure a few advance copies with memorandum on principal points of significance.
3. Recommendation as to duration Miss Harriet Moore's visit to Buryat Mongolia.
4. Could Bremman spend at least 3 months as a member of the International Secretariat in 1938 or 1939.

5. Procedure with reference to members of the International Secretariat and the Secretariats of the National Councils visiting the Soviet Union in the future.
6. The internal situation in the Soviet Union.
7. Suggestions from Soviet Council to the Secretary-General regarding making the work of the International Secretariat more efficient.
8. How secure promptly several copies of the following publications of the Institute of World Politics and Economics. Provisional titles only:
 - a. Symposium on Fifth Anniversary of Japanese Invasion of Manchuria.
 - b. Guerrilla Warfare in Manchuria.
 - c. Symposium on China.
 - d. Position of and Struggle by the Peasantry for Improved Conditions in Japan.
 - e. Financial Situation in Japan.
 - f. Position of the Working Class in Japan.
 - g. Dissertation on the Decay of American Imperialism by Gourivitch.
 - h. Dissertation by Levina (?) developing Lenin's idea that Capitalism is acceptable to the United States peasant because of the absence of feudal factors.
9. Other business as proposed by the officers of the U. S. S. R. IPR.
10. Shiman.
11. Lattimore.

EXHIBIT No. 1042

Please pass on the word of Shiman's arrival in the Far East to Liu Yu-wan, Saionji, Pyke and Downing.

HOTEL METROPOLE,
Moscow, 20th August, 1937.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City, N. Y.

DEAR FRED: In order to keep the records complete, this is a record of the Shiman incident.

On the 12th August I received your cable of the 11th reading as follows:

"Shiman stuck London no word Soviet visa applied 8 weeks ago.

Can you push Moscow end cable Shiman Amexco London today."

In order to discover whether he wanted merely to visit Moscow or to go to the Far East via Manchuria or via Vladivostok I wired him as follows:

"Wire Metropole kind of visa desired".

He replied as follows:

"Tourist visa preferred leaving London new address American Express Vienna."

As I could only act if I had precise information I wired you as follows on August 13th.

"Shiman gone Austria wire me duration stay itinerary desired".

To this Hilda replied as follows.

"Shiman care Markus Sevensix Weidner Hauptstrasse Vienna communicate directly no knowledge present itinerary."

I then wired Shiman in Vienna as follows:

"Wire duration stay itinerary desired."

Shiman then wired me on the 16th, as follows:

"Desire enter Negoreloye 3 days Moscow transit Manchouli".

This I received late on the evening of the 16th. On the morning of the 17th I delivered, personally, letters of recommendation, information, and appeal to, Belsky, the head of Intourist, Ward, the passport man at the American Embassy, and to Dr. Motylev. Belsky rang up the Government immediately and discovered that Shiman's visa had not been refused. This meant that the situation was

still hopeful. As Belsky told me to pull all possible wires in order to get speedy action, I wired you on the 17th as follows:

"Suggest you ask Umansky burn wires behalf Shiman."

On the 19th I had to leave for Kalinin for two days. On my return on the 21st I received a telegram from Shiman in Vienna reading as follows:

"Boat tickets too scarce to wait longer. Stop. Sailing Naples Singapore August 28 Japanese Terukuni signing off with thanks."

A few moments later Belsky informed me that the visa had been granted and that the telegram to the Soviet Consul in Vienna had gone forward late on the evening of the 19th or early on the morning of the 20th. I immediately wired Shiman at his home address in Vienna, as follows:

"Your telegram received visa telegraphed Vienna nineteenth."

Shiman presumably left Vienna before the final telegram arrived or felt already committed to sail via Singapore.

Now for the future. Whenever fully accredited and important members of the Pacific Council or the American Council staff desire to visit or pass through the Soviet Union, full details as to the person and the purpose of the trip should be sent by you or me to Dr. Motylev with a copy to Secretary-General Y. P. Bremman. If possible this information should be sent a full fortnight in advance of making the application for the visa at the local office of Intourist and the Soviet Consulate.

Simultaneously similar letters giving all details should be sent to the Chief of the Consular Section of the American Embassy in Moscow. I would recommend that, even though no one in Moscow proposed it, a similar letter be sent to any personal friends you may have in the Soviet Embassy in Washington or Shanghai or wherever the application is made.

Both Motylev and the officials of the American Embassy are always embarrassed if the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs address communications to them regarding the visits of I. P. R. personalities of whose visits they have not already heard.

One other suggestion I gather that with reference to members of the American Council who are not members of the staff you should be very discriminating in giving letters of introduction to the Soviet I. P. R. Any member of the American Council who is a really serious student can be introduced but any who want to go purely as trippers had better stick closely to the Intourist program. I deeply regret that the hours that I spent on Shiman's behalf did not secure action two hours earlier.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—You might show this letter to CHS, HA, CP, HM, KB, and EFC.

EXHIBIT No. 1043

HOTEL RICHEMOND,
Geneva, Switzerland, 7th September, 1937.

DR. V. E. MOTYLEV,

% Soviet Union Institute of Pacific Relations,
20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MOTYLEV: From London I cabled Mr. Field to send you a copy of each issue of Amerasia from the beginning mailing each copy separately. I hope that all will reach you in due course.

In the meantime my copy of the July issue has arrived. I am, therefore, posting it to you. On page 230 you will find the translation of your Pravda article.

Here in Geneva I have had the great privilege of meeting Mr. Sokoline, the Soviet Under Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

Very sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1044

ON BOARD M. V. "GEORGIC,"
EN ROUTE TO NEW YORK,
18th October, 1937.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,
33 Ta Yuan Fu Hutung,
Peking, China.

DEAR OWEN: One of the cables that I sent to you which was apparently garbled was that in which I inquired whether I could give Motylev a copy of your two articles on your visit to the Chinese Communists. The first was "The Stronghold of Chinese Communism." The second was "The Present and Future of Chinese Communism." Motylev was naturally exceedingly eager to have the benefit of your impressions. Perhaps more eager than any other member of the Pacific Council.

I did not tell him that I had copies of these two articles because I was not quite sure whether you would wish me to show them to him. But I would like to hear from you as to whether I may send them or whether you would prefer to send him copies or to write him direct a long letter giving him the benefit of your impressions.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1045

G-2
RSB

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2,
Washington, D. C., November 5, 1937.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd St., New York, N. Y.

DEAR Mr. CARTER: In reply to your request of November 5, I am listing below the officers who attended the meeting in Colonel Strong's office this morning.

With much appreciation for your kindness in giving us so much of your time, I am

Sincerely yours,

R. S. Bratton
R. S. BRATTON,
Lieut. Col., Inf., DOL.

td

List of Officers:

Captain W. L. Lind, U. S. N., Office of Naval Intelligence
Commander S. M. Creighton, U. S. N., Office of Naval Intelligence
Captain W. L. Bales, U. S. M. C., Office of Naval Intelligence.
Colonel Geo. V. Strong, U. S. A., War Department, G-2
Lieut. Col. P. E. Van Nostrand, U. S. A., War Department, G-2
Lieut. Col. R. S. Bratton, U. S. A., War Department, G-2
Major William Mayer, U. S. A., War Department, G-2

EXHIBIT No. 1046

JOSEPH BARNES, *Moscow Correspondent*

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE,
HOTEL METROPOLE,
Moscow, November 10, 1937.

DEAR Mr. CARTER: Your reference to Nyon, however pessimistic, hardly needed toning down. All that has happened since then has only strengthened the case of those, and they are legion here, who feel that there is nothing more to do but wait, and arm, and fight. The blackmail policy of aggression—taking endless half-loaves of bread by threatening each time to take the whole loaf—seems to pay such dividends that it is not likely to be discarded voluntarily,

and the chances of checking it by any sort of collective action certainly grow slimmer and slimmer. I have reason to believe that even some of the more bitter-minded Soviet people score the steady losses up to bad diplomacy in western Europe, and to the failure of otherwise-sensible people to see just what the policy of endless forbearance and compromise leads to. For myself, this is steadily a less satisfactory explanation. It makes me appear to out-Bolshevik the Bolsheviks, which is not a fair conclusion, but it is hard for me to dodge the suspicion that increasing groups of owning people, in Japan, in eastern Europe, and now in England, have beaten the workers to class-consciousness, and that they have in spirit if not in the letter of treaties decided to get down off their post-Versailles fence on the Facist side, God knows it's not an unreasonable conclusion for a Yugoslav banker, say or *Montague Norman*, or the b'Iwasakis to come to, but it's a depressing one for those who watch it. Without some such explanation, it is hard to understand the endless patience of the English, or their old-maid's fright at the thought of a Soviet under the bed. Brussels appears to have gone the way of Nyon. If I were a Czechoslovak today, or a citizen of Danzig, or a young Englishman of draft age, I would feel that my very life depended on the slim chance that some of my rulers would wake up to the fact that cooperation with the Soviet Union, a united front of democracies committed to collective security and the indivisibility of peace, is the only thing that could now stop what's going on.

God knows the Russians don't seem to be working very hard on convincing them, but they've had twenty years of trying, and maybe they're justified in being discouraged. If the Bolsheviks decide, after their Spanish experience, to give the Chinese their blessing and their sympathy—which I am increasingly convinced is what is happening, and no more—and watch the Japanese slowly founder in the snow of North China, it will be pretty hard for us Friends of the Soviet Union, or for our first-cousins, the self-righteous liberals stranded between *realpolitik* and pacifism, to keep up the present chorus about the world's having been let down by the Soviet Union.

This started out to be a simple note, telling you that I was glad to see you in Moscow, but the indignation which gets choked on a cable line seems to have overflowed.

I assume you have heard all the recent news about Moscow which would interest you from those of your staff who read Pravda attentively. The issue of October 3 was full of news.

News continues for us too, with no sign of a let-up. The elections are now ahead, as soon as the celebration is decently over. When the dull routine days will come, when I have been planning to settle down and do some of the real work that I have got to do, is still uncertain.

Give my best regards to Mrs. Carter, Ruth, and John [Handwritten.] Carter.

Very sincerely yours,

JOE

EXHIBIT No. 1047

[Copy]

OVERLAND LIMITED, EAST-BOUND,
December 23, 1937.

MR. FREDERICK V. FIELD
San Francisco

DEAR FRED: May I recommend that the Membership Committee of the American Council undertake to make a serious study of the desirability of securing for membership in the Council several, if not all, of the members of the House and Senate Committees on Foreign Relations.

The Committee might at the same time consider whether there are not other members of the two Houses who should be invited to become members of the American Council. The Nominating Committee or the Executive Committee may wish to consider having the SURVEY and some of the pamphlets go to key members of the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees even though they decide against asking them to become members of the Council.

As one means of capitalizing on my recent expensive visit to Kansas, I would like to propose that the Nominating Committee consider Governor Landon for membership in the American Council.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1048

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, February 24, 1938.

Miss VIRGINIA BURDICK,
*American Russian Institute,
56 West 45th Street, New York City.*

DEAR MISS BURDICK: 1. Because the Bulletin of the American Russian Institute aims at objectivity, covers contemporary life in the Soviet Union and is written by a highly competent staff, its importance both to scholars and to the more thoughtful section of the general public cannot be overemphasized.

2. I was attacked the other day, not by a Soviet citizen but by an American capitalist, for being on the Board of the American Russian Institute in which, it was alleged, there are still a number of Trotskyists. To what extent is this true? I do not believe in persecuting American Trotskyists in general, but I do not see any point in including them on the Governing Board of an Institute that is trying to promote intelligent understanding between the United States and the U. S. S. R.

3. Of what committee of the American Russian Institute am I a member, the Board or the Executive Committee?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1049

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, February 25, 1938.

Purely personal

CONSTANTINE OUMANSKY, Esq.,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: When I saw you last Wednesday, I meant to show you a copy of the letter that I sent to Motylev last November. At that time I sent a similar letter to several consultants, the majority of which favored the proposal.

In the light of these letters from several parts of the world we have now drafted a short statement as to the inquiry to be organized. This I enclose also. You will note that it is marked confidential.

I would enormously appreciate your personal criticism of these two enclosures.

I was very glad that the Ambassador invited me to lunch, and was particularly pleased that I was able to meet Mrs. Oumansky. It was delightful sitting beside her.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1050

ADDITIONAL NAMES RECOMMENDED FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN COUNCIL

(By EDWARD C. CARTER)

Oscar Littleton Chapman, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Washington, D. C.
Ernest L. Gruening, Director, Division of Territories and Insular Possessions,
Department of the Interior, Washington, D. C.

Alger Hiss, attached to the staff of Assistant Secretary of State Francis B. Sayre
Daniel A. de Menocal, Vice President, First National Bank of Boston, New York
Mr. and Mrs. Philip Moore, Hubbard Woods, Illinois
Recommended by himself:

Dr. Frank Bohn, 2219 California Street, Washington, D. C., formerly a contributor to the New York Times; lecturer at the University of Southern California; now son-in-law to the Secretary of Commerce

EXHIBIT No. 1051

1795 CALIFORNIA STREET,
March 17, 1938.

MR. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, JR.
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, New York.

DEAR BILL: You will find enclosed a copy of a letter to Dr. Davis which follows a long discussion which wasted a good deal of the time available to the local advisory research committee at its meeting last week. I hope that the relationships I have outlined will be accepted without comment. In any case, I never could make out why research people were interested in these legalistic questions.

The remarks in my letter to Davis pertain also to the formation of a research committee in the East as discussed in your letter of March 14th. Since talking with you in New York I have somewhat changed my views as I have tried to figure out an organizational procedure which would be consistent through the country. It is quite definitely recommended in the report of the nominating committee to the Annual Meeting of December 17, 1937, that the national research committee shall remain a skeleton committee composed only of the chairman, now Dr. Alsberg, and a secretary from the staff, yourself, and that a series of regional advisory research committees on the model of the one already established in San Francisco should be organized. Therefore, to make the committee which you are getting together in and near New York the national research committee instead of a New York or Eastern research advisory committee would be contrary to the recommendation made and accepted at the Annual Meeting.

A procedure more consistent with our development elsewhere and with the needs of the organization would be to make the committee on which you are now at work another in the series of advisory research committees to which Dr. Alsberg and yourself will make definite requests from time to time. At the moment the principal responsibility which is being put on this new committee is to take charge of the studies which the International Secretariat has requested the American Council to undertake on behalf of the large war settlement inquiry. I shall seek the advice of our research groups here and in Southern California and of research individuals in other parts of the country but responsibility for the work will be placed in the hands of this new group.

Do you agree that this will be a sounder way to go about our work?

In any case the composition of your committee is hardly affected as we are not likely to develop more than one research advisory between Chicago and New York for some time to come. There would be, therefore, no difficulty in including a Chicago member on the regional committee established from New York.

I think the names you suggest are excellent with the possible exception of Erich W. Zimmerman of North Carolina. His book on raw material resources was my bible for a couple of years and I have the highest regard for him as a scholar. For committee work, however, he is not particularly useful, largely because of very conspicuous deafness which makes it difficult for him to participate in a discussion. He served on one of the American Coordinating Committee groups of which I was a member and I recall that the general impression was that he was very seriously handicapped. There is the further point in connection with him that the University of North Carolina represents a good deal of travel expenses to New York. The only other possible question as to the members you have suggested is Shotwell whose name in some quarters has become synonymous with monkey wrench. There is no question that he is inclined to run away with a committee if he becomes interested nor is there any question that he has more than once started research work off on a tangent and an expensive one at that. Confidentially, Miss Walker of the Rockefeller Foundation expressed the frank opinion at lunch three weeks ago that valuable as Shotwell had been in the past that time had come when he should be no longer appointed to research committees of any sort.

I feel very self-conscious about Shotwell because of having gone to considerable trouble to organize a stop-Shotwell movement among the younger people in New York six or seven years ago. The movement was so successful that I have often wondered since whether we were justified in taking such an unfriendly attitude towards him in our IPR work. At his request Barnes and I got together a group of about eighteen or twenty people who met at Shotwell's house and ate his food one evening a week for about four months

in order to engage in an open discussion of the original motivations of international relations. Barnes and I carefully stacked the cards so that out of a meeting of twenty there were nineteen Marxists or pseudo-Marxists and one violent anti-Marxist, Shotwell himself. Each meeting was more embarrassing than the last for, all being young, we were rather unmerciful in tearing to pieces every clause issued by this renowned scholar.

With regard to a representative from the business community, I am quite certain that Whitney Shepardson will not accept a position on one of our committees. Some years ago he decided that he would undertake outside work with only one organization, namely the Council on Foreign Relations, and as far as I know he has stuck religiously by this self-imposed rule. He is always available for personal consultation but not, I think, for committee work. I do know your alternative candidate, Howard Houston of the American Cyanamid Company. I do not think that he is a vice president but rather assistant to the president. He is an old friend of Carter's, was at one time on the staff of the League of Nations, and very likely was one of the important YMCA boys during the War, though of this I am not certain. My acquaintance with him is slight, being limited to two or three fairly long talks in connection with a possible gift to the IPR from the company with which he works. We did not receive the gift but our relations with Houston, and with the company for that matter, were extremely satisfactory. They actually read a very elaborate report I prepared for them and gave me the impression of understanding rather accurately what we were driving at. In other words, I would very much support the suggestion that Houston be included in the committee.

I am also glad to see that you have included Edward M. Earle of Princeton. I have never met him personally but for a long time I have heard only the highest praise of his work. He was a great friend of the Barnes family who used to tell me about him while I was still an undergraduate at Harvard. More recently I have often heard Professor Chamberlain speak about him.

In going over your list again as I dictate I notice that you have included Alsberg on this committee. If we adopt the organizational procedure which I recommend in the first fifteen paragraphs of this letter, he should not, of course, be made a member of a regional advisory committee in view of his position as chairman of our national research committee.

Finally, on the question of the procedure which should be adopted for appointing this committee, I am today taking the first step which is to secure Alsberg's approval. After you have replied to this letter, giving me the final list of the committee, I shall communicate with members of our Executive Committee by correspondence and I have no doubt that our recommendations will be speedily accepted.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

EXHIBIT No. 1052

[Copy]

225 FIFTH AVE., N. Y. C.,
March 31, 1938.

Mrs. EDWARD C. CARTER,
American Council, I. P. R.,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

MY DEAR MRS. CARTER: It is a pleasure to accept your invitation to participate in the week-end conference at Princeton, on April 23rd and 24th.

The agenda for the conference is certainly complete. My only criticism would be that it is too minutely detailed, and in some instances duplicated. It may be that a somewhat broader and shorter agenda might be easier to handle at a conference which is to last only two days.

In addition, I would like to suggest one more topic, and that is, concerning the German-Japanese Pact and its implications. How much truth is there in the Japanese warning that China is on the verge of going Communist, and what is meant by Communism in China? A clarification of these issues would go a long way toward creating a better understanding of what American business may or may not expect in China, whether victorious or defeated.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) PHILIP J. JAFFE.

EXHIBIT No. 1053

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,
Washington, D. C., March 29, 1938.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
*Institute of Pacific Relations,
 129 East 52nd Street, New York City, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter of March 26. As before I am at your disposal for the dinner.

I understand that the verbatim report in English of the recent proceedings will arrive in this country shortly. At that time I shall not fail to send you a copy immediately.

Sincerely yours,

[S] C. OUMANSKY.

P. S.—I have sent you under separate cover two issues of the Moscow News dealing with the trial.

CO: P

EXHIBIT No. 1054

129 EAST 52nd St.,
New York City, March 31, 1938.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
1795 California St., San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR OWEN: Here is a copy of my second letter to Scherer. I think I have already sent you Yasuo's comment.

Tsuro is supposed to have Leftist sources of information. Shiman and Jaffe regard him very highly.

Now it may be that Scherer is right and Tsuro and Yasuo wrong, but I need to be shown.

Scherer wrote as if he were writing for Pacific Affairs. I hope this is not the case. He doubtless is a swell guy, but I cannot quite see the point of Pacific Affairs suddenly taking up with him when our best friends in the Japanese I. P. R. would have been pained if we had featured him even when he was doing his pro-Japanese writing.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1055

129 EAST 52nd STREET,
New York City, March 31, 1938.

Professor JOSEPH P. CHAMBERLAIN
8 Sutton Square, New York City

DEAR JOSEPH: Would you be interested in dining with me and a few others at the Century Club at 7:15 on the evening of Wednesday, April 20th, to listen to a hundred-percent Bolshevik view of the Moscow trials? I have invited Constantine Oumansky, the able, two-fisted Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, to come to New York that evening to speak to a little dinner of a dozen of my friends and then submit himself to the frankest questions that any of my guests care to put.

If it is possible to accept, I can promise you a provocative and interesting evening.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Handwritten note:)

Mr. Chamberlain's secretary called to tell Mr. Carter that a previous engagement prevents Mr. Chamberlain from accepting the dinner invitation for April 20.

12:40

APRIL 6, 1938.

EXHIBIT No. 1056

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, April 2, 1938.

Dr. JOHN H. FINLEY,
Editor in Chief, New York Times.

DEAR DR. FINLEY: Would you be interested in dining with me and a few others at the Century Club at 7:15 on the evening of Wednesday, April 20th, to listen to a hundred-percent Bolshevik view of the Moscow trials? I have invited Constantine Oumansky, the able, two-fisted Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, to come to New York that evening to speak to a little dinner of a dozen of my friends and then submit himself to the frankest questions that any of my guests care to put.

If it is possible to accept, I can promise you a provocative and interesting evening.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1057

APRIL 16, 1938.

E. C. C. to Russell Shiman:

When I was seeing Ballantine, Thursday, in the State Department on another matter, he said he wished to talk to me about Virginia Thompson's notes on Siam. It appears that she has been most industrious in making voluminous notes from the private consular reports. The Department has been carefully scrutinizing these and hopes that, in the terms of my original application, she will use this material only as background. Ballantine and Spencer read me an "aide memoir," a copy of which I attach for your private information. Ballantine was clearly in a dilemma. He did not wish to have the Department appear rigid and restrictive with reference to Miss Thompson's work. At the same time, he felt that there was some material in Miss Thompson's notes which would be embarrassing if published, especially if the State Department was given as the source.

I think the Department has confidence in the I. P. R. and in Miss Thompson. At the same time, they were worried about a good deal of what they felt was irrelevant, marginal, and indiscreet in her notes.

I assured Ballantine and Spencer that Miss Thompson could be trusted to play the game 100 percent and that I would make a point of seeing her personally and assuring myself on this score before she sailed for Europe.

This I did yesterday afternoon with entirely satisfactory results as you can see from the attached letter to Mr. Ballantine.

It seemed to me that all the Department's points were well-taken, but I am sure that Miss Thompson's promise will dispel their fears.

For the purpose of their confidential information, I wish you would share this memorandum and the attached correspondence with Miss Porter, Mr. Lockwood, and Mr. Field.

EXHIBIT No. 1058

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
April 14, 1948.

In your letter of February 24, 1938, addressed to the Secretary, requesting permission for Miss Thompson to examine the political reports from Siam, it was stated that her desire was "solely to get background for her study, not in any case for direct quotation." It is on the basis of that understanding that it is, therefore, requested that the materials and information contained in the notes taken by Miss Thompson in no case be quoted from or be cited as obtained from official sources. In this connection, attention is invited in particular to the passages in the notes which have been marked on the margin with red pencil.

In addition, throughout the notes there will be found certain passages which have been marked with red brackets. It is desired that the information and statements contained in those bracketed passages in no wise be used, cited, or quoted from.

It is with the understanding that the above-mentioned conditions are acceptable to you and to Miss Thompson that there are being returned to you for delivery to Miss Thompson the notes under reference.

EXHIBIT No. 1059

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, April 15, 1938.

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE, Esq.,
Department of State,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. BALLANTINE: In accordance with my promise to you yesterday I have just handed Miss Thompson her notes and told her of my conversation with you and Mr. Spencer yesterday. I also gave her a copy of the memorandum which was the basis of our discussion.

As I expected Miss Thompson understood that her notes were solely to serve as background for her study and not in any case for direct quotation.

As I assumed was the case, she has just assured me that she was planning to make no reference whatsoever in her book to the privilege which you have accorded her; and, in addition, was planning to send you the whole manuscript informally before publication in the hope that you would feel free to read it to make doubly certain that at no point had she violated the understanding which was the basis of her work while in Washington.

Very sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1060

(Handwritten:) Copy. FVF return to ECC. A. W. Dulles.
Oumansky

Cable address: "Ladycourt," New York—Paris

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL

48 Wall Street, New York. 39 rue Cambon, Paris

NEW YORK, April 22, 1938.

EDWARD C. CARTER, Esq.,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd St.,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I want to tell you how much I enjoyed our dinner the other evening with Mr. Oumansky. It was one of the most interesting affairs of this character that I have attended for a long time.

Faithfully yours,

[s] A. W. Dulles
(A. W. DULLES.)

EXHIBIT No. 1061

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, May 8, 1938.

MISS VIRGINIA BURDICK,
American Russian Institute, 56 West 45th Street, New York City.

DEAR MISS BURDICK: The International Secretariat has arranged for the translation of the titles of every one of the maps in the "Great Soviet Atlas of the World." It has also arranged for the translation of detailed items on—

Map 27—Mineral resources of the world

" 53—World map of oil and coal industries

" 63—Map of the financial dependence of countries in the capitalist world

" 69—Map of the financial dependence of capitalist countries. Spheres
of capital investment

Map 83—Economic rivalry of imperialistic powers in the Pacific

" 99—Map of mineral resources of the U. S. S. R.

" 133-34—Fuel, mining metalurgical, and chemical industries in the European part of the U. S. S. R.

" 135-36—Machine-building and machine-working industries of the European part of U. S. S. R.

" 137—Machine-building and metal-working industries in the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R.

" 138—Forests, timber and paper industry of the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R.

" 141-42—Light industry in the European part of the U. S. S. R.

" 143—Light industry in the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R.

" 144—Food industry in the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R.

" 151—Industry within the limits of the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R. in 1913

" 152—Industrial map of the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R. in 1935

" 166—Map of the foreign trade of the U. S. S. R. (imports)

" 167—Map of the foreign trade of the U. S. S. R. (exports)

The translation takes about 28 pages of double-spaced typing. If this abbreviated translation is of any value to you it can be supplied by the International Secretariat at \$2.00 per copy.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1062

WASHINGTON, D. C., 23rd May, 1938.

Ref: 55886/749

Mr. I. F. Wixon,

U. S. Department of Labor, Immigration and Naturalization Service,

DEAR SIR: Very many thanks for your letter dated May 21st, advising me that you have directed that the visas of Mr. Chen Chu and Mrs. Susie Ku Chen be extended to May 18, 1939.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1063

Address Reply to Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization and Refer to File Number 55886/749

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Washington, May 21, 1938.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,

*Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52d Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR SIR: Referring to your letter of the 11th instant and your telegram of the 18th instant, you are advised that the Department has directed that the temporary admission of Mr. Chen Chu (Geoffrey C. Chen) and Mrs. Susie Ku Chen be extended to May 18, 1939.

Respectfully,

I. F. Wixon

I. F. WIXON, *Deputy Commissioner.*

EXHIBIT No. 1064

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, June 30, 1938.

Miss SYDNOR WALKER,

*The Rockefeller Foundation,
49 West 49th Street, New York.*

DEAR MISS WALKER: Have you any convictions as to whether the I. P. R. ought to seek to create in any of the Latin American countries unofficial societies for the scientific study of international affairs?

Both Sumner Welles and Lawrence Duggan in the State Department would give a good deal if the I. P. R. could catch on in Latin America.

Their difficulty and that of the I. P. R. is that in none of the states as yet is the nonofficial study of international affairs encouraged.

Have you, through any of your contacts or reports, any advice to give?

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1065

129 EAST 52ND STREET
New York, June 16, 1938.

MAXWELL M. HAMILTON, Esq.,

Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR HAMILTON: Would it be possible for you to arrange to have the enclosed letter sent to Salisbury in the diplomatic pouch? I am particularly anxious to avoid any risk of having it read by the censors of the present Peking regime.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1066

(Handwritten:) HM
KB
CHS
KM
MT

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

In the City of New York

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

DEAR CARTER: Thanks for your note. I'm not talking in public in re USSR. It's too darned complex, & we were there only 3 wks.

I did see Motylev, who is a corker. Got from him a glowing sense of a scientist at work in U. S. S. R.—as well, of course, as much inf'n.

We will "plan another visit," of course, but it isn't in sight as yet.

Cordially,

LYND.

EXHIBIT No. 1067

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, December 14, 1938.

Dr. ROBERT S. LYND,

Physics Building, Columbia University,

New York City

DEAR LYND: It was delightful to see you across the room at the Town Hall Club last week. I would like to hear your impressions of the U. S. S. R. and if you're giving them to any little group at Columbia, I hope I will be included in the invitation.

When your hurry-up letter came asking for letters of introduction to Moscow last summer, I was away. I got back to the office and received your letter a few hours before you sailed. Someone assured me that Oumansky had given you the necessary introductions so I did not send any. I do hope that Oumansky's letters gave you the necessary entree. If they didn't and you are planning another visit, give me a month's notice and I think I may be able to interest Dr. Motylev, the head of the U. S. S. R. IPR, in your visit. He has thus far been unflinching in the opportunities he has made available for all who have gone with our credentials.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1068

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

In the City of New York

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

JUNE 20, 1938.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,

*Institute of Pacific Relations, 120 East 52nd Street,
New York City*

DEAR CARTER: Mrs. Lynd and I are going into Russia this summer. We hope to settle down in a Middletown-sized community of 40-50,000 growing up around a new industrial site and try to get some sense of how social and community organization is taking place in Russia.

Geroid Robinson says we should certainly have a letter of introduction to the editor of the great Soviet Atlas. Robinson believes he would understand our problem and be helpful. If you know the editor and are in a position to give us a letter to him we would appreciate it a lot.

As we sail tomorrow (Tuesday) will you answer this in care of the Open Road, S W. 40th Street, New York City, attention of Miss Messenger?

Truly yours,

[s] ROBERT D. LYND.

EXHIBIT No. 1070

120 EAST 52nd STREET,
New York, June 18, 1938.

LAWRENCE E. SALISBURY, Esq.,

American Embassy, Peiping, China

DEAR SALISBURY: Would you be kind enough to see that the enclosed letter is delivered privately to Professor George Taylor at Yenching University? It so happens that I want to avoid any risk of its being read en route.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1071

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 27, 1938.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,

*Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street,
New York, New York*

DEAR Mr. CARTER: As requested in your letter of June 16, 1938, there is being sent in the diplomatic pouch to the American Embassy at Peiping your letter addressed to Mr. Laurence E. Salisbury, together with its enclosure addressed to Professor George E. Taylor, Yenching University. As you of course know the Department transmits private communications in the pouch only in exceptional cases.

Sincerely yours,

MAXWELL M. HAMILTON,
Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

EXHIBIT No. 1073

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Massachusetts, 19th July, 1938.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,

*c/o Allie Robinson's Camp,
Independence, California.*

DEAR OWEN: Thank you for your long and delightful letter of July 10 from Independence. What an intriguing name for editorial work in this particular age.

In the strictest confidence I am sending you a copy of Paul Scheffer's comment on Bloch's original outline (I did not tell Scheffer who wrote the outline).

With reference to Hu Shih, we had him here at Lee for a week-end conference just before he sailed. Chen and Chi were also here. Though both these men differ with Hu Shih very strongly, the both believe in his integrity of character. We are all trying to get him to write a major monograph to document the "temporizing policy" of Nanking in the last few years. He is convinced that the Generalissimo was preparing as fervently for ultimate resistance to Japan as were the Communists. We have asked him to go the whole way in making available documents that would prove his thesis. Whether we agree with his thesis or not it is important to have the job well done. This a a round about way of answering your question as to the weight which Hu Shih exerts in American circles and the extent in which he molds or leads the opinions of the Chinese in America. With Americans who have never heard of Chu Teh, Hu Shih stands out as a really great Chinese patriot—a man of dignity and a mind with a spacious point of view. To those Americans who feel that the Chinese Communists are making an epic contribution to Chinese unification Hu Shih seems to be living in the Victorian Age, albeit in rather a distinguished fashion. The reaction of Chinese in America to Hu Shih is similar to that of Americans according to their own line up on the question of Chinese Communists.

Thank you for the tip about Sereno. I will write to Lasswell today.

With reference to the question which you raise as to the role that you should play in view of Japanese attacks on the impartiality of members of American Council staff and the Pacific Council staff I am inclined to take the position that the American Council staff are in one category, the Chinese and Japanese members of the International Secretariat are in a second, and you, Bill Holland, and I in a third, though all three categories blur into each other. The American Council staff are responsible only to the American people. They thus should be among the freest people on earth. The Chinese and Japanese members of our own staff are chosen among other reasons because they are Chinese or Japanese and we want from them the fullest possible reflection of all that is most fundamental in the attitudes of their countries. You and Holland and the other non-Oriental members of the International Secretariat and myself are the servants of all eleven Councils. Our role is an almost impossible one. It might be likened to the role of the Speaker in the House of Commons, namely to ensure that every responsible point of view in the Institute is given a full hearing. This means that we ought to convince all the National Councils that whatever are our own private views, the Secretariat, the research program, the conferences, and Pacific Affairs are administered with complete detachment so that every responsible point of view is represented in the most favorable possible light.

If in our private capacities we take a line that is so conspicuous that any large element in our constituency feels that we cannot administer our international responsibilities with impartiality then I think that our non-Secretariat activities should be reconsidered. Some weeks ago I came to the tentative conclusion that so far as I myself am concerned I should seriously consider declining all public invitations to speak on the Far Eastern situation. By public invitations I mean those which are reported by the press. In the past month I have declined to write for Amerasia. I did this because in Japan Amerasia is regarded as having been founded with a definite anti-Japanese bias.

However unjust this feeling may be we have got to make some allowance for the exigencies of war psychology as it affects our Japanese friends.

Saionji is one of the straightest thinking of young Japanese. He has stood apart and above the muddled-headed war philosophy during the past year in a most striking manner. The other day I learned privately that he had single-handed raised the money that was needed to carry on the Japanese I. P. R. this year, but that now the donors were hammering him because of the line taken both by members of the International Secretariat and the American Council Staff. I understand that he feels that the American Council staff are free. In other words to his friends he defends the right of the American Council staff to take any line they want. But he finds it difficult to explain what appears to be partisanship on the part of members of the Secretariat. I personally wish that it was possible for you to withdraw from the Amerasia board in the interests of the major task of integration which we have ahead of us for the next two years. I do not think any hasty action is called for but it is a matter I have long wanted to discuss with you and have never had the opportunity.

I am exceedingly glad that you approve of the way Yasuo is functioning. If ever a man was in a hot spot he is it.

Motylev is going to the Soviet Far East instead of coming here. I am urging him to send Voitinsky in his place.

Dennery, Takayanagi, and Dafoe are all coming to Sunset Farm for ten days on August 10 to meet with the International Secretariat. Is there any chance of your coming east in time for this meeting or at least arriving by the 16th or 17th?

Would you let us know just how we should describe your Johns Hopkins appointment so that it can be announced in the next issue of I. P. R. NOTES.

If you are able to come on while Dennery is here you will be able to find out who the French counterparts of Archie Rose and Barbara Wooton are.

It is grand to hear that the family is all well and that you are making good progress on your book. If anything takes you to Seattle you may wish to look up John Alden Carter who is acting as an assistant to the president of McDougall Southwick Co. He is at present staying with Herb Little. Mrs. Carter and Ruth send their greetings to your whole household.

Yours very sincerely,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

FVF (Pencilled:)

EXHIBIT No. 1074

YENCHING UNIVERSITY

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

PEKING, CHINA

Telegraph Address: "Yenta"

JULY 20, 1938,

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,

Institute of Pacific Relations,

129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

MY DEAR NED: The last American mail brought your note and the clipping from the New York Times about happenings here. This was quite accurately reported, and I am impressed with the promptness with which the news reached America. It happens that thus far yours is the only word that had come to me about this, so that I am the more grateful.

There has been during the past few days a recrudescence of pressure on another matter, the yielding of which would seem to me to violate the principle of academic freedom. The matter is being dealt with at present on a basis of friendly negotiation, but if driven to it, we shall stand for our principles and take any consequences. I think the odds are, however, that those concerned will not carry it to any such extreme.

I hear indirectly that the IPR is considering the organizing of American opinion with a view to somewhat more definite action. If this is true, I feel very much pleased, and should like to be kept informed of developments.

With all good wishes.

Very sincerely yours,

[S] J. LEIGHTON STUART.

Jls/c

EXHIBIT No. 1075

SUNSET FARM,

Lee, Massachusetts, July 25, 1938.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,

1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR FRED: For a variety of reasons, both scholarly and politically, both the Chinese and Japanese outlines have been drastically revised. Enclosed for your advance information are copies of the latest edition of the two outlines.

The process and reason for these changes I will explain to you on my arrival.

I need hardly add that the following approve of the outlines as they now stand: Holland, Mitchell, Chen, Borton, Chi, Cholmeley, and myself.

None of the assignments to individual research workers, e. g., Borton, Chen, or Chi have in any way to be altered by reason of the reformulation of the outline of these two studies.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

ECC:K

EXHIBIT No. 1076

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, August 23, 1938.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.

Office.

DEAR HOLLAND: Yesterday, at the suggestion of W. W. Lockwood, Han-seng and I had a call from Theodore H. White who has this year graduated with high honors from Harvard University. Lockwood met him at the Institute of Far Eastern studies at the University of Michigan. White has been awarded a Frederick Sheldon fellowship by Harvard University. This fellowship is an unconditional grant and allows the holder to travel and observe in any part of the world he chooses. He plans to use this fellowship in order to go to the Far East to enter Chinese China and see and learn what he can. Ultimately, he would like to write and publish what he learns. Before coming he wrote me as follows:

"Although my broad general purpose is as I have set it forth, my specific objectives are, at present, somewhat hazy. There are a great many contemporary phenomena in Chinese life that I would like to study; for example: the economic reorganization within China since the outbreak of the war; the changing relationship of the provincial warlords to the Central Government; the shifting of the political base of the Kuomintang; and other problems."

I showed him a list of some of the questions on which we wish to get information and asked him which would be most interesting to him. I quote those that he checked:

What degree of political coalition exists among parties and groups since the Kuomintang National Conference of party delegates on March 29th? Particularly, what is the situation between the Kuomintang and his Communists?

There are many people in the government who have never liked the Communists. Why are these people now adopting a conciliatory attitude towards them?

How close does the Kwangsi faction stand with Chiang Kai-shek's group?

In China at present, both patriots and traitors are revealing themselves almost every day. Is it possible to have a general analysis of these two groups?

What recent improvements in communication have been made in China's northwest and southwest? What new factories have been set up in these sections?

To what extent and how has the Chinese army been transformed from its mercenary nature to a modern national force? What is the general composition of the present high strata of military officers? What is the general living condition and the discipline among the Chinese soldiers? Are there ideological differences among the different troops?

To what extent is the present personnel in the Chinese air force different from the prewar set-up? Has this new development any political significance in China?

It is generally recognized that the Partisan movement in Hopeh, Shansi, and western Shantung has attained a certain degree of success. To what extent may we say that the ex-students and ex-teachers of the Peiping-Tientsin area have organized and led this movement?

What are the most influential and most representative newspapers and magazines and to what degree do they enjoy freedom of speech?

In Hopeh the Japanese have recently reorganized the puppet political organization called The North-China Youth Party into an organization called Hsin Min-wei, which now directs the activities of at least four societies. These are, Hsin-min Academy, a training school for civil servants; The

Dawn of Asia Society; Federated Association for East Asia Culture; and Association for Promoting East Asian Peace. Is it possible to have a general analysis of the personnel and procedure of these Japanese-protected organizations?

Is it true that the Japanese authorities in China entertain different attitudes towards Great Britain and America? If so, what are they and what motivates them?

What can be inferred as the Soviet policy in China?

Do the German advisers in China take the same stand as the German Government and as the German merchants in China?

I wired to Fairbank, who was his principal tutor in Harvard, last night as follows:

"Please wire collect regarding T. H. White. Is his scholarship exceptional? How do you rate him on tact, social presentability, capacity to adjust to new situations, discretion, reliability?"

Today I have had his reply as follows:

"Decidedly exceptional. First history summa in three years supported himself through college stop Short stature Jewish features keen and sensitive reaction to people feeling for situations and motives mature experience of practical life in Dorchester environment inexperienced elsewhere but apparently adjusted will at Michigan this summer discreet and reliable without question first appearance probably unimpressive but markedly attractive personality immediately effective stop No hesitation recommending for anything requiring intelligence initiative selfreliance providing given forty-eight hours to learn the ropes."

He is coming in this afternoon to talk a little further with us and then returns to Boston where his home is 60 Greenwood Street, Dorchester, Mass. He is scheduled to sail for Europe on September 28. He will return here on the 27th in the hope of seeing Dick Walsh with a thought of making a tentative arrangement for a few articles after he has been in China a year. He has had three years of Chinese at Harvard and describes himself as "reading Chinese with difficulty, but, nevertheless, reading it." He hopes to get his spoken Chinese on reaching China. After leaving here he pays short visits to England, France, and possibly to Palestine, and hopes to reach one of the frontiers of China—either the Burmese or French—either December 15th or 31st. I gave him a copy of Mrs. I. A. Richards' letter to me describing briefly her journey from China to Burma. I also let him read Peter Fleming's London Times articles on the Burma road to China.

I would like to have a suggestion as to what specific requests we should make to him in response to his offer to act as a Secretariat fellow in China without any financial obligation on our part.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1077

SOVIET RUSSIA TODAY

"The truth about the Soviet Union"

114 EAST 32ND STREET
MURRAY HILL 3-3855-6

SEPTEMBER 1, 1938.

Dr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

My DEAR DR. CARTER: We are planning to publish a special anniversary issue of our magazine for November, centered largely around with subject of the Soviet struggle for peace, and with special emphasis on the Far Eastern situation. We should very much like to have an article from you for this issue dealing with the development of the Soviet Far East. If you feel that you can do this for us, I should appreciate an opportunity to come and discuss it with you, so that I may also get your advice on other angles of the problem that should be dealt with, and suggestions of others who might help us. Will you let me know

whether you would consider writing the article for us, and whether it would be convenient for you to have me come and see you sometime during the week following Labor Day?

Your radio speech, which you were good enough to let us publish in our May issue, was extremely popular with our readers, and many of them wrote to us commenting on it as one of the best articles we have ever published. So naturally we are anxious to have another article from you.

Sincerely yours,

JESSICA SMITH, *Editor.*

EXHIBIT No. 1078

28TH SEPTEMBER, 1938.

ECC from CH-s:

Last week when Fred came in and discussed with me the matter of getting Soong to a small dinner, I told him that so far as I was informed, Soong was in this country, having arrived with K. P. Chen, but that to get him to the public perhaps is difficult. As I was told by some Chinese in private, Soong is to deal with the loan matter while Chen's delegation is negotiating on the matter of silver purchase. I suggested to Fred that it would be safe and desirable to sound out somebody in the Treasury Department to reach Young first, and then through Young to get a private interview with Soong. I added that the idea of a small dinner would not probably be feasible. Now, according to Hornbeck, even Chen may not respond to such an invitation at this time. I have just telephoned to the Chinese Consulate asking the Consul whether Soong is here. His answer was that Soong has not come but that even if he were here it would be better to deny it.

EXHIBIT No. 1079

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, September 29, 1938.

Professor FELIX FRANKFURTER.

DEAR FRANKFURTER: H. J. Timperley, the Manchester Guardian's China correspondent, has recently arrived in this country, having flown from China after nearly a year there after the war started. While in London he had occasion to inform himself intimately with regard to the attitudes of different sections of London life toward the developing Far Eastern struggle. I think you will enjoy meeting him. He has had more than ten years in the Far East and has had the friendship of many of the best Chinese and Japanese.

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1080

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Amsterdam—Honolulu—London—Manila—Moscow—New York—Paris—Shanghai—
Sydney—Tokyo—Toronto—Wellington

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

11TH OCTOBER, 1938.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,

300 Gilman Hall,

Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: Neither Harriet Moore nor I have seen Kantorovich's name or nom de plume in any Soviet magazines or newspapers recently. In view of the request that Bremman made to me regarding Kantorovich, I would be inclined to suggest that you should not write direct to Kantorovich but write to Motylev saying that your first choice would be Kantorovich, if he is once more able to write, if he is not, would Motylev ask whatever Soviet scholar is best qualified.

Maybe you don't want to give Motylev as much leeway as this. I am inclined to think that if you write to Motylev as though you thought Kantorovich was still certain to be in his orbit, he will feel that the staff work in the International Secretariat is bad.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1082

SUNSET FARM,

Lee, Massachusetts, 16th October, 1938.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,
*Institute of Pacific Relations,
 1795 California Street,
 San Francisco, California.*

DEAR FRED: In accordance with Miss Wiss's suggestion I invited Meharally to a meeting in the Pacific Council Library attended by Farley, Lockwood, Chen Han-seng, Yasuo, Fairfax-Cholmeley, Downing, Friedman, and Ruth Carter. Meharally gave an illuminating account of his experience at the Labor Congress in Mexico and then swung into a vivid description both of the open and underground political movement in India. He is a brilliant student and a very shrewd political organizer. He has been in prison often and is clearly connected with a movement that is steadily increasing its power with English domination clearly on the wane but by no means finished. Yasuo must have been distinctly interested in his remark that, though after the Russo-Japanese war the Indians regarded the Japanese as Gods, he doubted there was any other country in the world now that was as completely anti-Japanese as was India. He had been informed that the boycott against Japan in India was more complete than in any other country.

Another matter may be of interest to you. Harold Laski is lecturing at Teachers College. He spoke at a Council House dinner last week on British Labor Movement and British Foreign Policy. It was an amazingly clear analysis by the most studied understatement. He left in my view no shred of justification for the Chamberlain policy. The audience was predominantly tory and while all were not convinced of Laski's thesis, I think everyone must have felt that as sheer tour de force in political analysis Council House had never witnessed such a performance.

I have no idea yet of Laski's plans, but I would love to see Pacific Center arrange at the Pacific Union Club a dinner of the sixty "most powerful figures in San Francisco business" and turn Laski loose on them.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1083

OCTOBER 17, 1938.

E. C. C. to I. F.:

Here is the State Department's reply to my letter of October 6 regarding registration of the Pacific Council. Would you immediately read the rules and regulations as well as the registration form, and advise me as to what action I should take?

EXHIBIT No. 1084

(Penciled initials:) CP
 MRT

SUNSET FARM,

Lee, Massachusetts, 20th October 1938.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,
*Institute of Pacific Relations,
 1795 California Street, San Francisco, California.*

DEAR FRED: Night before last Herbert S. Little arrived full of the European situation. He seems to have managed to check in at each European capital at just the right moment—in Prague just after Runciman wrote his ghastly letter to Chamberlain, in the House of Commons when Churchill made his scathing arraignment, in Berlin when Hitler made his Nuremburg speech, in Moscow

when the Bolsheviks were seething of Lindbergh's reported luncheon conversations in London, and in Vienna, Paris, Munich, etc. at crucial moments.

Motylev and Harrondar were hospitality personified during his five days in Moscow. That visit made a profound impression on him, and of course was indispensable in rounding out his European experience.

As I assume you will be seeing him in the near future, I hope you can help him in sorting out his experiences so that he grasps the deeper meaning of all that he witnessed. Do not let his audiences encourage him to dwell on personalities so that he fails to pass on a picture that will reinforce the realistic study of the world situation to which you are summoning members of the American Council.

I think with a little coaching you could get him to give at a private meeting limited to members of the American Council at Pacific Center an account of his observations which would be valuable to them and of exceptional value to him if you are able to get him to base his statement on a fundamental political and economic philosophy.

If you can help him to measure up to your standard in a performance in San Francisco, it may be that you will want to use him at an early date for the members in Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle.

Unfortunately his time in New York was so crowded that I was not able to reach any conclusion as to the stage he himself has reached in making a fundamental analysis. He has, however, the raw material for something that may be important. You can help him greatly in ensuring successful accomplishment.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1085

(Hand written:) WLH
KM

NEW ASIA HOTEL, LTD.,
Canton, May 28, 1938.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
*General Secretary, Institute of Pacific Relations,
57 Post Street, San Francisco.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have just concluded my journey through the Chinese interior and the front, which I thought to restrict to a period of two months but it lasted twice as much due to the delays in communication. I have collected all the material needed for my study, and I return to Shanghai to write the final manuscript. Now, you wanted to have the final manuscript in New York end of July, and I agreed to it, but it becomes now quite impossible. However, I can deliver at that time a considerable part of it, and then the rest in parts during August. It means that the whole manuscript will be in New York no later than one month after the date we have agreed upon, which is due to the exceptional difficulties I had to overcome a comparatively very short delay. I am sure you will understand the situation and excuse me for the unavoidable delay. Please address all correspondence for me through your office at Shanghai.

Yours very truly,

[s] M. G. SHIPPE,
(Handwritten:) (Asiaticus).

EXHIBIT No. 1086

Copies to CP
MRT
1ST NOVEMBER 1938.

N. Hanwell from ECC:

H. B. Elliston of the Christian Science Monitor was in the office yesterday and inquired whether someone on the staff of the American Council would be willing to send him such information as the American Council has on the present routes into China and a rough estimate of the munition-carrying capacity of each. Specifically he mentioned: the motor roads from Indo-China into Yunnan, the railway from Indo-China into Yunnan, the road or roads across the desert which bring in Russian supplies, and the road from the Burman frontier which is under construction. I told him that there was not a great deal of reliable

information about, but he thought that someone in the American Council must have a lot.

If you are interested, what can you get together? Have you been in correspondence with Owen Lattimore to see whether he has been over to Washington to see his friend Major Mayer in G-2? He admires Lattimore so much that he probably would give Lattimore all the information that G-2 has.

Elliston is about to write an article for the Atlantic Monthly and wants to use anything the American Council has on the different munitions routes into China. I don't know whether you will care to supply Elliston with this information or whether you want to use it yourself. In general it is a good thing to cooperate with Elliston. You probably saw recently the fine blurb which he or someone contributed to the Christian Science Monitor on October 25th reviewing Miss Farley's pamphlet on American Far Eastern Policy.

EXHIBIT No. 1087

(Copy of this letter sent to Virginia Burdick)

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, November 4, 1938.

FREDERICK P. KEPPEL, Esq.,
Carnegie Corporation of New York,
522 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

DEAR KEPPEL: The work of the American Russian Institute is both well done and important. The very fact that the Bolsheviks are so generally unpopular in the United States makes the maintenance of the clear-headed, able, fact-finding work of the A. R. I. all the more important to the American people. I know of few organizations which are as greatly needed at the present time, nor do I know any which do as big a work on as small a budget. I wanted you to know that I hope the appeal now before you will merit favorable action.

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1088

ECC TO CHS
KB

CC.OL

NOVEMBER 9, 1938.

Owen Lattimore has just written me as follows:

"Enclosed I am sending you a review of the 'Trotsky Vindication' by Kingsley Martin, who is editor of the NEW STATESMAN. I shall be particularly interested in your comments. Do you think we should print the review as it stands, or drop it, or get some other comment to put with it? I shall eagerly reserve my own comments until I have yours."

Attached is the article by Kingsley Martin on Trotsky. It seems to me that this article adds nothing to the subject except Kingsley Martin's opinion. It is an interesting opinion but it seems a little like flogging a dead horse.

I don't know whether the article has come in solicited by Lattimore or not. Lattimore's own writing on this subject is so much more meaty than Kingsley Martin's that I would mildly vote for returning the manuscript to the author.

Would each of you, however, without reference to my bias against the article, write your own views to Lattimore.

EXHIBIT No. 1089

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, November 9, 1938.

MISS HARRIET MOORE,
American Russian Institute,
56 West 45 Street, New York City.

DEAR HARRIET: I assume that you have already seen in the October-December 1938 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST the article on archeology in the U. S. S. R. by

Henry Field and Eugene Prostov. Henry Field is a new member of the American Council of the I. P. R. and is authority for the statement that the U. S. S. R. has at the present moment more archeological expeditions in the field than all the rest of the world put together.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1090

(Handwritten :) Copy sent to B. L. 1/10/39, re *S. F.* Exposition.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Amsterdam—London—Manila—Moscow—New York—Paris—Shanghai—Sydney—Tokyo—
Toronto—Wellington

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

129 East 52nd Street, New York

DECEMBER 15, 1938.

MR. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Office.

DEAR FRED: In continuation of my note forwarding a copy of Lasker's letter of December 8 about Soviet participation in the San Francisco Exposition, I had a few moments with Oumansky in Washington and he said that the Soviet Government was not in a position to participate adequately in two simultaneous expositions. There is a Russian proverb that one cannot dance at two wedding ceremonies at the same time. The dance in the New York Fair will be in the grand manner and very expensive.

If Californians on their own initiative wish to do something in San Francisco in the field of art, literature or music, the Soviet Government would probably assist, but any exhibit on the Fair grounds, signalized by flying the Soviet flag, etc., would probably not be welcomed by the Soviet Government which would, I am sure, be unalterably opposed to anything of an amateurish nature in the Fair grounds which might be mistaken by visitors as the best the great Soviet Government could do, and thus subject to highly invidious comparison.

I gather that the San Francisco American Russian Institute has raised the question and that probably you may wish to suggest to Lasker that he discover how far that organization has gone in a library, or an art exhibit or what not, on the old mainland of San Francisco within the city limits.

I assume that you will want to suggest to Lasker that he decide whether the Fair or the American Council, whichever Lasker is, want to go ahead independently or in cooperation with the A. R. I. I gather that there is now in New York an excellent Soviet art exhibit and a book exhibit which might be sent to San Francisco at the time of the Fair under the sponsorship of some American organization. Harriet Moore would know all about these items.

I read between the lines that a great deal of musical talent is likely to come from the U. S. S. R. to the New York Fair. I can envisage nothing more musically thrilling and socially contradictory than to create a music lovers corporation—Wallace M. Alexander & Bruno Lasker, Inc.—which might sponsor in the Municipal Opera House under the auspices of Presidents Wilbur and Sproul a really first-class series of performances of Soviet pianists, violinists, ballet and national folk music, interspersed with cantatas by, say, the Red Army chorus, if this exciting musical society could be persuaded to visit the capitalist shores of San Francisco and Long Island.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1092

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, December 15, 1938.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.
300 Gilman Hall,
The Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: I have just been reading your letter of the 12th to Miss Van Kleeck. I do not know that you need to be too afraid of Archibald MacLeish

because I think he still feels under a considerable debt of obligation to the I. P. R. on account of letters which I gave him to Ushiba. On his return he told me that these gave him more insight than he got from any other source. Ushiba apparently let him into the inner shrine and I think MacLeish attributes a good deal of what success the FORTUNE on Japan had to the time and trouble that Ushiba took.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1093

DECEMBER 20, 1938.

WLH from ECC:

Could you or Lilienthal edit this report of Calder's so as to take out all traces of its being the work either of Calder or of an official of the United States Government? All names should be eliminated or hints of names indirectly. For example, on page 5 the identity of the high official Chinese mentioned at the beginning of the last paragraph, should be still further obscured. You or Lilienthal should go through the whole thing with a fine-tooth comb to see that all traces of sources or authorship are completely obliterated. Then I can see no reason why this should not be circulated to the people you mention.

Before, however, mimeographing this and sending it to a dozen people in different countries, I think you and I should talk over the whole problem with Field in the light of the desirability of carrying out your suggestion of getting these materials coming into the office in a steady stream from Washington.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter I am sending to Roger Greene.

If we decide to send this information outside the office, it should be with a personal letter asking that none of the material be quoted.

You will note that Greene in his covering letter said: "If you do not allow them to be *quoted* I see no reason why you should not use them *in your organization*."

We have got to be very careful in making certain that the use of this material with non-Americans does not prove to be a boomerang.

EXHIBIT No. 1094

[Day letter]

JANUARY 10, 1939.

CONSTANTINE OUMANSKY

Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.:

Expecting Ploppin and you lunch tomorrow Wednesday Century Club at one. Among acceptances are: Roger Levy, Paris; Liu Yuwan, Chen Hanseng, China; W. L. Holland, New Zealand; Professors Philip Jessup and Joseph Chamberlain, Columbia; also Frederick Field, W. W. Lancaster, T. A. Bisson.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1095

[Telegram]

JANUARY 10, 1939.

GRENVILLE CLARK,

31 Nassau Street, New York City:

Could you lunch Century tomorrow or on Wednesday; meet Ploppin, legal advisor, Soviet Foreign Office.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1097

[Day letter]

JANUARY 18, 1939,

CONSTANTINE OUMANSKY

Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.;

I desire Liu Yuwan very able secretary China Institute Pacific Relations see you for half hour at your convenience. Please wire have you any time free on the twentieth, twenty-first, twenty-second, or twenty-third.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1098

JANUARY 23, 1939.

Mr. EDWARD CARTER,

*c/o American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.*

MY DEAR NED: I am awfully happy to learn that you are coming out this February in connection with preparations for the International Conference in October. Ben Kizer and I have both written to Fred Field to utilize you for a talk, and doubtless Fred has already talked with you about it. I do hope that you can lengthen your visit in Seattle so that the date will be a little more convenient for getting out a good crowd. This would really be a "kick-off" dinner.

John and I would both like to have you stay at the house. There will be plenty of room for you there, as we have two unused bedrooms, one of which could be used by Ruth, or anyone else in your company, and the other by yourself. John has a portable typewriter, and if this would not be sufficient we could borrow a regular typewriter for you. You would have more room in which to operate, and I would be happy to loan you my car so that the distance from the business center would not be a pressing problem.

By the way, was Motylev at the Pacific Council meeting? I have often wondered, especially in view of his remarks to me concerning the feasibility of future Soviet participation. I do hope he came and that the Soviet group will remain in.

Please pardon me for having inadvertently mislaid your letter sending me the article written by Maxwell S. Stewart in the Bulletin on the Soviet Union of October 15th.

On the whole I would agree with Stewart's position except I doubt that there was much stiffening in the French attitude after Litvinov's speech, although I do think there was a stiffening of the Czechoslovakia attitude, I think the pattern of French foreign policy has not really changed very much since the Austrian Anschluss any more than Chamberlain's policy. There is not much doubt in my mind that Chamberlain, Halifax, Bonnet and probably Daladier have thought all year of eventually arriving at a four-power pact. As far as future Soviet foreign policy is concerned I must say that I was greatly impressed with Joe Barnes' thoughtful analysis. He prefaced his remarks by saying that the new generation Bolsheviks "who have never been abroad" is at the helm now. The men behind Stalin are men whose whole mind set has been directed by a score of years of operation within the framework of the Soviet social order. Those who are now in charge of shaping government policy are not the old diplomats, but younger men taken from industry and trade organizations instead of from the humanistic professions.

One of Joe's principal points was that in the immediate future the policy of the government will be to neutralize the forces of war. He spoke of a possible, although not necessarily likely alternative of rapprochement with Germany to make the gentlemen in Paris and London feel uncomfortable, and perhaps force them to change their policy. He spoke also of a continued desire for good will and closer relations with the United States. He also mentioned the likelihood of a determined effort to win back the Oslo Bloc to a policy of "objective neutrality." He believes that the Soviet Union will now concentrate in preparing to defend itself singlehanded. The Soviet Union will, of course, endeavor to build up more friendly relations with Poland and Rumania. This would be justified on the short-term basis of self defense in order to give the Union that modicum of time which it undoubtedly needs to put its own house in order, especially in view of the loss of leadership following the purge.

The intensive Bolshevization of Soviet life, particularly in the army, is most significant. For example, Leo Mekhlis, a forty-eight-year-old Jew recently editor of Pravda is now in charge of the Bolshevization of the army. He ranks in authority above the Marshals. While this would be criticized by army strategists, nevertheless it is felt necessary as a policy measure. I got the very definite impression after talking with many people, that the rank and file of the soldiers are genuinely loyal and also that they are pretty well treated. I also got the impression that cruel as the purge was, probably partly necessary and partly unnecessary, nevertheless in the main it was justified on the ground that it has temporarily at least brushed aside the danger of counter revolution.

If the Soviet Union can delay for two or three years longer any attack from the west or the east its position will become nearly invulnerable. From many estimates which I received in Moscow I am inclined to think that at this moment there are at least 3,500 first-line planes attached to the two western armies, to-wit, the White Russian and the Kiev armies, which aggregate pretty close to 400,000 men, and that there are between 2,000 and 2,500 first-line planes in the Far East with a force of approximately 350,000 men. Furthermore, during all of this crisis the Red Army of 1,300,000 men, excluding the border troops of NKVD approximating probably 300,000, have been fully mobilized. Furthermore, I suppose that the Russians have more fully trained reserves than any other nation in Europe, not excepting France.

I do not believe the Soviet Union would yield a single inch of territory. I think a compromise with Germany involving a cession of the Ukraine would be out of the question. The Soviet Union, like England and France, might be willing to sacrifice another Czechoslovakia, but not its own territory. It might be willing to agree to the partition of Poland, by no means an unnatural alternative, but I think they would fight to the end to defend themselves. Many times they mentioned to me "Remember Napoleon", and they do not believe that either Japan or Germany could defeat them.

I am sorry that I have written at such length, but having once started I became too interested in the problem to make the letter as short as I had intended.

With best wishes to you, and hoping to see you soon, I remain

Sincerely,

HERBERT S. LITTLE.

HSL: C

EXHIBIT No. 1099

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 2nd February, 1939.

CONSTANTINE OUMANSKY, Esq.,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: Thank you most sincerely for sending me the text of the theses to be delivered by Mr. Molotov on March 10.

Looking forward to seeing you on Sunday, I am,

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT 1100

FEBRUARY 13, 1939.

NH from ECC:

Here is what Lattimore has written Utley regarding Haldore Hanson. Do you think that you ought to put Lattimore wise?

ECC from NDH:

I had an all afternoon discussion yesterday with Hal Hanson on every type of topic possible and must say that I'm at a loss to understand how the impression got abroad that he was particularly anti-Soviet. Despite his unpleasant experiences in Yenan, due to undiplomatic question he asked, he seems all for the guerillas even though he may discount some of the publicity about them. It may be that he was careful because he knows of my particular bias, but I feel his background is quite solid. For factual material, he is full to overflowing with good stuff—critical and commendable. He has lost his worship of Chiang K'ai-shek and seems sounder and more mature than when I last knew him in China. If someone praises too much he might point to the black side that we all know exists, but otherwise he seems to maintain a proper balance.

EXHIBIT No. 1101

c/o JOHN A. CARTER, Esq., MACDOUGALL SOUTHWICK CO.,
Seattle, Wash., 21st February 1939.

Miss HARRIET MOORE,
*American Russian Institute,
 56 West 45th Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR HARRIET: Here is a letter from George Marshall and a copy of my reply. I wish you would wire me collect as to whether I am right in having a hunch that it is a little bit better for me not to accept this invitation.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1102

129 EAST 52d STREET,
New York, N. Y., 14th March, 1939.

CONSTANTINE OUMANSKY, Esq.,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: I was on the point of writing you asking if you could give me a copy of the full text of Stalin's March 10th speech, when the postman brought it to me. This is yet one more evidence of your unfailing thoughtfulness.

I am almost certain to be in Washington on Friday and Saturday. If I am I will telephone you in the hope that you may have a few minutes to spare.

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1103

Executive Committee, San Francisco, Bay Region Division: Ray Lyman Wilbur, Chairman; Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin, Vice Chairman; Robert Gordon Sproul, Vice Chairman; Jesse Steinbart, Treasurer; Wallace M. Alexander; Carl L. Alsberg; Allan E. Charles; Harry Deans; Mrs. Edward H. Heller; Ira S. Lillick; Mrs. Duncan McDuffie; William F. Morrish; Mrs. William H. Orrick; Charles Page, Jr.; Chester Rowell; Paul Scharrenberg; Richard S. Turner; John H. Oakie, Secretary
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AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

1795 California Street, San Francisco
 Telephone TUxedo 3114—Cable Address: Inparel

MARCH 23, 1939.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I took Chen Han-seng to Palo Alto yesterday where he had what I hope was a fruitful half hour or so with Dr. Wilbur and what I am sure was a fruitful lunch with Hobart Young, H. H. Fisher, Merrill Bennett, Masland and a few others. I was not at the luncheon as I had other business with Radius and a graduate student by the name of Bloch whom I hope to draft for IPR work. Han-seng informed me, however, that he was delighted to have discovered H. H. Fisher as a man who knows far more about the USSR than the more widely known Kerner of the University of California.

I will give you a complete report on Chen's local activities within a few days.

Bill Lockwood has just arrived and is this moment in conference with Hall, a doctoral student from the University of Michigan, who is en route to Baja, California to renew his studies of the Japanese in Mexico.

Very sincerely,

[s] Jack JOHN H. OAKIE.

EXHIBIT No. 1104

129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK CITY,
March 28, 1939.

Purely personal

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esquire,
300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: If you have a chance to write Carlson saying that there are certain advantages in his remaining in the Navy, I hope you will not hesitate to do so, for it may be, I suppose, that the Navy will ask him to reconsider. Your view as expressed in your letter of March 27 to me might be helpful.

I think it would be a good scheme to write McWilliams asking whether he would like to have you publish a protest on the New Zealand article. I think the more people see that their protests are recognized, the more they will have faith in the desire of the editor to include an expression of varying points of view. It also will encourage people who have not yet dared to criticize this or that article to come forward.

I am glad that the Fairbanks are staying with you. You will doubtless be able to help Fairbanks realize what his generally good knowledge of contemporary China really means.

Are you in touch with anyone in Baltimore or Washington who is able to bring illumination to the committees of the Senate and the House on Foreign Affairs with reference to the terrible deficiencies of Pittman's bill, to be known as "The Peace Act of 1939," in so far as it applies to the Far Eastern situation?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1105

19TH APRIL, 1939.

MRT from ECC:

As a follow up on our lunch with Mr. Plant you may wish to ring him up and say that on Monday I was informed by two members of the Far Eastern division of the State Department that Ambassador Johnson was returning to China on the next sailing of the *President Coolidge*. For particulars please note the enclosed copy of my letter to Field.

EXHIBIT No. 1106

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Maryland, April 21, 1939.

Dr. V. E. MOTYLEV,
20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR DR. MOTYLEV: Your book on "Origin and Development of the Pacific Ocean Nexus of Contradiction" has just arrived. It is too late to be reviewed in our June issue, but I am listing it among the important books recommended to readers of PACIFIC AFFAIRS, and I shall review it myself in the September issue. I have already started reading it and want to tell you how much I admire the clarity of your analysis and the precision of your statements.

A review of such an important book helps to make up for the lack of articles in PACIFIC AFFAIRS by Soviet authors, but it all the more stimulates my ambition to get direct contributions from you and some of your colleagues. Take the case of such a book as this. It would have been an editorial triumph if we could have published in translation one of the chapters, either before the appearance of the book or simultaneously. To translate from it now would not be quite the same thing. It would look as though, in spite of the fact that there is a Soviet Council of the I. P. R., we were unable to secure original contributions by Soviet authors.

I am now working myself on the conclusion of my book on Inner Asian Frontiers of China. It ought to be finished next month. Then there will still

be the planning of a number of maps, and a good deal of work in connection with completing footnotes and bibliography. However, the book is now definitely planned for publication in January by the American Geographical Society.

When that is over, I hope to be able to take up some new work on contemporary aspects of Mongolia and Western China. One thing on which I should especially like to do some studying is the Moslems of China—both those who speak Chinese and those who speak Turkish.

With cordial personal regards,

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 1107

CC to Mrs. Carter and RDC.

ON BOARD: S. S. "PRESIDENT DOUMER",
Tokyo to Hongkong, 20th May, 1939.

Private and confidential

Miss KATE MITCHELL,
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, U. S. A.

DEAR KATE: For the most part this will be an off-the-record letter, not for official circulation round the office or for insertion in the official Secretariat files. Its contents, however, may be communicated orally by preference to Holland, Field, and Lattimore. It should not go into either the Amco or the Paco files.

With reference to Boku (Pakh) you may all regard him as a turncoat, a crook, a spy, a patriot or statesman, but whatever your classification of him, I think you will conclude, if you get him to talk frankly, that he is able and courageous. Publicly and privately he is able to make sense out of the positive side of the organisation of Manchuria. Of more interest to you will be his private opinion of the muddle and futility of the Japanese invasion of North China. A professor of agricultural economics in Tokyo told us of the beneficence of Japan in Peiping with the reorganisation of all the universities into a single great joint Sino-Japanese university; of the settlement established by a dozen charming recent girl graduates of Miss Hani's school in Tokyo for the girls of the Peking slums. That effort can be described with the same enthusiasm that characterised Mrs. Humphrey Ward's account of Passmore Edward's settlement in London forty years ago, or the brave deeds of Junior Leaguers in the Isle of Manhattan. The professor told us that there were now 70,000 Japanese in Peking and that if Chiang Kai-shek did not come back soon, Peking would be a Japanese city. Boku gave a different picture, the point being that 70 Japanese gangsters arrive in Peking daily from Japan and go on with their work of spoilation, adding indescribable exploitation to the chaos and disorganisation of the invading army. Boku is unreservedly contemptuous of the complete lack of psychology that has characterised Japanese effort in China, nor is there in his view any improvement in Japanese psychology in Korea. Although publicly he describes the positive achievements in Manchuria, I suspect that privately he has more admiration for the Korean bandits who are still a far from negligible thorn in the flesh of the Manchukuo Government. These Korean bandits he describes with an enthusiasm similar to the paragraphs of Snow and Bertram in their eulogy of the Eighth Route leaders. I hope you, Fred, Bill, Owen, and Bisson may be able to get him to talk as candidly to you as he did to me. Hypothesis number 7 would be that he is agent provocateur extraordinaire. If this is his real role, then he deserves the highest pay for the quality of his acting in my conversation with him two years ago in Hsinking and last week in Tokyo. As I think I have already written you, he is leaving Chicago about the 8th June. He is then going to have a few days in Washington before coming to New York. He will then sail on the "Queen Mary" on the 21st June for Warsaw where as Consul-General of Manchukuo he is expected to bring about closer relationship between his own and the Polish Government.

For the purposes of confirmation I wish now to quote copies of cables and radio letters which I hope were ultimately clear and that you were able to separate the paragraphs which may go into the files from those which were purely personal and unofficial. They are as follows:

Cable from Kobe on the evening of the 19th:

"Fred Owen: If you discover George inclined to stronger policy than writing notes urge you arrange he see Stanley Cordell without fail. Stop. Very important you win Joseph to Harry's viewpoint ask Hilda tell Philip approve Purvis if she does."

Radio letter sent from the "Doumer" on the evening of the 20th:

"George Means Sansom, Joseph Grew, Harry Price Treat, Fred Owen message strictly confidential George may prove more progressive than Joseph send Craigie affairs my request stop what would Jessup, Field, Holland you think Victoria consist national councils staffs international secretariat Paco officers inquiry contributors Ushiba Saionji privately suggested this believing Victoria more possible and better results if composed younger generation."

Soon after my arrival in Tokyo I had a private talk with Ambassador Grew whom you know is one of the ablest, straightest and finest ambassadors the United States has anywhere in the world. His prestige with the people of Japan is rightly greater than that of any other Ambassador. His conversations with the Japanese authorities have never lacked in candour. It is quite clear that he has put tremendous pressure on highly placed Japanese in order to get the government and the army to take the view which apparently the navy takes, that a military alliance between Tokyo and Berlin would be certain to lead to a long and terrible war between Japan and the United States in the event of a European war into which he and the Japanese navy believe the United States would inevitably be drawn. No one is more aware of the barbarity of the Japanese army's behaviour in China than Grew. No one is more aware of the fact that there is a vast gulf between the charming, gentle and sophisticated Japanese who surround the Embassy and the Japanese army and Japanese gangsters who are overrunning the Mainland. Nevertheless Grew has the same hope that many of us cherish, namely, that the Japan of the future shall not become a slave of Hitler with Gestapo agents adding subtlety and strength to the barbaric impertinence of the Japanese militarists. Rather he envisages the ultimate triumph in Japan of the school of thought which now characterizes the throne. This school maintains that Japan's natural political and intellectual friends are the Americans and to a certain extent the English and that the American rather than the German way of life will best serve the people of the Japanese Empire. With the double aim of wooing Japan away from Hitler and strengthening the position of those whose deepest desire is that Japan be worthy of American friendship, Grew believes that American sanctions against Japan would be decisive in deflecting the course of history and throw all Japan into Hitler's arms. This Grew conceives as a calamity alike to Japan and to the United States. I surmise that he thinks that sanctions would not only lead to a military alliance between Tokyo and Berlin (I wonder whether perhaps it has not already been made), but would lead to war between Japan and the United States. If I were to disagree with Grew, and this I should hesitate to do because of my superficial knowledge of the Far East, it would be only at this last point, namely, that United States sanctions would lead to war between Japan and the United States. Every day in Japan revealed how critically Japan is dependent on the United States for her campaign in China and for economic survival at home. A 100% economic embargo might, I think, quickly lead to war because Japan's position would soon become so desperate that war itself with the United States would hardly be a more ghastly alternative. But the desire for friendship with America combined with the fear of America are influences which I think would prevent war if the sanctions were gradual and explained on the very rational grounds which already exist for such action. Let the United States begin with machinery, machine tools, trucks, scrap and oil. Gradualism would give the extremists less of a case than a complete severance of all economic relations.

Grew's stature and courage never impressed me more. He is certainly right in his view that the American public does not want war with Japan. He is certainly right that Japan has more to gain in the long run in freedom and progress by cultivating America rather than Nazi friendship, but whether he is right that no means exist stronger than words but short of war, I question. Unfortunately my visit synchronised with his last days in Tokyo. He was under terrific pressure and the landing at Kulangsu came only twenty-four hours before his boat left. Otherwise I would have tried to lead him to my view or endeavour to accept his, for he as much as I desire to see Japan saved from the almost certain ruin towards which the extremists are rushing her today.

As this was impossible for lack of time, I am hoping that you can persuade Field or Lattimore or Holland or any two of them to have long talks with Grew soon after his return, for several reasons: first, you all ought to get to know his views more thoroughly than I was able in our short talk; second, if his analysis is different from yours, he would enormously appreciate getting the benefit of the views of those whose central purpose is so close to his own. He was full of enthusiasm for Mr. Roosevelt's letter to Hitler and for Roosevelt's whole foreign policy. He was tremendously pleased to learn that in answer to questions from Japanese Cabinet Ministers I had replied that even though Roosevelt had the support of but, say, 55% of the American public, his letter to Hitler probably had the support of 80% of Americans.

As you know, Sansom sailed a few days before we arrived. Missing him was a great disappointment. I wirelessed his steamer to ask whom I had best see in his Embassy in his absence. He radioed back recommending that I see the Ambassador himself. This I did. I had never met him before and must confess that my former picture of his views was incorrect, or it may be that his views have undergone a radical change. In any event he seemed to me to have views that more nearly approximated those of Harry Price than any Englishman I have met for a long time. He assured me that the entire Embassy staff was united. He very definitely feels that there are measures stronger than words, short of war, that both his government and the American government can take in the present situation. He was obviously pleased that the British Navy with or without Cabinet instruction had landed at Kulangsu. He quite obviously believes that the time for appeasement in the Far East has ended though he clearly hopes that Japan can be persuaded to extricate herself from a Military Alliance with Berlin and Rome. I suspect that if he were pressed he would repudiate the Japanese propaganda that he and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr hold antithetical views. I told him of the Imperial Hotel lobby gossip about peace terms which were, according to a terribly well-informed* English hireling of the Japanese, to be British recognition of Manchukuo; a British loan of 50 million sterling for reconstruction in North China, Japanese withdrawal from Canton, and British opportunity in the Yangtse provided Britain recognised that Japan had succeeded her as a dominant power in the area. The British would demand also the Japanese withdrawal from Hainan, but this the Japanese could not concede. Sir Robert dismissed all this as utterly fantastic and obviously could not see the slightest possibility of a London loan to Japan for North China reconstruction.

From the foregoing, I hope that you and your colleagues will be able to make sense out of my cable and radio letter.

Please send Sir Robert Craigie, "Pacific Affairs" beginning with the June issue for one year, telling him that you are sending it at my request. The latter part of my message about Victoria is the only one which you need to trouble Jessup with. If it is not completely intelligible, it will be when you receive by, I hope, this same mail, a copy of my long letter to Jessup reporting on my negotiations with the Japanese Council in Tokyo.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1108

Unofficial

CARLTON COURT, PALL MALL PLACE,
London. S. W. 1 June 29, 1939.

MR. V. E. MOTYLEV,
20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MOTYLEV: This is to thank you most sincerely for your help while I was in Moscow. My main object was to have long talks with you and Voitinsky and the conditions for these could not have been more satisfactory. It was most encouraging to find you both in such excellent health. I am greatly pleased with the outline of your bigger book and feel that it will be of the greatest value.

Now with reference to your criticism of Miss Moore's monograph, both she and we are very eager to have your best and earliest criticisms. As you pointed out every member of the Secretariat must have the liberty to write fully, and

*Well-informed in the view of the hireling.

freely provided he writes objectively. At the same time no member of the Secretariat writing for an international audience can be sure that he has attained the maximum degree of objectivity unless he and she have the frankest criticism and suggestions from scholarly friends like yourself.

All of my colleagues will enormously appreciate the reiteration of the position which you took in your Princeton cablegram that members of the International Secretariat must be given full academic freedom but this very freedom makes everyone of us all the more eager to have the most searching kind of criticism of all our work.

Please do not wait therefore until you can send your criticism of Miss Moore's manuscript by word of mouth. You can write a purely private letter marking it private either to Miss Moore or to me and it will be regarded not as a formal communication but simply as a private letter from one scholar to another.

In Amsterdam among many others I talked with Van Walree who was exceedingly sorry that pressure of engagements had prevented his calling on you on his most recent visit. He had gone in connection with the U. S. S. R.-Netherlands trade treaty and every minute was taken. Apparently he felt that the trade treaty was of substantial advantage to the Netherlands and he hoped also of substantial advantage to the U. S. S. R. He enormously appreciated the opportunity of meeting you on his former visit.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1109

CARLTON COURT, PALL MALL PLACE,
London, S. W. 1, July 3, 1939.

Mr. SHERWOOD EDDY,
Toynbee Hall, 28 Commercial Street,
London, E. 1, England

DEAR SHERWOOD: I have just sent Oumansky a night cable letter reading as follows:

"Sherwood Eddy, a consistent critic but genuinely sincere friend of Soviet Union, informs me his visa canceled. Personally believe net result of his seminars is of equal value to both countries in interest of mutual cultural relations. Urge get matter reconsidered. Eddy's address Toynbee Hall, London, until July twelfth."

I suggest that you go direct to Maisky and explain the whole situation to him. I wish I were in a position to do more. My cable address in Paris on Thursday and Friday will be care of Poletan Paris.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(PENCILLED:) ECC

EXHIBIT No. 1110

SHERWOOD EDDY
52 Vanderbilt Avenue
NEW YORK CITY
Telephone: Murray Hill 9-3668

JUNE 24, 1939.

Mr. E. C. CARTER
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 E. 52nd Street, New York City

MY DEAR NED: I need your help and you can certainly give me help. At the last moment, twenty-four hours before sailing, Intourist informs the Open Road that my Soviet visa, which was granted weeks ago, has been suddenly cancelled.

Someone has blundered. This must be reversed. It means the end of the Seminars and that would damage Russia. I have taken a thousand people to Russia in the last twenty years. For a dozen years our parties have been the largest and most influential that have entered Russia and nine-tenths of our people have rendered favorable reports. For twenty years I have been a friend of Russia's. I am on Mrs. Dilling's red network, supposed to be "supported by Moscow gold". I have always been a Stalinist, never for Trotsky.

I would appreciate it very much if you would do anything you could to have this cancellation reversed. It will certainly make a bad impression on our party of nearly forty and end the Seminars forever.

I am at Toynbee Hall, 28 Commercial Street, London E. 1 (cable Toynbee Hall), July 1-15.

Thanking you in advance for your help,

Very sincerely yours,

[s] SHERWOOD EDDY.

EXHIBIT No. 1111

ON BOARD S. S. "AQUITANIA",
July 11, 1939.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,

300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

DEAR OWEN: The Chinese are more unanimously enthusiastic about Pacific Affairs than the members of any other group. Franklin Ho was immensely impressed by Guenther Stein's "The Yen and the Sword." Ushiba assured me that the office of the Japanese Council was taking seriously your request for additional Japanese articles. Motylev was eager for much more intimate factual details giving both very recent economic information and also personal observations as to what is going on in China and Japan.

As you will see from the enclosed copy of my letter to Jaffe, he likes the militancy of Amerasia. He recognizes that Pacific Affairs cannot quite take this line but he still insists that no one can legitimately criticize you if you do decide to adopt his request to you of three years ago that Pacific Affairs come out strong consistently and repeatedly for the collective system. Both he and Voitinsky regret that there is no evidence of our having taken seriously their request for this three years ago. They feel the necessity for this was never greater than today. Their insistence was of great interest to me for two reasons. First, because it is evidence that they treat the IPR seriously and have orderly memories of their suggestion. Second, because it controverts the assertions of the reactionaries in Paris, London, and Washington that the retirement of Litvinoff meant that the Kremlin was throwing over its commitment to the collective system.

Could you use the present appearance of Sir Arthur Salter's "Security—Can It Be Retrieved" as the occasion for an early full length treatment that will be so fundamental as to appeal to the more thoughtful members of the Institute in every member country and so militant as to convince Motylev and Voitinsky that we are responding to their suggestion.

One of Motylev's most urgent requests was for information regarding Chinese internal economic and financial position. Happily this will be supplied by Chi's study for the Inquiry. (You have doubtless seen his Virginia Quarterly article.) I am going to reopen with Jessup and Angus the question of publication of some inquiry material in Pacific Affairs when it is of such a nature as to fit in with your own policy as editor and when it is of a kind which will make important and authentic information of which scholars and statesmen are in need available to a wide Pacific Affairs audience.

Your many friends all along the line inquired for you and sent you their warmest greetings. All are asking when your book will be published.

I learned in one or two quarters that Miss Virginia Thompson's book on Indo-China is not being taken seriously because there is a criticism of Pelliot or an implied criticism of Pelliot's position. Do you happen to know what would be the basis of this and whether scholars in other countries regard Pelliot with the same degree of infallibility as he regards himself.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1112

ON BOARD S. S. "AQUITANIA",
July 11, 1939.

Mr. PHILIP J. JAFFE,

129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR JAFFE: All around the coast of Asia and Europe I picked up highly complimentary remarks with reference to Amerasia. Someday I would like to sit

down with you and some of your colleagues and run over the whole question of promotion overseas. Copies ought to be in the reading rooms of the Chinese, British, American and French Embassies and Legations in Tokyo, Chungking, Shanghai, Bangkok, Paris, London, Moscow, The Hague, Ottawa, Canberra, Rome, Berlin and Brussels. Ways and means should be discovered for substantially increasing the circulation in Japan, China and Great Britain. Motylev wishes that Pacific Affairs carried as essential information as that which he discovers invariably appears in your section "Economic Notes." Motylev also likes the consistently militant quality that characterises almost every issue of Amerasia and which appears so clearly, according to Motylev, in everything that Fred Field writes whether in Amerasia or elsewhere. If Amerasia and AMCO merge the prestige of both will be enhanced in several countries.

Do you suppose the Amerasia free list could stand sending a complimentary copy for a year to Murray G. Brooks, Y. M. C. A., Rangoon, Burma. He is working for the reeducation of certain Burmese members of Parliament who are obstructing the Burmese government's efforts to facilitate cultural and material communications between Burma and China. He is facilitating a Burmese vernacular translation of Vesper's "Secret Agent of Japan."

Hoping you can come to Sunset Farm for a long talk sometime before September, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1114

Editorial Board: Frederick V. Field, *chairman*; Philip J. Jaffe, *managing editor*; Lillian Peffer, *assistant editor*; T. A. Bisson; Ch'ao-ting Chi; Kenneth W. Colegrove; Owen Lattimore; William W. Lockwood; Cyrus H. Peake; David H. Popper; William T. Stone; Harriet Levine, *secretary*

AMERASIA

A review of America and the Far East

125 East 52nd St., New York

Telephone: PLaza 3-4700

AUGUST THE 11TH, 1939.

MR. EDWARD CARTER,

Institute of Pacific Relations,

129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I appreciate the opportunity to make what I hope are constructive comments on Captain Carlson's report on China's Military Strength and Efficiency. I am very sorry to be some days late with my comments.

Carlson's report is, in my opinion, a very excellent one and a very much needed one. The latter half especially is excellent. As I was reading the first half, without knowing what would follow, I kept thinking that too much was elementary knowledge easily obtainable elsewhere, but upon completion of the whole study I am not sure that his way is not the best. Some of the elementary material might be converted into explanatory phrases throughout the whole manuscript, while some might be converted into notes. In addition the introduction can perhaps be strengthened by inclusion in it in summary form some of the strong points in the latter half.

There are a few sections which, in my opinion, are treated too incompletely. For example, the aviation section could have more precise material on training centers, particularly those in Kansu and Yunnan. Our own Curtis Wright Company is apparently very active in building and supplying the Yunnan bases with planes and instructors. In addition, some estimate should be made of the probable future effectiveness as well as size of China's growing air forces.

The section on China's Industrial Cooperatives is too incomplete. They have not been moving ahead rapidly enough and the five million dollars promised by Dr. Kung has not been advanced. The reasons for this should be written and analyzed. Understandably enough, there are many conflicting and contradictory elements in the building up process going on in China.

The section on the Italian Aviation Mission should be enlarged slightly and it should be brought out that the chief reason at the time for the ability of the Italians to outbid American companies was due to superior credit terms. At that time the United States demanded practically cash in advance for plane orders. The fact that we have regained that market and have, even in the

past year or two, extended sizeable credits to China, contains within it the obvious political conclusions that China has proved itself worthy of commercial confidence, etc., etc.

In the section where the German Military Mission is discussed, there should be some study made of the contradictions involved in Germany's selling large quantities of munitions to China. Germany's continuance to do so in the face of its pact with Japan may play an important role in the future of the Sino-Japanese war.

There have been reliable reports about ten million troops being trained in the province of Sikong. Some study of that should be included in an appropriate place. Additional material might be added on Mohammedans and Mongols in Inner Mongolia, and their probable military strength and effectiveness.

In the section on present facilities for arms manufacture, the building of roads and railways, as well as that on war financing, I feel it would be important to express an opinion as to how much the continued success of these depend upon foreign help. On page 79, which contains the six conditions which will bring China victory, Section 5 states that "China must continue to receive credits from abroad until such time as she can manufacture her own raw materials," which idea is repeated again on page 81. It is not improbable that some time in the future Great Britain, supported by France and possibly the United States, will make an effort to effect peace and in its effort to do so will put pressure on China by threatening to shut down both the Burma and Indo-China ports of entry. In the face of such an eventuality, will China be able to continue to carry on a protracted war even if limited to guerrilla warfare? Will China then be able to manufacture sufficient small arms and munitions, grow sufficient food, develop new transportation facilities, and find means of financing her economic set-up? Therein, it seems to me, lies the biggest question mark in China's war of resistance.

I hope that the above remarks have sense and are constructive, and I would be only too delighted at any time to expand these remarks with whatever facts are at my disposal.

Sincerely,

PHILIP J. JAFFE.

PJJ:g

EXHIBIT No. 1115

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Mass., August 24, 1939.

PHILIP JAFFE, Esquire,
Sunset Farm.

DEAR PHIL: Here are letters from Edgar Snow, Rewi Alley, and John Hersey which are self-explanatory.

Perhaps this evening or this afternoon you can give me the benefit of your advice on all these matters.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER,

EXHIBIT No. 1116

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, September 8, 1939.

Dr. V. E. MOTYLEV,
Pacific Institute,
20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MOTYLEV: You will be getting a copy of AMERASIA in due course, but I thought you would be particularly interested in two of the articles, so I am enclosing them in this letter. One is by my colleague on the International Secretariat, Miss Kate L. Mitchell. The other is by Mr. Frederick V. Field. The entire magazine will be reaching you shortly.

I understand that it is likely that the American Council will shortly assume full responsibility for AMERASIA as its own journal.

I am writing you in another letter regarding the decision to go ahead with the Victoria Meeting. All of us feel that the war in Europe makes Victoria more important than ever.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1117

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Mass., 11th September 1939.

Dr. V. E. MOTYLEV,
Pacific Institute, 20, Razin Street,
Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MOTYLEV: I have just cabled you as follows:

"Proceeding with victoria as planned. War situation makes contribution your institute more important than ever. Hope nothing will prevent your attendance. Suggest arriving New York ten days early for preliminary private discussion."

There is little need to amplify what I have said. All that is necessary is to emphasize and underline it. You will have learned from my circular letter of September 5th to the National Secretaries of the decision of Jessup and Tarr to go ahead with the Study Meeting.

What I consider a very biased interpretation of the significance of the Moscow-Berlin non-aggression pact in editorial and political circles in several of the I. P. R. member countries gives added importance to your presence and that of your colleagues at the forthcoming Study Meeting.

Earnestly hoping that we will receive an early word that you are planning to come, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1118

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Mass., 15th September 1939.

(Penciled initials:) KM

Dr. PHILIP C. JESSUP,
Norfolk, Conn.

DEAR JESSUP: You will remember my telling you that I cabled Dr. Adam von Trott zu Solz in Berlin urging that he get permission to have his national service consist of exploring with us the possibilities of extending the I. P. R. Inquiry to the wider field. You will remember that I secured approval for this proposal from both Lord Lothian and Mr. Sumner Welles.

I have today received a cable from him in Berlin stating that he will be glad to come over on the *Vulcania* if I can facilitate his passage and landing, otherwise he will have to come via Siberia and the Pacific Ocean. I wired to Sumner Welles today to see if he can facilitate the passage on the *Vulcania* as he promised me last week in Washington that he would do everything in his power to facilitate von Trott's coming to this country.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1119

68 WEST 91ST STREET,
New York, N. Y., September 21, 1939.

DEAR MR. CARTER: With regard to your note of the 16th, I have read with genuine admiration Rosinger's article in the September issue of Pacific Affairs entitled "Politics and Strategy of China's Mobile War." It is the most penetrating and most accurate survey of the situation I have seen. I don't know whether Rosinger has been in China or not, but it is evident that he has followed developments there very closely, and he has caught the spirit of the new order.

Now, with respect to Colonel Burckhardt's comments. I have known Burckhardt in a casual way for a number of years—since he was British military attaché at Peiping, as a matter of fact. I saw him at Hongkong last autumn. He was intelligence officer for the General Officer Commanding the China Forces.

Burckhardt has, like so many orthodox military men of the old school, missed the point in China's guerrilla warfare. Probably the only politics he knows is the residue of what he was exposed to at Harrow or Sandhurst. At any rate, he has failed to comprehend the importance of the political (ethical, if you will) development which parallels the military strategy of the Chinese guerrilla units. He points to isolated incidents of guerrilla activities, some of which

admittedly have been amateurish, as evidence of the ineffectiveness of the whole movement. He apparently overlooks the magnitude of the guerrilla movement, and he has no sense of the social and economic reforms that have made possible the continuation of Chinese control in those areas which were penetrated by the Japanese. He even overlooks the fact that in Shansi province the guerrilla pattern of resistance developed and executed by the 8th Route Army, supplemented by provincial troops inspired by the 8th Routers, has for over two years prevented the Japanese from conquering that province and moving on Sian.

On the other hand, there is a good deal of truth in many of Colonel Burckhardt's comments. There are still many young men in China with the attitude of the youth who remarked: "Why can't the foreigners fight our wars for us?" This attitude is prevalent among many of the youth who have not been reached by the 8th Route Army doctrines. I saw a good deal of it at Hankow, and it thoroughly disgusted me. But that attitude is diminishing rather than increasing. Both the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang are striving to make the youth of China more unselfish and more self-reliant.

Staff work has been poor in the past, but intensive training in staff schools, plus practical experience in the field, is improving this condition.

Strong leadership, especially in the higher ranks, has been lacking. But this was largely due to the semifeudal military system with which the Generalissimo had to deal. Political considerations made it imperative for him to proceed with caution in removing high ranking military officers from office. Even this obstacle is being overcome. However, as the younger officers move into positions of high command it takes time for them to adjust themselves to their new responsibilities. Here again, the important point is that the trend is in the direction of progress and greater efficiency, rather than the reverse.

The Colonel's remarks regarding the prospect of a revolution in Japan and about foreign intervention are not new. I have encountered no large scale sentiment in China in favor of intervention by the Western powers. They want our material assistance—in the way of loans, war supplies, etc. But that is all.

The point about the China situation which worries me right now is Russia's attitude. The United Front has been dropped, apparently, as a policy of the Comintern. Does that mean a possible break in the United Front in China? Is there any connection between the visit of Chow En-lai to Moscow and the Russo-Japanese negotiations concerning a possible nonaggression agreement? Is there a possibility that a Chinese Soviet may be set up in the northwest in return for freedom being granted the Japanese to move against the British, French, American and Chinese interests in the balance of China?

Many thanks for letting me see Colonel Burckhardt's comments.

With best regards, I am,

Sincerely,

EVANS F. CARLSON.

EXHIBIT No. 1120

OCTOBER 11, 1939.

FVF from ECC:

The other night at dinner I met Mrs. James Warburg, who purports to have a flaming interest in China. She struck me as extremely intelligent and more articulate than her husband. Should she be approached as a recorder for Virginia Beach, in case I get another opening, or better still through you? Is there any other moneyed person of brains whom we might rope in with an eye to long term financial future of the American and Pacific Councils? How about Ellie Auchincloss?

EXHIBIT No. 1121

CAVALIER HOTEL,
Virginia Beach, Va., December 3, 1949.

MR. CONSTANTINE OUMANSKY,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: This is to introduce my colleague from Berlin, Dr. Adam von Trott. I hope you and he can have a long talk together.

Would you ask one of your consular officials to advise him with reference to procedure in getting his visa for his Moscow visit?

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1122

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 11th December 1939.

KENNETH DURANT, Esq.,
Tass Agency, 50 Rockefeller Plaza,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR DURANT: Having returned from the I. P. R. Study Meeting at Virginia Beach today, I take pleasure in sending you herewith by special messenger copies of the following statements at Virginia Beach:

1. Dr. Jessup's Opening statement. (Document 9)
2. Statement by L. W. Holland at Opening Plenary Session. (Doc. 10)
3. Rapporteur's Summary of Round Table Topic I. (Document 12)
4. Mr. Lattimore's Statement at Plenary Session Opening Round Table II. (Document 15)
5. Rapporteur's summary of Round Table Topic II. (Document 16)
6. Mr. Angus' Statement at Plenary Session Opening Round Table III. (Doc. 18)
7. Rapporteur's Summary of Round Table Topic III. (Document 19)
8. Mr. Staley's Statement Opening Topic IV. (Document 21)
9. Dr. Jessup's Summary of Round Table Topic IV. (Document 23)

Any of these may now be quoted. Ultimately a summary of these will be published in the proceedings. For your purposes, perhaps the most interesting summary is that made by Dr. Jessup on December 2. It is marked Document 23.

I don't know whether you will wish to share these with Mr. Todd in Washington but if you so desire you are at liberty to do so.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1123

To—	From—	Date	File No.	Exhibit No.
A. von Trott	E. C. Carter	1/ 8/40	100. 111	1123A
A. Van Scheletema (Mrs.)	E. C. Carter	12/15/39	100. 111	1124
Adam	E. C. Carter	3/13/40	100. 111	1125
Oumansky	E. C. Carter	1/ 8/40	100. 249	1126
E. C. Carter	Calvin B. Hoover	1/22/40	100. 274	1127
Ida Pruitt	E. C. Carter	2/16/40	119. 36	1128
Ingrid Warburg	E. C. Carter	3/ 8/40	112. 33	1129
E. Fairfax Cholmeley	E. C. Carter	3/ 9/40	119. 5	1130
Ingrid Warburg (Miss)	E. C. Carter	3/13/40	100. 239	1131
W. L. H.	E. C. C.	3/14/40	104. 22	1132
Oumansky	E. C. Carter	3/19/40	100. 386	1133
Mr. Carter	Ingrid Warburg	3/20/40	107. 22	1134
Oumansky	Edward C. Carter	3/22/40	100. 209	1135
W. L. H.	E. C. C.	3/30/40	191. 87	1136
W. L. Holland	Edward C. Carter	4/24/40	191. 90	1137
Edward C. Carter	C. K. Moser	4/29/40	191. 188	1138
C. K. Moser	Edward C. Carter	4/24/40	191. 188	1139
C. K. Moser	Edward C. Carter	4/24/40	100. 360	1140
H. A.	E. C. C.	5/ 2/40	105. 133	1141
Edward C. Carter	Charles F. Loomis	5/ 2/40	131B. 99	1142
Edward C. Carter	Charles F. Loomis	5/ 3/40	131B. 98	1143
Wm. W. Lockwood	Edward C. Carter	5/ 8/40	105. 293	1144
Philip C. Jessup	Edward C. Carter	12/19/42	191. 37	1145
E. C. Carter	Edgar Snow	5/10/40	126. 4	1146
Owen Lattimore	E. C. Carter	6/ 6/40	102. 3	1147
E. C. Carter	John M. Gaus	6/ 3/40	102. 3	1148
KM	E. C. C.	6/10/40	105. 21	1149
Motylev	Edward Carter	6/12/40	100. 114	1150
ECC	RWB	7/ 3/40	106. 9	1151
FVF	ECC	7/ 2/40	500. 26	1152
F. V. Field	E. C. Carter	7/11/40	191. 162	1153
Philip C. Jessup	E. C. Carter	7/15/40	191. 12	1154
E. C. Carter	G. M. Fisher	8/10/40	105B. 4	1155
E. C. Carter	V. E. Motylev	8/21/40	100. 94	1156
Mortimer Graves	E. C. Carter	9/20/40	125. 1	1157
Owen Lattimore	E. C. Carter	9/24/40	105. 175	1158
Owen Lattimore	E. C. Carter	9/26/40	151. 65	1159
E. C. Carter	Mortimer Graves	10/10/40	119. 3	1160
F. V. Field	E. C. Carter	10/14/40	105B. 3	1161
E. C. Carter	A. Grajdanzev	10/15/40	100. 87	1162
E. C. Carter	Joseph P. Chamberlain	10/18/40	191. 257	1163
E. C. Carter	Phil	10/29/40	128. 49	1164
Owen Lattimore	E. C. Carter	10/29/40	100. 206	1165
Oumansky	E. C. Carter	11/ 6/40	100. 208	1166
E. C. Carter	Oumansky	11/ 7/40	100. 218	1167
Invitation	AMCO	11/19/40	116. 18	1168
Philip C. Jessup	E. C. Carter	11/28/40	105. 13	1169
CP	ECC	12/ 2/40	105. 321	1170
E. C. Carter	Grajdanzev	12/13/40	100. 37	1171
E. C. Carter	Edwin O. Reischauer	12/17/40	131B. 45	1172
E. C. Carter	Harriet L. Moore	12/17/40	500. 30	1173
Oumansky	E. C. Carter	12/18/40	100. 220	1174
Oumansky	E. C. Carter	12/13/40	100. 220	1175
E. C. Carter	Bob	12/30/40	191. 72	1176
E. C. Carter	Geoffrey	1/21/41	106. 47	1177
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	1/21/41	500. 29	1178
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	1/22/41	119. 143	1179
Chen Han-seng (Geoffrey)	E. C. Carter	1/24/41	106. 54	1180
E. C. Carter	C. K. Moser	2/11/41	500. 31	1181
Ch'ao-ting Chi	E. C. Carter	2/18/41	106. 51	1182
E. C. Carter	Chen Han-seng	3/12/41	119. 31	1184
E. C. Carter	Frederick D. Sharp	6/ 4/41	131B. 28	1185
KM	E. C. C.	3/24/41	105. 297	1186
E. C. Carter	Harriet L. Moore	3/25/41	131B. 81	1187
ECC	MG	4/ 3/41	500. 32	1188
Members of 9th Conf.	E. C. Carter	4/11/41	119. 98	1189
Wm. R. Herod	E. C. Carter	4/18/41	119. 105	1190
E. C. Carter	Owen Lattimore	5/ 2/41	500. 33	1191
Lt. Col. Sharp	E. C. Carter	6/ 6/41	131B. 27	1192
Lt. Col. Sharp	E. C. Carter	7/ 3/41	131B. 27	1193
HA	ECC	6/19/41	100. 226	1194
Philip C. Jessup	E. C. Carter	6/23/41	100. 248	1195
Lt. Col. R. S. Bratton	E. C. Carter	6/25/41	131B. 60	1196
I. P. R.	Lt. Col. G. S. C.	6/23/41	131. 60	1197
E. C. Carter	James J. Maloney	7/ 1/41	172. 1	1198
Irving Friedman	E. C. Carter	8/ 7/41	172. 1	1199
E. C. Carter	Irving S. Friedman	9/ 9/41	172. 1	1200
Irving	E. C. Carter	2/17/41	172. 1	1201
Dr. White			172. 1	1202
Memo (handwritten)			172. 1	12. 3
E. C. Carter	Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley	7/ 3/41	100. 2	1204
WJH	ECC	7/ 8/41	131B. 97	1205

To—	From—	Date	File No.	Exhibit No.
Henry J. Wadleigh	E. C. Carter	7/14/41	191.184	1206
Capt. R. Stuart Murray	E. C. Carter	7/15/41	131B. 96	1207
Wm. D. Carter	E. C. Carter	7/15/41	131B. 152	1208
Wm. A. M. Burden	E. C. Carter	7/16/41	119.97	1209
Lt. Col. Frederick S. Sharp	E. C. Carter	7/23/41	131B. 26	1210
E. C. Carter	Frederick D. Sharp	7/25/41	131B. 26	1211
E. C. Carter	Jessica Smith	8/4/41	100.179	1212
E. C. Carter	Jessica Smith	8/14/41	100.179	1213
Jessica Smith	E. C. Carter	8/10/41	100.404	1214
Summer Welles	E. C. Carter	8/13/41	100.410	1215
E. C. Carter	Quincy Wright	8/20/41	106.50	1216
Philip C. Jessup	E. C. Carter	9/2/41	105.304	1217
State Department	E. C. Carter	10/2/41	191.83	1218
Nathaniel Bretholtz (Mrs.)	E. C. Carter	7/15/41	191.83	1219
Nathaniel Bretholtz (Mrs.)	E. C. Carter	7/16/41	191.83	1220
HA	E. C. Carter	11/14/41	199.38	1221
WWL	ECC	11/22/41	131B. 69	1222
E. C. Carter	Herman Beukema	11/24/41	131B. 153	1223
Tass	E. C. Carter	1/1/42	100.21	1225
Joseph E. Davies	E. C. Carter	2/27/42	191.147	1226
E. C. Carter	Catherine Porter	6/2/42	119.144	1227
John A. Pollard	E. C. Carter	3/12/42	119.92	1228
E. C. Carter	Lauchlin Currie	3/13/42	119.122	1229
W. L. Holland	C. F. Remer	3/17/42	119.121	1231
ECC	WLH	4/6/42	191.111	1232
Wm. W. Lockwood	Roy Veatch	3/30/42	191.111	1233
E. C. Carter	Lauchlin Currie	4/25/42	119.13	1234
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	5/5/42	119.13	1235
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	6/23/42	119.13	1236
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	6/26/42	119.13	1237
E. C. Carter	Lauchlin Currie	10/7/42	119.13	1238
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	10/7/42	119.13	1239
E. C. Carter	Lauchlin Currie		119.13	1240
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	9/17/41	119.13	1241
Oumansky	E. C. Carter	3/29/38	100.119	1242
I. P. R	Oumansky	4/20	100.119	1243
V. M. Molotov	E. C. Carter	11/14/42	100.119	1244
E. C. Carter	Phil	3/24/42	105.31	1245
Mrs. Johnstone	E. C. Carter	4/6/42	100.81	1246
E. C. Carter	Mrs. A. H. Johnstone	4/8/42	100.81	1247
E. C. Carter	Charles A. Thomson	5/12/42	191.74	1249
Charles A. Thomson	E. C. Carter	5/13/42	191.74	1250
E. C. Carter	Truman M. Martin	5/30/42	131B. 92	1251
Edgar J. Tarr	E. C. Carter	6/11/42	119.96	1252
E. C. Carter	Anthony N. Fedotov	6/26/42	100.115	1253
E. C. Dayason	E. C. Carter	7/11/42	119.109	1254
Philin C. Jessup	E. C. Carter	8/3/42	105.246	1256
Ned (E. C. C.)	Brooks Emeny	9/7/42	191.139	1257
G. E. Voitinsky	E. C. Carter	9/28/42	100.20	1258
W. W. Lancaster	E. C. Carter	10/1/42	100.210	1259
E. C. Carter	W. W. Lancaster	10/14/42	100.210	1260
W. W. L.	E. C. C.	10/21/42	106.3	1261
E. C. Carter	Yung-ying Hsu	10/23/42	105.59	1262
John W. Holmes	E. C. Carter	10/23/42	100.251	1263
Jerome D. Greene	E. C. Carter	11/17/42	105.42	1264
J. W. Dafoe	E. C. Carter	11/25/42	112.22	1265
Michael Greenberg	E. C. Carter	3/27/43	100.193	1266
E. C. Carter	Lauchlin Currie	10/1/42	500.48	1267
E. C. Carter	Robert W. Barnett	9/12/42	500.47	1268

EXHIBIT No. 1123-A

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 8th January 1940.

DR. ADAM VON TROTT,
c/o John H. Oukie, Esq.

DEAR ADAM: Enclosed is a copy of a letter to Motylev which is self-explanatory. I shall try and send a copy of it by way of Oumansky's diplomatic pouch so that it will get to Motylev in advance of your arrival.

Motylev's office, the Pacific Institute, is at 20, Razin Street, Moscow. It is less than seven minutes' walk from the Kremlin and equally near to whatever hotel you may be staying at. It is an oldish building in which there are several other organizations. Motylev, as you know, is an economic geographer and a very able intellectual. He has been a very active member of the Party and is a Lecturer at the University of Red Professors.

Voitinsky you can get in the Far Eastern Section of the Institute of World Economics and Politics of which Varga is the head. Varga is of German origin and is of very great intellectual ability.

Eugene Harondar is Office Secretary of the Soviet I. P. R. He does not always give full-time to the work of the Institute. His Russian, German, French, and English are all exceptionally good. Motylev and Voitinsky, if I remember rightly, speak English, German, and French equally well.

I think you will enjoy greatly meeting all of the friends and members of the I. P. R. in Moscow. I suggest for the most part that you concentrate your attention on them while in the city. I vaguely remember that you were only planning to spend three days in Moscow. If you can possibly extend this, I would strongly urge it. You ought to try to spend from five to seven days, unless there are some overriding reasons for hurrying on to Berlin.

J. arrived back from a visit to Edgar on Saturday. On Sunday afternoon he met K.

We miss you greatly and hope you are getting a little rest in the sunshine and warmth of California.

If you want to have Loomis arrange to drive you around to see the beauty spots of Honolulu, please wire me and I will cable him that you are passing through. Maybe you would prefer to arrive unannounced. His new office address is 501 Dillingham Building. This is only two minutes' walk from where your steamer lands.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1124

129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK CITY, December 15, 1939.

Mrs. ADAMA VAN SCHELTEMA,

International Institute for Social History.

264 Keizersgracht, Amsterdam C, Holland.

DEAR MADAM: This letter is to introduce Dr. Adam von Trott, a German scholar who has been engaged, on behalf of the Institute of Pacific Relations, in the preparation of a study on the relation of the Chinese guild system to modern Chinese nationalism and labor organization. I am sure you will find him an able research student and I hope that you and your Institute may be able to give him the information and help he desires for the completion of his work. I shall be most grateful for anything you can do for him.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1125

NEW YORK CITY, March 13, 1940.

DEAR ADAM: Your very interesting letter from Tokyo dated February 6 reached me on the morning of March 11, as did your cable from Moscow, dated March 9. It was most interesting that the two messages, one from Tokyo and one from Moscow, arrived at the same moment. Your Tokyo letter was posted at Kobe and came through promptly.

I gather that after you wrote you did get the visa to permit you to stop over in Moscow. I do hope that you saw Motylev. I am sure he would appreciate your up-to-date impressions of Virginia Beach and Japan.

I understand that there are considerable delays in the mails to Holland, so I have not written to His Excellency there. It has seemed better to write to our good friend Strong. He, I gather, may be able to see you in person before very long.

It now looks as though I could not start for Chungking until the middle of July.

Corbett has been hard at work, and he and his group are making real progress. There is much to be done. He and his colleagues are doing it very well. I have shown your letter to him, to Jessup, to Bill and to one or two others here.

I have sent a copy to Edgar. Though he was offered the job in the Far East, he declined. He is likely to spend Good Friday with us in New York.

We are all very eager to get your impressions of Moscow and Berlin.

With warmest regards from Mrs. Carter, Ruth, and myself, I am

Ever sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1126

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., January 8, 1940.

HIS EXCELLENCY, the SOVIET AMBASSADOR,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: Here is a letter which I would like to have reach Motylev in advance of von Trott's arrival in Moscow which encloses a letter of introduction that I have given to von Trott. Is it possible for you to send these to Motylev via the Diplomatic pouch? If not, can you advise me how to mark it so as to ensure its reaching Moscow without interference or delay?

With very best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1127

DUKE UNIVERSITY,
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, OFFICE OF THE DEAN,
Durham, N. C., January 22, 1940.

DR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR DR. CARTER: I regret that an extraordinary press of work has prevented my being able to read at all carefully the manuscript by Miss Harriet Moore on "Soviet Relations in the Far East, 1931-1939." I had hoped I would be able to do it but I simply have not been able to do so.

In looking the work over hastily, I do have the impression of a sort of pro-Soviet bias which would prevent the work being accepted as wholly objective. To quote several isolated sentences on page 76:

"During the second Czech crisis in September, the Soviet Union indicated, in the first days of September, its readiness to aid France and Czechoslovakia, only to have this cooperation rejected not only in the final Munich settlement but in all the negotiations leading up to it."

This is quite possibly true but so far as I know the facts are very much in dispute. Take another sentence as an illustration on the same page:

"Following the annexation of Austria by Germany, and the increasing threat to Czechoslovakia, Litvinov issued an appeal to convoke a world conference of peaceful nations to take positive action to prevent further aggression. But he was answered with silence."

Now it is quite possible to describe what happened in these words; that is what Litvinov said he did, but these "peaceful" nations are the very ones now which Soviet Russia declares are those conducting an imperialistic war. I could go on with scores of other illustrations. I do not know whether the nuances which I am attempting to explain are clear to you or not but I feel quite sure that scholars reading the work would get the impression which I have mentioned.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

CALVIN B. HOOVER, *Dean.*

CBH: RK

EXHIBIT No. 1128

(Handwritten Notation) Copies to:

JRH
Roy Veatch
EFC
R. P. Chin

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 16th February 1940.

Miss IDA PRUITT,
c/o American Bureau for Medical Aid to China,
67 William Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MISS PRUITT: Would you please prepare for me on two pages a statement which will reach me not later than Tuesday morning giving an authoritative statement of the method of handling any United States Government money that might conceivably be available for C. I. C. You have written of this several times. Roy Veatch has asked me to meet next week a number of his friends to discuss the matter.

I can give a general description of the way the local cooperatives work, but I have no material that would show the mechanism for handling government loans nor have I any details on the two types of financial administration and control in China. Type I being cooperatives financed by the National Government. Type II being cooperatives financed by the Hongkong Committee.

It is going to be relatively easy to arouse people's enthusiasm for the program of the cooperatives. It is going to be more difficult to describe the entire financial administration and control in such a way as to show people how it works, what controls there are, and who audits the accounts.

Don't think for a minute that because Veatch has asked me to meet his friends that this means that a grant from the Washington government is likely. It is a long and uncertain journey from a junior official in the State Department to a vote in Congress, and there are many adversaries.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1129

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, March 8, 1940.

Miss INGRID WARBURG,
25 West 54th Street, New York City.

DEAR MISS WARBURG: I have recently been asked to write a letter to Johannes Schroeder, whose address is care of Senora Maria E. Villaseñor, Humboldt Av 39, Dept. 4, Mexico City, saying that we would like his counsel in anti-Fascist work in the United States. He has a Mexican passport and was in this country on a visitor's visa from September 1939 to December 1939. He requires a letter from some American organization so as to get a visa for a return to the United States.

This request has come to me from S. A. Trone, 390 Riverside Drive, whose telephone is Monument 2-8335.

I have only known Mr. Trone slightly. Do you know anything about Schroeder? I think I will also write Dr. Niebuhr.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Pencilled notation:)

Sent to 227 Eden Road, Palm Beach, Fla.

EXHIBIT No. 1130

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 9th March, 1940.MISS ELSIE FAIRFAX-CHOLMELEY,
c/o China Institute of Pacific Relations,
10, Peking Road, Kowloon, Hongkong.

DEAR ELSIE: This is to acknowledge your cablegram reading as follows:

"Hanseng fieldworking sun honorary chairman fully confident committee due Hanseng's effort Hongkong Chungking cooperating Cripps enthusiastic committee wishes you urge Kung finance Snow."

I have the approval of John Hersey and Ch'ao-ting Chi of wiring Kung to send Snow but I am waiting now to hear from Ida Pruitt for I do not want to act without her full approval.

There is another matter on which I want your help. About a year ago we managed to get through Miss Madge Cleeve from His Majesty's Stationer's Office a few copies of the pamphlets in the series of Peace Handbooks that Sir George Brotherton of the British Foreign Office prepared for the Paris Peace Conference. If I remember rightly I handed them over to you to get bound for the Pacific Council Library.

Phil Lilienthal has searched the Library several times but has failed to find them.

You may remember that we borrowed one or two of the bound volumes of the Peace Handbooks from the Council on Foreign Relations but we would invariably return them to them.

Can you rack your memory and give us some clue as to what happened to the half dozen little pamphlets in this series that we got from London a little while before you and I sailed for the Far East?

P. C. Chang is leaving today or tomorrow to attend the meeting of the People's Political Council. You will doubtless see him as he passes through Hongkong.

I note that about a fortnight ago Miss Pruitt reported to you that I was about to go to Washington in connection with a Government loan for the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives. I hope this did not raise false hopes on your part or that of any of your friends. Very informally I met representatives of the Treasury, the S. E. C., the State Department, and the Department of Agriculture. These were all for the most part junior officials with whom Miss Pruitt had already been in contact. They are all deeply interested in the Cooperatives. At the same time they seem to be of the unanimous opinion that there was no chance whatsoever at the present session of Congress for any Governmental aid to C. I. C.

If I had seen higher ups I do not think I would have received a different report. The \$20 million credit through the Export-Import Bank is all I am afraid that can be expected from Governmental sources this year. And I do not imagine that the Chinese Government has any intention of deflecting any of the 20 million to the C. I. C. I ought to add that Miss Pruitt's work among officials in Washington has been of a very high order. She has aroused genuine interest. It is a pity it can't be canalized into a substantial government grant.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—As you will have gathered from the copy of my letter to John Hersey of February 8, I do not feel that Hubert Liang should be sent to this country on behalf of the Industrial Cooperatives. He is a man of the highest character and patriotic spirit, but what is needed is someone who will carry greater weight and greater conviction.

EXHIBIT No. 1131

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, March 13, 1940.MISS INGRID WARBURG,
25 West 54th Street, New York City

DEAR MISS WARBURG: You will, I think, be glad to hear that Adam sent me a cable from Moscow on March 9, saying that he was leaving for Berlin on that day. I have also had a letter from him from Tokyo indicating that he had a very useful and illuminating visit there.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1132

MARCH 14, 1940.

WLH From ECC:

Here is Fred Field's proposed letter to Tsurumi. The letter is to my mind adequate except for one point: at the top of the second page Fred says that the American Council strictly avoids political statements. Fred in this letter is using AMERASIA to differentiate between IPR and non-IPR activities. If this letter goes to the Japanese Council, will they feel that it puts Fred over his own signature as frankly playing the role of Mr. Box and Mr. Cox?

Intrinsically I can find no fault with Fred's excellent letter. Should I have any misgivings about it?

(Pencilled: "No".)

EXHIBIT No. 1133

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, March 19, 1940.

His Excellency the Ambassador of the U. S. S. R.

Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: It has occurred to me that possibly you would be interested in reading this article of Lattimore's that has just appeared in the VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1134

MARCH 20, 1940.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you very much for your two letters. They did not reach me before as I am traveling until about April 6.

I am very glad to know that Adam got as far as he did.

Regarding Johannes Schroeder I want to assure you that I don't know anything about him, only that he was a member of the C. P. in Germany.

I hope to see you soon.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

/s/ INGRID WARBURG.

EXHIBIT No. 1135

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 22nd March 1940.

His Excellency, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR,

Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: Doubtless you saw Miss Dorothy Thompson's confession in her column this morning. Do you happen to know who her misinformants were?

With best wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1136

WLH

IIA From ECC:

Please note the attached from Cabot Coville. Under the circumstances I am inclined to send Coville a full set of the Inquiry documents, but do not wish to go to this expense if either of you think it is unwise. If the State Department were not so financially starved by Congress I would send the whole set to him with a bill for the same. For promotion purposes, I am proposing to send him the five books already issued in printed form and tell him I will write him later whether we are in a position to send him all of the mimeographed and forthcoming printed volumes.

Please note the people whom he suggests as in a position to comment on Colegrove.

EXHIBIT No. 1137

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 24th April 1940.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.,
Care, Giannini Foundation, University of California,
Berkeley, California.

DEAR BILL: Our copy of the Tamagna manuscript has arrived minus the material that he says he will send us later. After you have glanced through it will you immediately air mail me answers to the following questions:

(1) Is this good enough in its present form to justify our making copies to go immediately to the Advisers and to the following commentators:

Frederick Schuman	von Beckwrath
Kurt Bloch	proper person in
Dragoni	State Department

(2) In view of the arrival of this manuscript a little more promptly than we anticipated, what are your recommendations with reference to the editing? Do you or Phil desire to undertake it, or do you wish us to secure someone here?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1138

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE,
Washington, April 29, 1940.

In reply refer to 35

(Penciled notation:). WLH. Scan & return ECC

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: In reply to your letter of April 24, I am informed by my colleague, Mr. Ernest C. Ropes, who handles information on Russian commercial matters for this Bureau, that the whole matter of Soviet purchases from the United States is one of considerable complication. The Soviets have bought considerable copper from us during the past year because they were unable to obtain it elsewhere. The figures over recent months, as far as we have them, are as follows:

Copper to U. S. S. R.

Exports:	Lbs.
Sept.-Dec. 1939-----	46, 782, 000
January 1940-----	53, 205, 784
February 1940-----	12, 816, 549

Lbs.-----	112, 804, 333
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Reexports:	Dollars
Sept.-Dec. 1939-----	1, 149
January 1940-----	337, 476
February 1940-----	410, 077

748, 702

Unable to get by the regulations of our Maritime Commission with shipments of copper to Vladivostok. Amtorg, it appears, shipped the goods to Mexico where they were reloaded on Soviet boats that had come over from Vladivostok. En route to port, the vessels were stopped by the British and taken to Hong Kong where they were turned over to the French who still have them, according to reports. The last cargo stopped is reported to have been returned to the United States, and a few days ago the Amtorg in New York offered a lot of copper for sale but because of unsatisfactory prices offered the copper was withdrawn.

Oil shipments to Soviet Russia in 1939 and 1940 were actually less than in the two previous years, although it has been reported in the press that they amounted to 2,500,000 barrels. Last year only ordinary gasoline was involved, while in previous years the bulk of shipments were of aviation grade. Mr. Ropes expresses the opinion that in all years these shipments were purely for the supply

of Soviet Russia in the Far Eastern area and that none was likely to get to Germany.

Tin shipments appear large because the Soviets have not previously bought tin in the United States at all, and actually the purchases from us are small compared to the Soviet's annual imports over a number of years.

Relative to your inquiry regarding shipments of copper from Spain to Germany, our Metals and Minerals Division does not have any definite information. It is known, however, that during the period of the Spanish Civil War considerable quantities of copper or copper-bearing materials, produced at Rio Tinto, were shipped from Spain to Germany. The Division is inclined to doubt that much, if any, copper has gone from Spain to Germany since the outbreak of the war in Europe.

The newspaper reports which you mentioned in your letter as emanating from Japan are given little credence here, because reports of a similar nature are almost a daily occurrence in the course of political disturbances in the Far Eastern area.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

[S] C. K. Moser,
C. K. Moser.

Chief, Far Eastern Section, Division of Regional Information.

EXHIBIT No. 1139

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, April 24, 1940.

Dr. C. K. Moser

*Department of State,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR DR. MOSER: Around the middle of April the British were making a fuss over American shipments to Vladivostok. At that time, Mr. Butler gave out figures calculated to give the public the idea that the total of American shipments to the U.S.S.R. had increased greatly since the beginning of the European war.

An AP dispatch from Tokyo, dated April 23, which appeared in last evening's and this morning's papers contained among others, the following paragraphs:

"Reports reaching Japan said Vladivostok was choked with incoming cargoes consigned to Germany, that warehouses were overflowing and docks piled high. It was said that an average of 1,500 metric tons (1,653 American tons) of carbon was being licensed daily for transshipment.

"American copper imports arriving at the Russian port from the outbreak of the war until March 31 totaled 70,000 metric tons (71,140 tons) according to Japanese statistics, whereas formerly Vladivostok received an average of only 6,000 metric tons yearly. Imports of oil and tin had increased similarly, it was said."

It begins to look as though it was the beginning of an Anglo-Japanese alliance to scare people abroad about American shipments to the U. S. S. R. I assume that you would be able to answer for me the following double question: Have British and American exports to all U.S.S.R. ports increased or decreased since the war began?

By the way, what information have you regarding shipments of copper derivatives to Germany from a British-controlled company in Spain to the amount of 30,000 or 35,000 tons per month?

May I explain to you privately my own personal position and that is that it will be a political and strategical mistake of the first order for the Allies to go to war with the U. S. S. R. Contrary to the popular opinion, I am convinced that the U.S.S.R. wants to stay out of the war in Europe, but that if the British and French continue their hostile attitude they may still succeed in effecting an alliance between Moscow and Berlin as a substitute for the present Berlin-Moscow non-aggression pact.

Your reply will of course be treated confidentially. With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1141

Copies to: WLH
ED
OL
CTC
AB

129 EAST 52ND STREET, New York, N. Y.,
2nd May 1940.

HA from ECC:

I note in a letter from Field to Shotwell about sending Carnegie publications to China the following p. s.:

"Miss Hume also informs me that, as it is the only port which is definitely open for shipments to China, packages should be marked 'Via Rangoon.'"

Will you please investigate and see whether book packages that we are sending to "free China" as differentiated from Hong Kong and Shanghai are and should be marked "Via Rangoon." When you have cleared up this point, would you notify all whose initials appear at the bottom of this letter.

WLH
OL
AB
ED
CTC
ECC

EXHIBIT No. 1142

MAY 2, 1940.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Secretary-General, Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR NED: This will introduce Lt. Colonel George E. Arneman, who for the past three years has been one of the most useful and active members of the Hawaii Group, I. P. R.

He is the one who engineered the two Schofield conferences for us and has been a member of several of our study groups. He was the G-2 intelligence officer at Schofield Barracks and has had two different tours as military attaché in Baltic countries.

I want him to see the library and general workings of the Top Floor and hope it will be possible for him to participate in one of your regional conferences. His immediate assignment is to the state of Maine.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES F. LOOMIS, *Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 1143

TELEPHONE 5325

Cable: INPAREL, Honolulu

Hawaii Group, Executive Committee: Riley H. Allen, Chairman; A. L. Dean, Vice Chairman; Frank C. Atherton, Treasurer; Charles F. Loomis, Secretary; Robbins B. Anderson; Paul S. Bachman; Peter H. Buck; David L. Crawford; W. F. Dillingham; Gerald W. Fisher; Peyton Harrison; Shao-chang Lee; Frank E. Midkiff; Iga Mori; Philip S. Platt; Oscar F. Shepard; Yasutaro Soga; Hugh C. Tennet; Heaton L. Wrenn

AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTION OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

501 Dillingham Building

HONOLULU, HAWAII

MAY 3, 1940.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR NED: Colonel Arneman is an enthusiastic I. P. R. booster and is responsible for getting several army officers in our Group. At least three of

them have written saying that their contacts with our study groups while here were the most stimulating ones they had.

He sails today on the U. S. T. *Hunter Liggett* to his new assignment in Maine and will call on you and Field en route.

Sincerely yours,

Chas.,
CHAS. F. LOOMIS.

Encl.

(Penciled notation:) P. S.—And what are your travel plans for the summer and fall? Any new developments with our friends in Japan?—CHAS.

EXHIBIT No. 1144

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, May 8, 1940.

MR. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
American Committee for International Studies,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR BILL: I have given your letter of May 2 considerable thought. Rather than limit myself to one or two suggestions, I think it is better for me to make quite a number which I regard as of great importance, or of being worthy of further investigation.

In order that you may understand my reaction to your letter, and to this highly interesting and significant statement which Earle and you have just issued on the American Committee for International Studies, I am venturing quite informally to send you quite a number of names.

Your Committee's statement, as well as the quality of its leadership and its membership are most encouraging. As would be expected of the kind of leadership that you and Earle are giving, it is encouraging to note that you are not disinterested in relating scientific research to questions of policy and that your main objective is to make new and constructive approaches to the study of international affairs.

You are, I think, familiar with Dr. Percy E. Corbett's general plan of work. He has the approval of McGill for a continuation of major work on this project after his return to McGill in 1941. In the meantime, he and I are looking for an appropriate colleague with a Far Eastern background comparable to Corbett's background in Europe, the Americas and the British Commonwealth, in the hope that the two of them with appropriate assistance can make a synthesis and interpretation of all that is most fundamental in the I. P. R.'s Far Eastern Inquiry with what is basic in the studies of Chatham House, of P. E. P., of Shotwell's Committee, the New School, Buell's book and the many European Studies and those that are appearing in Australia, New Zealand, and elsewhere. Corbett is thinking not simply of a review of reviews or a synthesis of existing plans. He aims to carry them further, more fundamentally and contagiously.

The basic work that he has in mind and much of the work of many of the groups and individuals just mentioned would in my view be aided enormously if arrangements could be made for some such international exchange fellowships as the following:

(1) Bring over R. H. Tawney so that he may appraise, criticize and interpret the Corbett project, contribute to it and at the same time make a critique of the plans of the other serious groups on this continent.

(2) Bring Ushiba, Saionji or Yokota in order that we may have someone from the very inside of Japan closely in touch with current thought in the Japanese army, and bureaucracies and the universities.

(3) Send Harriet Moore to the U. S. S. R. to go through all government and party writing on postwar problems and supplement this by interviewing party and politburo chiefs.

(4) Bring von Trott from Berlin to be associated with Corbett, Sansom, Tawney and others, and hold him here until a week before America enters the war.

(5) Discover who is the most valuable man in the P. E. P. group, namely the one principally responsible for the now really first-class P. E. P. Memorandum (7th Edition), and bring him to the United States after a visit with Kittredge and his French colleagues in Paris.

(6) If Tamagna turns out to be as promising as he looks on paper, send him to Rome to undertake a study there on lines similar to Miss Moore's study in Moscow, returning at the end of six months to give six months to collaboration with the group under the direction of Corbett, Sansom, Holland, Alexander, and also with the A. C. I. S., Earle and yourself.

(7) Discover whether there is one wise and great man in Manila—(Would Apostol qualify?)—and have him spend three months on the project in Manila, a month each in Chungking and Tokyo and then bring him, preferably by way of the trans-Siberian railway, to collaborate with the groups here.

(8) Send Phil Jessup or Jack Sheppard for three months each to Batavia, Chungking, Manila, Tokyo.

(9) Discover whether Myrdal would be free three months after his return to Sweden to contribute an analysis of above-ground and under-ground concepts in Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Latvia, Esthonia, and Lithuania on postwar organization.

(10) After he has served six months in the French Army, if he is still alive, dig up Dennerly for the roots and bring him over to collaborate with Corbett, Earle, and yourself. Failing Dennerly, consider Joxe.

(11) Discover whether there is some European, African or British scholar who knows the greater part of Africa from the political and economic angle, and arrange for him to make a fresh visit to the principal African states and colonies. After a ten-month survey of war repercussions and the establishment of contact with that handful of people in each area who are thinking of postwar organization, bring him to New York for collaboration with the groups here.

(12) Ask Henry Allen Moe, Laurence Duggan and others who are the one or two Latin Americans of great intellectual ability who look at Latin America from a continental and international point of view, who might establish contact with the appropriate groups in the leading countries and then come to New York to give the groups here the benefit of his study of such thinking as there is in Latin America on war aims and postwar organization.

(13) Bring both Searle Bates and Chen Han-seng from China to collaborate both with Corbett, Tawney, Sansom and Holland on the one hand and with such groups as the American Committee may recommend on the other.

(14) Bring either Motylev, Troyanovsky or Voitinski, to contribute alike to the I. P. R. Inquiry, Corbett's special synthesis and to such studies by other American groups as may be recommended by the American Committee for International Studies.

(15) Discover from S. K. Datta and Jawaharlal Nehru what Indian scholar is qualified or could take time under a Rockefeller fellowship to qualify himself to come to New York to contribute to the work of the various international and national groups here.

The parochialism of even the greatest thinkers is such that unless international organization is studied in an atmosphere that is made realistic by the physical presence of people from every continent, grave errors are inevitable. You will remember that in his *A Study of History*, Arnold J. Toynbee asserts that, as a historian, he disapproves of the use to which historical information has been put. He maintains that historical scholarship has substituted the nation for mankind and thwarted the impulse to comprehend life as a whole. To support this he examines one case and discovers that English history is unintelligible when taken by itself. The "intelligible field of study" must be in some larger unit than the nation. "Historical thought takes a deep impression from the dominant institutions and the transient social environment in which it happens to live."

You will note that the people I envisage as fellowship holders and collaborators represent everyone of the disciplines in the social sciences.

It seems to Holland and me that either your Committee or your Committee acting jointly with the I. P. R. or the Rockefeller Foundation itself should set up a temporary research bureau in New York for the next three or four years, devoted solely to studying the question of wartime and postwar problems.

Many of these suggestions, or perhaps the multiplicity of them, may cause you to feel that I have gone beyond your request. This I have clearly done, but I have been moved to do so by my fairly deep convictions. The I. S. C. has done valuable work, but one of its principal limitations has been that it has been too much conditioned by its European environment. The I. P. R. has done valuable work, but it has been too much conditioned by its Pacific environment. It seems to me that the war situation makes it more imperative than ever that a nucleus of scholars be established somewhere in the world, probably of neces-

sity in New York, which can look at present problems of mankind from an even more inclusive point of view than that of either the I. S. C. or the I. P. R.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1145

129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y.,
19th December, 1942.

DR. PHILIP C. JESSUP,
Columbia University, New York, N. Y.

DEAR PHIL: Here are the rapporteurs' reports for the last group of Round Tables. I think you will be particularly interested in the reports of Harriet Moore, Fred Field, and Ralph Bunche. You will want to read, of course, ultimately, Condliffe's report, though it was not regarded as measuring up as well to the requirements as the three others.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1146

(Handwritten :) RWB, HP, FVF, KM, WLH.

BAGUIO, May 10, 1940.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have read Robert Barnett's article, China's Industrial Cooperatives on Trial, and the comments of Rewi Alley and Miss Cholmeley on this presentation. I am amazed that Barnett could have drawn such a clear picture of both the strength and weakness of Indusco, from such a distance. He is to be congratulated for his understanding of both the potential significance of the movement (with which he is obviously in sympathy) and the dangers which confront it with possible failure.

What comment I have to offer is not meant as criticism either of his point of view, which is good, or his objective analysis of the material available to him, which is sound enough and as competent as anyone could have done without a more intimate experience with complex problems that face Indusco workers in the field. I offer these remarks merely to fill in a little of the background of those problems. Most of it is probably already familiar to you. Fundamentally I agree with Miss Cholmeley that the weakness of Barnett's article—if it is a weakness—is failure properly to estimate the degree to which the political milieu conditions the development of Indusco. This is fully implied also in Alley's comment.

I will just enumerate a few things which might have been handled differently if Barnett had possessed all the facts.

1. First of all, a word about the objectives of C. I. C. It is not correct, as far as I know, that "conflicts developed among those who supported the movement" over the points Barnett mentions. The charge of "communism" came from C. I. C.'s enemies, not its supporters. Leaders in the organization all fear the degeneration of the movement into a chi-kuan: nobody advocates it. And without exception they welcome foreign help and participation that offers any practicable advantage.

But a certain disagreement between some leaders over fundamental objectives sometimes causes confusion of purpose. I should say the majority, in practice, and almost everybody, in theory, admits that the first objective of C. I. C. is *not* to set up a model cooperative movement in the midst of present chaos, but to *win the war*. Therefore, C. I. C. is no place for the Rochdale orthodox to come on pilgrimage, for their principles must be sacrificed wherever they handicap the primary purpose. Starting cooperatives with destitute workers possessing no assets whatever is in itself a mortal sin in Rochdale eyes, yet this is Indusco's essential method.

To win the war, Indusco recognized its task to be (1) to maintain independent Chinese industrial production of some kind over the widest possible areas, both in the rear and behind the Japanese lines, so as to offer a market for the greatest possible number of Chinese, (2) to mobilize Chinese skilled labor, in order to prevent Japan from exploiting it in war aims, and for other obvious reasons, (3) to furnish war bases for the guerrilla troops, (4) to achieve this mobilization in a form which would strengthen the will and the sense of responsibility of the

working class. Indusco people accepted these aims and the fundamental win-the-war objective because everybody saw clearly that if China lost the war no cooperative organization, however model or ideal it might be, could survive. Dozens of examples of the fate of small-scale, carefully-charted pre-war institutions (consider Ting Hsien, for one) in the occupied areas proved this beyond any argument. The thing was to make this a practical mass organization on the biggest scale possible, and quickly enough to affect the outcome of the war. Indusco is above all a mass movement, as Alley keeps repeating, and as such it must acquire much of its character from below. It is a war-time improvisation, a method of mobilization, a section of national defense, an instrument of struggle, a training ground for democracy, a social and political hope, and a focus for the help of all those who believe it is desirable to have an independent democratic China. It is all that and a lot of other things simultaneously with its organic form as a cooperative movement. So you see how very radically it differs from any cooperative attempt of the past. Because of its unique character, Indusco can fail in some respects as an efficient cooperative organization, but still be a triumph if it attains its other objectives.

While I think few inside the movement would dispute the priority of these hopes, in theory, nevertheless there are some who in practice feel depressed whenever the cooperative ideal comes into conflict with the practical need. Thus you find schisms occasionally where opposition develops to extending co-ops into dangerous regions, to expansion to new areas or into new industries while existing units are still in the formation stage, or to the sacrifice of cooperative principles in order to meet emergency needs. E. g., the army order for 400,000 blankets was filled partly by employing thousands of women on a piece-work basis. E. g., some rear-line co-op workers object to C. I. C. extension into the guerrilla areas, where the danger of loss through war greatly increases. Maybe, as Alley says, C. I. C. is attempting too much. But if that is true it is because everywhere the need and the opportunity are so urgent and the alternatives to C. I. C. are so weak, that the latter cannot restrict itself as a peacetime organization might be able to do.

2. Now, in view of all this, one might think the various elements which make up the Government would unanimously extend all possible aid to C. I. C. Such is not the case, though I am afraid Barnett assumes it to be. Certain individuals, originally lukewarm, are now staunch backers: Mme. Chiang, the Generalissimo, Mme. Kung, Dr. Kung—in general the "palace satellite group". All liberal and left-wing elements are behind it, but they have little to say in the Government. The groups which dominate the bureaucracy, on the other hand, are opposed to C. I. C. and will continue to be as long as it is not a *chi-kuan* under their control. And these (chiefly the C. C. and the Cheng Hsüeh Hsi) are powerful enough to keep the organization from getting necessary financial backing, often interfere with it locally, raise the baseless cry of "communism" to the embarrassment of its friends, and have had to be placated by compromises in certain regions—which are consequently now the most backward of all.

3. C. I. C. has thus never been given its proper status as a national defense institution, and the Soong family, while behind it, have never understood the full implications of the objectives set forth above. Thus the Government help (which up till now amounts to only about \$3,000,000, as contrasted with about an equal amount raised from bank loans and gifts) has been limited mostly to third-line areas. It was not available for extraordinary expenses which really should have come from defense expenditure: i. e., salvaging of tools and machinery, transportation of essential workers, and the setting up on guerrilla industry. Consequently, countless opportunities to save valuable means of production were lost, especially in front line areas. The delay in recognizing C. I. C.'s defense function cost China millions of dollars in lost plant and labor power. What results it has accomplished in this respect have been financed largely by (1) gifts from special funds raised by outside supporters, (2) borrowing "special funds" from capital funds and charging them against loans made to the co-ops eventually set up. The latter is highly irregular, as Barnett rightly points out. But what would you do, let the machines fall into enemy hands in order to be regular? I note, for example, Barnett's praise for the removal of some of the Kingtehchen kilns and workers to southeast Kiangsi. They would not be there today had it not been for just the kind of irregularity which he—again quite rightly—deplores. Alley and other C. I. C. leaders have repeatedly plowed back their own salaries into the organization, when the Government would not advance special funds. Alley in fact put his life savings into this work; and so did others. Often, due to bureaucratic manipulation, salaries (provided for the staff personnel by Government allowance from relief funds) were withheld for months.

At one time Alley's own salary was seven months in abeyance. When I was in Paochi staff salaries had not been paid for three months and organizers were digging into their own pockets to meet daily needs. Show me another organization, outside of the guerrilla districts, of which this is true. These men were even facing the prospect of permanent withdrawal of Government aid and had already brought the problem before the cooperative guild, and considered ways and means of financing staff work from co-op contributions.

4. "The word cooperative is not mentioned." I know of no cases where co-ops have been organized without a discussion of the co-op constitution, the pledge of all to observe it, and in no case has money been loaned to start private factories or workshops. Unquestionably the basic principles are often but hazily understood by new groups. But there is never any attempt to entice them into this method of work by deception.

5. "In one co-op more than 200 light machine guns are made daily." This is incorrect. The output of China's best arsenal at present is only 200 machine guns a month. Co-ops have made guns and grenades; one in southern Shensi turned out 70,000 hand grenades in one month, on Government order, but on Government order stopped making them also. The Government does not want co-ops to make munitions, and extends no aid to C. I. C. to build badly needed war industries in the guerrilla districts.

6. Most of C. I. C.'s machinery has been salvaged from war areas, purchased from inoperative plants, or made in its own machine shops. A little has been imported. In few instances has any functioning plant been bought and turned over to cooperative ownership. In many cases of handicraft industry one or more members of a co-op possessed tools or light machines, but lacked operating capital and technical direction. In other cases odd bits of machinery were lying unused in scattered villages, but there was no one to bring them together to create a workable industry. C. I. C. performed that function. Sometimes Government-owned industry had been abandoned or partly dismantled, until C. I. C. with great difficulty managed to buy it up and put it back into production. This was true of C. I. C.'s alcohol plant in Shensi, and of the testing laboratory there. It is true of a sulphuric acid plant in Sian, which C. I. C. has been trying to buy. But—though the plant remains idle—the political opposition succeeds in frustrating the purchase.

7. Barnett praises co-op hospitals, schools, creches, and clubhouses. In most cases these have had to be financed by non-Government funds, or by methods he would consider "irregular." When they have proved their value it is hoped the Government will give them some support. The schools are opposed by the C. C., who will probably succeed in preventing that support for some time.

8. The Shensi laboratory was not "placed at the disposal" of C. I. C. Though it was idle, C. I. C. could not secure it from the Government except by payment of an annual rental of \$10,000. This latter will have to be supplied, probably, from capital funds, until the Co-op Guilds become strong enough to maintain it themselves—which should be the case in a year or so. Another irregularity—but an imperative need.

9. "The Government may abandon its support" not because of inefficient accounting methods—C. I. C. has an infinitely better record in this respect than the machine-bossed Credit co-ops—but because it is making a determined fight to keep its organization out of the hands of the bureaucratic apparatus, and it may lose. C. I. C. is the only war organization now training accountants from the masses, from its own workers, and the only one whose accountants are not machine appointees. Exceptions are found in Szechuan, where some C.C. men have had to be given posts, under pressure from the party, and where the worst co-ops in the organization are found. Government money "earmarked for use by cooperatives has been withheld" not because of any proven case of corruption but because of bureaucratic opposition.

10. Barnett is quite right in emphasizing the need for improvement in accountability, for a greater degree of discipline, and for greater coordination of field workers with general headquarters. Due to various conditions, the growth of the movement in the field has been far more rapid than the general section could follow or direct. One of these conditions is political. Another is communications. It takes a week to reach Paochi from Chungking, and two weeks to reach Kanchow. Telegrams take almost as long. Money travels about four times as slowly as that. People in Chungking have no conception of the daily problems facing headquarters' chiefs, and the latter more and more assume responsibility for decision. The tendency now is definitely away from too much centralized power, which has in the past handicapped the growth

of field work. Only when the working units become numerous and powerful enough to be an important factor in national economic life can the central section find its real place. The aim of most co-op leaders is eventually to bring that section under the control of the many field units, through a National Induseco Guild, instead of the other way round. C. I. C. people are definitely democrats, all their workers are being trained in democratic principles, and that is just why "it is not always plain who the single individual is through whom" all authority is exercised. The aim of C. I. C. is to make that "single individual" the united will of the co-op members, not the whim of a politician.

11. Barnett cites a case where "shares carried a fantastic multiple liability of 250 times their face value" and believes "reform is essential if the co-operatives are to merit continued financial support from government or non-political sources." The case cited is unusual but all through the co-ops liability probably exceeds share investment by from 10 to 50 times. Should we wait until the destitute refugees turn bandit, steal enough cash to buy a shop, and then come back and get a loan to start a cooperative? Barnett probably does not realize the extraordinary rate of capital turnover in light industries in Free China. In the whole C. I. C. chain it is now averaging 16.8 times per year, and it is quite possible for workers in some industries to pay back an unsecured loan in six months. In certain areas the value of C. I. C. production appears to be as much as 25 times that of capital. This is quite "normal," and occurs in all countries during infant industrialism. Even in Shanghai now an annual 10/1 ratio of production to capital is common. There are many reasons for this, which I won't go into here. In any case, Barnett's fears in this respect are exaggerated—though that is the line of attack used by the C. C. and other enemies of the movement. What they object to, however, is really the fact that C. I. C. loans are not under their control, and go to poor people instead of to the gentry, as in the case of the so-called "agricultural cooperatives." The C. C., through the co-op control commission, pumped 50 millions into the villages last year, through the magistrates, who in many cases simply called in the gentry and formed a "co-op" with them, distributing the manna without further ado.

12. The "hired labor" problem is quite serious and C. I. C. must fight against this abuse. No hard and fast rule can be laid down without more experience. Clearly a machine shop co-op, for example, cannot take in 10 carpenters as members when it needs their labor only for a special order to make wheels for carts, or frames for looms, for which there may not be another demand for weeks or months. Spinners, for whose products C. I. C. textile co-ops may have a temporary need, also present a problem. Clearly the case cited by Barnett, where in a co-op with 32 members only 16 were at work, together with 13 hired laborers and 33 apprentices, was an outrage unless it was a temporary phenomenon. I know that such cases exist in Szechuan, and that when discovered by inspectors these co-ops are either reorganized or dissolved. Outside that province (where C. I. C. faces an especially acute political struggle, as I have pointed out) such instances are rare, though the problem definitely exists. Here is just the place, in fact, where C. I. C. would go to pieces if it fell in the hands of Chinese Tammany methods. It would simply degenerate into another loan bureau, through which the party machine would dump money into the pockets of the t'u-hao and the lieh-sheng, to enable them to hire slave labor under the name of "cooperation."

I would not like any part of this to be quoted under my name but I think it is worth discussing at this length, so that American friends can better appreciate the complexity of the tasks that face C. I. C. It is a great movement, with great aims, and some fine men and women in it. Maybe it is attempting the impossible, but so far it has achieved enough to keep hope alive. The real danger is that it is moving much faster than the country as a whole, particularly its political life. Only the war moves ahead of it, and in that emergency lies the explanation of its existence at all. It is not "China's Industrial Cooperatives on Trial" really—they have already proved that they are inherently sound—it is "China on Trial Through Industrial Cooperatives."

I wish you would express my profound appreciation to Robert Barnett for his brilliant statement on C. I. C. Despite the points of disagreement made above, I think it is the best objective summary I have seen.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

[s] Edgar Snow
EDGAR SNOW.

EXHIBIT No. 1147

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, June 6, 1940.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esquire,
300 Gilman Hall, John Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: Here is Gaus' reply and my acknowledgement. Is Vincent competent? Is he now in Washington? What do you suggest as the next move?

Sincerely yours,

Edward C. Carter
EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—Please return these letters at your convenience.

EXHIBIT No. 1148

THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
South Hall
MADISON, WISCONSIN

JUNE 3, 1940.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter of May 29 with its invitation to review the new book by Owen Lattimore. I am just reading the book with very great pleasure and profit. I must say in all honesty, however, that I simply lack the knowledge that a person should possess to review this book adequately for *Pacific Affairs*. It is far too distinguished and important a work to be left to one who is an amateur in these questions. And while I have read all of Mr. Lattimore's books and some others on Asia, I have not visited that region or made a special study of its history and problems.

I wonder if you know Mr. John Carter Vincent of our Foreign Service, formerly a member of the staff of the Embassy in Peiping and during the past year State Department representative at the International Labor Office in Geneva. He knows Lattimore and his work, and he knows the Far East very well indeed, as does his wife. I think that he may have been ordered back to this country in view of the developments abroad, but I am not sure. I mention him, because I know how much I would turn with eagerness to a review of this book by him. Doubtless, however, you have many other experts on your list who are available.

Thank you again for your kindness in inviting me to review the book.

Faithfully yours,

John M. Gaus
JOHN M. GAUS.

JMG: EMB.

(Handwritten:) I find *Pacific Affairs* excellent.

EXHIBIT No. 1149

JUNE 10, 1940.

KM from ECC:

Here is a copy of Corbett's proposal for the Summer, also a copy of his project for the year, entitled, "I. P. R., European War, and International Organization." From the latter you may wish to make an appropriate note for the forthcoming issue of I. P. R. NOTES.

Miss Virginia Thompson has just completed the manuscript of her book on Siam. She is at present a member of the International Secretariat in New York cooperating in the study of the effect of the war in Europe on the policies of those countries which are chiefly interested in the Far East. In this connection her special field of study is the war and peace aims of France in relationship to the Far East and the general problem of international organization.

Ch'ao-ting Chi has been given six months leave of absence to assist in an independent survey of the Chinese transportation systems and war economy. He sailed from San Francisco on May 15, 1940. It is expected that he will travel widely in free China in connection with his present assignment.

Nagaharu Yasuo, who joined the International Secretariat on January 11, 1938, for a period of two years, was able to get permission from Domei news agency to continue as a member of the Secretariat longer than was originally proposed, namely, until April 1st, when he resumed work for Domei, being posted in the first instance in its New York office. He has, however, been able to continue part time work as a member of the Secretariat. It is hoped that he will be able to continue to do so until his successor arrives in New York from Tokyo.

EXHIBIT 1150

JUNE 12, 1940.

[Night letter]

MOTYLEV, *Pacific Institute, 20 Razin Street, Moscow (U. S. S. R.)* :

In view his recent Asia visit recommend you talk with Cripps.

EDWARD CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1151

(Handwritten notation :) OL scan & return to ECC.

JULY 3, 1940.

ECC from RWB :

Thank you for letting me see Lattimore's "Empire in the East." I agree with you that it represents an important point of view. His argument is, I believe, that as China goes, so goes Asia ; that China may go under the yoke of colonial domination and other Asiatic peoples follow, or China may wrest her independence and freedom from the existing stalemate in the Far Eastern hostilities. The future of half the peoples of the world lies largely, therefore, with the fate of China. The argument is well taken. However, without exaggeration, the argument may be carried even further for with the fate of China lies the future of the other half of the peoples of the world as well. China loses and, whatever happens in Europe, the United States and the British Empire (or its remnants) must maintain a military and naval alert in the waters of the Pacific. China wins and democratic processes acquire a practical verification which they have not yet gained in Europe. Either of these developments will have far-reaching repercussions upon democracy here. Thus, one might say that "as China goes, so goes Asia—so goes democracy—so goes the United States."

On pp. 3-4 Lattimore refers to the lessons of Changkufeng and Namonhan. I believe his implicit point is that the United States should take a bold stand, in which I concur. But his depreciation of the argument that boldness unifies Japan behind counteraction is contradicted by his admission that Japan did attack the USSR. This argument cuts no ice with American readers who in general, desire only to avoid war ; not to win small ones.

EXHIBIT No. 1152

(Penciled notation :) Copies to WLH

OL
HP
LKR
RWB

JULY 2, 1940.

FVF from ECC :

Recently I wrote to a Chinese friend in Hongkong asking about Kuomintang-Communist relations. He is not a member of the Secretariat of either the China I. P. R. or the Pacific Council. Under date of May 31st he wrote me as follows :

"Since last March I have been worried about the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communists. You may be aware that the Communists have been conducting publicity against the Central Government for the last

12 months. They have printed lots of pamphlets under the name of a certain Mr. Robert, at first at Hongkong and then at Manila. Their criticisms seem reasonable enough, but it is strange that they should print them in English instead of Chinese. Moreover, quite a number of Kuomintang magistrates and officials have been done to death by the Communists in certain areas. All this has been going on for the last ten months or so. The Central Government has done nothing to retaliate. But since last January, certain Party members apparently couldn't stand any more Communist propaganda and anti-Government actions. It was then decided that some measures should be taken to counteract Communist propaganda. So a good many pamphlets *in Chinese* have been circulated abroad detailing the anti-Government activities of the Communists. The whole affair was deplorable. I did what I could to impress upon our authorities the unfortunate effect which any semi-official propaganda against the Chinese Communists would have on foreign friends of China, and how welcome it would be to China's enemies. I suggested that no more pamphlets should be circulated against the Communists, and that the Central authorities should tell the Communists that they must stop all anti-Government propaganda and subversive activities in future. I am glad to tell you that this has been done. So, for the present at any rate, there is peace between the Central Government and the Communists. But I would deceive you if I do not tell you that there has been no final settlement of the Kuomintang-Communist misunderstanding. However, there is no reason for undue pessimism. I still think that a satisfactory and lasting solution is not impossible, if there is good faith on both sides.

"I have written rather frankly to you, because I owe it to you as a real friend of China. The truth is oftentimes most unpleasant, but I know you like to hear it. Please keep what I have here written confidential."

EXHIBIT No. 1153

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 11th July, 1940.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR FRED: Lawrence Duggan says that it will make it easier for Deborah Hubbard to get into the press conferences at Havana if she goes as a correspondent of a daily rather than of such august periodicals as the Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs.

Could you manage to have her accredited by PM or by any of the other newspapers in which you are interested?

Deborah wouldn't object if PM had two representatives there: one to do the work and herself to do the listening?

Deborah might go down for the illustrative section, as you will remember she is both an artist and a researcher.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1154

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, July 15, 1940.

DR. PHILIP C. JESSUP,
Columbia University,
New York City.

DEAR PHIL: Recently Holland wrote me as follows:

"The other day I had a visit from Dr. H. W. Baerensprung who was introduced by Carlson. He is a very interesting German social democrat, formerly chief of policy in Saxony and brought out to China by Rajchman as one of the various experts in Rajchman's entourage. After Rajchman left he taught international law in Soochow University for some time and then was employed by the national government as a lecturer in the Central Police Training School at Nanking, and later in Hankow and Chungking. He is still employed in this capacity and has been sent to this country by Chiang Kai-shek to learn something of American police methods, and is, accordingly, spending a good deal of time with the police

in Berkeley and Alameda where they apparently have a number of outstanding authorities on various aspects of police and finger-printing work.

Baerensprung is hoping to return to Chungking but feels that what with the Japanese blockade and the fact of his German nationality, he may find it impossible to get back, especially if he has to go through Singapore and Burma. He is an anti-Nazi and was imprisoned in Germany before he came to China but this is no guarantee that he would not be interned in British Territory today, although they let him come through Hongkong without difficulty a few months ago. He apparently has enough to live on here for nine months or so but is anxious to obtain one or two lecturing or research assignments that would enable him to qualify with the immigration authorities as a teacher or research worker, i. e. as a non-quota immigrant."

I do not know whether any department at Columbia would be interested in getting Dr. Baerensprung for a lecture or two. If so, you may wish to pass this letter on to the appropriate person.

He does not quite fit into the I. P. R. research program.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1155

AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Incorporated

260 California Street, San Francisco

NITTA MARU, August 10, 1940.

DEAR CARTER: Enclosed is my original letter of July 2 to you, which in a cautious moment I decided it would not be well to entrust to the Japanese post. I repeated the gist of it in the letter that I did then send.

After my return from our five days in Peking I had leisurely talks with Takayanagi at his home, and with Ushiba, Takagi, and Matsumoto in Tokyo; also with Yamakawa. The talk with Matsumoto was unfortunately cut short by the sudden death of Mr. Cox, of Reuters who was one of his close friends.

It is not easy to summarize the long talks with Ushiba and Takayanagi, but I will try. In trying to reflect the trend of attitude of the Japan Council toward the IPR as a whole, and toward the Pacific Council and the Secretariat in particular, they of course did not always express their own attitudes.

1. There is a conviction that the Secretariat is biased in two unfortunate directions: in favor of China and of USSR. The former they think has been fostered by Field, Jaffe (whose attendance at the Pac. Council staff meeting last Dec, they resent), and Lattimore, and has been shared at times by you. The latter they probably resent now more than they did a few years ago, since the China war is so largely motivated by an anti-USSR objective, and its success has been greatly hindered by the Red Army in China and by USSR. They doubt that you and your white associates can overcome this bias sufficiently, or in time, to reorient and redeem the whole IPR. They do not all distrust you, but I judge that a majority of the leading minds do, even though they may like and admire you, in great measure.

2. They mean to send at least one representative to the next meeting of the Council, but Matsumoto told me he could not possibly get away for it. Ushiba is reluctant to go himself, but I believe will do so, especially if a worth-while agenda is proposed and submitted to the Japan Council as early as practicable.

3. Ushiba seems to hold some doubts as to the practical efficiency of the present heterogeneous composition of the Pac. Council, and raised the question of some possible regional groupings, with a federation of them all, which would be in effect, an Inst. of World Relations. The trend of the European war lends weight to this query.

4. A reorganization of the International Association of Japan is likely to occur before long, according to Ushiba, and if it does, greater importance and leeway will accrue to the Japan Council of IPR. I judge that it would, however, be premature to count too surely on this.

5. I heard no criticism of the volumes of the INQUIRY thus far published, except that some of them were inevitably inconclusive, because the Sino-Japan conflict is still in progress, and many trends will depend on its outcome; not to mention

the effects of the European war on the Far East. They feel that the Japan Council has lived up to its assurances respecting the parallel series of studies made by them, and Ushiba says he has nearly completed the English translations. They say that the authors are a group of younger men, competent and ambitious, likely to be heard from as time goes on. I have only glanced at a few passages in two of the eight volumes now out, but they seem to me promising. They will apparently give an impressive array of data, with emphasis on those which justify the positions taken by the Japanese Government. That, at least, is the tendency in one passage that I read.

6. PACIFIC AFFAIRS sticks in their throats. They think that Lattimore's China bias makes him anxious always to counteract the influence of any article that seems to support Japan's case. But they admit that he has tried hard to secure articles from Japan, and that they have not given him adequate aid to that end. They seem to absolve Holland and Alsberg of bias in the administration of research, in so far as they control it. None of the men I interviewed had yet read Lattimore's new book on China's Inner Frontiers.

7. As to their attitudes toward the China war, I found some differences. All but one of them showed an awareness of the moral weakness of Japan's position, and of the extreme difficulty of achieving a decisive military or political victory in China. They are disposed, however, to place heavy responsibility on the United States for her negative and obstinately obstructive tactics toward Japan, and they think that if continued, this will drive Japan into the arms of Berlin and Rome. Even Matsumoto seemed to believe that China needed Japan's tutelage, and that Japan can not now turn back, although she should strive to make her benevolent intentions convincingly clear. When I talked with Prof. Nasu in Peking he paid no attention to military or political matters, but stressed the backwardness of the Chinese farmer and villages, and the great need of the science and administrative efficiency that Japan was beginning to contribute. I am now trying to organize my voluminous notes of other interviews, and to write a couple of articles. The day before we sailed I made a short-wave broadcast to the Western U. S. from Tokyo, and in it I incorporated briefly a point or two. Am sending a copy of it to Fred Field.

Very inadequate and spotty though this letter will seem, I send it for what it may be worth.

Faithfully,

(Signed) G. M. FISHER.

EXHIBIT No. 1156

(Handwritten notation:) Copies to

PCG	HM
JWW	BKB
CA	AG
WLH	MSF
EJT	CO

(Handwritten notation:)

HA
FVF
WWL
JS
PEC

COUNCIL OF THE USSR,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
20, Razin Street, Moscow, August 21, 1940.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City, N. Y., U. S. A.

DEAR CARTER: Under separate cover I am sending you a complimentary copy of my latest book entitled "The Pacific Nexus of the Second Imperialist War," which has just been published in a cheap edition in 20,000 copies as a part of our Institute's work.

This study, which represents the continuation of my first small book, will be included, in a much enlarged form, of course, as Part II in the monograph on which I am working at present.

The book was finished last spring and I made the last additions to it by the end of May. However, unfortunately, the publication was somewhat delayed in print.

Simultaneously, I am sending you a reprint of my article "Anglo-German Contradictions in the Epoch of Imperialism" which appeared in the sixth issue of the publication "Pod Znamenem Marxizma." I hope that this article containing my interpretation of the reasons which led to the present war, will be of some use in the Institute's library.

Yours sincerely,

V. Motylev.,

V. E. MOTYLEV.

(Handwritten notation:) Return ECC to send cable.

(Handwritten notation:) Many thanks for yours Aug. 21 eagerly awaiting arrival your book. Please send 20 additional copies each Pacific Nexus and 12 copies Anglo G Contra.

EXHIBIT No. 1157

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, September 20, 1940.

MORTIMER GRAVES, Esquire,

*American Council of Learned Societies,
West Newbury, Massachusetts.*

DEAR GRAVES: BEN Dorfman and Knight Biggerstaff have recently written me with reference to a grant-in-aid for Mr. Jay Robinson, who apparently has an unusual knowledge of the Chinese language. He is within a year of getting his Ph. D., has supported himself throughout his scholarly career, and according to Dorfman and Biggerstaff, is a man of promise.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter that I have written to Ben Dorfman on the subject.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1158

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Amsterdam—London—Manila—Moscow—New York—Paris—Shanghai—Sydney—Tokyo—
Toronto—Wellington

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Massachusetts, 24th September 1940.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,

*300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland.*

DEAR OWEN: On September 20 Holland wrote me as follows regarding Shore's article:

"I agree with you that the article on 'Sun Yat-sen, Lenin and China,' by Maurice Shore, is too long for PACIFIC AFFAIRS. I also have the feeling that this kind of doctrinal discussion is no longer so useful as it might have been before the present Sino-Japanese war started. Moreover, I suspect that you would get violent differences of opinion on almost all the issues raised by Shore if you were to submit the article to such people as Holcombe, McNair, Browder, Anna Louise Strong, Ed Snow, Harold Isaacs, and Chen Han-seng, not to mention Borodin, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung. That does not necessarily damn the article, but it suggests that it might better appear in one of the learned journals or else in pamphlet form. Could Owen, perhaps, raise with the author the question of submitting the article to some of the people I have mentioned with a view to getting it published, together with their comments, in pamphlet form? I personally feel that the value of the study would be immensely increased if the author could attempt to apply his arguments to, or to

consider how Lenin and Sun Yat-sen might have reacted in the face of, the present situation in China. Admittedly it would take a pretty colossal intellect to do such a thing."

I have no idea what your reaction will be to this.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1159

SUNSET FARM,

Lee, Massachusetts, September 26, 1940.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esquire,

300 Gilman Hall, John Hopkins University,

Baltimore, Maryland

DEAR OWEN: Andrew Roth, who has been doing a small but important monograph for the I. P. R. Inquiry, is going on with his Far Eastern studies. He has completed his third year in the Chinese language, has started Russian, and has done a good deal on Chinese labor and nationalism, on Chinese post-war history and also on Indian history. He will be delighted to contribute to PACIFIC AFFAIRS if you wish to appeal to him for help. You have already seen some evidences of his writing and will know better than I whether he will fit into your plan for PACIFIC AFFAIRS during the next two years. I think you know that he is rated very highly by Jessup and Pepper.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1160

TELEPHONE: DISTRICT 3395

CABLE ADDRESS: ACOLS

American Philosophical Society, 1727; American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1780; American Antiquarian Society, 1812; American Oriental Society, 1842; American Numismatic Society, 1858; American Philological Association, 1869; Archaeological Institute of America, 1879; Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis, 1880; Modern Language Association of America, 1883; American Historical Association, 1884; American Economic Association, 1885; American Philosophical Association; 1900; American Anthropological Association, 1902; American Political Science Association, 1903; Bibliographical Society of America, 1904; American Sociological Society, 1905; American Society of International Law, 1906; History of Science Society, 1924; Linguistic Society of America, 1924; Mediaeval Academy of America, 1925

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

Member of the International Union of Academies

Executive Offices: 907 Fifteenth Street

WASHINGTON, D. C.

OCTOBER 10, 1940.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,

129 E. 52d St., New York, N. Y.

DEAR CARTER: I am happy to send you two more copies of Notes on Far Eastern Studies in America, No. 7.

Sidney Glazer is on my list in Arabic and Russian. His name will go into the Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel as soon as the people on H Street get it working.

Last week-end, we discussed Mr. Jay Robinson as one of our problems in Far Eastern personnel. Most of the members of the two Committees knew him, and all were exceedingly favorably disposed toward him. There is, however, a very general feeling that he is not in our field. His interest in social and economic phases of Far Eastern studies are primary, and he has his linguistic competences. We have been able earlier to rationalize help to social scientists on the theory that we were giving them language training, and that after all language is a "humanity." This rationalization does not seem possible in Robinson's case. There was general agreement that he would be an excellent man for you; in fact that his whole career to date has been training for the kind of thing which we assume you are doing.

The consensus of opinion was that Mr. Robinson ought to be set down to doing a job within his competences, and made to stick to the job until he had cleaned it up. I should think that he might be urged to apply to the Social Science Re-

search Council. Why not give him a card to Phil Mosely, who is with the SSRC this year, or to somebody else in that organization? I would be quite willing to convey the opinion of our Committees, individually and collectively, that he is an excellent prospect, but he just simply is not up our alley. If you know of any argument against this view, I should be pleased to see what can be done with it.

Most sincerely yours,

[s] M. G.

MORTIMER GRAVES,
Administrative Secretary.

EXHIBIT No. 1161

129 EAST 52D STREET,
New York City, October 14, 1940.

URGENT

FREDERICK V. FIELD, ESQUIRE,
16 West 12th Street, New York City.

DEAR FRED: Here is the galley proof of Peffer's manuscript. Don't bother with typographical errors. I am most worried over the manuscript because of a good many very sweeping and unsupported assertions in the manuscript. I am also a little uncomfortable because he assumes that the behavior of all the Western Powers, including the U. S. S. R., in the Far East is similar. Finally, he assumes and declares that the U. S. S. R. is an imperialist power.

I hasten to say that so far as brilliance of style is concerned Peffer's book is tops in the I. P. R. series.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1162

A. GRAJDANZEV,
October 15, 1940.

To E. C. CARTER,
Secretary of the IPR:

DEAR MR. CARTER: Herewith I enclose a short summary of the contents of Dr. Motylev's book and the full translation of its conclusions. I do not think that there is something new for the members of the Institute in this book except the interpretation of the known facts, but this interpretation is quite clear from the Conclusions which I translated in full.

By the way, out of 60 quotations in the book 13 are taken from the IPR books, Far Eastern Survey and Amerasia (others are chiefly the works of S Stalin, the Oriental Economist and Foreign Trade Statistics). Evidently the works published by the Institute and its affiliations are studied in Moscow.

May I report you also that the cataloging of the books in Japanese language in the Library of the IPR is finished and that we have with the recent additions 1,494 volumes for each of which we have two cards (by the author and contents), an entry in the list of the books; each book has its number on the title page, on the first and last pages, so that one may easily find in the list the name of the author, the translation of the title, the name of the publisher, place, year, and month of the publication, edition, number of pages, and the price.

Herewith I enclose also a list of 20 books just received from Japan, so that you can see whether there is something what you consider good for translation.

Yours respectfully,

A. GRAJDANZEV.

(Penciled notation:) Copies to WLH
OL

V. MOTYLEV

The Pacific Knot of the Second Imperialist War, Moscow, 1940, 200 pp., 20,000 copies.

Introduction—the meaning and the importance of the Sino-Japanese War.

Ch. I. China at the end of the third year of her war for national liberation.

The Creation of the United Front. Three stages of the War. Now—the stage of the equilibrium. The military-economic construction in China. The

economic ties of China with capitalist powers. A hope is expressed that the development of the economic base in the West will finally make China independent from foreign supplies.

Chapter II. Japan at the end of the third year of her military adventure in China. Stimuli and direction of the Japanese aggression. It is shown that Japan is richly endowed for peaceful development. The National Income and the problem of the financing of war. The problem of the raw materials in the third year of war. Symptoms of the coming economic crises in Japan. Political situation in Japan.

Chapter III. Pacific interests and Pacific policy of the USA. USA as a Pacific power. Economic interests of the USA in the Pacific. Japano-American antagonism and the Far Eastern policy of the USA. The author shows that the American policy is based first on the commercial principle of getting profits from the Chinese as well as from the Japanese; second, on the principle of the open doors, i. e., the USA as an industrially developed country is sure of her success in case of the open door competition in China. Thirdly, on the readiness of certain groups in the USA to support Japan as a bulwark against the USSR. These groups pray also for the Russo-Japanese war.

Naval construction of the USA in the Pacific. The author presents the bases under construction as the bases not only for defense, but also for an offense. The problem of the Philippines' independence. The author explains some steps made in the direction of the independence (1) by the desire of the USA to bring Great Britain, France, and Netherlands face to face with Japan (because before these powers felt that they are sheltered by the Philippines against Japan and could safely play Japan against the USA) and (2) by the economic competition of the Philippine sugar with Cuban sugar. But he believes that this policy is undergoing a change.

Chapter IV. The Economic Interests and the policy of Great Britain, France, and Netherlands.

Chapter V. The Economic interests and the policy of Germany and Italy.

Conclusions—translated fully.

Conclusions

EUROPEAN AND PACIFIC "KNOTS" OF THE SECOND IMPERIALIST WAR

In the preceding chapters the inner logic of the development of the Pacific knots leading to the Second World War was examined. The influence of the Imperialist War in Europe on the War in China and on the Pacific knot of contradictions connected with it was taken into consideration as much as was necessary in each particular case. This does not preclude, however, the necessity of considering the interconnection of the European and Pacific knots as a whole. Insofar as the probable interaction of these two knots of the Second Imperialist War is only beginning to take definite forms, we shall limit our task to the mere formulation of the problems. The turning of the Pacific knot of Imperialist contradictions into the Pacific knot of the Second Imperialist War was proceeding in direct connection with the development of the Second Imperialist War in Europe. The struggle of Japan for the subjugation of China is only a part of the struggle for the redivision of the capitalistic world which brought on the Second Imperialist War. The outbreak and development of the Imperialist War in Europe has changed the situation in the Pacific and is of tremendous importance in connection with the development of the Sino-Japanese War and Imperialist rivalry on the Pacific. There is a real danger that the Pacific War will fuse with the European War. *First*, the war in Europe caused such a weakening of British and French military positions in the Pacific that the Anglo-French imperialists become very interested in safeguarding their rear through an agreement with Japan. At the same time the development and intensification of the Second Imperialist World War and the growth of the national-revolutionary movement in India, Burma, etc., as well as the successful progress of the Chinese War of national liberation present a growing danger to the Anglo-French Imperialists as factors in the revolutionization of the colonial peoples. All this makes these imperialists interested in a speedy end to the Sino-Japanese war, even at a price of recognition of Japanese demands on China, at least of a substantial part.

These Imperialists undoubtedly cherish a "clever" plan to bring Japan over on their side, to induce her to sever her trade connections with Germany, to provoke the deterioration of the Soviet-Japanese relations, etc. In this respect the information reaching the world press that Great Britain and France are ready

to supply Japan with necessary raw materials, if she severs her trade connections with Germany, is symptomatic. If this is true, it means that the British-French imperialists are trying to use the acute shortage of raw materials and foreign exchange in Japan to draw Japan in on their side with promises of help.

However, the British-French imperialists are interested in such a policy only insofar as they can buy Japanese "friendship" in a time of European War. The fate of this policy depends upon the problem of whether with these concessions to the Japanese demands they will be able to draw Japan into their orbit. If Japan, with the further development of the European war follows a German orientation, the British-French imperialists may become interested in a more intensive use of China against Japan. In spite of all their anti-Chinese actions and maneuvering, they are interested in China as a tool of their plans.

But even in case a rapprochement with Japan, is realized the growing threat of Japan to the British and French possessions in the Pacific and Indian oceans cannot be removed.

Secondly, with the growth of demand for American arms on the part of the European countries the American Imperialists become less and less interested in selling arms and raw materials to China and Japan. At the same time continuation of war in the Far East threatens with social and political consequences in China and Japan which are contrary to the interests of American Capitalists. The hope of the American imperialists that at a certain stage of exhaustion of the belligerents the USA will be able to dictate a peace which will be profitable for the American Capitalism becomes more and more uncertain. This is the reason why the American Imperialists want a speedy end to the war in China, even at a price of certain concessions to Japan. But though the USA are evidently ready to recognize temporarily certain Japanese demands in China, they, unlike to British and French imperialists, are unwilling to sacrifice their own present and future chances in China. This circumstance makes difficult an agreement between American and Japanese imperialists. In any case the first attempt of the USA to compel Japan to agree to a compromise which would be acceptable to the USA was not successful and brought on a new deterioration of Japano-American relations.

In general, whatever maneuvers the American imperialists may carry out for the speedy end of the Sino-Japanese war, this cannot remove or even mitigate the intensity of Japano-American contradictions, especially because the development of the European war may bring a new burst of Japano-American rivalry in connection with the struggle for redivision of the Asiatic territories.

Thirdly, the British-French imperialists (and to some degree, the American imperialists) interested in the speedy end of the Sino-Japanese war have brought pressure on the Chinese national government with the purpose of getting its consent to the concessions, i. e., capitulation to the Japanese. Insofar as certain groups of Chinese bourgeoisie are closely connected economically with the foreign capitalists, this new attitude adopted by the British, French, and Americans strengthens the psychology of capitulation among these groups. This creates an atmosphere favorable to the intensification of Japanese intrigue inside of the Kuomintang and for the provocative work of the Japanese agents in China. This results in the activity of the right wing of the Kuomintang, which wants to liquidate the united anti-Japanese national front, which was and is the only real base of the war of national liberation.

But this defeatist attitude is in sharpest contradiction with the development of the Sino-Japanese war, with the relative strength of Japan and China, with the present phase of the war of national liberation, with the interests and mood of the Chinese masses, with the aims of all progressive elements in the Kuomintang. For almost three years now the heroic Chinese people have been fighting for their independence. This war has proved beyond doubt that militarily China is able to resist successfully the Japanese plans of enslavement. Since the end of 1938 the line of fronts in China has been almost stable and a period of balance of forces has begun. Now it is clear to the whole Chinese people and even to the whole world that the Japanese imperialists will not be able to enslave China with bayonets alone. Meanwhile, the political maturity of the Chinese masses, their activity and their organization has reached such a level that they will not be reconciled to a defeatist position, whoever may be behind it. Wrote Chou-eng-lai: "Even if we admit that the Japanese imperialists may succeed in their plot—to strike a blow at the anti-Japanese forces and to their unity with the help of the defeatists and appeasers, just the same, the masses of China, the armed forces of the country and all anti-Japanese parties and groups in China will steadfastly continue their anti-Japanese war till the victorious end."

Thus, under all conditions the anti-Japanese war of national liberation will continue. Meanwhile, Japan is so weakened by this war, the political state and the morale of her army in China is so impaired that the continuation of war will become more and more dangerous for the Japanese imperialists and pregnant with disasters inside Japan.

Fourth—and this especially important,—each change in the balance of European war will find its reflection in the Pacific and may cause the spread of war in the Pacific. The essence of the problem of the Pacific is the struggle between the Imperialist powers for hegemony in Asia and the Pacific approaches to Asia. If one keeps this in mind, then it becomes clear that the new intensification of the imperialist struggle in the Pacific is possible not only with regard to China, but also, for example, with regard to the Dutch Indies and for any territory which may become a definite object of war. Above it was shown that neither the Japanese nor the American imperialists are ready to give up the Dutch Indies to the rival in case of violation of Netherlands' neutrality.

But the development of the European war may create a situation in which the British and French possessions in the Pacific and Indian oceans will become more defenseless than now; and though Japan is exhausted by her war with China and needs peace, the spirit of adventure of her ruling groups may throw them into the struggle for the redivision of the British and French colonial Empires. But it is clear that this will bring nearer the moment of Japanese-American armed conflict in the Pacific. Though this variant of the development of events is not the only possible one, yet it is clear that the American imperialists are not ready to permit the Japanese imperialists to use the war in Western Europe to thoroughly strengthen the Japanese positions in the Western Pacific and in Asia. Quite the contrary; the American imperialists want to use the weakening of Great Britain and France in the Pacific in order to strengthen the American positions at the expense of the former. At the same time the British imperialists, even under stress of war in Europe, are ready to use Japano-American contradictions to their own advantage. All this shows that the development of war in Western Europe intensifies the Japanese-American antagonism. There are, of course, other problems of interdependence and interaction of the Pacific knots of the Second Imperialist War. But even these which were mentioned show how close is the connection between further development of the Pacific knot of the second imperialist war and the development of this war as a whole.

EXHIBIT No. 1163

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
In the City of New York

OCTOBER 18, 1940.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 East 52d Street, New York City.

DEAR NED: I have read Miss Farley's memorandum. I hope to see Phil Jessup and talk it over with him. I think that he is right in believing that it is better to wait until after the election. No such letter is likely to get much attention now, but it might be more useful after the election.

I am in doubt as to whether an open letter like this would do much good. I think that the general idea is well expressed, and it is of course an idea in the minds of a few people, but I do not think that in this form it would have much effect as a letter to the Times. Possibly, if we could have a dinner of some sort, particularly with a group of men like the American Council, with some of the really strong names on the Council ready to endorse the statement, we might get general press publicity.

I understand that there is a committee in the State Department working on plans after the war, of which Wilson, former American Ambassador to Berlin, is the chief, and with which Mr. Welles is concerned. So far as the State Department is concerned, it seems to me that there would have to be work done with this committee or with Feis and Livesay, or Pasvosky, who appear to be the economic advisors to the Secretary. You might get started in the Department through someone in the Far Eastern Division who could urge on the powers-that-be in the Department the value of working with the Institute. That I think would be the most effective procedure, and I doubt whether newspaper publicity would be of value in pushing such a program.

To take away the impression that this is simply a group of professors, it might be a useful thing if you could get some businessman to go down with you

and Jessup to talk with the State Department, and then you could perhaps lay out more definitely the general terms of a study which could be worked in with consideration of the European situation and its consequences as part of a world settlement. Even taking Eastern Asia by itself, it would be an advantage to make some such study. I suppose you are already working with the committee of which Ed Earle appears to be the head. I have not had a chance to see how far they are going or what they are doing, but I am a great believer in cooperating with any important organization which seems likely to produce some effect. You will know better than I if Ed Earle's group fills this prescription.

I trust that Mrs. Carter is much improved. Again give her my best regards and my best hopes for her getting back to normalcy more successfully than the United States was able to do after the shock of the last war or, perhaps more notably, after the shock of the depression.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) JOSEPH P. CHAMBERLAIN.

EXHIBIT No. 1164

PACIFIC COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
October 29, 1940.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,

Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 E. 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR NED: I don't really think we can use Fred's statement as is, much as I would be glad to help him with his cause. How about a combination of the two, something like this:

"Frederick V. Field, who has been on the staff of the American Council since 1928, has resigned in order to become Executive Secretary of the American Peace Mobilization. 'The American Peace Mobilization is a mass organization of progressive trade unions, farm, church, youth, Negro and fraternal groups dedicated to preserving the interests of the United States through the strengthening of American democracy and through non-participation in the war between England and the fascist powers.' Mr. Field had a deep conviction that he was obligated to accept this new responsibility and felt that in view of the acceptance of his new position, it was not possible for him to continue his official connection with the I. P. R. The Executive Committee, being forced to the conclusion that Mr. Field's decision was final, felt compelled to accept Mr. Field's resignation with great regret. It expressed its appreciation of the distinguished service that Mr. Field had rendered during his eleven years of service to the American Council and expressed the hope that when his new task was completed, it would be possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the I. P. R."

Perhaps we could add to that the expression of appreciation which came from the staff.

How does that strike you?

The paragraphs in regard to Lasker seem to me excellent.

Sincerely yours,

CHIL.

EXHIBIT No. 1165

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 29th October 1940.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,

300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: If the page proof of PACIFIC AFFAIRS is still on your desk, may I suggest two minor changes?

First, in your admirable and very important summary of Motylev's book, I think you might add on the bibliographical side that Motylev refers to a considerable number of I. P. R. publications. I note, for example, in addition to the sources that you mention, references to the Far Eastern Survey, to Miriam Far-

ley's book in the Inquiry Series, to Bisson's book in the Inquiry Series, to Remer's book done at the instance of the I. P. R. on Foreign Investments in China, and to Kurt Bloch's I. P. R. Inquiry book on German Interests.

In view of the considerable number of references to I. P. R. sources I think we might allow ourselves a little backscratching, at least to the extent of one I. P. R. reference.

Second, Adam von Trott has found that the best way of advancing the interests of the I. P. R. in these difficult days in Germany has been to join the staff of the Foreign Office to promote Far Eastern studies. As a member of the Foreign Office, therefore, he is ineligible to be a member of the International Secretariat and his name should be deleted from the last page of **PACIFIC AFFAIRS**.

I may add privately that he will continue to cooperate with us in every possible way, though naturally his area of operations is considerably circumscribed.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1166

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, November 6, 1940.

His Excellency the SOVIET AMBASSADOR,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: It is a matter of the greatest personal regret to both Mrs. Carter and myself that we are unable to accept the very kind invitation which you and Mrs. Oumansky have sent us for the Twenty-Third Anniversary.

A long time before your invitation arrived I had promised to preside at a gathering from five to six-thirty on November 7 here in New York, and I have not been able to get relieved of this responsibility. Though airplanes are fast, they can't get me from New York to the Embassy between 6:30 and 7:00.

Mrs. Carter is making good progress, but she is not yet quite at the place where a journey to Washington is feasible.

You know that neither of us has ever wanted to "snub" the U. S. S. R. Embassy—least of all at the present time.

With very kindest regards to you and Mrs. Oumansky from us both, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1167

In Celebration of the Twenty-third Anniversary
of the Great October Socialist Revolution

The Ambassador

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

and Mrs. Oumansky

request the honor of the company of

MR. AND MRS. EDWARD CARTER

at a reception

on Thursday, November the seventh

from five until seven o'clock

at the Embassy

R. S. V. P.

Please present this card at the door

EXHIBIT No. 1168

The American Council
of
The Institute of Pacific Relations
and
The American Russian Institute
cordially invite you to a dinner conference
on

THE PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

Tuesday, November 19, 1940

8:30 O'clock

at the

Twentieth Century Association

3 Joy Street

Boston, Massachusetts

Speakers

Edward C. Carter, Chairman

Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations

Bruce C. Hopper

Professor of Government, Harvard University

Joseph Barnes

Foreign Editor, New York Herald Tribune

(Discussion and question period will follow speeches.)

R. S. V. P., Harriet L. Moore., 64 Griggs Road, Brookline, Mass.

\$1.25 per plate

(Please make checks payable to Miss Moore)

EXHIBIT No. 1169

129 EAST 52ND STREET,

New York City, November 28, 1940.

Dr. PHILIP C. JESSUP,
Columbia University, New York City.

DEAR PHIL: In view of the probable importance of the Princeton discussions I am inclined to think that we should invite two or three younger men to come in the role of recorders or rapporteurs. What would you think of our creating a panel for this purpose consisting of William W. Lockwood, Charles Dollard, and William D. Carter?

Bruce Hopper has just written that he cannot come, though he regrets greatly that he is not free. What would you think of our asking Joseph Barnes? He has as good, perhaps a better, idea of the potentialities of Soviet policy as it may affect or be affected by American or British policy in the Pacific.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER,

EXHIBIT No. 1170

DECEMBER 2, 1940.

CP from ECC:

You found the essence of Mirian's letter to Jessup. Here is the whole letter and there is nothing of importance in the resolution except what you had already spotted.

I have taken the liberty of slightly elaborating your first draft. I enclose a copy of what I have written. I hope it will meet with your approval.

(Handwritten:) This is exactly what should have been written. Sorry the job fell to you.

CP
F

Frederick V. Field.—It was voted unanimously to record the American Council's appreciation of the work of Frederick V. Field as follows:

It was with the deepest regret that the Board of Trustees learned that the Executive Committee had found it necessary to accept the resignation at its meeting of September 18 of Mr. Frederick V. Field from the Secretaryship of the American Council. As the minutes of that meeting showed, the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Parker, had asked the Chairman of the American Council whether he felt that Mr. Field could not be persuaded to resume the Secretaryship. Dr. Jessup had replied that he thought Mr. Field's decision was final.

Mr. Field joined the staff of the American Council in 1929. During his eleven years of service he has demonstrated an unusually high quality of leadership. The program of the American Council has expanded notably under his direction, partly because of his own untiring efforts, and partly because of his imaginative leadership in developing the cooperation of the entire staff. Mr. Field was one of the Founders of the FAR EASTERN SURVEY. He was the author of "American Participation in the China Consortiums," published by the University of Chicago Press, and presented as a research study at the Hangchow-Shanghai Conference of the Institute in 1931. In 1932 and 1933 he acted as Editor-in-chief of the "Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area," which was published by Doubleday-Doran and Company in 1934 with a foreword by the late Mr. Newton D. Baker. In this monumental work his own research abilities, together with his rare capacity for stimulating research on the part of his colleagues, were strikingly exhibited. It was largely through his initiative that the series of regional conferences on American foreign policy were developed in various parts of the United States in 1938, 1939 and 1940.

While he was executive secretary the membership of the American Council more than doubled, but it is impossible to make a full record of his services to the American Council, because in innumerable unknown and anonymous ways he has contributed to the maintenance and expansion of the IPR program. His capacity to surround himself with young and able scholars has served as a compelling example in other National Councils. His services likewise to the International Secretariat and the Pacific Council have been a major contribution to the development of the Institute's international work.

Throughout his connection with the Institute he has been most scrupulous and exacting in maintaining the highest objective standards for his own IPR writing and that of his colleagues. He has combined personal modesty with the capacity to inspire high achievement on the part of others. He has been noted for his practical wisdom in counsel and amazing energy in action.

The Board of Trustees desire that the officers assure Mr. Field that his job on the American Council staff will be awaiting him when he completes his present work.

EXHIBIT No. 1171

(Handwritten letter :) To Mr. E. C. Carter.

DEC. 13, 1940.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I think that there is no necessity to translate the whole book of Mr. Motylev because the basic ideas were well presented in Owen's review. However if you find it necessary it may take 10 days of work.

Yours respectfully,

GRAJDANZEV.

EXHIBIT No. 1172

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF FAR EASTERN LANGUAGES

HARVARD-YENCHING INSTITUTE
Boylston Hall

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

DECEMBER 17, 1940.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
*Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd St., New York City.*

DEAR SIR: As you may already know, there is an urgent need for Japanese interpreters and translators for service with our armed forces. There is a project to create here a special training centre to give additional instruction to those who know some Japanese. These men will probably be given commissions in the navy or in the marine corps and will have their full expenses paid while studying here.

Before a final decision can be made in Washington, we shall have to submit to the proper authorities a list of possible candidates for this training. Will you be so kind as to send us a list of all the young men whom you know have some knowledge of Japanese and who might possibly be interested in receiving commissions during this emergency or permanently in the navy or the marine corps.

This request is, of course, strictly confidential and perhaps should not be mentioned as yet to the possible candidates. We expect to meet with the authorities in Washington on December 26th, and therefore we shall need to receive your reply at least by December 24th. We are very sorry that we must ask you for such speed on your part, but the training centre, if organized, will probably begin to function early in February, so there is need for very quick action. The persons to whom this request is being sent are:

Knight Biggerstaff
Derk Bodde
Peter A. Boodberg
Hugh Borton
E. C. Carter
Homer H. Dubs
Robert B. Hall
George Kennedy

Owen Lattimore
G. MacAfee McCune
H. F. MacNair
Harold S. Quigley
David Rowe
Earl Swisher
George Taylor.

Yours sincerely,

SERGE ELISSEEFF,
EDWIN O. REISCHAUER.

EXHIBIT No. 1173

Telephone: MURRAY HILL 2-0312

Cable Address: AMRUSCUL

THE AMERICAN RUSSIAN INSTITUTE

For Cultural Relations With the Soviet Union, Inc.

Fifty Six West Forty-Fifth Street

NEW YORK

Editor and Executive Secretary: HARRIET L. MOORE

DECEMBER 17, 1940.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd St., New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I am returning herewith Miss Anderson's notes from the round table in Boston. Have you ever received Joe Barnes' outline for his talk? He has never mentioned to me whether or not he would give them to us. I am afraid he has probably thrown them away.

I am also returning Mr. Slesinger's letter regarding Vassiliev. I do not know anything in particular about Vassiliev. I believe he has been in our library using our materials, but I have never had an opportunity to talk with him. If he comes in again I shall try to find out what he is now doing. If you are further interested in him, it may be that Dr. Stefansson knows something about him.

I hope that after Christmas we will have the opportunity to discuss the question of further conferences. We continue to get favorable comment from Boston and I cannot help but think that such discussions have a very real value, particularly outside of New York City. I may take the opportunity to talk over the general idea with people in Chicago when I am there on Christmas.

Very sincerely,

[S] Harriet
HARRIET L. MOORE.

HLM : ss

EXHIBIT No. 1174

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 18th December, 1940 (may be 17 December).

His Excellency, the SOVIET AMBASSADOR,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R.
Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: You doubtless saw this editorial in the NEW YORK TIMES of December 11, referring to Lattimore's reference to Motylev's book in the December issue of PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

Under separate cover I am sending you marked copies of PACIFIC AFFAIRS for December and AMERASIA for November, for I think you will be interested in glancing at Lattimore's comment on Motylev's book on page 446 of the former and Crajdanzev's translation of the last chapter of the book on page 417 of the latter.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1175

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., December 13, 1940.

His Excellency, the SOVIET AMBASSADOR,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R.,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY, Under separate cover I am sending you marked copies of PACIFIC AFFAIRS for December and AMERASIA for November which I think you will be interested in glancing at. In PACIFIC AFFAIRS beginning on page 446 Lattimore has commented on Motylev's book. In AMERASIA on page 417 Grajdanzev has translated the last chapter of Motylev's book.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Penciled notation:) This is for possible use without reference to the Embassy. Thank you very much.

CONSTANTINE A. OUMANSKY,
Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

EXHIBIT No. 1176

(Penciled notation:) WLH Scan & return to ECC at Nassau.

AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTION OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

INCORPORATED

131 MUSEUM RD.,
Shanghai, December 30, 1949.

EDWARD C. CARTER, Esq.,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City,
New York, U. S. A.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Except for your letter of October 3rd and a copy of a letter from Maxwell Hamilton regarding the Shiratori interview we have received no communication from you by mail since reaching Shanghai. I state

this as a matter of fact to be incorporated in the record rather than as a complaint. If complaints were in order I should direct mine to the Chinese Post Office which is now completely under the control of Japanese supervisors and censors. We are hoping that on the next boat a letter or two from our headquarters may elude the authorities. I have referred to letters. We received a cable, through Phil, from you on December 19th. To this cable we replied:

"Crisis foreseen developing slowly here Patricia's sailing deferred Shanghai study finished January cabling then for approval cooperatives if Chekiang impossible. Signed: Bob."

At the present time Patricia has tentative reservations on the *Taft*, sailing January 20th, and on the *Asia*, sailing in the second week in February. Other than putting her name in the lists we have made no preparations for her to go. "Crisis foreseen developing slowly" may require a word of explanation. Ian Morrison, special writer for the London Times and resident agent for the British and Chinese Corporation which handles Chinese railway securities, wrote in his November report to London as follows: "The Shanghai problem has become overshadowed by much graver events. It is now one out of many issues involving those fundamental questions of the relations between Japan, China, Soviet Russia, Germany, Great Britain, and America. Let us put it like this. A year ago the Shanghai issue lay primarily between the governments of Great Britain and America and the government of Japan. Today it lies primarily between the Shanghai Municipal Council and the Japanese army in Central China." He implies here that Shanghai is not likely to become a casus belli between Japan and the Anglo-American bloc. With this opinion I am in agreement. With his view that the Shanghai issue lies between the SMC and the Central China Japanese military, I am not. Since the outbreak of the European war the Shanghai issue has become progressively more closely identified with total world issues. Since the signing of the Tri-Partite Pact the conflict at Shanghai has been transformed from the underlying triangular conflict involving China, Japan, and the Western Powers which Vinacke analysed in his preface to Shanghai and Tientsin, to a bilateral truce involving on the one hand Japan, Germany, and Italy, and on the other a developing Anglo-American-Chinese bloc. The USSR is suspended in the balance. Shanghai is, relatively speaking, a piccollo stake in this developing antagonism. It is, indeed, to the advantage of the Central China military authorities to preserve the peculiar status of Shanghai for as a haven for their loot and as a luxuriant orange to be squeezed, Shanghai serves well the greed of the Japanese military. It does so, however, only so long as it is a going concern, enjoying relative freedom for industry, finance, and commerce. The private gains now accruing to the local military and to a few of their favorites, Japanese and Chinese, count for nothing, however, in the light of the larger designs of Japanese leaders in Tokyo. There is no indication that today they are less infatuated than in September by visions of their Greater East Asian autarchy. In that autarchy there will be no place for Shanghai, as it now exists, nor for American and British interests, as they have existed. The fate of Shanghai, therefore, lies with Japan's fortunes in realizing her aims in Southeast Asia; and, probably, will not be sealed until that program of realization is under way. I talked to Sugita yesterday. Sugita is the secretary of the headquarters of the China Seas Fleet of the Japanese Naval Bureau in Shanghai. When I learned he was a Cambridge man, I mentioned that I was from Oxford and flashed quickly the range of my Tokyo connections. In consequence, perhaps, he talked more freely than any Japanese of my acquaintance in Shanghai. Several times he said with quiet intensity that Japanese-American naval hostilities would be a supreme tragedy. Nevertheless, Sugita informed me, unprecedented naval preparations are under way in Japan and in the China Seas. Tomorrow he flies to Formosa, Amoy, Canton, Hainan, Haiphong, and back to Japan. This is an index of activity in one quarter. This morning's newspapers reveal that Japan is planning a coup d'etat in Thailand aiming to install a sympathetic war government there. Here is more activity. In Japanese ports, in Dairen, in Tsingtao and elsewhere German boats are being equipped with arms and in south Pacific waters German vessels flying Japanese flags have engaged in naval harassing activity. More activity. Activity, moreover, Axis as much as Japanese in flavour. Meanwhile, on the other plate of the scales, lies the increasing effectiveness of the RAF in Britain, Greece, and North Africa, the Italian losses at Taranto, the advances of British mechanized forces towards Bardia, the fulfillment of the American cruiser unit at Manila and the arrival of more heavy bombers, reports of accelerating American rearmament, the failure of Germany

and Italy to recognize Wang, the British and American loans to Chungking, and the continued existence of large Japanese forces on the Manchukuo border—defense against attack from that enigmatic quarter. These are some of the basic factors influencing the Shanghai issue. SMC-Army (or Puppet) flurries are window-dressing. We cabled that the crisis was developing slowly because from this vantage point it looks as though war in Europe has taken a turn advantageous to Britain (despite the shipping losses and the movement of German troops across Rumania where they confront large Russian concentrations) and because, as many people have maintained before this, it looks as though the Japanese threat may prove to be bluff if it runs into determined Anglo-American opposition. There are some indications, including Grew's latest bucket of cold water on Axis exuberance, that America means business out here. If Japan throws caution to the winds, goes south risking war, and has an easy time of it, then Shanghai falls in her lap. If Japan does not go south and in exasperation takes over Shanghai she may find herself experiencing the economic counter-attack, embargoes and tariffs, which even now she fears almost as much as American and British warships. Hence, we foresee the situation developing slowly here—unless, Germany unexpectedly upsets the applecart completely in Europe.

As to the remainder of our cable. My Shanghai study has not proceeded quite as quickly as might have been the case had I not undertaken, soon after our arrival here, to do spadework, simultaneously on the Chekiang study. I hope, and I believe I have good reason to expect that the Shanghai brochure will be finished by February 1. I already have in hand a large quantity of background material on Chekiang; the notes upon which my address on occupied Hangchow was based; extensive notes on the wartime Chekiang coastal blockade; and several translations of recent articles appearing in the Chinese press and in Chinese economic journals on economic and political developments in free Chekiang. I dislike abandoning a project upon which I have made some extremely interesting preliminary observations. Tentatively, therefore, I have arranged that Leonard Hsu, son of an old Hangchow friend of my father, join me for a six weeks' tour of Chekiang in February and March. He knows the patois a great deal better, naturally, than I do. His contacts in free Chekiang are excellent. He has had experience with the KMT in its prewar Nanking days. He kept the accounts of the "refugee center" which formed the basis of some of my remarks about economic Hangchow. We have in mind slipping across into guerrilla territory near Hangchow or taking a boat from Shai to Ningpo. At best, both trips are dangerous. At worst, they might be fatal. Japanese mopping up in the Hangchow environs is continuous. The Japanese navy has shelled Chinghai, the port of Ningpo, periodically since 1937; intensively since September 1940. I hope, however, that advised by various shipping magnates here not averse to shady dealing with naval authorities we may be given what we can consider safe conduct. I mention these details hoping that they may reflect my determination to complete a really satisfactory survey of Chekiang. Without field observations, the study would be bloodless, if not mere guesswork. If, however, the Chekiang study proves quite impossible, I shall cable you for approval to go to Chungking. Pat is reading the second proof of Mrs. Ed Snow's book of the cooperatives as a favor to the family. With that background, which undoubtedly will be highly romanticized, it should be possible to conduct a systematic survey and a critical analysis of the movement on the basis of uncollated materials known to exist at Chungking and on the basis of some travelling.

In recent days there has been much talk of aggravated KMT-Communist friction. Reports to this effect appearing in the local press come from Domei. Some of our government people, however, have heard corroborating reports from Chinese coming out of the interior. Anna Louise Strong, in Hongkong, expressed alarm over friction several days ago. One indication of the seriousness of the conflict is seen to be the transfer, on Chungking order, of the New Fourth Army from East Central China to the northwest. I have not shared alarm felt in some quarters. Domei's reports of friction have been legion. I seem to recall Agnes Jaffe's black picture of the United Front last summer and now find it easy to understand Miss Strong's pessimism. Both of them should be excused, perhaps, for not seeing the whole China picture because through preference they associated only with those who made it their business to see the seamy side of KMT corruption and tyranny. As to the withdrawal of the New Fourth Army: They are guerrillas and mobile troops unequipped for or unpractised in positional warfare while in this war area there are indications that

the Chinese may be contemplating an offensive which will require a unified command and the best equipment of the most highly trained regular troops. Takung Pao sums up the matter thus: The crux of today's problems, therefore, does not lie in the question of political unity, but in the question of unified command of the Chinese armed forces. If any army today should refuse to obey the orders of the High Command, or even resort to irregular activities, such action should be regarded as detrimental to the efforts of resistance, or even as threatening the safety of the state. Unity applies to political questions, but in the army there can only be discipline and order. Powell thinks the people of Central China are congenitally anti-Communist. On this point I am in total disagreement. From the most selfish banker to the wildest little student here in Shanghai I have heard nothing but admiration for the courage and fighting effectiveness of the 8th and 4th Armies. While in Hangchow, I was told that hostility to communists had evaporated, for reasons I have explained to you before. There may be a recurrence of KMT-Communist friction in Chungking; partly for political reasons, partly over military issues. The consensus here is that Chiang has it in his power to annihilate the Communist military threat. Were he to try, nothing would please the Japanese more. Were he to try without Soviet approval, few things could so jeopardize one important source of his power to conduct continued resistance. To answer those who assert that Chiang, more than ever, is in tow of the petticoat government, Madame etc., and the corrupt Kung coterie it is relevant to ask if the execution and dismissal of corrupt mayors and magistrates indicates complete satisfaction with the administrative and political status quo.

I am tempted to share with you my estimates of personalities I have reason to meet here. I am thinking, especially, of Keswick, Hunt, Itoh, Lockhart, Br. Consul-Genl. George, Smith of BAT, etc. Perhaps these estimates will color portions of the book when it reaches you. The rest sounds better in a gossip session, than in print on a page.

I cannot, however, resist the temptation to record a few highlights of my relations with the South Manchuria Railway people. I have not yet received from them a long-promised reply to a lengthy questionnaire placed in their hands early in November. Ushiba had told me that Itoh could place at my disposal more information than any other Japanese in Shanghai. Another Japanese friend told me that the SMR employs rather more than 300 researchers. I called on Itoh and told him my objective in coming to Shanghai. He served tea, offered cigarettes, and called in an interpreter. All went well and Itoh promised full and prompt replies to any questions I might wish to ask. That night I prepared an extensive questionnaire on trade, industry, shipping, etc. In many cases I presented data which I had got from Japanese english-language sources and merely asked for confirmation. I sent along the questionnaire. Two days later Itoh left for Japan, Dairen, Tsingtao, returning to Shanghai early in December. Meanwhile, his translator told me he had the questionnaire and was working on it. Three times each week I telephoned for developments. Finally, his translator rang me up. Expectantly I waited, only to be informed that he wished to dine me at the French Club. Cigars topped an excellent meal. There were, however, only vague promises regarding my questionnaire. The next day I put in writing what I had explained by word of mouth the night before: namely, that I did not wish to have the responsibility of knowing facts which had not already appeared in print, either in English or Japanese. I said that I knew the Shanghai Japanese press gave reports bearing upon my questions, but unfortunately I did not know Japanese. Could they refer to their clippings? The translator sympathized with my modest request and promised early action. In the first week in December Itoh returned. I called upon him and learned that he had talked about my work with Konoye's private secretary (Ushiba) and others whom I had met. The next day his translator called me up and said that the research staff was working on my questionnaire, but that their report would be in Japanese. Itoh had, apparently, found a way to shift the buck while in Tokyo. Several days later I called again and learned that the typists had finished writing the report, that revisions were being made by the translator and Itoh, and that the document would be in my hands the next day. The next day I received a telephone call. The document, apparently, had been sent over to the press division of the local army headquarters. They, however, could not pass it, though all the materials there contained had previously been published in Japanese papers. They ordered the SMR to send the document to Nanking where it will be read by the press division of General Nishio's military headquarters. With apologies to me the SMR has done this and together we await its return.

I have found similar difficulties in dealing with British, Chinese, and Americans here, but none of them have been on this super-Japanese scale.

Cordially,

Bob.

(Pencilled notation:)

P. S. over.

P. S.—Under no circumstances will I expose Pat to the rigors of interior travel. If I go to Chekiang, she stays here or goes back to U. S. A. If we go to Chungking, we fly—or, at least she does so.

When you write please include some news of developments in the office. We are starved for it.

EXHIBIT No. 1177

Box 222, Post Office,
Hongkong, January 21, 1941.

DEAR MR. CARTER, This is a note to you in great hurry, as I am so busy with all sorts of things at the present moment. Enough for me to report that these are grave days in China. By war regulations in Hongkong we cannot send out any clippings of any sort; hence I am enclosing herewith a copy of the British editorial which is published in today's South China Morning Post. Also enclosed in this envelope is our little Bulletin, under the date of January 15th. I hope that the second article therein on the Japanese international and internal situation will be of interest to the friends in New York. I hear that Joe Barnes is now the Foreign Editor of the H-Tribune and please give my best regards to him when you see him.

There was a battle between the Kuomintang troops and the New Fourth Army from Jan. 9th to Jan. 12th. About four thousand NFA people crossed the Yangtze, as they were carrying out the order of the Government to go to the northern part of the River. All of a sudden, the Kuomintang troops attacked them. Someday the true story of how the four thousand were killed and wounded, and even children and nurses had to take up rifles in self-defense, will be told in detail. The deputy commander, Han Ying, was murdered after being wounded. The commander Yeh Ting was taken after seriously wounded. Ever since Sian, China's leaders have pledged that their guns would never again turn direct against their own nationals. Now such a promise is violated. If such break-up of agreements goes on, how can the leaders expect their overseas patriots contribute their support in the financial and material contributions? How can they guarantee that their leaders' repeated declarations that they would not make peace with their enemy unless the enemy withdraws, would be kept? Certainly the democratic way is not through bullets, but should be through ballots.

Madame Sun and other Members of the Kuomintang OEC have sent a written appeal to the Generalissimo to maintain unity at any price. We are all trying our best to ask our "leaders" to stop fighting themselves while the enemy remains in China. Please do not hesitate to call on me for any work for the Secretariat that I can do while out here.

Most sincerely, and pardon my great hurry,

Yours,

[S] GEOFFREY.

EXHIBIT No. 1178

(Penciled notation:) Sent Jan. 21—Allen, Bisson, Carlson, Farley, Pepper, Taylor.

JANUARY 21, 1941.

Sent from 33 East 71.

DL.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE

3132 P Street N. W., Washington, D. C.

Delighted you are going Chungking. Regret illness prevents my going Washington see you before departure. Strongly recommend you wire my colleague Dr. Chaoting Chi suggesting he see you Washington before you leave. He is an economist of distinction and has just returned from Free China. You could wire him direct care Universal Trading Corporation 630 Fifth Avenue, New York City. He could go Washington anytime before you leave.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1179

120 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, January 22, 1941.

Mr. LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
3132 P Street NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CURRIE: Last evening I wired you as follows:

"Delighted you are going Chungking. Regret illness prevents my going Washington. See you before departure. Strongly recommend you wire my colleague, Dr. Chaoting Chi, suggesting he see you Washington before you leave. He is an economist of distinction and has just returned from Free China. You could wire him direct, care Universal Trading Corporation, 630 Fifth Avenue, New York City. He could go Washington almost any time before you leave."

Herewith I am sending you a rather important galley proof of Dr. Chi's forthcoming study "Wartime Economic Development in China." If you are able to take on the clipper only one item of all I am sending you, I should recommend that you take this.

Yesterday, however, I did mail you the following books:

Japanese Industry: Its Recent Development and Present Condition, by G. C. Allen
American Policy in the Far East: 1931-1940, by T. A. Bisson
The Chinese Army, by Major Evans F. Carlson
The Problem of Japanese Trade Expansion in the Post-War Situation, by Miriam S. Farley
Prerequisites to Peace in the Far East, by Nathaniel Peffer
The Japanese-Sponsored Regime in North China, by George E. Taylor

The above volumes are all part of the IPR Inquiry Series.

After you have scanned Dr. Chi's galleys you will, I think, realize what a valuable piece of work he has done. He gathered this material on a trip he made to China for the IPR a year and a half ago. About six months ago he made another trip to free China, accompanying Mr. K. P. Chen, the well-known Chinese banker, as his research secretary. With Mr. Chen he travelled all over free China.

It has suddenly occurred to me that if you should want the services of a highly competent Chinese who is intimate alike with Chinese problems and the American point of view you would be well advised to consider asking Dr. Chi to accompany you on this trip. His research and personal qualifications are of the highest.

The Universal Trading Corporation has recently borrowed him from the IPR staff, but I cannot think of any more important work for him than to go along as your interpreter and Chinese secretary, unless you have already made provision for such a person.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1180

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 24th January, 1941.

Dr. CHEN HAN-SENG,
P. O. Box 1688k, Kowloon, Hong Kong.

DEAR GEOFFREY; You were doubly generous and thoughtful this year in first sending me the FAR EAST BULLETIN of December 15 as a substitute for a Christmas card and then following it up with this charming card from you and Susie.

There is one good thing about the serious difficulties within the United Front in China in recent weeks.

At long last our friend Joe Barnes persuaded the Ogden Reids to appoint Edgar Snow as a Herald Tribune correspondent in China. Edgar Snow is, therefore, giving the American people a more accurate picture of the serious state of affairs in China than any correspondent has given in cabled stories since the war began.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1181

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE,
February 11, 1941.

EDWARD C. CARTER, ESQUIRE,
Board of Editors, Far Eastern Survey,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

MY DEAR CARTER: Knowing your interest in our economic relationships with the Far East, when in need I turn to you with my cry for help. Recently I have been placed in charge of a committee for making certain economic studies in re our relationships with Far Eastern countries in connection with our Defense Program. Within the next few weeks we are trying to complete a preliminary report comprehending the basic material required, to be subsequently expanded into a much more complete study. For this immediate study we are lacking in trained research workers.

I am wondering if your American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations—or, more specifically, the Board of Editors and Research Associates of Far Eastern Survey—could loan us the services of two or three or more of your research experts over the next two or three weeks. Of course we might like to have them longer, if their services were still available. I had in mind, because of their special fields, a list from which any number whose services you could spare might be detailed to help us: Miss Miriam Farley, Kurt Bloch, Miss Kathleen Barnes, Miss Virginia Thompson, John R. Stewart, Jack Shepherd, Dorothy Borg, William N. Lockwood and Ellen de Jong, or others whose names might occur to you as available.

Our work is under the general direction of the Export Control Administrator, with whom, I believe, arrangements can be made without difficulty for paying the present salaries of any who might be available for temporary loan from your staff, together with such additional expenditures as would be necessarily incurred. I am not, however, undertaking to initiate such arrangements until hearing from you that the desired personnel may be available.

If you find no one willing or available among those connected with the Far Eastern Survey, I would be glad to have any other suggestions as to research assistants that might occur to you. Please let me have a reply at your early convenience, as the matter is of some urgency.

With sincere personal regards.

Very truly yours,

C. K. MOSER,
Chairman, Far Eastern Research Unit.

EXHIBIT No. 1182

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, February 18, 1941.

Dr. CH'AO-TING CHI,
541 West 113th Street,
New York City.

DEAR CHI: What would you think of my sending to Chungking some such cable as the following:

LAUGHLIN CURRIE,
American Embassy, Chungking:

If press could report you had visited Chow Enlai this might help public opinion in view present crop ugly rumors regarding serious break in China's unified resistance.

It is a very ticklish matter, and I do not want to make things worse. However, it is certainly not in American interest or that of any country in the Pacific for China to start a two-front war.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1184

CHINA INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
P. O. Box 1688, Kowloon, Hongkong (Received March 12, 1941).Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: With this mail will arrive also Mr. Currie on his way back to America. He was twenty days in Chungking but as a trained observer and not like a trained bureaucrat he has certainly learned and understood many things. I am sure he has already appreciated the fact that Chungking is not China because of the exclusive depressive deteriorating atmosphere over there. He certainly made a splendid speech of half an hour before the highest and selective audience in Chungking sponsored by the Sino-American Cultural Society on February 23rd. All the way through his speech he emphasized the importance of democracy for the sake of both national resistance and the up-building of a modern state.

I saw him both on his way to Chungking and upon his return despite the attempts to encircle him. While in Chungking he asked Hollington Tong to arrange an interview with Professor Ma Yin-tsu. Holly replied after a day or so that Ma was not to be found. Currie enquired if Ma was confined somewhere, but Holly said that cannot be true. Factually, of course, Ma is now confined somewhere near Chungking because of his criticism of the government finance. He advocated a tax levy on those who became rich during the war.

By ordinary mail I sent you a few days ago a copy of February 15th Newsletter of the China Defense League. The article on the United Front in that issue is worth reading and if I may say so it may be regarded as a brief supplement to my unprinted MS on that same topic. Kindly pass this on to Rosinger if you see fit.

(A. W. Circulate)

The American Council is to be congratulated for the improved style and new policy of the FAR EASTERN SURVEY. I for one have always been opposed to the narrow and dry statistical articles that the Survey used to carry. I am enclosing a clipping herewith for the Survey's reference. I wish somebody would find it feasible to use Dr. Lim's speech and write a short piece for the Survey.

Dr. Lim pointed out three problems in his work: nutrition, training, and transport. His work is really connected with everybody's work because these problems are both national and urgent. I wish I could find time to write a short article to explain how the economic policy has now affected the Central troops very seriously, because these troops are in the rear where prices are high and no fighting is being carried out. The guerrillas and other troops are mostly on the fronts, where prices are much cheaper, being unaffected by the government policy. Their morale is much higher. If there is really a wide-scale civil war, I estimate that only one-tenth of the Central troops are fit to fight. Have you received the 28th issue of the FAR EAST BULLETIN, dated February 15th?

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Chen Han-seng.
CHEN HAN-SENG.

EXHIBIT No. 1185

FDS/we
Room 811, 1270 SIXTH AVENUE,
New York, N. Y., June 4, 1941.

TELEPHONE: CIRCLE 6-1484-85

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Acting Sec'y., American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 E. 52nd St., New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for calling our attention to Mr. John R. Stewart as a specialist familiar with Manchurian affairs.

Your valuable and continued cooperation with this office is very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Frederick D. Sharp.
FREDERICK D. SHARP,
Lieut. Col. G. S. C.

EXHIBIT No. 1186

MARCH 24, 1941.

KM from ECC:

I am awfully glad you are reprinting Anna Louise Strong's article. Would you send me up three copies of it? It is certainly one of the most important articles that you have carried for a long time.

EXHIBIT No. 1187

Telephone: MURRAY HILL 2-0312

Cable Address: AMRUSCAL

Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, Basil Bass, Edward C. Carter, Wm. O. Field, Jr., Mortimer Graves, Harriet L. Moore, Henry E. Sigerist, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Maxwell S. Stewart

THE AMERICAN RUSSIAN INSTITUTE

For Cultural Relations With the Soviet Union, Inc.

Fifty-six West Forty-Fifth Street

NEW YORK

Editor and Executive Secretary: HARRIET L. MOORE

MARCH 25, 1941.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City

DEAR MR. CARTER: I shall attempt to answer your bevy of letters which I received this morning.

I shall be able to attend the meeting of the Board of Trustees of the American Council on Tuesday, April 8.

As I understand it Dr. Stefansson's handbook for the War Department is a tremendously long and detailed study of the development of the Soviet Arctic. In preparing this he has undoubtedly amassed a wealth of new information on the Northern Sea Route. I do not know just what he means by suggesting that the IPR undertake research on the subject inasmuch as I believe he has already exhausted all the material available in this country. I am sure however that Dr. Stefansson or his staff could write a very interesting article for PACIFIC AFFAIRS or perhaps a pamphlet.

The vice president of the Press is the famous Eddie Moore and no relation of mine.

Florinsky's article in our opinion is about 70% accurate as to fact but very extremist as to interpretation. A few examples are as follows:

1. In the middle of page 43 he says, "The directors are allowed to grant an application for dismissal or transfer only in the following instances * * *." The decree provides that directors must grant the application in those instances and may grant applications on other grounds as well.

2. On page 47 he says, "volunteers were also admitted * * *." The fact of the matter is that volunteers filled the entire quota and it was unnecessary to recruit any youths.

3. An example of his interpretation is on page 45 where he says, "* * * the Soviet Constitution whose high-sounding promises the new legislation so flagrantly violates." I think it would be impossible for the strictest lawyer to find any constitutional violation no matter how much they may dislike the new laws.

There are other examples of this sort but this is probably enough for you to understand on what basis we choose 70% as the degree of factual accuracy.

Sincerely yours,

Harriet
[s] HARRIET L. MOORE.

HLM/kw

EXHIBIT No. 1188

APRIL 3, 1941.

ECC from MG:

1. I have added a section and altered the conclusion in order to deemphasize the ten points. I think we have now so hedged the points around that they can no longer be taken as a program for action climaxing the discussion.

2. Miss Farley thinks that Jessup's name should not be mentioned. I am inclined to agree.

3. I agree with WWL that the title should be "Showdown at Singapore" and that the title page should say by way of explanation "A report of a private international conference held at Princeton to discuss Anglo-American cooperation in the Pacific."

4. I think the authorship should be anonymous, unless the authors be described merely as rapporteurs.

5. Above all, if the pamphlet is to sell it should be published in a big hurry.

EXHIBIT No. 1189

(Penciled notation:) To the members of the March 9th conference. Return KP.
APRIL 11, 1941.

It is now almost ancient history but I am sending you herewith a report of the informal conference held in this office on March 9 with a view to investigating the possibility of a sort of planned economy in the use of scholars with a knowledge of Japanese, Chinese, and Russian during the present crisis.

You will note that we asked Mr. Mortimer Graves to establish contact with various agencies in Washington. As a result Mr. Graves must have given an enormous amount of time to the matter since March 9. Confidentially I may say that he has induced the Civil Service Commission to call together a number of interested agencies of the United States Government to talk the matter over with the Civil Service Commission and Mr. Graves in the near future. It looks as though some progress would be made.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Penciled notation:) cc: all members and KG-DB
MSF-CP
AG

EXHIBIT No. 1190

(Handwritten:) ECC
KRCG

APRIL 18, 1941.

Mr. WILLIAM R. HEROD,
570 Lexington Avenue, New York City.

DEAR HEROD: Are the following paragraphs of any use apropos Monday's discussion?

In connection with the war emergency several United States government agencies have asked for the loan of members of the Institute's research staff. In one instance a government department which must remain nameless asked for the privilege of employing the whole research staff on a particularly urgent and important task involving many weeks of work. These requests are striking evidence of the government's high appreciation of the work of the Institute and its research staff. Interestingly enough, it so happens that it has been possible to prove to the government agencies concerned that the I. P. R.'s staff members can render the government a greater service by continuing as members of the Institute's highly competent research group.

In this way the research staff is kept intact for essential group collaboration and is thus in a position to serve all government agencies concerned with the Pacific through special reports and through articles in the FAR EASTERN SURVEY.

Maybe you will want to ring me up to let me know whether you would like the foregoing redrafted in any way to put a little more punch in it. Unfortunately, it is not possible for us to put into a letter the names of the government agencies concerned.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER, *Acting Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 1191

(Handwritten:) WLH
ED300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Maryland, May 2, 1941.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR CARTER: There seems to be a number of minor items on my desk to clear up. The first is the question of my proposed pamphlet for the Oxford University Press. They tell me that they want about 8,000 words. My idea is a survey of the war that covers the time span of four years and the changes in the character of the war and the internal problems of Japan and China that run from the Marco Polo Bridge to the Russo-Japanese neutrality declaration, and include the relation of the Far Eastern war to the European war. Sounds like quite a large order, but it will be interesting to try. My original idea was to approach the job by elaborating more completely and linking up with each other a number of the ideas very briefly brought forward in my recent articles in *Foreign Affairs*, *Asia*, and the "After Four Years" article that is to appear in *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*.

I am quite sure that Oxford will be only too glad to cooperate with the Institute of Pacific Relations not only in planning the format of the pamphlet but in its distribution. I have not said anything to them yet. It seems to me slightly immodest, when I have not yet written the pamphlet! I can either bring it up with them when I send them the MS or you may feel perfectly free to use your own discretion in sounding them out in advance.

Another thing I want to mention is the list of translations from the Chinese that you have sent me—translations totalling about 151 pages, made by Mr. Hsu, and covering the wide range of subjects. Would it entail much additional work to have an extra copy of future translations made? I have been thinking that if I were able to keep track of them, I might be able to use extracts in almost every issue of *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*, thus matching the very interesting translations from the Japanese with which Grajdanzev is supplying me regularly.

That was a vitriolic memorandum on Brandt's article by Bloch that you sent me. Bloch must be quite a temperamental guy to have around the office. I have already sent the memorandum to Bill Holland as you requested, and so can only refer to it by memory.

Perhaps I am an ineffable innocent, but I can see nothing particularly "Marxist" about the article. It seemed to me to be a perfectly legitimate discussion of a broad problem which undoubtedly is shaping up as a turning point in the history of empires and their colonies and spheres of interest—whether you call the change evolutionary or revolutionary. As far as Brandt has presented his ideas, I should say that the implications are more New Dealish than Marxist. It seems to me that a major contention of his is that the future of profitable private enterprise in Asia requires a system of loans on such a large scale that they can only be handled by governments. This is undoubtedly a paradox, but I can see the force of the argument: the loans should be planned in terms of speeding up industrialization in Asia. The loans themselves should not be made with a view of political control or even a large margin of profit, though the capital outlay may be recoverable. By bringing the Asiatic and European-American levels closer together, this will open a new horizon for profitable private trade. All of this would be, to my mind, compatible with political democracy, and I fail to see anything sinister in it.

Some of Bloch's criticisms ought to be addressed to me rather than to the author of the article, whom I asked to present his theory in broad terms, without using too much statistical documentation or too much space. In at least one case what Bloch calls "Marxist arithmetic" is purely the result of a slip that occurred in editing: I tried to untangle a rather Germanic sentence that looked the wrong way round in English, and in so doing the words got straightened out but the figures got mixed up. This has already been caught in proof.

I remember one place where Bloch makes a great to-do about whether the average Chinese acreage is half an acre or two acres. I looked up the source quoted by Brandt, and found that he had simply quoted word for word what was said by his authority. In this connection, I think you will agree with me that it is absurd to stickle for statistical exactness in figures that apply to China, where statistics are so chaotic. For the purposes of an article like this it is quite sufficient if the fact emerges that the average Chinese acreage is of the order

of half an acre to 2 acres—not of the order of 20 acres or 40 acres. It is simply unprofitable to try to determine whether the exact statistical average should be 1.2 acres, or whatever.

Generally speaking, while Bloch seems to consider that Brandt is obsessed, it is fairly clear that Bloch has some obsessions of his own. For instance, he seems to make it an article of faith that an increasing population means a rising standard of living. This gets right in the teeth of what is evident to any general observer: that for a couple of decades the rural standard of living in both Japan and China has fallen. As far as Japan is concerned, I should think it not impossible that there has been simultaneously a rise in the urban standards and a fall in rural standards; but to hold dogmatically that because the Japanese population as a whole has been growing, the Japanese standard of living has been rising, in the face of the fact that it is widely admitted by Japanese that they are burdened with a chronic rural depression which has been getting worse and worse, is absurd.

I am keeping by me your quoted note from Bob Barnett on Miss Strong's "Eighth Route Regions in North China" and shall see what can be done when the article comes back in proof.

I'm down today with a very heavy cold, and as I have to go out tonight to be initiated into Phi Beta Kappa, to the greater confusion of American scholarship, I am dictating this at home and Mrs. Young will sign the letter when she has typed it.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 1192

(Penciled notation:) Lt. Col. R. S. Bratton, Chief of F. E. Section, Mil. Intell. Div., G2 War Dept., General Staff.

JUNE 6, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

Lient. Col. FREDERICK D. SHARP,
Room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue,
New York City.

DEAR COLONEL SHARP: Thank you for yours of June 4. May I in confidence bring to your attention Dr. Russell G. Shiman of the IPR staff who for the past seven years has edited our fortnightly research service THE FAR EASTERN SURVEY. Under separate cover I am sending a few sample copies of the SURVEY under his editorship.

Dr. Shiman's economic knowledge of the whole Far Eastern region is exceptional. He has visited Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Netherlands Indies, the Philippines, and has long studied China, Japan, and Manchuria. He has a very unusual knowledge of the source and production cost of the principal commodities of the Pacific Area, such as rubber, tungsten, antimony, oil, rice, copra, coal, iron, etc.

He has unusual skill in gathering material from a great many different sources and coordinating the researches and investigations of others as well as doing his own research work.

At the beginning of this year the International Secretariat of the IPR borrowed Mr. Shiman to make a special study of certain of the Far Eastern commodities for the Economic Handbook of the Pacific. He is now bringing this work to a successful conclusion.

It has occurred to me that in view of the inquiries which various members of your staff have made in this office, you might like to consider borrowing Dr. Shiman for several months or for the duration, as he has a wide and encyclopedic knowledge of the whole Pacific Area, writes well, edits well and knows how to eliminate irrelevant material.

I have not told Dr. Shiman that I am writing you this letter, for I did not want to mention it if there were no chance of your wishing to consider him. If you would like to size him up you could get him over to the office some day to talk not about a job but about some of the problems that your staff are facing.

I have to leave for the Pacific Coast tonight but will be back here on June 16 in case you wish to talk the matter over with me before talking to Dr. Shiman.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1193

CONFIDENTIAL

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., July 3rd, 1941.LIEUT. COL. FREDERICK D. SHARP,
Room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue, New York City.

DEAR COLONEL SHARP: In continuation of my confidential letter to you of June 6th regarding Dr. Russell G. Shiman. I am now writing to say what I would have passed on to you orally had I had the good luck to find you in when I called at your office a few days ago.

Shiman has a firm offer from me to continue his work as a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations staff, but he like other patriotic Americans wants to spend the coming year where his life experience will best serve our Government during the emergency. Knowing something of the great scope of your work, and of other studies which the War Department is planning, I wish very strongly and enthusiastically to call him to your attention.

To aid you in forming an opinion of his experience I am enclosing his Curriculum Vitae. Everything I said in my letter of June 6th holds true. He is not only an indefatigable research worker himself, but has shown marvelous ability in taking promising but people untrained in the Far Eastern field and guiding their studies so that after a short time they have shown great competence.

This combination of qualities might be of very great value to the War Department. I do hope that you can arrange in due course to meet him or fix a time when one of your staff can have a talk with him.

As you will note from my earlier letter, he has first class editorial ability which you will have noted from the samples of *The Far Eastern Survey* that I have already sent, and from perusing his chapters in *The Economic Handbook of the Pacific*, published by Doubleday Doran for the IPR in 1934.

I am sending this letter and the Curriculum Vitae in duplicate in case you wish to send on copies to Lieutenant Colonel Bratton.

With kindest personal regards, I am,

Sincerely yours.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1194

HA from ECC:

JUNE 19, 1941.

Will you please prepare a memorandum showing the dates and amounts of all USSR Council contributions to the Pacific Council since they began to contribute.

Pencilled in:

August 26, 1935-----	\$2,000.00
June 5, 1935-----	2,000.00
Feb. 7, 1937-----	\$500.00
Apr. 29, 1937-----	2,500.00
	<hr/>
June 1, 1938-----	3,000.00
June 1, 1938-----	2,500.00
May 23, 1939-----	2,500.00

EXHIBIT No. 1195

JUNE 23, 1941.

Dr. PHILIP C. JESSUP,
c/o American Express,
Santiago, Chile.

DEAR JESSUP: Immediately following your excellent suggestion regarding General Barrows I wrote Wilbur and asked whether he would be willing to make a presentation of a series of IPR publications to the General for the ultimate purpose which you and I discussed.

Wilbur responded in the affirmative, and I sent him a handsome assortment. These reached Barrows on the morning of June 10. Just by a pure fluke this was the day on which Wilbur and the Bay Region IPR gave a luncheon at the

Palace Hotel at which Wilbur asked me to speak of some of the latest developments in the IPR. I sat between Wilbur and General Barrows.

This morning Wilbur sent me a letter from General Barrows, copy of which I enclose. So far, so good.

I ought to add that at the luncheon I was able to emphasize to General Barrows the role that W. L. Holland and Galen Fisher are playing in the total program of the IPR. The Bay Region group has a scheme for an emergency study of the Japanese in California and have made some progress in getting Barrows interested in seeking to secure part of the funds from the Carnegie Endowment.

The Canadian Institute—Northwest-American IPR two-day meeting at Victoria was realistic and worth while. The discussions were at a very high level. After Victoria I met members of the Institute in San Francisco, Stanford, Berkeley, and Los Angeles. Holland is a great asset on the Pacific Coast, though we miss him sorely here. Sproul's Executive Assistant James E. Lash is gradually wiping out the difficult situation that existed under Warren Scott.

I wonder whether you happened to hear Churchill's speech yesterday. Hitler, Stalin, and Churchill managed quite a spectacular week end. It so happened that last week I had lunch with Oumansky in Washington on Wednesday. We talked for a couple of hours. I was fortunate in getting Lattimore over from Baltimore, as I thought it was pretty important for him to have a long talk with Oumansky, in view of his job and the evolving world situation. It was a most illuminating two hours.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1196

(Handwritten:) GL
CC—Oakie

NEW YORK CITY, June 25, 1941.

Lt. Col. R. S. BRATTON,
*Chief, Far Eastern Section, War Department General Staff,
Military Intelligence Division, Washington, D. C.*

* DEAR COLONEL BRATTON: Your letter of June 23rd reached us this morning. We shall, of course, be glad to cooperate with you to the fullest extent but, before writing in detail, I am wondering to what extent you have already made use of the material in the National Roster of Scientific Personnel. We have already provided somewhat similar information to the National Roster and would like to save your time and ours by avoiding any duplication of effort.

Needless to say, however, we are very much interested indeed in assisting you in every way and hope that you will let us know just how we can be of most assistance to you.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1197

WAR DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Intelligence Division G-2

WASHINGTON

FAR EASTERN SECTION, G-2,
June 23, 1941.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
429 East 57th Street, New York City.

GENTLEMEN: This office is interested in obtaining the services of personnel who have the necessary linguistic qualifications as well as a knowledge of the social, geographic, political and economic aspects of the Far East, including Thailand, Indo China, Burma, Malay Peninsula and the Philippine Islands.

The salary will vary between \$2,000 and \$3,200 per year, depending upon the Civil Service rating.

I shall appreciate the names of individuals who may be desirous of such employment.

Yours,

R. S. BRATTON,
Lt. Col. G. S. C., Chief, Far Eastern Section.

EXHIBIT No. 1198

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
SECRET SERVICE DIVISION,
New York, N. Y., July 1, 1941.

Office of Supervising Agent, District No. 2, State of New York and Territory of Puerto Rico.
Rm. 804, 90 Church St., New York, N. Y.

Please refer to file CO 5002.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 E. 52d Street, New York, N. Y.

SIR: This office has under investigation Irving S. Friedman relative to his position with the Treasury Department. He has given your name as a personal reference.

Will you kindly advise us the length of time you have known the subject and furnish any information which you may possess regarding his character and ability, and employment record with you.

There is enclosed for your reply a self-addressed envelope which requires no postage.

Very truly yours,

JAMES J. MALONEY, *Supervising Agent.*

EXHIBIT No. 1199

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., August 7th, 1941.

IRVING S. FRIEDMAN, Esq.,
Research Division, Washington, D. C.

DEAR IRVING: This is just to let you know how glad I am that you are so well established in Washington. Bob Barnett spoke very enthusiastically about the way you are taking hold. You certainly have a big job. You have my very best wishes.

I hope you will forget my harshness the last time we met. I happened to be very fatigued that week and hope you did not carry away a permanent picture of me as always loaded with vinegar.

With very kindest regards and best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1200

(Penciled notation:) R. W. B. any suggestion? ECC.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT.
DIVISION OF MONETARY RESEARCH.
Washington, D. C., September 9, 1941.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
*Secretary General, International Secretariat,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 E. 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: Would you be kind enough to suggest the names of a few people who might be interested in working down here in the Division of Monetary Research. From what I have been able to gather from my own brief experience here, it would be best if any person suggested had some training in economics, but of more importance, however, is some acquaintance with the Far Eastern area.

I do hope that I shall have the pleasure of seeing you again the next time I come up to New York.

With best regards to the IPR.

Sincerely,

IRVING S. FRIEDMAN.

EXHIBIT No. 1201

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, February 17, 1941.

IRVING S. FRIEDMAN, Esquire

DEAR IRVING: Would you glance through this Act, H. R. 10094 and let me know whether you think either the American Council or the Pacific Council should consider registration under it.

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1202

DEAR DR. WHITE: I understand from Mr. Irving S. Friedman who holds the appointment of Head Clerk in this office, that he has been appointed to the post of research economist in your Department.

Under the terms of his appointment here, Mr. Friedman has to give me one months notice in advance before relinquishing his post, and on account of certain circumstances it would be extremely inconvenient for me and detrimental to the interests of the work of this office if I were to allow Mr. Friedman to leave at any shorter notice than the month referred to above. At the same time I do not wish to do anything that might in any way affect his prospective position in your Department, as I am delighted to hear of his new appointment though I shall be very sorry to lose him. I would be most grateful, therefore, if you could kindly let me know whether there would be any objection from your point of view in Mr. Friedman continuing his appointment here until the end of the current month.

(Handwritten notation on back of letter)

DEAR MALTH: I understand that Mr. Friedman is joining the United States Treasury and as my nominee I hope that he has lived up to my recommendation. If you have not already secured another man for Mr. Friedman's post, may I suggest a man whom I believe has any of the qualifications which you seek. If you are at all interested I shall be glad to have him call on you at any time convenient to you.

Sincerely yours,

EXHIBIT No. 1203

(Hand written note:)

NOTE.

Irving S. Friedman started June 9, 1938, on regular payroll at \$35.00 a week until May 15, 1939.

Around the office until January or February 1940.

EXHIBIT No. 1204

CHINESE INDUSTRIAL CO-OPERATIVES

SOUTHEAST HEADQUARTERS, KANHSIEN, KIANGSI

108 SITKIN ROAD, KANHSIEN, KIANGSI, 3rd July, 1941.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Your letter of May 1st was sent to me up here and I was very glad to hear from you and to know that you have such a good understanding of our problems and the reasons for our failings out here.

I came up to Kiangsi at the beginning of May, flying to Namyung which is just one hour from Hongkong. I first went to Kukong, Kwangtung's Provincial war-time capital for a few days and then came straight here in one day by postal truck. I am now collecting material for the C. I. C. people in Hongkong to use for publicity and I send them down a five-page report every two weeks. The situation has become rather difficult and the C. I. C. is now going through a period of consolidation rather than of expansion. The two great needs are for capital and education. I find that I learn mostly about poverty and the only surprise is that organisations like CIC can do anything at all—not that they don't do more. The only equipment is the land and the people. Here in Kanhsien the land is rich and bamboo and wood plentiful. We should be able to make large quantities of good paper, but improvements in the technique of manufacture are a first necessity. At present it is all done handicraft way and no one knows how to tap rosin from the pine trees so that the paper could be sized to take ink.

When I came here I, of course, relinquished my work with the China Council, about which I have already written you. I heard that it was possible that you would be coming out here to talk things over and to discuss the program. I hope you may be able to make a somewhat extended stay so as to get it really stabilised because it looks as though the I. P. R. will have, in the great storms to come, an even more important task to fulfil than it has ever had in the past. It looks as though it were a historical necessity that the importance of events will gradually shift from Europe to the Pacific once the path is set.

Connected with this is another matter which I would like to discuss with you. It seems that now the World War has really begun the relations and inter-relations of European, Asian and American countries will inevitably become more complex and inter-dependent. In the present situation it looks as though, if the IPR succeeded in bringing about a closer collaboration of the Councils of the Pacific, including the Soviet Union, it might contribute to the important task of avoiding an extension of the war within the Pacific area. Of course the position of the Soviet Council in this affair gains in importance for it seems that this would coincide with the present interests of the Russians and therefore we can hope to get the most active collaboration of the Soviet Council and could count on its willingness to cooperate with all the Councils of the other countries in question. It looks to me, therefore, as though it would be of great advantage if somebody from the Secretariat could at present get information on the spot about Russia's position and the position of the Council, and keep in personal touch with the people concerned. If you share in this opinion, then I would like to ask you to consider letting me proceed to Moscow where I feel I could do far more effective work than I shall be able to do here in the immediate future.

It seems to me that if the International Secretariat were to have a liaison officer in Moscow, closer ties could be established not only between the Secretariat and the Soviet Union but between the Soviet Union and the other national Councils. In general such a liaison officer would have to keep the Secretariat and other Councils informed of the Soviet Council's work and viewpoint, and to keep the Soviet Council informed of the work of the other Councils and of their viewpoint. Second, to give a provisional report of the view of the Soviet authorities on Pacific problems in view of the present political situation along the Pacific coasts and as influenced by the present German-Russian war. Third, to get a special publication for the IPR prepared on a special Russian-Japanese-Pacific issue. Fourth, to make known and get the widest distribution possible for the IPR publications, especially those which have lately been published in Shanghai.

I realize that if you were to consider doing this that my identity would have to be established before I could get a visa. As you know, when I first came out here I started sending—on your suggestion—the "Internos" to the Soviet Council—two copies of each issue. Harondar wrote me asking for information about it and expressing their appreciation, but at that time owing to the situation in Hongkong which was very difficult, I was only able to answer him in a very general way. When the "Far East Bulletin" was issued I asked Alec Crosby of the "Federated Press" in New York to continue sending the Bulletin to Motylev, and I think that he did this until communications made it impossible. The Embassy in Washington, however, is a regular subscriber.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Bill Holland as the percentage of mail that gets lost these days seems to be extremely high, but I hope one or the other gets through. I haven't had any mail from England for three months and I feel that that part of the world is marooned.

Please give my best greetings to Mrs. Carter and remember me to all the people I know in 129, and with best greetings to you,

Yours ever,

Elsie
ELSIE FAIRFAX-CHOLMELEY.

EXHIBIT No. 1205

JULY 8, 1941.

WLH from ECC:

I have been working hard with Colonel Sharp in New York and Colonel Bratton in Washington to get Shiman a job in the Army Intelligence either in New York or Washington. Temporarily Washington has turned him down on the ground that he does not feel free to go to Washington for full time.

I have also been in correspondence with Loveday, but Loveday doesn't want to take anyone on until the autumn. I am beginning to think that Field and other members of the American Council staff were much more responsible for the success of *The Far Eastern Survey* than Shiman himself was. Confidentially, I may say he is rather a pathetic figure at the moment. He is his own worst enemy as he spent several years slaving on the *Survey* but at the same time opposing every move of his colleagues that would introduce him to a wider world and richer personal contacts and a steadily growing personality. The quality of his work is now so poor and the necessity for his facing the realities of life so great that I am wondering what you would think of our computing what severance pay should be given him in line with the traditions in this matter, with the American Council and the Pacific Council splitting the amount, and thus endow him for a period of months to paddle his own canoe.

I hate to write you in this way, but his performance since we took him on the International Secretariat has really been shocking. Not the least is the quality of the work he has done on Phillip's manuscript and the sort of last straw was his billing you for employing outside people to do the work that he should have done during the two months that he was sulking and nursing his grievances, none of which were caused by either the American Council or the Pacific Council.

In spite of all his limitations, he is so vastly better than many of the captains, majors and colonels who are studying the Far East that I can recommend him in the highest terms to service in the Army. He needs a complete change of environment, a start in a fresh setting. He has got a chance of rehabilitating himself in a way which he sorely needs. We are rendering him no service by trying to build up his ego by continued odd jobs.

It may be that I am unduly pessimistic, and I want you to come back at me with your sternest criticism and your fairest judgment. If you think we should assign him the five months' job I will defer entirely to your judgment. I am showing no one a copy of this letter except Bill Lockwood who recognizes that Shiman is very much more competent than a lot of the people that Washington is using in important jobs. He is in a position to help Shiman a lot in finding a new opening.

EXHIBIT No. 1206

(Penciled notation:) cc. Robinson
WWL
WLH

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, July 14, 1941.

Mr. HENRY J. WADLEIGH,
c/o Dr. Leo Pasvol'sky, State Department.

DEAR MR. WADLEIGH: In accordance with my promise to you on Friday afternoon I write to say that I have just had a talk with Mr. Jay Robinson. Before he came to see me at my request, I took the opportunity of going over our files regarding him.

As I indicated to you over the phone I think that the recommendations which Ben Dorfman and Mortimer Graves have sent you regarding Robinson are fully justified.

Robinson has an unusual experience. I know but few men who have worked so thoroughly on many of the economic and political problems of the Far East. His studies have included work on Korea and on the railways of Manchuria for

Dr. Walter Young of the Lytton Commission, for Mr. Ben Dorfman on currency, and in connection with his work at Yenching University, on cooperative banking, the cotton crop of certain Chinese provinces and oil production in China.

For the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Robinson worked for over a year to our great satisfaction on a cooperative study which we were making of the effect on China of the overseas Chinese communities.

In addition to a good knowledge of French, German and Spanish, he has an altogether unusual knowledge of Chinese. Here Graves, Peake and others are better qualified to speak, for I myself do not know Chinese.

Of course I only have a general idea of the nature of the work that you have in mind from what you said on the telephone, but from your brief description I should have no hesitation in recommending Mr. Robinson because the imaginative character of his mind and the initiative and independence that he has shown throughout his career. As Dr. Pasvolsky suggested a general area for study, I would be inclined to think that Mr. Pasvolsky would not have to give Mr. Robinson detailed supervision but could count on his doing the job independently and thoroughly.

In the study of post-war adjustments in the Far East, Mr. Robinson could, I know, count on informal collaboration from time to time on the part of W. W. Lockwood of Princeton and W. L. Holland of Berkeley, for both of these men are familiar with Mr. Robinson's qualifications and are deeply interested in the problems that you have in mind to put up to Mr. Robinson to investigate.

As to character qualifications I am satisfied that they are of the highest. If I can be of any further assistance to you in this matter please do not hesitate to command me.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1207

JULY 15, 1941

CAPT. R. STUART MURRAY

Room 811, 1270 6th Avenue, New York City.

DEAR CAPTAIN MURRAY: This is to confirm in writing my remarks to you when you telephoned yesterday to the effect that we would not only raise no objection to your appointing Miss Virginia Thompson but would welcome it in the national interest provided it would be possible for the War Department to employ her for four days a week, thus giving her two days a week for a continuance of her work on the staff of the IPR.

The following work requires her further effort: (1) a study of British Malaya, (2) occasional contributions to the FAR EASTERN SURVEY (3) IPR staff consultation (4) the study of nationalism in Southeastern Asia.

Her appointment by the War Department would of course delay completion of her work on some of these tasks, but the arrangement proposed above would meet our requirements and would enable us and the public to cash in on the very large investment already made.

As you know we have the highest regard for Miss Thompson's character and you are already informed as to the high quality of her work. For purposes of information you may want to know that her present salary rating is \$3,000 annually.

If you wish further information please do not hesitate to call upon me.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Acting Secretary.

EXHIBIT No. 1208

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, July 15, 1941.

Mr. WILLIAM D. CARTER,

*Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service,
316 F Street NE, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR BILL: It was swell to see you in Washington and at Princeton.

Enclosed is a sheet of your notes which you left in my room at the Mayflower. Andy Roth has recently seen Colonel Black of the Military Intelligence in Washington. Black is looking for four economic analysts beginning at \$2,600

a year. Roth is very hopeful that Colonel Black will appoint him as soon as the formal appropriation comes through from the budget office.

Sincerely yours.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1209

JULY 16, 1941.

WILLIAM A. M. BURDEN, Esq.

Reconstruction Finance Corporation,

Lafayette Building, Room 312, Washington, D. C.

DEAR BILL: Aside from the heat, how do you like your new job in Washington? I am most eager to hear.

I am wondering whether we may count on your making a contribution of \$250 to the I. P. R. some time between now and October 15th.

Since I last saw you, four governments have recognized the I. P. R.'s achievements and the high quality of the I. P. R. personnel by the following appointments.

You doubtless know that on President Roosevelt's nomination, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has invited Owen Lattimore to go to Chungking as his personal political adviser. Lattimore flew from San Francisco on July 8th and is due in Chungking this week. Another member of the International Secretariat, Dr. Ch'ao-ting Chi, has gone with our best wishes on the same plane to become General Secretary of the American-British-Chinese Currency Stabilization Fund of U. S. \$95,000,000. Here we have a case of outstanding services of the I. P. R.—in the case of Lattimore, an American to the Chinese Government, and in that of Chi, a Chinese to the American, British and Chinese Governments. A former member of the Secretariat, Irving Friedman, for whom I secured an appointment and an opportunity to study India as an employee of the Indian Government Trade Commissioner in New York, has now been given an important research position in the Treasury in Washington, one for which he is highly qualified.

Officers in the Army, Navy, Federal Reserve Bank, Department of Commerce and the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supplies are asking for and getting substantial help from our research staff. The Office of the Export Control Administrator recently asked for the full time service of all the American Council research staff for a long period. We had to persuade that office that our staff could render a greater service by continuing its work as a well-balanced, experienced research group, rather than by moving en bloc to Washington, where its services would be available only to a single Government department.

Another demand of a different kind has been made upon us. Mr. Henry R. Luce, Mr. Wendell L. Willkie, and Mr. James G. Blaine have asked me to serve as chairman of the Disbursements Committee which is making a very thorough-going survey of China's needs and how the \$5,000,000 fund, if raised, can best be spent for maximum relief and at the same time to contribute to long-range reconstruction.

All of the foregoing is for your private information, for part of it is obviously not for general circulation.

This service to governments has not, happily, thus far lessened our service to business groups, the press and our university and secondary school constituency. The demands for Institute services from all these groups is greater than ever before, and I think we are furnishing more help in all these directions than ever before.

Nor has the international work of the I. P. R. throughout the world been reduced by the war excepting in the case of France and Holland. In the case of Holland nearly all of the activities have been transferred to Batavia, where van Mook, who has been the principal negotiator with Yoshizawa, is the I. P. R. leader. (Interestingly enough, van Mook and Yoshizawa were members of the same round table for a fortnight during the I. P. R. Conference at Yosemite in 1936.)

While Prince Konoye has been Premier, Ushiba, the chief I. P. R. Secretary in Japan, has acted as his private secretary. It is expected that he will return to the Tokyo office of the I. P. R. if Konoye refuses to form a new Cabinet. While Ushiba has been helping the Premier, Saionji, the grandson of the Genro, has acted as chief Secretary of the I. P. R. in Tokyo, save for the period of Matsuoka's visit to Europe. Saionji accompanied the Foreign Minister on his fantastic round of visits to Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin.

Bruce Turner, for many years Secretary of the I. P. R. in New Zealand, has just come to Washington with a member of the New Zealand Cabinet and will

shortly be going to London to help get another New Zealand Cabinet officer there. The Royal Institute in London has recently very greatly augmented its studies of the Far East. The Far Eastern program of the Canadian and Australian Institutes is more fundamental and better supported than at any period in the past.

As to adjustments in the International Secretariat, we have been fortunate in getting Y. Y. Hsu in place of Chi. It so happens that he was a classmate of Chi's both in China and during their undergraduate days in the United States. While I am taking over the editorship of *PACIFIC AFFAIRS* temporarily, I am going to have the help as managing editor of Michael Greenberg, a fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, who has an unusually clear head, a good knowledge of the Far East and an exceptional pen. The Rockefeller Foundation has just awarded a fellowship to Dr. George E. Taylor, formerly of Nanking and Yenching Universities, who is now head of the Oriental Department at the University of Washington, to spend a year in this office as a member of our staff beginning October 1st.

Our Shanghai office is still in charge of our very able associate international research secretary, Philip E. Lilienthal, who for the past two years has handled the production and distribution of a very large list of research studies which he has been putting through the press in Shanghai for prompt distribution to our whole Far Eastern constituency as well as for the British and North-American market. Dr. Chen Han-Seng is carrying out his studies with Hong Kong and Chungking as his two bases. Jack Shepherd, who has been the Australian member of the International Secretariat, has just been awarded a Carnegie Corporation fellowship for a study—pilgrimage through Japan, China, Indo-China and the Netherlands Indies.

In view of the foregoing, I hope that you can come to our financial assistance again this year.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER, *Acting Secretary.*

enc.

EXHIBIT No. 1210

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., July 23rd, 1941.

Lt. Col. FREDERICK D. SHARP,
Room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

DEAR COLONEL SHARP: Some time ago Mr. W. L. Holland, the International Research Secretary of the IPR, sent me a copy of a letter he had received from Martin R. Norins applying for a research appointment in the Institute of Pacific Relations. His offer was declined because the budget of the Institute did not permit of additional appointments.

Thus, I have personally made no inquiry regarding Mr. Norins. It occurred to me, however, that you might like to see his letter of May 20th to which is attached his autobiographical record.

In other words, I am passing on this with the suggestion that if he has qualifications that you need you make your own investigation about him.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1211

ROOM 811, 1270 SIXTH AVENUE,
New York, N. Y., July 25, 1941.
FDS/eh

TELEPHONE: CIRCLE 6-1484-85.

(Penciled notation:) WLH for your private information. ECC.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd St., New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Yours of July 23rd with reference to Mr. Martin R. Norins was received, for which I thank you.

I am forwarding this information to the War Department for such use as they may care to make of it.

Thank you for your kindness in keeping me in mind.

Very sincerely,

Frederick D. Sharp,
FREDERICK D. SHARP,
Lieut. Col., G. S. C.

EXHIBIT No. 1212

Telephone: MU. 3-3855-6.

SOVIET RUSSIA TODAY,
114 EAST THIRTY SECOND STREET, NEW YORK,
August 4, 1941.

Dr. EDWARD CARTER,
66 East 79th Street, New York City.

DEAR DR. CARTER: In our August issue we published a preliminary group of statements from noted figures in the field of culture and public affairs, expressing support of the U. S. S. R. in its common struggle with Great Britain against Nazism. Similar statements from others have appeared elsewhere and some who would be glad to make such statements have been traveling and have not yet been reached. We would like to publish in our September issue a complete list as can be gathered. Will you be good enough therefore to send us a copy of any public statement you may have made, or wish to make, for this purpose. We go to press on the 12th of August for the September issue. May we therefore have your answer before then?

Yours sincerely,

JESSICA SMITH, *Editor.*
Jessica Smith.

JS:FMU
UOPWA #18

THE AUTHORITATIVE AMERICAN MAGAZINE ON THE SOVIET UNION

EXHIBIT No. 1213

Telephone: MU. 3-3855-6.

SOVIET RUSSIA TODAY,
114 EAST THIRTY SECOND STREET, NEW YORK,
August 14, 1941.

Dr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR DR. CARTER. Many thanks for sending us the copy of your cable to Moscow for publication. I shall be glad to indicate that it was cabled to the U. S. S. R. on June 26th, and will send you the proof as soon as it comes back from the printer.

Sincerely yours,

JESSICA SMITH, *Editor.*
Jessica Smith.

THE AUTHORITATIVE AMERICAN MAGAZINE ON THE SOVIET UNION

EXHIBIT No. 1214

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Massachusetts, 10th August, 1941.

Miss JESSICA SMITH,
Soviet Russia Today,
114 East 32nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR Miss SMITH: On June 26th I cabled to friends in Moscow the following message:

"American opinion, while holding varying political views, agrees with Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, in condemning Hitler's 'treacherous attack' on the Soviet Union and in declaring that 'any rallying of forces opposing Hitler

would redound to the benefit of American security.' It is highly significant that the vast majority of commentators recognize that this is a clear-cut case of indefensible Nazi aggression.

"Though American writers on strategy are divided in their judgment of the military outcome, I personally believe that the attitude of the Soviet citizens and the character of the Soviet Army are such that a Hitler victory is as unlikely as it is undesirable. The Soviet Army has already proved its competence in the Far East, and demonstrated its power in the West. Many Americans expected that Japan would quickly conquer China. After four years of fighting the army of Free China and the spirit of the Free Chinese are stronger than ever before. Neither the Chinese people nor the peoples of the U. S. S. R. with their infinitely more integrated military organization and political structure, would expect the Soviet Union to be less determined or less certain of final victory. I believe that the American people, too, will rise above internal differences and support every Soviet effort to resist the Nazi aggression."

You may use this in the next issue of *SOVIET RUSSIA TODAY* provided that you indicate that it was sent to my friends in the U.S.S.R. on June 26th.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1215

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., August 13, 1941.

The Hon. SUMNER WELLES,
State Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. WELLES: At the suggestion of Charles C. Burlingham, Judge Thomas D. Thacher, Joseph Barnes, Allen Wardwell, Dr. Henry E. Sigerist and others, I have accepted the chairmanship of a preparatory and temporary committee to organize an American Committee for Medical Aid to Russia.

We have consulted the Hon. Joseph E. Davies in his capacity as a member of the President's Committee on War Relief Agencies, and Mr. Davies has asked that I go ahead with the organization of the proposed committee. We have consulted the Soviet Ambassador who has assured us of the full cooperation of his Government. A representative of a New York law firm has undertaken to aid in drafting articles of incorporation. He will also aid in preparing the papers necessary for the approach to the Treasury in connection with the necessary authority for gifts being deductible in income tax returns.

The firm of Barrow, Wade, Guthrie and Co. has accepted our invitation to serve as honorary auditor and to aid in setting up the books and supervising the accounts.

Mr. Charles C. Burlingham and I have been in correspondence with the Hon. Norman H. Davis as to relationships with the American Red Cross. I expect to talk the matter over further with Mr. Davis in Stockbridge this week end. Similar consultations are taking place with the American Friends Service, and the Joint Distribution Committee of the Jews.

In order to have as much coordination as possible we are asking James G. Blaine to act as consultant for United China Relief and Mr. Winthrop W. Aldrich to act as consultant for British War Relief. We are asking Mr. Aldrich to arrange for Mr. F. V. Gehle, one of the vice presidents of the Chase Bank, to cooperate with us in setting up a sound organization which can profit by the very extensive experience of British War Relief.

Colonel Philip R. Faymonville of the War Department is being kept informed as to the developments of this plan.

When the preliminary appeal is made we will emphasize that the immediate need in Russia is for medicines, drugs and surgical instruments, rather than for ambulances or personnel.

The preparatory committee will make a decision very shortly as to the precise title of the permanent committee. Some recommend American Committee for Medical Aid to Russia. Others propose United Russian Relief.

All with whom we have consulted favor the idea of a central organization in order to avoid duplication of effort, as local groups all over the country have already started raising funds for medical aid.

I would appreciate it if you would pass this letter on to the appropriate officer of the State Department with the request that he inform me as to any further steps which I should take on behalf of the preparatory committee at this stage.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1216

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
August 20, 1941.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR NED: I have just received a letter from Tuan-Sheng Chien from Kunming, China. He is distinctly more optimistic than he was in my last letter from him, although he says the economic situation, especially around Chungking is getting pretty bad. He emphasized the importance of the Burma Road and the great loss to China by the Japanese occupation of Indo-China and the stoppage of access by that route to the outer world. He hopes the United States may do more to improve the administration of the Burma Road.

He is a good deal concerned about the Russian entry into the war, thinking it may complicate China's position, although of course he realizes the possibilities of great military advantage. As a Left, but not Communist Chinese, he is afraid China will be squeezed by the Communists on the one hand and the "Shanghai minds" on the other.

Perhaps you have got this same letter, but if not I am sure you would be interested in the following paragraph: "The attitude of the left intelligentsia of America towards the Chinese Communists and the latter's quarrel with the Central Government is most unintelligible to me. I know very few of that left. But I do know that the Amerasia group, which is almost identical with the international secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, is the moving spirit of that pro-Communist and shall I say anti-Chungking propaganda. How far that propaganda poisons the American mind and how far that group gets a sympathetic hearing from the New Deal I am in no position to judge. But I do think that that propaganda is very harmful in the sense that it interferes with our liberty of action in regard to the disloyal troops of Communism and prevents American public opinion from otherwise exerting a great and healthy influence on Chungking which needs to be criticized and also to go very much further to the left (again not Communist)."

He adds a word of surprise at Owen Lattimore's appointment as adviser to Chiang Kai-shek on the grounds that he is not very close to the Roosevelt administration, nor a man of the technical ability sorely in need in Chungking.

"There was rumor that the choice was made by that left intelligentsia referred to above, through Laughlin Currie. If this could be true, one naturally looks to a more virulent anti-Chungking (but of course pro-Chiang) pinkish propaganda in America, and the task of true reformers of the liberal left of China, will be made only more difficult."

I have just written Mr. Chien assuring him that the Amerasia group now has no connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations and that the latter does not sympathize with the attitude of the former. I also said a word for Owen Lattimore and assured Chien that he is not closely associated with the Amerasia group.

I would be glad to have your comment on this situation.

Sincerely yours,

QUINCY WRIGHT.

QW: hmp

EXHIBIT No. 1217

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, September 2, 1941.

Dr. PHILIP C. JESSUP,
Columbia University, New York City.

DEAR PHIL: * * *

Professor Tuan-sheng Chien who was one of the members of the Chinese group at Virginia Beach has written to several Americans criticising Owen Lattimore, Laughlin Currie, and by indirection the IPR.

We need not be worried about the letter, because by now Lattimore has apparently made good with the Generalissimo as is evidenced by the wide publicity which the Chinese Government propaganda ministry has given Lattimore's address on August 12 at Chungking, but I would be interested to know whether Chien has written you; and if he has, I thought you would want to see my comment on his letter to one of his several correspondents in this country.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1218

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 2nd October 1941.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Visa Division, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIRS: This is to certify that I am well acquainted with Mrs. Hilda A. Bretholtz. I have known her for the last twelve years and she is a very responsible character.

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1219

[Telegram]

JULY 15, 1941.

Mrs. NATHANIEL BRETHOLTZ,
Care of Philip J. Jaffe,
Box 66, Roxbury, Connecticut (Telephone Woodberry 323):

Do you know any good unemployed cartographers in addition to Winslow and Watkins?

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1220

[Telegram]

JULY 16, 1941.

Mrs. NATHANIEL BRETHOLTZ,
c/o Philip Jaffe,
Box 66, Roxbury, Connecticut (Telephone Woodberry 323):

Earnestly hope you Nat can come Lee lunch one Saturday.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1221

NOVEMBER 14, 1941.

HA from ECC:

Here is my letter to Remer and his reply about Chi's monograph. I suppose we have to send him a copy if we have one to spare. I do not remember saying that we put Remer on the mailing list in the sense of his getting free copies. Would you handle the whole matter on my behalf, both with reference to Chi and the Economic handbook. The Coordinator of Information has barrels of money and they ought to pay for all of the books we send them. If you send Chi's manuscript, be sure to put a time limit of say eight days when it should be returned.

EXHIBIT No. 1222

NOVEMBER 22, 1941.

WWL from ECC:

Schoyer has just been in to ask my advice with reference to Colonel Sharp's proposal. It is quite clear that he is very loath to leave the IPR, but realizes that if he went to Colonel Sharp it might result in a budget saving.

Considering his age and single blessedness I suppose government service is indicated.

What I would like to urge very strongly on you is that you tell him you will release him in the hope that Colonel Sharp will permit his doing two things;

First, complete the present radio program; and second, put through a second AMCO-CBS program after the first of the year. I think it is likely that CBS will give us another series and at an even better hour.

I think we ought to do this second series for three reasons:

- (1) Its intrinsic value in our total program of public education.
- (2) It will in the long run help us with AMCO finances (e. g. Grover's very complimentary remarks).
- (3) If we don't go ahead with a second program we let the Far Eastern radio field go by default to Dick Walsh and Pearl Buck, and to Upton Close.

I think Schoyer could manage the second program without its taking too much of his time from Colonel Sharp's office. The more often he does it the more skillfully and speedily he can do the job. It would hardly be fair to also ask him to carry the task of answering any questions that come in in the fan mail.

If you agree, I suggest that you get Schoyer to drive a bargain along the foregoing lines.

EXHIBIT No. 1223

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, GOVERNMENT, AND HISTORY,
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY,
West Point, New York, November 24, 1941.

(WWL dealing with this)

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
The Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Early in 1942 the War Department will launch an educational campaign which aims to inform all military personnel as to:

1. The train of events beginning with the outbreak of World War II which compelled the United States to launch the current defense program.
2. The hazards facing the United States today.
3. The day-to-day interpretation of further events as they occur, with emphasis on their relationship to our national defense.

We will look to selected officers in the various posts, camps, and stations to give the lectures which are intended to bring the soldiers abreast of the situation. At the same time we hope to build up a "pool" of not less than a hundred civilian specialists whose lectures will highlight the campaign. In many cases their intimate knowledge of specific problems will not otherwise be available to the Army.

The job of organizing this project was turned over to me a few days ago. We have been fortunate at the outset in securing the full support of the Foreign Policy Association in our work. I am hoping that the Institute of Pacific Relations will do likewise, in view of the fact that no other research group can provide comparable information in the Far Eastern field.

Our immediate wants are:

1. A list of your publications which will serve as background material for the research work of the Army officers who will give the lectures. They should go back at least to early 1931. I have in mind particularly the pamphlets and magazines which you publish—issued volumes of the "Far Eastern Survey," etc. As for your books, although I am reasonably sure I can find them in the War College Library, it will still be advisable to have our own supply. Please quote your prices on all items.

2. A list, with quotations, of current publications.

3. A list of suggested speakers in the Far Eastern field. We are looking for the realist who will stick to an objective presentation, avoiding the direct emotional appeal. Also, he should be able to put his ideas across in a relatively simple style, inasmuch as his audience will in many, perhaps most, cases be a mixed group—officers and enlisted men. I have in mind James R. Young as a typical example.

We plan to call on the speakers for not more than six lectures each during the period Jan. 2–April 15. Their assignments will be at camps and posts as near as possible to their normal places of business. The standard Government consultant fee of \$10.00 per day, plus expenses, will be paid. As you see, we look to them for a contribution to defense.

I will be in my Washington office, Chief of Public Relations, War Department, during the periods November the 26–28 and December 2–6. Thereafter I will be in

Washington regularly (for an indefinite period) from Tuesday to Saturday of each week. Please write to that address.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) HERMAN BOUKEMA.

NB: ht.

EXHIBIT No. 1225

[Telegram]

JAN. 1, 1942.

(Handwritten:)

TASS,

A. P. Building N. Y. C.

Message just received. If not too late you may send following. The spontaneous thundering and long sustained applause by the United States Senate and House of Representatives following Winston Churchill's remarks regarding the Soviet Union's great role in the World War reflects the feeling of gratitude of the American people to the people of the Soviet Union as we now are joined together in the War against Hitler.

EDWARD CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1226

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, February 27, 1942.

The HONORABLE JOSEPH E. DAVIES,
South Ocean Boulevard, Palm Beach, Florida

DEAR MR. DAVIES: Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of the March PACIFIC AFFAIRS, the quarterly journal of the IPR. Ultimately I think you may want to familiarize yourself with this magazine. The reason I am writing you today is to call your attention to the review of "Mission to Moscow" which begins on page 124.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1227

JUNE 2, 1942.

Memo to E. C. C. from C. P.:

My four days in Washington last week were fruitful in ideas if nothing else. Several things came up which Bill Lockwood has suggested that I pass on to you.

1. *W. Norman Brown* (British Empire section of the C.O.I., Library of Congress Annex) whose specialty is India was full of good intentions and would very much like to see some arrangement made whereby an organization like the IPR would have access to material and personnel in the various Washington departments. He is going to suggest to someone in the Office of Facts and Figures that they consider making the IPR a semi-official channel for releasing certain information to the public. This was his own idea, and coming from him it might carry some weight.

I spent quite a while with Bill Carter in the hope that some way could be found of securing for the IPR such releases as the Monitoring Department can distribute. Bill felt that the only way that such an arrangement could be made would be by an important IPR person making an appeal directly to MacLeish or someone of equal importance. Bill realizes that the IPR would make far better use of the releases than some of the newspapers which evidently do get the benefit of this service. It does seem ridiculous that an office like ours has to depend upon newspaper stuff at second or third hand.

Would you be willing to write to MacLeish presenting the problem which the IPR is facing now that it is cut off from most Far Eastern news, and ask whether it would be possible for certain information secured through the Monitoring service to be released to us for use in the Survey, Pacific Affairs etc.

2. The people who are working on India seemed to show more interest in IPR and its potentialities than anyone else I met in Washington. Eric Beecroft (Board of Economic Warfare) talked to me at length about his

desire to see the Far Eastern Survey and other Institute publications give adequate attention to India. He thinks it important that we add a scholar on Indian to our staff and raised the question of making such an appointment. Having in mind the possibility of a Rockefeller fellowship for such a person, I asked Beecroft whether he could suggest any candidates. He mentioned (I suppose this should be treated confidentially) Daniel Thorner who is in the C. O. I. working under Brown's direction. Brown has an extremely high regard for Thorner, and Beecroft thinks he is one of the most promising young men in the country. He does not know Thorner's background beyond the fact that he is a New York man, that he studied at Columbia and wrote his thesis on the history of Indian railways in relation to the progress of industrialization in India. Beecroft says that Thorner probably knows more about the transport problem in Indian than any other person in this country. It is Beecroft's notion that a fairly attractive offer here could wean Thorner away from his present government job. (Beecroft is not sure what Thorner's present salary is. He thinks it is probably \$2,600 or \$3,200.) I have discussed this somewhat briefly with Bill Lockwood. He is a little uncertain about the second fellowship for the American Council staff. If this fellowship could be made available, or if you could find it possible to give Thorner a secretariat appointment, it would certainly mean a great deal to the IPR program for the next year.

3. I was very much interested to find a large number of our friends in Washington bemoaning the fact that the whole IPR was not located in Washington, or at least that a branch office was not in full operation there. Several people mentioned to me the dinner meeting which was called by Graves on May 13 to discuss the whole problem of India and the presentation of information about India in this country. Every person who attended that dinner was delighted that the opportunity had been given him, and said quite honestly that if it had not been for Graves' action, they would probably not have sought the opportunity to discover what other departments of the government were doing in their field of particular interest. It was pointed out that an active IPR office in Washington could do a great service by calling together frequent meetings of this kind. I wish it were possible for our staffs to have someone in Washington full time. We are certainly missing opportunities of service to ourselves and of usefulness to others.

All in all, it is very heartening for a member of the IPR staff to discover how highly the organization and its publications are regarded everywhere in the capitol city.

CP: RY

EXHIBIT No. 1228

(Penciled notation: not sent?)

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, March 12, 1942.

MR. JOHN A. POLLARD,

*Special Reports Division, Coordinator of Information,
270 Madison Avenue, New York City.*

DEAR MR. POLLARD: Thank you for your letter of the 28th regarding Mr. Field. I have no hesitation in testifying to Mr. Field's political integrity and freedom from activities which might place his loyalty in question.

I was associated with him intimately from 1929 until September 1940. During this period his Americanism was of the most rugged and valuable character. He was an indefatigable and exceptionally able student of domestic and foreign policy and became one of our foremost authorities on the Far East. He saw the menace of Japan, and I do not know of anyone who more unerringly envisaged the inevitable movement of Japan into Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya and the Netherlands Indies. He again and again called attention to the costly appeasement policy of London and Washington, and as I remember, indicated that if the United States was not willing to fight to prevent the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China all of Southeast Asia would fall to the Japanese.

In the autumn of 1940 Mr. Field broke with me in the sense that he resigned from the staff of the Institute because he recognized that it was impossible for him to continue on the Institute staff and engage in political activities as planned by the American Peace Mobilization. He felt that the war as defined by the

London and Paris Governments in 1939 was in danger of involving the United States in Chamberlainism, in the underwriting of British Imperialism and in the ultimate appeasement of Germany and Japan as advocated at various times by the Cliveden set. He therefore resigned from the IPR, threw himself into the APM, carried on a nation-wide educational campaign and to gain publicity for this campaign organized the picketing of the White House.

Though I had a great deal of sympathy for many of his ideas I had tried to dissuade him from joining the APM because I thought it might endanger both his research and political usefulness, and also because I felt that the sooner the United States got into the war the sooner it could be transformed from an imperialist war into a people's war against the new and terrible imperialisms of Germany and Japan.

The Congress of the United States, many employees of our government, and a great many trusted officers of our armed forces were in 1940 in my view as inadequate in their political analysis as Mr. Field. A very high percentage of loyal Americans were working, as Mr. Field was working, to keep us out of the war. They did this for all kinds of motives and all kinds of reasons.

[Mr. John A. Pollard —2— March 12, 1942]

Yet the vast majority of these are accepted today as citizens of integrity, completely free from activities which might place their loyalty in question.

Mr. Field was, of course, politically ill-advised to picket the White House, but a great many of our most reliable and responsible citizens have made political mistakes.

That Mr. Field could be guilty of any disloyalty to the United States is inconceivable. The great advantage that he has over many is that his political analysis of the Far East has been far in advance of most of our best informed citizens. His knowledge of the Far East is very extensive. His capacity for work is great. His usefulness to the Government would, in my view, be beyond question.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

[Mr. John A. Pollard —2— March 12, 1942]

Yet the vast majority of these are accepted today as citizens of integrity, completely free from activities which might place their loyalty in question. I would trust Mr. Field's integrity more than I would certain well known isolationists, because I think he possesses more than most a keen awareness of the essence of our American democracy.

There will, of course, be wide difference of opinion as to the wisdom of APM's picketing the White House. Personally, I think it was an ill-advised move. It was defended by its protagonists on the ground that APM felt obligated to expose the nature of what they regarded as the phony war which was being waged at the beginning. The difference between APM and certain genuinely subversive movements was that APM was attempting to do everything in the open, and its picketing of the White House was an attempt to bring out into the open before the American people and the American government the important issues which it believed must be faced by the American people.

That Mr. Field could be guilty of any disloyalty to the United States is inconceivable. The great advantage he has over many is that his political analysis of the Far East has been far in advance of most of our best informed citizens. His knowledge of the Far East is very extensive. His capacity for work is great. His usefulness to the Government would, in my view, be beyond question.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. JOHN A. POLLARD,

Special Reports Division, Coordinator of Information,

270 Madison Avenue, New York City.

EXHIBIT No. 1229

(Pencilled initials:)

WWL	EJT
WLH	PCG
HA	JWB
ED	Lomis
KG	RLW

Holmes

Keenleyside

ISM

L. Curtis

Parkin

Claston

Skelton

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, March 13, 1942.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
*Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street,
New York, New York.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: I am happy to express my interest in the continuation of the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which I believe is more necessary now than ever before. Several of the volumes of the Inquiry Series have been of distinct use to this office, and there have been a number of articles in *Pacific Affairs* and in the *Far Eastern Survey* which have helped us in the analysis of problems upon which we have been working.

It would be a distinct loss if these publications had to be shut down or even curtailed. I hope that in the interest of our war effort in the Pacific they may be actually expanded. I do not know of any agency inside the government or out of it which is in a position to do the work which the Institute has been doing.

Sincerely yours.

Lauchlin Currie,
LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Administrative Assistant to the President.

EXHIBIT No. 1231

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION,
Washington, D. C., March 17th 1942.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
*Research Secretary, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR Mr. HOLLAND: The Far Eastern Section of the Office of the Coordinator of Information wishes to acknowledge the assistance which it has received from the Institute of Pacific Relations and particularly from those in charge of its research activities. . . . The outstanding example is the receipt of a number of manuscripts in advance of their publication by the Institute. These include the translation of a work by Charles Robequain on the economic development of French Indo-China, a manuscript by H. G. Callis on foreign investments in Southeast Asia, one by Virginia Thompson on Burma, and one by Chao Ting-chi on China.

This acknowledgment may be useful to you in any appeal you may make for support during the coming year.

May I express the hope that your plans for the year will include provision for further cooperation with this Section. The immediate importance of this is emphasized by the fact that our own work has become more closely integrated with that of the Army and Navy.

We look forward to the continuance of the cooperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations with confidence that such cooperation will make for effectiveness in research and economy in the use of personnel.

Sincerely yours,

C. F. REMER, Chief, Far Eastern Section.

EXHIBIT No. 1232

APRIL 6, 1942.

To: ECC
WLH
From: WWL

I'd like your advice on a reply to the attached letter from Roy Veatch. It proposes a conference this spring on the essentials of a postwar settlement, attended by persons in and out of the government.

There isn't any doubt but that this would be a very useful undertaking if properly set up. It might in fact be the Prout's Neck follow-up which we have been unable to arrange thus far.

The chief problem I should think would not be organizational sponsorship but finding someone with the standing, time, and resources to pull it off. Given this it would be easy to get the necessary informal cooperation.

As for our taking the lead, shouldn't positive I.P.R. efforts in this field be devoted primarily to our own area of concern? I should think any conferencing that we do ought to be directed first of all at several preparatory meetings for the September show. This would not preclude our chipping in but would mean that someone else would really have to carry the ball.

Ed Earle is out west for a month investigating different aspects of the Japanese evacuation.

I am sending a copy of Roy's letter to Phil Jessup. He might like to consider the proposal in relation to his Carnegie Endowment program.

Veatch's personnel proposals are entirely American, but surely this meeting should be international in character.

EXHIBIT No. 1233

BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Washington, D. C., March 30, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, JR.,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: I have had an opportunity to talk with a good many people both inside and outside the Government since I came down here, particularly regarding the present state of thought and action on plans and advance preparations for the postwar world. It seems perfectly clear to me, and to others who are trying to observe the situation closely, that some new impetus is needed to bring scattered thinking into focus. We do not yet have in Government or outside of Government any agreement, or any general understanding, as to the essential points in a postwar set-up that will make impossible another war within a generation or two, and there is no adequate plan for such public discussion of this problem as will lead to general support of the action that Governments must take.

I, and a few others here, have been casting about for the proper agency or medium to bring together the people who should think through this problem and advise upon lines of action. This might be done by Edward Meade Earle's Committee, as a follow-up of the Prout's Neck Conference last summer. On the other hand, I believe it would be desirable for the auspices to be a little broader and I wondered therefore whether the I. P. R. and the F. P. A., and perhaps also Shotwell's Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations, might join with Earle's Committee in sponsoring such a conference, entirely without publicity.

It would be my idea that a group ought to meet near Washington during the Spring, at least before the end of May, and that it should spend two to four days together. If the meeting is limited to two days, say Saturday and Sunday, I believe you would have a better chance to hold the entire group together since each member might be able to commit himself to that much time.

As a starter I would suggest the following people outside the Government: Shotwell, Buell, Pittman Potter, Eugene Staley, Jacob Viner, Clarence Pickett, Quincy Wright, J. B. Condliffe, Isaiah Bowman, Dr. Boudreau, A. Loveday, A. Hansen, Edward Meade Earle, Walter Van Kirk, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Vera Micheles Dean, and of course you and Ned Carter. You might want to include also George Warren, Secretary of the President's Advisory Committee

on Political Refugees; Patrick M. Malin, American Director, International Migration Service; Michael Straight, Maxwell S. Stewart, Carter Goodrich, Esther Brunauer, Bill and Anne Johnstone, and John Coyl of the National Planning Association.

From within the Government you might include Mrs. Roosevelt, Vice President Wallace, Milo Perkins, Berle, Acheson, Pasvolsky (and Julian Wadleigh, Charles Yost, and Harley Notter, from Pasvolsky's Division in the State Department); Harry White of the Treasury; Leslie Wheeler, Paul Appleby, and Mordecai Ezekiel of Agriculture; Wayne Taylor, Amos Taylor and A. R. Upgren of the Department of Commerce; Lubin and Hinrichs from the Labor field; Stacy May from WPB; Stephen Raushenbush from the Power Commission; Ringland and Fox, on the staff of the President's Committee on War Relief Appeals (and perhaps Joseph E. Davies and Keppel of the Committee); and from the staff of our Board, Lewis Lorwin, Winfield Riefler, William T. Stone, and Louis Bean.

Let me know what you think about this plan. If you are not in a position to take the initiative we should like to take it up with someone else.

Sincerely yours,

ROY VEATCH.

P. S.—Of course other names will occur to me as soon as this has gone—for instance, I certainly wouldn't leave out Phil Jessup. Presumably a group of four or five would want to do a careful job of drawing up the list.

EXHIBIT No. 1234

[Telegram]

APRIL 25, 1942.

From: The WHITE HOUSE, Washington, D. C. 25. 124OP.

EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd Street:

Planning to attend conference Tuesday.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

EXHIBIT No. 1235

[Telegram]

MAY 5, 1942.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,

*Administrative Assistant to the President,
White House, Washington, D. C.:*

Wire collect can you spare five minutes anytime Wednesday.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1236

[Telegram]

JUNE 23, 1942.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,

*Administrative Assistant to the President,
White House, Washington, D. C.:*

Washington visit postponed until next week.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1237

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, June 26, 1942.

Mr. LAUCHLIN CURRIE,

*Administrative Assistant to the President,
White House, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR CURRIE: I am going to be in Washington on Thursday, July 2nd, and hope you can see me in the forenoon of the day.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1238

[Telegram]

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D. C., October 7, 1942.

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations:
Eighth only time would be better if convenient.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

EXHIBIT No. 1239

[Telegram]

OCTOBER 7, 1942.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Executive Offices of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.:

Visiting Washington tomorrow, Thursday. Will telephone you in morning for appointment.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1240

[Telegram]

7 GOVERNMENT,
Washington, D. C. 5 5:32 P.

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations:
Glad to see you at 12:30 Wednesday.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

EXHIBIT No. 1242

[Day letter]

MARCH 29, 1938.

MR. CONSTANTINE OUMANSKY,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.:

Could you dine with a dozen of my friends at the Century Club on the evening of Wednesday April twentieth?

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1243

[Telegram]

Washington, D. C., April 20 1035A.

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations:

Will be Century Club tonight 7:15. Arriving consulate about five. Regards.
C. OUMANSKY.

EXHIBIT No. 1244

NOVEMBER 14, 1942.

NLT

93

V. M. MOLOTOV,
Narkomindel, Moscow (U. S. S. R.):

Respectfully and urgently invite you to authorize some members of Soviet Embassy Washington and Soviet Legation Ottawa to attend eighth conference Institute Pacific Relations, Montremblant Province, Quebec, December four to fourteen Stop Influential leaders coming from England, China, Fighting France, Philippines, Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United States Stop E. Varga, G. Voitinsky, Constantine Oumonsky, V. Motylev, famil-

iar with Institute purposes Stop Conference agenda includes better prosecution of war in racial political economic matters. Conference discussion will be private.

EDWARD CARTER,
Secretary-General, Institute Pacific Relations,
129 East 52 Street, New York.

EXHIBIT No. 1245

PACIFIC COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
New York City, March 24, 1942.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 E. 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR NED: I hope you have sent copies of Lauchlin Currie's letter to such key people as Dr. Shotwell, Dr. Butler, Roland Morris, and the people at the corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation.

Sincerely yours,

[S] PHIL.

EXHIBIT No. 1246

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., April 6th, 1942.

Mrs. ANNE HARTWELL JOHNSTONE,
Foreign Policy Association,
National Press Building, Washington D. C.

DEAR MRS. JOHNSTONE: Thank you for sending me *Russia at War*. I am sorry the War Department took such a timid attitude. I imagine General McCoy has by this time decided to reopen the question with the War Department. If the army can't stand as mild a dose of the Soviet Union as this, how can American soldiers be expected to be effective comrades in arms with our gallant allies of the Soviet Union? And how can our soldier civilians consider intelligently the issues which will confront all Americans when the representatives of the Soviet Union are sitting with our representatives at some future peace conference table?

As for other channels of distribution, neither I nor my colleagues in the IPR can think of any avenues of promotion with which you are not already familiar.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1247

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS VICE PRESIDENT AND WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE
22 EAST 38TH STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. WILLIAM T. STONE

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC.

Washington Bureau: National Press Building, Washington, D. C.

TELEPHONE: DISTRICT 3780

APRIL 8, 1942.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52d Street, New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter about our Headline Book, "Russia at War." I sympathize entirely with your questions on the subject and I am really alarmed at the amount of distrust or, to put it more mildly, questioning of Russia that I find here.

I think we have done a good job of promoting Mrs. Dean's pamphlet through the regular channels. I had in mind that your work with Russian Relief might have suggested certain new areas of interest which the pamphlet might help consolidate.

Sincerely yours,

Anne H Johnstone
Mrs. ANNE HARTWELL JOHNSTONE,
Education Secretary.

AHJ: MH

EXHIBIT No. 1249

WLH file
WWL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 12, 1942.

In reply refer to RC

MY DEAR MR. CARTER: In connection with its program of cultural and technical assistance to China, the Department plans to send to universities and other research centers in that country scientific and technical textbooks, reference works, and learned journals.

Because of the difficulties of transportation, it is for the moment impossible to send to China the actual books and journals needed in any appreciable quantity. The Department is, therefore, making arrangements for the microfilming of certain urgently needed books and journals with the permission of their publishers which has been generously extended in each case thus far taken up.

As a war measure and for the duration of the present transportation stringency the Department would appreciate receiving your permission to make microfilm copies of pamphlets, books, and articles from the periodicals published both by the International Secretariat and the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations for transmission to China in connection with the program referred to above.

Sincerely yours,

[S] CHARLES A. THOMSON,
Chief, Division of Cultural Relations.

EXHIBIT No. 1250

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, May 13, 1942.

MR. CHARLES A. THOMSON,
Chief, Division of Cultural Relations,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. THOMPSON: Thank you for your letter of May 12. We are very glad to cooperate with you in your admirable program for sending microfilms to China and are glad to give you permission to make microfilm copies of our publications.

We should be interested to hear from time to time what particular articles or books you select for this purpose.

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1251

(Pencilled notes:) Don't these people ever consult other govt. departments?
? Schumpeter? John Steward?

WLH
WWL

Please deal with this ECC

KG: No, except for the attached stuff, if that counts. WLH

WM 1. Has this been answered?

MR 2. Martin & Pettigrew for our Washington list KG

WWL: What's to be done about this? WLH OK HS

WAR DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Intelligence Division G-2

WASHINGTON

MAY 30, 1942.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
*Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City, New York.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: The Japan-Manchuria section of the Far Eastern Branch of the Military Intelligence Service, War Department, is interested in obtaining the services of some additional research analysts primarily to prepare economic and geographic surveys, studies, and reference material on Japan and Manchuria. In fairness to the analysts now on hand, it is necessary that additional personnel employed under the new authorizations have outstanding records of accomplishment in the field of scholarship or in the business world. While a knowledge of Japanese or other Far Eastern languages is not essential, some personal experience in the Far East is practically indispensable. The work consists of the preparation of research material and, in some cases, the direction and supervision of other research analysts of superior qualifications and accomplishments.

Salaries range from \$2,000 to \$3,800, and if someone with the necessary qualifications and experience is available, it is probable that arrangements could be made to employ one research analyst at \$4,600.

Because of your wide acquaintance among research workers interested in the Far East and your accomplishments in directing research and the serious study of Far Eastern questions, it may be that you know of some American that you would consider suitable for the kind of work roughly described above. In any case, I shall be under obligations to you if you will send to me or to Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, Chief, Far Eastern Branch, MIS, any information you think might be helpful in obtaining the services of two or three research workers who can be depended upon for at least a year to turn out a considerable amount of research work of high quality on economic and other subjects relating to the Japanese Empire and Manchuria.

Yours sincerely,

[s] Truman M. Martin,
[t] TRUMAN M. MARTIN,

Lieut. Colonel, G. S. C., Chief, Japan-Manchuria Section.

hl

JUNE 26, 1942.

WWL from ECC:

If John Stewart isn't already in government service isn't he just the person to recommend to Truman Martin? I certainly would not want to recommend Mrs. Schumpeter.

(Pencilled note:) ECC I talked with Pettigrew and proposed Stewart, among others.

WWL

EXHIBIT No. 1252

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, June 11, 1942.

EDGAR J. TARR, Esq.,
*Monarch Life Assurance Company,
Winnipeg, Canada.*

DEAR EDGAR: Your letter of the 9th raises two points: first, the welcome possibility of an invitation from Canada; second, the question of postponement until December.

Regarding the latter, I think an overriding consideration will be the point you raise as to the psychological time for getting the best results. I know that our chances of getting people from the Soviet Union would be better in December

than in September. I raised the matter of Soviet representation with Litvinoff last week. He is deeply interested in the Institute and very appreciative of its work, but he says that this summer it is going to be terribly difficult to get anyone to leave the Soviet Union. Everyone wants to stay and participate in the winning of the war. To the Russians, as you know, this summer is the crisis period. Litvinoff has the greatest difficulty in getting over adequate staff for this reason. On the cultural side he has been under tremendous pressure from government and private agencies here to get over Shostakovich, the composer, the Red Army Chorus, etc., and though he has put tremendous pressure on these people to come over and help in the task of speeding up America's war effort for Russia he has had absolutely no success. No one wants to leave the Soviet Union now. In spite of this I do not exclude the possibility of Motylev or Voitsinsky coming, but all the indications point to December being much better than September.

As to the possibility of our getting a really significant group of people in as short a time as three months, I believe that we can certainly get as good a personnel from the Pacific Area for a September Conference as we got for the Atlantic Area at Prout's Neck last year, but I think we all want to attempt an even higher level for the IPR than we had for the Atlantic Conference. (I except, of course, Canada, because we could not think of a better group for the IPR than that you mobilized for Prout's Neck.)

Last week in Washington, Holland and I made some soundings with reference to Wallace and Milo Perkins. Right now both of them have to watch their step because of the very delicate relations between the Board of Economic Warfare and the State Department. The Department is known by the public to be a little exercised about the activities of the BEW, and I read between the lines that neither Wallace nor Perkins wants in the next few weeks to do anything that would aggravate this situation.

And here is one of the critical problems faced by the American Council. Many thoughtful Americans believe that there is more constructive thinking on postwar reconstruction in the BEW than in the State Department. Many would hope that the lead in the proposed Conference, from the American point of view, could be taken by Wallace and Perkins and some of their very able staff members. Certain foreign office people from other countries might be more eager to meet Wallace and Perkins than some of the more routine people in the State Department. We can undoubtedly secure the presence of some State Department people if that seems wise to the officers of the Pacific Council, but it would be difficult to manage at the moment.

Wallace is known to be grieved at the rivalry that the public talks about and is leaning over backwards to liquidate it. It may be that the whole matter will be cleared up in another two months, but until it is Wallace may be very reluctant to commit himself. Mr. Perkins, or any of the other members of his staff to attendance. If we can get Wallace's consent to attend within the next fortnight I think we can get good personnel from other countries. If it is impossible this month to get a decision from Wallace, then I am inclined to think that for the reasons you give December might be very much more preferable.

The actual mechanical work I feel sure Holland, Austern, Parsons, Lilienthal, and I can handle.

Jessup, Holland, Lockwood and I will meet you in Montreal or N. Y. for the 19th and 20th, or receive you here, as you prefer. Please wire your preference in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1253

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,
Washington, D. C., June 26, 1942.

Dr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your kind invitation to attend the next international study conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

It would be possible for me to attend the conference only on permission and instructions of the Soviet Government. I regret to have to decline your invitation, which I am doing, because I do not have the above instructions.

It is also impossible for me to separate myself from the official diplomatic rank, which I am holding at the Embassy, and come as a private person.

Sincerely yours,

Anth. Fedotov,
ANTHONY N. FEDOTOV, *Third Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 1254

120 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, July 11, 1942.

EDWARD C. DYASON, Esq.

Arroyo 845, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

DEAR DYASON: It was delightful to get your letter of May 11 and your extraordinarily interesting letter to Spalding which I am forwarding to him at this time.

Though truncated by the war, activity of the IPR is in many areas greater, more important and more publicly recognized than ever before. For fifteen years the IPR has been trying to advance the thesis that the Pacific must be considered as well as the Atlantic. Pearl Harbor in a single day did perhaps more to substantiate the IPR's thesis than we have been able to do in the past decade and a half of careful scholarly and educational work. For example, here in the United States, departments of the government which reluctantly ordered but a single copy of our publications, are now ordering them by the dozen and in the case of the pamphlet series by the tens of thousands. Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of the latest catalog and supplement.

Some months ago there was a suggestion that PACIFIC AFFAIRS, the FAR EASTERN SURVEY, and AMERASIA consolidated into a single publication. This proposal broke down in part because the editors of AMERASIA wish to continue the magazine on an entirely independent basis, free of all institutional impediments. The negotiations were most friendly but were not successful.

The Canadian Institute and the American Council are broadening out very substantially in the field of popular or semipopular education. The pamphlet series of both organizations have reached very large circulation figures. The American Council is on the air regularly once a week over the Columbia Broadcasting System. Under separate cover I am sending you a pamphlet, "Spotlight on Asia" which though out of date, shows you the type of popular presentation which the American Council has adopted in cooperation with the CBS.

A considerable number of the staffs of the various Institutes have been drafted into governmental service. Enclosed is an extract (brought up to date) of a letter I wrote some time ago reporting on some of these. In spite of these wartime changes in personnel it has been possible to maintain the secretariats of the American and Pacific Councils intact, as many of the governments, though eager to employ every member of the staff have recognized that it is in the interests of all the United Nations governments and the various departments within the governments to have the IPR retain a balanced, competent, expert staff that could look at the whole Pacific as a unit and be freer for writing and publication than if all were in government service.

I was very interested in the December-January issue of the *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin*.

On the financial side there have been some losses and some gains. Support from Japan, France and Holland has faded; that from the Philippines has deceased. The China IPR has, however, increased its allocation to the Pacific Council from \$1,000 to \$5,000, which is exceptionally generous and inspiring at this particular moment in China's struggle against the invaders.

I think the best plan with reference to Spalding's book is for you to keep it and return it to me when you next come to New York, which I hope will not be any one of your dollar accounts.

I am a little discouraged by what you say of the cultural efforts in your neighborhood. International intercultural efforts has many pluses and minuses.

In the light of your letter and your letter to Spalding I am of course intrigued as always with the development of your own thought. As you will have guessed

from our last conversation the world into which you are moving is one which I myself have not traversed. That does not mean that I shall not be profoundly interested in the results of your study. My hope is that I may be sufficiently intelligent to profit by your unique pioneering.

Mrs. Carter joins me in sending you our warmest greetings.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER REPORTING ON IPR PERSONNEL NOW IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (REVISED JULY 11, 1942)

Owen Lattimore, on the nomination of President Roosevelt is acting as Chiang Kai-shek's personal political adviser. He is at present back in Washington temporarily, but may soon be returning to Chungking.

Ch'ao-ting Chi is serving in Chungking as Secretary General of the Currency Stabilization Board.

Irving S. Friedman is serving in the Division of Monetary Research in the U. S. Treasury.

Dr. Russell G. Shiman has gone to the Tariff Commission in Washington.

Ellen van Zyll de Jong is working on the Netherlands East Indies problems in the Intelligence Section of the War Department.

Virginia Thompson is with the Tariff Commission in Washington.

Information supplied by Miss Harriet Moore of the American Russian Institute and Edward C. Carter to the British authorities in Washington was said to have been useful in clearing the way for a coordination of British and Russian appeals for American material.

Jack Shepherd was attached to the Ministry of Information in Singapore and is now with the Ministry of Information in India.

W. L. Holland and W. W. Lockwood have served in a consultative capacity to several Washington agencies but have not entered government service.

Andrew Grajdanzev has compiled urgently needed information for the Library of Congress, the War Department, and the Coordinator of Information.

Percy E. Corbett, while serving on the International Secretariat of the IPR has advised the Ottawa government on Latin American problems as a result of his observation at the Havana Conference and his subsequent studies of hemispheric problems.

John Leaning is in charge of the British Press Service for the American Pacific Coast.

Frank M. Tamagna is dividing his time between the Federal Reserve Bank in New York and the Board of Economic Warfare in Washington.

EXHIBIT No. 1256

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, August 3, 1942.

Dr. PHILIP C. JESSUP,
Columbia University, New York City.

DEAR PHIL: I was glad to see your circular on International Administration. It is most interesting.

As for the people in the YMCA and YWCA who might be interested, here are a few names to start on:

YMCA, 347 Madison Avenue, New York

E. E. Barnett

S. M. Keeny

Jay Urice

F. V. Slack

YWCA, 600 Lexington Avenue, New York

Miss Talitha Gerlach

Miss Sarah Lyon

Miss Rhoda McCulloch

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1257

(Handwritten:)

PIERSON COLLEGE—YALE UNIVERSITY,
Master's House, 231 Park Street, September 7, 1942.

DEAR NED: I had better send this to you while I have it, but with the reservation that \$50 is to be credited to the account of the Foreign Affairs Council for purchase of IPR publications. Would you have the Treasurer write a letter to me in Cleveland to this effect?

The Ted White letter is most interesting. Have a few extra copies which I might send to members of the Cleveland delegation who participated in the Conference.

As soon as Winifred can get a line on her own complicated tax situation she will send a contribution to IPR. We are both up against it!

She sends warmest regards with the hope of seeing you very soon. You might be interested to know that I am now appointed to the Department of State for the duration "on a part time basis." My function is still considered "secret and confidential", but between you and me I am very grateful over the whole affair. There is much I want to talk to you about.

Warmest regards.

Ever yours,

BROOKS EMENY.

P. S.—I am here until Thursday of this week then on to Washington for two days and then to New Hampshire for a week before returning to Cleveland the 21st. Am in Washington at least every Friday and can always be reached at the Metropolitan Club or the Department of State. The former is probably better given the confusion of government departments.

EXHIBIT No. 1258

SEPTEMBER 28, 1942.

G. E. VOITINSKY, Esq.,

Pacific Institute, 20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR VOITINSKY: This is to acknowledge with thanks your cable informing us that Soviet participation in the IPR December Conference is doubtful.

During these months of titanic struggle between your heroic army and people and the Nazi hordes we realize how tremendous the pressure is on you and all Soviet citizens. The whole world is inspired by the epic character of the gigantic war that the U. S. S. R. is waging. Your countrymen are bearing the brunt of Hitler's onslaught. All of the rest of the world is in debt to the Soviet Union.

Many of us in the Institute of Pacific Relations believe that we must do all in our power to make certain that the war develop not as a series of national wars but in fact as well as theory as a real United Nations effort. We believe that the December Conference of the IPR can aid at least in a small way in facing the problems of a United Nations war. If it were not for this we would not dream of asking a single Soviet citizen to leave the Soviet Union at this critical moment.

Enclosed is a copy of the revised Conference announcement, agenda and provisional document list. We do hope that you will be able to reconsider the matter and come if possible yourself, or at least arrange for one or two equally competent scholars to come to the meeting.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1259

129 EAST 52D STREET,
New York City, October 1, 1942.

Mr. W. W. LANCASTER,

55 Wall Street, New York City.

DEAR LANCASTER: I would be glad to give your friend letters of introduction to any or all of the following:

Edgar J. Tarr, President of the Monarch Life Assurance Company, Director of the Bank of Canada, Chairman of the Finance Committee of the IPR.

H. L. Keenleyside, Department of External Affairs, for several years in Tokyo.
 L. B. Pierson, Minister-Counsellor, Canadian Legation, Washington.
 Brooke Claxton, Member of Parliament from Montreal.
 W. A. Mackintosh, Special Economic Adviser, Department of Finance, Ottawa.
 M. J. Coldwell, Member of Parliament from Ottawa, Member of the CCF.
 J. B. Coyne, K. C., Chairman of the Winnipeg Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

Howard Greene, Member of Parliament from British Columbia.
 Louis Rasminsky, Member of the Canadian Foreign Exchange Control Board, formerly in the Economic Section of the League Secretariat.

Captain R. G. Cavell, Businessman, Toronto, former army officer in India. (He has a very different attitude from that which might be expected from a former Indian army officer.)

James M. Macdonnell, National Trust Company, Toronto.

John W. Holmes, Secretary of the Canadian Institute, Toronto.

Norman A. M. MacKenzie, President, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, N. B.

Is this the kind of list that you think would be helpful?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1260

WM. W. LANCASTER

55 WALL STREET,
 New York, October 14, 1942

Personal

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
 129 East Fifty-second Street,
 New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Referring to your letter of October first, I would like very much letters of introduction to the following:

Mr. Edgar J. Tarr
 Mr. H. L. Keenleyside
 Mr. Brooke Claxton
 Mr. W. A. Mackintosh
 Mr. M. J. Coldwell
 Mr. J. B. Coyne
 Mr. Louis Rasminsky
 Mr. James M. Macdonnell
 Mr. John W. Holmes
 Mr. Norman A. M. MacKenzie.

The person in whose favor the letters are to be written is Ivan Krotov, Commercial Attaché to the Legation of the U. S. S. R., at Ottawa. The letters can be sent to me, and I will endeavor to get them into the hands of Mr. Krotov, who has already left for Ottawa where he is living in a hotel.

Very sincerely yours,

WM. W. LANCASTER.

WWL/rp.

EXHIBIT No. 1261

OCTOBER 21, 1942.

WWL to ECC:

Despres suggests that we consider bringing Rajchmann to the conference in some capacity. Despres has a high respect of Rajchmann's insight into fundamental issues and for his finesse in conference discussion—this particularly on matters which don't directly concern China, and on which he therefore has fewer official inhibitions.

EXHIBIT No. 1262

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
 New York, Oct. 23, 1942.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thanks for the increase in my pay check and the extension of my appointment, as informed by Miss Hilda Austern.

I have been working under Mr. Holland's direction. I am sure he has kept you informed. I just like to mention that the work has been interesting, and as I have just finished translating Mao Tsetung's two books on war the coming weeks will be devoted to clippings sent by Dr. Chi. Two summaries on these have been written and a copy of each has been presented to you through Miss Ruth.

Best wishes to you and Mrs. Carter.

Sincerely yours

[s] Yung-ying Hsu
[t] YUNG-YING HSU.

EXHIBIT No. 1263

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 23rd October, 1942.

JOHN F. HOLMES, Esq.,
*Canadian Institute of International Affairs,
3 Willcocks Street, Toronto, Canada.*

DEAR JOHN: It gives me the greatest pleasure to introduce to you Mr. Ivan Krotov, Commercial Attaché to the Legation of the U. S. S. R. at Ottawa. Mr. Krotov has long been connected with the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade and has visited the United States several times on special missions.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1264

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 17th November 1942.

JEROME D. GREENE, Esq.,
*54 A Garden Street,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.*

DEAR JEROME: As you know, Tarr and Jessup have been asked to revise the IPR constitution to bring it in line with present realities and necessities. In this connection, Jessup has recently written Tarr and I enclose a copy. The object of my sending this to you is to inquire whether you think Jessup is right that the quorum provision in the original constitution was inserted to give the United States a control over the expenditure of funds.

I never sat in on the work of drafting, but this is the first time I have ever heard of the point which Jessup raises.

Can you enlighten me?

I question a little whether Jessup's proposal would ever be necessary. Won't you write me frankly?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1265

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 25th November 1942.

Dr. J. W. DAFOE,
Winnipeg Free Press, Winnipeg, Canada.

DEAR DAFOE: Thank you for your letter of the 6th. Lattimore is due any moment. We are hoping to persuade him to go to Mont Tremblant. That gathering, as Tarr will have told you, seems to loom very large in the thoughts of people in many parts of the world. They are coming in larger numbers than any of us had anticipated. Apparently the more complicated the world gets, the more people look to the Institute for light. I only wish our record as a light-house had been better.

There is great depression among many of my friends regarding Darlanism and over Otto von Hapsburg. The arrest of Valtin is one bright speck, however, on the political horizon. We certainly are a nation of suckers.

Have you by any chance heard of the scheme for world order worked out by Ely Culbertson, the Bridge expert? I have not mastered it yet, but it has

been endorsed by a number of fairly thoughtful Americans as "THE ANSWER" to world order. We will see what we will see.

I am glad there is a prospect of your coming to New York, but don't come until after we return from Mont Tremblant.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1266

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, March 27, 1943.

MICHAEL GREENBERG, Esq.,
814 17 St. NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR MICHAEL: In a rash moment I agreed to participate in the Constitution Hall discussion on Monday, March 29th, on Russia and the United Nations. The topic I was assigned was Russia's Role in Asia. Here is the first draft of my proposed remarks. I would be immensely grateful to you if you would do me the great service of reading this critically and letting me know whether you can detect any inaccuracies or politically unwise assertions or emphasis.

I will telephone you Monday forenoon in the hope of getting your suggestions.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1267

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, October 1, 1942.

Mr. EDWARD CARTER,
Institute of Public Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.

DEAR CARTER: Would you drop in and see me the next time you are in Washington? There are one or two things I would like to discuss with you.

Yours,

Lauchlin Currie.
LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

EXHIBIT No. 1268

National 3428

PACIFIC COUNCIL,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
700 Jackson Place NW., Washington, D. C.,
September 12, 1942.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I hope that you will be able to attend all four of our round table discussions on *Chinese Post War Reconstruction*. Alger Hiss congratulated me on securing you as the wind-up chairman calling you a "whiz-bang" at that fine art.

Enclosed is an outline containing a statement of our procedure, our guest list (acceptances to date checked), and a draft agenda. Should you wish to offer it, I would welcome your comment.

Thus far the quality of our participants is quite unusual even by Washington standards—and reflects, I believe, a confidence in IPR achieved in the last two decades.

Sincerely yours,

R. W. B.
ROBERT W. BARNETT.

EXHIBIT No. 1269

STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York, ss:

I have examined the documents described in the list annexed hereto as Exhibit A. While I have a present recollection of only a few of them, I am

satisfied that these documents, subject to the comments noted below, are letters or memoranda received by me or photostatic copies thereof, or copies of letters or memoranda sent by me to others or photostatic copies of such copies:

<i>Document</i>	<i>Comment</i>
2. M. Gerbode ECC File No. 100.382-----	Date is illegible.
5. S. Welles ECC File No. 191.272-----	Date should be 11/7/46
22. Mrs. McLaughlin ECC 3/11/47, File No 133.6-----	These items are respectively an original copy of a letter to Mrs. McLaughlin and a photostat of such original copy; I do not know whether the letter or any copy thereof was ever sent to Mrs. McLaughlin.
23. Mrs. McLaughlin ECC 3/11/47, File No. 105.194-----	
31. Progress Report Wash. office, File No. 119.42-----	The date should be 5/1-6/12.
42. ECC, C. Lane, WLH 11/4/48, File No. 191.67-----	The source of this document is KRCG.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Dated: May 9th, 1952.

Sworn to before me this 9th day of May 1952.

[SEAL]

IRENE R. DONOHUE,

Notary Public, State of New York.

Qualified in Queens County. No. 41-6061300. Certs. filed with Queens, Kings, New York, and Bronx County Clerks and Regs. Offices, Westchester & Nassau Co. Clerks Offices.

Commission expires March 30, 1954.

EXHIBIT No. 1270

To—	From—	Date	Type of Document	File Number	Exhibit Number
ECC	OL	4/11/46		100.349	1270A
M. Gerbode	ECC	4/16/46		100.382	1271
V. Kazaniev	ECC	4/4/46		100.383	1272
R. Guthman	ECC	9/20/46		100.345	1273
S. Welles	ECC	11/7/46		191.272	1274
B. Emeny	ECC	12/27/46		191.251	1275
WLH & MAS	ECC	4/18/46		191.271	1276
O. P. Swift	ECC	4/11/46		104.70	1277
B. Emeny	ECC	12/27/46		112.45	1278
M. A. Stewart	ECC	11/4/46		131B.33	1279
ECC	R. A. Millikan	3/22/46		122.43	1280
C. Lamont	ECC	5/15/46		100.353	1281
ECC; R. A. Millikan	R. A. Millikan; ECC	3/22/46; 3/27/46		133.5	1282
ECC	J. Barnes	5/30/46		100.352	1283
F. Myers	ECC	9/26/46		107.34	1284
R. Guthman	ECC	10/22/46		105.252	1285
M. Graves	ECC	11/1/46		105.250	1286
ECC	S. Welles	11/9/46		191.273	1287
R. Guthman	ECC	12/24/46		100.846	1288
WLH	ECC	1/10/47		119.19	1289
MAS	ECC	3/3/47		131B.34	1290
Mrs. McLaughlin	ECC	3/11/47		133.6	1291
Mrs. McLaughlin	ECC	3/11/47		105.194	1292
ECC	T. Gerlach	6/11/47		105.295	1293
ECC	G. G. Davidson	6/9/47		119.49	1294
G. G. Davidson	ECC	6/12/47		119.49	1295
ECC	R. D. Carter	1/9/47		119.20	1296
Ask Beecroft		1/9/47		"	1297
Memo for: J. F. Byrnes		2/20/46		"	1298
R. P. Patterson					
J. Forrestal					
C. L. Chapman					
ECC	R. Guthman	6/12/47		119.52	1299
Progress Report	Wash. Office	5/1-6/12/47		"	1300
Luncheon		5/28/47		"	1301
Memo of ECC's talk with Lauchlin Currie		7/18/47		191.103	1302
C. Porter; interview with Report to ECC from W. Fairbank		3/18/48		119.43	1303
U. S. Industrial Training for Personnel Survey by Wilma Fairbank for ECC		3/48		"	1304
J. K. Penfield	ECC	3/25/48		191.250	1305
ECC	J. B. Powell	5/4/48		100.351	1306
A. H. Dean	ECC	8/7/48		100.400	1307
Finance Agenda	ECC	9/15/48		101.82	1308
C. Oumansky	ECC	9/29/38		100.227	1309
WLH	ECC	11/4/48		191.67	1310
ECC, C. Lane, WLH		11/4/48		"	1311
ECC, refers to Hiss quoting Conant		12/7/48		191.102	1312
A. Hiss	ECC	5/8/51		500.87	1314

EXHIBIT No. 1270-A

THE WALTER HINES PAGE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Maryland, April 11, 1946.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th St., New York City.

DEAR CARTER: Replying to your letter of April 8 on the subject of William Henry Chamberlain's allegation that I received a letter from the Soviet Council stating that it would withdraw from membership in the IPR if Chamberlain wrote on any subject whatever in *Pacific Affairs*, it is difficult to rely on memory after the lapse of so many years. I am almost sure that there was a letter, though whether I showed it to Chamberlain or merely quoted it to him I cannot remem-

ber. I doubt—but not having the letter cannot state positively—that Motylev threatened to withdraw. My recollection is that the wording was negative rather than positive; i. e., that instead of saying "would withdraw" he said "could not be expected to participate," or "could not be expected to contribute," or something like that.

You will remember perhaps that when you and I talked with Motylev, it developed that there had been gaps in the correspondence. At least one and perhaps two letters which I had written had never been received by Motylev. These gaps had of course given him the impression that I had not written, and therefore instead of discussing problems was presenting to the Soviet Council a blank and stony face. It is worth adding that I wrote the unreceived letter or letters not from Peiping but from the inland Province of Shansi, which was under the rule of Yen Hsi-shan, who had a tendency to manifest autonomy in the matters of politics and censorship as in other matters. The letter or letters might therefore have disappeared into a censor's pigeonhole either in Shansi Province, in the process of clearing through the Chinese National Post Office, or in Russia.

Sincerely,

Owen,
OWEN LATTIMORE.

ol: ec

EXHIBIT No. 1271

APRIL 194.

Mrs. FRANK CARBODE,
2560 Divisadero Street,
San Francisco 15, California.

DEAR MARTHA: Thank you for yours of the 14th. By this time Ray will have arrived.

If I go out at all I do not expect it will be before the 10th or 15th of May. Enclosed are letters to the new Soviet Consul-General and to one of his colleagues. Both men were attached to the Soviet Consulate in New York for some months and were most friendly and cooperative while here. They did a lot for Russian War Relief.

If I go to San Francisco Mrs. Carter will not be accompanying me. Thank you for your concern about accommodations. A relative has offered me a cot for a few nights but if collapses I may ask you to be on the look-out. But don't bother to do anything about it now as I do not yet know whether I can go out at all.

If the Soviet authorities have thus far, presumably for strategic reasons, been reluctant to show their head regarding war with Japan it may be that they will be reluctant at the moment to identify themselves with I. P. R. activities. This, of course, will not be a permanent phenomena.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1272

4TH APRIL, 1946.

The Honorable V. KAZANIEV,
Consul-General of the U. S. S. R.,
7 East 61st Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. KAZANIEV: At last I seem to have so caught up with out of town engagements that I am free to have our long-postponed talk.

This is to inquire whether you could do me the honor of coming to this office for a light lunch at, say, one o'clock on either Monday, April 8, or Tuesday, April 9.

I do hope that you will be free on one of these dates as I am very eager to have a long talk with you regarding the Institute of Pacific Relations and other common interests.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1273

SEPTEMBER 20, 1946.

Miss RENEE GUTHMAN,
1710 G Street, NW., Washington 5, D. C.

DEAR RENEE: For a fair sized lunch or a meeting in the small hall of the Chamber of Commerce of the Cosmos Club, you may wish to consider inviting L. L. Lorwin and E. C. Ropes, who recently went to Moscow for the Department of Commerce to discuss trade possibilities. It may be that you will find that they are not allowed to talk or it may be that they were and now the muzzle on Wallace will be applied to them but as Russia, whether good or bad, is very much in the people's minds at the present time I am sure a talk would draw a good crowd and both men are tempered, informed and know Russia. Both of them are familiar with the work of IPR. Lorwin attended either the Kyoto Conference in 1929 or the Shanghai Conference in 1931. He was also at Banff.

Yesterday, Charles Gamble came in to see me on another matter and as he was leaving asked for you. I told him you had been promoted to a new and bigger job and he was very pleased. He has a high regard for you and was glad to be reassured that you had done a swell job while here in New York.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Cc to Mrs. Stewart

EXHIBIT No. 1274

7TH NOVEMBER, 1946.

SUMNER WELLES, Esq.,
P. O. Box 4669, Anacostia Station, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. WELLES: It was most encouraging to get your favorable reaction last week to the problems and plans of the IPR.

After my talk with you I wrote immediately to Mortimer Graves to be sure to telephone you for an appointment on his return from the west so that he and you and Miss Guthman can carry on from where I left off. I told him of your early departure for the South and the desirability of his getting as much help from you as possible before you leave.

Ever since I belatedly realized that Benjamin Welles was your son, I have been reading his New York Times dispatches with renewed interest. He certainly observes competently and writes well.

It has occurred to me that he might find useful for background reading a monograph prepared by Michael Lindsay on "The Military Prospects in a Chinese Civil War." Lindsay, as you may remember is Oxford of Oxford, his father being the Master of Balliol. Lindsay served for a time in the British Embassy in China, taught for a period at Yenching University, and then when the Japanese approached, started for Chungking and Oxford. He had to pass through the Communist area and was so intrigued by what he found that he cancelled his passage to England and stayed in Communist China for several years. Then the British Government asked him to return to share his observations with the Foreign Office.

The Master of Balliol then wrote me suggesting that his son might visit Canada and the United States and we arranged with the Canadian Institute to have him visit a number of the Canadian cities and then we brought him back across the United States. He is now teaching at Harvard in the Department of Government. Last summer, just before returning to this country, the London Times published a series of his articles. He subsequently put part of them into a memorandum, a copy of which I am sending to you thinking that your son might like to read it.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1275

27TH DECEMBER, 1946.

BROOKS EMEY, Esq.,
Council on World Affairs,
922 Society of Savings Building,
Cleveland 14, Ohio.

DEAR BROOKS: Thank you most sincerely for sending me this quotation from your anonymous friend's letter.

Rightly or wrongly, our Government during the war tried to woo Petain away from Hitler. Many Americans felt that this partially successful tactic saved great numbers of American and British lives.

Personally, I see no reason why our Government and people should not seek by the same formula to woo the Chinese Communists. I am not particularly anxious to have my sons, Bill and John, go through another war fighting the Russians on the plains of Manchuria.

Perhaps Uncle Sam could have wooed the Chinese Communists nine months ago with a considerable degree of success. Informed Americans and Chinese who have recently come from China, tell me that this would be much more difficult today. But I still think nothing would be lost by such an effort.

Of course Owen Lattimore is not always right. But I am not certain that his critics are any more accurate. They read extracts from his "Solution in Asia." If they would only read without emotion the book from cover to cover I think they would take a little different attitude. It seems to me that what Lattimore is trying to say is this: If America and Britain go all out for democracy here and in Asia, we can still attract Asia's restless millions into the democratic orbit. But if we go on backing up people like Chiang Kai-shek, then Moscow and not the British-American concept of democracy will win out.

Thanking you for your thoughtfulness in sending me this quotation, and with best New Year's greeting, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Hand written:) Amco Correspondence, 1947 A-E.
 Brooks Emev, 1947.

EXHIBIT No. 1276

APRIL 18, 1946.

WLM
 MAS from ECC:

Have you any suggestions that I could send in reply to the following letter from Sumner Welles which arrived this morning?

"When I had the pleasure of seeing you here the other day, I forgot to ask your advice with regard to a matter which is of much interest to me.

"You may know that I am the editor-in-chief of the Harvard University Press Series which is now bringing out a considerable number of volumes written by individual authors and dealing with the relations between the United States and other countries and regions of the World. One of the projected volumes is to deal with Southeastern Asia. My associates and I have been unable as yet to find a suitable author for this volume, although we have tried to secure several competent authorities. I shall be deeply indebted to you if you will let me have your suggestions as to possible authors for this volume who in your judgment possess the personal experience and ability required. I should add that we are agreed that the authors of all of the prospective volumes must be United States citizens."

EXHIBIT No. 1277

11TH APRIL 1946.

OTIS PEABODY SWIFT, Esq.,
2600 Woodley Road, N. W.,
Washington 8, D. C.

DEAR OTIS: Your intriguing and handsome Sea-Air brochure arrived a few days ago. Many, many thanks, and all success to this venture.

The lanes across and over the seas and continents give one a renewed zest for travel.

Today I received a call from a young Lieutenant who is about to be demobilized from the U. S. Navy who hopes to make a leisurely trip around the world, beginning in Europe, proceeding through the Middle East, India, South-eastern Asia, China and Japan, and back across the Pacific. The following papers and magazines have expressed an interest in his articles and most of them have already published his writings. They are: The Star Weekly (biggest circulation in Canada); the Australian Consolidated Press; Mademoiselle; Colliers; Holiday; the National Herald in India; the New Statesman in London; and the Nation in New York.

His name is Andrew Roth and his address is 266 Washington Avenue, Brooklyn, N. Y. Color is added to his writing by reason of the fact that he was one of the government servants who was rounded up at the time of the "Arrest of the Six." As you know, the case against him was completely thrown out and discredited with due apologies to him.

Now it has occurred to me that there is a possibility that you might like to retain him in some capacity to publicize the facilities of your principals. The fact that he already has the above-mentioned outlets would probably be more advantageous to you than if you had to market his material yourself. If you could not arrange compensation, you might help meet his financial needs by getting some of your principals to provide free passages.

Turn it over in your mind, and if there is anything worth exploring, drop him a note and I know he will be glad to see you.

The other day in the train you asked me to bring you up to date regarding the IPR. Perhaps one of the best ways of doing this briefly is for you to read this little folder "21 Years of IPR" and scan this list of our popular pamphlets. Possibly after reading these you may wish yourself to become a \$50 member of the American Council or recommend that the National Federation of American Shipping become a corporate and supporting member.

With all good wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1278

27TH DECEMBER 1946.

BROOKS EMENY, Esq.,

Council on World Affairs,

922 Society for Savings Building,

Cleveland 14, Ohio.

DEAR BROOKS: Here is a letter which, if you wish, you can pass on to your out-of-town friend. Naturally, I am glad that you have not lost faith in me. This means a lot.

I am afraid dear Admiral Greenslade was very much worried by some of my remarks. And I am told that there was a story in last night's New York Post by Edgar Mowrer in which, referring to the Cleveland Conference, he criticizes Lattimore, Teddy White, John Carter Vincent, and myself. Perhaps it was a mistake to invite him in to a single session without his having heard what went on before. He is very likeable, but he's not nearly as objective as he was when he was stationed in Geneva.

Reverting to my remarks in my formal letter of today's date with reference to American wooing the Chinese Communists, I might add that the fact that General Marshall and Ambassador Leighton Stuart had some sympathy with my point of view is substantiated indirectly by a letter written from Shanghai on December 2nd (just before the Country Club meeting) by an American doctor reporting to the American Friends Service Committee in Philadelphia on the cooperation of Marshall and Stuart in flying in to Yen-an a medical team of six together with medical supplies.

Because of the cordiality which many of the members of the Country Club Conference expressed to me personally, I sent letters to several immediately after the Conference inviting them to membership in the IPR. Two or three have accepted. This morning I received a letter from Cass of White Motors. I thought you would be interested in seeing a copy. Here it is.

From the purely selfish, personal point of view, as well as from the point of view of the public interest, I hope history will prove that I was as right in my remarks at the recent Cleveland Conference as I was five years ago when one

of your Cleveland papers on the Saturday preceding the Pearl Harbor Sunday quoted me as saying that war between the U. S. and Japan was inevitable.

If you can spare the time, would you write me as to your guess as to how Harry Luce got on the trail of my "misbehavior" at the Country Club?

I don't think Hurst, the Cleveland manager of TIME, was in the round table I attended. But at the plenary session, when by accident I was in the chair and you asked me to present the Iglauer resolution, he may have concluded that I had initiated it.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Hand written:) Amco Correspondence, 1947 A-E.
Brooks Emeny, 1947.

EXHIBIT No. 1279

(Handwritten:) RDC & MAS: Has this contribution come in yet?

NOVEMBER 4, 1946.

MAS from ECC:

On October 24, I wrote Edith Field asking her to contribute \$500 to the American Council. This afternoon she rang up and said that she had just got the letter on her return from California and would be glad to send a check; only she will be broke throughout this calendar year but plans to send her donation in January. While she didn't say so specifically, I think she plans to send \$500.

On the train coming east, she met a Captain Leslie Anderson whose designation on his uniform was United States War Artist. He is going to be around New York for six months. He is an ex-businessman who has made art his hobby. He has been attached to the engineers in the war, is about 43, and has a distinctly liberal outlook. I told her we would be delighted to meet him and maybe we could persuade him to give us some of his sketches.

EXHIBIT No. 1280

CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
Pasadena, March 22, 1946.

Mr. E. C. CARTER.

Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: The present Russian situation poses a very bothersome question for the Institute of Pacific Relations which I have felt keenly for some time and started once or twice to write you frankly about. Perhaps the following incident will bring to the fore the matter that has been disturbing me lately.

You will agree that the Institute loses completely its usefulness if it gives the readers of the Far Eastern Survey the impression that the articles which it publishes therein are, wittingly or unwittingly, Russian Communist propaganda. Some time ago I read an article in the Far Eastern Survey entitled "Political Problems in Indonesia—Independence the Issue" by Charles Bidien, and I mailed this article to one of the most prominent and informed supporters of the I. P. R. with this request—"Take a look at this article of Bidien's and then let me know whether the Institute of Pacific Relations is wise in promoting the interests of that type of man, as it is certainly doing herein." I received the reply, "I have been disappointed in the general attitude of the Far Eastern Survey during the last year or two. Presumably under the influence of a small group of men it has become biased, I think, in some of these Far Eastern matters, and I expect to withdraw my support." From articles by Bisson, which have often appeared in the Survey, I myself have lost all confidence in his scientific quality or objectivity.

Again, in a copy of the Far Eastern Survey just received I find the advertisement of the book called "The Challenge of Red China" by Gunther Stein, with the statement at the bottom that "orders may be sent to the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street, New York City." I know

nothing about the content of this book, but in the mind of the public it would, I fear, tie the Institute of Pacific Relations in with Red China. That would certainly tend strongly to destroy its usefulness. From my own point of view, and I suspect from the point of view of all thoughtful people, this is about the worst time in the world for any American organization that wants to do a constructive job to get the reputation that the present Russian propaganda influences are capturing it.

Having here at the California Institute some fifteen to twenty very fine Chinese advanced men, I have had some opportunity through them and the Chinese who come here through them to get an impression of what Red China is. I have asked at least a dozen men who know China well this question, "Are the Chinese Communists merely social reformers, as their friends say they are, or are they Marxian Communists?" The difference is the difference between day and night. If they are the last, then they are necessarily a world menace, for Marx was the most potent war monger that this world has yet seen. I have generally received the reply from men in whose knowledge and objectivity I had come to have confidence, such as T. Z. Koo, Secretary of the World Student Christian Federation, "I think it is correct to call them essentially Marxian Communists."

That answer is highly significant, for the organization that Lenin set up, following the Marx pattern, was specially designed to infiltrate other governments the world over and stir up disturbances, unrest, and bring about by fair means or foul violent revolutions. This is the way it actually functioned and is still functioning in Mexico and in many other parts of the world. Marx-Lenin policy is, I think, reliably reported to have caused the starvation of many millions in Russia until up to the time of the fight between Stalin and Trotsky. Then Stalin at least had the intelligence to see that in order to prevent complete starvation of the Russian people he had to desert Marx to an extent and to borrow the incentive wage principle from capitalism, and he thus began to improve a little the physical condition of the Russian people, although an American expert on Russia with whom I talked yesterday told me that the standard of living of the Russian people as a whole *outside "the party"* was not now a particle better than it was under the Czars. Churchill and Roosevelt both felt that at Yalta they had got Stalin to join with them in finding a *modus vivendi* by which Russian Communism and the free system of the Western world which has been successful in raising the standard of living of the common man to historically unparalleled heights, might exist side by side and a basis of real cooperation for the prevention of war established. Recent events have shown to the world that Roosevelt and Churchill failed completely at Yalta. The Lippmann editorials, the Byrnes and Churchill speeches, and official and private reports on the policies of the State Department leave no doubt whatever but that the forces of cooperation and enlightenment have been thrown out of the window in Russia by the small group of men who now hold Russia in their power, and so far as international relations are concerned *are Russia*. The evidence is unmistakable, as Lippmann says, that Russia is now going to use all its energies, not to raise the standard of living of the Russian people, but to try to build the greatest system of military imperialism that the world has ever seen, and to keep its own people in complete ignorance by their secret police system and by the building up of military force of a system of buffer states all around Russia so as to hermetically seal Russia against the infiltration of all knowledge of the ideas and of the standard of living of Western peoples, while it indoctrinates them with the group of ideas which they must have to keep them submissive to the dictatorship of the central controlling group.

Further, so as to weaken all the states of the world outside the Bolshevik core we find that they are continuing now their old methods of stirring up dissatisfaction, strikes, riotings, rebellions, and the overthrow of orderly government all over the world in order to weaken countries so as to make them as impotent as possible to resist Russian attack. While you and I are doing what we can to raise funds for Russian relief for the staving off of Russian famine, the Russian autocracy while accepting our wheat is sending hundreds of thousands of bushels into France as the first and weakest country in which they can destroy what is left of a once free system.

Informed men in this country now know that the UNO, under the leadership primarily of the United States and Britain, has got to quit its appeasement attitude and say "No" to the Russian attack. Manchuria and Northwest Communist China are merely two of these buffer states which in violation of all their agreements they are proposing to control.

With that kind of a world outlook, when I see the Institute of Pacific Relations joining with Anna Louise Strong, Bidian, Bisson, Edgar Snow, and other befuddled writers in casting aspersions upon the patriotism of the only leader in China through whom there can be any hope for the building of a united and prosperous China, namely, the Chiang Kai-shek government, I begin to be greatly concerned.

I took dinner just a little while ago with Dr. Mei, the Acting Chancellor of Yenching University, and said to him, "There is a group of American writers, some of them connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, whom I find continually pouring out poison with respect to the patriotism and motives of the Chiang Kai-shek government. Would you be good enough to tell me, first, whether that distrust as to the patriotism of Chiang Kai-shek is generally prevalent in North China where you live, namely in Peiping? His reply was, *"We Chinese as a group realize that the only hope for the unification and the building up of China is in Chiang Kai-shek."* I can assure you that in Peiping if you took a poll, eighty percent would be behind Chiang Kai-shek as a great patriot and the hope of China." I then put precisely the same question to Leighton Stuart whom you must know, a wise and objective man, telling him that I was disturbed by the writings of some of the men who have become hipped by the Chinese Communist movement—a movement which I thought gave itself away as to its motives *by its insistence upon maintaining an army, that this thing alone indicating that what it was after was military conquest corresponding to all Communist teachings* but something which at the very start makes constitutional government impossible. I knew that the Chiang Kai-shek government had promised to China constitutional government which would give the Communist party the same right in elections to get across its ideas by nonviolence that they have in this country. Mr. *Leighton Stuart's* reply was, "I think I can assure you that you need not be worried about the attitude of the Chinese people. I would say that President Mei understated it in saying that eighty percent regard him as a patriot and were behind him. I should estimate that fraction at eighty-five or ninety percent."

I myself have been on Mr. Leighton Stuart's Advisory Board for years, and I know him well. I regard him as a very able and an exceedingly fine man. I would trust one word of his farther than I would trust one hundred words of writers of the sort I have mentioned above, or even of Owen Lattimore's who is better than the rest but who I heard speaking at Banff in a way which I thought tended to undermine the influence of Chiang Kai-shek. Everybody recognizes the terrible difficulties that confront him in a country in which the whole atmosphere is permeated with graft, and if Mr. Lattimore was wise enough I thought he would have stated something of that sort instead of in effect by his words to begin to undermine the effectiveness and smear the character of the man whom I suppose is the only hope of China.

Finally, in your own speech which you made here at the Biltmore before the Town Hall you first showed a complete misunderstanding of the fission problem and the kind of world benefits than can come from it. For this you were not to blame; you can lay this to the type of foolish reports which some scientists have made. But when you stated that the London conference broke down because of the attitude of Mr. Truman with respect to the bomb, I thought you exhibited a most uninformed mind with respect to the real significance of what Russia is doing and is likely to do at this stage of world history. In my own judgment, if the United Nations cannot say a powerful and emphatic "no" to Russia in her present machinations in playing every possible game to build a Russian imperialism at the expense of the well-being of the Russian people and of the world, we shall be in World War III with certainty inside of thirty years. The situation is identical with that existing at the time of the invasion of the Ruhr by Hitler. If all the powers had said "No" to Hitler at that time there probably would not have been World War II. If we have not the strength and the intelligence to say "No" to Russia now, when she is not prepared for war and is afraid of atomic bombs, too, then World War III is inevitable some time.

I am writing this letter because the Institute of Pacific Relations is now trying to build a strong branch in Southern California, and I told the organizing persons, at their request, that I would write to you my doubts about the wisdom of trying to do too much right now, and that primarily because the recent record of the Institute of Pacific Relations has been such as to raise doubts about the kind of management which is behind it.

Very cordially yours,

(Signed) ROBERT A. MILLIKAN.

RAM: IH

EXHIBIT No. 1281

15TH MAY, 1946.

CORLISS LAMONT, *Esq.*,
 450 Riverside Drive, New York, N. Y.

DEAR CORLISS: As you know, the IPR has done a modest task in interpreting the U. S. S. R. to this and other countries. The pamphlet "Land of the Soviets" was distributed to many thousand men and women in the armed forces. It is being used in over a thousand public school systems.

In another of our pamphlet series we hope to publish before the year is over a pamphlet on American-Soviet Relations by Foster Rhee Dulles and a pamphlet on Soviet Asia by Marguerite Stewart of our staff.

In our various publications we endeavor to make people realize that the U. S. S. R. is a Pacific as well as a European power and that her destiny and our own are intertwined in Asia.

You are already familiar with Harriet Moore's admirable book published jointly by the Princeton University Press and the IPR on Soviet Far Eastern Policy.

Enclosed is a formal invitation to you to become a member of the American Council of the IPR. We hope that you will accept. You can, as you will see, become a member for \$10. In that event the IPR financially would profit to the extent of about \$1 a year.

If, however, you should be so venturesome as to think of the IPR as a public institution like a university, art museum, or library, to which you would like to contribute so that the public rather than you personally could benefit, then you might wish to become a Supporting Member at, say, \$500 or \$1,000 a year.

Some of my friends have felt that I have neglected the IPR by giving so much of my attention in recent years to Russian Relief and the American Russian Institute. Most of my intimate colleagues feel that I have been justified in doing this. But there is one thing that I have neglected, and that is to bring home to those who think as you do the important role of the IPR in the total picture.

As you know, the international IPR is one of the very few private bodies that has an affiliate in Russia, namely, the U. S. S. R. Council of the IPR. This is a present and a long-range asset in our common cause.

If you would like further information before reaching a decision, I would be delighted to talk the matter over with you.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1282

27TH MARCH, 1946.

DR. ROBERT A. MILLIKAN,
California Institute of Technology,
Pasadena, Calif.

DEAR DR. MILLIKAN: Thank you most sincerely for your letter of March 22nd. If only all our members wrote as frankly, the IPR would have even greater vitality, though happily I think it has reached a new high not only in number of members but in membership interest and participation and also in its inclusiveness of people of many different points of view and background.

This very diversity means an enrichment of the essential texture of the IPR. For example, you imply that readers of the *Far Eastern Survey* may be getting the idea that its articles are wittingly or unwittingly Russian-communist propaganda. You or others are entitled to that opinion, though personally I do not think it would be easy to substantiate that thesis.

In contrast to your apparent view, for example, is that of Chancellor Ray Lyman Wibur of Stanford University who recently wrote an unsolicited letter to Mr. Salisbury, the Editor of the *Far Eastern Survey*, as follows:

STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
Stanford University, California, March 18, 1946.

OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR

DEAR MR. SALISBURY: This is just a line to tell you that I have noted a steady improvement in the FAR EASTERN SURVEY. I am particularly

struck with the March 13th issue. I trust that you will be able to keep the same kind of material constantly before as many people in the country as possible.

Congratulations and all good wishes.

Faithfully,

Ray Lyman Wilbur.

With regard to the article in the *Survey* by Charles Bidien, I am convinced that the editors were attempting to follow an unbiased policy. They asked a Dutch official and an Indonesian each to write an article on the situation in the Netherlands Indies. Each was shown the article written by the other prior to publication. The Bidien article preceded the Dutch article in the issue for the reason that in the issue of the *Survey* of October 18, 1944, when *pro* and *contra* views had been published regarding Dutch policy in the Netherlands, the article expressing the *pro* views preceded the article expressing the *contra* views. The editors would have preferred to obtain an objective article by an American writer instead of publishing the Bidien and Vlekke articles. None was, however, available. And, believing that the Indonesian situation should be dealt with, the editors followed what they believed to be an unbiased course, namely, that of permitting each side, the official Dutch side and the Indonesian side, to present their views side by side. Bidien was recommended to the editors by a competent American scholar as a suitable man to present the Indonesian view.

A comparable recent instance of this policy of the editors was the publishing of two articles on the situation in North China, one by Michael Lindsay (the son of the Master of Balliol) who was in the area from 1941 to 1945, and the second by Lin Yu-tang, outstanding protagonist of the Kuomintang.

Concerning the attitude expressed in articles published in the *Survey* dealing with Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Communists, articles which have dealt with those subjects during the past year and one-half have been written by the present Editor, Laurence Salisbury, except for the Michael Lindsay and Lin Yu-tang letters already referred to. Mr. Salisbury was a senior State Department officer in China for several years and, from Pearl Harbor until June 1944, served in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of State. In none of his articles has he advocated the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang, nor has he advocated rule by the Chinese Communists. He has expressed the view, held by many interested officials in our Government and in the Kuomintang, that the government of Chiang Kai-shek should be liberalized. A number of Chinese and American officials have privately assured Mr. Salisbury that his articles have been accurate and sound. Because of their official position, I cannot quote them. I am taking the liberty, however, of quoting in confidence a sentence or two from an unsolicited letter received by Mr. Salisbury from General Stilwell after the publication of Mr. Salisbury's article in the *Survey* of April 25, 1945, perhaps his most significant article. General Stilwell, who certainly knew the situation existing then as thoroughly as any one, wrote in his letter of May 4, 1945: "Congratulations on your article, 'Our China Policy' in the Far Eastern Survey. We all read it with great interest and I believe you should print it in large gobs and give it widespread distribution. At least send a copy to every Member of Congress as a matter of education. I marveled at the restraint you showed and the completeness of the picture." Mr. Salisbury also received an unsolicited and favorable letter from former Ambassador Gauss at the same time, but I have not secured Ambassador Gauss' permission to quote it. However I can assure you it was most favorable. Neither General Stilwell nor Ambassador Gauss could be regarded as having Communist tendencies, but both have first hand knowledge of the situation in China.

With reference to Mr. Bisson, he has had no article on China in the *Survey* since the issue of July 14, 1943. He had no article in the *Survey* in 1944, and his three articles published in 1945 all dealt with Japan. In 1945 Mr. Bisson was invited by the United States Government to accompany Mr. Ed Pauley as a member of the American Reparations Commission to Japan. His work was so acceptable that he was recently invited by General MacArthur to return to Tokyo as a member of MacArthur's staff and he has already started for Japan for a second visit for the United States Government.

Contrary to your impression of bias on the part of Mr. Bisson, his volume "America's Far Eastern Policy," published by the IPR in 1945 and distributed by

the Macmillan Company, has received universally high commendations, for its scholarly objectivity.

In sending out advertisements of Gunther Stein's "The Challenge of Red China," the American Council was following its policy of bringing to the attention of its readers important books dealing with the Far East. Stein's book had received almost without exception favorable reviews in leading newspapers and periodicals. As a competent reporter with long Far Eastern experience, Stein's book contains material not available elsewhere in regard to Kuomintang-Chinese Communist relations. To those who have read the volume, it seems to be as impartial a presentation as one can expect in dealing with so controversial a situation. I have looked through the file of advertisements sent out in the *Survey* since last July and find that only one other book on China was advertised during that period, Lawrence K. Rosinger's "China's Crisis," an advertisement of which was sent out in July. Since then the publications advertised have been William C. Johnstone's "The Future of Japan," William Herbert Hobbs' "The Fortress Islands of the Pacific," John Embree's "The Japanese Nation," Harriet L. Moore's "Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-45," and a pamphlet issued by Chatham House entitled "The Publications of the Royal Institute of International Affairs." To my mind this seems to be a varied group of advertisements which are not pressing a "line."

In addition to reviews and an occasional advertisement in the *Far Eastern Survey*, the American Council from time to time sends out bibliographies and reading lists. These are selective, but comprehensive and authoritative. For example, a great many of them have been distributed by the office of United China Relief because UCR is as eager as is the IPR to develop an informed public.

It is quite true that many Chinese, as well as many Americans, dislike and distrust Red China. But Red China is a political fact, whether we like it or not, and it is important for informed Americans to understand it. This does not imply that they necessarily approve of it. It is so important that the United States Government sent no one less than General George C. Marshall to bring about a *modus operandi* between Red China, the Kuomintang, and the Democratic League. Certainly the IPR, which is obligated to face real situations, could hardly fulfill its task by ignoring the existence of Red China. I hold no personal brief for Gunther Stein, but I think you would be on safer ground if you read the book before passing judgment on it.

For many years I have been a friend of both T. Z. Koo and Leighton Stuart. I would agree with Koo that the leaders of Red China are essentially Marxian Communists, though their present program is in no sense Communist. Nevertheless, classifying them as Marxian Communists does not obliterate the fact that they are the leaders of millions of Chinese citizens.

Your splendid group of nearly a score of fine Chinese advance scientists at Cal Tech are from all accounts men of great integrity and competence. I imagine that they have all come from Kuomintang China. It may be that many of them have been nominated by the Kuomintang Government for study with you. I imagine that at least a half a dozen mature men might come to Pasadena from Yen'an with as strong anti-Kuomintang feelings as your present group possesses pro-Kuomintang views.

As to my remarks on the bomb at the Town Hall luncheon in Los Angeles to which you refer, I must confess that on the scientific aspects of the fission problem I must bow to you as a scientist, for I am a layman. What I did say at that meeting was that I believed Truman's early handling of the problem did result in a sharp change in Molotov's behavior at the London conference of Foreign Ministers. Warm supporters and appointees of Mr. Truman's government have assured me that his early pronouncements were most unfortunate, not only in our relations with Russia, but with other countries as well. Mr. Byrnes' later visit to Moscow, which was apparently prompted by Mr. Truman's earlier treatment of the matter, was further evidence of Washington's recognition that the first statements by Mr. Truman were not ideal. And Mr. Acheson has only this week helped clarify the situation.

My observations at the Town Hall luncheon are, I think, substantiated by the writings of Alexander Worth, for many years an accredited English correspondent in Russia for the Sunday Times (London) and other English newspapers. As you will remember, International Affairs is the journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Patron of which is His Majesty the King. In the January 1946 issue of International Affairs Mr. Worth wrote as follows:

"* * * When I was recently in Sweden, my friend Paul Winterton had the enviable publicity of being splashed over the front page of at least half the newspapers for saying that the atomic bomb had reduced Russia to a second-class Power overnight. Such things do not make for good relations with Russia, do they? And day after day the Swedish Press was featuring on its front pages new details about the atomic bomb, with always this implication: 'That'll teach the Russians.'

"My own private view is that the atomic bomb has a great deal to do with the breakdown of the recent Foreign Ministers' Conference in London. The Russians were in a very bad mood; sticky and obstructive, and reluctant to compromise. I do not think there was any fear that Great Britain and the United States would attack them with atomic bombs in a foreseeable future. I think the chief reason for their obstructiveness was to show the world that they were not a 'second-class Power,' and that they were not frightened, and that they could be a nuisance, despite the atomic bomb.

"Against this idea that Russia can some day be threatened and bullied by the atomic bomb, there is a wave of popular, one might say, national resentment in Russia. As one Russian put it, with a touch of bitterness: 'I suppose one day they will want to atomise the heroes of Stalingrad.' There is a tricky question of national pride involved in all this, and a feeling of 'How can we trust anyone?' It is a deplorable state of affairs, and it is my profound conviction that unless something is done to place the atomic bomb at the disposal of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization (without even necessarily giving away the technical secrets to anyone) the Russians will remain acutely distrustful and difficult. But I do not believe that they want to go into isolation."

But correspondence is, of course, a poor substitute for face-to-face discussion. I wonder whether there is any chance of your being in New York in the near future because I do want a long talk with you, for I know how deeply interested you have been in the IPR ever since your attendance at the Banff Conference in 1933. I remember, too, how pleased Allen Wardwell and I were when you were one of the very first Californians to affirm that you would be glad to be a sponsor of Russian Relief way back in the autumn of 1941.

Few Americans have had more recent experience as to the perplexities of dealing with the Russians than our late Ambassador W. Averell Harriman. And yet with all his background, he recently affirmed at a great dinner at the Hotel Commodore that he did not think there was anything so important at the present time than for private American citizens to intensify their humanitarian gifts to the people of the Soviet Union through Russian Relief.

The present effort to develop a branch of the IPR in Southern California derives principally from the luncheon at the University Club convened by Mr. Rosecrans in December which you attended when all seemed to agree that Southern California should be given an opportunity for a larger participation and when all further agreed that the appointment of a full-time executive officer was necessary in order to carry out the wishes of Southern California IPR members.

I do hope that my letter has aided you a little in clarifying your mind, and that you will be able to give to Mr. Rosecrans, Mr. McKelvey, Professor Coons, Miss Dahl, Mrs. Heineman, and all the others that fine cooperation that you have given in the past.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1283

European Edition : Published Daily and Sunday in Paris

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE,
230 WEST 41ST STREET,
New York 18, May 30, 1946.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I think you would be well within your rights in declining to sign the final report of the Russian study group. At the last meeting, it was decided to submit the report to the Committee on Studies of the Council together

with a very strong minority report, so I doubt if any signatures will be included without express authorization.

The final meeting was interesting. Of 20 men present, only four dissented sharply from the report, which is on the friendly side although not very dangerously so. These four were led by Frank Altschul. Four more were prepared to sign with some reservations. Twelve of us were ready to swallow our objections and sign it as it was (they were very different objections)—we included Duggan, Gerry Robinson, John Hazard, and Bidwell himself, but I still think the vote is an interesting commentary on the increasingly common assumption that nearly all business and banking leaders are openly hostile to Russia.

Sincerely yours,

Joe
JOSEPH BARNES, *Foreign Editor.*

EXHIBIT No. 1284

CC: MAS

SEPTEMBER 26, 1946.

FRED MYERS, Esq.,
*American Russian Institute,
58 Park Avenue, New York City.*

DEAR FRED: Eleanor Lattimore, you know, is terribly keen on our Washington IPR program and recognized that our Pollard experiment did not work out presumably because his campaign would have been keyed on Sumner Welles and Welles didn't come across.

Mrs. Lattimore has just written Peggy Stewart as follows:

"Here is some information about the public relations outfit I spoke to you about. My friend Carl Green understood, and I am sure made clear to Mr. Flato, that I was not inquiring about it in any official capacity or representing Mr. Carter in any way, but was asking only because of my personal concern about IPR finances. There is no point in my talking with Mr. Flato, but if you or ECC would like to talk with him when you come down, I'd be glad to arrange it."

Enclosed is a letter from someone named Carl Green, whom I do not identify. Will you return it with your comments?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Enclosure.

MRS. OWEN LATTIMORE
ROLAND VIEW ROAD

RUXTON 4, Md., *September 24, 1946.*

DEAR PEGGY: Here is some information about the public relations outfit I spoke to you about. My friend Carl Green understood, and I am sure made clear to Mr. Flato, that I was not inquiring about it in any official capacity or representing Mr. Carter in any way, but was asking only because of my personal concern about IPR finances. There is no point in my talking with Mr. Flato, but if you or ECC would like to talk with him when you come down I'd be glad to arrange it.

Mr. Carter's wire to Owen about the Kohlberg case being settled has just come. What a relief! We are longing to know the details.

Was my pamphlet ever found? [Handwritten:] What pam.?

Yours,

ELEANOR.

EXHIBIT No. 1285

OCTOBER 22, 1946.

MISS RENEE GUTHMAN,
*American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1710 G. Street NW., Washington, D. C.*

DEAR RENEE: Here is a copy of a letter I have just sent to Mortimer Graves. I don't know whether you would consider J. Franklin Ray for some kind of a meeting. He is only two weeks back from China where he was acting head of UNRRA after Kizer's resignation. He knows Japan—has long been connected with our Government's enterprises in China, first I think for Lauchlin Currie

and Lend-Lease, then FEA and, more recently, UNRRA. Mrs. Ray, as you know, was Miss Hilda Austern, for a long time a valued member of the IPR staff.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Encl.

EXHIBIT No. 1236

NOVEMBER 1, 1946.

Mr. MORTIMER GRAVES,
1219 16th Street NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR MORTIMER: Yesterday I had an hour and a quarter with Welles at Oxon Hill Manor. He was in excellent form. First I told him of the fine reports I had had of his recent visit to Canada where he was immensely impressed with our Edgar Tarr. Then we discussed his earlier and his most recent book. He expressed great gratitude to the IPR for furnishing the map for his latest book showing the division between Kuomintang and Communist China.

We then wandered around the world a bit and then came down to the IPR. I presented him with a copy of Olga Lang's "Chinese Family and Society" and an advance copy of Dulles' pamphlet on "Russia and America—Pacific Neighbors" as samples of our work at two levels, long-term research and competitive popularization. He professed eagerness to read both. He clearly is aware of the existence of the Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs. He had already seen "Treatment of Asia in American Textbooks" so that was a good preliminary to presenting Miss Guthman's report of the current program in Washington, and I told him of the way both a teachers' institute and a regional conference would fit into the national and international picture. I showed him the list of present members prepared very carefully in the Washington office. He agreed that it was a mixed grill and that there were a great many obvious gaps. He noted particularly that there were not enough people from Baltimore and the "rich counties or Maryland." He is going to see Isaiah Bowman next week and will try to get suggestions for additional Marylanders. I told him that most of the Washington members gave \$10 a year but some gave \$25, \$50 and more, and that Mrs. Bolton had given \$1,000 a year for several years and promised a larger gift in 1947. He has a very high regard for her. Somewhere in the conversation he mentioned that taxes had about broken him this year but would send a "generous check" in 1947. We will all have to guess as to his interpretation of the word "generous." If he has a good memory, he will recall that several months ago I asked him for a gift of \$1,500.

Later I showed him the long list that Pollard and others compiled last summer and asked him to check the names of those whom he thought were membership prospects. He took that rather seriously and said that rather than do it hurriedly yesterday he would like to take more time and would mail the list back to me. I think it contains the names of a number of people in his exclusive world. I certainly hope so.

At an appropriate time in the conversation I described adequately the real gifts of his two principal colleagues, yourself and Miss Guthman. I emphasized your travels, your broad knowledge of the Far East, your linguistic services to the United States Government, not only in the matter of Chinese, Japanese, and Russian but also the innumerable "funny" languages. Then I spoke of your statesmanship in facilitating the building up of area faculties in some of the larger universities. As Miss Guthman is in the room, I will not set down in this letter my description of her.

He asked me to be sure and request you to phone him immediately on your return to Washington next week from your present trip and make an appointment to go out and see him to discuss ways in which you and he can cooperate in activating the program.

He has a copy of Miss Guthman's one page report on the Washington office activities. He has seen the present membership list and by that time will have checked the long prospect list. There is one joker and that is that he goes to Florida, I presume for the rest of the winter, around the tenth of December so you will want to line him up for the maximum activity before he goes.

I am convinced that he is deeply interested in the IPR. He likes bouquets about his books. Benjamin Welles, the New York Times correspondent in Peiping, is his much admired son and this gives him an added interest in the Far Eastern scene.

He had read enough of our circular letters to the Board of Trustees to have formed the impression that we had eliminated Kohlberg from the scene which he thought was a great blessing. I had to amplify that this was, alas, not the case but the amplification gave me a good opportunity to reinforce his own conviction that Kohlberg was a crackpot.

With very best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

cc Mrs. Steward, N. Y.

cc Miss Guthman, Washington.

ECC: sh

EXHIBIT No. 1287

(Handwritten:) Mortimer Graves: Note and return to ECC.

SUMNER WELLES

OXON HILL MANOR

OXON HILL, MARYLAND, November 9, 1946.

EDWARD C. CARTER, Esquire,

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,

1 East 54th Street, New York, New York.

MY DEAR MR. CARTER: I am very glad to have your letter of November 7 and I am indebted to you for your kindness in sending me with it a copy of the monograph prepared by Michael Lindsay. I am sending this on to my son and I know he will be much interested in it.

I have not yet heard from Mr. Graves, but I shall be glad to talk with him as soon as he notifies me that he is back from his trip to the west.

With my kind regards, believe me,

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES.

(Handwritten:) Seeing him at Oxon Hill Nov. 22 at 5 p. m.—MG.

EXHIBIT No. 1288

DECEMBER 24, 1946.

MISS RENEE GUTHMAN,

American Institute of Pacific Relations,

1710 G Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

DEAR RENEE: Professor Dorothy Douglas of Smith College will be sending, in a few days, to me in care of the Washington Office a small bundle of books. These, she wants me to present to the Soviet Ambassador on the occasion of my next visit to Washington. Would you guard the package when it arrives and keep it until I call for it? I am hoping to have a few hours for Washington some time within the next two or three weeks. Is there in this period any particular date on which you would like to have me in Washington if I can manage it?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1289

10TH JANUARY 1947.

WLH from ECC:

Toward the end of my recent talk with Secretary Krug of the Department of the Interior, he asked whether we couldn't make a comparison of social, economic, and political results of civil government in the Virgin Islands and Naval government in American Samoa. He had in mind a comparison of such services as police, fire, roads, water, health, education, economic advance, costs to Uncle Sam, etc.

Beecroft is going to help us in assembling material.

Doubtless Emerson at Harvard, Kennedy at Yale, Keesing at Stanford, would be among those who can comment helpfully on how to go at the study, including an outline for the study itself. Also Ralph Bunche at U. N.

But before approaching others, I would like your general comment.

(Handwritten:) Good idea, but include Guam also.—W. L. H.

(The name Kennedy is circled and a line is drawn to the handwritten name L. Thompson.)

EXHIBIT No. 1290

FEBRUARY 3, 1947.

(Cross off with pencil:) CGM

MAS from ECC:

Here is a copy of Brooks Emeny's letter and my acknowledgment. Have you any comments?

(The following is handwritten in pencil:)

FEB. 3, 1947.

ECC fr. MAS:

It is an advantage in many ways to have Brooks as a national officer. I wonder, however, whether it might not be preferable to have him serve as a Vice Chairman, rather than Treasurer.

In these days of rising costs, and expanding budget and unusual difficulties in fund-raising, it seems to me there would be important advantages in having a Treasurer here in New York to advise and help you possible. As it is now, with Brooks in Cleveland, you've had to bear the brunt alone.

EXHIBIT No. 1291

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

Honolulu—Los Angeles—Milwaukee—New York—San Francisco—
Seattle—Washington, D. C.

1 East 54th Street,
New York 22, N. Y.

ELdorado 5-1759

MARCH 11, 1947.

Mrs. ALFRED McLAUGHLIN

3575 Clay Street, San Francisco 18, California.

DEAR Mrs. McLAUGHLIN: Thank you for your frank and helpful letter of February 25. I can well appreciate how the connection of Frederick Field and myself with the IPR have added to your difficulties in the Bay Region.

Without doubt an easy, though merely temporary, gain would result from a decision on his part and mine to withdraw from all official connection with the IPR.

But, alas, we are up against a vastly complicated, abundantly financed movement which is employing the classical Nazi methods in attacking liberals, leftists, and middle-of-the-road conservatives.

Mr. Kohlberg is one of the spearheads of this nation-wide intrigue. He has carefully planned his time table and is moving with great skill from objective to objective. To the IPR he has added the FPA, and to that he has recently added an attack on Alger Hiss, the very able but by no means leftist successor to President Nicholas Murray Butler as the new President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Reverting to the IPR, Kohlberg's time table is roughly something like this: (1) the expulsion of Field, (2) the expulsion of Carter, (3) of Lattimore, (4) of Salisbury, (5) of Staley, (6) Mrs. Stewart, and so on. Now you may personally feel that Field, Carter, Lattimore and Salisbury should leave but I am sure you would regret as much as I would the loss of Staley. It is because of the end result rather than the fortunes of Field and myself that I am inclined to stand my ground in adhering to the invitation extended me by Sproul, Jessup, Calkins, and others late in 1945: that I accept a three-year appointment as Executive Officer of the American IPR beginning in the early part of 1946.

You will remember the Bay Region Committee, when apprised of this invitation, suggested the appointment be for one year but its attitude changed to approval of the three-year appointment at a meeting of the Bay Region Committee presided over by Admiral Greenslade and attended by Mrs. Rogers, Mrs. Gerbode, Julian Arnold and others. I think you will remember that Admiral Greenslade made himself the spokesman for the entire committee in saying that now that the whole picture was clear he fully supported the three-year appointment.

I am fully aware that at one stage some of the members of your committee felt that all would be well if we could eliminate Field but, subsequently, some felt that both Field and I should go. The reason why I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that I should stand my ground personally is because, as I have sketched above, I know the Nazi technique of killing off its opponents progressively one by one. I am aware also that you and a few others have had your fingers crossed on me for many years, long before my alleged redness entered the picture. I am pretty confident that these criticisms have aided the redbaiters in recommending my elimination. On all of these issues, I am quite willing to admit that I have made mistakes but I would also ask from your side that degree of live and let live that I have consistently granted to you personally. Furthermore, I hope that some day you and I can sit down alone for a couple of hours, if you have the time to review all these matters which have worried you over the years such as: Mrs. Grady, the librarian, the Bell-Nugent textbook, our national secondary school program, etc. I do not want to defend myself or my colleagues in these matters, but I think you owe it to me to let me explain the reasons for the actions I took and, then, when you have given me your side of the picture, I know I will profit by your description of the ways in which you think I have been in error.

With reference to our invitation to you to go to Coronado, I should inform you that invitations were automatically sent to all of the 1946 National Board of Trustees and all of the candidates for the 1947 Board. You were in the first category and thus the invitation went to you with no thought that it would jeopardize the freedom of the Bay Region committee in its choice of the Bay Region group at Coronado. We do hope that the Bay Region quota will be fully utilized and that the Bay Region committee will not feel that it must limit its selection to the quota because the 1946 and 1947 Trustees have been invited and we sincerely hope they will accept.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1293

Tel. 15212.213.214

Cable Address: "EMISSARIUS SHANGHAI"

NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE YOUNG WOMEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF CHINA

133 YUEN MING YUEN ROAD

SHANGHAI, June 11, 1947.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
*Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you kindly for your acknowledgment of the cabled proxy which IPR members in Shanghai sent for the fateful April 22nd meeting.

We rejoice that the IPR was given the overwhelming vote of confidence which the quality of its work unquestionably merits.

May I take this opportunity to recommend a coworker of mine who I hope will be invited to become a member of the IPR? This person is Miss Edith Lerrigo who has served on the national staff of the YWCA in China for the past five years. Miss Lerrigo is returning to the States for furlough the end of June. She wishes to be in constant touch with up-to-date sources of dependable information about the Far East. She should be addressed as follows:

Miss Edith M. Lerrigo,
Foreign Division,
National Board YWCA,
600 Lexington Avenue,
New York 22, N. Y.

You will find her to be a staunch supporter of the democratic movement in China and the Far East.

We are happy to send Dorothy Berg from time to time.

Sincerely,

TALITHA A. GERLACH.

TAG/s

EXHIBIT No. 1294

ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, June 9, 1947.

Mr. EDWARD CARTER,
President, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: There has been quite a number of developments relating to the Pacific since our last conversation, which was prior to the trip that several of us took to the Pacific. I should like to discuss some of these developments with you at your convenience.

If you expect to be down in Washington, I hope you will give me a ring. It may be that I will be in New York the latter part of this week, and if so I will try to get in touch with you at that time.

With all kind regards and best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

C. GIRARD DAVIDSON,
Assistant Secretary.

EXHIBIT No. 1295

Take to Washington.

JUNE 12, 1947.

Mr. C. GIRARD DAVIDSON,
Assistant Secretary, United States Department of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. DAVIDSON: Thank you for yours of June 9. I certainly will be delighted to see you in the near future. If you come to New York, let me know a little in advance so I may be sure to be here.

If you don't turn up here first, I will certainly make every effort to see you in Washington the next time I am there.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

ECC: sk.

EXHIBIT No. 1296

JANUARY 9, 1947.

ECC from RDC:

In response to the various points I gave Beecroft over the phone, he remarked the following:

1. He wondered whether we had anyone in mind for the Virgin Islands Study. He said he might send someone in to see you on this, i. e., Nelson Nichols, who was in the Virgin Islands representing the OPA, who is interested in making the kind of study you have in mind.

2. He didn't have time to mention it when he saw you, but he thought the IPR should approach the dependent areas division of the Department of State with any plans it has for research on the South Pacific and Pacific Islands. Some other organizations are very active on this and a good deal of planning is going on for research activities in the Pacific. A good deal of pressure is being put on the State Department by the National Academy of Sciences, Douglas Oliver, Harold Coolidge, etc. He would like to talk with you about this some time soon.

EXHIBIT No. 1297

JANUARY 9, 1947.

(Shorthand notes unreadable across top.)

ASK BEECROFT:

1. Spelling, initials, title & address of Davidson (penned) C. Garard.
2. That Davidson was the only additional person at the Krug-Carter interview

3. Davidson had never seen the Thompson study on Guam, so ECC is sending him a copy even though he knows there is a copy in Beecroft's office.
4. In talking to Krug, ECC didn't mention Beecroft, but in talking with Davidson afterwards, ECC did mention Beecroft in his capacity as an expert on Hawaii apropos of the possibility of Krug visiting Hawaii and Davidson wanted ECC's help in nominating people of different points of view to talk to Krug while in Hawaii. Davidson wants ECC to send him a list of people Krug should see in Hawaii. Would Beecroft send ECC such a list for him to pass on to Krug? (Penciled notation:) ECC will add few names.
5. Krug suggested that the IPR make a small comparative study of the Virgin Islands and American Samoa. Would Beecroft be able to send ECC some material on this? (Penciled notation:) & a brief outline of how the comparison could best be made in the proposed monograph.
(Penciled notation:) With comments on them (not legible) and specialties e. g., pro Statehood anti-Statehood pro Civil Gov't for most of the Pacific islands or pro Navy gov't. also whether (Bus?) men formalists, etc.
(Shorthand notes unreadable.)

EXHIBIT No. 1298

FEBRUARY 20, 1946.

Memorandum for Hon. James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State.

Hon. Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War.

Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. Oscar L. Chapman, Acting Secretary of Interior.

The following proposal of the Department of the Interior for administration of the Pacific islands is submitted in accordance with the resolution adopted on January 30 by the subcommittee of the committee of four Secretaries which was appointed by the President on October 20, 1945.

1. It is proposed that military government should be replaced by civil government in all Pacific islands under the control of the armed services of the United States, with the exception of islands or parts of islands which may be designated as military reservations, subject to any future international agreement as to the status of these islands. The proposal will apply to Guam and American Samoa and to the other islands which are already under United States sovereignty; to all of the Micronesian islands which were formerly under Japanese mandate, including the Marianas, the Palaus, the Carolines and the Marshalls; and to the Ryukyus, the Volcanos, the Izu and the Bonins. It will also apply to any additional Pacific islands which may from time to time be brought under United States administration.

2. The administrative agency for the islands will be the Department of the Interior. Through its Division of Territories and Island Possessions, the Department of the Interior is already responsible for administration in nearly all overseas territories of the United States. For over 100 years, the Department has dealt with the problems of indigenous peoples, both on the mainland and overseas. Under its jurisdiction, the Philippine Commonwealth is preparing for independence; Hawaii and Alaska for statehood; Puerto Rico (under the bill supported by the President and the Department) for such status as its voters may choose; and the Virgin Islands for a rapidly increasing measure of self-government. By maintaining Navy rule in Guam and American Samoa for the past 45 years, the United States has had the distinction of being the only power in the Pacific which treats an inhabited area as a mere appurtenance of a military base. This is not a distinction which the American people will justify at a time when enlightened opinion, at home and abroad, demands expert attention to the progress of dependent peoples.

3. The Department of the Interior recommends that, even if some delay in transferring jurisdiction is anticipated, the decision to employ civil administration in islands under United States control should be made and announced at once. Such a decision would correct a belief which is prevalent, both at home and abroad, that our military interest in this area tends to ignore the civil rights and the economic welfare of the island inhabitants. The announced intention of this Government to employ civil administration in areas under its supervision will strengthen, not prejudice, our claims for military or administrative responsibility in the Pacific, and it will place this Government in a sound position to insist upon the adoption and maintenance of proper standards of civil administration in areas under the control of other powers.

4. The decision and announcement concerning civil administration will permit immediate steps to be taken by the Department of the Interior to prepare the necessary plans. The transfer from military to civil administration should be made, as an interim arrangement, as soon as the necessary preparations can be completed. Such an arrangement would, of course, be subject to subsequent international agreements. Nothing done under an interim civil administration would stand in the way of sound decisions concerning military use or concerning the future disposition of the Pacific Islands or concerning trusteeship or other terms under which the islands are to be governed.

5. An immediate decision to replace military by civil government at an early date and to begin planning to that end will have the further advantage of easing the necessary final adjustment which will have to be made by the Departments and the personnel concerned. It would help to remove the impression that exists among civil affairs personnel and island peoples alike that the present island program is a temporary one. It would also help to give a sense of continuing responsibility to those concerned with carrying out the administration of island affairs.

6. American experience in the Micronesian area already strongly suggests that any division of the islands for administrative purposes would multiply the difficulties in the way of economical and efficient government. If the taxpayers of the United States (or those of some other administering power) are to be relieved largely of cost in connection with island affairs and if the islanders are to have the benefit of an adequate control of conditions affecting their welfare, it would be essential to regard Micronesia, including Guam, as a single administrative unit, subdivided only for the purposes of local administration. Some of the islands have agricultural, mineral and fish resources which may be used for the maintenance of the population and as a source of taxable revenues. Other islands may be deficit areas which, if left to their own resources, might become a charge upon the budget of the administering power. To treat the whole region as a single unit for the purpose of dealing with the practical and difficult problems of transportation, communication, food distribution, public health, and public finance will provide a sound basis for economical administration.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Military government should be replaced by civil government, with the Department of the Interior as administering agency, in all Pacific islands under the control of the armed services, with the exception of islands or parts of islands which may be designated as military reservations.
2. The decision to adopt civil government should be made and announced at once. The Department of the Interior should then proceed accordingly, with the assistance of other departments concerned, to prepare plans of administration.
3. The transfer from military to civil administration should be made, as an interim arrangement, as soon as the necessary preparations can be completed. Such an arrangement would, of course, be subject to subsequent international agreements.
4. In the interest of economical and effective administration, the Micronesian area, including Guam, should be regarded as a single unit, subdivided only for purposes of local administration.

EXHIBIT No. 1299

SUMNER WELLES, *Chairman*
MORTIMER GRAVES, *Vice Chairman*

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

New York—San Francisco—Los Angeles—Honolulu—Milwaukee—Seattle
Telephone District 8665

WASHINGTON OFFICE: 1710 G STREET N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 12, 1947.

DEAR MR. CARTER: There seems to an accumulation of items for this letter. General Marshall's home address is simply Leesburg, Virginia.

Mac Fisher still will not give a yes or no answer on being a trustee. When I asked him last night he said he wanted to wait till Abbot Low Moffat returned

to talk it over with him. Moffat will not be back till next Monday. I explained that the trustees met on Tuesday and you would like to know before then. He said he would let me know Monday. I have a suspicion his answer will be no. However, I'm amazed and so is Shirley at the list Bill Holland suggested and which I am enclosing. Unless it were simply for prestige reasons Ropes and Hummel are too old. Ropes has taken no interest in this office at all—Hummel only a mild interest. Ed Martin and Stelle aren't even members and never attended anything even when asked personally. Gauss is a terribly busy person. Hoskins and Linebarger share opinions and Linebarger considers the IPR Communist. Beecroft is out of Interior and will be looking around for a job elsewhere. On the positive side what about Harry White or Bob Berkov or Nelson Johnson. Mortimer Graves will be at the meeting Tuesday of the trustees. He might have some other suggestions for a replacement then if Mac Fisher says no on Monday.

Mortimer Graves will also be telling you about the meeting last night which I have reported on briefly in the enclosed report. As I mentioned to Celestine, Mr. Graves would like to make a report on the Washington office at the meeting. On the basis of the talk with Welles and the meeting last night various ideas and suggestions were put forth. Everyone is enthusiastic about having the program here continue. But there does seem to be some differences on what the aims of this office should be. Graves is planning to leave in September if OIC gets its budget. So we have until then to think of a possible successor. Perhaps you can get him to express some ideas on that too.

I'm afraid the results of my financial efforts today were two very cold shoulders. But perhaps it was the heat! Anyway, I'll continue to try.

Sincerely,

RENÉE GUTHMAN.

P. S.—Had lunch with Eric Beecroft yesterday and Catherine Porter today. Catherine will be in New York next Wednesday as I guess you know. Eric Beecroft is out of a job and very anxious to talk to you and Bill Holland about various ideas and job possibilities.

EXHIBIT No. 1300

PROGRESS REPORT, WASHINGTON OFFICE, MAY 1-JUNE 12

During the month of May two meetings were held—an office meeting for Mr. U Myat Tun, the Secretary of the Commerce Department of the Government of Burma on May 1st, and a luncheon meeting for Mr. John Caldwell on May 28 (list attached). Mr. Caldwell was head of the U. S. Information Program in China until recently. The luncheon was held in the YWCA dining room and was one of the most successful meetings of the year.

The present Washington membership totals 265. As of the first of November the membership was 205. This is an increase of 60 members in seven months even disregarding those who have moved away, resigned or allowed their memberships to lapse.

Much of the time covered by this report has been spent attempting to raise some money in the Washington area. Mrs. Gifford Pinchot, Mrs. Lillian Coville and the Hon. Sumner Welles have all made suggestions of people to approach. To date the results of those approached have not been too encouraging, but there are still many contacts to pursue and the main efforts of the office during June are being devoted to this end.

A final meeting of the season of the advisory committee and other interested and active Washington members was held Wednesday evening, June 11th. Present were: Mortimer Graves, William Carter, Isobel Ward, F. MacCracken Fisher, Cora DuBois, Robert Berkov, Robert Fearey, Frank Lorimer, John Barrow, Karl Pelzer, Shirley Jenkins and Renee Guthman. The program for the past year was reviewed and suggestions and comments made on the program for the coming year. The general feeling of the group was that the Washington office should

concentrate its effort on a program to aid and abet the national program rather than attempting to have a typical regional office program. For example, more effort should be made to "win friends and influence" Congressmen and Senators; the Far Eastern experts which are concentrated in Washington should be utilized more than they are perhaps by a weekly broadcast over a local station from which records could be made and sent around the country; efforts should be made to keep track of various national and international conferences emanating from Washington to see that the Far East is given as much attention as possible; close contact should be established and maintained with the information officers of all embassies; international relations secretaries of all national organizations with offices in Washington should be contacted and all help and information available through the IPR should be offered to them. There seemed to be some question in the minds of the Washington group as to just what course the National Office wanted the Washington Office to pursue, and it was hoped that perhaps a more clearly defined directive could be worked out through the mutual efforts of the Washington group and the National Office.

A somewhat curtailed program is being planned for the summer months—two luncheon meetings a month to suffice—with the full program to be resumed in September.

EXHIBIT No. 1301

LUNCHEON MAY 28, 1947—12:30 P. M.—Y. W. C. A.

Speaker: John Caldwell, O. I. C., State Department; Introduced by
Robert Berkov, O. I. C., State Department

Drury Anderson, State Dept.
Russell Andrus, State Dept.
Pat Barnett, State
John Barrow, U. S. Office of Educ.
Dr. M. Bernardo, State
Effie Browne, State
Mr. Busuego, State
Mrs. Busuego
Stanley Caidin, formerly with Foreign
Broadcast Intell., FE
Wallace Cohen, attorney
Mrs. Cohen
Lillian Coville, member
John DeFrances, Social Sci. Res Fellow
Henry Douglas, Library of Congress
Jim Elliot, State
Katherine Erwin, Librarian, Wilson
State Teachers College
Mrs. Fairbank
F. M. Fisher, State
George Ford, guest of Mr. Andrus
Mr. Friedberg, Int. Monet. Fund
Henry Galant, guest of Agnes Roman
Mrs. Galant
Jean Gates, Central Intell. Group
Carl Green, WQQW
Engracio Guerzon, State
Renee Guthman
Sally Hawkins
John Heideman, State
Arthur Hummel, Library of Congress
Mrs. Hummel
Clarence Hendershot, State

Robert Hummel, State
Mr. Isikoff, UNRRA
Shirley Jenkins
Eugene Karst, State
Bessie Kibbey, member and guest
Eleanor Lattimore
Mildred Lau, State
Mr. Liang, Int. Monet. Fund
Wm McAfee, State
General McCoy, FE Commiss.
Lloyd Millegan, State
Frances F. Miller, guest of Miss Roman
Lorna Morley, State
Raymond Moyer, Agric.
Mrs. Moyer
Carl Nelson, State
Mrs. Nicholas, Miss Simester's mother
John Oldham, Australian Embassy
Mrs. James Penfield and mother
Hilda Ray (Mrs. Frank) and sister
Charlotte Riznik, guest of E. Lattimore
Agnes Roman
Rodolfo Severino, State
Edith Simester, former teacher in
China
Joseph Smith, Office Educ.
Ted Tannenwald, attorney
Mr. Ubaldo, State
Freda Utley
Henry F. Vicinus, State
Mr. Villareal, State
Isabel Ward, State

EXHIBIT No. 1302

JULY 18, 1947.

MEMORANDUM OF CARTER'S TALK WITH LAUCHLIN CURRIE

1. Can you be sure of saving Salisbury and the rest of the IPR if you let one member of the Executive Committee resign?
2. Currie will contribute \$25 now and another \$25 at the end of the year if he can possibly do so.
3. Harry Beyster of the Beyster Corporation in Detroit is an advisor to the Philippine Government with a 16-million-dollar project in the wind.
4. Joe Swan of Haydon Stone handles the accounts of a great many Chinese.
5. Bill Pauley (of Pauleyville) has the State of Travancore pretty well sewed up.
6. A number of American corporations are angling in a big way for Japanese business. The IPR might begin by lining up the group mentioned in the attached New York Times column of July 18.

EXHIBIT No. 1303

PHILIPPINE RECONSTRUCTION ACT

(Ecafe Training Study Report to ECC from W. Fairbank)

Interview with Miss Catherine Porter, in charge of Philippine desk, Area Division, Far East, Office of Information and Educational Exchange, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

MARCH 18, 1948.

Miss Porter reported that under the Philippine Reconstruction Act it is planned to bring to the U. S. on American Government funds about 800 Filipinos for in-service training in U. S. Government department's or bureaus between 1947 and 1950. Some of the trainees will be studying purely military subjects at West Point or with the Signal Corps, etc. but that others will get civilian training analogous to that now received by Latin Americans in U. S. Government Bureaus under the U. S. Government program supervised by the Interdepartmental Committee for Scientific and Cultural Cooperation.

I was not able in my brief talk with her to get details of this program or of State Department information regarding any trainees from the Philippines in the U. S. under other auspices but will look into this further if ECC desires.

Miss Porter suggested that if ECC should go to the Philippines in the course of his survey he might find it useful to discuss possible training programs or to get information on current programs from Bienvenido Gonzalez, President of the University of the Philippines.

EXHIBIT No. 1304

U. S. INDUSTRIAL TRAINING FOR PERSONNEL FROM ECAFE COUNTRIES

Survey by Mrs. Wilma Fairbank for Mr. Edward C. Carter, ECAFE Consultant,
March 1948

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NOTE.—Italicized phrases in the index refer to individual memoranda which constitute the body of the report.

EXHIBIT No. 1305

Straight Message.

MARCH 25, 1948.

JAMES K. PENFIELD,

*Far Eastern Division, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.:*

Hope see you nine fifteen Friday morning two minutes urgent matter. Re-
turning for longer talk at ten.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1306

JOHN B. POWELL

PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL, HARKNESS PAVILION

180 Ft. Washington Avenue

NEW YORK 32, N. Y., May 4, 1945.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,

*Editor, Pacific Affairs,**1 East 54th Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR Mr. CARTER: After reading T. A. Bisson's letter to the New York Herald
Tribune, dealing with political changes in China, I am prompted to ask you

whether Bisson is the official spokesman of the Institute of Pacific Relations. You may have noticed that he indicated such at the end of his article.

I make the inquiry because his article more or less confirms charges which I have recently heard regarding the Red leanings of a considerable number of officials and employees of the Institute. Mr. Bisson's charge against the Kuomintang may be quite correct, but why not say something about the totalitarian pro-Russian inclinations and connections of the Chinese Communist Party?

It is quite true that the Kuomintang has not had an election, but what country, aside from the United States, has had one? Also, how would China go about having a general election with the Japs and Reds holding about half of the country?

Also, incidentally, why confine all the attacks to China when Russia seems to be the main disrupting force at the San Francisco meeting? I have read a great many publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations but I have never seen one single criticism of the dictatorial Communist Party in Russia. According to Sun Fo, who has always been friendly toward the U. S. S. R., there isn't the slightest chance of a democratic development in Russia within fifty years, and possibly it will take a hundred. Why do you ignore the situation in Russia while concentrating all of the Institute's criticism on China and the Kuomintang?

Since practically all of the attacks on the Kuomintang and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek can be traced back to Chinese Communist and Russian sources, it seems to me that the whole thing is a build-up for a further grab of Chinese territory, this time by the U. S. S. R. All through World War I we appeased Japan; now we seem to be following a similar policy with respect to the Soviet Union and the Communist Party.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) J. B. Powell
J. B. POWELL.

EXHIBIT No. 1307

CATHAY HOTEL, Shanghai, China, 7 August 1948.

ARTHUR H. DEAN, Esquire,
48 Wall Street, New York City.

DEAR ARTHUR: The enclosed was delayed. Since writing it I have received a clipping from the New York Herald Tribune reporting on Mr. Cromwell's bequests. I was particularly interested in his gift of \$450,000 to the Russian War Relief and his \$300,000 gift to United China Relief. As you can well imagine, as an IPR person, I wish it could be established that Mr. Cromwell made this gift to the Russian War Relief because I was its president: In such an event you might persuade the executives that the money should be paid over to the American IPR because it was the IPR that enabled me to serve as president of the Russian War Relief!!

Doubtless my colleagues Bill Lancaster and Peter Grimm are in touch with the executors as to the pros and cons of asking that the \$450,000 be made available for relief to war sufferers in the Soviet Union. I am wondering whether the Un-American Committee will wish to have Mr. Cromwell's remains examined in order to discover whether he was a Moscow agent.

I hope to see you the end of August or early September.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1308

9/15/48

Jerome Cohen
Ellen Hammer

AGENDA FOR E. C. C.

I. FINANCE

1. Follow up September 13 memo—KRCG from ECO
2. Contact: Devereux Josephs
Dollard
Shepardson
Joseph E. Davies
\$100 and over
Mrs. Emmons Blaine

3. Check all \$50 and up for 1947 and 1948, starring any who have not paid yet in 1948.

Detroit

4. Arrange to see Ford Foundation at the same time as Economic Club engagement. If this does not take place, see Craig anyhow. (Handwritten:) See or write with Compton before seeing Craig.
5. Make sure that as many as possible of the following are invited to one or more of the appropriate small dinners:

Willits	Mr. and Mrs. Stein
Fahs	Wilbur Forrest
Shepardson	Beatrice Auerbach
Dollard	Mr. and Mrs. Michael Straight
Josephs	Henry Allen Moe
Mrs. James	W. A. M. Burden
Mrs. Schoellkopf	Nelson Rockefeller
Mrs. Lilienthal	William S. Paley
The Rossbachs	John Hay Whitney
Joe Barnes	Mr. & Mrs. Maurice T. Moore
Louis Weiss	David H. McAlpin
Marshall Field	John Cranes
Dr. and Mrs. David M. Levy	
6. Consider a meeting for such people as:

Mr. and Mrs. Max Stewart	F. P. A. Barber
Henry Collins	Mrs. W. W. L. Tuckman
Fred Myers	The Coffs
The Gelfans	W. W. Lancasters
The Lauterbachs	Andrew Grad
Mrs. Jaffe	Mr. and Mrs. Cune
Mrs. Hale	Rosamond Lee
Rose Rubin	Tiedemann
The Jenkins	Weems
The Conants	John Stewart
Mr. and Mrs. John Hazard	Mrs. P. E. L. Norees
Mrs. Brownell	Larule Davis
E. C. Roper	

II. ASIA : REPORT AND FOLLOW UP

1. Read, edit and revise all ECC'S letters from Asia.
2. Decide to what use they can best be put.
3. Place in chronological or other order all miscellaneous memos, clippings, bibliographical material, etc., collected during or since the Asia visit.
4. Revise speech for Pakistan Institute or write fresh article.
5. Consider revising the three instalments of material on Ooty for Lilienthal.
6. Prepare outlines for two or three talks in case FPA or others ask for formal engagements.
7. Write appropriate letters to those in each country who facilitated visits and asked for some action here.
8. Review with Holland, Healy, Lilienthal, Greene, Rosinger, Ruth Carter various suggestions, e. g.
 - A. A follow up of key Asians in this country, particularly Siamese, Burmese, Filipinos, Javanese.
 - B. Consider possibility of Southeast Asia graduate student conference.
 - C. Consider ways and means for more effective cultivation of Chinese in the United States.
9. Go to bottom of reasons for failure to get visa for Japan and decide whether to make an issue of it.

III. OFFICE ARRANGEMENTS

In advance of Lane's arrival, about September 26, evacuate all personal material from present office, allocating some to the new office, here, some to 72nd Street, and some to Lee.

IV. EXPENSE ACCOUNT

1. Clear with Holland, Shahn, Greene adjustment of Asia expense account.
2. Finish and submit AIPR expense account for period prior to March 30.
(Handwritten:) (done) (out \$70)

V. WHAT TO DO AFTER JANUARY FIRST

1. Get advice from Holland, Greene, Lilienthal, Willits, Dollard, Dean, Chamberlain, Vera Dean, Mitrany, Bolton, Davies, Lattimore, Fairbank.
2. Review from time to time the 14 alternatives outlined at Lee.
3. Consider seriously taking three months for study and writing before fulfilling any engagements either in North America or Asia. One object of this might be to supplement present sketchy knowledge of Eastern situations by thorough study, possibly at Andover-cum-Cambridge so as to be able to deal more authoritatively on Eastern topics, whether in America or Asia. A last trip to Asia could be far more productive if it was preceded by such a period of study.

VI. PACIFIC COUNCIL

Review with Holland and Shahn Pacific Council financial situation and consider what letters Carter or others should write to India, Pakistan, etc.

VII. WASHINGTON VISIT

See among others: Joe Davies

Keiser (middle east)

Johnstone

Bolles

Sumner Welles

Margaret Carter

Whoever in State Dept. is in charge of ECAFE both with reference to Ooty and the November meeting in Australia

Catherine Porter

Oneal—U. S. Ambassador to the Phil.

Burmese Ambassador

Siamese Ambassador

Indian Ambassador

Pakistan Ambassador

Philippine Ambassador

Ask Holland and Greene whether one of them could persuade Arthur Dean to write separately to Davies and Welles suggesting that each arrange a small dinner at which ECC could report. (It might be better to ask Dean to write but one of the men and get someone else to write the other.)
(Handwritten:)

? *Canadian Visit* (See ECC to WLH of 15 Sept. & his reply.)

? *Cleveland Visit* (See ECC's corresp. with Mrs. Bolton & Cleveland Council.)

? *F. P. A. Visits* (See ECC's corresp. with Frances Pratt.) If Pittsburgh is visited see that Paul Mellon & his Foundation are invited to small luncheon or dinner.

EXHIBIT No. 1309

129 EAST 52ND STREET, *New York City*,
September 29, 1938.

CONSTANTINE OUMANSKY, Esq.,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R.

Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: My colleague, Owen Lattimore—Editor of *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*—has just written his interpretation of the meaning of recent events in Japanese-Soviet relations. He has done this in an article entitled "Siberia Seals Japan's Fate."

It will probably be published in an early issue of *AMERASIA*, but I thought that you would like to see it immediately. If you have any personal comments to make on this analysis, I would be very glad to have them.

You may be interested to know that Owen Lattimore has now come to the Atlantic seaboard and, while continuing on the I. P. R. staff as editor of *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*, he will be on the faculty of Johns Hopkins University in charge of what is called the Walter Hines Page School of International Affairs.

When are you coming to New York next? Are you visiting Moscow in the near future?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1310

NOVEMBER 4, 1948.

WLH (cc. to KRCG)
CL from ECC: PEI
LKR)

(KRCG)

Holland will remember that I wrote to New York from Southeastern Asia last summer of the desire of the Burmese, Siamese and Filipinos that either the American IPR or the International Secretariat undertake the task of educating their abler graduate students and engineers in North America in the lore of the IPR. I suggested that one way of doing this might be for one or other of the IPRs to organize a Southeast Asia student conference.

Last week in the State Department in Washington I asked Miss Cora DuBois what she thought of the proposal of a student conference. She reacted highly favorably and said that she thought the time was ripe for it and that much could be accomplished. Her section of Research and Analysis covers all of Southeast Asia with the exception, I think, of Pakistan and India, but she feels that the inclusion of Pakistanis and Indians in such a conference would be of great value. Her tentative recommendation was that it be a southern Asia affair and that greater reality would be achieved if we didn't bother to include Chinese students.

On the basis of her reaction I tried the idea out on Bill Johnstone and found him wholly favorable.

Of course both of them recognize that the best results would accrue if it was entirely non-official and that the State Department did not appeal—though each of them would be glad to help with names and in any other way that the IPR desired. They both were under the impression that the majority of the students from southern Asia are in the East and thus that a conference on the eastern seaboard would be indicated—though Miss DuBois wished that funds could be secured so that it could be a national conference, bringing a few of the best from the Pacific Coast. But she added that a successful eastern seaboard gathering might pave the way for a similar conference later on the West Coast.

If you and your colleagues think that the matter should be further explored, I think we should talk it over with Miss Nuvart Parseghian, the head of the Asiatic and African Division of the Institute of International Education. She, according to Wilma Fairbank, is a most unusual person, as we all discovered when we got her views on the ECAFE study of technical training. Perhaps it would be advantageous to have the conference under the joint auspices of the IPR and the IIE. Until we have all discussed the matter further, I am not certain whether it would be best to have the American IPR or the International Secretariat take the lead.

I should assume that the more student participation in the affair, the better. To this end a consultative meeting of some of the best leaders among the students in the east might be desirable so that they could feel a stake in the show from the start.

As to possible topics, several ideas were mentioned, including the following:

THE ROLE OF SOUTHERN ASIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS
INTELLECTUAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN SOUTHERN ASIA
THE SECURITY AND DEFENSE NEEDS AND POSSIBILITIES OF SOUTHERN ASIA
WHAT HAS AMERICA TO LEARN FROM SOUTHERN ASIA AND VICE VERSA?

At the moment I cannot think of any special source to which we might appeal for the necessary financing. In the case of Government students, we would probably discover that they might draw on their expense accounts for travel and hotel bills, but probably some of the best students would have no funds on which to draw. Further, there would be expense of organization and for paying the expenses of the few adult leaders—IPR and non-IPR—whose presence would be important.

From one angle it could be said that the project falls within the scope of the Secretariat because one of the aims would be to develop IPR leadership in Asia. On the other hand, it could be affirmed that it is equally in the interests of the American IPR and the American people to have such leadership developed.

Perhaps you can all be thinking of the pros and cons and ways and means and then in a few days we could get together and try and reach a consensus.

EXHIBIT No. 1311

4 Nov. 48.

Memorandum to: E. C. Carter.
C. Lane.
W. L. Holland.

Subject: Conference of Students from Southeast Asia.

Isn't this a project in which we could get excellent cooperation from Alger Hiss and the Carnegie Endowment? As you know, the Endowment is reworking its whole student program, and particularly the organization and work of the International Relations Clubs in colleges throughout the States. Last April, these Clubs held their first national conference (at Endowment expense) in St. Louis. They planned, at that meeting, to hold annual, nation-wide meetings, with, I gather, the lively expectation that the Endowment would pay the costs. One of the theme songs of the student conference in St. Louis was that almost every college intl. rel. club was "using" the foreign students.

It seems to me that, rather than a conference exclusively of Southeast Asian students (with, of course, a few experts from US faculties, etc.) it might be more interesting and more valuable for the students (most of whom, I assume, are graduate students (?)), to have an opportunity to meet with leading Americans in fields outside of their actual college and university contacts—social work leaders; heads of hospitals; heads of city and small town libraries; school teachers; public health officers; country agricultural agents, and so on and so forth, including business; newspapers; radio; etc.

The danger of a conference exclusively, or very largely of Asian students would be (I should imagine) the danger of continuing "international house" relations—seeing too much of one's fellow Asians and fellow foreigners generally, and not enough of the plain, unvarnished U. S. picture.

These are very random thoughts; the only one with any value (I hope) being that the Endowment might be called in for financial and organizing help. I confess to being slightly appalled at the thought of organizing any more conferences, when the AIPR's own program is not yet started.

KROG.

EXHIBIT No. 1312

8 A. M. 8:58 A. M. TUES. DEC. 7 48 HARVARD CLUB OF N. Y., PRESIDENT
CONANT & ECC

Conant—knows Hiss lawyer—says nothing in it—JBC Do you know him—ECC Yes as inconceivable as the late Henry James. J. B. C. The press can break an innocent man without recourse in the present Am scene. ECC Brooks House—Harvard Mission to India intercoll. pride not brick & mortar—strange alliance between Harvard and YMCA play grounds coop. cred. Student Hostels not bricks & mortar Yale in China Hence ECC a Bias on India since 1902. Self Govt. 400 yrs. Vast change today British prestige. Lord Louis—Rajagopalachari Marion Dix—Strongest & most dem. Govt. in Asia Middle East Africa—(So. Africa exception) Within framework Truman Doct India immense asset to US. What increases confidence & coop. between UK & India is an asset to US. Now India no longer British Preserve. US & India getting together can aid UK Univ—Trade—Libraries (reminded JBC Harvard IPR Russia State War Navy) India Am. Conf. Dec. 1949 4½ weeks De Kiewist—Allen (JBC knows him) ECC asks Conant should see—JBC likes traveling but never does his home work—Appalled at idea that being an expert in 5 weeks. If JBC asked ECC to become an atom scientist in 5 weeks. ECC said if he was head of a great Univ. without a nuclear faculty 5 weeks might result in his establishing one. JBC would like to go would be difficult because Annual Report to Bd. Overseers Jan. 6. However, that

could be managed. But it might be better for his Provost Buck went. He has established a precedent of taking December off. So if ECC asked JBC to designate an alternate in case he could go JBC would suggest Buck—ECC mentioned Don Ingalls came in Gen'l Ed on India (half course undergrad) JBC thot Clark had impossible task Sanskrit to present day—Maybe Harvard should get some other Univ. to take on India—two Universities should do India not more. Why not get revolutionized AAU to form a Committee of the best six and make it a joint project—Tressider started revolution now Pres. Wriston of Brown is present president (one yr. rotation) He is always looking for new things—Let the Univ. part of this be Wriston baby. JBC said tried interest Carnegie in a master catalog of all Univ. courses in Int. affairs there should be far more coord. & coop. among ding univs. Harvard for eg. should loan or send Clark to whatever Univ. was doing a thorough job on India. Worried about financing when Carnegie 700,000 to Harvard Russia Institute ends. Rather appealed to by Eisenhower & Stassen. Delighted to hear of new India strength & attitude to British. Really something new & surprising like the election every one delighted at the fall of the Polsters?? Spoke proudly of Harvard—Yenching (ECC mentioned Fairbank JBC “please write me & I will give matter my best consideration”—Prestige of Harvard should not mean Harvard should do everything—Again delighted to hear of new forces in India & pleased to be asked.”

12.40 phoned Fairbank re above says Buck young first class liberal the key men at Harvard under JBC. He might not want to leave for 5 yrs. Warm support of Fairbanks program. Fairbanks thinks Wriston's committee well worth exploring.

Paul Herman Buck 1899, A B OSU MA Phd Harvard Sheldon Fellow
London, Paris, 25-26, Pulitzer Prize History, 9 Kirkland Place, 5 University Hall, Cambridge.

Henry M. Wriston, 1889, 180 Hope St., Providence.

James Bryant Conant, 1893, 1 Quincy St.

3.10 PM ECC phoned Whitney Shepardson reporting on JBC—Shepardson was interested—also though Wriston good action man sometime second thots better than first. ECC mentioned Buck—WHS thot new AAU idea worth exploring—WHS also said ECC should talk John Gardiner of Carnegie Corp. full of ideas—WHS says avoid Leslie Ames—owns Minneapolis & has largest library on India in U. S. Talks your head off & other peoples also has some good ideas but.

EXHIBIT No. 1314

MAY 8, 1941.

ALGER HISS, Esq.,

3415 Volta Place NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR HISS: Your private comments have so supported my own views that they have been most gratefully received! I think our final production will be better as a result of our accidental conversation.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, JUNE 20, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:30 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Arthur V. Watkins presiding.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in session.

You may present such matters as you have.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there are certain documents and affidavits which have come to the attention of the committee since the last hearing and I would like all of these to go into the public record today.

Senator WATKINS. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. The first one is the sworn statement of Karl August Wittfogel, dated May 29, 1952, to Senator McCarran, with attached documents.

Senator WATKINS. They may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit 1380, A, B, C, D, E," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1380

Tel. University 4-3200, Ext. 2657

CHINESE HISTORY PROJECT

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MAY 29, 1952.

Senator PAT MCCARRAN,

*Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Internal Security Subcommittee, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR: Mr. Lattimore devotes a section of the statement that he read before your Committee on February 26-28, 1952, to my testimony of August 7, 1951. I beg permission to correct, insofar as they concern me, the most serious of his distortions and misrepresentations.

(1) Mr. Lattimore claims that, in my testimony, I tried to create the impression that "in the early years of our acquaintance we were friendly with each other on the basis of mutual Communist sympathies." This is just not so. The basis of our relations was primarily scholarly interest. As I said in my testimony, I considered him a leading expert in the field of Inner Asiatic and Chinese relations (Hearings of the Committee on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Part I: p. 328); and he on his part was very receptive to my ideas on

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Chinese history and society. Although our relations became "less and less cordial" (p. 327), they were maintained in the academic field until 1947 (p. 331).

(2) This leads up to Lattimore's second misrepresentation. Allegedly I tried to create the impression that after I "finally stopped being a Communist in 1939" I broke off relations with him. I neither made such a claim, nor is it justified by my testimony, which documents in considerable detail the continuation of our relations until 1947.

(3) Lattimore calls "the flimsy statements by which Wittfogel attempted to show that I knew he was a Communist * * * complete nonsense." And to prove his point he invokes the very method which he so eagerly ascribes to his critics. First he disregards my many relevant remarks, and then he tries to create the impression that all I did to indicate that I was a Communist was to smile at him. As my testimony states, I had indicated my political past in different ways to Lattimore. For instance, "all our talks about Chi the son and Chi the father made sense only in connection with the background of the Chis' story when it was perfectly clear that we were dealing with a man who had this Communist background, and my relations were in the same set" (p. 301). How well Lattimore understood my position is shown by a letter that he wrote to Frederick V. Field immediately after a trip we had made together in the first week of September 1935. In this letter, dated September 27 and identified as Exhibit No. 492 in the Hearings of your Committee, Lattimore wrote: "I have just been traveling with Wittfogel who, as you probably know and I dimly suspect, is a bit of a heretic from either the Stalinist or Trotskyist point of view, when it comes to the bourgeois feudal controversy over the nature of Chinese society." Thus, Lattimore related my position not to any conservative, liberal, or social-democratic views, but to the views of the two most prominent protagonists in the Communist movement of that day, Stalin and Trotsky; and he felt that my interpretation of Chinese society differed, but only "a bit," from theirs. Lattimore's description shows him not only "dimly," but very clearly aware both of my ideological and political orientation.

(4). Throughout his attack on me, Lattimore tries to prove that, contrary to my alleged claims, he was no Communist. To quote him directly: "He [Wittfogel] has attempted to show that at that time [in 1935 and 1936] I knew he was a Communist and must therefore have been one myself." Lattimore's assertion that I called him a Communist again misrepresents the facts. In my testimony I carefully distinguished between party membership and a pro-Soviet attitude. Senator Smith asked me, "Do you know whether or not he [Lattimore] was a full-fledged member of the party?", and I answered: "No, I do not know." But in commenting on his political development, I did say that he showed "a consistent pro-Soviet pattern," which in the earlier days was accompanied by a somewhat "easy-going" ideological attitude (p. 309 ff.).

(5) As a scholar I am especially concerned with the analysis and interpretation of Asiatic society in general and of Chinese society in particular; and it was just in these matters that Lattimore's views for years lagged behind pertinent Soviet tenets. In his statement before the Committee and also in other recent writings, Lattimore has sought to obscure the political meaning of the very important political issue underlying this seemingly academic argument. In his statement, Lattimore wrote: "Wittfogel also made the ridiculous assertion that the fact that I used the terms 'feudal' and 'feudal survival' in describing Asiatic societies showed that I was a Communist. His claim that these terms are nothing but litmus papers for telling Communists from non-Communists is ridiculous." In his attempt to confuse the issue completely, Lattimore notes that Esther S. Goldfrank (Mrs. K. A. Wittfogel) speaks of the survival of "feudal elements" in Japan. But if Lattimore thought that the mention of feudalism in Japan would make my position absurd, why did he bother with my wife's passing remark? Why didn't he cite from my writings directly on this subject? Wasn't he familiar with these writings of mine, which distinguish sharply between the great managerially bureaucratic Oriental societies of the Asiatic mainland and feudal Japan? On the contrary. Lattimore knew these writings so well that he quoted from them at length and approvingly in his *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, published in 1940 (pp. 572, 39, 395 passim). And more, in this same publication, while speaking of Japan's "feudal" aristocracy (p. 147), Lattimore was at great pains to explain why, as the result of "the prime factors of evolution and growth, which have been authoritatively classified by Wittfogel" (p. 370), China's early and not quite European type of feudalism (pp. 369 ff.) was superseded by a "bureaucratically administered empire" (p. 375; cf. also pp. 368, 369, 373, 376 ff.).

In March 1944, a few months before he went on his widely discussed trip to the USSR with our then vice president, Henry A. Wallace, Lattimore in a review of certain recent Russian writings on China still noted that Stalin's concept of "feudal survivals" was among the "paramount Communist theses" that "a Communist writer has * * * to maintain" when dealing with China (*Pacific Affairs*, March 1944, p. 83). And in this same article, which otherwise highly praised the Soviet studies under review, he objected to the "emphasis on 'feudal' thought later than the Christian era" for China; and he noted that "the social data are somewhat obscured by loosely used terms like 'semi-feudal' and 'feudal survivals'" (p. 86).

I cannot enter into a full explanation here as to why the concept of "feudal survivals" is among the "paramount Communist theses" that "a Communist writer has * * * to maintain." Suffice it to say that it obscures the true nature of Oriental despotism with its managerial functions and its bureaucracy as a ruling and exploiting class. The masters of the USSR were quick to see the devastating implications of such a historic precedent for their own despotic class rule and the appropriateness of a "feudal" *ersatz* formula that one-sidedly stresses the property issue and conveniently bides the dangers of a totalitarian apparatus state. But they were also extremely careful not to propagandize so explosive an argument. Thus it was that in 1935, when I began to familiarize Lattimore with the concept of Asiatic society, I myself was not yet fully aware of all its political implications. And Lattimore, despite his pro-Soviet leanings, upheld until 1944 a theory, which seemed only "a bit" heretic and which was scientifically so productive.

(6) In the late 1940's Lattimore shifted to the "feudal" position, which was being upheld with increasing rigidity by the Communist world outside the borders of the USSR. In his statement before your Committee, he defended his later use of the form "semifeudal" as accurate; and this he has every right to do; but he failed to explain his changed position—and this poses a serious problem.

Lattimore's assertion that in my testimony I had described the terms "feudal" and "feudal survivals" as litmus papers for telling Communists from non-Communists is a complete distortion of what I said; and his quip: "I am sorry that I did not know the Communists had a patent on the term 'semifeudal'" confuses the issue further. In a democracy, any student is free to employ whatever interpretation or terminology he chooses; and a number of writers have used "feudal" designations naively and in good faith. In my testimony I warned expressly and strongly against "narrow word catching," and against accusing those who applied the term "feudal" naively to agrarian Asia of having Communist leanings (Hearings I: p. 338 ff.). But Lattimore, who knew in the fall of 1935 that the "feudal" issue was part of the Communist controversy over the character of Chinese society, who upheld in his main scientific work (1940) the bureaucratic and not the feudal interpretation of imperial China, and who recognized up to the time of his 1944 trip to the USSR that the "feudal" interpretation of traditional China was Communist-promoted and scientifically harmful, did not live in what I, in my testimony, called "the innocence of paradise" (p. 339). Lattimore must justify his new position with convincing scientific arguments. If he fails to do so, it will certainly be viewed, as he himself formerly viewed this position, as an acceptance of one of the "paramount Communist theses" in the field of Oriental studies.

(7) Lattimore has placed with your Committee several of my letters, which were written in 1940, 1941, and 1945, and which give evidence of our friendly personal relations and my high regard for his major scientific work, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*. By referring to his book as the "Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (economics and society) of the oases," I was playing on the title of my own book, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas* (China's Economics and Society). This is quite understandable, for Lattimore had used my key concepts in his analysis of the oases of Inner Asia, and he had also discussed the development of Chinese society in terms of factors which, to quote him again, "have been authoritatively classified by Wittfogel." Indeed, I had every reason to be satisfied with a book, which in its historical and institutional analysis so faithfully followed my ideas.

To be sure, the fact that Lattimore, in the late 30's and early 40's and under my influence, was upholding the "bureaucratic" interpretation of Asiatic society against the Soviet-promoted "feudal" view does not mean that he was opposed politically to a crucial Communist position. When a prominent English Communist told Mr. Carter in 1934 that my disagreement with the Soviet interpreta-

tion of Asiatic society was purely "academic" (Hearings I: p. 340), he expressed what many prominent Communists outside the Soviet Union thought, not only then but for years afterwards. Dr. Chi Ch'ao-ting in his *Key Economic Areas* occasionally applied the term "semifeudal" to China, but essentially he upheld the classical "Asiatic" view. The leading theoretician of the English Communist Party, R. P. Dutt, in his introduction to a pamphlet entitled, *Karl Marx: Articles on India*, and published by the Indian Communist Party in Bombay in 1943, consistently upheld Marx' version of the classical non-feudal interpretation of Asiatic society. Thus it may be said that Lattimore's later adjustment to the "feudal" and Soviet-promoted concept is politically significant, whereas his early adherence to the "Asiatic" interpretation, when viewed in the context of international Communist usage of the time, merely expressed preference for a less favored, but permissible ideological variant.

(8) The intricacies of Lattimore's ideological development explain in large degree, but not completely, my attitude toward him over the years. As a former Communist, I had decided to rebuild my life on an essentially scholarly basis; and while my evaluation of the ideas of Marx and Lenin underwent great and continuous change, I was happy in the middle 30's to establish relations with such persons as Lattimore, who not only shared my professional interest in Chinese society, but who also accepted the key tenets of my interpretation.

The letters of mine which Lattimore put in the record were undoubtedly chosen to demonstrate my esteem for his writings; and in this respect they are extreme rather than typical. However, they indicate the essentially scientific and personal quality of our conversations and correspondence. In our exchange of opinions, political argument played no great part. But there were times when it did. I attach herewith photostatic copies of four letters written me by Lattimore in 1942, 1944, 1946, and 1947, respectively, as well as photostatic copies of two letters that I wrote him in 1944 and 1947, respectively, all of which have a direct bearing on the statement he made before your Committee.

(a) Lattimore's letter of April 20, 1942, shows that our relations were by no means free of open political disagreement. (Some of our earlier arguments I have indicated in my testimony.) In this letter Lattimore answers my criticism of his stand on certain Communist problems. His argument is typical of the attitude he has maintained toward me throughout these years, the attitude of a man who knows little about Communism and who considers himself neither an anti-Communist nor a pro-Communist. Like his letter of September 27, 1935, this letter refutes his claim that he was unaware of my background: Lattimore distinguishes me from both Browder and Freda Uteley; but these two (a then top-ranking Communist and a former Communist) are his only points of reference.

(b) Lattimore has sought to characterize our relations in 1944 and 1945 on the basis of the letter I wrote him on March 4, 1945, while carefully omitting to mention the sharp political argument we had in the fall of 1944 concerning Joseph Barnes and the future of Korea (cf. Hearings: p. 327 ff.). Lattimore's letter of October 3, 1944, mentions my "violent personal attack" on his "old friend"; and it also supplies evidence that this initial clash was followed by such a "forceful presentation of political opinions" on my part that he was "completely dazed." In my letter of November 5, 1944, I criticized him for failing to answer questions raised in my previous letter (written, as he says, on September 24, but of which I have no copy at hand); and I felt there was no point in continuing the political argument since I encountered a "psychological situation, which it is probably wise to accept as definite, at least for the time being."

(c) However, since I still considered Lattimore the leading American authority in the Inner Asian field and since, in his book *Solution in Asia*, he, despite some compromise formulations, did not embrace the feudal interpretation of Chinese society, I endeavored to keep our political differences in the background. So on March 4, 1945, I wrote him the "nice" letter, which I referred to in my testimony (p. 328) and which Lattimore put into the record.

I am not proud of this letter. However, such a phrase as "an expert to end all experts" was, if Lattimore cared to remember our previous conversations hardly the flattering epithet he wants others to believe it was. But aside from this, anyone who reads this letter of mine carefully, will see that I praised Lattimore essentially, if fulsomely, for the problems he raised and not for the solutions he offered. And while I did not elaborate on our political differences, I expressly indicated, in the last sentence, that such differences did exist. Significantly, Lattimore's statement neither quotes nor paraphrases this critical last sentence.

(d) The three letters written in 1946 and 1947 clearly refute the description that Lattimore gave your Committee of our final break in the latter year. Says Lattimore in his statement: "During 1947 we had a disagreement over his invitation to me, at the end of 1946, to write an introduction to his *History of Chinese Society: Liao*. I asked him to be allowed to read the book before writing the introduction, and I am afraid that I indicated that I would not write an introduction without being given a chance to form my own opinion about the work I was supposed to sponsor in this way" (Galley 78).

Lattimore's story is as specific as it is false. In the first place, and as our correspondence shows, I invited him to write the introduction not "at the end of 1946" but in 1944. In the second place, it was Lattimore who, in his letter of December 18, 1946, reopened the subject by asking whether I still wanted his introduction; and in doing so, he did not mention the manuscript. Thus his statement that his entirely reasonable request for the manuscript "didn't seem to suit Wittfogel" is a fairy tale behind which he has hidden the real reason for our break.

In my letter of January 24, 1947, I said politely, but firmly, that we needed no introduction by him. Under these circumstances, I naturally made no reference to the manuscript; and Lattimore's letter of January 29, 1947, which once more reasserts his eagerness to write the introduction (" * * * I should feel very much honored by such an association with such an important piece of work"), correctly states the reason for my not sending him the manuscript: "To be quite frank with you, I thought that since you had never sent me a copy of the manuscript, or of proofs, * * * that you were hinting that you no longer needed an introduction by me."

In my letter of January 24, 1947, which cancelled our previous arrangement about the introduction, I expressed the wish that our scientific relations be maintained. But at the same time I clearly emphasized the differences in our political attitudes. In his recent statement Lattimore falsely lays our break to my unwillingness to let him see the *Liao* manuscript. But in his letter of January 29, 1947, he showed that he was thoroughly aware of our political differences, which were indeed the sole basis for my decision.

Lattimore's account of our break as given in his statement concludes as it began—with misrepresentation: "* * * after several letters I heard no more from him." The fact of the matter is that in my letter of March 19, 1947, I had refuted his mendacious political assertion with his own writings (pp. 330 ff.); and this letter Lattimore failed to answer—on paper. And when he remarked to me subsequently at a meeting in Princeton: "You were probably pleased that you caught me with the one about the Mikado" (p. 333), he terminated in a cheap and ugly way what had been originally, at least on my part, a genuine and productive friendship.

(9) At least on my part. In making this qualification, I do not mean to say that in the middle 30's Lattimore did not have a genuinely friendly attitude toward me. I have every reason to believe that he did. But the documents that have come to light recently show Lattimore, from the middle 30's on, intensifying his relations with Soviet representatives and pro-Communist Americans; and although Lattimore's interest in—and sympathy for—the USSR was clear enough, he was careful not to express in conversations with me the blunt pro-Soviet attitude that emerges from letters such as the one he wrote to E. C. Carter on July 10, 1938. Lattimore's way of handling political disagreements as evidenced by our correspondence permitted him to hide ideas even from so close a scientific friend as I was. Usually he listened attentively to all arguments; and when they were critical of the USSR, as indeed they were from the early days of our friendship on, he nodded thoughtfully, claimed lack of competence, and let it go at that.

(10) These facts may make more understandable not only my own relations to Lattimore, but also the relations to him of many others, who, since they were probably less experienced politically than I, were even more easily misled as to his real political acts and intentions. If I had known the full extent of Lattimore's relations with the representatives of the USSR and with their many foreign friends, I would surely have been more critical of him even before 1939; and our relations would certainly have deteriorated much faster after that date.

I make this statement in order to explain rather than to excuse my own development. And I make it about facts that were dynamic and changing rather than static and set. Today I am not the political person I was in the 30's, although it was during that decade that I gradually disassociated myself from the Com-

munist orbit. And as far as I can judge, the Lattimore of 1952 is not the Lattimore of the 30's either, although his behavior during that decade, as recent investigations have disclosed, show him already willing in the 30's to take the course that he has followed ruthlessly since. Realizing how Lattimore's special and unusual talents were increasingly furthering the aims of total power, we should examine more than this single man, who without doubt did great harm to the free world. We should study the entire political nexus that encourages the Lattimores, for the world that admires the Lattimores is disastrously related to the world that breeds them.

KARL A. WITTFOGEL.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th day of May 1952.

[SEAL]

MADeline F. SCULLY,
Notary Public, State of New York.

Commission expires March 30, 1953.

EXHIBIT 1380-A

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

RUXTON, Md., April 20, 1952.

DEAR KARL AUGUST: First, a piece of news which I know you will be glad to hear, if you have not heard of it already. T'ao Hsi-sheng escaped from Hong-kong and is now in Chungking. This news from Liu Yu-Wan, via Hu Shih.

Second, a belated word of thanks to you and Esther for the visit with you, which refreshed me more than I can say. I am only disappointed that Eleanor was again unable to meet Esther.

I have just sent back the General Introduction. As I said when I saw you, many of the marginalia are not to be taken too seriously. They are just things that occurred to me while reading your introductory remarks, without having the opportunity to see the main text.

In reading your remarks, in your letter, about "watchmaker" problems—the delicate, specialized approach in contrast with the crude or amateur approach, I think I can fairly say that I appreciate many of your criticisms, without being able to share them. Like anybody who tries to study and understand China, I have in recent years heard a lot about Communism. And when you learn about Communism and China, it naturally overlaps to include, at least to a certain extent, Communism & Russia.

Now the main point about Communism, so far as I am concerned, is that I am no Marxist. I have never read Das Kapital, much less studied it. I have never read Lenin. Therefore when I hear Communists presenting Communist arguments, based on specialized "watchmaker" interpretations of Marx & Lenin, I cannot judge them as if I were a watchmaker myself. I can only form my own judgments on political problems and methods according to my own non-specialized, non-Marxist qualifications.

But for the same reason, when I hear specialized anti-Communist arguments which are also based on a specialized knowledge of Marx and Lenin, I am equally compelled to continue following my own crude, general, non-specialized judgments.

Thus, if I were to have an argument with Earl Browder, and disagree with him, I should not necessarily consider myself an anti-Communist. But in the same way, if I were to disagree with Freda Utey, I should not necessarily consider myself a pro-Communist.

But, human nature being what it is, in the one case Browder would probably call me an anti-Communist, while in the other, Utey would probably call me a pro-Communist.

You are in a different classification. You should, therefore, respect those intellectual responsibilities which are yours, because of their qualifications. But I must equally respect my own classification.

These are very hurried thoughts while waiting to catch a train to Philadelphia.

As ever,

OWEN.

EXHIBIT No. 1380-B

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION,
Washington, October 3, 1944.

Dr. K. A. WITTFOGEL,
*Chinese History Project, Low Memorial Library,
Columbia University, New York, New York.*

DEAR KARL AUGUST: Forgive my having taken so long to answer your letter of September 24. I have been working mostly at home without a secretary, so my correspondence has fallen behind.

I am really eager to see your Liao manuscript as a whole, and the additional pages on Qara-Khitay will be especially interesting. I shall read it with envy as well as admiration. It seems an endless time since I have been able to do any new work or fresh thinking on these problems which once so engrossed me. I sometimes get very despondent because in these years I have accumulated a certain number of books; but most of these I have not even been able to read. The Liao manuscript was so promising in its early stages that I am sure the finished work is going to be really important.

About my confining myself to conventional phrases during your brief visit here, the fact is that I was completely dazed. I thought we were meeting as old friends for the first time in a long period and was at a loss as to what to say when you opened with a violent personal attack on another old friend for whom I have as much respect as I do for you. You followed that up by a very forceful presentation of political opinions on which I, myself, have either no opinion or only an unformed or half-formed opinion. In such cases I find it very difficult to be expected to endorse somebody else's strongly held opinions, even if I know that his opinion is based on experience and knowledge. I still cling to the privilege of what I believe is known legally as the "Scotch Verdict"—that is, the right to say that I don't know.

With the best regards and hoping to see you when I come up to New York.
Very sincerely,

Owen
OWEN LATTIMORE.

NOVEMBER 5, 44.

DEAR OWEN: Your last letter did not answer the questions raised in my letter. Please, permit me therefore not to answer your letter either. The pattern of our correspondence evidently reflects a psychological situation, which it is probably wise to accept as definite, at least for the time being.

Of course, I am glad to notice your continued interest in my work. Yes, the Liao manuscript is completed; half of it went to Philadelphia the other day. Although work on the Ch'ing, T'ang, Chin, and Ch'in and Han periods may still require much effort and time, Liao ought to be out in the spring or summer of 1945.

You remember my dream of having Professor Tawney and you write forewords. Tawney, who twice agreed to do so, came finally to the conclusion that he ought to spend a couple of weeks studying the manuscript before formulating a preface or foreword. He will not be able to devote himself so long to this job, so we shall have to do without him—for Liao.

I think that there is something in his attitude which is right, but I am equally sure that your case is different. You are much closer to our problems; you will get an over-all picture much faster. It would be fine if you could come to New York, as you once suggested, to look the matter over. I am aware how busy you are, but having just reread your *Inner Asian Frontiers* (which are required reading in my Columbia class), I feel most vividly how close Liao is to your life work. It would be fine if we could discuss the question soon, here, or wherever you wish.

Yours cordially,

EXHIBIT 1380-C

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

BALTIMORE 18, MARYLAND

WALTER HINES PAGE SCHOOL OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

DECEMBER 18, 1946.

Dr. KARL AUGUST WITTFOGEL,
*Chinese History Project, Columbia University,
New York, N. Y.*

DEAR KARL AUGUST: This is just an interim note to tell you both how much I am impressed with your Liao Introduction and how warmly I appreciate your very generous remarks about me personally. I look forward to a careful and detailed study of the Introduction, and still more to the eventual publication of the entire work.

In view of your own very careful and complete introduction, and in view of the fact that the work of printing and publication is now so far advanced, I assume that you do not wish me to write a special introduction. It would look very thin and unsubstantial in comparison with your terrific assemblage of documentation!

With warm regards for the Christmas season.

Sincerely,

Owen
OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL/m

EXHIBIT No. 1380-D

JANUARY 24, 1947.

Professor OWEN LATTIMORE,
*Walter Hines Page School of International Relations,
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore 18, Maryland.*

DEAR OWEN: Please forgive me for not answering your good letter of December 18th before this. George was here between the two holidays and I was busy with conferences. Immediately afterwards I went to Seattle with him to contribute whatever small experience I have to the crystallization and development of his research group. He is building a very fine Far Eastern Institute.

I am glad that you like the General Introduction to our *Liao volume*. The question of whether, in view of my "very careful and complete introduction," a special introduction by you is still needed took me by surprise. Indeed your feeling that another introduction would suffer by comparison certainly seems a Chinese way of being polite. However, it is true that I tried to incorporate as many of your relevant ideas as possible, and it is good to know that you are so well satisfied with the results. If it weren't for this, I should be even more reluctant to accept your implied suggestion not to insist upon another introduction to the General Introduction.

As you well know, you have had little time for scientific contacts with me since your trip to the U. S. S. R. with Henry Wallace. This I regret, for I feel that different political attitudes should not interfere with scholarly relations. In fact, I have a great many scientific friends whose political opinions differ strongly from mine. Surely it should be possible for us also to meet on these terms.

Good wishes to you and Eleanor for the New Year,

Sincerely Yours,

KARL A. WITTFOGEL.

EXHIBIT No. 1380-E

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

BALTIMORE 18, MARYLAND

WALTER HINES PAGE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

JANUARY 29, 1947.

Dr. KARL A. WITTFOGEL,

*Chinese History Project, Low Memorial Library,
Columbia University, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR KARL AUGUST: Many thanks for your letter of January 24.

I should not only be very glad to write an introduction for your Liao volume; I should feel very much honored by such an association with such an important piece of work. To be quite frank with you, I thought that since you had never sent me a copy of the manuscript, or of the proofs, from which I could draw the material for framing the ideas which would need to be expressed in an introduction, that you were hinting that you no longer needed an introduction by me. So I thought the graceful thing to do would be to offer, with as much Chinese politeness as possible, not to write an introduction.

As far as concerns any difference between us in political attitudes, the adjustment of the relations between us depends more on you than it does on me. Your political opinions are much stronger than mine, and much more vehemently expressed. I am not conscious of any awkwardness except on occasions when you devote a great deal of energy, and some very vivid language, to trying to convert me from opinions which I do not hold.

With all good wishes to you and Esther for 1947,

Sincerely as ever,

Owen

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. Next is the sworn statement of Eugene Staley dated May 27, 1952.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit 1381" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1381

STATE OF NEW YORK,

County of New York, ss:

EUGENE STALEY, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

My name is Alvah Eugene Staley, but my customary practice is to call myself simply "Eugene Staley."

I am an economist. I am referred to in "Who's Who in America", Vol. 27 (1952-1953), as follows:

"STALEY (Alvah), Eugene, economist; b. Friend, Neb., July 3, 1906; s. Alvah H. and Helen Teresa (Browne) S.; A. B., magna cum laude, Hastings Coll., Hastings, Neb., 1925; Ph. D., U. of Chicago, 1928; study and research (fellowship of Social Science Research Council) in Geneva, Paris, Berlin, Kiel, London and the Balkans, 1929-31; m. Phyllis Eugenia Parker, Dec. 19, 1936; children—Pamela Myrick, Thomas Eugene, Asst. prof. economics, U. of Chicago, 1931-37; asst. prof. (on leave from U. of Chicago), Grad. Inst. Internat. Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, 1934-35; asso. prof., later prof. internat. economic relations, Fletcher Sch. of Law and Diplomacy, 1937-44, on leave for govt. service, 1943-44; prof. internat. economic relations Sch. of Advanced Internat. Studies and Foreign Service Training Center, Washington, D. C., 1944-45; director Bay Region Div. of Am. Council, Inst. Pacific Relations, 1945; teaching Grad. Sch. of Business, Stanford U., 1945-46; executive dir. World Affairs Council of Northern Calif., 1947-49; research associate, Hoover Inst. and Library on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford U., also cons. Stanford Research Institute, 1948-50; economist Stanford Research Institute since 1950. Government work as economist with Administrator of Export Control, Bur. of Budget, Dept. of State, UNRRA; mem. UNRRA mission to China, 1944; mem. Secretariat U. N. charter conf., 1945; cons. econ. affair United Nations;

senior economist Cuban Mission of International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, 1950. Mem. Am. Economic Assn., American Political Science Association, Council on Foreign Relations, American Institute of Pacific Relations, Foreign Policy Assn. Author or coauthor books relating to field since 1930. Home: 455 Seale Av., Palo Alto, Calif. Office: Stanford Research Inst., Stanford, Calif."

At the hearing on September 25, 1951, conducted by the Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate To Investigate The Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Mr. Kenneth Colegrove mentioned my name in the following extract from the testimony (p. 920, Printed Record of the Hearings of the Subcommittee Investigating The Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 3) :

"THE CHAIRMAN. You have named certain people who were present at that meeting as belonging to that particular group that favored Communist China and the Kremlin. Have you named all of them that you can recall who belonged to that group?

"Mr. COLEGROVE. I see one other name I should have thought of, Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer, who is very decidedly of that group; sometimes Eugene Staley, Professor Staley."

I have never belonged to any such group and the imputation that at any time I was actuated by anything except a strong concern for the national interest of the American people, and in a manner to defeat the aims of the Kremlin and its Communist leadership, is completely false. I have never been a Communist, or a member of the Communist Party, or a fellow-traveler, and any implication or suggestion that I have been is completely untrue and does me irreparable damage.

Mr. Colegrove testified that in an advisory conference of Far Eastern specialists held by the State Department on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, "one group was very obviously pro-American in its thinking, put America first, that is, foreign policy must serve the national interest of the American people," while another group "tended to be sympathetic to Communistic China and very, very considerate of the Kremlin." In answer to a question by Senator Ferguson whether this latter group "were favoring, in your opinion, the Communist line rather than the good interests of the United States of America?" Mr. Colegrove replied, "That was my impression." The testimony continued:

"Senator FERGUSON. From what was said?

"Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

"Senator EASTLAND. Did they advocate economic aid to Communist China?

"Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, very, very strongly.

"Senator FERGUSON. And recognition of Communist China?

"Mr. COLEGROVE. Immediate recognition of Communist China, and were very much opposed to a Pacific pact."

Mr. Colegrove named a number of participants who, in his opinion, comprised this group and, in answer to the Chairman's question, "Have you named all of them that you can recall who belonged to that group?" he added:

"Mr. COLEGROVE. * * * sometimes Eugene Staley, Professor Staley." (Printed record of the Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 3, pp. 919, 920, 921.)

I desire to make two points, the first with reference to my part in the conference itself, the second on my general attitude toward Communism.

First, my remarks in the conference were based on a very strong concern for the national interest of the American people and were distinctly directed toward finding ways to defeat the aims of the Kremlin and its Communist leadership in China and all over the world. This is plainly shown by the stenographic transcript published subsequent to Mr. Colegrove's testimony. Mr. Colegrove himself apparently recognized this fact when he had an opportunity to read the transcript, for he testified again on October 12, 1951, and this time omitted to mention my name, though he claimed that his original testimony with respect to various other people was supported by the transcript.

Permit me to cite the following pages of the transcript, which report my main statements in the conference. References are to the subcommittee's printed Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 5, Appendix.

(P. 1562.) I asked a question of Mr. George Kennan, prefacing it with a statement that Marxist doctrine had predicted proletarian revolutions in the most advanced capitalist countries and that this had been "a great failure as a forecast," but that now apparently the Russians had shifted the emphasis in their

strategic thinking and planning to the so-called backward countries like China and the rest of Asia.

(P. 1576.) I proposed that we analyze "what are the interests of the United States in relation to China?" After stating a number of possible formulations, I said, "expressing my own view" our "dominant concern" should be the interest which I had described as "whether or not China's regime is tied to the apron strings of Russia," and I added that "what we are mainly interested in is (that) the power of the Soviet Union should not be augmented by having subservient regimes in China and all through Asia. * * *

(P. 1595.) I referred to Mr. Stassen's proposal for a greatly stepped-up positive program of American economic aid to strengthen non-Communist Asia against Communism as "a broad and constructive concept." (The rest of the first sentence or two is mixed up in the reporting, but this much is clear, and this was my meaning.) Then I asked him whether "maybe we haven't more to gain from the standpoint of American interests" by using United Nations agencies whenever we can for this sort of effort, thus lessening the charges of "imperialism" against us and "setting up as against a Marxist internationalism the United Nations type of more voluntary internationalism and doing everything we can to boost that * * *

(Pp. 1620-21.) I suggested measures to improve the preparation of the personnel we send to Asia on Point Four operations, urging that in this way we could "derive very great political values for the United States." Specifically, I recommended that Point Four personnel should be briefed on political matters, "the kind of attitudes they will find towards the United States as they get to talking with people, the kind of attitudes they will find toward Russia, what the Russian propaganda has been in the area * * * At least so they will be informed so that in a case one day if it is thrown up to them that the United States has consistently tried to dominate the country and a lot of misinformation is involved in it at least they know some of the elementary answers to it."

(P. 1641.) I opposed economic aid to Communist China, recommending instead a policy of "judicious disinterestedness." I concluded: "In other words, help the countries more that are more friendly to us."

(Pp. 1666-7.) On the question of recognition of the Communist regime in China, my statement was: "In general, the view that Mr. Herod first expressed, and expressed very ably, seems right to me, so I am not going to discuss that any more." Mr. William R. Herod, President of the International General Electric Company, had not favored immediate recognition, but had advised recognizing it and when the Communists attained the positions of having complete control of the machinery of state, "unless in the meantime there has been some other factor" (p. 1659). I went on to consider public opinion in relation to possible recognition and quoted in that connection four points made by Mr. Roger Lapham on his return to San Francisco from his ECA mission in China. I quoted these points from a resolution that had just been formally adopted by the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce. The fourth of these points advised "acceptance of the fact that we may soon have to recognize, in such areas as they control, the Communist government as the de facto government, and be prepared to recognize it whether we like it or not," just as we had found it expedient to recognize the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and other countries whose regimes we do not particularly admire.

My own view at the time on the recognition problem was based principally on two thoughts: (1) that nonrecognition is not a very effective weapon, and at the same time has the effect of cutting us off from possibly useful sources of information and means of action on behalf of American citizens, and (2) that recognition might have some value in holding open the possibility of an eventual defection of the Chinese Communist regime from the Kremlin, as had happened with Tito in Yugoslavia. The merits of these tactical views are, of course, debatable; but to suggest, as Mr. Colegrove seemed to do, that persons willing to contemplate recognition of Communist China under the conditions of the autumn of 1949 (before the Communist aggression in Korea) were therefore "sympathetic" to Communist China and the Kremlin and not "pro-American" is quite unwarranted. Imputations of this kind definitely weaken our side, because they tend to prevent full consideration of any tactics except those dictated by the most simple emotional responses.

Second, as to my general attitude, I believe deeply and honestly in the principles of freedom on which the American government and the American economic and social system are founded, and I am decidedly opposed to the philosophy, aims, and practices of Communism and Communist regimes. The Com-

munist world movement is in my view the greatest menace in the world today, both to America and to the broad interests of humanity. It seems superfluous to add, though I am glad to do so for the record, that I have never been a member of the Communist Party and have never sought to advance the Communist cause of propaganda through "front" activities or in other ways. Far from looking to the Communist "line" for guidance in my conclusions as a social scientist or in my efforts to assist in public education on world affairs, I have consistently opposed key Communist doctrines and have on numerous crucial issues advocated policies such as no one "considerate of the Kremlin" could possibly advocate. This is true not only lately but over the years. Specifically:

a. My book *War and the Private Investor: A Study in the Interrelations of Diplomacy and International Private Investment*, published in 1935, reaches conclusions directly contrary to the Marxist-Leninist dogma on issues very important to Communists.

b. In 1940-41, before Germany had attacked the Soviet Union, the Communist line was that the war in Europe was an "imperialist war," and American Communists and fellow-travelers were urging America to stay neutral. I was publicly urging that American interests would be gravely jeopardized by a Hitler victory and that we should intervene to any extent necessary to prevent it. (See my article, "The Myth of the Continents," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1941.)

c. I have strongly supported, by public speeches or writings, the Truman Doctrine for containment of Communist aggression, the Marshall Plan, the United States proposals for international control of atomic energy, the North Atlantic Treaty and the military organization based on it, the United Nations resistance to Communist aggression in Korea, and the present rearmament program of the United States and its allies. All of these things are anathema to Communists and those who follow the Communist line.

EUGENE STALEY.

Sworn to before me this 27th day of May, 1952.

[SEAL]

THOMAS P. DUNN,

Notary Public, State of New York.

Commission Expires March 30, 1954.

Mr. MORRIS. I would now like to introduce a sworn statement by Edward C. Carter, dated June 10, 1952, entitled "A personal view of the IPR 1925-1952 by E. C. Carter."

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1382" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1382

A PERSONAL VIEW OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, 1925-1952

(By Edward C. Carter)

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FOREWORD

Here recorded are some personal impressions of the important events in the story of the Institute of Pacific Relations over the past twenty-seven years.

The IPR record is one of which thousands of citizens in this and other coun-

tries are proud. It is indeed the record of an unusual organization. It is a society which, by committing itself to painstaking and objective scholarship, has enlisted the enthusiasm of a great company of men and women from business, banking, academic, and professional life in an unfolding process of research, discussion, and publication.

It is an organization that has attracted mature minds from many countries that were united in a common belief. They held that the process and power of adding painstakingly to the world store of knowledge about the Pacific area would gradually remove the misunderstanding and ignorance that has curtailed off from the Western world that half of mankind which dwells in Asia.

Although the record which follows contains many pages, it is actually a severely condensed account. I believe it to be an accurate one, however. If it were extended many times, it would be found to be rich in detail and grounded in fact. Nevertheless it would differ sharply from the muddled story unfolded in the proceedings of Senator McCarran's Subcommittee. So replete have the hearings been with half truths and innuendo that those familiar with the actual work of the Institute are convinced that the Subcommittee's lawyer has attempted to prove the IPR subversive, rather than objectively to provide Senator McCarran and his associates with the true facts concerning the organization and its real record and achievements.

This may or may not have been deliberate. There is no doubt, however, that the attorney has concentrated on the Institute's correspondence files rather than its publications—on letters and informal inter-staff memoranda which were a necessary and legitimate part of its efforts to present all sides of a given study, rather than the study itself. In short, he has put the spotlight on the machinery of the organization, while virtually ignoring the finished product.

Here I shall endeavor to tell the story of the Institute—the story of the final product as well as the machinery. This is the record of events as I saw them as an IPR officer for many years. But it does not tell the whole story. It should be read in connection with the Institute's periodical reports, its published output and the letters and statements presented to the Subcommittee by William L. Holland, John K. Fairbank, Gerard Swope, Owen Lattimore, Jerome D. Greene, William W. Lockwood, and the many letters from Americans of eminent scholarship and integrity who have a first-hand knowledge of Asia and a long-time acquaintance with the IPR and its publications.

215 EAST 72ND STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y., *April 23, 1952.*

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

What It Is

The Institute of Pacific Relations is a non-partisan, non-governmental organization with member councils at present in ten countries which have an interest in Asia. Its purpose is to carry on research and educational activities designed to create an informed public opinion in all countries on the problems of development of the Far East and the Pacific area.

How The Organization Started

The Institute grew out of a dawning awareness after World War I of the need of an intelligent understanding of Far Eastern affairs. There were few non-governmental agencies dedicated to this subject. Two—the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London and the Council of Foreign Relations in New York—had grown out of private discussions by members of the British and American delegations at the Paris Peace Conference. A third—the Foreign Policy Association—had begun to hold meetings in New York.

It was already apparent, however, that these groups were going to concentrate primarily on European issues. The League of Nations and the other official international bodies (all of which had their headquarters in Europe) likewise were focussing major attention on European problems. Even when situations in other parts of the world were considered, there was an almost inevitable tendency to look at them through European eyes.

Naturally this was viewed with concern in Far Eastern countries. It was not long before a group of prominent business men, educators and YMCA leaders in Hawaii began to protest that the Pacific area was being overlooked. Keenly aware of the vast new forces upsurging in Asia, these men expressed a need for an organization which would concentrate on the needs and developments of the far-flung region washed by the Pacific Ocean.

By 1924 this group in Hawaii had associated with itself Chinese, Japanese, Canadians, mainland Americans and others. Out of their efforts, the IPR was

born. It was organized formally at an international conference held in Honolulu, in 1925. The Hawaiian group had been inspired by YMCA leaders and the conference had been originally organized by YMCA people from Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, China, Korea, the Philippines and the United States. But before it convened, there had been a demand for a more representative membership, and the YMCA leaders had farseingly relinquished their sponsorship and agreed to cooperate in the development of the Institute on a broad and wholly secular basis.

What Countries Were Invited To Join The Institute?

The founders of the IPR in Honolulu and their later associates in the countries around the Pacific not only insisted from the first on the Institute's being nongovernmental; they also insisted that it should be completely non-partisan, providing a platform for the expression of the widest possible variety of viewpoints. For example, the Honolulu leaders urged that trade unionists be included among the conference members so that labor's opinions might be heard during the deliberations. At the same time, efforts were made to get the attendance of bankers, journalists and scholars in China, Japan, the Philippines, Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.

By 1927, leaders from these seven countries had joined with Americans in deciding to enlist scholars, business men and others from additional countries with interests in the Pacific, in the work of the Institute. At first, a few of the Americans had hesitated about inviting Europeans to join the Institute, on the ground that membership should be limited to groups in those countries whose shores were washed by the Pacific Ocean. Those who took a broader view maintained that the problems of the Pacific could not be studied scientifically unless help were received from all countries which exercised sovereignty in the Pacific area. The latter concept prevailed and it was agreed to establish contacts with people and institutions in the United Kingdom, Holland, France and the U. S. S. R. Although Portugal exercised sovereignty in Macao and Timor, no effort was made to enlist any of its citizens in the Institute's effort.

The Institute's leaders, recognizing that Soviet Russia's shores were also washed by the Pacific and that its influence in Asia and the Pacific area might have great potentiality, considered it desirable to seek collaboration of Oriental research scholars in Russia. Thus it was that the first General Secretary, Mr. J. Merle Davis (formerly a YMCA secretary in Japan), in connection with visits to England, France, and Holland was sent to Moscow in the winter of 1927-1928, in the hope of securing scholarly cooperation in Russia, and the formation of a Soviet IPR. This visit was followed by sending the Institute's Conference Secretary, Charles F. Loomis, to Moscow in the summer of 1928, and a little later, Dr. J. B. Condliffe, the International Research Secretary (at that time a New Zealand citizen).

The leaders of the IPR, not only those in Hawaii, but eminent Americans on the mainland, like Ray Lyman Wilbur, Jerome D. Greene, Roland W. Boyden, Chester H. Rowell, Joseph P. Chamberlain, Carl L. Alsberg, and Norman F. Coleman, maintained that it was of the utmost importance to have the fullest possible Soviet collaboration. This was generally the position held by the representatives of all of the other countries participating in the IPR. It was because of this that, following the visits to Russia by Mr. Davis, Mr. Loomis, and Dr. Condliffe, I made my visits to Russia and stimulated others in the IPR to do so. My first visit to Moscow was to accompany Mr. Jerome D. Greene (then a partner of Lee, Higginson & Co.) who was then chairman of the American IPR. We were seeking Soviet scholarly cooperation in the IPR while en route to the Kyoto Conference in 1929. Among those who accompanied us were Mr. Boyden, formerly United States Observer with the Reparations Commission, and Joseph P. Chamberlain of Columbia University.

In 1948, IPR Councils were formed in India and Pakistan.

A month before Pearl Harbor, the Japanese IPR ceased contact with the Institute and ordered the immediate return of the Japanese member of the International Secretariat. After the war, the Japanese IPR was reorganized and in 1949 permitted to renew its membership.

Although contacts were established in 1927-1928 with Soviet Oriental scholars, an active Soviet IPR was not formed until the winter of 1934-1935. This Council contributed to the support of the Pacific Council in the years 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938 and 1939. Its leadership suffered greatly during World War II and the Secretariat's last contact with the Soviet IPR was in 1945.

The Role of the IPR's International Conferences

Between 1925 and 1950, the IPR sponsored ten international conferences, usually of a fortnight's duration, as follows: Honolulu, 1927; Kyoto, Japan, 1929; Hanchow and Shanghai, 1931; Banff, Canada, 1933; Yosemite National Park, 1936; Virginia Beach, Va., 1939; Mt. Tremblant, Canada, 1942; Hot Springs, Va., 1945; Stratford-at-Avon, England, 1947; Lucknow, India, 1950.

Here outstanding Far Eastern authorities and men and women of different professions from many countries gathered to discuss the problems of the Pacific area, freely and informally. To insure a frank give-and-take and the widest possible expression of views, newspaper reporters acting as reporters were excluded from the discussions. No delegate need hesitate to speak lest his remarks conflict with some official policy of his native land. Not the least among the values of IPR conferences was the fact that they were nonofficial private meetings where experts could exchange opinions without any fear of press misinterpretation.

Months of preparation preceded each conference. Research monographs were prepared on each question on the agenda. The conference discussions were carefully recorded and a final report published.

The position of the national groups at the conferences was unusual, as it was also in the membership of the national councils in each country. The public had become accustomed to conferences of bankers, Chambers of Commerce conferences, newspaper gatherings, trade-union conventions and a great number of assemblies of college and university professors. The IPR, in its membership and in the groups attending its conferences, attempted to cross these lines. Its goal was unique. It aimed to draw in to distinctive academic discussions and research the practical experience of members of all the foregoing groups. The conference personnel consisted of academic leaders, businessmen, bankers, editors, trade-unionists, women's organizations. Here was something new, stimulating and highly productive. Concrete evidence of this important innovation will be found in the following lists of those who served as chairmen of the national council groups at the international conferences and in a sample list of the personnel of a single binational conference at Delhi in India.

Conference Chairmen of National Member Groups

It should be emphasized that the lists that immediately follow are simply the *chairmen* of the national groups. The total attendance at these conferences from all the national councils ranged from 150 to 250 members.

HONOLULU, HAWAII—1927

- Hon. F. W. Eggleston, Australia. Formerly Attorney General and Minister of Railways, State of Victoria, and subsequently Australian Ambassador in China and the United States. (Australian group)
 General Sir Arthur Currie, G. C. M. G., K. C. B., principal and vice chancellor, McGill University, Montreal. Formerly general officer commanding the Canadian Corps in France during the First World War. (Canadian group)
 David Z. T. Yui, general secretary of the National Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association of China, Shanghai. (Chinese group)
 Sir Frederick Whyte, K. C., S. I., formerly president of the National Indian Legislative Assembly. (British group)
 Frank C. Atherton, vice president and manager, Castle & Cooke Ltd., chairman Central Advisory Committee, Honolulu. (Hawaii group)
 Hon. Masataro Sawayanagi, member of the House of Peers; president of the Imperial Educational Association, Tokyo. (Japanese group)
 Uck Kym Yu, dean and professor of Law, Chosen Christian College, Seoul. (Korean group)
 Walter Nash, secretary of the New Zealand Labor Party, Wellington. (New Zealand group)
 Francisco Benitez, dean of the College of Education, University of the Philippines, Manila. (Philippine group)
 Ray Lyman Wilbur, President of Stanford University, California. (U. S. group)

KYOTO, JAPAN—1929

- Hon. F. W. Eggleston, Australia. (See above.) (Australian group)
 Rt. Hon. Viscount Hailsham, formerly Lord Chancellor. (British group)
 Hon. Newton W. Rowell, K. C., President of the Privy Council of the Government of Canada and subsequently Chief Justice of Canada. (Canadian group)

- Dr. David Z. T. Yui. (See above.) (Chinese group)
 Inazo Nitobe, Member of House of Peers, formerly Under Secretary General of League of Nations. (Japanese group)
 W. B. Matheson, Government Representative at International Agricultural Conference at Rome. (New Zealand group)
 Conrado Benitez, Dean, School of Business Administration, University of the Philippines. (Philippine group)
 Jerome D. Greene, Lee, Higginson & Co., New York. Subsequently, Secretary of the Harvard University Corporation. (U. S. group)

HANGCHOW AND SHANGHAI, CHINA—1931

- Tristan Buesst, Writer, Melbourne. (Australian group)
 J. Mackintosh Bell, Mining Engineer, Almonte, Ontario. (Canadian group)
 Chang Poling, President, Nankai University, Tientsin. (Chinese group)
 W. G. S. Adams, Professor of Politics, Oxford. (British group)
 Jerome D. Greene, Lee, Higginson & Co., New York. (U. S. group)
 Inazo Nitobe, Member, House of Peers, Tokyo. (Japanese group)
 J. E. Strachan, Headmaster, Rangiora High School. (New Zealand group)
 Rafael Palma, President, University of the Philippines, Manila. (Philippines group)

BANFF, CANADA—1933

- Ernest Scott, Professor of History, University of Melbourne. (Australian group)
 Edgar J. Tarr, K. C., Attorney, Winnipeg. Later, President of Monarch Life Assurance Company, and Director of the Bank of Canada. (Canadian group)
 Hu Shih, Professor of Philosophy, National Peking University. Later, President of Peking University, and Chinese Ambassador in Washington. (Chinese group)
 Rt. Hon. Sir Herbert Samuel, G. C. B., G. B. E., M. P., later Lord Samuel. (British group)
 Inazo Nitobe, Member, House of Peers, Tokyo. (Japanese group)
 J. H. Boeke, Professor of Eastern Economics, University of Leyden. The Netherlands and Netherlands Indies group)
 Hon. Walter Nash, M. P. Later, Finance Minister of the Government of New Zealand. (New Zealand group)
 Judge Manuel Camus, Member, Philippine Senate. (Philippine group)
 Hon. Newton D. Baker, former Secretary of War. (U. S. group)

YOSEMITE NATIONAL PARK, U. S.—1936

- Hon. W. F. Eggleston. (See above.) Australian group
 Hon. Newton W. Rowell, K. C., Member, Imperial War Cabinet, 1918. (See above.) Canadian group
 Hu Shih. (See above.) Chinese group
 Albert Sarraut. Former Governor-General of Indo-China; Former Prime Minister of France. (French group)
 Tadao Yamakawa, Member of House of Peers. (Japanese group)
 G. A. Dunlop, Managing Director, Netherlands Indische Handelsbank. (Netherlands-Netherlands-Indies group)
 Horace Belshaw, Professor of Economics, Auckland University College. (New Zealand group)
 Conrado Benitez. (See above.) Philippine group
 The Rt. Hon. A. V. Alexander, M. P. Formerly and subsequently First Lord of the Admiralty. (British group)
 Carl L. Alsberg. Director, Food Research Institute, Stanford University. (U. S. group)
 V. E. Motylev. Director, Institute of the Great Soviet World Atlas; Professor, Institute of National Economy, Moscow. (U. S. S. R. group)

VIRGINIA BEACH, U. S.—1939

- Jack Shepard. Formerly, Hon. Secretary, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1936-38. (Australian group)
 J. W. Daffoe, Editor in Chief, Winnipeg Free Press; Chancellor of University of Manitoba. (Canadian group)

- W. W. Yen. Formerly Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador to the United States, 1931; Ambassador to the U. S. S. R., 1933-36. (Chinese group)
- J. B. Condliffe. Formerly Professor of Commerce, London School of Economics, and a member of the Economic staff of the League of Nations. (New Zealand group)
- Camilo Osias. Former Resident Commissioner of the Philippines in Washington; Chairman of the Philippine Educational Commission Abroad. (Philippine group)
- George H. Blakeslee. Formerly special assistant to the American Legation, Peiping, and Counselor to American Member of Lytton Commission; Professor of History and International Relations at Clark University and at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. (U. S. group)

MONT TREMBLANT, CANADA—1942

- R. J. F. Boyer. Member of the Australian Broadcasting Commission since January, 1940. President, Graziers' Federal Council of Australia. (Australian group)
- Edgar J. Tarr. (See above.) Canadian group
- Sao-Ke Alfred Sze. Acting Chairman, China Defense Supplies, Inc., Washington. Former Ambassador to London and Washington. Head of the Chinese Delegation to the Washington Conference, 1921-22. Chief Delegate to the Assembly of the League of Nations, 1931. (Chinese group)
- Paul Rivet. Formerly Professor at the Paris Museum and Head of the Musée de l'Homme, Paris, 1928-40. (Fighting France group)
- Sir A. Ramaswami Mudaliar, K. C. S. I. Indian Delegate, Nine Power Conference, Brussels, 1937. Member, Imperial Economic Committee, London, 1936-39. Commerce Member, Government of India, 1932-42. Member, British War Cabinet and Pacific War Council, London, 1942. (Indian group)
- Younghill Kang. Economic Analyst, Board of Economic Warfare. (Korean group)
- Raden Loekman Djajadiningrat. Director of the Department of Education and Public Worship. (Netherlands-Netherlands Indies group)
- Walter Nash. New Zealand Minister to the United States and New Zealand Member of the Pacific War Council, Washington. New Zealand Minister of Finance since December, 1935. Deput Prime Minister since 1940. (New Zealand group)
- Joaquin M. Elizalde. Resident Commissioner of the Philippines to the U. S. Member, Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs, 1937. Philippine Delegate to the International Sugar Conference, London, 1938-42. (Philippine group)
- M. R. Seni Pramoj. Free Thai Minister of the United States. (Thailand).
- The Lord Hailey, G. C. S. I., G. C. M. G. C. I. E. Member of the Indian Council Service, 1895-1935. Governor of the Punjab, 1924-28, and of the United Provinces, 1928-30 and 1931-34. Director of the African Research Survey. (British group)
- Philip C. Jessup. Chairman, Pacific Council, IPR; Professor of International Law, Columbia University. Assistant Solicitor, U. S. Department of State, 1924-25. Legal Adviser to American Ambassador to Cuba, 1930. Later, U. S. Ambassador-at-Large. (U. S. group)

HOT SPRINGS, VA., U. S. A.—1945

- Boyer, R. J. F. (See above.) Australian group
- Wallace, Malcolm. Principal Emeritus of University College, University of Toronto. (Canadian group)
- Chiang, Mon-Lin. Formerly Minister of Education, Chancellor, National Peking University. Now, Member, Executive Council, National Southwest Associated University; President, Chinese Red Cross. (Chinese group)
- Naggiar, Paul Emile. Ambassadeur de France. Formerly Ambassador in Moscow and previously Ambassador in Nanking and Hankow. (French group)
- Pandit, Mrs. V. L. Ex-Minister for Public Health, Local Self-Government, United Provinces. Later, Indian Ambassador to the U. S. (Indian group)
- DeYoung, Henry C. Member, Korean Delegation to Disarmament Conference, 1921. Member, Korean Commission, Washington, D. C. (Korean group)

- Visman, Frans H. Member of the Board for the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curacao in New York since 1943. Netherlands Indies Civil Service, 1910-32; Governor of Menado (Celebes), Netherlands Indies, 1932-35; Commissioner for Reforms in the internal administration of the Netherlands Indies, Batavia, 1935; Member of the Council for the Netherlands Indies, Batavia, 1936-41. (Netherlands-Netherlands Indies group)
- Belshaw, Horace. (See above.) New Zealand group.
- Zafra, Urbano A. Economic Adviser to the President of the Philippines; Member, War Cabinet; Member, Filipino Rehabilitation Commission; Chairman, Technical Committee of the President of the Philippines; Alternate Member, Council of UNRRA; United Nations Food and Agriculture Interim Commission. (Philippine group)
- Pramoj, M. R. Seni. (See above.) Thailand group
- McFadyean, Sir Andrew. His Majesty's Treasury, 1910-19. Director of the British North Borneo (Chartered) Company. Secretary of the British Delegation, Reparation Commission, 1920-22. General Secretary to the Reparation Commission, 1922-24 and to the Dawes Committee 1923-24. Commissioner of Controlled Revenue, Berlin, 1924-30. (British group)
- Jessup, Philip C. (See above.) U. S. group

STRATFORD-ON-AVON, ENGLAND—1947

- Ross, Ian Clunies. Executive Officer, Australian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. (Australian group)
- McInnis, Edgar. Associate Professor of History, University of Toronto. (Canadian group)
- Chiang, Monlin. (See above.) Chinese group
- Gourou, Pierre. Professor of Geography, College de France, Paris. (French group)
- Belshaw, Cyril. Formerly Administrative Officer, British Solomon Islands. (New Zealand group)
- McFadyean, Sir Andrew. (See above.) British group
- Gilchrist, Huntington. Executive, American Cynamid Co., New York; consultant on Trusteeship to United Nations; League of Nations Secretariat, 1919-28. (U. S. group)

LUCKNOW, INDIA—1950

- Edgar McInnis. (See above.) Canadian group
- Hriday Nath Kunzru. President, Indian Council of World Affairs; President, Servants of India Society; Member of Parliament. (Indian group)
- Komakichi Matsuoka. Member, Nippon House of Representatives; President, Japanese Federation of Trade Unions. (Japanese group)
- A. B. A. Haleem. Vice Chancellor, Sind University, Karachi; Chairman of Council of Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. (Pakistani group)
- Quirino G. Gregorio. Executive Secretary, Philippine IPR. (Philippine group)
- Sir George Sansom. Professor of Japanese Studies and Director, East Asian Institute, Columbia University; Chairman, International Research Committee, IPR. (British group)
- Harold H. Fisher. Chairman, Hoover Institute and Library; Professor of History, Stanford University, California; Representative of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York. (U. S. group)
- Hadji Agoes Salim. Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta; former Minister of Foreign Affairs. (Indonesian group)

Observers at Conferences

In addition to members from the national councils, a number of people from other organizations were invited as observers. Frequently these included people from the International Labor Organization, the League of Nations, the Carnegie Corporation, the Rockefeller Foundation. Later, observers attended from the United Nations Secretariat and the following United Nations agencies: United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, United Nations Children's Emergency Fund.

Binational Conferences

Binational conferences attended by businessmen, journalists and scholars, from British Columbia, Washington and Oregon, have been held almost every year, alternating between Canada and the U. S. A significant binational conference

(India-America) was held in Delhi in December 1949. Among the 37 members of the Indian group were:

Kunzru, H. N. President of the Savants of India Society, and member of the Constituent Assembly since 1947

Aiyer, Sir C. P. Ramaswami. Former Dewan (Prime Minister) Travancore State

Durga Das. Joint Editor, *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi

Gadgil, D. R. Economist; Director, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Poona

Kabir, Huamyun. Educationist; Joint Educational Adviser to the Government of India. Educated at Calcutta and Oxford. Secretary, Oxford Union Society and Indian representative on the International Students Union

Lokanathan, P. S. Economist, Member, Executive Committee, Indian Council of World Affairs. Professor of Economics, University of Madras and Editor, Eastern Economist. At present, Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Bangkok

Pattani, A. P. Formerly Dewan (Prime Minister) of Bhavnagar State

Prasad, P. S. N. Economist. Director, Balance of Payments Division, Reserve Bank of India, Bombay

Ranga, N. G. Principal, Indian Peasants Institute, Nidubrolu

Rao, V. K. R. V. Economist. Director, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University

Setalvad, M. C. Lawyer. Former Advocate-General to the Government of India. Leader, Indian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, 1949

Shri Ram, Sir. Industrialist

Srinivasan, C. R. Journalist. President, All-India Newspaper Editors' Conference, 1949-1950

Tara Chand. Educationist

Trivedi, H. M. Deputy Manager, Scindia Steam Navigation Company Limited, Bombay

Vakil, C. N. Director, University School of Economics and Sociology, Bombay and University Professor of Economics, Bombay University

Yodh Raj. Banker

The members of the American group were:

Atherton, J. B. Vice President, Mutual Telephone Company, Honolulu

Ames, C. L. Ames Library of South Asia, St. Paul, Minnesota

Baker, I. F. Director, Vice President and Treasurer, Westinghouse Electric International Company, New York

Carter, E. C. Provost, New School for Social Research, New York. Member, Executive Committee, American Institute of Pacific Relations

Compton, A. H. Chancellor, Washington University, St. Louis

Darden, C. W. Jr. President, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va.

Elliston, H. Editor, the *Washington Post*

Fisher, H. H. Chairman, Hoover Institute and Library

Fosque, J. D. Caltex (India) Limited

Hancher, V. M. President State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa

James, F. C. Principal and Vice Chancellor, McGill University, Montreal, Canada

Johnson, C. S. President, Fisk University, Nashville, Tennessee

Kizer, B. H. Lawyer. Graves, Kiser & Graves, Spokane and Seattle, Washington

Lamb, Beatrice P. Editor, *The United Nations News*

Lattimore, O. Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, The Johns Hopkins University

Lewis, Vinita V. Child Welfare Officer, International Refuge Organization, U. S. Zone, Germany, since 1948

Lindeman, E. C. Professor of Social Philosophy, New York School of Social Work, Columbia University, New York

Malcott, D. W. Chancellor, University of Kansas, Lawrence

Mandelbaum, D. G. Professor of Anthropology, University of California

Murphy, J. M. Assistant Vice President and Chief, Far Eastern Section, Foreign Division, Bankers Trust Company, New York

Opler, M. E. Professor of Anthropology, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York

Parton, Margaret. Correspondent for India and Pakistan, *New York Herald Tribune*

Potter, P. B. Dean, Graduate Division, School of Social Sciences and Public Affairs, The American University, Washington, D. C.

Rivers, W. F. Manager, New Delhi branch of the Standard Vacuum Oil Company
 Shaw, G. E. Manager, Overseas Industrial Relations Department, Standard Oil Company
 Straus, D. B. Vice President, Management-Employee Relations, Inc.
 Talbot, P. Senior Associate, Institute of Current World Affairs
 Trone, S. Adviser to the Government of India on Industrial Planning
 Turner, R. E. Professor of History, Yale University
 Valentine, A. President, University of Rochester

The reports of these conferences were submitted many months ago to the Senate Subcommittee for its study. In the Senators' questions and remarks, there was little evidence that they had noted the significance of these conferences, however, either from the point of view of the high quality of the discussion, the monograph submitted, or the importance of the personnel and the long-term results.

Instead of noting these, the Subcommittee and its counsel have put their fingers on minor matters of trivial import. Instead of appraising the high significance of the participation of scholars, businessmen and journalists from many countries interested in the Pacific, attention has been called to the presence at two or three of these conferences of men and women who served in minor secretarial positions.

Senator McCarran's insinuation in his opening statement at the first hearing that, though there were many "eminent people of great respectability and of preeminence in capitalistic achievement," the real work of the IPR was done by Communists, operating shrewdly behind the scenes, is completely false. The men and women of respectability and those who had attained preeminence in capitalistic achievement did not travel thousands of miles to attend these conferences as a "joy ride" or to be "taken for a ride"; instead they took the work of the conferences most seriously. They did not absent themselves from the discussions.

Summaries or reports of the discussions of each conference were published and distributed widely. The volumes contain the gist of the discussions, they list all of the data papers submitted, they provide a brief "who's who" of all who attended from national groups, and the observers. They list those who attended in clerical and administrative positions. The volumes are on the shelves of many of the principal libraries of the world. They speak for themselves. I cannot remember a single case when a member of a conference called in question the accuracy of these books of standard reference.

If the Senators could even now take the time merely to scan the names of those who attended the conferences, they might revise their estimate of the paramount importance of these gatherings. Members spent a full twelve to fourteen days living, usually, in a small compact area or under the same roof, eating together in the same dining room, conferring together on the conference agenda between the sessions, and observing the work of the recorders, rapporteurs, and the conference staff.

Toward the end of nearly every conference, one or two full sessions were given to appraising the work of the conference, its staff, and its permanent secretariat. The chairmen urged the members for criticisms, rather than bouquets; there was great frankness. There was, too, the fact that groups from the various countries were always asked to contribute financially to the Institute's support. Thus, they had a very direct stake in the IPR, because they had to make up their minds whether it was worth their continued support. If any of the national groups had seen signs of Communistic control, the Senators may be assured that capitalistic financial support of the Institute would have been withdrawn.

Among the hundreds of delegates who participated in IPR international conferences, and aside from the four Soviet citizens (two at Kyoto, 1929, and two at Yosemite, 1936) whom we assumed, of course, were Communists, the McCarran Committee has cited and given major attention to the name of a member of the Japanese delegation at Yosemite in 1936, Hotsumi Ozaki. It is quite clear that the group of eminent Japanese attending that conference would not have included him in their group if they had suspected that he was a Communist.*

No member of the Senate Subcommittee, or its staff, has ever accused any of the following of being Communists: Ray Lyman Wilbur, Jerome D. Greene, Newton D. Baker, J. W. Dafoe, Edgar J. Tarr, Philip C. Jessup, Percy E. Corbett,

*There is certainly no evidence that he was one at that time.

and Huntington Gilchrist. Yet all of these men, as chairmen of the Institute's international governing body—the Pacific Council—were very active rather than figurehead chairmen. They attended, participated in, and guided the international conferences. Between conferences, they gave an enormous amount of time to the work of the Institute. As is well known, they were all anti-Communist.

The members of the international conferences were not only men and women of stature in their own countries, many of them were of international eminence. I cannot remember a single instance where an IPR member in any of the national groups declined to attend an international conference, because he suspected that the Institute was infiltrated by Communists.

One of the fundamental principles of the IPR was its nonofficial and non-governmental character. It not only did not seek governmental officials for membership in its international conferences, it definitely and strongly discouraged such proposals. There were notable exceptions during the second World War when, in every country, business men, bankers, journalists and university personnel were drafted into government service in large numbers. This wartime situation robbed the national councils of a high proportion of nongovernmental personnel interested in Pacific problems. The officers of the Pacific Council, therefore, made an exception in the case of the conference membership at Mt. Tremblant, in 1942, and at Hot Springs, in 1945. In most delegations there was a minority of wartime government officials, but even here every effort was made to insure that the number of permanent officials of foreign offices and state departments was kept at a minimum. The officials who did attend came principally as observers, not as active participants in the round-table discussions.

In a few instances exceptions were made at other times. At one or two of the earliest conferences the American delegation, which would have stoutly opposed the membership in its group of a state, war or navy official, did include an agriculture economist from the Department of Agriculture. He was an expert on Asia's agricultural and rural problems.

The atmosphere at all the conferences was that of a group of private citizens. The importance of this was emphasized repeatedly by Pacific Council Chairman, Ray Lyman Wilbur, who said that at an official international conference free discussion could not be carried beyond the point where the official's instructions from his home government began and ended. He asserted that the great advantage of the IPR conferences was that *thinking* was sought in areas that were difficult for government representatives to discuss. Every effort was made to provide a setting in which the members of the conferences could examine the most controversial questions—questions which, in the days before the United Nations was organized, government officials rarely discussed on a broad basis with representatives from other governments.

The IPR conferences progressively worked out what might be described as a cooperative technique for dealing with conflict. The "hottest" and most highly controversial questions were, by design, placed on the agenda. There was a consistent invitation for the utmost frankness, because a premium was put on the most candid expression of the most diverse points of view. An atmosphere of cooperation and a respect for the views of others developed. After a fortnight of intense discussions, members were not expected to depart to their countries and homes with precisely the same point of view with which they arrived. The discussions were aimed at widening the members' points of view in the light of fresh data and the deeper knowledge of the psychology and interests of those with whom they disagreed.

It was because of the importance of the foregoing that the IPR developed its public relations policy as it concerned members of the press. Round-table discussions were closed to reporters. Many eminent newspaper men attended the conferences, but their role was not that of reporters, but that of informed citizens who could make a contribution to the discussions. The presence of reporters would have prevented most of the members from giving any appearance of having learned anything in the discussions. If, for example, an American, a Japanese, a Chinese, or an Englishman, said on a Monday: "This is my point of view" or "This is the point of view of my country," his position might be cabled to the country from which he came. Then, if by Friday his point of view had widened and changed, he would still have to adhere to what he had said on Monday, even though by Friday he realized that he had spoken earlier without full knowledge. The conferences were not "secret" in the sense that its members were conspirators. It was rather a private gathering where the members sought to widen their outlook and to grow.

Because the Institute recognized the enormous importance of the press, at most conferences a member of the Institute from one of the national delegations was appointed as press officer. He would report to the newspaper men each day on the general trend of the discussion, the subject matter of the round-tables, the different points of view expressed, but withheld the individual names of those who made this or that statement. This did not, of course, of course, completely satisfy all the reporters but, in the main, their cooperation was invaluable in bringing the Institute's discussion to a wider public. Among those who served as conference press officers were Chester H. Rowell of the San Francisco Chronicle, Victor Sifton of the Winnipeg Free Press, and W. W. Waymack of the Des Moines Register and Tribune.*

The results of the international conferences are difficult to describe. They may be listed as follows:

1. From 150 to 250 people, during the fortnight's discussions, met many people from other countries, whom they would not have met otherwise. They must have learned much at the discussions because, for the most part, these were intensely interesting and exciting. A high proportion of the members read the substantial data papers either before, during, or soon after the conference and they kept them for reference in future years.
2. Most of the members took to their own constituencies on their return not only the publications of the Institute, but oral reports of its proceedings. Some of them spoke to small and large audiences in their countries on the results.
3. Copies of the data papers and the proceedings were distributed widely to the press of many countries.
4. Full documentation of each conference was filed in the national libraries of each member country and also with the foreign offices. Many libraries have standing orders, not only for all the publications of the Institute, but for the proceedings of each conference.
5. In spite of the limitations imposed on newspaper reporters, the press of several countries was aided in making the problems of the Pacific vivid to their great audiences.
6. Although the aim of the conferences was to add to the body of knowledge on the part of the members, the members of the delegations in their individual capacities were so influential that, on their return, in many instances, they discussed the conference topics with members of their own governments.

Research, a Primary Function of the IPR From The Beginning

In addition to its conferences, research is a major function of the IPR in all the countries where the organization has member councils. This has been true from the beginning. At the first conference at Honolulu in 1925, the various roundtables discovered that while there was a great measure of good will, and a deep eagerness to solve the problems of the Pacific, the conferees, coming as they did from many professions and many countries, were without a broad and deep factual basis for their discussions. It was then and there that the IPR's most momentous step was taken, namely, its commitment to long-term fundamental research. Idealistic speeches, pleasant social intercourse, lofty generalities were to be set aside in favor of fact finding.

At the start, to be sure, there was a minority who were irked by this commitment to research, who wanted to "get things done", to pass resolutions, to memorialize governments, to use the Institute as a crusading organization. But the majority ruled otherwise. The Institute was never to become an action organization. It would continue its efforts to conferences, research, publications, and education, on a factual, non-partisan basis.

This research program has done much to raise the level of public information on Far Eastern questions. It has given people in all parts of the world a factual base on which to judge developments in Asia. It has provided material for journalists and commentators. It has been of practical value to economists, importers, exporters, scholars, and others with interest in the Pacific area.

The Institute of Pacific Relations has recently made a quantitative compilation of the materials published by the Institute and its national councils during the past quarter century, as follows:

*Also Christopher Chancellor of Reuters.

Books	249 titles	72, 411 pages
Conference documents.....	696 "	26, 171 "
Monographs.....	61 "	5, 183 "
Pamphlets.....	136 "	6, 919 "
Educational materials.....	46 "	3, 782 "
Totals	1, 190 "	114, 466 "

The Institute's chief executive, Mr. W. L. Holland, has, I believe, presented a list of the titles of these publications. As of today neither the members of the Subcommittee nor its counsel have given any substantial evidence that they have appraised the value of this considerable and carefully prepared material.

In the early days, the founders of the IPR were particularly mindful in planning the research program of the necessity of a deeper understanding of the emerging nationalisms in Asia and the uncertain implications of the Bolshevik Revolution. Although a measure of attention was given to Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, Korea, and the Far Eastern interests of Canada, Great Britain, Holland and France, the IPR leaders, especially those in the U. S., regarded Japan, China and Russia as presenting the most baffling problems. During the early period there was but little concern with the Asian areas under the sovereignty of Britain, Holland and France. These were to emerge as "hot spots" later. In the 1920's, many considered Japan as a danger only in the event of the U. S. failing to adjust some of her discriminative policies which irked the Japanese—the Oriental-exclusion policy, and the discrimination—legal and social—against resident Orientals, particularly in the Pacific Coast states. Toward the study of these, the American IPR undertook several major studies such as *The Legal Status of Aliens in Pacific Countries*, *Oriental Exclusion*, *The Status of Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast*.

Meanwhile, studies to which the National Councils and the International Secretariat devoted themselves were, among others: *Land Utilization in Japan*, *Land Utilization in China*, *Trade and Tariff Barriers*, *Problems of Japanese Shipping*, *Mandated Territories*, *The Position of Japan and China in Manchuria*, *Foreign Merchant Ships in Chinese Rivers*, *Commodity Control*, *Land and Labor in China*, *The State of Asia*, *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution 1925-1928*, *Economic Survey of The Pacific Area*, *The Government and Politics of China*, *Manchuria Since 1931*, *Old China Hands and the Foreign Office*, *China: The Land and the People*, *Symposium on Chinese Culture*, *The Occupation of Japan: Second Phase*, *Korea Today*, *The Western World and Japan*, *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction*, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, *Malay Fishermen*, *The Economic Development of French Indochina*, *The Structure of Netherlands Indian Economy*, *Thailand: The New Siam*, *Land Utilization in Australia*, *Guam and Its People*, *The South Seas in The Modern World*, *Americans of Japanese Ancestry*, *China Enters the Machine Age*, *China's Post-War Markets*, *The Chinese Family and Society*, *Earthbound China*, *The Economic Development of French Indo China*, *Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang*, *The Governing of Men*, *Industrial Development of The Netherlands Indies*, *Japan's Prospect*, *Japan's War Economy*, *Life and Labour in Shanghai*, *Modern Korea*, *Pioneer Settlement in The Asiatic Tropics*.

The Inquiry Series

Shortly after the Japanese occupation of North China, in 1937, the officers of the Pacific Council decided to undertake an inquiry into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East. This was called the IPR INQUIRY. During 1938 the *Inquiry* was carried on under the general direction of Dr. J. W. Dafoe, Chairman of the Pacific Council, and in 1939, under his successor, Dr. Philip C. Jessup. Dr. Dafoe, up to the time of his death, was Editor of the *Winnipeg Free Press*. Dr. Jessup was Professor of International Law at Columbia University. The officers of the Council had the benefit of the counsel of the following advisors:

Professor H. F. Angust of the University of British Columbia

Dr. J. B. Condliffe of the London School of Economics

Mr. Etienne Dennerly of the Ecole des Sciences Politiques in Paris

In addition to the foregoing, the Secretariat secured the expert help of several dozen authorities in the U. S. and abroad, to whom, according to their specialized fields, copies of early drafts of *Inquiry* manuscripts were sent for comment and criticism.

The Inquiry was financed by a grant of \$90,000 from the Rockefeller Foundation. The purpose of the project was to provide members of the Institute and the public with an account of the economic and political conditions which had produced the

situation existing in July 1937, with respect to China, Japan and other foreign powers concerned, and a constructive analysis of the major issues which must be considered in any future adjustment of international relations in the Pacific area.

The project comprised twenty-seven published volumes. It turned out to be one of the most important Far Eastern research enterprises undertaken by a private agency. Manuscripts were sent to experts in various fields and in various countries for criticism. Their comments were then sent to the authors, with the request that they be seriously considered in the final draft.

The Japanese Council of the IPR feared that the *Inquiry* would prove to be an anti-Japanese project. On two occasions, it sent emissaries to the United States to discuss the project with officers of the Pacific Council. Several changes were made in the plans for the study in an effort to meet the Japanese objections without interfering with the integrity of the research. But despite these concessions, the Japanese IPR refused to participate. The foreword of each volume in the series carried the following:

"The statements of fact or of opinion appearing herein do not represent the views of the Institute of Pacific Relations or of the Pacific Council or of any of the National Councils. Such statements are made on the sole responsibility of the author. The Japanese Council has not found it possible to participate in the *Inquiry*, and assumes, therefore, no responsibility either for its results or for its organization."

* * * * *

"Attention may also be drawn to a series of studies on topics bearing on the Far Eastern situation which is being prepared by the Japanese Council. That series is being undertaken entirely independently of this *Inquiry*, and for its organization and publication the Japanese Council alone is responsible."

Scholars from Australia, Canada, England, France, New Zealand and the United States contributed volumes to the *Inquiry* series. Several Chinese advised the Institute in the development of the project. A notable example was Dr. H. D. Fong. As indicated elsewhere, Dr. Chi was invited to write one of the volumes but his duties in the American-British-Chinese Government Currency Stabilization Board prevented this. He did contribute a partial study which was printed in a small edition of merely 100 copies in mimeographed form for limited circulation. Presumably for lack of time, it did not measure up to the standards of the regular printed volumes in the *Inquiry* series. China's most modern and most able banker, and Minister of Finance, the Honorable T. V. Soong, wrote an important and laudatory preface for the book by Frank M. Tamagna on Banking and Finance in China. His closing paragraph reads as follows:

"Until now there has been no single book to which a Western reader could turn for an account of this development. Dr. Tamagna's comprehensive and up-to-date survey is therefore especially timely. It is the result of careful work, extending over several years. This volume may stand for a number of years, therefore, as the standard work in its field."

Soviet scholars did not cooperate in the project because they said that the Soviet Union wished them to concentrate all their efforts on defeating Hitler. (It was generally believed that both Churchill and Roosevelt believed that Russia should direct all its efforts to crushing the Nazis before taking on any other enemy.) In this situation the Soviet leaders did not wish to give the Japanese imperialists any occasion, however slight, for thinking that Russia was planning war with Japan.

The Institute Publishes Magazines in Several Countries

The Pacific Council (the Institute's international governing body) and several of the National Councils have, at various times, published nine different magazines. The Pacific Council's quarterly magazine, *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*, holds a unique position amongst the most thoughtful persons, academic and government leaders in many countries. Its International Secretariat publishes monthly in mimeograph form the *FAR EAST DIGEST*. This consists of summaries on current periodical material on the Far East, India, Pakistan, Australia, and New Zealand.

The American IPR's research fortnightly, the *FAR EASTERN SURVEY* which, like *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*, concentrates on Asia and the Pacific and circulates principally in the United States.

Periodicals have been also put out by several of the other National Councils. These have included the *AUSTRAL-ASIATIC BULLETIN*; the *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL* published by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs; *TAIHEIYO MONDAI*

SHIRYO, published prior to the war by the Japanese Institute of Pacific Relations; MEDEDEELINGEN (Bulletin of the Royal Colonial Institute in cooperation with the Pacific Institute) published before the war by the Netherlands-Netherlands Indies IPR (no longer in circulation); POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, published by the French Council; PAKISTAN HORIZON published by the Pakistan Council of International Affairs; the INDIA QUARTERLY published by the Indian Council of World Affairs; and INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. Some of these magazines covered more than the Pacific.

At first, PACIFIC AFFAIRS was edited and published in Honolulu as a monthly. Later, when it was edited on the mainland, it became a quarterly. It enlisted the cooperation of as wide a circle of writers from different countries as could be secured.

The IPR, as is well known, has sought consistently the expression of diverse points of view on controversial questions, both in its books and its magazines. If at this time, in retrospect, an attempt should be made to classify the place in the political spectrum of the Institute's scores of writers, I think it would be an almost impossible task for the following reasons:

(1) It would involve subjective judgments. In any group of competent scholars unanimity of appraisal is difficult to achieve.

(2) What in one decade is regarded as right, center, or left, is often quite different from that of a later decade.

PACIFIC AFFAIRS' first editor was Miss Elizabeth Green in Honolulu. Her successors were Owen Lattimore, 1934 to June 1941; Edward C. Carter, 1942; W. L. Holland, 1943; Edward C. Carter, 1944-1945; P. E. Lilienthal, 1946-1952.

The first of the fortnightly research bulletins of the American IPR was published on March 3, 1932. It was first called the IPR MEMORANDA, and was issued in mimeographed form. It was for the most part staff written. It gradually became so highly regarded because of its coverage and objectivity that after, I believe, a couple of years, it was published in printed form, and called the FAR EASTERN SURVEY. It has had a succession of able editors, including Russell Shiman, 1935-1941; Catherine Porter, 1941-1944; Laurence Salisbury, 1944-1948; Miriam Farley, 1948-1952.

The Soviet IPR leaders criticized a few articles in the quarterly PACIFIC AFFAIRS, but so far as I can remember in twenty years, with about 500 issues of the FAR EASTERN SURVEY and about twice as many major articles, only a single article stirred up a measure of public controversy. This article appeared in July 1943, and was entitled *China's Role in a Coalition War* by T. A. Bisson. It caused more criticism on the part of a self-appointed American critic than it did among the Chinese in China. The author spoke in high terms of the accomplishments of the Generalissimo and the Chinese people in the war, passed on to some of the prevailing Chinese criticisms of the Nationalist regime, and then moved on to a description of Chinese Communist contributions to the war against Japan. The article probably would have avoided controversy if the author had not used one or two debatable phrases. He described the Kuomintang regime as "feudal" and the Chinese Communists as "democratic." This was perhaps a tactical error rather than a factual one. It is true that subsequently the Generalissimo himself and many non-Communist writers described China as feudal or semifeudal. It is also true that at that period China's communism was developing a peasant base that was more democratic than the Kuomintang. However, "feudal" and "democratic" were fighting words among pro-Kuomintang Americans and some of the Chinese in the United States.

The flurry that followed the publication of that article was accentuated because just previously two other articles had appeared in New York which were very critical of China, one by Hanson Baldwin in the New York Times, and the other by Pearl Buck in LIFE magazine. When the editor of FAR EASTERN SURVEY learned that the article was challenged by Chinese Nationalists in New York, she asked Dr. C. L. Hsia to write a rebuttal which was printed in full in a subsequent issue of the magazine.

It so happened that, at the invitation of the Generalissimo, Mr. W. L. Holland and I arrived in Chungking just about the time that incomplete quotations from these three articles were cabled to China. The Chungking newspaper printed in English published an editorial under the title of "The Three Busy Bees." These were identified as Baldwin, Buck, and Bisson. On the basis of these inadequate and misleading cables from America, the editor felt himself justified in writing as he did.

The matter ended in an amicable fashion. One morning, Dr. Chiang Monlin, Chancellor of the National University and Chairman of the China IPR, came to

see us at our hotel and told us that at a dinner the previous evening, attended by several of the top people in the Government, criticism of the IPR had been made. However, General Wu Teh-chen, the Secretary General of the Kuomintang, had remarked that the Chinese in the long view should be grateful to the IPR instead of being critical. He asked them to remember the twenty years in which the IPR had served China, that it had called attention to China's needs when hardly any other research group in the U. S. had done so. It had made China favorably known throughout the world. The IPR, he declared, had been one of the staunchest and most influential friends that China had ever possessed, and even this one critical article was the work of a long-time friend of China.

A Variety of Educational Projects Developed

In addition to its program of research and conferences at the expert level, the IPR saw the need for educational activities designed to inform the public at large on developments in various countries of Asia.

As time went on, some of the National Councils of the IPR—particularly the Royal Institute of International Affairs (United Kingdom) and the AIPR—published popular pamphlets, bibliographies and other materials designed for the nonspecialist in Far Eastern affairs. In addition, the AIPR undertook a number of special projects which were designed to improve teaching, library and museum services in the Far Eastern field, and increase the number of specialists and trained personnel.

(1) It was noted, for example, that the Far East was generally neglected in universities so a study was made by the IPR and published in a volume entitled *CHINA AND JAPAN IN OUR UNIVERSITY CURRICULA* with the results that scores of colleges added Far Eastern courses to their curricula.

(2) It soon became apparent that almost all of the fellowships for post-graduate study abroad were being awarded to American students for research in *Europe*. An examination of this situation resulted in a volume which called attention to the need of more opportunities for graduate study in the Far East.

(3) It was observed that the language requirement for American college entrance was such as to discourage the children of American businessmen, educators and missionaries in China and Japan, from capitalizing on their early knowledge of these difficult languages. A study of this resulted in the alteration of the language requirements in over 500 American colleges and universities.* This was achieved just in time to provide for the United States Government, both civil and military, a larger company of American linguists in the Second World War than would otherwise have been available.

(4) A book was published on *Careers for Americans in China and Japan*.

(5) Considerable attention was paid to the problem of providing secondary and elementary school teachers with factual information on the geography, history and way of life of Far Eastern peoples. As one educator wrote, "the fact is that the average American school child learns more about the tiny country of Holland than about the whole continent of Asia, which includes more than one-third of the land surface and is inhabited by nearly one-half of the population of the earth."

So the AIPR initiated a series of discussions with high-school authorities, city Boards of Education, and State Superintendents of Schools, on the preparation of study outlines, bibliographies, and finally of a series of textbooks for high-school use.

In 1945, the AIPR in cooperation with the American Council of Education appointed a committee of educators to appraise the treatment of Asia in 108 widely used junior and senior high school textbooks for history, geography, civics and modern problems.

The results of this study were published by AIPR and the American Council on Education in a pamphlet entitled *Treatment of Asia in American Textbooks*. This report showed the lamentable neglect of all the countries of the Far East in books used in American schools. It was widely read by educators and textbook publishers, and several of the latter sent their authors to the IPR to get advice as to how to include adequate material on Asia in new editions.

The Role of Edward C. Carter in the IPR

My principal initial contact with the organization was attendance at an all-day meeting held at the Yale Club in New York, in 1925, where some forty Americans

*This, in turn, had enabled many American students with an early knowledge of Chinese or Japanese to continue their language study in American institutions.

met to consider the pros and cons of holding the conference at Honolulu at which the IPR was born.

Although I was consulted both before and after the Yale Club meeting, I did not attend the 1925 conference, but I did attend those held in 1927 (Honolulu), 1929 (Kyoto), 1931 (Shanghai), 1933 (Banff), 1936 (Yosemite), 1939 (Virginia Beach), 1942 (Mont Tremblant), 1945 (Hot Springs), and 1947 (Stratford on Avon). I became honorary Secretary of the American IPR in, I think, 1926, and a year or two later, became the salaried Secretary of the American IPR, which I served until 1933 when I became Secretary General of the Pacific Council, serving through 1946, when I reverted to the American IPR as Executive Vice Chairman, continuing in that position until the end of 1948.

When I became Secretary General of the Pacific Council in 1933, among my special responsibilities was the strengthening of the National Councils; helping them to secure their income; bringing about general liaison between the National Councils, the Pacific Council and the International Secretariat; encouraging liaison between the IPR and scholars, publicists and businessmen in countries having a stake in the Pacific, who were not members of the Institute; stepping up the preparation of each National Council for and participation in the international conferences; and, above all, extending their research and publication programs.

Training Personnel

Along with the organization of international conferences and cooperation with my colleagues in the research and publication program, I was expected, in most of the countries, to be a sort of talent-scout to find young people of promise who might join the staffs of the National Councils or the Pacific Council, for periods of training and service. Most of those who were recruited, whether for the National Councils or the International Secretariat, were paid modest salaries. But over the years quite a number of highly competent young men and women were trained, thus adding to the intellectual output of the Institute in a way that was not recorded in the annual financial statements. The number of volunteers from various countries who participated with little or no salary in the administration of the International Conferences was considerable and established a tradition of high-level voluntary participation which had permanent value. The spirit of spontaneous service was a great asset.

As Secretary General I was charged with the responsibility not only of helping to strengthen all of the National Councils, but also of increasing their number. A continuous effort was made to strengthen the existing Councils and to form new ones. This activity was undertaken through the following methods: (a) correspondence; (b) inviting leaders from organized and unorganized countries to attend the periodic international conferences; (c) getting scholars, in their regular travels, to talk with leaders in other countries with reference to possible organization; (d) personal visits to other countries by my staff colleagues and myself.

In view of statements made before the McCarran Committee and in the press, casting suspicion on my relations with a few Russians, I cannot emphasize too strongly the far greater volume of correspondence, personal interviews, and conferences that I also had with important Chinese leaders in Kuomintang China; with people in many professions in Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Great Britain, France, Holland, and with similar people in India, Pakistan, Burma, and Siam. The correspondence and personal contacts with people interested in the Pacific in the U. S. S. R. were only a small fraction of those which I had with people in the countries just named.

In fact, the proper fulfillment of my obligation to the IPR as a whole called for many more contacts with Russians than I am able to make either in the U. S. S. R. or in other countries. Apart from diplomats and a few newspapermen, there were scarcely any Russians abroad whom one could see except during the War, When Lend-Lease brought scores to the United States. But few of these knew Asia.

Formality or red tape or something else, meant that I could see fewer Russians in a day in Moscow than interested people in any other capital. Russians, whether officials or scholars, were or purported to be busier than those in other countries. Further, only in prewar Japan was it necessary to spend as much time in "sightseeing" and in being "entertained" as in the U. S. S. R. The social hospitality in both countries was lavish and warm. In a fortnight in Moscow I would be taken gratis to more plays and performances at the Opera than I could afford in New York in a whole season. In Tokyo that "No" plays were a "must" and deeply impressive. Russia and Japan were still in the

propaganda stage. In all other countries it was assumed that I knew and enjoyed their cultures. I need not be "educated."

My efforts to stimulate the formation of IPR Councils in the Pacific Ocean countries of Latin American—Mexico and Chile—were a complete failure. I did not visit Chile, but a Chinese and a Canadian diplomat, serving in Chile and knowing the value of the Institute to their own countries, sought in vain to persuade thoughtful Chileans to organize. I made two visits to Mexico without result. Private citizens there as in Chile maintained that the authorities would not favor the formation of a private society for the study of international problems independent of government control. Further, they affirmed that their people were not interested in the lands across the Pacific. They concentrated their foreign concern on Europe and the Americas.

My visits to the principal National Councils were frequent (eleven or twelve times to each). They were always personally rewarding. The warmth and volume of the hospitality that was extended to me in every country and especially in China, Japan, the Philippines, and later in India and Pakistan was informative and inspiring. All of this added greatly to the value of the Institute's work. In all countries my visits seemed to be cordially welcomed. *Every facility was accorded to me. *Engagements were made to acquaint me with every possible person and institution that might assist in the work of the Institute. Invitations to speak before various groups were received in volume. Great candor and mutual "give and take" in academic circles were characteristic during the few years of active Soviet IPR membership. A very small company of Soviet scholars appeared to be nearly as eager for cooperation as the much larger number in all the other countries, but after 1945, personal contacts with the Soviet IPR leaders ceased. I felt that I had failed signally in achieving what the leaders of the IPR in all countries expected of me.

In the other member countries the IPR was welcome because it was unofficial, scholarly, and provided a platform for the expression of widely differing and conflicting points of view. This, of course, was one of the many reasons for the Institute's great strength in the earlier years, as it is still today.

How The Institute Is Financed

Much of my time was spent in obtaining financial support for the Institute—not only for the Pacific Council, but for the American IPR and some of the other Councils as well.

For the American IPR the principal sources of income are:

- (1) regular annual dues from members;
- (2) individual donations from \$100 a year and upward;
- (3) industrial and business corporations, and banks (from \$200 to \$2,500 annually).
- (4) Foundations.

The Pacific Council is financed by annual contributions from the National Councils and by Foundation grants. Of all the National Councils, the American IPR was able to raise larger funds for Pacific area study than any of the others. The AIPR and certain American Foundations were therefore the largest contributors to the Pacific Council budget. Neither the American nor the Pacific Council has a penny of endowment. Grants from the Foundations were rarely for more than a three-year period. Contributions from banks and industrial corporations, as well as from individual members, were on an annual basis.

All of the national Councils of the IPR incurred large expenditures over and above their money contributions to the Pacific Council budget. The Pacific Council did not pay the very heavy expenses of the National Council representatives attending the international conferences and the meetings of the Pacific Council that were held between the international conferences. The National Councils met the bill for the hundreds of data papers presented at the conferences. They also met the travelling and living expenses of some of their members who attended the international conferences. Many members paid their own expenses, thus, in effect, the National Councils' total financial contribution to the work of the Institute was very much higher than the grand total that would be shown by combining the budgets of all the National Councils and the Pacific Council. Between and during the conferences the amount of highly intelligent volunteer work of hundreds of people in the different countries was substantial.

The same phenomena characterized my own secretariat. Except during the war, Mrs. Carter accompanied me on most trips aiding greatly in my staff

*Except in the U. S. S. R. There social hospitality was bountiful, but intellectual contacts severely limited.

work. The staff included at various times young people from Great Britain, China, Japan, and the United States. Seventeen young men and women served as volunteer members of my travelling staff without cost to the Pacific Council for either salary or traveling expenses.

Of even greater significance have been the travels of the unpaid and senior officers of the Institute. Most of them frequently gave as much as two or three months in a single year in advancing the Institute's program. They travelled thousands of miles at their own expense to distant countries for conference, and for the international conferences. The large cost, both in time and money, to the Institute's officers cannot be estimated. Among others who travelled extensively in the interest of the IPR were: Ray Lyman Wilbur, Jerome D. Greene, Newton D. Baker, J. W. Daboe, Edgar J. Tarr, Sir George Sansom, Philip C. Jessup, Percy E. Corbett, Huntington Gilchrist, Carl L. Alsberg.

The foregoing list includes only men from the United Kingdom and North America. It would be greatly increased by adding to the record many eminent leaders from China, Japan, the Philippines, and later from India and Pakistan.

Many eminent people were active in the IPR

As already noted, a significant feature of the IPR was the opportunity it afforded people of various countries to know each other. Notable were the personal contacts established during the international conferences when anywhere from 150 to 250 people from several Pacific countries met for periods of twelve to fourteen days. As I indicated earlier, they were usually housed under the same roof or in the same small area. They discussed and ate their meals and took such limited recreation as the program permitted together. Many of these contacts were kept up for years and persist today. After each conference, a good many of the members remained in the country where the conference was held and visited quite widely under the auspices of the host Council.

Further personal contacts came in the intervals between conferences when members of the Institute and its staff travelled widely in countries other than their own. Members, when travelling, were invited by the National Councils to address meetings at their headquarters or at their branches. The International Secretariat took the initiative in facilitating such contacts so that the conference discussions might continue informally and not be limited to the arbitrary times of the conferences themselves.

Many scores of visits and discussions have taken place over the years. Without access to the files but simply from memory, I could give many dozen illustrations of this sort. Often when former members of the Institute became government officials stationed in countries other than their own, these contacts were informally continued. For example, one of the founders of the IPR was F. W. Eggleston of Australia, who many years later became Australian ambassador to China in Chungking. He was allowed by the Chinese government a limited, but fairly substantial luggage allowance "over the hump." This he used in large measure to have flown in his entire library of IPR books. As a result, his embassy provided for scholars and government servants in Chungking the largest library of books on the Pacific that existed in that part of war-torn China. Later, Mr. Eggleston became Australian ambassador in Washington where he continued his interests and contacts with the Institute.

The Hon. Vincent Massey, who has just become Governor-General of Canada, attended the Shanghai conference in 1931 and made a real contribution through the Canadian Institute in which he was a leader.

There were many Chinese IPR leaders whose lectures and discussions in other countries added much to the development of knowledge of the Far East. These included W. W. Yen, Hu Shih, Chiang Mon-lin, Y. C. James Yen, P. C. Chang, Liu Yu-wan, Franklin Ho, K. P. Chen and Chang Po-ling.

Similarly, Japanese IPR leaders who advanced the Institute's program while abroad were Dr. I. Nitobe, Professor Y. Takaki, K. Yozizawa, M. Matsuo, Ino Dan, S. Saito, Y. Iwanaga, M. Anesaki, T. Mayeda, S. Matsukata, S. Urumatsu and S. Matsumoto.

Canadians other than Vincent Massey were Newton W. Rowell, Edgar J. Tarr, J. W. Daboe, Edgar McInnis, Norman MacKenzie, F. H. Soward, Escott Reid, G. R. Parkin and R. G. Cavell.

From France there were Paul Pelliot (now deceased), the greatest French Sinologist; Emile Naggiar, formerly French Minister in China; E. Dennerly, now in the French diplomatic service; H. Bonnet, now French Ambassador in Washington; Roger Levy, author and Secretary of the French IPR; Father Robert (Society of Jesus); Pierre Gourou; Charles Robequain.

From Holland there were H. J. van Mook, formerly Lieutenant Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies; G. A. Dunlop, Amsterdam banker; Baron F. M. van Asbeck; J. J. L. Duyvendak; T. Moll.

From England there were Lord Hailsham, Lord Hailey, Lord Samuel, Arnold J. Toynbee, Sir Frederick Whyte, Miss Eileen Power, Sir Andrew McFadyean, Ivison S. Macadam, Captain L. D. Gammans, Sir John Pratt, Lord Snell, G. F. Hudson, A. V. Alexander, Sir Charles Webster, Margaret Cleeve, Malcolm MacDonald, W. W. Astor, Miss Barbara Ward, Archibald Rose and A. Creech Jones.

I remember, for example, that on Miss Ward's first visit to the United States (she was then foreign editor of the London *Economist*), the American IPR arranged for her to meet influential audiences in Seattle, Los Angeles, Washington and New York. A large luncheon was given for her at the Mayflower in Washington and a large dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria here. The IPR had the honor of introducing to influential Americans on their first visits to North America Mrs. Pandit, lately Indian ambassador in Washington; Zafrulla Khan, foreign minister of Pakistan; and many other Indians and Pakistanis. The same can be said of Herbert Gepp of Australia, Walter Nash of New Zealand, Francisco Benitez and Rafael Palma of the Philippines.

Reference should also be made at this time to the names of many others mentioned in the statement for the McCarran Subcommittee prepared by William L. Holland, the Institute's present Secretary General. In the Institute's published proceedings of the international conferences and in the printed and mimeographed periodical reports of the American IPR, the names of a very large number of participants in IPR activities have been regularly made available to a wide public. I cannot remember a case in the entire history of the Institute when an effort was made to suppress the name of any person. In fact, it would have been completely contrary to the whole philosophy of the IPR so to do. Nevertheless, at the very first session of the McCarran Subcommittee (July 25, 1951) counsel Robert Morris said he was going to read to me a list of names—"which names turn up with great frequency in the files. This list has been compiled by the staff here as a condensation of many people, of many names who are interested in the Institute." Reading the list of some 80 names Mr. Morris did not find time to mention a single one of the foregoing who had been really active in IPR affairs in one capacity or another. Nor did Mr. Morris call attention to many of the names which Mr. Holland has submitted.

The following afternoon Mr. Morris went to great pains to blow up out of all proportion the role that I played in introducing to Washington people interested in Asia, a Tass representative, Vladimir Rogov, whom I had met several times in my IPR travels. The number of Soviet citizens with a knowledge of the Far East who visited the United States, was much more limited than those from China, Japan, Great Britain or France, and I took the opportunity of letting a number of people in Washington know of his presence in this country. If more Soviet citizens of his background had come to my attention in this country, I would have sought as the Secretary General of the Pacific Council to give them the opportunity of meeting thoughtful Americans. I considered it a part of my job as an officer of the international IPR. I did not think and still do not think for a moment that hardheaded Congressmen like Judd and Fulbright would be poisoned by such contact. Nor did I have any misgivings as to any deleterious effect from talks between a convinced Russian Communist like Rogov, and such competent, democratic-minded Americans as Stanley Hornbeck and John Carter Vincent. According to State Department protocol, my inquiry to Hornbeck was through his right-hand man, Alger Hiss, of whose loyalty at that time there was no question whatever in the American mind. Rogov had a wide circle of acquaintances in several countries. The list included representatives of Reuters, Havas, A. P., U. P., correspondents of metropolitan newspapers and American business men in Shanghai. I feel sure that all of these knew him as a convinced Communist. Rogov was, of course, not the only foreigner whom I introduced to people in Washington. There were a great many and they were non-Communists.

The foregoing instance is but one illustration of Anne O'Hare McCormick's charge in the New York Times (October 3, 1951) that the Senate Subcommittee is "carrying on its investigation in the context of today instead of in the state of mind of yesterday when such events occurred."

A Tribute

To the late Frank C. Atherton (one of Hawaii's "Big Five") and Charles F. Loomis (Secretary of the Honolulu YMCA) should go a major tribute as the

two most decisive initiators of the IPR. With Atherton's backing, Loomis travelled abroad studying official and unofficial international organizations. He consulted leaders from the Orient and the Occident.

Atherton and Loomis enlisted the interest in these formative years of David Z. T. Yui and S. Saito, the National Secretaries of the YMCA in China and Japan; secured the commanding interest of the late Ray Lyman Wilbur of Stanford University, the late Wallace M. Alexander (Alexander and Baldwin Ltd., San Francisco), Carl L. Alsberg, of the Food Research Institute (aided much by Herbert Hoover), Chester H. Rowell of the San Francisco Chronicle; John Nelson (Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Montreal). This group, of course, were all volunteers. The administrative work in Honolulu and exploratory work abroad was undertaken by Charles F. Loomis, who was loaned for the purpose by the Hawaiian YMCA. But a little later, the steadily growing group from several countries required a larger staff and a nucleus international secretariat was appointed consisting of J. Merle Davis as General Secretary, Dr. J. B. Condliffe as International Research Secretary, and Miss Elizabeth Green, a very competent newspaper woman with Far Eastern experience, as Editor. Loomis himself became Associate and Conference Secretary. Under the inspiring Dr. Ray Lman Wilbur, these four staff members made a remarkable team. They envisaged the potentialities of the developing organization, they overcame great obstacles, they enlisted the active participation of many others, including Dr. Nitobe of Japan; Dr. Hu Shih of China; Newton W. Rowell and General Sir Arthur Currie of Canada; Jerome D. Greene, Stanley K. Hornbeck (then at Harvard) and George H. Blakeslee of Clark University. All of these whom they secured were active in building up national councils in their own countries.

The imagination and competence of Davis, Loomis, Condliffe and Miss Green contributed in a distinct way to building the Institute on sound foundations. A few years after the founding of the Institute, Dr. Condliffe secured as his research colleague a fellow-New Zealander, William L. Holland, whose unique abilities led to his succeeding Condliffe when the latter joined the Economic Staff of the League of Nations in Geneva; and, in 1946, he succeeded me as the Secretary General of the Pacific Council. Under his creative leadership, the Institute has advanced to a position of world recognition which was only barely envisaged by the first founders. His capacity for discovering, training and leading researchers, and in skillfully editing the first drafts of their manuscripts has been outstanding. No Secretary General of any international organization, official or unofficial, has approached Holland in a rare combination of intellectual fertility combined with administrative skill. The Pacific, the American, and all the other National Councils are counting on him for eminent leadership for many years to come. Such talented and self-effacing leaders are indispensable.

Without the financial contributions of business men, bankers, industrialists and the officers of steamship companies, both in California and Hawaii, the early efforts of IPR leaders would have been limited. Later, bankers and industrialists on the eastern seaboard and in other countries followed the example of those far-sighted men in San Francisco and Honolulu.

At an early stage also substantial support came first from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial; later from the Rockefeller Foundation itself; and later still from the Carnegie Corporation. The smaller gifts from high school teachers, college professors, journalists, librarians and government servants were greater in number, and not less generous proportionate to their income. These donors were invaluable, too, in the Institute's discussions, and in their criticism of and use of IPR publications.

The contributions to the international budget from the National Councils, large and small, were significant in the Institute's support. They were creative in building a living, working solidarity of scholars, journalists and business men. By their own standards, national councils' contributions were all generous. When compared in terms of national income, the contributions from the councils in Nationalist China and in Canada were the most substantial.

CONCLUSION

Let the Record Testify

In my personal view the foregoing are characteristic of the activities that have occupied the IPR over the past quarter century. These have been the muscle and sinew of its tireless effort to realize the aim—its only aim—of acquiring and making available an accurate fund of knowledge regarding conditions in Asia.

That this has been a sole objective of the organization over the years is plain

to any fair-minded observer who will take the trouble to look into the record of the Institute's work as it was actually carried on, not as the counsel of the Senate subcommittee has endeavored to portray it to Senator McCarran and his associates, so as to conform with a preconceived bias.

In addition to this personal statement (A Personal View of the Institute of Pacific Relations), I shall soon submit to the Senate Subcommittee another memorandum. This will be entitled "Amplification, Correction and Clarification of Edward C. Carter's Testimony Before the McCarran Subcommittee." Those who read the present statement will, I believe, find it useful to read also this Amplification. In it I will attempt to correct errors I made in answering some of the questions at the hearings. I will try to amplify and clarify my testimony, too, in order that Senator McCarran and his associates may have a clearer picture of my personal views of the Institute, and my considered reactions to several of the questions put to me by members of the Subcommittee and its counsel.

I cannot close this statement without affirming that something far more important than the institutional fortunes of the IPR is at stake in the attacks during the hearings of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on scholars concerned with teaching and studying the Far East. A whole generation of American scholars in the Far Eastern field is being threatened. Even more important than this is the menace to the American people of a movement which might rob them of the services of those who, through long study of and great experience in Asia, are highly qualified in aiding the citizens of this country to reach their own conclusions regarding American Far Eastern policy. This situation has been emphasized in a short letter published April 23, 1952, on the editorial page of the New York Times, and signed by the following from universities which specialize on Far Eastern issues. They are as follows:

Derk Bodde-----	University of Pennsylvania.
Delmer Brown-----	University of California.
George B. Cressy-----	Syracuse University.
Rupert Emerson-----	Harvard University.
L. C. Goodrich-----	Columbia University.
K. S. Latourette-----	Yale University.
Shannon McCune-----	Colgate University.
Lauriston Sharp-----	Cornell University.
C. Martin Wilbur-----	Columbia University.

The letter says that the attacks "do violence to the principle of academic freedom inherent in our democratic heritage, and tend to deprive the Nation of the views of trained specialists regarding an area which is today of critical national concern."

STATE OF NEW YORK,

County of New York, ss:

Edward C. Carter, being duly sworn, says: That he has read the foregoing document and knows the contents thereof; that the same is true to his own knowledge, except as to the matters therein indicated to have been communicated to him by other persons and except as to the matters therein which are matters of opinion, and that as to the matters indicated to have been communicated to him by others, he believes it to be true and as to matters of opinion, that the opinion expressed is his own and that is his true opinion.

Sworn to before me this 10th day of June 1952.

[SEAL]

IRENE R. DONOHUE,
Notary Public, State of New York.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here, Mr. Chairman, a sworn statement again by Mr. Edward C. Carter, dated June 10, 1952, entitled "Amplification, Correction, and Clarification of Testimony Before the Committee by E. C. Carter."

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1383" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1383

AMPLIFICATION, CORRECTION, AND CLARIFICATION OF TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE

(By EDWARD C. CARTER)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Relationship of Frederick V. Field to the Institute of Pacific Relations.
 2. The letter of July 10, 1938, from Owen Lattimore.
 3. Asiaticus, Chen Han-seng and Chao-ting Chi.
 4. Did the IPR ever place people in government departments?
 5. The illegal seizure of the Institute's files by an agent of Senator McCarran's Subcommittee.
 6. Has the Board of the IPR ever conducted an inquiry into the operations of the IPR to determine whether it is under Communist influence or domination?
 7. People who were and were not actively associated with the IPR.
 8. The role of the IPR in making it possible for persons in various countries to meet people of opposing Far Eastern backgrounds and unpalatable viewpoints.
 9. How did I happen to suggest that a pro-Communist book be sent to certain American officials and Senators?
 10. The Institute explored many controversial issues.
 11. Facts about IPR methods and purposes of which the McCarran Subcommittee has shown little understanding.
 12. Further amplifications, correction, addition, and clarification:
 - (a) The Subcommittee's procedures contrasted with those proposed by Senators Kefauver and O'Connor.
 - (b) Senator Ferguson's irritation at my implication that the IPR files had been tampered with.
 - (c) Correction of my testimony regarding Alger Hiss.
 - (d) The Committee on Militarism in Education.
 - (e) "Death does not rob a man of his place in history."
 - (f) James S. Allen's appeal for a financial subsidy was not granted.
 - (g) Miss Smedley asked the IPR's help in getting two Chinese (prisoners of the Japanese in Hong Kong) placed on an exchange list.
 - (h) Challenge to Mrs. Massing's testimony by Miss Harriet Moore.
 - (i) Invitation list to a conference at Sunset Farm—October 18-21, 1935.
 - (j) Mrs. Massing's attack on Corliss Lamont.
 - (k) William S. White's significant article in the *New York Times*.
- Appendix A. Copy of a letter from Carter to Lattimore, dated July 19, 1938.
- Appendix B. Letter to members of the American IPR from seven prominent members of the IPR Board, dated March 17, 1947.
- Appendix C. Copy of letter from Dr. James L. McConaughy, President of United China Relief, to Alfred Kohlberg, dated August 13, 1946.

ERRATA

- Hearings, page 11, line 42: For Roland *Boyd* read Roland *Boyden*.
- Hearings, page 12, line 23: Dr. *Chao-ting Chi*, a Chinese Communist, should read Dr. *Chao-ting Chi*, a Chinese economist.
- Hearings, page 16, line 14: For UNESCO read ECOSOC (The Economic and Social Council of the U. N.).
- Hearings, page 29, line 46: *Stone was in the AIPR* should read *Stone was in the FPA* (Foreign Policy Association).
- Hearings, page 38, line 17: *Comintern* should be corrected to read *Kuomintang*.
- Hearings, page 141, line 32: For Mr. *Lewis* read Mr. *Luce*.

I would like to clarify and amend my testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security on the following points:

1. RELATIONSHIP OF FREDERICK V. FIELD TO THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

At the Senate Subcommittee's first public hearing on July 25, 1951, questions were asked of me regarding Mr. Field's relationship to the *New Masses* and the *Daily Worker*. Senator Eastland and the Subcommittee's counsel, Mr. Robert Morris, appeared to be endeavoring to prove that while Field was Secretary of the American IPR, he was also connected with the *New Masses* and the *Daily Worker*. I realized that the question of dates was important. I endeavored, therefore, at four different times to get the Subcommittee's assistance, but completely in vain. I spoke as follows:

"I would like to, if I may, ask counsel, Mr. Morris, who must have all these dates at his fingertips, whether Mr. Field was an executive officer of the IPR concurrently with being on the editorial board (*New Masses* or *Daily Worker*)."¹

Unable to get a precise answer the first time, I asked Senator McCarran's permission again to help clarify the question of dates. My query was as follows:

¹ Hearings of the Senate Subcommittee, page 10.

"The point I wanted to clear up was whether the committee's records show that Mr. Field wrote for the *New Masses* or the *Daily Worker* before 1940 and the date he went on the board of *New Masses* and the relationship of the date of his withdrawal from the secretaryship of the institute."²

Again, the matter of dates came up as follows:

"Senator EASTLAND. And you knew at that time that Mr. Field was on the editorial board of either *New Masses* or the *Daily Worker*, did you not?

"Mr. CARTER. One reason that I wanted to get these dates straightened out—

"The CHAIRMAN. Answer the question, if you can. There was a direct question put to you, Mr. Carter."³

Still again, I beseeched and begged Mr. Morris for the dates:

"Senator EASTLAND. He was on the board of editors (*New Masses* or *Daily Worker*) before 1940, was he not?

"Mr. CARTER. That was the question that I challenge and beseech and beg Mr. Morris to produce for me."⁴

That Mr. Morris did have the dates at his command at that time when I was pressing for them is clear from Exhibit No. 15, Hearings, pages 125-126. These Exhibits were not shown to me, although Mr. Morris had them filed in the record at the end of Mr. Field's testimony the following day, July 26, 1951. I had no opportunity of seeing them until many weeks later when they were printed in Part I of the Subcommittee's hearings.

From the foregoing, it is clear to me that Senator Eastland and Mr. Morris were evading questions that I put on four separate occasions. It seemed as though they were trying to prove that Field was identified with the *New Masses* and the *Daily Worker* while he was still Secretary of the American IPR.

It would be noted that after the first of my four consecutive attempts to clarify the question of dates, the Institute's lawyer, Mr. Crossman, saw immediately that this matter of dates was crucial. As Mr. Crossman was sitting at my side at the Subcommittee's table, he attempted to help me, but Chairman McCarran rules against this. A little later, Senator McCarran threatened to remove Mr. Crossman from the table to the audience and to "do it very fast."⁵ Senator McCarran thus identified himself with the efforts of Senator Eastland and Mr. Morris to frustrate the sincere efforts of Mr. Crossman and myself to get the facts. These facts, as it now appears from the printed record, were in total disagreement with the false thesis that two members of the Committee and its counsel were seeking to establish.

Now, the facts are these: Mr. Field, the then Secretary of the American IPR, asked in June, 1940, to be relieved of the administrative and financial routine of his office.⁶ With regret the IPR deferred to his wishes. He was appointed staff advisor, to be on leave without salary for the ensuing six months. Furthermore, three months later, namely, on September 1, 1940, he resigned as Secretary of the IPR and his resignation was accepted by the IPR on September 18, 1940.

Turning now to the Subcommittee's Exhibit No. 15, it appears that the earliest date on which Field had any connection with either the *New Masses* or the *Daily Worker* was on December 16, 1941, when the *New Masses* published an article by him entitled "How Strong is Japan?"⁷ (This immediately followed Pearl Harbor and I have been informed, was cleared by Military Intelligence.) Thus, eighteen months elapsed between the time Field first asked to be relieved of administrative responsibility and the appearance of his first article in either of these periodicals. According to Exhibit No. 15, Field was not listed as an editor of the *New Masses* until December 15, 1943.

According to the same Exhibit, Field's first article in the *Daily Worker* was not until April 25, 1944—three years and seven months after he had resigned as Secretary of the American IPR. Exhibit No. 15 further shows that Field's first article in the *Communist*, later known as *Political Affairs*, did not appear until September 1944—four years after he had resigned as Secretary of the American IPR.

During the six years Field served as Executive Secretary of the American IPR (1934-1940), he maintained a very high standard of objectivity, factual

² Ibid., page 17.

³ Ibid., page 21.

⁴ Ibid., page 22.

⁵ Ibid., page 18.

⁶ Ibid., page 122, Exhibit No. 13.

⁷ Ibid., page 125.

accuracy and nonpartisanship. The same is true of his attitude on the Executive Committee of the Board (1940-1947). In 1946, as a matter of fact, when he offered his resignation to the Board of Trustees, it was decided at a largely attended meeting, with but one dissenting vote, that he be urged to withdraw. It so obvious was it to those who had observed him in action that he had followed only the most exemplary, nonpartisan standards in his work for the IPR and had always been scrupulous in keeping his political views out of IPR affairs.

The Committee's counsel appeared to take exception to my having written a letter recommending Mr. Field for a commission in Army Intelligence.⁸ I testified that I had done so on the basis of his record of objective, nonpartisan scholarship and factual accuracy while at the IPR, and his background on Japan. I was certain that Mr. Field would perform an outstanding service for his country if granted a commission. For this reason I was glad to recommend him.

The Committee made much of my letter to the War Department. *I have never been shown a copy of that letter*, although it was made the basis of extensive questioning. At the hearing on July 25th I did not remember fully the details of this incident but, on the following day, when Mr. Field himself appeared as a witness, the Subcommittee asked him many questions about his negotiations in the matter of a commission in Army Intelligence. Here Field, under oath, brought out that he did not initiate the proposal. On page 106 and following of Part I, Mr. Field stated clearly that the origin was the other way around. His words were: "I was asked if I could accept a commission."⁹ Field subsequently was asked to visit officers in Washington, where the matter was fully discussed.

Mr. Field in his testimony¹⁰ made it clear that, in his discussions in Washington, the question of his political views was discussed frankly and that finally he was definitely offered a commission. In response to further questioning on this same point by Senators Ferguson and O'Connor, Field testified again that he revealed his views fully to Army Intelligence. Senator O'Connor asked what was the problem on which Army Intelligence wanted Mr. Field's help. He replied that it was the strategic bombing of Japan.

From a perusal of all of Field's testimony, it is apparent that Field was first approached by an officer of United States Army Intelligence proposing that Field accept a commission in that unit to work on the problem of the strategic bombing of Japan. Subsequently, Army Intelligence asked Field to do what he could to eliminate objections which had been made to his appointment by someone outside of the United States Army. Without the IPR files I cannot remember at what stage I wrote my letter commending Field. Field, I remember, approached me and I volunteered to write a letter to the Army recommending him.

This I did in good faith, for the following reasons: (a) I knew that from Japan's illegal occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and onward, Field had been a constant and intense opponent of Japanese aggression; (b) I knew that Field had a good knowledge of the Japanese economy, its industrial centers, railway assembly yards, ship building facilities, communication centers, which, if damaged, could deprive Japan of much of her economic power; (c) I knew that Field had extensive knowledge and facilities for bringing to the attention of highest Army authorities those locations and installations overseas which, if the Army planned a large bombing program, would substantially weaken Japan's strength and her war potential; (d) I was convinced that Field would throw himself with complete abandon into the United States Government's attempt to weaken and ultimately destroy Japanese aggression; (e) I was aware, too, that Field had an excellent general knowledge not only of Japan, but of the Philippines and China; (f) as I stated in my testimony, I was confident that if the security agencies had derogatory data regarding Field that I did not possess, his appointment would not be approved. Under no circumstances could I conceive of a letter from me taking precedence over the recommendations of a security service objection.

So far as I could see Army Intelligence wanted Field and wished that he could overcome the objections to his serving. In view of the foregoing, I not only had no hesitation about recommending him, I felt it was my patriotic duty because, like him, I had seen on the spot, step by step, Japan's massive attempt to become master of as much of China as possible. With Professor Chamber-

⁸ Ibid., page 11.

⁹ Ibid., page 106.

¹⁰ Ibid., page 107.

lain and others I had traveled across Europe and Siberia, arriving in Manchuria on the eve of the Mukden "incident." Our party traveled from the border to Harbin and through no man's land to Changchung and Mukden where we were joined by Field, who had traveled through Japan and Korea, arriving in Mukden the night of the "incident." We saw concrete instances of the ever-expanding plans of the Japanese militarists. As Japan's aggression increased, I had noted that Field became more deeply concerned. Many of his studies were calculated to aid our people and our Government in recognizing the danger of Japan's march both to the vital interests of China and those of the United States. His early isolationism toward Europe did not apply to the Far East.

Now I will revert to a part of the testimony which I will quote as follows from pages 21 and 22 of Part I:

"Senator EASTLAND. You do not remember, then, whether or not you attempted to get a commission in Army Air Force Intelligence for a member of the Editorial Board of either the Daily Worker or the New Masses?"

"Mr. CARTER. I don't remember."

I did not remember because, at this time, Field had no editorial connection with either of these publications (as shown above, Hearings, Exhibit No. 15, pages 125-126).

Mr. Morris asked whether I recalled that Field took a position with the American Peace Mobilization and had I known that that organization was Communist controlled.¹¹ I replied that I knew that it was cited as that and that I had come to the conclusion that the Communists took it over.

At the time of Pearl Harbor, Field's position (which had been isolationist with reference to Europe up to June 1941) changed radically. Here his position seemed similar to that of a great company of other Americans including many notable conservatives. The war had now developed away from the Chamberlain-Daladier concept of appeasement. The attack on Pearl Harbor compelled the United States to fight aggression. Here was a campaign to which all patriotic Americans could be expected to respond with complete devotion. I was convinced that to the war against Japan for which Field was so well fitted, he would commit his remarkable gifts and knowledge with utter devotion. I could not conceive then, nor can I conceive now, of his not having given everything he had.

I wish to extend my remarks with reference to the autumn of 1940 when the American Peace Mobilization was forming at a time when Quakers, pacifists, Reds, and conservatives were trying to keep us out of the Chamberlain-Daladier war. I understood that the Chairman of the Peace Mobilization was a non-Communist clergyman—the Chaplain of the University of Chicago. He had associated with him not only Quakers, but other non-Communist American citizens who wanted to keep our country out of war if possible. (This movement synchronized and in many respects was parallel to the powerful America First movement.)

Under what I understood to be pressure from the Chaplain of the University of Chicago and others, Field responded to the invitation to become Executive Secretary. At what point in the American Peace Mobilization the Communists came to dominate, I never learned; but, by the time of the picketing of the White House, I surmised that they had attained large influence. When I said to the Subcommittee that at this time (i. e., the picketing of the White House) Field was behaving like a Communist, I did not mean to suggest that I knew him to be a Communist or that I considered him as even a fellow traveler.

A little later, Senator O'Connor implied that I had been doing something detrimental to the interests of my country.¹² I certainly did not and do not now think I was doing anything detrimental. Please remember that at that time all the Allies were concerned in stopping Japan and Germany. Field's special competence was such that I firmly believed his talents could be used in aiding in the stopping of Japan.

Senator O'Connor then introduced a letter on the stationery of the periodical *Amerasia*. This I identified and noted that the editorial board included Professor Kenneth Colegrove of Northwestern University. I would now like to remark that *Amerasia* was never connected with the IPR. Its Board and its authors were a mixture of persons familiar with developments in Asia, but of widely differing political points of view. Professor Colegrove of Northwestern, Dr. Cyrus Peake of Columbia, and several others on its Board, could by no stretch of the imagination be labeled as pro-Communist.

¹¹ Ibid., page 22.

¹² Ibid., page 30.

2. THE LETTER FROM OWEN LATTIMORE OF JULY 10, 1938

Mr. Morris read two paragraphs from a long letter from Owen Lattimore to me dated July 10, 1938.³³ This letter became the subject of extensive questioning by members of the Subcommittee and its counsel. I was asked what was the inquiry referred to in that letter. I replied that it was an inquiry into the issues of the Sino-Japanese War. I was in Peking in 1937 when the Japanese came in and took over Tientsin and Peking. The Japanese were clearly on the march. It seemed to me that here we had an opportunity while a major conflict was starting to get people of different points of view to analyze it.

It is now clear that at one of the preliminary planning stages of the Inquiry, it had been proposed that Chi, Chen Han-seng and Asiaticus be asked to write books for the Inquiry. These proposals along with many others were contained in a letter of mine to Dr. Carl Alsberg who had served for so many years as head of the Food Research Institute aided by Mr. Herbert Hoover at Stanford University.

But later it was decided not to employ either Asiaticus or Chen Han-seng. For particulars with reference to the limited and non-Inquiry series assignment to Chi, please see page 23 of "A Personal View of the IPR", recently submitted to the Subcommittee. The best evidence of the integrity of the IPR was not in inter-staff letters, but in what was actually published in the Inquiry series, in its many other published volumes and in its periodicals.

However, Lattimore's letter was attacked over and over again. When, at long last, he was allowed to testify on February 26, 1952, he explained in detail what he meant in the passages quoted from his letter.

In the early autumn of 1951 and continuing to December, I wrote several times to Senator McCarran and Mr. Morris requesting copies of my correspondence with Lattimore just prior to and following the letter to me of July 10, 1938. Although, last year, Mr. Morris told a Herald Tribune representative that he was sending me the material, and although Mr. Mandel confirmed last year that there was such material in the files, nothing was sent to me until March 1952, when I received from Morris a copy of my letter to Lattimore of July 19, 1938. This letter reveals so clearly the impartial position which the IPR has endeavored to maintain throughout its history that I respectfully request that it be published in the Subcommittee's printed record. It is submitted herewith and marked "Appendix A" to this statement.

3. DID I REGARD ASIATICUS, CHEN HAN-SENG AND CHAO-TING CHI AS COMMUNISTS?

The purpose of the introduction of the Lattimore letter was apparently intended to prove that Asiaticus, Chi and Chen Han-seng were known to be Communists.

My testimony regarding the three men was and is that I did not regard either Chen Han-seng or Dr. Chi as Communists when they were writing for the Institute. Today I do not know whether Chen Han-seng is a Party member or not; he left the United States last year, I believe. I do not know whether Chi is a Party member or not. I was not aware of the fact that he wrote for *China Today* under a pseudonym. I do know that for a long time he was an official in the Kuomintang government of China, assisting Dr. H. H. Kung. The presumption now is that he is a Communist Party member because he is employed in a high position by the Chinese Communist Government. Regarding Asiaticus, who never wrote a book in the IPR Inquiry series, I do know that he did some writing for the IPR, but at the time I was not informed that he was a Communist.

4. DID THE IPR EVER ATTEMPT TO PLACE PEOPLE IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS?

In response to Mr. Morris' question as to whether I was instrumental in having Dr. Philip C. Jessup go into the State Department, I replied that I was not, although we denied him as a competent man. Senator Eastland apparently ignored my denial of putting Jessup into the State Department when he asked that I tell "who else they placed in the State Department."³⁴

The implication of Senator Eastland's questions I believe to be completely without foundation. The Senator here revealed a basic lack of knowledge, both

³³ Ibid., page 36.

³⁴ Ibid., page 32.

of the Institute's policy and its history. From its beginning, the Institute has maintained itself as a private and non-governmental society. It has refused as strongly to bow before government pressure as it has refrained from putting pressure on the government. Its *raison d'être* from 1925 to the present time has been the important and distinctive role which it could play in public understanding by remaining private and unofficial. There is ample justification for this in terms of the American way of life. This was the accepted view of the national units of the IPR in Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, China, France, Holland, and in Japan. During the few years of activity on the part of the Soviet Russian IPR, even its leaders made the best attempts they could to disassociate their organization from foreign office control. Just before Pearl Harbor the Japanese IPR was compelled to bow before government pressure. The Chinese IPR throughout its history courageously resisted government pressure.

To revert to the American IPR, I want to make it clear that what actually happened was precisely the reverse of Senator Eastland's implication. Both the American Institute and the International Secretariat had one major concern—how could the IPR resources in research and personnel make the maximum contribution to the war effort. The case of each individual was studied carefully with this objective in view. When some of the civilian agencies of the government made inquiries regarding this or that person, I discussed the case with the government representative in the light of the foregoing principle and usually succeeded in establishing the fact that the person concerned could help the Allies most by continuing his or her study of a problem which bore directly on Allied success. My attitude toward those of my associates who were of military age was, of course, different.

I remember that at one time, late in the war, when the IPR personnel consisted only of older people, I had been invited to the Pentagon for conference with Major General Frederick Osborn and some of his colleagues. A Colonel on the staff of General Osborn proposed that practically the entire American staff of the IPR should enter the service of General Osborn's program. Flattering though this was, I took the position that my associates and I could render the United States a greater service by remaining at our posts. The deal was never consummated.

To the best of my knowledge, the IPR or its officers made no move whatsoever in the matter of Jessup's entering the State Department. Over the years he had acquired experience, stature and contacts which were even more imposing than his invaluable service to the IPR. So far as I am informed, the initiative came from the State Department, based on Jessup's long record as a scholar, international lawyer and public servant.

Senator Eastland asked whether the Institute or whether I, as an official of the Institute, recommended people to the State Department for employment. To this I replied that several times we had had requests from several agencies of the government for a man for this or that job. Senator Eastland reminded me that he had asked about the State Department. I replied that a number of our people, more of our junior staff, were employed in the State Department during the war. Senator Eastland then asked who they were. I said that I thought more of the people went into the Army, that Robert W. Barnett is in the State Department at present. My testimony regarding Barnett was incomplete. He did not go from the IPR into the State Department. He went from the IPR to, I think, an OSS training course and thence to General Chennault's staff in Kunming. Later, he was attached to the staff of the Far Eastern Commission in Washington under General Frank R. McCoy. Whether that was a State Department or an independent appointment, I do not remember. It was made several years after he had resigned from the IPR staff. However, he has now for some years been a State Department employee.

5. THE ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF THE INSTITUTE'S FILES BY AN AGENT OF SENATOR M'CARRAN'S SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. Sourwine asked if I thought the seizure of the files was illegal, why wasn't there a contention to that effect made in February or March rather than in July in connection with the hearings. I replied that that question should be addressed to a responsible officer of the Institute.¹⁵

¹⁵ Ibid., page 43.

At the close of the hearing, Mr. Holland reminded me that Mr. Sourwine was completely wrong in his intimation that the Institute had made no previous challenges to the legality of the Subcommittee's taking possession of the files. He handed me a press release, dated February 16, 1951, which had been issued by Mr. Gerard Swope, the Chairman of the AIPR, and which included a telegram that the IPR had sent to Senator McCarran and other members of the Subcommittee, calling to their attention the fact that the Institute's files had been seized illegally.

Here is the text of the telegram sent to Senator McCarran and other members of the Subcommittee:

"We respectfully call your attention to the recent publication in several newspapers of materials obviously taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations which your Subcommittee has seized without any subpoena being served either on Mr. Carter or on any officer of the Institute. As previously stated, we have no objection to these files being examined in an orderly manner by any properly accredited U. S. agency or to their being made public through appropriate procedures.

"But we again appeal to you, in common decency and for the protection of hundreds of persons named in the files, to see that such unauthorized and partial leakages of private correspondence are stopped and that the materials are used fairly and not taken out of context. May we have your public assurance on this?"

So far as I have been informed, Mr. Gerard Swope never received a reply from Senator McCarran, or from any of the other members of the subcommittee, or its staff.

6. HAS THE BOARD OF THE IPR EVER CONDUCTED AN INQUIRY INTO THE OPERATIONS OF THE IPR TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT IS UNDER COMMUNIST INFLUENCE OR DOMINATION?

Senator Ferguson asked a question about investigations within the IPR itself.¹⁶ He said that I had indicated that prior to the Amerasia exposure there had been an investigation on the so-called Kohlberg charges. A little later, Ferguson read¹⁷ what he described as a line or two of testimony, *not giving the name of the person who testified to it*. The anonymous writer asserted that the IPR investigation of the Kohlberg charges was prepared by a staff member and then accepted by the Executive Committee.

That description is not quite adequate. The Kohlberg charges were studied by the Executive Committee, and very carefully analyzed by a subcommittee of three Board members. The two committees were aided in this by a staff committee designated for the purpose. A member of the staff, Mrs. Stewart, was asked to edit the written reports of all those who worked on the Kohlberg charges. This she did. Her summary was then approved by the Executive Committee and issued in mimeographed form.

There was a good and compelling reason why the officers and trustees of the IPR had never been impressed by charges that the organization was serving as a Communist front, or even influenced by Communists or any other partisan group. The IPR trustees and especially the Executive Committee knew from first-hand observation that such charges were completely groundless because they kept in close personal touch with the organization and its publications. It would have been impossible to pull the wool over the eyes of this group of representative business, academic, and professional leaders. They were genuinely interested in the IPR and felt a keen sense of responsibility regarding its successful operation. They were all kept fully advised on the nature of Mr. Kohlberg's charges.

The Executive Committee met frequently, giving scrupulous attention to all aspects of its program and functioning. They were familiar with its publications so they were not taken in by a few paragraphs taken out of context by an irresponsible or dishonest critic. They were present at its conferences and observed for themselves the high degree of nonpartisanship that characterized those meetings. In short, they did not require an independent outside investigation to prove that the Institute was not a front for Communism. They knew it was not.

Senator Ferguson wanted to know whether or not it would be reasonable when charges were made against an organization as large as the Institute that it was acting as a front for Communism that someone would not have ordered another

¹⁶ Ibid., page 45.

¹⁷ Ibid., page 74.

detailed investigation after the papers were seized, and whether or not they did, and whether or not they made a report.¹⁸

I replied that the charges made in recent months were in large part the same baseless and irresponsible charges that had been made by Mr. Kohlberg in 1944, that these had been investigated by the IPR and were not substantiated. The recent charges were so similar, in some cases so identical, that the Institute trustees felt that there was no use in going through them again. Senator Ferguson asked whether any officer, or group of officers, of the IPR had made an independent check to ascertain whether there were any reasonable grounds for the charges that the IPR was serving as a Communist front.

I replied that from the time of the Senate Subcommittee's illegal seizure of the IPR files in early 1951, the officers and Executive Committee of the American IPR have followed the proceedings in Washington. It has kept its members throughout the United States informed regarding the procedures of the Senate Subcommittee. Further, it employed the firm of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl to watch its interests. Inasmuch as the charges have so faithfully followed the lines established and developed by Mr. Alfred Kohlberg, the officers and the Executive Committee have felt that the investigation which the IPR made of those charges in the 1945-1947 period was still valid. Mr. Holland, the Institute's present chief executive, has, I believe, already submitted a copy of a circular letter which was sent to all the members on March 17, 1947. This I regard as valid today as it was then. It was signed by: Joseph P. Chamberlain, Professor of Public Law, Columbia University;¹⁹ Arthur H. Dean, attorney, Sullivan & Cromwell, New York; Walter F. Dillingham, Oahu Railway & Land Company, Honolulu; Brooks Emeny, formerly President of Cleveland Council of World Affairs, now President of Foreign Policy Association, New York; Huntington Gilchrist, American Cyanamid Company (now in Europe with MSA); W. R. Herod, President, International General Electric; Philip C. Jessup, then Professor of International Law, Columbia University.

For purposes of emphasis, I enclose a copy of the letter of March 17, 1947. I request that it be reproduced in the published record of the Subcommittee in photostat form as "Appendix B" to this statement.

Reference has already been made to my service to the Chinese Mass Education Movement and to Nankai University. As mentioned elsewhere, during the war I was Chairman of the Program and Disbursements Committee of United China Relief at the request of Henry R. Luce, W. R. Herod and B. A. Garside. (At the same time, I was President of Russian War Relief.)

My services in United China Relief were impaired by an attack on me and on UCR's Field Director in China, Mr. Dwight Edwards, by an importer of Chinese textiles, Mr. Alfred Kohlberg. Mr. Kohlberg had been splendidly active in one of UCR's constituent societies, the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China. Although UCR contributed more to ABMAC than to any of the other societies, Mr. Kohlberg came to the conclusion that we should give more to his society, and thus less to the others. He launched an attack on Mr. Edwards and myself in a long document which he submitted to the officers of the UCR. Charles A. Edison, ex-Governor of New Jersey, was then President of UCR. He appointed a special committee to listen to Mr. Kohlberg's charges. The committee consisted of Paul G. Hoffman, Henry R. Luce and James G. Blaine, President of the Marine-Midland Trust Company. These three men listened for some hours to Mr. Kohlberg. Subsequently, they submitted to the UCR Board a report dismissing Mr. Kohlberg's charges. In addition, they recommended that Mr. Edwards' salary be increased and that he be promoted to a vice presidency of UCR.

They exonerated me and, sometime later, a group of eminent Chinese in China sent me an elaborate and handsomely illuminated Chinese scroll testifying to what they regarded as my distinguished service to the Chinese people.

The signers of this scroll included Dr. T. F. Tsiang, Director General of CNRRA (Chinese Nationalist Relief and Rehabilitation Administration); Dr. Chiang Mon-lin, Secretary General of the Executive Yuan; Dr. Han Lih-wu, Vice Minister of Education; Bishop Paul Yu Pin, Catholic Bishop of Nanking; Dr. Robert K. S. Lim, Surgeon General of the Chinese Army; Dr. Y. T. Tsur, Minister of Agriculture; Dr. King Chu, Vice Minister of Education; Dr. P. Z. King, Director of the National Health Administration; Dr. C. K. Chu, Director of the National Health Institute; Mrs. William C. Wang, Chairman of the Women's Advisory Committee of the New Life Movement; Mrs. Nora T. H. Chu,

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, page 46.

¹⁹ Since deceased.

Director of the National Association for Refugee Children; Dr. Chang Fu-liang, General Secretary of the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives; Dr. Y. S. Djang, Treasurer of the International Relief Committee; Dr. H. C. Chang, Chief of the Welfare Division of the Ministry of Social Affairs; and Dr. A. Pan-tung Sah, of the Academia Sinica.

A translation of part of the text in typically flowery Chinese was sent to me by Dr. James L. McConaughy, at that time President of the UCR. Subsequently, Dr. McConaughy became Governor of Connecticut. The translation was also conveyed by Dr. McConaughy to Mr. Alfred Kohlberg in a letter dated August 13, 1946. A copy of this letter is attached as "Appendix C" to this statement.

Mr. Kohlberg, having been refuted, resigned from ABMAC and all connection with United China Relief. Some months later, however, he came up with a violent attack on the Institute of Pacific Relations and on me personally. The IPR made a thorough investigation of Mr. Kohlberg's charges and then, after an effort to take his case to the courts, he was allowed to send his massive attack to all of the members of the Institute throughout the United States, appealing for proxies which would enable him to have the IPR investigated and presumably re-organized to his liking.

Mr. Kohlberg's immense propaganda against the IPR did not pay off. He lost his proxy battle decisively—66 members voted in his favor; 1,163 members voted against him, thus affirming their confidence in the Institute and its administration.

7. PEOPLE WHO WERE AND WERE NOT ACTIVELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE IPR

Counsel Morris announced that he was going to read a list of names that had turned up with *great frequency* in the files.²⁰ The list purported to be a condensation of names of many people who were active in the Institute. I was admonished to give a quick yes or no answer.

Mr. Morris' definition of "connection" was confusing because he described it in three different ways. First, he said "people who were interested in the Institute"; second, he said "names that were connected with the Institute in any way"; third and finally, he established his criteria as follows: "The standard is this, Mr. Carter: They are either members of the staff, they were contributors to IPR publications, they were members of the executive board of trustees, or they performed substantial services in addition to their membership in the IPR."

Further, Mr. Morris' method of query precluded advance notice so I could have investigated to see what, if any, connection these individuals had had with the IPR during the past 27 years. This, it seems to me, should have been done if the Subcommittee had really desired to fulfill its announced purpose of getting the facts. Mr. Morris' list was, of course, what some people might call a "loaded" list. It was unfair because of the implication that the Subcommittee's staff had assembled these names as *though they were principal personalities in the Institute's program and policies*.

I should like to remind the Subcommittee that my entire life has not been devoted to the Institute of Pacific Relations. That has been for a span of nearly a quarter of a century. I've had a great many other contacts before and during my IPR relationship; Y. M. C. A., Columbia University, RWR, UCR, ARI, China Institute, Japan Society, the United Nations, and many others. After having had connections with so many people, I do not see how, when a very long list of names was suddenly presented to me, I could possibly have been expected to give completely adequate answers, as well as accurate ones.

I now wish fully and frankly to declare that several of my answers were inaccurate or inadequate. Here I will set down the correction and amplification of my answers in the light of Mr. Morris' final criteria. For ease of reference, I will put the names of those I refer to in capital letters. My replies to Mr. Morris at the hearing will be in italics. These will be followed by my current comments.²¹

SOLOMON ADLER. *I can't answer.*

My answer is that Adler met *none* of Morris' criteria.

JAMES S. ALLEN. *I think he wrote one article.*

As a matter of fact, he wrote two articles for *Pacific Affairs*.

BETTY BARNES. *Yes.*

This is incorrect—my reply is *no*.

²⁰ Ibid., pages 69 through 73.

²¹ These comments are based in part on data furnished to me by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

ESTHER BRUNAUER. *Yes.*

This is incorrect—my answer is *no*.

EVANS CARLSON. *Lecturer. Yes.*

My reply is that he wrote a book in the Inquiry Series on the Chinese Nationalist Army, and a few articles. He was a Brigadier General in the Marines and commanded "Carlson's Raiders."

O. EDMUND CLUBB. *Yes.*

He wrote a single article for the *Far Eastern Survey* which was published in 1950.

FRANK V. COE. *Yes.*

This is incorrect—my answer is *no*.

JOHN DAVIES. *Yes.*

This is incorrect—my answer is *no*.

HUGH DEANE. *I don't remember.*

It seems he wrote on article for the *Far Eastern Survey*.

EMILE DESPRES. *I don't remember.*

The answer is *no*.

LAWRENCE DUGGAN. *Yes.*

This is incorrect—my answer is *no*.

THEODORE DRAPER. *Dromedary Dates, was he, or Federal Reserve? Yes, I had lunch with him one day.*

Mr. Morris then asked, "Was he connected with the IPR, Mr. Carter?" I replied: *I don't think so.*

My answer is *no*. The Draper with the Federal Reserve System was another person (Ernest G. Draper).

JULIAN FRIEDMAN. *We had a Friedman whose name was Irving. I don't place Julian.*

Julian Friedman wrote a supplement to a monograph by Epstein entitled "Notes on Labor in Nationalist China."

MARK J. GAYN. *Yes, slight.*

The answer is *no*.

HALDORE HANSON. *Yes.*

This is incorrect—my answer is *no*.

PHILIP J. JAFFE. *Yes.*

My answer is *no*. He met none of Mr. Morris' criteria. He was a contributing member as were hundreds of others.

SERGEI KOURNAKOFF. *Don't remember.*

My answer is *no*. To this day I have failed to identify him.

CORLISS LAMONT. *Contributor. Yes.*

Actually, Mr. Lamont met *none* of Mr. Morris' criteria. Mr. Morris avoided mentioning Mr. Thomas W. Lamont who contributed many times as much money as his son, and a great deal more of his time.

DUNCAN C. LEE. *Yes, sir.*

This is incorrect—my answer is *no*.

MICHAEL LEE. *Attended a conference, yes.*

My answer is *no*.

HOZUMI OZAKI. *Ex-mayor of Tokyo. Maybe, I don't know.*

Mr. Morris then asked "Was he not a delegate to your Yosemite Conference in 1936?" To which I replied: *Yes.*

There were two Ozakis. One had been the greatly venerated mayor of Tokyo. The one who attended the Yosemite Conference way back in 1936 was, at that time, attached to one of Japan's greatest newspapers, *The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*. He contributed a data paper for Yosemite on recent development in Sino-Japanese relations.

FRED POLAND. *Yes.*

This is incorrect—my answer is *no*.

MILDRED PRICE. *I don't know.*

The answer is that she met none of Morris' criteria.

LUDWIG RAJCHMAN. *I don't remember. I remember him. I don't remember his IPR connections. * * **

The answer is *no*. Dr. Rajchman, a Polish citizen, was long a member of the International Health staff of the League of Nations. For many years, he was a close associate and assistant to the Honorable T. V. Soong, both in China and in Washington. Because of his knowledge of China he was proposed, I think,

by some influential Kuomintang person for membership in the international IPR conference at Mt. Tremblant in Canada in 1942. As a Pole, he could not be admitted as a regular conference member because no Polish organization was affiliated with the IPR. I remember that he was invited to attend as an observer, but for some reason he did not accept.

HELEN SCHNEIDER. *Don't remember.*

Mr. Morris asked "Was she not a staff worker?" To which I replied: *I don't remember.*

Subsequent inquiry reveals that she was employed as Business Manager of *Pacific Affairs* for about two years in the late 1940's.

JOHN S. SERVICE. *Yes.*

The answer is *no*. Mr. Service met none of Morris' criteria.

AGNES SMEDLEY. *Yes; she was a member for two years.*

The answer is *no*. Dues-paying members did not meet the criteria set up by Morris.

MARY VAN KLEEK. *I don't know. I know her, but I don't remember her in an IPR connection.*

Mr. Morris asked "Did she not write for your publication?" I replied: *I don't remember.*

My answer is that Miss Van Kleek contributed one article to *Pacific Affairs* in June 1938.

HARRY DEXTER WHITE. *Very limited; yes.*

The answer is *no*. Mr. White was not even a member of the IPR. He did not meet any of the Morris criteria.

ELLA WINTER. *I don't remember.*

Miss Winter contributed one article to *Pacific Affairs* in 1935.

Following the foregoing colloquy I endeavored to point out that the Morris list was not at all representative. It could not be regarded as a balanced sample of people who influenced IPR publications and policies. I reminded the Chairman that, at the outset, he wanted me to give the whole picture. If I had done this, I would have been able to mention the names of a far longer list than that of Morris'. These would have been people who rendered a much greater service than the majority of those that Morris mentioned.

8. THE ROLE OF THE IPR IN MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR PRIVATE CITIZENS AND OFFICIALS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES TO MEET PEOPLE OF OPPOSING FAR EASTERN BACKGROUNDS AND UNPALATABLE VIEWPOINTS

Mr. Morris introduced an article by Rogov printed in the Soviet trade union periodical, "The War and the Working Class."²²

I asked that I be supplied with an extra copy of that article. Morris replied that an extra copy would be made for me.²³ (This he failed to do, but many weeks later it appeared in the published edition of the Hearings.)

Morris asked whether I took Rogov to introduce him to important Government officials in Washington. I said yes, but this should be qualified. I did not take him personally. From New York I wrote letters suggesting that several Washington people might wish to meet him. This was a routine procedure at the IPR. I regarded it as part of my job to acquaint Americans and others—both officials and laymen—with visiting Europeans and Asians who were well informed on the Far East.

Mr. Morris made a great deal of the fact that I wrote to Mr. Alger Hiss to inquire whether his chief, Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, would wish to see Rogov. I replied stating that Hiss was Hornbeck's secretary or assistant and a natural channel. I should add that I was following correct State Department protocol. In the matter of high officials seeing a citizen of a foreign country whom they might not wish to see, the proper procedure was to approach them through a subordinate, so that the higher official might not have to be placed in the position of himself refusing to see a foreigner.

It so happens that Rogov, in my view, had special credentials. These came from Kuomintang Chinese, American and British friends of mine who knew full well that he was a hundred percent Russian Communist. For example, Dr. Hollington Tong, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's principal public relations adviser, told me that there was hardly one foreign correspondent in China who knew China as widely as Rogov. He mentioned Rogov's mastery of the

²² *Ibid.*, page 128.

²³ *Ibid.*, pages 130-131.

Chinese language and added that he had travelled more widely in China than almost any correspondent.

This was also the view of Christopher Chancellor, of Reuters; Liu Yu-wan, then secretary of the China IPR; and several of the American correspondents.

I conceived it as one of my duties to use every opportunity to promote occasions when people of different backgrounds and diverse points of view could meet informally to discuss problems of public importance.

In 1940, for example, the then British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, whom I had known intimately for years, invited me to lunch at the British Embassy in Washington to meet the late Sir Stafford Cripps, who had just returned from a visit to Asia. Lord Lothian believed that I would want to hear of Cripps' impressions. His remarks at lunch were so illuminating that I arranged for him to meet a dozen or more people later at a private dinner in New York.

Earlier, in the mid-1930's, when Prince Konoye was visiting this country, I gave a lunch in his honor in private rooms at the Century Club, so that a number of Americans might meet him.

Later, in 1939, when I was visiting in Japan and China, I received word from Dr. S. K. Datta, principal of the Forman College in Lahore, urging that I visit India to discuss with him and with Pandit Nehru the organization of an IPR affiliate in India. I cabled that on my flight from China to Europe I would be glad to stop over for a few days, in order to meet Nehru and himself. The three of us spent twelve hours in intimate conversation about the problems of India, and about the ways and means for forming the India section of the IPR. Naturally, Nehru and Datta asked me my impressions of Japan and China. Toward the end of the day, I told Nehru that I thought it was of the utmost importance that he should visit China himself. He retorted that he had never had an invitation. I replied that I was sure that the China IPR would invite him, if it thought that there was any chance of his accepting.

So I cabled to Mr. Liu Yu-wan, the secretary of the China IPR, suggesting that he cable an invitation to Nehru to visit China. I then took the plane for Amsterdam. On arriving there, I received a cable from Nehru, saying that the China IPR, a number of other Chinese organizations, and the Generalissimo had all cabled him, inviting him to visit Chungking, and what should he do. I simply replied "accept."

This he did. He flew to Chungking as the guest of the Generalissimo and received an overwhelming reception. He had an exceptional opportunity for a long, intimate talk with the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang for, in the middle of a big state dinner in Nehru's honor, there was a Japanese air raid on Chungking. The Chiangs took Nehru alone to one of those deep shelters in the cliffs of wartime Chungking, where, for several hours, under rather dramatic circumstances, the three of them were able quietly to discuss the common problems of the two most populated countries in the world—China and India.

Upon my return to the United States, I called on the then Chief of the State Department's Far Eastern Division, Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, and reported on what I thought were the significant features of the experiences on my journey. He was so impressed that he asked if he could turn me over to interested officers in the office of Naval Intelligence and G-2 in the War Department. As a result, I was invited to spend a long morning at one of the War Department's offices. Both the Army and Navy officers were interested in my impressions, especially with reference to Japan, China, Korea, and the Soviet Far East. I had been in Peiping and Tientsin when the Japanese took over at the time of Marco Polo Bridge in 1937. I had passed through the Japanese lines to Manchuria where, in the capital (Changchung), I was received by Lieutenant General Hoshino and members of his staff. Hoshino was the commanding General of the Japanese Army in Manchuria and had authority over all Japanese, whether civilian or military.

Those who were present at the conference at the War Department mentioned above were:

Captain W. L. Lind, U. S. N.....	Office of Naval Intelligence.
Commander S. M. Creighton, U. S. N.....	Do.
Captain W. L. Bales, U. S. M. C.....	Do.
Colonel Geo. V. Strong, U. S. A.....	War Department, G-2.
Lieut Col. P. E. Van Nostrand, U. S. A.....	Do.
Lieut. Col. R. S. Bratton, U. S. A.....	Do.
Major William Mayer, U. S. A.....	Do.

In the summer of 1942, Mr. Henry R. Luce (publisher of *Time*, *Life*, and *Fortune*) told me that he was eager to have Mr. Wendell Willkie familiarize himself with the Far Eastern situation by visiting China. Because of Mr. Willkie's relationship to President Roosevelt, Mr. Luce told me that he assumed that if Mr. Willkie could be persuaded to go to China, he would want to avoid a presidential veto. As Mr. Lauchlin Currie was the one of the President's six executive assistants who was dealing with Chinese affairs on behalf of Mr. Roosevelt, it was suggested that I might arrange for Mr. Willkie to meet with Mr. Luce, Mr. Currie and myself informally to talk the matter over.

I then gave a small private dinner in New York at which my guests were Mr. Willkie, Mr. Luce, and Mr. Currie. During most of the dinner, the conversation stemmed from Mr. Willkie's request that the three of us should tell him as much as we could about China. He did his best to get us to explain the Chinese situation and to get Mr. Luce and me to indicate why we thought a visit to China by him would be in the public interest.

Toward the end of the evening the delicate question of Mr. Willkie's relationship to the President in the matter of a possible visit to China was discussed. If I remember rightly, Mr. Currie had not discussed the matter with Mr. Roosevelt prior to the dinner. He indicated, however, that in his personal opinion such a visit by Mr. Willkie would be useful. Mr. Currie clearly thought that the more intelligent Americans made a first-hand study of China, the better. The dinner ended without any firm commitment on either side. It was, however, a valuable and highly interesting affair.

I have forgotten precisely what happened subsequently but, as is well known, Mr. Willkie with Mr. Roosevelt's blessing on his around-the-world journey did visit China and, on his return, gave the American public the benefit of his impressions of China and of the Chinese leaders. I was personally glad that Mr. Willkie had visited China because of what he brought back to the public, and also because I was at that time Chairman of the Disbursements and Program Committee of United China Relief. Mr. Willkie's service to that organization in securing greater interest in China's needs was of great value to UCR.

In the winter of 1934-35, when Mrs. Carter and I were in England prior to proceeding to India, China, Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, we were invited by an old friend, Mr. Philip Kerr, for a week end at Blickling Hall in Norfolk. Mr. Kerr was then head of the Cecil Rhodes Trust in Oxford. Later he became Lord Lothian and British Ambassador in Washington.

Among the other guests were Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Admiral Standley, the Honorable Norman H. Davis and Sir Archibald Sinclair, M. P., who later became Secretary for Air in Mr. Churchill's War Cabinet.

Because of my knowledge of Asia and Mr. Davis' concern with the continuing repercussions of the Japanese conquest of Manchuria, our host led the discussions again and again to the Far East, both during the meals and before and after. Mr. Chamberlain seemed to be so impressed with my general knowledge of the Far East that he subsequently invited me to lunch in London. Toward the end of our talk, the conversation swung around to India with which I had had considerable contact since 1902 when I first went to live and travel in that sub-continent. After inquiring as to the purposes of my Indian visit (which were to inquire as to the possibilities of establishing an Indian affiliate of the IPR and to see Mr. Gandhi, in whom my friends in the Far East were immensely interested), Mr. Chamberlain expressed his desire to have me talk with Lord Willingdon, then Viceroy of India.

This he arranged presumably by cable for, on our arrival in Bombay, a messenger from the Viceroy met our steamer with an invitation from Lord Willingdon to proceed immediately to New Delhi as his guests. There we stayed for a few days at Viceroy's House, where we had long talks with him and Lady Willingdon. We met members of his government and staff and attended the festivities in honor of the visiting Maharajah of Nepal. Lord Willingdon expressed the hope that after his term as Viceroy was over, he himself could visit the Far East. He questioned me extensively about conditions in that area and wished me well on my impending visit to Gandhi in Central India. He added that I was fortunate to have this opportunity and added that he had made a mistake in affirming that while he was Viceroy he would never meet Gandhi.

His official interest in the possibility of the eventual establishment of an Indian affiliate of the IPR luckily did not obstruct but aided indirectly in the eventual establishment of the Indian Council of World Affairs. This today is one of the strongest members of the Institute.

This catalogue could continue to excessive length. It is included here only to point out that I made it my business as Secretary-General to inform both private citizens and government representatives of the developing work of the IPR and the IPR's desire to secure authentic information from as many sources as possible.

9. HOW DID I HAPPEN TO SUGGEST THAT A PRO-COMMUNIST BOOK BE SENT CERTAIN AMERICAN OFFICIALS AND SENATORS?

I was asked several questions regarding a book published by Little Brown & Co., entitled *The Unfinished Revolution in China* by Israel Epstein.²¹ In response to an inquiry by the publisher's publicity director, Miss Anne Ford, for suggestions as to whom she might send the book, I wrote Miss Ford making a number of suggestions. It was a frequent procedure for publishers to consult the IPR on such occasions. But I want to point that *this was not an IPR book*. It was published quite independently of the IPR by Little Brown & Co., a reputable publishing firm.

In reply to Miss Ford's inquiry for a list of names to whom she might mail copies, I indicated that I had read two-thirds of it and I thought it important for Little Brown to send copies of the **Secretary of State, to Senators Vandenberg, Morse and Ives, and also to John Foster Dulles, John Carter Vincent, United States Ambassador Leighton Stuart and others in China.** Knowing the competence of all of the foregoing, I did not think that the reading of a single book would sway them. This appeared to me to be the first major postwar book that had appeared on the Chinese Communist program in North China. The first part of the book contained a great amount of material that had not been available to the public.

In suggesting that it be sent to American officials and Senators, however, I did not expect any one of them to accept the book as anything more than the outlook of one person. To think that such wise Americans as those I mentioned would be swayed by the book strikes me as ridiculous and childish. Those who are familiar with the ability and integrity of the late Senator Vandenberg, for example, could hardly picture him as being thrown off balance by one book from a little known author.

Whether Miss Ford did actually send copies to any or all on the list, or whether any of them read the book, I have never learned. Today I am convinced that if a large number of thoughtful Americans and Chinese had more seriously studied the sort of problems which Epstein outlined, we would have been better prepared to meet the challenge of Chinese communism in subsequent years.

10. THE INSTITUTE EXPLORED MANY CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES

In its research studies and at its conferences, the Institute unhesitatingly focussed attention on the "hot spots" of Far Eastern conditions. Listed below are a few examples of published studies of issues that were highly controversial at the time they were undertaken:

- Extra-territoriality in China*, by James T. Shotwell (1929)
- Tariff Autonomy of China*, by Mingchien Bau (1929)
- The Manchurian Dilemma-Force or Pacific Settlement?* by Shuhsi Hsu (1931)
- Land and Labor in China*, by R. H. Tawney (1932)
- Trade and Trade Rivalry Between the United States and Japan*, by W. W. Lockwood (1936)
- The Struggle for North China*, by George E. Taylor (1940)
- Social and Industrial Problems of Shanghai*, by Eleanor Hinder (1940)
- Japan and the Opium Menace*, by Frederick T. Merrill (1942)
- British Economic Interests in the Far East*, by E. M. Gull (1943)
- Industrial Development of the Netherlands-Indies*, by Peter Sitsen (1944)
- American Policy and the Chinese Revolution (1925-1928)*, by Dorothy Borg (1947)
- The Chinese in Malaya*, by Victor Purcell (1948)
- Manchuria Since 1931*, by F. C. Jones (1949)
- Korea Today*, by George McCune (1950)

²¹ Ibid., pages 452-466.

11. FACTS ABOUT IPR METHODS AND PURPOSES OF WHICH THE McCARRAN SUBCOMMITTEE HAS SHOWN LITTLE UNDERSTANDING

From the line of the questions put by members and counsel of the McCarran Subcommittee, it would appear that they are so obsessed by the fairy tale which had been fabricated of the IPR as a Communist front and espionage agency that they could not examine the true purpose and achievements of the Institute throughout its history.

They seem to have refused to acknowledge the plain fact that here is an organization that has adopted the most nonpartisan, democratic of methods in an effort to add to the fund of human knowledge on the Pacific. Closing their eyes to the preponderance of reliable evidence in the IPR record, the Subcommittee has become a prisoner of its own unethical procedure of taking isolated letters, documents and sentences from published volumes completely out of context, both as to date and substance. Ignoring the full pattern of the organization's work, they have built their case on the flimsy basis of minor and unrelated threads.

Particularly startling is the fact that these Senators of the United States show so little understanding of the abysmal ignorance of the Far East on the part of the American people, and fail so utterly to appreciate the need for the very type of program the Institute has carried on this past quarter century. (I have found as yet no evidence that more than one of the Subcommittee has ever set foot in Asia.)

Yet the founders of the IPR faced the problem of public inertia from the first. In 1925, they saw clearly that if anything was to be done to increase American knowledge of the Pacific, many sectors of American life had to be aroused to a sense of the need of more information on the subject. This meant that fresh factual material had to be prepared. New research personnel must be recruited and trained, and linguistic skills had to be developed. Funds for the new venture had to be raised. Media for testing and diffusing the new knowledge had to be devised, and a long-range plan developed for mobilizing scholars, teachers, librarians, businessmen, publicists and others to our work.

The founders realized, too, that the underlying approach of the new organization would be all-important. Committed to the task of studying the problems of many peoples whose outlook was different and whose viewpoint might frequently conflict, they saw that it would necessarily have to adopt a coldly scientific attitude in all its activities, and would have to be completely nonpartisan. It would have to assemble data from all countries concerned with each issue studied. It would have to show the same hospitality to the "unpalatable" as to the "palatable" point of view on controversial issues.

Thus the standard was set up for the organization—a strict standard of accuracy, objectivity and nonpartisanship. For twenty-seven years this philosophy has shaped the work of the IPR. It has been respected throughout the world. The McCarran Subcommittee seems to have missed its significance.

They have failed utterly to understand that here is an organization which has refused to be limited to safe issues and the viewpoints of a chosen few.

This is an organization whose standards of scientific inquiry have been so strict and so generally respected, that for the past quarter century it has been able to focus the spotlight of study and discussion on the "hot spots" of Asia and East-West relations—on the most controversial issues of our time. It is obvious to anyone of unbiased mind that this has been an outstanding achievement. It has made a unique contribution to the record of human knowledge. Only men of small minds would wish to see it changed either in approach or content. Bankers, industrialists, scholars and journalists in several countries, including the United States, do however desire one change. They urge that its program be enlarged.

One eminent American who holds this view is Mr. Gerard Swope, the honorary president of the General Electric Company, and the active chairman of the American Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like to close this page by quoting a paragraph from a statement which Mr. Swope made at a press conference in New York on October 9, 1951, as follows:

"If the day ever comes when it will not be possible for a private nonpartisan society like the American Institute of Pacific Relations to seek and publish facts without fear of political reprisal, and to present to the public differing opinions on controversial issues, something essential to the American way of life will have been lost."

12. FURTHER AMPLIFICATION, CORRECTION AND CLARIFICATION

(a) The Subcommittee's procedures contrasted with those proposed by Senators Kefauver and O'Connor

The officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations are only a few of many Americans who believe that the time has come to establish a sound set of procedures for Senate investigatory committees. For example, Senator Estes Kefauver has shown his concern by introducing S. Con. Res. 44. This has not yet been referred out of the Committee on Rules and Administration. I understand that Senator Kefauver does not expect that there will be a revision of Senate committee procedures until this resolution is adopted by the Senate. It should be noted that he is a member of the Committee on the Judiciary, although he is not a member of that body's subcommittee on the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I would like respectfully to call attention also to the admirable suggestions for Senate committees' procedures which were put forward last year by Senator O'Connor, an eminent member of the Senate Judiciary Committee and also a member of the Subcommittee on the IPR. A few weeks after Senator McCarran's Subcommittee began its public sessions, Senator O'Connor made a widely publicized statement in the course of an address before Chief Justices of the State Supreme Courts, New York, September 13, 1951. In this statement, like Senator Kefauver's, he summarized the principles that should guide the procedures of Senate investigating committees. Nevertheless, in not one of the several sessions of the McCarran Committee which I had the privilege of attending in 1951, did I note evidence that the Subcommittee was following the admirable courses which two members of the Judiciary Committee had already advanced and advocated.

Under these circumstances it was inevitable that many of our citizens, including officers of the IPR and its attorneys, were inclined to believe that the Senate Committee was not keeping up-to-date with reference to the march of American thought. The Subcommittee's sessions which I attended took on the atmosphere of an inquisition rather than that of a scientific inquiry.

Perhaps this was not so much the fault of the Senators as that of the Subcommittee's counsel, Mr. Robert Morris. Illustrations of procedures and tactics which I personally challenge are as follows:

(1) The Subcommittee's counsel, Mr. Morris, made an effort to put words into my mouth by summarizing remarks which I had just made, but in a quite different sense.

(2) From September 1951 to March 1952, Mr. Morris failed to keep his promises to provide me with copies of material from the IPR files which I requested in order that I might answer questions intelligently.

(3) I was asked to comment on Mr. Owen Lattimore's long letter to me of July 1938, before I had time to read it. In another case I was to read a part of a letter but ordered not to look at the rest of the contents.

(4) Mr. Morris avoided answering my questions as to the dates when Mr. Field wrote for leftist publications, i. e., *The New Masses* and *The Daily Worker*. It now appears from the Subcommittee's printed record, which was not published for several weeks after the session in which I interrogated Mr. Morris, that Field did not write for either of these two publications until a considerable time after he had ceased to be an executive officer of the Institute.

(5) I am free to admit that even if a truly American procedure had been followed, I would still have been handicapped. The Institute's Secretary General and also the Institute's attorneys, Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl, requested that the Senate Subcommittee return to the IPR files which an agent of the Subcommittee had seized illegally from my barn at Lee, Massachusetts. The Subcommittee failed to reply to these requests, nor did they offer even limited access to those IPR files which were stored in the Senate Office Building until some thirteen months after the robbery took place. Without access to these records during the hearings, I could not answer many of Mr. Morris' questions with satisfaction either to the Committee or to myself.

(b) Senator Ferguson's irritation at my implication that the IPR files had been tampered with

(Pp. 44-45) Here Senator Ferguson was apparently annoyed at a remark of mine that had implied that I suspected that the old files stored by the IPR in my barn at Lee, Massachusetts, might have been tampered with. That my suspicion was justified, but in a quite different context, was clear from the following.

At the time of the Subcommittee's illegal seizure of the files, it became apparent that the files had been tampered with prior to the Subcommittee's raid. It

is now a matter of public record that an agent of Senator McCarthy was party to robbing the barn on two occasions prior to the Subcommittee's seizure. Senator Mundt has been bold enough to make this sorry spectacle available to the public. The occasion of this was the appearance in *The New York Post*, on September 18, 1951, of one of a series of articles by Oliver Pilat and William V. Shannon. The pertinent excerpt is as follows:

"Early in 1951, McCarthy was again poaching on Hoover's (J. Edgar) preserves. Surine, his investigator, broke into a barn in Lee, Mass., and carried off some of the documents that had been stored there by the Institute of Pacific Relations. The IPR had already offered to let any authorized government agency go through the papers. In the summer of 1950, several FBI agents spent weeks poring over the material. Surine was unauthorized but eager to score a beat for McCarthy.

"Surine got the papers through one of the methods used by investigators generally, without the knowledge of the IPR," boasted Sen. Mundt (R—S. D.), a friend of McCarthy's who found the adventure a diversion from the weightier problems of his office. 'I don't think I'd better say just how he got them. It might get somebody into a lot of trouble,' Mundt told this newspaper.

"Surine brought some of the documents to McCarthy. McCarthy brought the samples to me. I went through part of them and Joe went through the others. Surine said the FBI was watching the barn and he was afraid the IPR might find that out and move the papers. We decided something had to be done quickly.

"We finally decided that Joe should talk it over with Senator McCarran (D—Nev.), chairman of the new judicial subcommittee investigating Communism. He did and the subcommittee decided to issue a subpoena for the documents. I suggested that instead of serving the subpoena on officials of the IPR it be served on the caretaker of the farm so there would be no possibility of the records being destroyed. That's the way it was done.

"That isn't quite the whole story. Surine took thousands of letters from the farm in the course of two different trips. He brought them to the office of Matthews (J. B.) in Hearst headquarters at 8th Avenue and 57th Street, where some of the more interesting ones were photostated. The samples examined by Mundt came from his cache. The real purpose of the McCarran seizure was to cover up the earlier escapade.

"The Mundt statement carried an implication that the FBI was not quite bright enough to protect the papers. The FBI may have noticed that, too.

"The FBI does not discuss grievances against a Senator or a former FBI man for the public record. It issued no statement on the Surine-McCarthy-Matthews-Mundt melodrama. It did, however, summon Surine and Matthews privately for extended questioning about the documents and the way they were acquired."

(c) Correction of my testimony regarding Alger Hiss

(Pp. 135-136) Here either I, myself, or the stenotypist, was responsible for totally misleading statements. Senator McCarran asked whether Mr. Hiss was not an assistant to Dr. Hornbeck, although I had designated him as a secretary. The printed hearings record me as having stated twice that Mr. Hiss was not much more than a stenographer. I was then asked whether it was not true that Mr. Hiss had an office of his own, separate and apart from Dr. Hornbeck. My reply was:

"You went in and there were two or three lady secretaries, and receptionists, and so on, and to the right was one of those old State Department lattice doors, and you went in to Hornbeck; and at the left you went in to Hiss, and it was a much smaller office, and as I remember it there was not a lattice door; and that was the geography of it."

I am sure I meant to say that Mr. Hiss clearly was much more than a stenographer. Of course, I knew at the time of my visits to Dr. Hornbeck's office that Mr. Hiss was Dr. Hornbeck's principal and highly valued assistant.

(d) The Committee on Militarism in Education

In the early summer of 1940, Mr. Field asked me for my opinion regarding invitations which both he and I had received from what was called the Committee on Militarism in Education to sign the Declaration Against Conscription. I did not accept the invitation. I learned later that Mr. Field did not do so either. I now wish to quote for insertion in the Subcommittee's printed record the following copy of my letter of July 2, 1940, to Field on this matter:

"DEAR FRED: I did not respond to the invitation of the Committee on Militarism in Education to sign the Declaration Against Conscription because I couldn't agree to sign it and I didn't have the time to write an adequate letter explaining why I couldn't sign it.

"Some of my reasons for dissent are as follows:

"1. The main body of the declaration seeks to prove that we are not in danger. I believe that American interests including American ways of life are greatly endangered by both Germany and Japan.

"2. This declaration appears to make the point that because a thing has never been necessary in the past it will never be necessary in the future.

"3. I think mass conscription of whatever forces are necessary whether it is five per cent or fifty per cent of our citizens is much healthier and democratic than the building up of an aristocratic professional army.

"If, for example, Versailles had permitted Germany a democratic army the post-war history of Germany might have been different. By limiting Germany to 100 thousand, Versailles created an aristocratic army which was predominantly Prussian. In other words, it perpetuated the Prussian military caste, the destruction of which was one of the announced aims of the Allies in going to war with Germany. This Prussian military caste was even more influential in bringing Hitler to power than German big business.

"With you, I would like to see a public authoritative study of our defense needs. I think such a study would prove the one sound point which I find in this declaration, namely, the last sentence—'that comparatively small forces of highly trained soldier-mechanics, properly equipped, can defeat many times their number of partially trained civilian conscripts regardless of how courageous the latter may be.' I want to see the government have the power to conscript highly trained soldier-mechanics to whatever extent necessary, but on a mass and democratic basis, not on the basis of aristocracy or poverty.

"Most of the declaration makes me sick at its emotional ardor for the American tradition and its total blindness to the dangers that confront us. I know that Hitler didn't pay for the drafting of this declaration, but he would get his money's worth out of its publication if he had contributed a large sum to its drafting. Until we as a people are willing to back up our beliefs with force, I see nothing but the total eclipse of civilization ahead.

"Sincerely yours,

"EDWARD C. CARTER."

(e) "*Death does not rob a man of his place in history.*"

In opening the session of August 2, 1951, Senator McCarran spoke in part as follows:

(P. 223) "Let me say before commencing the hearing of today I would like to mention that the names of people now dead will figure in today's testimony. I would like to say that the introduction of such names into the record is done with reluctance because we are aware that it is not for us to pass judgment on those who have passed beyond. But a congressional committee, charged with a heavy duty, must present every possible fact to shed light on present-day conspiracy. Thus an association of 5 or 10 years back involving a man or woman now dead can well illuminate a relationship of today or aid in characterizing a living conspirator. Death does not rob a man of his place in history. It is in this spirit then that reference will be made to the dead today."

Here Senator McCarran was preparing the way for the next witness, Mrs. Hede Massing, to pass judgment on Mr. Laurence Duggan when he was no longer alive to answer Mrs. Massing's charges. Senator McCarran's outlook could hardly have had a better illustration, for with the voice of one who was so deeply pained at the thought of mentioning the name of a deceased person, he said: "It is not for us to pass judgment on those who have passed beyond."

Mrs. Massing was given the opportunity of explaining her role as a Communist agent and then told of her success in recruiting Laurence Duggan into the Communist apparatus.

Against Mrs. Massing's boast regarding Duggan must be set the flatly contrary statements of Whittaker Chambers, Isaac Don Levine, Attorney General Tom Clark and Richard M. Nixon. These are to be found in the memorial volume published by the Overbrook Press of Stamford, Conn., entitled "Laurence Duggan, 1905-1948." For Whittaker Chambers, see page 11; for Attorney General Clark,

see page 60; for Isaac Don Levine, see pages 61-63; and for Richard M. Nixon, see pages 51-52. The text of the Attorney General's statement is as follows:

"DECEMBER 24, 1948.

"The FBI investigation has produced no evidence of Mr. Duggan's connection with the Communist Party or with any other espionage activity. On the contrary, the evidence discloses that Mr. Duggan was a loyal employee of the United States Government.

"In answer to many inquiries concerning Laurence Duggan, the Attorney General stated that while it is the policy of the Department of Justice not to comment upon the evidence in the files or upon interviews made by its agents, he was deviating from this rule in order to prevent an injustice, being done to the family of a former employee of the Government."

A few hours after Mr. Duggan's death, Karl Mundt, then Acting Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, called a meeting of the subcommittee of the General Committee which was attended by a minority of two members—Mundt himself and Richard M. Nixon. According to the press, these two members proceeded to inform a press gathering that the files of the Committee showed that Duggan has passed on to Whittaker Chambers confidential information. The following day, Chambers denied this. The public reaction to Mundt's action was shown immediately in condemnatory newspaper editorials. These appeared in such reliable organs of public opinion as the New York Herald Tribune, The New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, and by broadcasters such as Edward R. Murrow, Elmer Davis, Martin Agronsky and Drew Pearson.

The testimony thus far presented to the McCarran Committee shows that Duggan's contact with the Institute of Pacific Relations was of a most insignificant character due to the fact that his field was Latin America, and not the Far East.

It is to be hoped that the McCarran Subcommittee will include in its printed record a copy of the memorial volume described above. This little book gives the record of Duggan's life and, as previously mentioned, contains the statements by Whittaker Chambers, Isaac Don Levine and Attorney General Clark. It also contains Senator Mundt's inexcusable attack and the text of the dissent from that attack by certain other members of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Here Mr. Morris introduced letters from the IPR files concerning Laurence Duggan. The first was from me to W. W. Lockwood, dated May 8, 1940.²⁵ Mr. Morris asserted that in this letter I was discussing plans of the Institute of Pacific Relations. *This was not true.* My letter to Lockwood was addressed to him, care of the American Committee for International Studies. This was not an IPR body; it was an entirely separate Committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Edward M. Earle, of Princeton University. It was made up of prominent American scholars and men of affairs. It was aided by the Social Science Research Council. It included in its purview, not only the Pacific, but the whole world. My letter was written in response to a letter that I received from Mr. Lockwood in his capacity as secretary of that Committee. He had asked for suggestions in reference to the Committee's programs. I made some fifteen suggestions for that Committee's study. The only reference to Laurence Duggan was in Suggestion 12, as follows:

(P. 239) "(12) Ask Henry Allen Moe, Laurence Duggan and others who are the one or two Latin Americans of great intellectual ability who look at Latin America for a continental and international point of view, who might establish contact with the appropriate groups in the leading countries and then come to New York to give the groups here the benefit of his study of such thinking as there is in Latin America on war aims and postwar organization."

Mr. Moe was at that time, and still is, the head of the Guggenheim Foundation and a man who, like Laurence Duggan, was exceptionally well-informed on Latin America.

It should be pointed out that the purpose of the letter was to urge the American Committee for International Studies to adopt a broad and comprehensive plan for studying the problems of post-war organization in relationship to war aims.

²⁵ The full text of my letter to W. W. Lockwood of May 8, 1940, is printed on pages 237-239 as Exhibit No. 41. Following this letter is a favorable comment on it by Dr. Percy E. Corbett (pages 239-240). Dr. Corbett has been Dean of the Faculty of Law, McGill University, a Guggenheim Fellow, Professor of Government and Jurisprudence at Yale, and is now a Professor at Princeton.

In the United States and other countries, unofficial organizations were beginning to study these questions. My suggestion was that Dr. Earle's Committee could aid in giving these studies a global character in the hope that when the war was over, the peace could be won and not lost.

(P. 241) Mr. Morris' irresponsible method of establishing guilt by association without any fidelity to dates was illustrated by his introducing correspondence between Duggan and Frederick V. Field of November and December, 1935—long before Mr. Field had resigned as Secretary of the American IPR and an even longer period before Field had begun to write for *The Daily Worker* and *The New Masses* and when he was highly regarded by eminent scholars and bankers, who were familiar with his work. Duggan's letter to Field was simply an invitation to Field to spend an evening in Washington with an informal group that was carrying on a series of discussions of international matters of interest.

The attempt by Senator McCarran and Mr. Morris to discredit the IPR by bringing in the name of Laurence Duggan was in bad taste and irrelevant. Duggan was dead and could not comment. Duggan in fact did not meet any of the criteria of association with the IPR which Mr. Morris laid down.

(f) *James S. Allen's appeal for a financial subsidy was not granted.*

(Pp. 251-252) These pages give the correspondence I had with James S. Allen about his desire to get financial assistance from the IPR in furthering his studies of the Filipino economy. American knowledge of agrarian problems in the Philippines was severely limited. It seemed as though it was both in the American and in the Filipino interest to get several scholars to work on the problem. Because of the Institute's limited financial resources, Mr. Allen's request for monetary assistance for his project was never granted.

(g) *Miss Smedley asked the IPR's help in getting two Chinese (prisoners of the Japanese in Hong Kong) placed on an exchange list*

(P. 259) The reference here is to the letter which the IPR received from Miss Agnes Smedley, asking the Institute's good offices in getting two Chinese, who were prisoners of the Japanese in Hong Kong, placed on an exchange list. This couple was Dr. and Mrs. Chen Han-seng. Mrs. Chen was reported as seriously ill. This was a request for a humanitarian effort on the part of the IPR.

(h) *Challenge to Mrs. Massing's testimony by Miss Harriet Moore*

(P. 260) The reference made is to Miss Harriet Moore by Mrs. Massing. She asserts that she met Miss Moore socially in Moscow and that Miss Moore stayed either at the International Hotel or the Hotel Lux. Miss Moore, now Mrs. Gelfan, wrote to William L. Holland on September 8, 1951, regarding Mrs. Massing's testimony, that she had never been inside the Lux Hotel and doesn't even recall the existence of the Hotel International. On her visits to Russia, Miss Moore traveled Intourist and the hotels at which she stayed in Moscow were the Metropole and the New Moscow. She adds that she never met Mrs. Massing or Mr. Gerhard Eisler. In fact, she never heard of them until their names came into prominence in the past year or two. She never met Agnes Smedley and never heard of Grace Maul. Mrs. Gelfan closed with a paragraph saying that Mrs. Massing's testimony is false.

(i) *Invitation list to a conference at Sunset Farm—October 18-21, 1935*

(P. 263) Mr. Robert Morris introduced to the Committee a letter of mine dated Lee, Mass., August 31, 1935, to Frederick V. Field, inviting him to participate in a staff conference at Sunset Farm, October 18-21. The letter stated that I was hoping that the following could be present: Escott Reid, Richard Pyke, Kate Mitchell, Leonard Wu, Kathleen Barnes, Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley, Harriet Moore, W. L. Holland. May I comment on these as follows:

Mr. Reid was at that time Secretary of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and, later, for many years, has held high positions in the Canadian diplomatic service. Richard Pyke (British) was, for several years, on the staff of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in London, and had just accepted a position on the IPR's Secretariat to handle the publication of IPR books in Shanghai. Miss Mitchell, at that time, was serving as my secretary. Mr. Wu was a scholar from Kuomintang China, highly regarded by his Chinese colleagues. Kathleen Barnes (American) was then aiding in the IPR's studies of the Soviet Union.

Miss Fairfax-Cholmeley had accompanied Mrs. Carter and me on our visits to India, China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand in 1935. She came from a

well-known family in Yorkshire. Many years later she married Israel Epstein who, in the past years, has been accused by the Subcommittee as a supporter of the Chinese Communist cause. At the time of the Lee meeting in 1935, Miss Fairfax-Cholmeley showed no interest in Chinese Communists. I think she did not meet Mr. Epstein until they were fellow-prisoners of the Japanese in the Stanley Prison in Hong Kong in 1941. They and one or two Englishmen escaped from that prison and, together, traveled by sampan and on foot to Chungking.

Mr. William L. Holland is well known to the Committee.

Miss Moore, in her letter to Mr. Holland of September 8, 1951, pointed out that during the brief period when she was Acting Secretary of the American IPR in 1943-44, many of the staff members were called into military and other war service. Her appointment was simply to carry out existing projects until the staff returned and a new secretary could be found. As far as she was aware, there was not, at any time, any group in the IPR seeking to use it for propaganda espionage purposes. She believes that the record of that period, in regard to publications, research, and meetings, will confirm her view as to the variety of subjects dealt with and the diversity of views of the authors and subjects. Subsequent documents introduced by Mr. Robert Morris indicate some of Miss Moore's routine duties in connection with the Mt. Tremblant Conference and the favorable comment which the American IPR made on Miss Moore's services during the year that she served as Acting Secretary, following Mr. William Lockwood's departure for the China war theatre. (Mr. Lockwood was a Major on General Chennault's staff in Kunming. He is now a professor at Princeton.)

(j) *Mrs. Massing's attack on Corliss Lamont*

(P. 267) Mrs. Massing asserted that everybody knew Corliss Lamont was a Communist. This Mr. Lamont has denied in a communication to the Senate Subcommittee. He has recently published a pamphlet entitled "Why I Am Not a Communist."

(k) *William S. White's significant article in the New York Times*

Toward the end of the Subcommittee's first public hearing (July 25, 1951), Senator McCarran called attention to the length of the period during which I had been on the witness stand and added, "You have been a ready witness, and the Committee is grateful for the information you have given us." This was naturally reassuring to me personally, for this Subcommittee was the first Congressional Committee of which I had had personal knowledge.

I knew, of course, that the procedures of some Communists had been increasingly challenged in recent years. Indeed there were those who were saying that the procedures were such that a person being investigated could not hope to convince the general public, but he could at least reassure his friends. To this end and because it was my duty as an American citizen, I resolved that I would do my best to answer all questions as fully and frankly as possible. I do not consciously evade any question.

But, as the hearings continued, my skepticism of the current methods of the Subcommittee increased. It has grown as the months have rolled by. It was confirmed still further on March 23, 1952, when I read a significant article by William S. White in the Sunday Magazine Section of the *New York Times*. As is well known, Mr. White of the *Times* Washington staff, has covered many of the Congressional investigations since the end of the war. In this article, he has departed from straight reporting and expresses a personal opinion of what he considers a dangerous trend. He did not refer in his article to the Subcommittee's investigation of the IPR, but he did emphasize the evolution of Congressional investigation into what he thought, in all disinterest, must be called, all too often, a kind of pitiless inquisition in which, he put it plainly, the accused is licked before he starts. He added that such inquiries have now become, however, punitive rather than fact-finding. It is my personal opinion that what Mr. White said applied, for the most part, to the proceedings of the Subcommittee on the IPR. In fact, I am reminded that perhaps the best description of the Subcommittee's procedure is what they call in France The Communist Technique of Retroactive Defamation. The methods adopted by the Subcommittee's counsel, presumably with the approval of the Subcommittee, are sadly reminiscent of previous and current attempts by Communist authorities in several governments to defame retroactively or posthumously destroy the reputations of those who block their evil purposes.

215 EAST 72ND STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y., May 1 1952.

APPENDIX A

SUNSET FARM,

Lee, Massachusetts, 19th July, 1938.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,

C/o Allie Robinson's Camp, Independence, California.

DEAR OWEN: Thank you for your long and delightful letter of July 10 from Independence. What an intriguing name for editorial work in this particular age.

In the strictest confidence I am sending you a copy of Paul Scheffer's comment on Bloch's original outline (I did not tell Scheffer who wrote the outline).

With reference to Hu Shih, we had him here at Lee for a weekend conference just before he sailed. Chen and Chi were also here. Though both these men differ with Hu Shih very strongly, they both believe in his integrity of character. We are all trying to get him to write a major monograph to document the "temporizing policy" of Nanking in the last few years. He is convinced that the Generalissimo was preparing as fervently for ultimate resistance to Japan as were the Communists. We have asked him to go the whole way in making available documents that would prove his thesis. Whether we agree with his thesis or not it is important to have the job well done. This is a round about way of answering your question as to the weight which Hu Shih exerts in American circles and the extent in which he molds or leads the opinions of the Chinese in America. With Americans who have never heard of Chu Teh, Hu Shih stands out as a really great Chinese patriot—a man of dignity and a mind with a spacious point of view. To those Americans who feel that the Chinese Communists are making an epic contribution to Chinese unification Hu Shih seems to be living in the Victorian Age, albeit in rather a distinguished fashion. The reaction of Chinese in America to Hu Shih is similar to that of Americans according to their own line up on the question of Chinese Communists.

Thank you for the tip about Serene. I will write to Lasswell today.

With reference to the question which you raise as to the role that you should play in view of Japanese attacks on the impartiality of members of the American Council staff and the Pacific Council staff I am inclined to take the position that the American Council staff are in one category, the Chinese and Japanese members of the International Secretariat are in a second, and you, Bill Holland, and I in a third, though all three categories blur into each other. The American Council staff are responsible only to the American people. They thus should be among the freest people on earth. The Chinese and Japanese members of our own staff are chosen among other reasons because they are Chinese or Japanese and we want from them the fullest possible reflection of all that is most fundamental in the attitudes of their countries. You and Holland and the other non-Oriental members of the International Secretariat and myself are the servants of all eleven Councils. Our role is an almost impossible one. It might be likened to the role of the Speaker in the House of Commons, namely to ensure that every responsible point of view in the Institute is given a full hearing. This means that we ought to convince all the National Councils that whatever are our own private views, the Secretariat, the research program, the conferences, and Pacific Affairs are administered with complete detachment so that every responsible point of view is represented in the most favorable possible light.

If in our private capacities we take a line that is so conspicuous that any large element in our constituency feels that we cannot administer our international responsibilities with impartiality then I think that our non-Secretariat activities should be reconsidered. Some weeks ago I came to the tentative conclusion that so far as I myself am concerned I should seriously consider declining all public invitations to speak on the Far Eastern situation. By public invitations I mean those which are reported by the press. In the past month I have declined to write for Amerasia. I did this because in Japan Amerasia is regarded as having been founded with a definite anti-Japanese bias.

However unjust this feeling may be we have got to make some allowance for the exigencies of war psychology as it affects our Japanese friends.

Saionji is one of the straightest thinking of young Japanese. He has stood apart and above the muddled-headed war philosophy during the past year in a most striking manner. The other day I learned privately that he had single-handed raised the money that was needed to carry on the Japanese I. P. R. this year, but that now the donors were hammering him because of the line taken both by members of the International Secretariat and the American Council staff. I understand that he feels that the American Council staff are

free. In other words to his friends he defends the right of the American Council staff to take any line they want. But he finds it difficult to explain what appears to be partisanship on the part of members of the Secretariat. I personally wish that it was possible for you to withdraw from the Amerasia board in the interests of the major task of integration which we have ahead of us for the next two years. I do not think any hasty action is called for but it is a matter I have long wanted to discuss with you and have never had the opportunity.

I am exceedingly glad that you approve of the way Yasuo is functioning. If ever a man was in a hot spot he is it.

Motylev is going to the Soviet Far East instead of coming here. I am urging him to send Voitinsky in his place.

Dennery, Takayanagi, and Dafoe are all coming to Sunset Farm for ten days on August 10 to meet with the International Secretariat. Is there any chance of your coming east in time for this meeting or at least arriving by the 16th or 17th?

Would you let us know just how we should describe your Johns Hopkins appointment so that it can be announced in the next issue of IPR NOTES.

If you are able to come on while Dennery is here you will be able to find out who the French counterparts of Archie Rose and Barbara Wooton are.

It is grand to hear that the family is all well and that you are making good progress on your book. If anything takes you to Seattle you may wish to look up John Alden Carter who is acting as an assistant to the president of McDougall Southwick Co. He is at present staying with Herb Little. Mrs. Carter and Ruth send their greetings to your whole household.

Yours very sincerely,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

APPENDIX B

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

HONOLULU—LOS ANGELES—NEW YORK—SAN FRANCISCO—SEATTLE—WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 EAST 54TH STREET, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

ELdorado 5-1759

MARCH 17, 1947.

DEAR FELLOW MEMBER: For over two years, Mr. Alfred Kohlberg, a former member of the American Institute of Pacific Relations and an importer with substantial business interests in China, has been carrying on a campaign charging the Institute with bias in its treatment of the contemporary situation in the Far East, especially in China.

In any country as wartorn as China, there may well develop honest differences as to the factors which underlie the current difficulties and, consequently, as to the course which will lead to a solution. Feelings naturally run high. But no reader can draw as severe criticisms of the Kuomintang Government from the publications of the IPR as those set forth in General Marshall's report to President Truman.

You will note in the enclosure entitled "An Attempt to Stifle IPR Scrutiny of the Chinese Situation" that as one of the many efforts to meet Mr. Kohlberg's demands, he has been offered the privilege of mailing his accusations on March 20th to the entire membership of the American IPR. In this mailing, we understand, he will ask the members for proxies to be posted direct to him, authorizing him at a members' meeting on April 22nd to introduce a resolution appointing a committee to investigate his charges.

The Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees has investigated Mr. Kohlberg's charges and found them inaccurate and irresponsible.

We, the undersigned, have been connected with the IPR over a period of years. We have observed its research and educational program closely and have no hesitation in stating that the charges are false. We believe that you will agree with us that the IPR has an enviable record for unbiased and scholarly research. The enclosed excerpts of letters from recognized experts on the Far East are only some of the many that have been received emphasizing the high regard in which IPR publications are held by scholars. Some of the very publications criticized by Mr. Kohlberg have been highly praised by Army, Navy, and State Department officials in a position to know the facts and were exten-

sively used by the armed services during the war. Indeed, so useful were IPR materials to the war effort that the American IPR was awarded the Navy "E" in 1945.

Please sign the enclosed proxy and return it by quickest mail if you wish to support the present administration of the American IPR under the direction of the recently elected Board of Trustees whose names you will find enclosed. We hope that you will be present to vote in person. But in any case we urge that you send in your proxy. If you attend in person, your proxy will not be used.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH P. CHAMBERLAIN.
ARTHUR H. DEAN.
WALTER F. DILLINGHAM.
BROOKS EMENY.
HUNTINGTON GILCHRIST.
W. R. HEROD.
PHILIP C. JESSUP.

NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING OF MEMBERS OF AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC., TO BE HELD AT ITS OFFICES, 1 EAST 54TH STREET, NEW YORK CITY AT 4:30 P. M. ON TUESDAY, APRIL 22, 1947

PURPOSE OF THE MEETING

Considering a resolution to be proposed by Alfred Kohlberg appointing a committee to investigate certain charges of Alfred Kohlberg, and such other business as may properly come before the meeting

MARGUERITE ANN STEWART,
Secretary.

Please cut along this line and sign and return the proxy to the offices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1 East 54th Street, New York 22

PROXY

The undersigned member of the American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., does hereby constitute and appoint ARTHUR H. DEAN and JOSEPH P. CHAMBERLAIN, or either of them, with full power of substitution, as my duly constituted proxies and attorneys to vote in my behalf against any and all proposals made by Alfred Kohlberg at a meeting of the members on Tuesday, April 22nd, 1947, or any adjournment thereof, and to vote in favor of sustaining the policies of the Board of Trustees, with all the power I would possess if personally present, hereby ratifying and confirming all my proxies and attorneys may do in my behalf.

(Sign here)-----
Member

APPENDIX C

UNITED CHINA RELIEF, INC.

1790 BROADWAY

New York 19, N. Y.

AUGUST 13, 1946.

MR. ALFRED KOHLBERG,
1 West 37th Street, New York 1, N. Y.

DEAR MR. KOHLBERG: Because of your interest in the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, I believe the following may prove of interest to you. (I served on the Executive Committee of the Council for nearly three years.)

When United China Relief was organized one of the most difficult problems was the division of funds collected. A Program Committee was organized, an office

established in China, and an Advisory Committee of Chinese and Americans there was formed.

Mr. Carter was elected Chairman of the Program Committee from its start. At great personal sacrifice, he so served, with remarkable tact and diplomacy, until late last year.

The strongest test of the effectiveness of this Committee was in China itself. Accordingly, we were deeply impressed to receive, last month, for presentation to Mr. Carter a Chinese scroll expressing, from outstanding Chinese leaders, their gratitude for his leadership, devotion to China, and fairness.

Phrased in typically flowery Chinese, it reads, in translation, in part as follows:

America the glorious,
Our friend and neighbor,
Kindness in birth,
Righteousness in spirit,
Bright as the sun and stars,
That recognizes no national boundary.
Prominent among her people,
Is Mr. E. C. Carter.

We, the unworthy ones,
Through close contacts
And advisory capacity,
Have come to know his work more intimately.

So great is he
That none can emulate him.
His virtue is Christian
And his fame is historic.
Stronger he cemented national relations;
Closer he promoted spirit of friendship.

One person but two responsibilities,
He undertook to shoulder,
To bridge the Pacific.
East and West, standing on either side
Link hands through the clouds,
United our spirit in the sky.
With distance exceeding thousands of miles,
Age lasting hundred of years
This is to commemorate our everlasting gratitude.

The signers include Dr. T. F. Tsiang, Director General of CNRRA, Dr. Chiaung Mou-lin, Secretary General of the Executive Yuan, Dr. Han Lih-wu, Vice Minister of Education, Bishop Paul Yu Pin, Catholic Bishop of Nanking, Dr. Robert K. S. Lin, Surgeon General of the Chinese Army, Dr. Y. T. Tsur, Minister of Agriculture, Dr. King Chu, Vice Minister of Education, Dr. P. Z. King, Director of the National Health Administration, Dr. C. K. Chu, Director of the National Health Institute, Mrs. William C. Wang, Chairman of the Women's Advisory Committee of the New Life Movement, Mrs. Nora T. H. Chu, Director of the National Association for Refugee Children, Dr. Chang Fu-liang, General Secretary of the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, Dr. Y. S. Djang, Treasurer of the International Relief Committee, Dr. H. C. Chang, Chief of the Welfare Division of the Ministry of Social Affairs, and Dr. A. Pan-tung Sah, of the Academia Sinica.

I have always felt deep resentment at those who have criticized Mr. Carter as being "anti-Chinese"; I think, accordingly, this statement deserves special consideration.

Sincerely,

[s] JAMES L. MCCONAUGHY,
President.

STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York ss:

EDWARD C. CARTER, being duly sworn, says: That he has read the foregoing document and knows the contents thereof; that the same is true to his own knowledge, except as to the matters therein indicated to have been communicated

to him by other persons and except as to the matters therein which are matters of opinion, and that as to the matters indicated to have been communicated to him by others, he believes it to be true and as to matters of opinion, that the opinion expressed is his own and that it is his true opinion.

Sworn to before me this 10th day of June 1952.

[SEAL]

IRENE R. DONOHUE,

Notary Public, State of New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Next is the affidavit of Hilda Austern, dated May 5, 1952, which I would like to introduce at this time.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The affidavit referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1384" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1384

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND,

May 5, 1952.

CONFEDERATION OF SWITZERLAND,

City and Canton of Geneva,

Consulate General of the United States of America, ss:

AFFIDAVIT

I, HILDA AUSTERN (RAY), being duly sworn, depose and say as follows:

(1) I have just learned for the first time of the following testimony of Louis Francis Budenz before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security in August 1951:

"Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Hilda Austern was a member of the Communist Party?"

"Mr. BUDENZ. From official reports."

(2) It is my intent and purpose by this affidavit to deny, under oath, the charges against me which seem to be intended by this vague and more or less unresponsive reply of which, I understand, there is no further elaboration of any kind in the rest of his testimony.

(3) I am not now and never have been a member of the Communist Party nor of any other organization cited as subversive by the Attorney General of the United States. I do not hold and never have held any beliefs contrary to American democracy or the principles for which the United States stands. I am and have always been completely loyal to my country, its government, and its form of government.

Hilda Austern Ray,

HILDA AUSTERN (RAY).

Subscribed and sworn to before me, Charles W. Thomas, Consul of the United States of America in and for the consular district of Geneva, Switzerland, duly commissioned and qualified, this 5th day of May 1952, A. D.

[SEAL]

CHARLES W. THOMAS, *American Consul.*

Service No.: 2861. Fee: \$2.00 equals SW Frs. S.80. Tariff No. 24.

American Foreign Service \$2.00 Fee Stamp [affixed].

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL.

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, *May 5, 1952.*

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would next like to introduce excerpts from the executive-session testimony of Stanley K. Hornbeck of May 21, 1952.

Senator WATKINS. They will be received into the record.

(The excerpts referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1385" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1385

[EXECUTIVE SESSION]

UNITED STATES SENATE,
 SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
 OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
 INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
 Washington, D. C., Wednesday, May 21, 1952.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a. m., in Room 424-C Senate Office Building, Senator Arthur Watkins, presiding.

President: Senator Watkins.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in session.

Mr. Morris, you have a witness here this morning?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Senator, Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck.

Senator WATKINS. Will you stand and be sworn, Doctor?

Mr. HORNBECK. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Do you solemnly swear that this testimony you shall give before this subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HORNBECK. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Hornbeck, this committee has obtained from the Department of State an exchange of letters between Dean Rusk and yourself dated May 19 and June 7, 1950. In your answer to Dean Rusk you state that:

"* * * It was in the year 1945—and not before then—that the Government of the United States, first having taken action inconsistent with tradition and commitment in regard to China, embarked upon what became a course of intervention in regard to the civil conflict, the conflict between the National Government and the Communists, in China. It was then that words and action of the Government of the United States began to be expressive of an 'against' and a 'for' attitude; then and thereafter that the Government of the United States brought to bear pressures, pressures upon the National Government, pressures which were not 'against' the Communists but were on their behalf, pressures not to the disadvantage of the Communists, but, in effect, to the disadvantage of the National Government."

Dr. Hornbeck, I offer you the full text of both of these letters which have become part of our record, and I ask, did you in fact write the reply of June 7, 1950, to Dean Rusk?

Mr. HORNBECK. The letter which appears as having been addressed by me to Dean Rusk under date of June 7, 1950, in reply to a letter addressed by Mr. Rusk to me under date of May 19, 1950, is a copy, exact except for a few inconsequential typographical errors, of a letter written by me at the time and under the circumstances indicated.

Mr. MORRIS. Are the statements in that letter true statements?

Mr. HORNBECK. Everything that is said in that letter is to the best of my knowledge true.

Mr. MORRIS. On what facts and what experience did you base the conclusions that appear therein?

Mr. HORNBECK. I have been studying the subjects of international relations, American foreign policy and Far Eastern affairs for nearly 50 years. I was closely associated with matters involving conduct of United States Far Eastern policy for more than 25 years. In the Department of State, I was especially concerned with Far Eastern affairs from 1928 to 1944. Since my retirement in 1947, I have given and am giving most of my time to study of these subjects.

The conclusions to which I gave expression in the paragraph which you have quoted were—and are—based in part on consideration of the facts set forth in the preceding paragraphs of the letter, in part on consideration of other facts known to me from study and from experience, and in part on consideration of still other facts, knowledge of which I had gained from study of contemporary evidence and from conversations and discussions with participants in the acts or events to which they relate.

The paragraph in which I state that change of policy took place in the year 1945 is expressive in terms of interpretation of a conclusion or group of conclusions drawn from facts and stating what I believe to be absolutely true.

Mr. MORRIS. Next is an affidavit by Henry A. Wallace, dated June 6, 1952.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received and made a part of the record.

(The affidavit referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1386" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1386

FARVUE, SOUTH SALEM, N. Y., June 6, 1952.

HON. PAT McCARRAN,
Senate Office Building, Washington D. C.

DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: Thanks for the courtesy of your wire of June 6 in reply to my letter of June 3. In conformity therewith I am hereby formally swearing before a notary public that the following statement is the truth:

I am testifying with regard to the bottom 14 lines of page 1792, the top 16 lines of page 1793, the bottom 14 lines of page 1993, the top 19 lines of page 1994, the bottom 9 lines of page 2046, and the top 18 lines of page 2047—all from parts 6 and 7 of the hearings of the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Senate with regard to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The first 4 pages referred to in the foregoing have to do with Counsel Sourwine's apparent belief that I had in my Mission to China recommended that the Communist armies receive a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China. On pages 1793 and 1994 Vincent makes clear his belief that I made no such recommendations. I am sure that I was not directly or indirectly responsible for initiating the July 7 telegram from Roosevelt referred to on page 2073.

With regard to pages 2046 and 2047 commenting on the statement made by Vincent in the white paper, "Wallace referred to the patriotic attitude of the Communists in the United States—" I wish to call attention to my wire of June 5, 1951, to Senator Knowland which he kindly inserted in the June 6, 1951, hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. This wire was printed in its entirety on page 17 of the June 6, 1951, and again on page 14 of the June 7, 1951, issue of the New York Times. I hope therefore that your committee may extend me the same courtesy as the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees by at least publishing the reference to my letter to Senator Knowland as reproduced in the hearings of June 6, 1951, of the Senate committee. Exactly the same matter is up for discussion as on pages 2046 and 2047 of your committee's hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The prime purpose of this sworn statement is to say that I am in complete accord with Vincent and that I say independently that I made no recommendation to Roosevelt that the Communist armies be sent a proportionate share of American arms. (Communist in the foregoing means Chinese Communist.)

Respectfully submitted.

H. A. WALLACE.

Sworn to this 5th day of June 1952, before notary public.

CYRUS W. RUSSELL,

Notary Public in the State of New York.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here a sworn statement of W. L. Holland, dated June 10, 1952, which I would like to put in the record at this time.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received and made a part of the record.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1387" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1387

MEMORANDUM ON RAYMOND DENNETT'S TESTIMONY

I, William L. Holland, being duly sworn, depose and say as follows:

In his testimony before the McCarran Subcommittee, September 26, 1951, (Hearings, part 4, pp. 937-1005), Raymond Dennett, who had been Secretary of the American IPR from March 1944 to December 1945, made a number of misleading and unsubstantiated allegations concerning the American IPR and members of its staff. Among other things he said that he did not think the Institute "was an objective research organization"; that he had "grave doubts"

of the staff's objectivity; that he "came not to trust" the staff (although he explained that he had no reason to think any of them were Communists); that members of the staff tended to "favorably interpret" the Soviet Union (he explained that this was because the staff felt at that time that "if we had to live with the Soviet Union during the postwar period we had to explain why the Soviet Union acted this way"); that he thought certain members of the staff were biased against the Chinese Nationalist government and "probably" sympathetic to the Chinese Communists; that the staff tried to "control" the organization; and that when he took steps to reduce the staff's influence the staff attempted to use the union contract as an instrument for "getting rid of" him. He also said: "I was responsible for objective research. I do not feel there was objectivity and I resigned and got out."

It is incumbent on me as the present executive officer of the American IPR to point out how, in several important respects, Mr. Dennett's testimony was (perhaps inadvertently) inaccurate or incomplete. I do this with reluctance and regret, since my own relations with Mr. Dennett during and after his period of work for the American IPR were always cordial. Moreover, I admired his insistence in his testimony that he was convinced that Dr. Philip C. Jessup was not a Communist sympathizer. However, for the sake of correcting the record, I feel it necessary to submit the following remarks, which are based on my own knowledge, on a careful study of the relevant documents, and on corroboration by other persons directly acquainted with the period of Mr. Dennett's employment by the American IPR.

Much of Mr. Dennett's testimony must be judged in the light of the circumstances attending his departure from the IPR. His testimony creates the impression that he resigned his position with the IPR because he was dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the office. The fact is that the Executive Committee of the American IPR decided and made clear to Mr. Dennett that it would not be in the best interests of the organization for him to continue as Executive Secretary. This decision did not reflect unfavorably in any way upon Mr. Dennett's character.

When he became the administrative head of the American IPR, Mr. Dennett was a young man of limited experience. The job in which he found himself was one that required a high order of tact, judgment, and administrative and fund-raising skill. After a considerable period of observation, the Executive Committee regretfully concluded that Mr. Dennett did not fully measure up to all these requirements, especially the first and the last. Eventually the Committee decided that in the interests of the organization a change in the administrative direction was imperative, and made this known to Mr. Dennett. The matter was handled in such a way as to cause Mr. Dennett as little embarrassment as possible. For this reason, the full details of the story were never put in the official record. Nevertheless, its main outlines are sufficiently clear from a careful reading of the minutes of the Executive Committee at this period. These show:

(1) That the Executive Committee, at its meeting on June 18, 1945, adopted a resolution instructing the Secretary (Mr. Dennett) to devote the major portion of his time to fund raising.

(2) That the Executive Committee held two meetings, on October 11 and November 13, 1945, at Midston House, at which Mr. Dennett was not present. Customarily, the Executive Committee met in the IPR office, and the Secretary, a member of the Committee, attended its meetings.

(3) That at its meeting on October 11 the Executive Committee engaged in "general consideration of the purposes and program of the American Council and of the problems confronting it." There were present the following members of the Executive Committee: Robert D. Calkins, Chairman; Eugene E. Barnett, Frederick V. Field, Huntington Gilchrist, G. Ellsworth Huggins, James L. McConaughy, Lawrence Morris, and Mrs. Ada Comstock Notestein; also the following guests: Joseph P. Chamberlain, Philip C. Jessup, Grayson Kirk, and Owen Lattimore. At this meeting the Executive Committee appointed a special committee consisting of Messrs. Calkins, Jessup, and McConaughy "to carry on discussions and negotiations with any officers or branches of the American Council and with any outside organizations with a view to making proposals concerning the solution of the problems facing the Council, including recommendations concerning the location of the various activities of the Council." (This referred in part to certain proposals which had been made by Mr. Dennett.)

(4) That at the Executive Committee meeting on November 13, the same persons being present with the exception of Messrs. Gilchrist and Lattimore, the

special committee presented its recommendations. The Executive Committee thereupon voted to accept Mr. Dennett's resignation as Secretary, and to appoint Edward C. Carter as Executive Vice Chairman of the American IPR. The resolution accepting Mr. Dennett's resignation referred to the difficulties confronting the American IPR at the time when he became Secretary, and to subsequent unforeseen problems of great magnitude; it expressed appreciation of Mr. Dennett's services, mentioning his energy and devotion, but omitting any reference to his ability or accomplishments. It requested Mr. Dennett, if he found it possible, to continue on the staff until March 1946, performing such duties as might be assigned to him by the Executive Vice Chairman. The resolution appointing Mr. Carter as Executive Vice Chairman stated that "efficient management of the affairs of the American Council of the IPR requires an expansion of its executive direction at the top levels and the services of a man of great public prestige and broad experience in the work of the IPR." Mr. Carter was therefore "charged with the general management and control of the general activities and business affairs of the American Council."

It is worth noting that Philip C. Jessup, who had originally recommended Mr. Dennett for the position of Secretary, was a member of the special committee mentioned above.

In the light of this history it was perhaps natural for Mr. Dennett to feel that he had a grievance against the IPR. Unfortunately this feeling seems to have influenced his recollections to the point where parts of his testimony cannot be regarded as fully reliable, although it is certainly not suggested that he deliberately falsified.

Many of Mr. Dennett's administrative weaknesses at this period were those of inexperience. In fairness to him, it should be noted that he had the difficult task of dealing with an experienced senior staff, most of whom were older than he and had more knowledge than he of the Far East and of the IPR, and some of whom possessed strong personalities. Toward the end of his tenure in office, considerable friction developed between Mr. Dennett and some members of his staff. Hence he undoubtedly took away with him some personal grudges. His testimony concerning staff members must be interpreted in this light.

It should be added that the differences between Mr. Dennett and members of the senior staff arose partly from factors of temperament, partly from differences of opinion on administrative questions, and partly from the fact that the senior staff eventually lost confidence in his ability to administer the affairs of the American IPR in an effective manner. These differences were in no sense political.

As Executive Secretary, Mr. Dennett had full authority to protest or block any actions or publications of the staff if he felt they were not in keeping with the purposes and policies of the Institute and he could depend on full support from the Executive Committee. In fact, there is no evidence that he did make any such protests while he was Executive Secretary on any matters concerning the politics of staff members or the objectivity of the work and publications of the Institute.

A few specific points in Mr. Dennett's testimony are worth comment:

(1) His statement that the staff "began to rely on the union contract as a method for, shall we say, getting rid of me." Mr. Dennett may have believed this to be true, but it was not true. Neither the Book and Magazine Union, UOPWA, with which the American IPR had a contract, nor the shop unit (i. e., the group of union members in the office) made any attempt whatever to "get rid of" Mr. Dennett. (A fuller notarized statement on the Union has been submitted by Miss Miriam S. Farley to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security.)

(2) His statement that there was no "thorough investigation" of Alfred Kohlberg's charges against the IPR, but only an "answer" prepared by Mrs. Marguerite A. Stewart. Mrs. Stewart has stated that this "answer" was not prepared by her but by a committee of the American IPR staff under her editorship. Mr. Kohlberg's principal charges were contained in a lengthy document which alleged, with what purported to be supporting documentation, that IPR publications during a certain period had followed the Communist Party line. The staff, at the request of the Executive Committee, prepared a detailed analysis of Mr. Kohlberg's document, concluding that the evidence did not support his allegations. This was the analysis edited by Mrs. Stewart. Certain other inquiries were conducted, and some members of the Executive Committee, notably Mr. Arthur H. Dean (then a vice chairman) did a considerable amount of research on their own. In general, however, Mr. Kohlberg's charges were regarded as

so irresponsible, and so obviously motivated by political partisanship, that they commanded little credence among officers and members of the Executive Committee, who concluded that there was no necessity for the additional full-dress investigation demanded by Mr. Kohlberg. It will be recalled that in 1947 Mr. Kohlberg's demand for an investigation by an outside committee was rejected by a vote of the American IPR membership, 1,163 to 66, after the members had received through the mails materials from Mr. Kohlberg and from officers of the organization. In other words, the investigation conducted at that time was sufficient, in the judgment of the organization's officers and Executive Committee, to establish that there was no valid foundation for Mr. Kohlberg's charges, and this decision was upheld by an overwhelming vote of the membership.

W. L. HOLLAND.

STATE OF NEW YORK,

County of New York, ss:

William L. Holland, being duly sworn, declares that every statement in the above letter is true to the best of his knowledge.

Sworn to before me this 10th day of June 1952.

DAVID ADLER,

Notary Public, State of New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Next is the sworn statement of Michael Lindsay, dated June 3, 1952.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1388," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1388

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES, CITY OF SYDNEY,
Consulate General of the United States of America, ss:

I, Lord Lindsay of Birker hereby declare under oath:

It has been brought to my attention that, in the hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations before the Senate Committee on Internal Security, my name has been mentioned as a Communist or fellow traveller connected with the I. P. R. I would, therefore, like to make the following statement, firstly about my political standpoint and, secondly about my connections with the I. P. R.

Since I began to take a serious interest in politics I have consistently supported democratic government—defining democracy in the same general sense as expounded in my father's writings.¹ That is, I have believed that democracy implied free discussion, human fellowship, and a preference for the use of persuasion rather than force. As a corollary I have consistently opposed militarism and authoritarian and police state regimes.

On more general issues my thinking was greatly influenced by such books as J. M. Keynes' *Treatise on Probability* and Felix Kaufmann's *Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften*. I have believed that the truth or falsehood of any statement about the real world could only be tested by comparison of its implications with the evidence of observation and experiment and that, in consequence, any generalisation was subject to possible modification as new evidence became available; that, while economic or racial factors might influence the questions in which men were interested or incline them to illogical thinking on some subjects, the truth or falsity of the answer to any question was normally objective or interpersonally invariant. As a corollary I have opposed the claims of all groups who have believed that the absolute certainty of their knowledge entitled them to impose their views by force or deception and I have opposed all theories which claimed that truth or falsehood should not be judged by interpersonally invariant standards but according to expediency for the interests of some particular group.

The application of these principles has implied agreement at various times with parts of the orthodox Communist position and cooperation for a considerable period with the Chinese Communist Party, but it has also implied a consistently critical attitude towards the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership and disagreement with parts of the Communist position even during the period when I was working in the Chinese Communist organization. I would accept

¹ Such as *The Essentials of Democracy*, O. U. P., 1929.

the standard suggested in the following quotation from Freda Utley, "If one appreciates the fundamental difference between fortuitous similarity of views at a given moment, and consistent changes of attitude paralleling those of the Communists, there can be no danger of 'guilt by association' trapping the innocent."² Judged by this standard I have never been either a Communist or a fellow traveller.

Before leaving England for China at the end of 1937 I was engaged in adult education and economic research work in South Wales. I was extremely critical of the failure of the British Government to take any effective action on the problems of unemployment and the depressed areas and this implied a certain amount of sympathy for Communist criticisms of the existing economic system. I was also extremely critical of the failure of the British Government to support collective security and resist the development of aggressive militarism and this implied approval of the Soviet policies associated with Mr. Litvinov. On the other hand, a study of the history of the Weimar Republic, on which I gave a course of lectures, convinced me that Hitler's rise to power had been greatly assisted by the policies which the German Communist Party had followed under Comintern leadership. The evidence available about the Soviet Union seemed to show that, while it might have overcome some of the evils of the capitalist system, such as unemployment, it had even more serious though different defects of its own. In arguments with Communist friends I consistently criticized what I called their "fairy story" attitude—the belief that once they had the revolution "everyone would live happily ever after" so that meanwhile they could indulge in completely irresponsible criticism and sabotage with a clear conscience.

I arrived at Peiping in January 1938 to take up the position of Tutor in Economics at Yenching University. The evidence I saw of Japanese behaviour in North China soon convinced me that Japanese militarism was an evil which it was a duty to resist.

My first contacts with the Chinese Communist organisation came largely by chance. In April 1938 I was invited by some American friends at Yenching to go on a trip in the Easter vacation to have a look at the guerilla organisation that was starting in Central Hopei. I made a more extended trip in the summer vacation of 1938 with Mr. George Taylor to Central Hopei and the Wuf'ai area and, in the summer vacation of 1939, I made a journey with Mr. Ralph Lapwood and Chinese friends from Peiping to Sian, mainly through Eighth Route Army territory, returning via Chungking and Hongkong. On these trips I met generals Lu Cheng-ts'ao, Nieh Jung-chen, Chu Te and P'eng Te-huai and both in 1938 and 1939 I stayed some days with Dr. Norman Bethune whom I had first met on the boat from Vancouver to Yokohama.

Assistance to these guerilla organisations was an obvious way of taking part in opposition to Japanese militarism and, owing to the existence of extraterritoriality, a foreigner could give considerable assistance. By the summer of 1938 I had become fairly active in groups that were engaged in purchasing medical supplies in Peiping and later became involved in the purchase of radio and communications equipment, technical books, etc., and in delivering supplies to Chinese units outside the city.

I knew that the main Chinese resistance groups that I was working with were under Communist leadership but the Chinese communists whom I met on my trips into the countryside seemed to me a very different type of person from the Communists I had known in England. Instead of irresponsible destructive activity the Chinese Communists were engaged in responsible constructive work and seemed to be doing a very effective job both in organising resisting to Japanese militarism and in mass education and social and economic reform. Instead of the unreasoning dogmatism that had characterized most of the Communists I had known in England, the Chinese Communists mostly seemed to be reasonable sensible people who could argue without losing their tempers, who seemed ready to modify their theories to fit the facts and who were capable of cooperating with people who did not share their beliefs.

I contributed a number of articles to the London Times based in my observations during my trips into the Eighth Route Army areas. The account given of the Chinese Communist organisation was strongly favourable and I would still maintain that the facts of the situation at that time entirely justified such favourable reports. But even then I was critical of some of the Stalinist aspects of the organisation. A report I wrote after my trip in 1939 is strongly critical of the tendency of education to concentrate on indoctrination and discourage

² The China Story. By Freda Utley, Chicago; Henry Regnery Co., 1951, page 196.

critical thought. I argue, "For the development of democratic government it is essential to have people who are able to think scientifically and who can see through any attempts to deceive and exploit them through plausible propaganda. There is little point in fighting Japanese militarism by means which make the Chinese people equally liable to fall a prey to militarism. So long as the people believe whatever the government tells them democracy rests on a very insecure foundation and the people can be exploited by any group which can gain temporary control of the government."

I never felt any incompatibility between cooperation with the Chinese Communist organisation and loyalty to my own country or cooperation with other governments working for democratic objectives. The information obtained on my trips in the Chinese countryside was made available not only to the British but also to the American authorities in Peiping. While Kuomintang resistance groups were operating near Peiping I was equally ready to assist them. I helped in the collection of money to buy winter clothing for Chao Tung's troops in the winter of 1938 and tried to establish radio communication with Chungking on behalf of another Kuomintang organisation. (The attempt failed because the frequency fixed was, as I afterwards found, unsuitable.) Towards the end of 1941 I had managed to obtain permission from General Nieh Jung-chen for a British intelligence unit to operate in his area and maintain radio contacts with Hongkong or Singapore though unfortunately the scheme fell through because of delays in London.

Also my cooperation with the Chinese Communist organisation did not imply any agreement with the international Communist line. In the winter of 1938-9, Yen-ching University tried the experiment of a formal debate in the British or American college debating society style and in this I proposed the motion that "There is nothing to choose between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia." (The experiment was not repeated as we found that the Japanese Gendarmerie had taken the greatest interest in the proceedings.) In my course on Logic and Scientific Method I introduced my students to a certain amount of Marxian writing but used a good deal of it as illustration of logical and scientific fallacies.

I was entirely opposed to the official Communist line on international affairs between 1939 and 1941. Though I was strongly critical of the Chamberlain government I had no doubts that it was right to go to war over the German invasion of Poland and that, whatever the defects of the British and French governments, the war was basically a war of democracy against totalitarianism. I criticised the Communist arguments about an imperialist war in which the Germans were slightly less to blame than the British as being dishonest nonsense. I argued that the Soviet Union was clearly playing a game of completely cynical power politics and that the invasion of Finland and annexation of the Baltic States were clear acts of aggression.

In March 1950 I accepted an appointment as British Press Attaché at Chungking and in this capacity I made a number of protests to the Chinese authorities over the material appearing in the Communist New China Daily News which made frequent and violently abusive attacks on the Allies and only occasionally expressed mild disapproval of the Germans. I returned to Yen-ching University in September 1940 at the request of Dr. J. Leighton Stuart with the approval of the British Ambassador.

In June 1941 I married Li Hsiao-li who had been one of my students at Yen-ching. Since many allegations have been made, and fairly widely believed, that my wife was connected with the Chinese Communist organisation I will set out briefly the facts about her. My father-in-law came from the leading landlord family of Lishih hsien in Shansi, studied at the Paoting Military Academy and served in the Shansi Provincial Army under Yen Hsi-shan. He held some moderately important positions but was too honest to be very successful in Yen Hsi-shan's organisation and had retired some years before 1937 to live on his private income. When I first knew the family he was living in retirement near Peiping as he was afraid that he might be forced to serve in the Japanese puppet organisation if he returned to Lishih and the family was supported by my brother-in-law, a graduate of Harvard Business School, who was working in the Bank of China at Chungking. Lady Lindsay went to Bridgeman Academy, an American missionary school in Peiping, and then to Yen-ching University. She had very little interest in politics apart from a natural patriotic dislike of the Japanese. She had refused invitations from her friends to join the Kuomintang Blue Shirt organisation and had no connections with the underground Communist organisation at Yen-ching. Until December 1941 her knowledge of the

Chinese Communist Party and the Liberated Areas came almost entirely from what I had told her.

On the morning of the attack on Pearl Harbour my wife and I escaped from Yenching to the Western Hills and made contact with local 18th Group Army units. Our original idea had been to go on to Chungking and India but, on finding that I knew a fair amount about radio, General Nieh Jung-chen invited me to stay and work for his organisation and this seemed likely to be quite as useful a piece of war service as I could do anywhere else. I therefore remained in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei area for nearly two and a half years during which I gave classes in radio engineering to 18th Group Army technicians and travelled round rebuilding the army radio equipment. In 1943 I was officially appointed Technical Adviser to the Communications Department of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Military District.

During this period I was in a good position to confirm that the 18th group Army was doing an extremely good job in fighting the Japanese within the limitations imposed by the complete absence of outside supplies. I could also confirm that the government, under Communist leadership, was doing an extremely good job in economic and social reform and had succeeded in winning strong support from the great majority of the population. In this respect Lady Lindsay's observations were of great assistance. She had lived in the country as a child and found it easier to establish friendly relations with the peasants than many of the Communist Party organisers. She could also make the direct comparison with the prewar countryside in North China.

But while I was working in the Chinese Communist organisation and strongly approving of the greater part of their actual policies I still expressed disagreement with parts of the Communist position. I remember arguments in which I maintained that large parts of Marxian economics were fallacious; that the Chinese Communist Party was only successful because of its differences with other Communist parties; that the stupidities of Comintern policy were largely responsible for Hitler's rise to power. On the basis of information from British and American broadcasts I publicly criticized the official Communist views about the second front in Europe. I still have the draft in Chinese romanisation of a reply to a questionnaire about my political views from a friend in the Communist Secret Service Organisation. I was writing to minimize rather than to emphasize our points of difference but even so I argue that Hitler would certainly have won the war if the British workers had been silly enough to follow the leadership of the British Communist Party under Comintern direction. I admit that the Soviet Union might be very democratic in some respects but I argue that in other respects it was definitely inferior to British or American democracy, in particular I criticize the absence of free and informed discussion and the insecurity of the ordinary citizen against oppression by officials.

The fact that people in the Chinese Communist organisation were prepared to work in full and friendly cooperation for common objectives with someone who disagreed with them to this extent is strong evidence that, at this period, the Chinese Communist Party was considerably different from orthodox Stalinist parties.

By the beginning of 1944 I was becoming increasingly concerned at the complete lack of contact between the 18th Group Army and the British and American organisations in China as I believed that cooperation between them could make a very valuable contribution to the Allied war effort against Japan. Attempts to establish contacts from Shansi-Chahar-Hopei had failed and it seems that the best chances of making contacts were from Yen-an. My main work in Shansi-Chahar-Hopei was also coming to an end as I had done almost all the rebuilding of apparatus possible with the material available and nearly all the technicians with sufficient mathematical background to profit by my courses on radio engineering had been through them. We therefore moved to Yen-an in the spring of 1944.

In fact contacts with the outside world were established very soon after our arrival at Yen-an through the visit of foreign correspondents and the arrival of the U. S. Army Observers Section.

I designed the radio transmitter and directional antenna which enabled the New China News Agency to transmit its service to America and India but I gradually withdrew from technical communications work largely because the head of the Yen-an Communications Department was uncooperative and resentful of outside advice. I concentrated on helping the New China News Agency with their English language service and on trying to promote cooperation with the U. S. Army Observers Section. (Colonel David Barrett and Colonel Ivan

Featon could give evidence of my work in this connection.) Unfortunately relations between the U. S. Army and the 18th Group Army gradually deteriorated, largely owing to bad faith on the American side. The American personnel at Yen-an saw the advantages of cooperation for the Allied War effort and tried to work for it but their efforts were often sabotaged by the higher U. S. Army authorities at Chungking.

These American authorities in Chungking appeared to be opposed to cooperation with the British as well as to cooperate with the Communists. I heard that the head of British Military Intelligence at Chungking had wanted to visit Yen-an but had been compelled to postpone his visit and I wrote to him to say that, in case he was not getting all the information he wanted from Yen-an through the Americans, I had arranged with General Yeh Chien-ying for copies of all the 18th Group Army reports given to the U. S. A. O. S. to be made available for the British and that if he wanted any additional information I would ask General Yeh if it could be procured. On reaching Chungking in November 1945 I found that my letter had been suppressed by the anti-British American authorities in Chungking and that none of the information obtained by the U. S. A. O. S. at Yen-an had been shared with the British. I later learnt that General Hurley had issued orders that no British representatives was to be allowed to visit Yen-an and had been grossly insulting to Colonel Harmon in the presence of the British Ambassador because he had heard a rumor that Colonel Harmon had managed to visit Yen-an without his permission.

The result of the policies of the American authorities was that in a number of projects the 18th Group Army authorities were led by assurances of American cooperation into considerable expenditures of labour and scarce materials only to find that the Americans had backed out of their share of the proposed undertaking. For example, I worked with the U. S. A. O. S. on plans for a communications network. An appreciable part of the very limited communications equipment of the 18th Group Army became tied up in providing intelligence and weather reports for American use. Repeated assurances were given that this was only a temporary expedient and that American material would be provided for all radio stations working for the U. S. forces. But it was only after very long delays that any apparatus was delivered and then it was of types that the 18th Group Army had clearly and repeatedly stated to be useless for the front line areas so that it could only be used to scrap for the components.

This is not the place to discuss other instances but I would like to place it on record that the 18th Group Army was one of the few Allied forces that could almost certainly claim a balance due from the United States under any sort of Lend Lease arrangement. I would also like to record my opinion that the reluctance of the higher American military authorities in Chungking to cooperate in good faith for the common objective of defeating Japan played an appreciable part in stimulating the growth of anti-American feeling in China.

In this situation I tried to advise the 18th Group Army authorities that the best policy was to make a frank statement of their grievances to Americans and to make it clear that they were ready to carry out fully their part of any scheme for cooperation provided the Americans did the same. Unfortunately this advice had only slight effect in preventing the 18th Group Army authorities from reacting to American bad faith and lack of cooperation by becoming discourteous and obstructive on their side, even towards those Americans who were working for cooperation.

I was not directly concerned in the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations but I was in fairly close touch with developments and I would also like to place on record that General Hurley provided the Chinese Communist Party with a glaring instance of American bad faith. According to both Chinese and American eyewitnesses, General Hurley signed the Five Point Draft Agreement of 10th November 1944 saying that, though he could not commit his government, he was signing to show that he personally fully approved the draft terms and pledged himself to support them. Within a few weeks he had repudiated his signature. (It is an indication of the cowardice of the State Department against its critics that the White Paper tries to cover up for General Hurley by saying that he only signed the Draft Agreement as a witness (page 74) instead of revealing that, at one time, General Hurley had pledged himself to support the full Communist claims for a settlement with the Kuomintang with some additions proposed by himself, going even further than the original Communist draft). The point at issue is not General Hurley's judgment in first supporting the Communist terms or in later opposing them, it is

the simple issue of elementary honesty. When people of any political view take the Stalinist position that any undertaking can be repudiated as soon as it is considered expedient to do so, any agreement based on mutual trust becomes impossible. If every promise is liable to arbitrary repudiation, the only remaining guarantee of security is superior force.

It is strong evidence of the desire of the Chinese Communist leaders for a peaceful settlement in China that they should again have accepted American mediation after this experience of the behaviour of a United States Ambassador. Their rather quixotic honesty in some respects was also shown by their refusal to publish the evidence of General Hurley's bad faith because, during his visit to Yen-an, they had agreed that the terms to which he had pledged his support should not be made public without his consent.

In Yen-an, as in Shansi-Chahar-Hopei, I was working with the Chinese Communist organisation because in most matters of practical policy they seemed to be in the right and to be doing a good job. A large part of the criticism of the Chinese Communist Party and 18th Group Army that appeared in the Kuomintang or right-wing American press was based on statements that had almost no relation to the facts. But here again, my attitude was not one of uncritical support. Members of the U. S. A. O. S. could probably remember arguments I had with the 18th Group Army Liaison officers in which I maintained that some things that happened at Yen-an would arouse violent public protests in democratic societies such as Britain or America. I also wrote a long report of 30,000 words entitled "What's wrong with Yen-an," which I circulated among friends in the higher ranks of the Communist organisation. In this I pointed out the instances of bureaucracy and incompetence in the Yen-an organisation and that the general standards of work at Yen-an were lower than in the front-line areas. I related these defects to the fact that organisations at Yen-an were more purely Communist and less genuinely united front and suggested that the Communist theories about "democratic centralism" and about the nature of scientific judgments almost inevitably led to maladministration in any organisation that was predominantly controlled by Communist Party members. Although these criticisms attacked some of the basic principles of Communist organisation they were accepted by the people to whom I showed them as worthy of serious consideration and discussion. This again indicated an absence of dogmatism which was abnormal among Communists outside China.

In November 1945 I left Yen-an for England with my family. I had already been away from home for eight years and it seemed that if we did not return then the spread of a general civil war might prevent us leaving North China for a very long period. After a short time in England I went on a lecture tour in Canada and the United States at the invitation of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the Institute of International Education and the Institute of Pacific Relations. I was then invited to Harvard as a visiting lecturer and returned to the United States in September 1946 and worked at Harvard, mainly in the Far Eastern Area Programme, until June 1947. I was the only Westerner who combined a knowledge of the Chinese Communist areas outside Yen-an, some inside knowledge of the Chinese Communist organisation through having worked in it and academic qualifications in social science, and these invitations were a natural result of this.

I took part in the general controversy about China and U. S. policy in China, mostly in defence of the general position of the Chinese Communist Party, though I always based my support for the Chinese Communist Party on the fact that their policies were considerably different from those of normal Stalinist parties and on the hope that these differences might increase and become permanent.

In an article which appeared in the London Times of 17th January 1946 I wrote, "To sum up, the Chinese Communist Party is definitely Communist in its basic principles and its party organisation, but its practical programme and its traditions differ considerably from those of other Communist parties." And, by September 1946, I was writing to friends in the Chinese Communist organisation to the effect that the Russian form of Communism was showing itself to be similar in many ways to Japanese militarism and that it was only if Communism followed some of the special features of the Chinese organisation that it could become democratic. (The relevant passages of one such letter are reproduced in Appendix I.)

Looking back on the controversy about China it seems that there was a real problem about which people who accepted the assumptions of scientific thinking could honestly hold differing opinions on the evidence available at the time.

This problem was whether or not the Chinese Communist leadership was sincere in its proclaimed objective of serving the interests of the common people of China and whether or not it was capable of acting rationally in pursuit of this objective. If the answer on both these points was affirmative the policies of the Chinese Communist Party were bound to diverge increasingly from those of orthodox Stalinist Communist Parties and a unification of theory with practice was bound to involve the Chinese Communist Party in condemnation of the monolithic police-state systems of the Soviet Union and the Soviet satellites. But there was evidence of conflicting tendencies within the Chinese Communist Party.

On the one hand the success of the Chinese Communist Party and their ability to win very general popular support in the areas they controlled had depended on their readiness to adjust their policies to fit the facts and to give the ordinary peasant what he actually wanted and not just what Marx-Leninist theory said he ought to want. This had involved important departures from Stalinist orthodoxy. For example, the distinction between "good" and "bad" landlords corresponded to the obvious facts of experience but implied a rejection of the rigid Marxian view of determination of thought by class position. The agrarian policy in force from 1937 to 1946 was a "reformist" one. It produced strong economic pressures towards equalization of land holdings and transfer of capital from land or usury to productive industry or trade but it did not put any group in the community in a position where they either had to fight the regime or else passively accept "liquidation." The result of this unorthodoxy was to make possible a government in which the reality of popular support was proved by the absence of secret police terrorism. In spite of wartime conditions which made it impossible to prevent the infiltration of enemy agents the respect for due process of law was, by Chinese standards, remarkably high. Though rejecting the name the Communist Party had in practice accepted Sun Yat-sen's theory of "political tutelage" and it is hard to see how, in the Chinese situation, anything else could have functioned effectively at the higher levels of government. But the element of tutelage was more real than with the Kuomintang. At the village level, where the ordinary citizen could understand the issues involved in spite of illiteracy and lack of political experience, the system was genuinely democratic and, in the more advanced areas, there was a considerable degree of effective discussion and popular participation at higher levels. (The whole subject is discussed at greater length in Chapter II, Political and Social Background, of my Notes on Educational Problems in Communist China, New York IPR 1950.)

Besides this there were indications that the Chinese Communist leadership had begun to think about the question, "How can we know that the policies of the Communist Party do in fact represent the masses?" and were beginning to arrive at the obvious answer that this was only possible if the power of the Communist Party dependent on persuasion and if non-Communists had effective powers of criticism and discussion. An editorial in the official Yen'an paper went so far as to say, "Only when a party is functionally separate from the government can it be fitted into a system of democracy: * * *." Authoritarianism was a defect that was strongly condemned by the Chinese Communists in the early 1940's and the whole atmosphere of Yen'an was felt to be very different from that of Russia by people who had experience of both. And the atmosphere of the front-line areas was freer than Yen'an. In pure theory, Mao's lectures on Dialectical Materialism gave an interpretation that was almost certainly unorthodox. (By 1949 this book had, apparently, been completely suppressed.) If one considered these aspects of the Chinese Communist Party it seemed that it was likely to act reasonably in the interests of the Chinese people and to develop in an increasingly democratic and anti-Stalinist direction.

On the other hand, while many Chinese Communists were sensible, reasonable people, the Party also contained many doctrinaire fanatics who were not likely to modify their Marx-Leninist dogmas or their blind faith in the Soviet Union. Although the leaders paid lip service to the importance of discussion and critical thought, the training of Party cadres always suffered from the tendency to inculcate a blind uncritical respect for the authority of the Party. Even in the thinking of the sensible leaders there were elements of contradiction. For example, in an article entitled "The Reconstruction of our Studies" Mao Tse-tung makes a strong argument for genuinely scientific thinking—"seek the truth by referring to fact"—but ends by uncritical praise of the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," "* * * in the whole world, this is still the one perfect model." Judged by everything that Mao has said before the

last two paragraphs he should have condemned his illustration as the perfect model of what to avoid, the distortion of the facts to fit a preconceived view. Finally, in all its official statements on the international situation and nearly all its high-level public statements on theory and policy the Chinese Communist Party had followed the Stalinist line. This is not conclusive evidence that no anti-Stalinist tendencies existed as such public statements would be among the last things likely to change. The Yugoslav Communist Party continued official theoretical support of Stalin and the Soviet Union for a considerable period after the actual breach and it was not until 1950 that theoretical criticism of the Soviet Union appeared. The pre-Hitler German Social Democratic Party retained a revolutionary Marxian theoretical position for decades after it had become a predominantly Trade Union party working in an accepted capitalist system. But the failure of the Chinese Communist Party openly to dissociate itself from the Stalinist position indicated that the reasonable and democratic policies practiced after 1937 might be only a tactical move and that the Party might swing over to the orthodox doctrinaire, authoritarian and terrorist line as soon as it became strong enough to do so with impunity.

There was a similar real problem about whether or not the Kuomintang was capable of developing toward democracy and the evidence also indicated conflicting tendencies.

But these real problems were largely obscured in the public controversy that raged in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in the United Kingdom. Anyone who defended the respect for objective standards, which has been a basic part of both the Christian and the scientific traditions in Western civilization, found themselves in conflict over Chinese questions with the extreme anti-Communist groups in America and Britain. The Kuomintang publicity organisation and many Kuomintang supporters had, in practice, accepted the standards common to Stalinism and Hitlerism about what was legitimate in political controversy. Anyone who maintained that it was wrong to invent or suppress historical evidence to serve the interests of any cause inevitably became involved in defence of the Chinese Communist position, because such a large proportion of the attacks on the Chinese Communists were based on statements or assumptions which were completely untrue. One continually met arguments based on the assumption that Communist land policy and methods of government were the same after 1937 as in the Chinese Soviet Republic before 1935. Other arguments assumed that the area round Yen-an had remained the only important Communist area throughout the war. It was alleged that Communist-Japanese hostilities had practically ceased after 1939. The evidence of Kuomintang-Japanese collaboration and continuing Kuomintang secret-police terrorism was denied; and so on. Many of these completely false arguments, which only discredit genuine criticism of Chinese Communism, have remained in circulation until the present. (See Appendix II.)

Totalitarians of both sides have been united in denouncing people and institutions who have tried to retain standards of objectivity. Left-wing totalitarian views have been less in evidence in America but it should be pointed out that institutions such as the Institute of Pacific Relations and individual experts such as Professor J. K. Fairbank have been denounced by the genuine Communists and fellow travellers as well as by the anti-Communists (e. g., article by I. Epstein in *China Monthly Review* of January 1952). For my part, I have attacked those who have tried to falsify the historical record whether from the Communist or the anti-Communist point of view. Appendix III gives the text of an article written in October 1951 for the *Manchester Guardian*, criticising an official history of the Chinese Communist Party.

Looking back on events, I was too optimistic to begin with and underestimated the strength of the doctrinaire, extremist tendencies in the Chinese Communist Party. But as signs of extremism became more apparent, I more and more stressed that support for the Chinese Communist Party must be dependent on its differences from orthodox Stalinism and that the crucial test for popular support was the absence of secret police terrorism. I also argued that the only sensible policy for the West was to fight on the real issue between democracy and totalitarianism by challenging the good faith of the Chinese Communist Party over its proclaimed objectives of freedom and friendly relations with non-Communist countries. In a memorandum written in 1948 and circulated to Members of Parliament and others interested in Far Eastern policy I urge that Britain should establish contacts with the Communists and that British representatives in the CP areas should publish strictly factual material about Russian actions in Europe, from which everyone in North China or Man-

churia would draw the obvious conclusions about the similarities of the Soviet and Japanese systems, and that they should offer Chinese Communist representatives facilities for investigation in Germany if these reports were challenged. In a letter to Liu Ning-I in May 1948, I say, "The point which I hope you can make clear to people in the Liberated Areas is that the great majority even of socialist opinion in this country is Anti-Russian simply because they hate secret police terrorism." I say that if the Chinese Communists really wished for popular support in England or America they should issue a statement "denouncing the Kuomintang secret police, pointing out that the Liberated Areas do not need an organisation like the Kuomintang secret police organisation because the governments really have popular support and then saying that *no government could be called democratic which had to use an organisation like the Kuomintang secret police or the old Japanese Kempeitai to keep itself in power.*" I made the same general points in a number of letters published in the British press and in the articles written after a visit to China in 1949. (The relevant passages are reproduced in Appendix IV.)

On the outbreak of the Korean war I supported the U. N. action as being a defence of collective security and argued that if the U. N. had failed to act in Korea it would almost certainly have led to further acts of Stalinist aggression which would have produced a general war. I have been strongly critical of the handling of the Korean situation and of American intervention in Formosa and have maintained that Chinese intervention in Korea could probably have been avoided if earlier action had been taken to control General MacArthur's disloyalty and insubordination as U. N. commander but I have consistently attacked those who have tried to deny that the war was started by North Korean aggression and those who have tried to maintain that Chinese intervention was justified. (The persecution mania about the United States among the Chinese leaders was a fact of which U. N. policy should have taken account; but while this persecution mania explains Chinese intervention it does not justify it.) Appendix V reproduces some of my letters on these points which have appeared in the British press.

Since the degeneration of the Chinese regime towards terrorism and police-state methods after the middle of 1950 I have become steadily more critical of the Chinese Communist Party. In a broadcast (published in the Listener of 31st May 1951), I said, "If the Chinese take Russia as a model China may well develop something like the old Confucian system with the Communist Party in place of the scholar officials and Marxism instead of Confucianism as the official ideology * * *. One can even see the beginnings of a movement in this direction," and, "If the enforcement of a new uniform ideology prevents people from thinking scientifically they will be unable to prevent the degeneration of Chinese society into what Milovan Djilas calls 'bureaucratic centralism,' because they will not be able to understand what is happening. A static China will again face a progressing West." In a letter to the New Statesman on 27th May 1951 I reply to Chinese critics of British policy and argue that the main obstacle to better Sino-British relations was the intransigence of the Chinese government. (See appendix VI.) In a controversy in the Manchester Guardian I criticise Mr. Zilliacus's defence of Chinese terrorism and say, "It is quite true that American action over Formosa and the advance to the Manchurian border played a large part in producing political hysteria in China, but this does not alter the fact that political hysteria is a mental disease with disgusting symptoms. * * * Mr. Zilliacus * * * is here asserting a principle that would equally well excuse Maidenek or Buchenwald because of the part which French intervention in the Ruhr and Rhineland played in the growth of Nazism. As against this Lord Vansittart is entirely right in asserting the principle that all terrorism and massacre should be condemned. One only regrets that he did not apply this principle some years ago by condemning the Kuomintang with the same vigour that he now condemns the Communists." (Letter written 11th May 1951.) In more recent lectures I have argued that the resort of the Chinese regime to terrorism is evidence that it can no longer command popular support.

I have been strongly critical of United States policy in China, not because it opposed Stalinism and Soviet imperialism but because its actual result has been to assist the acceptance of Stalinist views in China, to discredit democracy, and to force China into reliance on the Soviet Union. After my return from a visit to China in 1949 I wrote, "The complete discrediting of America in Chinese eyes has been the work of the group who might be called the Kuomintang fellow travellers, whose attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek has been that of Com-

munist fellow-travellers towards Stalin. * * * This powerful group has made America appear in China as the consistent supporter of the most corrupt and reactionary forces in Chinese society." and, "If China ever becomes a Russian dependency, the best assistants of Russian imperialism will, as usual, have been the doctrinaire anti-Communists."³ In many public speeches I have said that if General Hurley had accepted a commission from the Soviet government to discredit American influence in China there was scarcely one of his actions he would have needed to change.⁴

I have maintained that, during the period from 1945-49, the State Department was very much better informed about China than the British Foreign Office and that the basic weakness of American policy was the failure of the State Department to stick to its principles against its right-wing critics. A summary of my views is given in an article on *The Cold War in the East* which appeared in the *Political Quarterly* for January-March 1951. (Appendix VII.) I have argued that if General Marshall and the State Department had had a free hand over China policy they could have very probably prevented the civil war in China and that a skilful handling of American policy could have put the Chinese Communists in a position in which they either had to break with the Soviet Union and repudiate the doctrinaire Stalinist elements in their position or else break with America and the democratic forces in China over issues on which they would have been violently opposed by all nationalist and democratic Chinese public opinion. I have argued that, in such circumstances, it is very probable that most of the Chinese Communist leaders would have broken with the Soviet Union. If they had not, their chances of success in the civil war would have been very much reduced if they had fought with the active opposition of the great majority of educated Chinese public opinion.

The points on which I disagree with the right-wing critics of the State Department involve the fundamental issues of democracy versus totalitarianism. I have argued that these right-wing groups have in fact accepted the Stalinist assumptions about the nature of the world conflict and the correct forms of political strategy. (See letter reproduced in Appendix V (b) and letters reproduced in Appendix VII.) As against this I have argued that the most serious danger in the present world conflict is the practical cooperation between extremists of both sides in strengthening each other's influence and in working for a situation in which no disputes can be settled except by war. A short statement of my views was given in a series of broadcasts which I gave last year for the B. B. C. Far Eastern Service which are reproduced in Appendix IX.

I have argued that, in psychological warfare, it is vital to fight on the right issues and that American policy in China failed because, under pressure from the groups in America who supported Stalinist strategy, it always fought on the wrong issues. It has seemed to me the height of folly for a democratic country to try to compete with Stalinism by using Stalinist strategies. In such competition the highly organized and completely unscrupulous professionals are certain to defeat the disunited and slightly half-hearted amateurs. On the other hand I have maintained that Stalinism could be defeated in psychological warfare if democratic countries insisted in fighting on democratic principles.

In writing on American policy in China I have always criticized the failure to stand for democratic principles and the failure to carry out the declared objectives of American policy. As early as January 1946 I wrote that a settlement was only possible if the Americans insisted on the conditions set out in President Truman's statement of 15th December 1945. (See appendix X (a).) In an analysis of American policy written in May 1947 I wrote, "Judged in terms of American objectives the basic mistake in American policy was failure to support the groups that would have been America's natural allies." (The full analysis is given in Appendix X (b).) The Chinese Communists were never challenged on the real issues of their conflicting loyalties to China and to the Soviet Union or on their readiness to repudiate policies of secret-police terrorism and to allow freedom of information and discussion. On the contrary the United

³ *The New China: three views*. London. Turnstile Press, 1950, pages 141 and 145.

⁴ In view of the controversy about military aid to the Kuomintang, it is worth pointing out that, in 1945, Generals Hurley and Wedemeyer and Commodore Miles told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, "They were all of the opinion that the rebellion in China could be put down by comparatively small assistance to Chiang's Central Government." (Admiral Leahy, *I Was There*. London Gollancz, 1950, page 395.) An important part of General Hurley's assistance to the Soviet Union was his provision to the U. S. government of completely inaccurate information about both the political and the military situation and his efforts to prevent the transmission of more accurate reports.

States became involved in the support of a corrupt and incompetent police-state regime against a regime which was strikingly more honest and efficient and which, until 1950, could make out a strong case for claiming to be more democratic. Most non-Communist foreign observers in contact with Chinese opinion agree that these policies completely discredited America and made educated Chinese opinion inclined to accept Communism. (Derk Bodde's "Peking Diary" is one example of such reporting.) The Formosan problem is, perhaps, the clearest illustration of the troubles caused by American failure to stand on the principles of American democracy. By every principle of American democracy, going back to the Declaration of Independence, the United States should have supported the efforts of the Formosans to free themselves from intolerable misgovernment, especially since there was no question of Communism involved in the rising of February 1947. If America had then supported Formosan home rule there would now be a Formosan government, either independent or under U. N. trusteeship, which would have represented the great majority of Formosan opinion in asking for support against attack from any totalitarian government on the mainland.⁵ Defence of Formosa would be an issue on which the United States could obtain support from democratic opinion throughout the world. Instead, the United States allowed the Kuomintang to suppress the rising by terrorism, including the regular Stalinist technique of killing off the educated natives who were likely to lead any opposition.⁵ As a result the defence of Formosa is defensible only in terms of military strategy and has become an issue on which democratic opinion in the free countries is strongly and justifiably critical of American action, and which, therefore, causes disagreements between America and her allies.

It is extremely improbable that the American advocates of totalitarian strategy could have prevented a Kuomintang defeat even if they had had a free hand in determining American policy in China, because they had lost the contact with objective reality which, as George Orwell showed in his brilliant analysis of totalitarianism, is an essential constituent of successful "double-think." All the arguments that the outcome of the civil war could have been changed by a limited extension of military aid to the Kuomintang depend on completely unrealistic estimates of the relative military strength and general competence of the Kuomintang and the Communists. My estimates of the military prospects in 1946 and 1947 proved to be much more nearly correct than those which were generally accepted at the time. In an analysis written at the end of 1946, based on the experience of the Communist-Japanese fighting, I argued that, even with full-scale American assistance and the use of American troops, it would take the Kuomintang a minimum of four or five years to win the war; that with only limited American assistance the Kuomintang might win positional battles to begin with but would probably end by being completely defeated by the Communists, also in four or five years (*Virginia Quarterly Review*, Vol. 23, No. 2). By the middle of 1947 I was pointing out that the Kuomintang seemed to have weakened to the point where it could not even win positional battles and suggested that while this might be altered by increased American intervention there was the possibility that full-scale American intervention on one side might produce Russian intervention on the other (*Fabian Quarterly*, June 1947).

This is not the place for a full discussion of American policy but I would maintain that there is strong evidence to support my general contention that the influence on U. S. policy of such bodies as the China Policy Association and such personalities as Generals Hurley and Wedemeyer, Senators Knowland and McCarthy, Congressman Judd and Mr. Henry Luce has been a major factor in bringing about the victory of Stalinism in China. I would also maintain that there is strong evidence to support my view that the present situation would be much better if U. S. policy had followed the views of those experienced China Service officers who have been denounced and in some cases dismissed for alleged disloyalty. There was, at the least, a reasonable possibility that the policies they advocated might have produced a Chinese government committed to democratic values and opposed to police-state methods and, therefore, aligned with the democracies against Stalinism, even though some of the leading fig-

⁵ By an irony of arrangement, Annexe 169 of the American White Paper, which describes the suppression of the Formosan rising by troops with American equipment and which reads rather like the accounts of the establishment of Soviet rule in the Baltic States, is followed immediately by an Annexe in which President Truman declares, "... it should be clearly understood that military assistance furnished by the United States would not be diverted for use in fratricidal warfare or to support undemocratic administration."

ures in such a government would have been members of the Chinese Communist Party. Even if such policies had failed to prevent the complete dominance of the Chinese Communist Party by the doctrinaire Stalinist and blindly pro-Russian elements in it and the complete victory in China of such a Communist Party, the American position in the Far East would still be far stronger than it is now. Stalinist dominance in China would have depended far more directly on force and terrorism against a Chinese public opinion which would have been naturally pro-American; and American moral influence and trust in American good faith would be far stronger in other Asian countries.

In conclusion, I would claim that the above account shows that my actions have always been based on a viewpoint completely different both from that of Stalinist Communists or fellow travellers and from that of the right-wing groups in America and Britain who accept the basic Stalinist assumptions on philosophy and political strategy.

Appendix XI gives a short account of my membership of political associations.

SECTION II

I first became acquainted with the publications of the I. P. R. after reaching China in 1938 and, at Yenching University, I was a close friend of the late Mr. Norman Hanwell, an I. P. R. research scholar who was doing very interesting work (unfortunately uncompleted because of his illness and death).

When in the United States in 1946 and 1947 I got to know a number of the staff of the American I. P. R. and gave a number of lectures under their auspices.

After returning to England, I was one of the British delegates, chosen by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, to the World I. P. R. conference at Stratford-on-Avon. After the conference I was invited to become a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

I have been working on a book on the growth of the Chinese Communist areas and the history of Communist-Kuomintang relations between 1937 and 1947. The book is sponsored by the I. P. R. and by the Royal Institute of International Affairs and, in 1949, the I. P. R. financed a visit to China on which I hoped to obtain more material for the book.

I have done some writing for Pacific Affairs, and Far Eastern Survey, largely book reviews, and in 1950 the I. P. R. published a mimeographed edition of my "Notes on Educational Problems in Communist China" which was originally written as a report for an international organisation.

In all my work on Chinese problems I have found publications by the I. P. R. to be among the most useful English-language sources. In the sample of I. P. R. publications, whose accuracy I have been in a position to check, the standards of objectivity and respect for the facts has been extremely high and, judging from the reports of other workers in the Far Eastern field, the work of the I. P. R. is very generally respected among serious scholars.

In the political, social, and economic problems with which the I. P. R. has been concerned, the evidence available is normally insufficient to give a definite decision between a range of alternative hypotheses. This means that there is a range within which scholars genuinely trying to be objective can honestly and legitimately differ, and the material published by the I. P. R. has seemed to me to represent a variety of views within this range. But the standards of scholarship and objectivity which the I. P. R. has tried to preserve imply the rejection of views outside the range which can be supported by an honest examination of the evidence. This has meant that the I. P. R. has been committed to a stand for one side in certain political controversies. To give an example that has now become comparatively uncontroversial, during the years before 1941 the I. P. R. was definitely pro-Chinese in the Sino-Japanese conflict and highly critical of the viewpoint which supported Japan's alleged "civilizing mission" and which advocated that the Western powers should accept the Japanese claims for a special position in China. But the pro-Japanese case was not one which could be supported by any honest examination of the record of Japanese behaviour in Manchuria or China. The argument, used by some influential Americans, that Japan should be conciliated as being the best customer for American cotton ignored the frequent statements in Japanese publications that control of North China was vital to Japan because it would make Japan independent of American cotton supplies. Thus, a refusal to accept views which depended on deliberate distortion or falsification of evidence inevitably put the I. P. R. in a position strongly critical of Japanese policy.

In the present controversies, a good deal of the criticism of the I. P. R. from both the extreme right and the extreme left has been caused by the policy of the I. P. R. in publishing factual material. If the I. P. R. were compelled to change its present standards for standards which reject scholarship and objectivity it would be an important victory for totalitarianism over the traditions of Western civilization.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this third day of June, 1952.

[SEAL]

NORTH BURN,

Vice Consul of the United States of America.

Service No. 7671, Item No. 24, Fee \$2.00—18s 4d.

APPENDIX I

EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO YU KUANG-SHENG (OF NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY IN YENAN), SEPTEMBER 13, 1946

However, Hsin Hua Shih publicity is far better than the publicity of the British or American Communist parties and especially the Soviet Union. Soviet publicity is almost incredibly incompetent. My impression in England was that Soviet publicity was a big factor in producing anti-Soviet feeling, and some of the Labour Party people who want to get Bevin out as Foreign Secretary feel that the attacks made on him by the Communists are one of the main factors keeping him in power. You could see the same sort of result very clearly in the Labour Party conference rejection of Communist affiliation. Even the South Wales Miners Federation, which had elected a Communist as their chairman, voted against affiliation by a large majority apparently because Communist publicity had been so subjective and so dogmatic that even very left-wing workers' organisations distrusted it.

The weaknesses seem to be dogmatism and an extreme subjectivism, which might be called Marxian idealism. They seem to have turned Marx upside down again and got back to a position like Hegel in "Naturphilosophie" of supposing that truth and falsehood can be determined entirely from ideas without reference to the material world.

As far as I could judge, Hsin Hua Shih was often guilty of serious omissions and was sometimes inaccurate through carelessness but it did not go in for deliberate invention or false statements. Soviet and Western Communist publicity, on the other hand, seems to have extremely little respect for facts. I'm carrying on a correspondence with "Soviet News" about an article they had on American intervention in China which was typical of the sort of stuff they put out. Among other things the author tries to make out that American policy was very good before the death of Roosevelt and very bad ever since, which of course means that he has to distort the whole history of the recall of Stilwell and Hurley's press conference on April 5th. Even when the facts support his general case he does not bother to get them right. He argues that it would have been cheaper (sic) both for China and America for the "People's Armies of Liberation" to receive the Japanese surrender rather than to send American and Kuomintang troops to disarm the Japanese. As he writes it, the reader would understand that the Japanese had been disarmed as soon as American and Kuomintang troops got to North China. In general, Soviet publicity makes so many statements that are clearly untrue that people often disbelieve even the true statements.

People who have had to do with the Russians find their subjectivism quite fantastic. My brother had one story about a committee he was on in Berlin. The British had one set of proposals and the Russians quite a different set, and as they could not agree on a compromise the meeting was adjourned for three weeks. At the next meeting the Russians said, "We have a new set of proposals," and produced almost word for word what had been the British proposals at the last meeting. They then said, "These are the Russian proposals and they always have been the Russian proposals." Someone who had been at San Francisco told me a very similar story about the conference. The Russians wanted to change some resolution, which may have been quite a sensible thing to do, but instead of proposing that the original resolution should be changed they proposed that there should be a new resolution and that all mention of the original resolution should be removed from the records of the conference. The man who told me said that

the Russians just did not seem able to understand it when other people said, "But the conference did pass the original resolution and that is a fact which you cannot alter by falsifying the records."

All the stories you hear from people who have been in Europe give you a fairly poor opinion of the Russians. In many ways the Russian army seems to be much more like the Japanese army than the Eighth Route army. All the British army people in Germany are struck by the fact that the difference in treatment between officers and men is much greater in the Russian army than it is in the British (and of course it is much greater in the British than in the Eighth Route). Also, for a long time there was a breakdown in discipline in many units with very widespread looting and raping. This was not just in enemy territory. A friend of mine was over in Denmark recently and he said that people had heard from friends or relations in Bornholm that the Russians had behaved very much worse than the Germans. (The people he was meeting were Danish workers or farmers.) Russian discipline was tightened up several months ago, apparently on orders from Moscow, though by rather brutal methods in which a lot of people were shot, and is now said to be rather better than American discipline.

Another point where the Russians seem to be much more like the Japanese or Kuomintang than they are like the Eighth Route is in secret-police activities. My brother had a lot of stories about it. This is a typical case. A German Communist was arrested in the British zone of Berlin for black-market activities. A day or two later two Russians came to the house of the German policeman who had arrested him and when they found the policeman was not in they carried off his wife. The Russian HQ said they knew nothing about it, but British intelligence got news of where she was and a British patrol went into the Russian zone and found her shut up in a cellar after having been raped and beaten. This is just the sort of thing which might have happened in Peiping if a Chinese policeman had arrested a criminal with Japanese connections.

A lot of the Russian defects seem to have come from the development of an authoritarian tradition. At the moment that seems to be very strong. People who have to do with the Russians say that people on the spot are very much tied down by detailed orders from Moscow and have very little freedom of initiative and also there seems to be a general authoritarian outlook. For example, my brother said he had a long argument with one of the Russians when the Russians wanted to prohibit private schools in Germany. The Russian attitude was that there was a correct education and that it was the business of the government to see that all children received this correct education and so all children should go to official government schools. My brother said to him, "Surely what you want is exactly the same as the Nazi policy of Gleichschaltung." The Russian thought about this for a bit and finally said, "Well perhaps our methods are the same as the Nazis", but we are using them for different ends."

I think that is the real point at issue between the Russians and British Socialists—how far the methods the Russians use can produce a democratic Socialist society. For example, in the part of Europe under Russian influence there have been very important reforms. On the other hand, they have usually been put through by rather authoritarian methods and a considerable amount of terrorism by secret police. Once a government starts using secret-police terrorism it automatically produces an irreconcilable opposition and has to go on using secret-police methods against them, and unless it manages to wipe out the opposition without creating other opposition groups in the process it may be extremely difficult ever to get away from authoritarian methods. It seems to me that secret police and terrorism in government are like morphine in medicine. It may be necessary to use them occasionally, but if they are used too long it may be very difficult to stop and they will have a disastrous effect on the whole society.

I think that one of the causes of misunderstanding between Russia and the West is that the Russians don't seem to understand this objection to authoritarian methods and assume that everyone who disagrees with them must do so because they are reactionaries who disagree with their aims. This comes from different theories about democracy. My father wrote a very good article, pointing out that to a very large extent the Russians and the West were talking at cross-purposes when they talked about democracy. The Russians asked, "Whose interest does the government represent?" The Russians would define a democracy as a country in which the government represents the interests of the masses while people in the West would define a democracy as a country in which government was carried on by free discussion and compromise. On the Russian definition America and, until recently, England are not very democratic, while on the Western definition Russia and other eastern European countries are not very democratic.

It seems to me that democracy should really include both definitions. The weakness of a lot of Western argument about democracy, especially in America, is that it ignores the class struggle. It refuses to face the difficulty that free speech and free elections are not in fact sufficient to prevent control of the government by groups representing interests opposed to the mass of the people. You would probably agree with criticisms of Western democracy on these lines; so I need not expand the point.

On the other hand the weakness of Communist theory is that it ignores the dangers of authoritarian organisation. It does not face the difficulty that unless there is effective free criticism and unless people can turn out a government they do not like there is no guarantee that the government will remain responsive to popular opinion. It seems to me that the Chinese party is the only one which has begun to face the question and that the Russian and European parties are still about at the stage of the Chinese party in 1935 or earlier. If you once start to ask, "How can we guarantee that the party will remain in touch with the masses and responsive to popular opinion?" it seems to me that you must be led to something like Mao Tse-tung's views about the 3-3 system. That is, the party must be separate from the government and be in a position where it only has power in the government by providing leadership which can gain the support of freely elected non-Communists. Where the system is working properly that automatically means that the Party has to adjust its program in response to popular opinion, has to know how to discuss its policy and to get along with non-Communists and has to face continual informed criticism and suggestions. My main criticism was that the Chinese Party had not fully worked out the theoretical implications of experiences for organisation within the party. I don't know if Po Ku ever showed you the long manuscript I wrote called *What's Wrong with Yen-an*. The point I tried to show was that general standards of efficiency in most Yen-an organisations were very much lower than in similar organisations at the front largely because they were much more one-party organisation which, because of Communist theories on party organisation, meant that they did not face continuous and effective criticism. I think there is little doubt about the low standards at Yen-an. Almost everyone I knew who came to Yen-an from the front noticed it, but you may not agree with my diagnosis. My theory was that at the front most organisations were subject to continual criticism. In the government there were able non-Communists who were free to criticize and in army organisation there was the continual test of the military struggle which amounted to very effective criticism from the Japanese. When an organisation was not engaged in a competitive struggle and did not have important non-Communist participation it was not subject to any effective criticism because of the Communist rule about not criticising party decisions. It seemed to me that the results of this rule were that in a Communist organisation mistakes were never corrected until their bad effects had become obvious to the party leaders. In *What's Wrong with Yen-an* I gave examples of cases where most people recognised that things were wrong but no one did anything because the defects were connected with some party decision. Actually Yen-an was never very bad because there was the general anti-authoritarian tradition and non-Communist participation, though not very effective, in the government. Also the organisation was so small that the leaders became aware of mistakes before they became really serious.

It seems to me that the big drop in administrative efficiency between 3-3 organisations and party organisations has important implications for party organisation. It implies that the best form of party organisation is relative to the situation. Lenin's views about the necessity for a centralised organisation which was authoritarian in the sense of not allowing discussion in the carrying out of policies which had been decided by the party are quite correct for a party carrying out a revolution. For dealing with this sort of situation an organisation must be largely authoritarian because quickness and decisiveness in action are so important. On the other hand as soon as you get a situation in which quickness and decisiveness in action are less important, then the loss in efficiency caused by the limitation of discussion and criticism becomes serious. As a result I don't think you can generalize about the best form of organisation and the fact that all Communist parties have adopted the same form of organisation has had important consequences. Communist parties operating in the type of situation for which the organisation was designed have been relatively successful while parties operating in Western democracies where the organisation is not suitable have been relatively unsuccessful.

To come back to Russia, my impression is that the Russian party has never even asked the question, "how can we guarantee that the party will remain in touch with the masses and responsive to popular opinion?" and that the same is true of most Western Parties. They seem to assume it as self-evident that the Party is the representative of the masses and that decisions of the Party are the only correct policy representing the interests of the masses. This has naturally made them authoritarian. If you believe that you certainly represent the people and that you know with certainty what should be done in the interests of the people you are naturally impatient of criticism and discussion and think that the best form of organisation is one which enables you to put your policies into practice as quickly as possible. Of course there is a lot of disagreement about what the Russian organisation is like but it seems to me that there is fairly strong evidence that it is authoritarian in the sense that there is not general freedom of criticism of government policies and that the government puts through the policies it thinks correct without very much concern for popular opinion, or perhaps you might say that the actions of the government are limited not by what the people would want if they knew and could discuss possible alternatives but by what the government can persuade them to want with a monopoly of publicity. I think you could confirm that judgement entirely from Communist sources. There are several good examples in the official Short History of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union.

I feel that a lot of the trouble in Europe has come from this Communist authoritarianism. If the Russian army had maintained proper discipline and the Communist Parties in Eastern Europe tried to set up united-front governments which were democratic in the Western sense as well as in the Russian sense there might have been quite a rapid political settlement which would have left the really reactionary opposition as a group too small to be dangerous. In fact the bad discipline of the Russian army produced a lot of anti-Communist feeling so that where there were fairly free elections in Hungary and Austria the biggest vote went to Catholic parties with strong reactionary elements. In countries like Poland or Yugoslavia there seems to be a vicious circle of Communist authoritarianism producing so much opposition that the government dare not allow free elections; this in turn makes more of the opposition side with the extreme reactionaries who want violent resistance to the government which in turn makes it necessary for the government to be still more authoritarian. The only country which seems to be progressing is Czechoslovakia where there was a real tradition of democracy in the Western sense.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

APPENDIX II

SOME POPULAR FALLACIES ON CHINESE COMMUNISM

The importance of continued publication of factually accurate accounts of recent Chinese history is shown by the recurrence in comparatively reputable publications of arguments based on simple and definite errors of fact. This appendix gives only a few of the simpler examples.

A whole series of arguments have been based on the assumption that the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia area around Yen-an was the most important Communist base area throughout the war. E. g., "undoubtedly, the organization of the Communists was good, but their forces were concentrated into a specific area [sic] which made matters easy for them. The Central Government suffered from the drawbacks of geography, with their forces sprawling awkwardly over vast areas both unmanaged and unmanageable with transport problems that were insoluble. (General Carton de Wiart, "Happy Odyssey," London 1950, page 268.) "Americans on conducted tours also failed to take into account that 'land reform' was comparatively easy in the sparsely populated Northwest left practically unmolested by Japan [sic]. Only a few perspicacious correspondents realized that the National Government, whose armies had to bear the main brunt of the Japanese attack, could not, even if it had wished, have instituted 'agrarian reform' in the midst of war and blockade." (Freda Utley, *The China Story*, Chicago, 1951, page 140.) G. F. Winfield uses a slightly similar argument about Communist land reform being easy because the Northwest was one of the few areas in China where there was some good uncultivated land. (*China: The Land and the People*, New York, 1948.)

In fact, the population of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia area was never over two million and, even by the summer of 1938, some of the Communist base areas in Shansi and Hopei had much larger populations. By 1940 Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia had become one of the smallest of the Communist areas which extended to Shantung in the East and the Yangtze valley in the South and by the end of the war the total population under Communist control had risen to about one hundred million. (The first map in Appendix B of the Bolton Report shows the position at VJ-Day.)

Thus the arguments that the Kuomintang suffered from greater transport difficulties than the Communists and that Communist agrarian reform depended on the specially favourable conditions of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia area are based on assumptions which are the exact reverse of the truth. Kuomintang communications may have been poor but they were almost all through territory under continuous Kuomintang control; while the Communist areas were cut up by strips of Japanese-held territory, in some cases 20 or 30 miles wide and strongly fortified, which could only be crossed by fairly dangerous night marches. Large parts of the Kuomintang area, including the whole of Szechuan, saw no fighting throughout the war, except for air raids on the cities, while all the Communist areas except Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia were overrun repeatedly in the course of Japanese mopping-up campaigns; but this did not prevent agrarian reforms being carried out in the front-line Communist areas. The reorganisation of taxation and public finance was actually further advanced in the front-line Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base area than in Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia.

It is also frequently alleged that Communist-Japanese hostilities practically ceased after 1939 (the allegation is made, for example, in the Bolton Report and in Freda Utey's *China Story*). But the biggest Communist offensive which put some Japanese-held railways out of action for a period was in the summer of 1940 and was reported by the National Government spokesman at news conferences in Chungking. The largest Japanese offensives against the Communist areas came in the period from 1941 to 1943 and evidence of widespread hostilities was seen by the various foreign observers who were in the front-line areas from 1941 on.

Another fallacy which occurs in the Bolton Report is the argument that Communist land policy was always simply redistribution of land (pp. 19-20) while, in fact, the agrarian reform policy between 1938 and 1946 was based on the reform measures which had been passed but never enforced by the National Government at Nanking.

These examples have been chosen because the errors of fact involved are simple and obvious, but the list could be greatly extended.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

APPENDIX III

1921 AND ALL THAT

Review, written for Manchester Guardian, of an official history of the Chinese Communist Party that appeared in 1951 in "People's Cihna"

The official Chinese-English language magazine *People's China* has been commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party with a series of articles on the history of the Party by Hu Chiao-mu, Vice Director of the Party's Propaganda Department. These articles give very little information that has not already been published in English but they do give a very revealing picture of the mental climate of present day China.

It is interesting to compare these articles with the history of the Party that was given to Anna Louise Strong at Yen-an in 1946-7. The description of Communist relations with the leaders of the Fukien revolt in 1933 provides a good illustration of the difference. The 1947 version is short enough to quote in full. "The leadership of the dogmatists cost us heavily," said Lu Ting-yi, giving the present Communist view. "When we were in Kiangsi we were offered an alliance with the Fukien general Ts'ai Ting-kai, the hero of Shanghai's 1932 resistance to Japan. The opposed Chiang's appeasement of Japan and was willing to cooperate with us. Our dogmatists were too orthodox to have a united front with 'that bourgeoisie' and thus we lost the chance of victory." (Dawn Out of China, by Anna Louise Strong, People's Publishing House, Bombay, 1948, page 18). In the 1951 version given by Hu Chiao-mu we are told that the Fukien

leaders "sought to unite with the Communists"; that the Communists had made a declaration in favour of an anti-Japanese united front; and that "the leadership of the Party, between 1931 and 1934 committed new, serious 'left' mistakes" (People's China, Vol. IV, No. 3, pp. 15-16). But we are left to guess that one of these mistakes was a failure to reach an agreement for cooperation with the Fukien leaders. The readiness to face facts and to exercise critical judgment that still characterized Chinese Communist thinking in 1947 has been replaced by an apparent fear of making any definite statement that might prove unorthodox.

The result is to produce a highly formalized version of history in which a decisive role is played by the ideological struggle between the invariably correct views of Mao Tse-tung and Stalin and the erroneous views of various deviationists. If this emphasis on the importance of the ideas of individual leaders represented a reaction from a rigidly determinist Marxism it would be a sign of progress. Unfortunately the assumption that ideas play an independent, and often decisive role in history is nowhere integrated or even reconciled with the rather doctrinaire Marxism which characterizes other parts of the narrative. The orthodox scheme in which the ideas of Mao Tse-tung and Stalin must be not only correct but also obviously correct makes it impossible to give any rational explanation of the views of their opponents. We are back in the old fashioned history where men just say to themselves, "I am determined to prove a villain."

Events which do not fit into this highly conventionalized version of history are usually simply ignored and the gaps are especially noticeable in the period up to 1928 when a serious Communist set-back has to be explained away. For example, most authorities on this period attach considerable importance to the various Comintern advisers who were active in China. The Soviet sources who provided the information for Louis Fischer's *The Soviets in World Affairs* describe Borodin as exercising an important influence on both Communist and Kuomintang policy and place a large part of the blame for the Communist defeat on the rival Comintern adviser who opposed his policy. Roy, in his *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China*, claims that a number of important Communist decisions were the result of instructions which he gave as representative of the Comintern. Even short histories of the period usually connect the reorganisation of the Canton government under a Kuomintang-Communist united front with the Sun Yat-sen-Joffe declaration of January 1923. But in Hu Chiao-mu's narrative all the Comintern representatives have vanished without trace. The only Russian influence which is admitted is wise advice from Stalin and responsibility for all Communist decisions is placed entirely on the Chinese leaders of the time.

It is interesting that the other important authority who agrees with Hu Chiao-mu is Chiang Kai-shek. The chapters of *China's Destiny* which describe the period from 1923-27 also make no mention of the Comintern advisers in the Kuomintang and Communist organizations. Unfortunately neither Hu Chiao-mu nor Chiang Kai-shek give any reasons to justify their assumption that the Comintern advisers were too unimportant to be worth mentioning.

Again, Hu Chiao-mu describes Chiang Kai-shek as "the Right-wing KMT commander in chief of the National Revolutionary Army of the time who 'had already organized an anti-Communist and anti-Soviet conspiracy on March 20th, 1926 * * *'" and who "at the end of 1926 * * * turned his headquarters at Nanchang into a centre of opposition to the Left-wing of the KMT at Hankow" (People's China, Vol. IV, No. 2, page 12). All this is quite correct but nothing is said about the line of the international Communist press which continued to praise Chiang Kai-shek as the loyal revolutionary leader right up to the Shanghai coup of April 1927 and denounced all prophecies of an impending split as counter-revolutionary attempts to weaken the revolutionary forces. After the Communist defeat Stalin defended his policy by pointing out various passages in his speeches in which he had advised the Chinese CP to build up their organisation in the Chinese armed forces in preparation for a split with the KMT. If the Chinese CP had consisted of highly disciplined revolutionaries it might have been possible to make effective preparations to fight Chiang Kai-shek while publicly proclaiming completed trust in him as a loyal revolutionary leader. But the majority of the Chinese Communists were comparatively untrained enthusiasts who tended to believe what they read in the Communist press so that effective preparations to resist Chiang Kai-shek were incompatible with acceptance of the Comintern line on publicity. When the Chinese Communists faced a similar problem during the second united front period they acted quite differently. In 1943, when the Communist leadership thought that there was a real

danger of a general Kuomintang offensive against the Communist areas, the Communist press at once started to attack Chiang Kai-shek and to expose his cooperation with the Japanese against the Communists. And his policy was defended as a lesson learnt from the mistakes of 1926-7. Thus, even if one accepts the explanations which Stalin gave after the event, it would seem that his propaganda policy in 1926-7 was mistaken and weakened his allies more effectively than it deceived his enemies. If, on the contrary, the Comintern press line up to April 1927 represented the real beliefs of the CPSU leaders than it is clear that their estimates of the Chinese situation were seriously mistaken.

If history must teach the lesson that Stalin and the CPSU are always right, then the record of events must be distorted in the sort of way in which Hu Chiao-mu distorts it. If this orthodox version of history is to be secure against overthrow by anyone with a sufficiently critical and scientific attitude to investigate the original sources, then these original sources must be suppressed. So far the process may only have got to the stage where it would be unhealthy for any Chinese historian to point out the obvious gaps in this official version of history; but Hu Chiao-mu has committed the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party to a policy whose logical conclusion is the activities of George Orwell's Ministry of Truth.

In dealing with later periods when the Chinese Communist Party was generally successful there are not such striking gaps in the record of events though a great deal of the narrative is still very controversial. One of the more interesting sections is that which deals with the negotiations in 1945-6. Here Hu Chiao-mu seems to be undecided between two objectives. On the one hand he wishes to show that the Chinese CP really wanted peace and, therefore, did its best to reach an agreement with the KMT which would have prevented the civil war. On the other hand he wishes to show that the Chinese CP knew from the start that both the KMT and the Americans were determined on war and, therefore, did not allow itself to be tricked into making any concessions that would weaken its military position. On the whole, it seems to be the latter objective which predominates, and as a result, Hu Chiao-mu leaves out some of the evidence which shows that the Chinese CP acted with more good faith than either the KMT or the Americans. The Chinese CP did, in fact, carry its effort to reach a peaceful settlement to the point of making concessions which quite seriously weakened its military position. Under the agreement of 10th October 1945, the Communists evacuated quite large areas south of the Yangtse in which they could almost certainly have maintained guerrilla bases and which they did not in fact recover until 1949. Again, while the demobilisation agreements were almost completely evaded by the Kuomintang, in some important Communist areas a third of the regular army had been demobilised by the end of March 1946.

Hu Chiao-mu spoils his case against America by exaggeration. The American attempts at mediation are represented as nothing but devices to gain time for Chiang Kai-shek's military preparations and the whole of the American government organisation is represented as being united in a policy of supporting the Kuomintang in a civil war. By taking this line Hu Chiao-mu precludes himself from making the criticism of American policy for which there really is strong evidence; that, while defeating Japan, America had become infected with the disease that proved fatal to the Japanese political system. The more responsible and better informed Americans who really wished to mediate a peaceful settlement in China were unable to control the military leaders who followed their own line in Chinese politics and the equally ignorant and irresponsible extremists who supported them at home, just as the more responsible Japanese statesmen could never control the military hotheads or the ultrapatriotic political gangster organisations.

Here again Hu Chiao-mu finds himself in strange company. He is revising the record of events in exactly the same way as it is being revised in America. Under pressure from Senator McCarthy and the Kuomintang lobby, the American statesmen whose words and actions in 1945-6 indicated a genuine desire to act as honest mediators in the Chinese dispute now try to show that they were always really in favour of supporting the Kuomintang in a civil war.

No doubt Hu Chiao-mu has managed to persuade himself that his revision of history serves the cause of peace and the interests of the Chinese people. But if he could discard the blinkers of Stalinist orthodoxy, he would see that he is actually fighting side by side with such men as Senator Knowland and Henry Luce. The version of history for whose acceptance they are all fighting is one in which no Communist can hope for peaceful agreement with a non-Communist American and in which no American can hope for peaceful agreement with any

Communist; in short, a version of history in which war is inevitable. The only Chinese interests which are served by such a revision of history are those of the Kuomintang regime in Formosa whose only hope of return to power in China lies in a new world war.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

APPENDIX IV (A)

LETTER PUBLISHED IN NEW STATESMAN

BALLIOL COLLEGE,
Oxford, 27/3/48.

SIR: The following analysis may explain why Communism under Russian influence has led to results which democratic socialists are compelled to repudiate.

Firstly, Communists tend to believe that Marx-Leninism is an exact science from which they can deduce with absolute certainty the policies required by the interests of the masses. (The official "Short History of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union" suggests that Marx-Leninism is as exact a science as biology). This inevitably produces a tendency to treat the ordinary workers who are not Marx-Leninist scholars like children who do not know what is good for them and whose wishes must be overruled in their own interests.

Secondly, Communists tend to be influenced by the Hegelian element in Marxism and to believe that abstract concepts such as classes or the socialist state are realities superior to the individuals who compose them. This leads to a readiness to sacrifice human beings to ideas (cf. Gorki's remark that Lenin treated the Russian people as a scientist treats his experimental material). It leads to a belief that the Communist Party representing the masses is an *a priori* truth which does not need to be validated by regular testing against actual mass opinion. The theoretical simplicity of "liquidating a class" has made Communists ignore the vicious circle inherent in police-state methods—the people who form an opposition class cannot, in practice, be "liquidated" without making other people into a new opposition.

The striking thing about East European Communist Parties is their contempt for the intelligence of the masses. Communists claim that the Communist-led governments of Eastern Europe enjoy general popular support. (If this were so then scrupulously fair elections could give irrefutable proof of popular support for Communism.) But they also claim that it has been necessary to dissolve or purge opposition parties and prevent the free expression of opposition views before holding elections. The two claims are only consistent on the assumption that the average worker or peasant in Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc., is so stupid that, if he is allowed to hear arguments against Communism as well as arguments for it, he will vote for parties which wish to enslave and exploit him instead of for a party that offers him freedom and prosperity.

The Russians act on the assumption that nearly all Soviet citizens are so weak-minded that their belief in Communism and loyalty to their country would be corrupted by any first-hand contact with the non-Communist West. The size and powers of the Russian secret police would seem to show that a generation of Communist government and liquidating the opposition has left cleavages in Russian society more bitter than those in capitalist democracies.

It is only in China that a Communist Party has shown a genuine respect for popular opinion and has tried to secure an objective correspondence between Communist policies and the desires of the masses. The wartime experience of the Chinese Liberated Areas is conclusive proof that New Democratic governments which really have wholehearted mass support can deal with enemy and fascist agents supported by a small opposition class without resorting to Russian style secret police terrorism.

It is possible to agree with much of the Communist criticism of Social Democracy, but the striking practical defects of the alternative offered by Communism have been a major factor in making progressive opinion in the West tolerant of reaction as the lesser evil. Communist doctrinaires and the Russian secret police have been the most effective assistants of world reaction.

Yours, etc.,

MICHAEL LINDSAY.

APPENDIX IV (B)

[From the Times of 25th January 1949]

COMMUNISM IN CHINA

SIR: Mr. Samson's conclusion that the Chinese Communist leaders are in favour of Communism is hardly new or surprising. Over three years ago (The Times of January 17, 1946) your own Special Correspondent lately in China wrote that " * * the Chinese Communist Party is definitely Communist in its basic principles and its party organisation." The real question is whether one objects to Communism even if it is based on popular support or whether one objects only to the use of terrorism and deceit by a minority to force through Communist policies regardless of human suffering or the wishes of the masses. Strong elements in the Chinese Communist Party have taken the line that Communist power should be based on popular support. In Mao Tse-tung's report to the 1945 Party Congress one finds such statements as "Our starting point is to serve the Chinese people earnestly and wholeheartedly * * *" and "Authoritarianism is wrong in all kinds of work * * *". The economic policies of New Democracy fit into this pattern by providing a possible transition to Socialism without a drastic reduction in the general standard of living. For a period in 1946 and 1947 the more extremist doctrinaire elements in the Chinese Communist Party seemed to be in the ascendant. But recent developments seem to show that the party has returned to the policy of basing its power on popular support through providing honest administration and respecting public opinion in the policies which are applied.

It is unfortunate that British policy towards China, insofar as it has existed at all, has usually played the role assigned to it by Cominform propaganda. British, and still more American, policy towards China has given left-wing Chinese opinion quite reasonable grounds for accepting the Cominform analysis of world affairs. Cominform attacks on the Marshall plan must appear reasonable if it is judged by analogy with the workings of UNRRA in China. (See your own special correspondent's comments in The Times of September 20, 1947.) The British reaction to elections with no opposition candidates and to secret police terrorism in Kuomintang China has been very different from the reaction to similar events in Eastern Europe. In spite of statements by the Chinese Communist leaders that they would welcome friendly relations with foreign countries besides Russia, no attempts have been made to penetrate the "iron curtain" in China imposed from the anti-Communist side. If present British policy continues, the leaders of the new regime in China will have had every reason to suppose that they face irreconcilable hostility from non-Communist countries, regardless of whether or not they represent majority opinion in China and whether or not they allow greater freedom than the old regime. This would make dependence on Russia unavoidable.

The only way in which this country can maintain British prestige in China and assist the new Chinese regime to genuine independence is by proving that the British people dislike government based on terrorism, either Communist or non-Communist, but that they would welcome friendly relations with any regime enjoying popular support, also either Communist or non-Communist. British policy should, therefore, make the experiment of assuming that the Chinese Communists are acting in good faith when they say that they would like friendly cooperation with other powers besides Russia and that they intend to maintain democratic liberties. British cultural and commercial contacts should at once be extended to the Communist areas and the possibilities of cooperation explored on the merits of the case in China.

If cooperation on these lines proved possible it would greatly raise British prestige in China, would greatly help in securing Chinese independence, and might even have an important influence on the world situation. Even if the experiment failed through Communist bad faith it would still be better than present policy. If this country made a sincere attempt to establish friendly relations with the new regime and was rebuffed by Communist prejudice it would then be more difficult for the Communists to obtain popular support for a policy aligned solely towards Russia against the interests of the Chinese people.

Yours, etc.

MICHAEL LINDSAY.

84, Sunny Bank, Hull.

APPENDIX IV (c)

EXTRACTS FROM NEW STATESMAN, ARTICLES 1949, FROM NEW CHINA: THREE VIEWS, PP. 147-150

(P. 147) * * * While the official British attitude toward Communism is one of unqualified opposition, every Communist is bound to treat the British authorities as declared enemies and accept the doctrinaire thesis of two irreconcilable factions in the world. But the position would be altered if the British authorities formulated the grounds of their opposition to Communism in a way which would command general support in England. Most people in England dislike Stalin's Communism because of its similarities to Hitler's National Socialism and would have very different feelings about any form of Communism which did not share these similarities. The principles involved are simple: The techniques by which the Nazis seized and held power are those which enable an organized minority to control and exploit the rest of the population. If any Communist regime uses the Nazi techniques of government—secret-police terrorism against all organized opposition or criticism and isolation of the masses from all information except highly distorted propaganda—this shows that the claim of the Communist Party to represent the masses is no better than that of the Nazis to represent the German people. And, in such regimes, the dominant secret-police organizations have a strong vested interest in a continuing threat of war.

Such a formulation of policy would involve an internal struggle against the extreme anti-Communists who have no objection to the Nazi techniques of government when used by anti-Communist regimes, by Chiang Kai-shek or Franco, and who would not accept a difference in principle between Communism based on terrorism and Communism based on mass support. But such a distinction would provide a rational basis for British foreign policy, with applications extending far beyond China. It would be possible to give both recognition and approval to the Chinese regime, insofar as it applied Mao Tse-tung's "scientific" interpretation of Communist principles, and quite consistently to oppose Communism in Malaya and Europe.

Such principles would not, at present, command agreement within the Chinese Communist Party, though they might well do so among the non-Communist elements in the regime. They would, however, reduce the basic disagreement between Britain and China from a fundamental conflict of principle to a dispute about facts, the truth or falsity of the claims of various Communist parties to represent the masses. (Such a development would destroy the whole mental world of the real doctrinaires both in China and England and would, therefore, produce violent emotional reactions.) Furthermore, if this diagnosis of the Russian regime is correct, it is likely that increased contact with Russia would lead the members of the Chinese Communist Party who really wished to serve the masses into agreement with the British position. * * *

(P. 150) With much smaller responsibilities in China, the British authorities have avoided the spectacular blunders of the Americans, but British policy has been extremely ineffective. China faces a choice between two roads of development; the one, based on the "scientific" interpretation of Marxism, toward a form of Communism which would really serve the people and could become fully democratic; the other, based on the "doctrinaire" interpretation, along the Russian road of degeneration toward "oligarchical collectivism" which could produce something like the traditional Chinese social structure but with Marxism instead of Confucian orthodoxy as the ideology of the ruling bureaucracy. Both tendencies exist and the British people have every reason for wishing the former to prevail. In fact, however, through lack of principles, lack of imagination, and lack of courage, perhaps all traceable to class prejudice, the British authorities have done almost nothing to encourage the democratic forces in China but, by both action and inaction, have done a good deal to strengthen the worst "doctrinaire" tendencies in Chinese Communism. Great opportunities have already been lost but it is still true that the essentials for an effective British policy are the repudiation of the anti-Communist doctrinaires and the formulation of rational principles of democratic policy.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

APPENDIX V (A)

LETTERS TO THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN

29TH SEPTEMBER 1950.

SIR: The North Korean peace proposals reported in your issue of September 28th are likely to be repeated and developed and may form the basis of plausible arguments that any continuation of the fighting is proof that the U. N. forces are acting for American interests and not for collective security. It is, therefore, very important that the U. N. should announce conditions under which it would cease military action and should make absolutely clear the relation of such conditions to the basic principle of collective security, that rulers who resort to armed aggression as an instrument of policy cannot be allowed to benefit by it.

A condition which would meet these requirements, and whose inclusion might render something like the North Korean proposals acceptable, is this: that the responsible leaders of the North Korean regime should put themselves and their archives at the disposal of a tribunal investigating the responsibility for the war. If the North Korean leaders could substantiate the claims of their own propaganda, they would have nothing to fear from such a tribunal. If, on the contrary, it could be substantiated beyond reasonable doubt that it was the unscrupulous ambition or fanaticism of the North Korean leaders, or their subservience to foreign advice, which has led to the devastation of their country and the sacrifice of thousands of lives, then it is important that they should not be allowed to retire unpunished and free to repeat their behaviour at the next opportunity.

Yours, etc.

MICHAEL LINDSAY.

APPENDIX V (B)

LETTER TO LISTENER

21/1/51.

SIR: While accusing the British press of failing to report the full story of the origins of the Korean war, Sir John Pratt states a case that depends on the omission of important evidence, in particular, the report of the U. N. Commission dated June 24th on their tour of the frontier. This stated that "South Korea army is organised entirely for defence and is in no condition to carry out attack on large scale against forces of North" (Annexe J. of British White Paper, Cmd. 8078 of 1950). Apart from this Sir John Pratt's case depends on equating South Korean words with North Korean deeds. The South Koreans made threats which their forces were completely incapable of carrying out. Whatever happened on June 25th, the North Koreans had an army vastly superior in offensive weapons and proceeded to use it in an attempt to conquer the whole of Korea, in which they nearly succeeded.

There is strong evidence to support the charges that General MacArthur and his political associates would like to embroil the United States and, if possible, the United Nations in a war with China. But the ability of this group to influence policy has depended at every crucial point on Communist assistance. Suppose the North Korean army had remained on the 38th parallel where it could have repulsed with ease any South Korean attack. And it is almost certain that the North Korean government, set up by the Russians and dependent on Russian military supplies, would have accepted Russian advice against taking the offensive. There would then have been nothing to justify U. N. military support for South Korea and no foreign forces would have supported any South Korean attack. Suppose that the Chinese government, instead of actively applauding the North Korean attempt to settle the Korean problem by war, had exerted its influence in favour of a peaceful settlement. There would then have been no pretext for U. S. intervention in Formosa and it is practically certain that China would by now have obtained both Formosa and the seat on the U. N. Suppose that, even now, the Communists were to indicate their desire for a peaceful settlement, as opposed to a settlement which would give them the fruits of victory without fighting. It is certain that the attempt to brand China as an aggressor would fail.

Sir John Pratt discredits his largely sound case against General MacArthur by his refusal to criticize the more fanatical, but equally unscrupulous and irresponsible men on the Communist side who combine professions of violent hostility against the extreme anti-Communists with practical collaboration in opposing every attempt to settle international disputes without resort to war.

Yours, etc.

MICHAEL LINDSAY.

APPENDIX V (c)

LETTER TO LISTENER

84, SUNNY BANK, HULL, 4/2/51.

SIR: Sir John Pratt still says nothing about the most obvious fact of the Korean war—that the North Koreans had an army vastly superior to the South Koreans in equipment and preparation and used it in an attempt to conquer all Korea. In the ordinary use of words such an attempt at conquest is aggression. Even if he could substantiate his allegations that the South Koreans were crazy enough to attack a far better armed opponent and that the members of the U. N. Commission faked their evidence to cover up this attack, Sir John Pratt would still not have proved his case. He would only have shown that the North Koreans could plead provocation as an extenuation for their aggression. He would not have shown that the U. N. decision to support South Korea against aggression was wrong but only that it was taken before the evidence had become conclusive. His arguments are irrelevant to the main contention of my previous letter—that, whatever actually happened on or before June 25th, the involvement of U. N. forces in a Korean war and all that has followed from this could have been prevented by a North Korean decision to remain on the defensive along the 38th parallel.

The question of principle involved is whether there is such a thing as a right of self-defence against anticipated attack? When the government of country A is convinced that some other country has aggressive intentions and that military intervention in country B is essential for defence against this anticipated aggression, has country A the right to resort to such military intervention without being condemned as an aggressor? Sir John Pratt seems to consider that North Korea and China had such a right; the Americans invoked the principle to justify their intervention in Formosa. In all these cases the evidence of aggressive intentions was by no means conclusive, but, quite apart from this, the principle itself is indefensible. In the present state of mutual suspicion in the world the assertion of a right of anticipatory self-defence is almost certain to produce a chain reaction in which the extremists of both sides cooperate in extending the scale of any conflict. The original North Korean offensive, the American intervention in Formosa and General MacArthur's advance to the Manchurian border, and the Chinese intervention in Korea are stages in such a chain reaction. If the principle of anticipatory self-defence is rejected as incompatible with world peace, then all these stages should be condemned.

I would suggest that a good definition of a warmonger is a man who claims the right of anticipatory self-defence for his own side but rejects it for the other.

Yours etc.

MICHAEL LINDSAY.
LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

APPENDIX VI

LETTER TO NEW STATESMAN AND NATION

84 SUNNY BANK, HULL, 27/5/51.

SIR: Some of the points raised by Mr. Tsou confirm Critic's contentions rather than his own. The issue of the British consulate at T'aipei is one of the points which have led the British authorities to suspect that the Chinese Government does not want normal diplomatic relations. It has been the established precedent for a consulate to deal with the de facto authorities in its area without prejudice to relations with the recognised government. Foreign consulates

continued to operate in Manchukuo and foreign powers, including the Soviet Union, retained consulates in the Japanese occupied areas under the Wang K'e-min or Wang Ching-wei puppet governments. So far as I know, neither Chungking nor Yenai ever protested that this showed unfriendliness towards China. The Chinese Government is now trying to establish a completely new precedent in international relations and is demanding British acceptance of its decision as a condition for accepting normal diplomatic relations.

Again, Mr. Tsou deduces British unfriendliness from an incident in which a visa was refused to one member of a Chinese delegation against whom the British authorities alleged personal objections although the other members were given visas at a few days notice. What, then, should we deduce from the Chinese response to British applications for visas or exit permits? Over 90 percent of official British requests for visas have been refused and the normal delay in granting a visa has been a matter of months.

One might also ask Mr. Tsou to imagine the Chinese reaction to British "friendship" delegation which modelled its conduct on that of the Chinese delegation which did visit this country. Suppose that a British "friendship" delegation were to allow its contacts with representatives of the Chinese Government or the party controlling that Government to be restricted to a single meeting which was made the occasion for reading a speech denouncing the Chinese leaders as puppets of Moscow. It is fairly certain that such behaviour would be taken as clear evidence of British ill will, and that no visas would be granted to any persons who wished to visit China under the same auspices.

Mr. Dean Rusk's recent assertions that the Chinese Government was a Russian colonial regime and that the Kuomintang really represented the Chinese people have been widely criticised as completely contrary to the evidence and as ruling out any possibility of any peaceful agreement with China. But numerous Chinese official statements have denounced the British Government as an American colonial regime and claimed that the British Communist Party really represents the British people. Such statements are quite as contrary to the evidence as Mr. Rusk's and create the same obstacles to any improvement in relations.

Many people in this country would agree with Mr. Tsou in regretting the rather half hearted stand which the British Government has taken in supporting Chinese claims which they believed to be just—the U. N. seat, Formosa and representation in settling the Japanese peace treaty. But the British authorities could take a much stronger stand in supporting Chinese claims if they had some reason to believe that a response from the Chinese side would enable them to refute their critics at home and abroad by reaching a fair negotiated settlement of Sino-British differences. In fact, Chinese statements have led the British authorities to suspect that nothing short of the subordination of British policy to Communist control would produce a response from the Chinese side. Given this complete lack of encouragement from China even the rather half hearted British actions indicate a very genuine desire for better relations.

The real issue between Britain and China is that the British Government believes that Russian imperialism is a far more serious danger than American imperialism while the Chinese Government holds the opposite opinion. Both could produce some valid evidence in support of their views and in both countries actions motivated by fear are taken by the other country as evidence of aggressive intentions. In this sort of situation the most urgent necessity is the development of mutual understanding based on a determination to find out the real facts and a desire to understand the position of the other side. What is alarming in the present Chinese position is the rejection of the frank discussion of differences which is the essential basis for any such understanding. A few years ago the obstacles to Sino-British understanding came preponderantly from the British side. But more recently an increasing British reasonableness has coincided with a growing Chinese intransigence. The best assistance which Mr. Tsou or your correspondents from Tsinghua could give to those in the West who are opposing MacArthurism would be to denounce the Chinese exponents of the Communist equivalent of MacArthurism.

Yours etc.

MICHAEL LINDSAY.
LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

APPENDIX VII

[Political Quarterly, vol. XXII, No. 1, January-March 1951]

THE COLD WAR IN THE EAST

By Michael Lindsay

The most obvious feature of the cold war in the East is that it has been anything but *cold*. In Europe actual fighting has been confined to guerrilla warfare in Greece, but in the east there has been fighting of varying intensity and duration between communist and anticommunist forces in most countries, in some cases large-scale regular warfare.

The character of the opposing forces is also different from Europe. The anti-communist governments are not democracies of the west European or American type. (The countries nearest to western democratic government tend to have the weakest communist movements.) Communism in the east is opposed by colonial regimes or by independent governments run by comparatively small ruling cliques with low standards of administration. On the other side, communism in the east has been greatly influenced by developments in China and tends to base its power on the peasants rather than on the city workers and to use the methods of guerrilla warfare rather than insurrection or political action.

Finally, the dependence of communism on direct Russian assistance has been much smaller in the east than in Europe. In the east it is only the Government of North Korea which was established under Russian military occupation and which contains former Soviet citizens in important positions. Elsewhere in the east, the successes of communism have owed little or nothing to direct Russian assistance.¹

By far the most spectacular development of the cold war in the east has been the loss of China to the American sphere of influence. The Americans started with everything in their favour. American reputation in China stood very high, even among the communists. The predominant foreign influence in Chinese universities was American, and American returned students held many important positions. This moral influence was backed by very great material power through the almost complete dependence of the Chinese Government on American military and economic assistance. The American Government attached enough importance to China to send General Marshall on a special mission. Several thousand million dollars were spent on military and economic assistance after VJ-Day. But within less than four years the forces supported by America had been driven from the Chinese mainland and Chinese public opinion had become strongly anti-American.

Many Americans realized that this might happen. In October 1944, one of the best-informed State Department officials wrote: "Unless the Kuomintang goes as far as the communists in political and economic reform, and otherwise proves itself able to contest this leadership of the people (none of which it yet shows signs of being willing or able to do), the communists will be the dominant force in China within a comparatively few years." And earlier: "If we come to the rescue of the Kuomintang on its own terms . . . both China and ourselves would only be its gaining a brief respite from the ultimate day of reckoning" (*U. S. White Paper on China*, pp. 572-3). The deductions from this analysis, which subsequent events very fully substantiated, were that the alternatives for American policy, not necessarily exclusive, were democratization of the Kuomintang or coming to terms with the communists, who, it was hoped, might be led to take an independent position friendly to America.

This sort of view seems to have prevailed in the State Department and formed the official basis of American policy during the Marshall mission. It has been widely criticized on the grounds that no communist party can ever be trusted to cooperate with noncommunists, and that the Chinese communists, once admitted to a coalition government, would have eliminated their associates like

¹ This statement has been disputed in the case of China. Both right-wing propaganda, interested in justifying American assistance to the Kuomintang, and Chinese communist propaganda interested in justifying the extreme pro-Russian policy adopted in 1949, have played up the importance of Russian action in Manchuria from August 1945 to April 1946. The subject is too large to discuss here, but there is very strong evidence for asserting that any Russian assistance to the communists in Manchuria was not on a scale whose absence would have altered the outcome of the civil war.

the communist parties of Eastern Europe. In fact, however, it is probable that if this policy had ever been effectively implemented it would have completely altered the course of events, especially as the Americans could have benefited from serious Russian mistakes.

The Chinese communists have been exceptionally successful because they have combined the normal discipline and enthusiasm of communism with a leadership sufficiently skilful and sufficiently independent to adjust policy to meet the demands of the Chinese people and the needs of the Chinese situation. On several important occasions Mao Tse-tung showed his readiness to reject bad advice from Moscow. This independence seems to have led the Russians to start with a serious underestimate of Chinese communism. According to General Hurley, Molotov told him that he did not consider the Chinese communists to be communists at all (*U. S. White Paper*, p. 93). While General Hurley is a very unreliable witness, articles in *Izvestia* and Mr. Byrnes's account of Molotov's remarks at the Moscow Conference indicate that the Russians were very badly informed about China, and Russian actions in Manchuria can very plausibly be explained on the hypothesis that they hoped to weaken a hostile Kuomintang Government rather than to help a communist rise to power.

Suppose that General Marshall had been able to implement official American policy; that a coalition government had been established; that the military reorganization agreements were in process of realization; that American influence had been used to strengthen the natural supporters of American democratic ideas and to eliminate from power those whom General Marshall called the "irreconcilable groups within the Kuomintang, interested in the preservation of their feudal control of China." Suppose, then, that America had expressed her readiness to support China in protests against the Russian removal of Manchurian industrial equipment and the behaviour of Russian troops in Manchuria. The communists would have faced a clear choice between loyalty to China and loyalty to Russia. If they had gone into opposition on this issue and resumed the civil war against a government rendered more democratic and efficient by the previous removal of the extreme right, their chances of success would have been very small. It is much more likely that the majority of the communists would have come out against Russia and that the break with Russia would have been followed as in the case of Yugoslavia, by increasing rejection of the Byzantine and Mongolian influences in Russian communism in favour of the liberal and scientific elements in the Marxian tradition. Such tendencies were already strong; "objective" was a term of abuse for Zhdanov, but a term of praise for Mao Tse-tung.

In fact, the issue of Russian action in Manchuria was largely discredited through its use by the right-wing Kuomintang in their campaign against the implementation of the agreements reached in January and February 1946.

But what might be called the "State Department" policy was always in conflict with a rival policy of unqualified support for the Kuomintang. Very influential sections of American opinion were ready to back any opponent of communism, and managed to persuade themselves that Chiang Kai-shek was a great democratic leader, aided by publicity, which was the only thing the Kuomintang did efficiently. General Marshall's efforts at mediation were nullified by General Wedemeyer, who saw the Chinese problem simply as a question of how to help the Kuomintang defeat the communists. The official account of American policy leaves out the episodes in General Wedemeyer's command hardest to reconcile with official American policy, such as his long delays in disarming the Japanese. But even so, it shows that the communists were given very good reasons to suspect the honesty of American mediation long before negotiations finally broke down.

The dominant impression is of the helplessness of those Americans who understood the situation. Chiang Kai-shek, confident of American support so long as he fights communism and refusing to the end to admit the dangers of the situation, drags both his party and American influence in China towards disaster. The Americans who see where they are going can only plead with him with steadily diminishing hopes that their advice will be taken.

If the American reactionaries had been anything like as intelligent and as unscrupulous as communist propaganda represents them, they would have organized a coup d'état to replace the right-wing Kuomintang by a government capable of reaching an essential minimum of efficiency. In fact, the dominant mental quality of reactionaries appears to be a vast power of self-deception. Chiang Kai-shek remained confident of victory till the summer of 1948. In face of overwhelming evidence from American advisers and officials in China that the Kuo-

mintang defeat was caused by hopeless incompetence and corruption in both Army and Government, Senator Taft continues to maintain that "the proper kind of sincere aid to the Nationalist Government a few years ago could have stopped communism in China."

The case of China is an excellent illustration of the basic dilemma involved in the decision to support an inefficient and reactionary government because it is anti-communist. What is needed is immediate assistance combined with reforms and democratization which can produce a government which can remain stable without outside assistance. But reforms touch on the vested interests of the ruling groups, and once the government has outside assistance the incentive to make reforms disappears. The strength of the communist forces depends on their ability to offer leadership in securing essential reforms which their opponents are unwilling or unable to make. The assisting power, therefore, finds itself committed to the support of a degenerating government against a growing communist movement. A simple policy of anti-communism, while it may seem effective in the short run, inevitably leads to this type of vicious circle. Positive support for democracy is much harder in the short run and involves fighting both the extreme right and the extreme left, but it is the only policy which can lead to permanent success.

In Korea the element of pure confusion in American policy was much larger than in China. Occupation started with no definite policy at all, and the normal prejudice of regular soldiers that "maintenance of order" is the supreme objective led to incidents in which Japanese police under American orders fired on Korean demonstrations to welcome the Americans. Subsequent policy was crippled by false economies. The occupation authorities never had the personnel to replace, or to train Koreans to replace, the Japanese who had held all responsible positions in all branches of administration. The limitation of salaries to regular civil service scales produced a rapid turn-over of American officials, who were forced to rely on the small minority of English-speaking Koreans whose politics and social background were usually conservative. Improvements were made after a very slow start, and fairly effective measures of land reform were started before the American withdrawal. The level of competence in South Korean administration fell even lower after the American withdrawal, but the elections, despite many abuses, were free enough to allow many opposition candidates to be elected.

The rival administration set up by the Russians in North Korea had the advantage of being able to draw on trained personnel from the Korean population of Eastern Siberia, and was much more drastic in land reform and in elimination of the Japanese. But it is not at all certain that it has any better claims to represent the Korean people. All the negotiations for the unification of Korea broke down because the Russians refused to accept any solution which would have forced the communists to compete with non-communist parties for popular support in free elections. The North Korean Government has always refused to allow its claims to enjoy popular support to be examined by the U. N. Commission or by other observers likely to diverge from the communist line. Even stronger evidence is provided by refugee movements. One quarter of the entire population of North Korea ran away to the South, while the reverse movement from the South was on a much smaller scale. Such movements indicate very strong preferences for one régime rather than the other. The unfortunate Koreans may quite possibly feel that they have only had the choice between King Log in the South and King Stork in the North. The resort of the North to long-prepared military action may well be an admission that the Soviet satellite type of communism cannot stand peaceful competition even with a government like that of South Korea.

Indo-China is the other area of large-scale conflict. There are obvious similarities with the Chinese situation. Viet Minh has an administration functioning over large parts of the countryside, while their opponents hold the cities. Like the Chinese communists, Viet Minh has managed to win very general popular support. Negotiations which might have settled the conflict in 1946 broke down, with Admiral d'Argenlieu playing the rôle of Generals Hurley and Wedemeyer. The additional complication is the colonial relationship with France. French concessions to nationalist feeling have nearly always been made too late. On the one hand, there was a reluctance to admit how bad colonial rule in Indo-China had been and how unpopular it had become, and on the other there has been a desire for precise definition of the future status of Indo-China which has prevented such gestures as the British withdrawal from India. An agreement with Ho Chi Minh would have been perfectly possible for less than has now been

conceded to Bao Dai. The French now seem to have reached a settlement in Laos and Cambodia, where the local population are afraid of Annamite domination, but there seems little prospect of a settlement elsewhere. The establishment of the Bao Dai Government was based on the sound principle that it is more effective to compete with a revolutionary movement than simply to fight it. But it is very doubtful whether such French-sponsored competition can prove effective after feelings have been embittered by several years of very brutal fighting. So long as Viet Minh can only draw on internal resources, the French army may be able to maintain their present holdings. But the position will remain unstable, and at any time Chinese assistance to Viet Minh could cause a rapid collapse of the French position.

The Malayan communists seem to have tried to repeat the strategy of the Chinese communist party without having the basis of mass support which would have made this possible. The continued resort to terrorist tactics has been made possible partly by the geography of Malaya and still more by the failure of the Government to conciliate the Chinese population, who, while not particularly pro-communist, have disliked the Government too much to assist it against the terrorists. The basic problem of the Government is how to implement policies which could win popular support while handicapped by an administration whose traditions include an authoritarian outlook, an anti-Chinese bias, and ideas of racial superiority.

Communist forces have also been fighting in the Philippines and Burma, but the Huk movement does not seem to be strong enough to be a serious threat even to the weak Government at Manila, while Burmese communism seems to be part of the general struggle between armed factions rather than a normal communist movement.

In India and Japan the cold war has been cold except for a few small guerilla areas in Hyderabad. In both countries communism might easily become strong if government by other parties became too incompetent or too oppressive. The recent Russian criticism of the Japanese communist leadership seems to be another instance of the tendency to sacrifice local communist strength in the interests of Russian international strategy. It is not likely that either the Japanese or the Indian communist parties will be able to win general mass support under present conditions until they are able to assert the right to independent judgment on the policies demanded by the Japanese and Indian people.

To sum up: communism in the east has been successful where, and in so far as, it could take the leadership in popular demands which its opponents were unwilling or unable to meet. The west has been defeated and Russia has won at no cost where, and in so far as, the forces of the west have been committed, not to the support of democracy, but to a blind opposition to communism.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

APPENDIX VII (A)

84 SUNNY BANK, HULL, 17/3/50.

THE EDITOR, THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN,

3 Cross St., Manchester 2.

SIR: Your report, on March 14, of Senator McCarthy's activities in Washington provides a good illustration of the natural affinity between right- and left-wing extremists.

Mr. Haldore Hanson of the State Department, who has been denounced by Senator McCarthy, was AP correspondent in Peking and made two visits to the new Communist areas in 1938. The factual basis of the charges against him is that he gave sympathy and assistance to the Chinese resistance against Japan, in which the Communists played an important part, at a time when many Americans of Senator McCarthy's views were advocating a policy of appeasement. But he did so as a believer in the American tradition of democracy. I visited the Communist headquarters at Wutai in 1938 soon after Mr. Hanson had passed through and was told that relations had become rather strained because of several heated arguments in which Mr. Hanson had maintained that the American type of democracy was greatly superior to the Communist type.

There is here a very obvious similarity with the distrust of the Czech Communists for their comrades who joined in resistance to Hitler before June 1941. Senator McCarthy apparently agrees with the Czech Communist leaders that consistent opposition to imperialist military aggression is a proof of political unreliability.

On a wider view, the right-wing extremist group to which Senator McCarthy belongs is a more serious threat to British and American security than any group under definite Communist control. Their campaign to eliminate from public life all people having any understanding or direct knowledge of Communism is, in effect, a campaign for the disarmament of America in the fields of psychological warfare and political intelligence. The Communists among the French dock workers are trying to deprive their country of the means to resist military aggression. Senator McCarthy and his supporters are trying to deprive their country of the means to prevent the outbreak of war, to leave their country powerless to counteract the deliberately produced ignorance and hysterical fear which may lead the masses under Communist rule to support the extremists of the Russian Communist Party in a policy of military aggression.

There has been considerable comment in America on the laxity of the British authorities in the case of Dr. Fuchs. This would seem to give the British public some right to comment on the extraordinary laxity of the American authorities toward the equally dangerous activities of Senator McCarthy and his associates.

Yours, etc.

MICHAEL LINDSAY.

APPENDIX VIII (B)

LETTER TO MANCHESTER GUARDIAN

84 SUNNY BANK, HULL, *21st April 1951.*

SIR: Your American correspondents who defend General MacArthur, and indeed the General himself, appear to accept the basic assumptions of Communist propaganda. They assume that there is a clear-cut struggle between the forces of good and the forces of evil in which all right-thinking persons must subordinate every other standard to securing a victory for the right side, and that this simple partisan motivation enables self-appointed leaders to provide infallible guidance on every question of policy. The case both against Russian Stalinism and this inverted American Stalinism can be stated in terms of the more realistic assumptions implicit in the practice of democracy and in scientific method; that any human cause is seldom wholly right or wholly wrong, that justice is not simply that which serves some particular interest but is something which makes cooperation between free men possible, and that our judgments can seldom be based on anything but the weight of more or less circumstantial evidence.

There is strong evidence to indicate that the continued loss of American, and allied, lives in Korea is a direct consequence of General MacArthur's refusal to take account of the well-founded warnings that an advance to the Manchurian border was almost certain to produce Chinese intervention. It is not unreasonable to suppose that General MacArthur is equally mistaken in believing that further hostile measures against China could be taken without producing Russian intervention and a general world war.

Going further back, there is evidence that the extremist and blindly pro-Russian forces in China owe their dominance very largely to the continued and active assistance they have received from the forces in America who now support General MacArthur. By their blind support of the corrupt and incompetent Kuomintang police state, these groups in America discredited democracy in Chinese opinion and appeared to substantiate extremist Communist propaganda. Even conservative Chinese opinion was rendered anti-American through the bombing of Chinese cities by an air force based on Formosa with American planes and, as most people believed, with American or Japanese pilots. Furthermore, it was these same groups in America who provided the Chinese armies now fighting the U. N. forces with a considerable part of their equipment. The shipment of American arms to China was continued in the face of expert warnings that a high proportion of these supplies was likely to end in Communist hands. It is likely that the same would happen to any fresh supplies given to the Kuomintang army.

The term "appeasement" was originally applied to policies which abandoned principles in the hope of appeasing aggressors. But in this case, British policy is upholding the principles of civilized justice against the totalitarian concept of justice. If the U. N. is maintaining any principle in condemning China on an issue where China is in the wrong it must also be ready to support China on issues

where China is in the right. And, on the merits of the case, the claims of the Chinese government both for recognition and the U. N. seat and for a free hand in Formosa are extremely strong. Those who argue that Chinese claims should not be judged according to the merits of the case but according to the political views of the Chinese government are rejecting civilized standards of justice in favour of the standards propounded by Himmler and Vyshinsky. Quite apart from any questions of principle, a policy which rejects even reasonable Chinese claims must destroy any hope of reaching a peaceful settlement in the Far East.

British policy has often been confused and has been greatly weakened by a reluctance to think about principles. But the general trend of British opinion has been consistent in disliking totalitarian philosophy and methods in whatever country they appear. One might have hoped that Americans who value their own democratic traditions would have approved these sentiments instead of denouncing them.

Yours, etc.

MICHAEL, LINDSAY.
LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

APPENDIX IX

[Broadcasts for B. B. C. Far Eastern Service, 1951, P. S. 12]

POLITICAL EXTREMISM

I

In a broadcast I gave some months ago I referred to political extremism as probably the most serious problem in the modern world, and in these talks I would like to develop the view that the risk of war is directly related to the influence of extremism on governments.

Perhaps the argument will be clearer if I begin by summarizing my main contention. Disputes between reasonable people should not lead to war. Resort to war in the modern world involves such great losses even for the victors that, even when there is a real conflict of interests, both sides can gain by compromising rather than by fighting it out. But compromise demands a certain degree of objectivity. Compromise is impossible when either party insists on terms quite disproportionate to its actual bargaining strength or refuses to give reasonable assurances that a bargain once made will be observed. When lack of objectivity rules out compromise, a conflict of interest can only be settled by force. Objectivity is even more important in the large class of disputes which can be settled by agreement and not merely by compromise. If people accept the basic assumption of rational thought, that there is some sort of objective real world about which human minds can obtain some sort of true knowledge by thinking, observation, and experiment, then it follows that those who are genuinely trying to get at the truth will ultimately agree on the answer to any question, because they will all reach the right answer. The parties to any controversy who accept this assumption of objectivity can agree to differ and to respect each others opinions in the expectation that continued discussion and the accumulation of evidence will ultimately lead to agreement. Even when possible agreement lies in the indefinite future reasonable people will realise that a controversy about facts or principles cannot be settled by fighting.

The trouble with extremists is that they maintain opinions which cannot be modified either by evidence or logic and may be determined to impose these opinions regardless of the cost. The extremist is always really making a demand for submission. He demands that others should accept his opinions even though he cannot give conclusive evidence to support them or, more simply, he demands that others should submit to his arbitrary personal will. When faced with a demand for submission one must either surrender or fight. To give an obvious example, what can one do when faced by people with an unshakable conviction that they have a right to rule the world and are justified in using any means to conquer it? This was roughly the challenge from the Nazi leaders and Japanese militarists. Given that these people had effective control of Germany and Japan the only alternative to the last war was submission to slavery. War could only have been avoided by policies which might have prevented these extremists from obtaining full control of their countries. The problem of preventing another

world war is the same problem of reducing extremist influence and there is not much to choose between the different varieties of extremism. And to reduce extremist influence one must understand extremism.

One of the best concise descriptions of extremism was given nearly 200 years ago by Hume. He describes two types of persons with whom reasonable discussion is impossible, "men pertinaciously obstinate in their principles" and, "persons . . . who really do not believe the opinions they defend . . .". Hume then goes on, "The same blind adherence to their own arguments is to be expected in both; the same contempt of their antagonists; and the same passionate vehemence in enforcing sophistry and falsehood. And, as reasoning is not the source whence either disputant derives his tenets, it is vain to expect that any logic, which speaks not to the affections, will ever engage him to embrace sounder principles." The appositeness of Hume's description can be illustrated today from almost any extremist statement, either of the right or of the left, and anyone who argues with extremists can confirm Hume's diagnosis that their tenets are based on emotion and not on reason.

The case of "persons . . . who really do not believe the opinion they defend . . ." had been very widely discussed, especially by the Marxists. Most people are familiar with the argument that certain views are maintained only from motives of class interest. And this Marxian analysis does explain a great deal. When one finds people refusing to admit certain evidence into their thinking or refusing to accept conclusions which follow logically from their own arguments one can very often relate these emotionally charged irrationalities to class interest. If you have read some of the better Marxian writings you will easily be able to supply examples. What is not so often realised is that this Marxian analysis can be applied to Communist organisations just as much as to Capitalist ones. One need only ask the question, "How would the interests of the secret-police organisations in Communist countries be affected if the risk of war became small or the internal class struggle really diminished?" Here are closely organised groups of men enjoying great powers and a considerable degree of economic privilege. The only justification for society giving them these powers is the existence of violent international tension and bitter internal class struggle. Their special skills, such as the interrogation of suspects, would be socially valueless in a peaceful and stable society. It follows that powerful elements in most Communist parties have a strong interest in maintaining the internal class conflict, for example, by economic policies which will antagonise large sections of the population, and an equally strong interest in preventing any international reconciliation or understanding. The vested interest of Communist secret-police agents in a continuing risk of war is at least as strong as that of capitalistic armament manufacturers. One can extend this line of argument and explain a good deal of Stalinist doctrine as a rationalisation by which Communist ruling groups try to maintain their power.

But this simple Marxian analysis does not give anything like a complete explanation of extremism, largely because its psychology is so inadequate. One can find many examples of people who use "passionate vehemence in enforcing sophistry and falsehood" as a means to gain power or privilege for themselves or their group. But very few people can convincingly defend an opinion of whose falsity they are fully conscious. The really dangerous political extremists are dangerous because they manage to combine sincerity with dishonesty. A brilliant analysis of this type of extremist was given by George Orwell in his "1984". Orwell defines a concept he calls *doublethink* which makes it possible "to use conscious deception while retaining the firmness of purpose that goes with complete honesty. * * *" Though Orwell is obviously describing the unchecked development of tendencies in left-wing extremism, most of his analysis applies equally well to the extreme right. The Japanese militarists in China often combined completely criminal behaviour with an apparently sincere belief in the superiority of their moral values over what they called the materialism of the West. One of the best examples of present-day *doublethink* is a combination one finds among some Western politicians who combine an apparently sincere belief in freedom and democracy with support for some of the most corrupt and oppressive regimes in Asia and Europe.

Luckily for the world, very few extremists manage to preserve the delicate balance of successful *doublethink*. What usually seems to happen is that people gradually come to believe in their own propaganda and lose the ability to take account of the objective reality which they deny in public. There is no sharp dividing line between the pure political gangster type that Orwell describes, who is to some extent conscious that he is defending false opinions from ulterior

motives and the genuine fanatic "pertinaciously obstinate in his principles", who may be completely altruistic but who operates in a world of fantasy and myth. The typical fanatic starts with the conviction that some policy or some doctrine is of such supreme importance that he is justified in using any means to impose his convictions on his fellow men. There is always an element of fantasy about the future in the fanatic's thinking. His certainty about the results which would follow from the acceptance of his doctrine is quite disproportionate to anything justified by the evidence. In most cases the element of fantasy goes much further and covers a wide field within which the fanatic refuses to admit any possibility of difference between the world as it is and the world as it should be according to his theories. Again, there is no sharp dividing line between political fanaticism and thinking which is definitely psychopathic. A very high proportion of political extremists have tendencies to persecution mania and some extremist behaviour is hard to explain except in terms of compulsive obsessions.

There has been much less public discussion of the fanatical type of extremist, "pertinaciously obstinate in his principles", probably because comparatively little is known about this field of abnormal psychology. But it is not reasonable to ignore something which is obviously important simply because we do not understand it. An investigation into the problems of what might be called psychopathic extremism might well prove to be one of the biggest contributions towards the prevention of war.

II

In my first talk I gave a general description of political extremism and today I want to develop some generalizations and to show their relevance to present problems.

One cannot describe the very important distinctions between different types of extremist by a simple division into classes. It doesn't make sense to divide mankind into reasonable people and extremists and then to subdivide extremists into gangsters and fanatics. For one thing, there are no reasonable people. Everyone has some extremism in his make-up and the completely reasonable man is a theoretical limiting case, in the same category as frictionless mechanisms or reversible heat engines in natural science. There is a continuous range from people of low extremism to people of high extremism. Similarly, the different varieties of extremist shade off into one another. To describe extremism one must talk in terms of variables, not in terms of classes, and one can give a fairly accurate description of any type in terms of three variables. Firstly, there is the degree of extremism. Secondly, there is the range between the pure gangster type, intent only on personal power, and the pure fanatic type, intent only on promoting some cause. Finally, there is the degree of realism, the extent to which irrationality about ends is combined with irrationality about means. Some extremists are only irrational in their objectives but remain very realistic in the way they set about attaining these objectives. Others operate in terms of a mental picture of the world so unlike objective reality that their actions may often produce results completely different from their intentions.

The whole controversy about appeasement can be clarified by discussing it in terms of degrees of extremism. The real issue is whether or not the people one is dealing with are so extremist that no agreement or compromise with them is possible. Such extremists do exist and may control governments. The completely ruthless and unscrupulous fanatic and the megalomaniac conqueror are types that appear again and again in history. Take an account written two thousand years ago: " * * * there was talk in the house of Nabuchodonosor, King of the Assyrians, that he should, as he said, avenge himself on all the earth. So he called unto him his officers, and all his nobles, and communicated with them his secret counsel, and concluded the afflicting of the earth out of his mouth. Then they decreed to destroy all flesh, that did not obey the commandment of his mouth." This isn't very different from Hitler and his officers as revealed in the Nuremberg trials. People at this level of extremism are absolutely determined to obtain complete submission to their will and the fallacy of appeasement lies in a refusal to recognize this fact. In spite of all evidence to the contrary, the British Government refused to believe that Hitler would not be satisfied with a compromise which gave him satisfaction on almost every issue where he could produce any sort of reasonable claim. They became disillusioned when Hitler occupied completely non-German territory. But the Russian Government then tried appeasement in the equally mistaken belief that Hitler would leave a modest share of the world to his allies if he were allowed to conquer the

rest. In the event it became clear that nothing could deflect Hitler from his fundamental aim of subjecting the whole world to the rule of the so-called "master race".

The appeaser just refuses to admit that there can be men like Hitler or Attila or Chiang Hsien-tung. He is like a man in tiger-infested country who talks about the perfectly real advantages that would follow from a nonaggression pact between human beings and tigers and refuses to admit the impossibility of making an agreement with tigers.

It is worth while pointing out the fallacy in the simple appeasement theory because there are still people who argue on the assumption that it must somehow be possible to reach a peaceful compromise with anyone. This still leaves the problem of how to decide whether or not some organisation is so extremist that no agreement or peaceful compromise is possible. The complication is that one is normally dealing with a ruling or controlling group which is not homogeneous. Some individuals in the group may be hopelessly extremist; others may be comparatively reasonable. The possibility of peaceful compromise depends on the balance of power within the group, and attempts to reach a compromise may shift this balance of power or even alter the degree of extremism in individuals.

The present situation is much more complicated than in the 1930's but in some ways it is more hopeful. Nazism, fascism, or the philosophy of the Japanese militarists were almost purely extremist theories. They were fairly transparent rationalisations of extremist demands for submission. This shows very clearly in the concept of the "master race" which was fundamental to German and Japanese theory. Present-day extremism is mostly based on exaggerations and distortions of theories which are very largely reasonable, and the sham controversies which only rationalize extremist demands are mixed up with genuine controversies about the best form of social organisation or the nature of human knowledge. The nearest equivalent to the "master race" concept is the Communist belief in the infallibility of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This is like the "master race" idea because it implies a clear demand for submission to the will of one particular group but it is not a belief which Communists formulate explicitly as an essential part of their theory. The difference with the 1930's is this: a nazi or fascist could only be reasonable and ready to accept a peaceful solution of world problems if he rejected the greater part of nazi or fascist theory, which meant that peace was impossible without the elimination of nazism and fascism. At present there are extremists of the type with whom no agreement or compromise is possible on both sides of the world conflict, but their power could be eliminated by comparatively small changes. A Christian, or a Communist, or a believer in free competition can all work for agreement and peaceful compromise without rejecting anything but exaggerations and distortions of their fundamental beliefs. There is no inherent reason why the present world tension should not be transformed into peaceful rivalry between different hypotheses about the best form of social organisation. The main requirement is to find a stabilizer which will stop the chain reaction in which rival forms of extremism help and intensify one another.

A major obstacle to the lessening of world tension comes from the implicit assumptions on which both sides base their policy. The constant theme of communist publicity is that the danger to world peace comes entirely from the plotting of the imperialists to extend their power and that peace can only be defended by demonstrating the military strength and preparedness of Russia and her allies. Very similar arguments are used in the West to justify the rearmament programme. In both cases the implicit assumption is that the other side is controlled by a fairly homogeneous group of high extremism and fairly high realism. It is only on these assumptions that the policy is sensible. High extremism and homogeneity imply that no genuine agreement or compromise is possible with any sections of the controlling group. High realism implies that the determination of the extremist controlling group to extend their power will not lead them to start a war unless they are reasonably certain of winning it. In this special case, rearmament is the only possible policy and is likely to secure peace. But extremists who are not realistic are quite capable of starting wars which they have no chance of winning. Francisco Lopez, the dictator of Paraguay, went to war with all the neighbouring states and went on fighting until five-sixths of the entire population of his country had been killed. When one is dealing with unrealistic extremists, rearmament is very unreliable as a security against war. The most that can be said for it is that it gives security against defeat.

In fact, it is extremely doubtful whether either side is justified in the implicit assumption on which it bases its policy. This can be seen most clearly in the West where politics operate with a fairly high degree of publicity. The individuals who control or influence Western policy obviously vary enormously in degree of extremism and the individuals who are violently extremist are very far from realistic, in many cases their extremism is clearly psychopathic. Under these circumstances, communist policy does not make sense as a means to promote peace. Its actual effect is to produce a widespread fear of communist aggression among reasonable people and to intensify and strengthen Western extremism. It is much harder to say whether the West is justified in its implicit assumption about communist controlling groups because the whole communist system operates behind the facade of the uniform party line. But one can say that the West has decided its policy without taking nearly enough trouble to find out whether its assumptions are correct. It is possible that Western policy for peace may be as mistaken as the communist. The difficulty is that for either side to pursue a policy that might really reduce the risk of war it would first have to be ready to oppose its own extremists. Next week I will try to discuss this general problem of how to reduce extremist influence.

III

In the last talk I tried to make two main points. Firstly, that one must face the unpleasant fact that there are people so extremist—so determined to enforce submission to their arbitrary will—that no agreement or peaceful compromise with them is possible. Secondly, that the rival views in the present world conflict are not inherently extremist as nazism or fascism were, which means that the danger to world peace could be eliminated simply by a lessening of extremist influence on both sides. The problem is to find out what produces extremism and what can be done to reduce it. What one has to explain is the process by which people who would be considered rather comic lunatics in stable times rise to positions of leadership and seem to infect large parts of society with their extremism. An obvious major factor in this process is frustration. People lose their ability to act rationally when faced with insoluble problems. This is very well established by psychological experiments. In wartime officer selection tests candidates were deliberately given insoluble problems to test their mental stability and a fair proportion broke down, often with the typical extremist reaction of disruptive aggression. There are also some very suggestive experiments on animals. Rats which were forced to face insoluble problems would develop compulsive obsessions. In some experiments a rat which could see and smell food in one direction would be driven by its obsession to go in another direction which always led to painful results. Maier, who made these experiments, pointed out the analogy with types of human extremist behaviour. Actual political examples are not as clear as controlled experiments but there are important cases which support the view that extremism is the product of frustration. The pre-Hitler elections in Germany showed a rise in the extremist vote whenever economic problems seemed insoluble, during the inflation and in the depression, and a rapid fall in extremism when conditions became stable. The growth of extremism in the Chinese Communist Party can be very directly related to frustration, over the failure to avoid the civil war in 1946 and over international problems in 1950. The growth of extremism in the West can also be very directly related to the frustration by Russian suspicion and obstruction of every attempt to improve international relations.

Frustration also explains the mechanism of the chain reaction between different forms of extremism. Because it is impossible to reach any agreement or peaceful compromise with people above a certain degree of extremism; extremism in one group presents an apparently insoluble problem to people in other groups who wish for a peaceful settlement of disputes. This frustration produces extremism which reacts back to produce further frustration and further extremism.

I've been talking about frustration produced by insoluble problems and I should make the point that it is just as frustrating to face a problem that one doesn't know how to solve as it is to face a problem that is really insoluble. One could make out quite a strong case for the theory that a lot of the difficulties of the modern world come from the long-time lag with which new ideas get into ordinary thought. Many people feel that problems are insoluble because they still think in terms of pre-Newtonian science and pre-Freudian psychology when they would not feel frustrated if they could use the tools of modern psychology

and logical analysis. What is relevant here is that many people get frustrated because they do not see the fallacies in extremist arguments. Extremists are always trying to present disputes in forms that allow no peaceful solution. It is only when differences can be made to appear irreconcilable that extremists can say, "This dispute can only be settled by everyone submitting to my opinion." And submission is what the extremist always wants. The typical extremist conclusion is that the only important political decision is choosing which side to support. And to reach this conclusion extremist arguments have to exaggerate some distinctions and explain away others. The fallacy in these arguments is nearly always an assumption that the world can be completely described in terms of simple pairs of alternatives; that if something is not black it must therefore be white. A great many fairly reasonable people get the worst of arguments with extremists because they don't realise that the extremist introduces his fallacy by the way in which he puts the question. An example can make the point clear. Consider the people who say, "In the West there is a free press while in communist countries there is not." They are easily made to look silly by a defender of communist extremism who can point out all the obvious limitations of press freedom in the West and then draw the conclusion that there is nothing to choose between the press on either side of the Iron Curtain. The fallacy is the assumption that the press must be either free or not free. "Free or not free" is a disjunction like "hot or not hot" which is meaningless without a definition of standards. If one states the question rightly, one must say that no country has a perfectly free press but there is more freedom in some countries than in others. One can also say that great social dangers appear when press freedom falls so low that no one outside a small privileged group can obtain the information necessary to form a correct political judgment. In this form the criticism of the totalitarian press is not easily refuted. As soon as one realises that most extremist arguments are based on this sort of fallacy one ceases to be worried by them.

Finally, what can one do about it all? The general lines of a sensible policy for reasonable people on either side become clear when one states the elements of the problem. (a) There can be no compromise with violent extremists, one must either fight them or submit to them. (b) The disputes between people of low extremism on either side in the world conflict could be settled by agreement or peaceful compromise. (c) Extremism is always strengthened by frustration and extremists are always trying to present disputes in forms that have no peaceful solution and so produce frustration. A policy to avoid war under these conditions must meet two requirements. On the one hand it must show complete firmness in resisting extremist demands for submission. On the other hand it must avoid producing the frustration which would strengthen extremism on the other side which means that it must offer a solution or possibility of peaceful compromise which would be accepted by the less extremist elements on the other side. A policy of appeasement, which fails to meet the first condition, cannot do more than postpone a war, at the expense of increasing the risk of defeat when war does come. A policy of intransigence, which fails to meet the second condition, makes war inevitable by increasing extremism to the point where no disputes can be settled except by fighting.

The difficulties in meeting these conditions for a policy likely to secure peace come from the fact that neither side could follow this sort of policy without repudiating its own extremists. At present these conditions are clearly not fulfilled by either Russian or Western policy. Communist policy claims to be trying to win over the less extremist elements in the West, but the attempt is made practically futile by an unrealistic analysis of the West and by a complete failure to repudiate or even to criticize the most extremist elements in Communism. There are some grounds for suspecting that the most violent extremists hold dominating positions in the Russian communist party. The West criticizes its extremists and sometimes even repudiates them, but its policies are confused. Those who see the dangers of appeasement are inclined to intransigence and those who see the dangers of intransigence are inclined to appeasement. One cannot say for certain that either side will prove able to follow an effective peace policy. But this only means that one cannot say for certain that war will be avoided.

The basic problem remains the repudiation of extremism, and I think extremists could be fought more effectively if they were attacked where they are weakest. The obvious case for repudiating one's own extremists is that they are a liability and not an asset in the cold war. They are like very bellicose generals who are always committing their forces to the defence of untenable positions.

I remember reading an article by American supporters of Chiang Kai-shek which measured his services in the war against Japan by the number of *Chinese* soldiers who had been killed under his command. Those who support their own extremists judge their services by the same perverse standards. There is very strong evidence that the complete discrediting of America in Chinese opinion was primarily the work of the anti-communist "China Lobby" in America, with only minor assistance from the communists. There is even stronger evidence that the Russian secret police have done more effective anti-communist propaganda than any nominally anti-communist organization. This means that peace-loving communists and anti-communists should be able to agree in fighting extremism. It is not at all clear which side either set of extremists is actually helping by their actions. It is quite clear that both sets of extremists are working for war.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

APPENDIX X (A)

[Times, January 2, 1946]

THE CHINESE TUG-OF-WAR—PROSPECTS FOR SETTLEMENT AT CHUNGKING— KUOMINTANG AND COMMUNIST SUSPICIONS

From a special correspondent lately in China

President Truman's statement on United States policy towards China and the reopening of negotiations in Chungking encourage hopes of a peaceful settlement of the differences between the central Government and the Chinese Communists, but there are still big differences to be overcome. All previous negotiations between Chungking and Yen-an had broken down because of the completely different views of the Kuomintang and the Communists, and the deep suspicions between them.

The Kuomintang has always insisted on its legal position as the National Government. It suspects that the Communists are determined to keep their independence and so insists that it must restore its full authority over all armies and all areas. The Communists base their claims on their achievements and actual position. They suspect that the Kuomintang is determined to maintain one-party rule, and so they refuse to give up their separate armies and areas until the central Government is completely reorganized. Since both parties claim that they stand for a democratic and united China the real issue is which party has more justification for its suspicions of the other. Here the Communists have the stronger case.

ONE-PARTY RULE

A great deal of the Kuomintang suspicion is the product of its own propaganda and censorship. At times the Sian authorities even stopped copies of the Yen-an papers addressed to Chiang Kai-shek, and the Kuomintang leaders have had no means of checking the stories put out by the violently anti-Communist secret police or by military commanders, who found reports of Communist attacks a convenient excuse for their failure to resist the Japanese. Actually the Communists refused to take their best opportunity for claiming independence at the time when there would have been a chance of the allies applying the Tito-Mikhailovich precedent.

On the other side the Kuomintang has a long record of promised reforms which have never materialized. For example, the secret police still make arrests, political prisoners have not been released, and the taking over of the Japanese occupied cities has produced graft and speculation on a larger scale than ever. The only real reform has been a relaxation of censorship. Also the Kuomintang has always resisted any real modification of one-party rule. In the recent negotiations it refused new elections for the National Assembly though the old delegates, chosen in 1936, are completely unrepresentative, as the government was then suppressing anyone who advocated resistance to Japan. These old delegates, many of whom have served under the puppet Wang Ching-wei, plus the Kuomintang Central Committee as *ex officio* members, would produce an assembly completely dominated by the right-wing Kuomintang, which would probably pass the 1936 draft constitution that has been described as "nothing but a legalistic device for the continuation of the Kuomintang dictatorship."

THE REAL ISSUE

The Communists have also had reasons for saying that the Kuomintang has considered them as worse enemies than the Japanese. Chungking always blocked any allied cooperation with the Communists, which could have greatly helped in the war against Japan, and even demanded the disbandment of most of the Communist armies regardless of the help this would have given the Japanese. Many Kuomintang commanders deserted to the Japanese and their prompt reinstatement after the surrender seemed to show that these deserters had been condoned in order to keep a Kuomintang army in North China ready for civil war.

After the Japanese surrender the Kuomintang relied largely on the puppets and Japanese. The puppets were made responsible for maintaining order till the arrival of Kuomintang forces. The Communists refused to recognize a surrender in which they had no share and advanced rapidly against the puppets until the Japanese started a general counteroffensive at the end of August. The Chinese surrender terms of September 11 ordered the Japanese to cooperate with Kuomintang forces, and Japanese, puppets, and Kuomintang forces have since fought together against the Communists. Even after the joint declaration on October 11, when Government and Communist leaders pledged themselves to avoid civil war by all possible means, Kuomintang forces continued to attack positions which the Communists held and had declared they would defend. The real issue has been the Communist right to hold positions taken from the Japanese and puppets since the surrender. As in previous disputes, the Kuomintang have a strong legal case and the Communists a strong moral one.

The Kuomintang had good reasons for sending troops into Manchuria, where the Communists had only small guerrilla forces in the southwest, but the argument that Kuomintang and American forces had to go into North China to receive the surrender depends on the unstated assumption that the Communist armies could not be used. In fact, if the Japanese and their puppets in North China had been ordered to surrender to the Communist 18th Group Army they could have been disarmed and normal conditions restored within a few weeks, as the Communists could quickly have sent large forces to every centre in North China. This would have strengthened the Communist position, but equally the Kuomintang movements strengthened their position against the Communists.

American policy after the surrender was contradictory. Their declared policies of eliminating the Japanese and of neutrality in Chinese internal conflicts were incompatible with their effective policy of cooperating only with the Kuomintang. Their assistance to Kuomintang troop movements greatly influenced civil friction and they have done nothing to eliminate the Japanese influence which the Kuomintang has been willing to preserve. In Peking the Americans neither disarmed the Japanese nor insisted that the Kuomintang should do so. They everywhere cooperated with the puppet commanders and collaborationist officials whom the Kuomintang had recognized, and actually had clashes with the Communists while protecting puppet troop movements. They made no protest about the arrangements by which Yen Hsi Shan protected Japanese interests in Shansi in return for their military support. In fact the United States cannot avoid interference in Chinese affairs because the present central Government depends on American support. Without this support its chances in a civil war are doubtful and it faces strong internal opposition which the withdrawal of American support would crystallize.

AMERICAN PROPOSALS

President Truman's statement advocates "modification of the one-party 'political tutelage'" and the "institution of a broadly representative Government" and repeatedly emphasizes the "elimination of Japanese influence from China." These are the essential conditions for a settlement but they are opposed by strong vested interests. The "elimination of Japanese influence" should include the removal of puppet commanders and of officials who have been closely associated with the Japanese and puppets, but many of them have powerful connexions in Chungking. A "broadly representative Government" should mean one in which the balance of power is held by the Democratic League. The Democratic League is still a fairly small organization but in any free election it would almost certainly get a big vote from the very large group which dislikes the present Government but distrusts the Communists. Also the balance of power in the hands of a party which stands for the policies which both Kuomintang and Communists accept in principle would be a guarantee to both sides. Such a Government

would, however, mean the end of one-party rule and the elimination of some leading figures in the present Government.

If the Americans insist on such conditions Chiang Kai-shek would be compelled to throw over his more reactionary associates and return to the more progressive position of 1937 and 1938. The Communists, who have always said they would merge their armies and areas under a coalition Government, could not now refuse to cooperate without losing popular support, and their military power depends entirely on popular support. Such a Government would face difficult problems, but there would no longer be irreconcilable conflicts which the Chinese genius for compromise would not solve.

The danger is that the United States may not insist on the conditions for a settlement but support proposals like the suggestions in Chiang Kai-shek's speech of March 1, 1945, which both Communists and Democratic League rejected as not really ending one-party rule. In refusing such proposals the Communists would have the support of the population of North China, who would fight rather than come under Kuomintang one-party rule. The result would be a very long civil war. The Communists could not easily defeat Kuomintang armies which continued to get American supplies, but it is equally unlikely that the Kuomintang would be more successful than the Japanese in eliminating the Communists from their bases, and the development of a strong and prosperous China would be indefinitely delayed.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

APPENDIX X (B)

POST-MORTEM ON AMERICAN MEDIATION IN CHINA

Michael Lindsay

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A post mortem is useful if it reveals something about the disease from which the patient died, which can help in avoiding similar deaths in the future. In this case the disease is not a unique one. There were very obvious analogies between the American position in China and the British position in Greece. Also the results seem to indicate the necessity for the rethinking of some basic principles in foreign policy if similar frustrations are to be avoided in the future.

General Marshall's mission to China started with an excellent formulation of United States policy in the President's statement of December 15, 1945. The basic aim was a "strong, united and democratic China" and the major obstacles to this were correctly diagnosed as the existence of an independent Communist party army which made political unity impossible and the form of the National Government as a "one-party government" operating under a theory of "Political Tutelage."

There is no reason to suppose that this aim was unattainable. General Marshall found that there were moderates in both the main parties who agreed in wanting a strong, united, and democratic China and who were prepared to compromise to avoid civil war. They had the support of most of the minor parties and the main body of unorganized public opinion.

However, in fact the United States completely failed to attain its objectives and the situation when General Marshall left was very much worse than in December 1945. The reasons for this failure are obviously complex but there is one major factor which has been very little discussed. This is the legal and diplomatic traditions within which the United States has operated.

The United States has usually operated in terms of the legal forms of the situation and has seldom been willing to take official notice of the divergence between legal forms and reality. As a result American action has often been diverted so that its actual results have been directly contrary to the declared objectives of American policy. American policy has been planned in terms of American traditions but it has operated in a situation where most people judge it in terms of Chinese traditions, which make it look very different.

The same failure to recognize the difference in political traditions made the United States miss its opportunities in the period when American mediation was accepted by both sides. American influence was dissipated in securing a legal structure of agreements which looked excellent on paper and might have

been effective in a country with the tradition of the rule of law, but which was largely unrealistic in terms of Chinese politics.

The most obvious example of the frustration of American policy through adherence to legal forms, was in the disarmament of the Japanese and the elimination of Japanese influence. The effectiveness of American mediation was always greatly weakened by the false position into which the United States had allowed itself to be manoeuvred. The President's statement of December 15, 1945, laid great stress on these objectives.¹

The fatal ambiguity in the statement was the implicit assumption that American objectives were shared by the Chinese National Government and could be attained by assisting it. But at the end of 1945 the military position of the Kuomintang in North China depended very largely on assistance from Japanese and puppet troops so that the implementation of American policy would have greatly weakened the Kuomintang position in the civil war.

The justification for arranging the transportation of Kuomintang armies to North China was the possibility that strong forces might be needed to disarm and evacuate the local Japanese army units. However, by the end of August, 1945, it was clear that the Japanese army in China remained an organized force under the control of its commanders who were willing to obey Allied instructions. It also soon became clear that the Chinese National Government was more interested in using the Japanese in the civil war than in securing their evacuation.² Japanese officers from North China Headquarters stated to the American Headquarters in Peiping that they could deliver all their troops at the ports within six weeks to await evacuation if only the Chinese government would allow them to do so.

The President's statement of December 18, 1946, points out the real physical difficulties of repatriating all the Japanese forces but it was purely legal and diplomatic inhibitions that prevented the United States from securing their removal from the Chinese political and military scene within a few weeks of VJ-Day. All that was required for this was the issue of appropriate orders to the Japanese and, if the Chinese government had refused to cooperate, the United States was in a position to issue orders directly through General MacArthur and the Japanese government.

The American government has always defended its military activities in North China with the argument that these actions were only assistance to the Chinese National Government in disarming and repatriating the Japanese. This argument is perfectly sound on the assumption that the American government had no obligation to go behind the forms of legal and diplomatic correctness; that it would have been an unfriendly act towards an allied government to have inquired whether the large Kuomintang armies transported to North China were necessary to disarm and repatriate the Japanese or whether they were in fact used for that purpose; that for the American forces to disarm the Japanese except at the request of the Chinese government would have been illegal interference in Chinese internal affairs.

Although American actions were correct from this formal legal standpoint they were, in reality, completely contrary to the declared objectives of American policy. Though most of the Japanese troops were finally repatriated when they were no longer essential to the Kuomintang military position, the American forces in North China made no attempts to secure the rapid elimination of the Japanese.³ The Kuomintang armies transported to North China were used

¹ It stated that, "to remove the possibility of Japanese influence remaining in China, the United States has assumed a definite obligation in the disarmament and repatriation of Japanese troops," and that, "The maintenance of peace in the Pacific may be jeopardized, if not frustrated, unless Japanese influence in China is wholly removed." For these purposes the United States would "assist the National Government of China in effecting the disarmament and repatriation of Japanese troops in the liberated areas," and would "cooperate with it * * * in eliminating Japanese influences from China." It was also stated that, "United States support (to the National Government) will not extend to military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife."

² Immediately after VJ-day, the Japanese in North China started retiring to a few main concentration points, fighting only defensive actions. But at the end of August they started a general counteroffensive against the Communists in cooperation with the puppet armies and later with regular Kuomintang troops. The Communists claim that this counteroffensive was the result of orders from General Ho Ying-chin to General Okamura that the Japanese should assist the puppet armies and must recover positions they had abandoned to "illegal armed forces and bandits." Such an order would explain the Japanese action and the Chinese surrender terms of September 11 ordering the Japanese forces to assist the National Government armies but making no mention of cessation of hostilities.

³ According to Dr. Abrams, the Regional Medical Officer of UNRRA, at the end of February 1946 Japanese troops were holding sections of the Kuomintang front within a few miles of the main American base at Tsingtao. Other American sources reported 40,000 Japanese still fighting in Shansi in April 1946 and some still remaining in December.

entirely in "Chinese internal strife" and American action was diverted into very definite intervention in the civil war.⁴

The position with regard to the puppets was similarly confused. The United States was not prepared to challenge the good faith of the Chinese government in making official appointments. As a result any puppet who received a new appointment from the Kuomintang became, for the Americans, an official of the Chinese National Government and as such he automatically received American support and assistance.

Here again the position was legally correct. It would have been interference in the internal affairs of China to query appointments made by the recognized national government. In practice the American forces which had come to "eliminate Japanese influence" were working with men who, a few months before, had been serving under the Japanese and proclaiming their determination to defend Greater East Asia against American imperialism.⁵

In terms of the Western tradition of law this does not necessarily imply bad faith on the part of the American government. The Kuomintang were trying to divert American action to their own ends; and the Kuomintang has the services of almost all the Western-trained legal talent in China. Also important sections of the American armed forces were, to say the least, not unwilling to allow American action to be diverted into intervention against the Communists.⁶ It is quite possible to argue that the American government meant well but was manoeuvred into a false position. But this would be hard to understand in terms of Chinese traditions. The whole Confucian tradition has been hostile to the idea of law as a set of invariant rules and has emphasized the subordination of legal rules to the special circumstances of each particular case.

This Chinese tradition of law is only part of the whole Chinese social and political tradition which has been very different from that of America. At its best the traditional Confucian imperial system was a benevolent, paternalistic authoritarianism. In times of decline it became a struggle for office and wealth between individuals or small groups in the ruling class. In modern history the decline of the Manchu dynasty began between 1800 and 1850 and Chinese politics since the revolution have been an open and ruthless struggle for power only slightly modified by some conventional rules. There were accepted fictions which no one openly challenged. For example, even the most independent war lords always officially claimed to be within the political and military organization of a united China under a central government. There were conventional forms of words whose real meaning was quite well understood.

Within the limits of these conventions everyone operating in Chinese politics, including the Japanese before 1937, used their actual power as far as possible to get their friends into office and their enemies out and to protect the groups they wished to support. It was the spoils system in an extreme form except that office depended on guns rather than on votes. The development of the forms of a modern state in recent years had only begun to modify the system. The Chinese liberals are trying to build up something very different but so far they have been more successful on paper than in real life.

Though some of the traditions of Chinese politics may be unique, there are many countries where the general pattern of political struggle is nearer to China than to America.

The United States has, for the past few years, been playing a leading part in Chinese politics, but has been playing it according to rules completely different from those which have been used by any other players.

There has been no doubt about the actual power of the United States during the last few years. It is widely believed, with some reason, that the continued existence of the National Government has depended on American support. If America had wished to change the composition of the National Government it is highly probable that it could have done so. Thrice-repeated invitations

⁴ On one occasion American forces were nearly manoeuvred into a full-scale battle with the Communist army when they accepted without question a Kuomintang request to take over Chefoo to receive the Japanese surrender more than a month after its capture by the Communists.

⁵ To give only two out of many possible examples: Li Hsien-liang, who was Mayor of Tsingtao until the autumn of 1946, was known to the American army to have been an officer in the Japanese sponsored "Imperial Collaboration Army" but received full American support; the first troops transported to Changchun with American assistance included units organized by the Japanese, under Chiang P'eng-fei, who had entered Japanese service in the East Hopei Autonomous Government before 1937.

⁶ From conversations with officers who served in China it is clear that General Wedemeyer did not consider himself bound by the official American policy of nonintervention in the civil war but planned American action to assist the Kuomintang military position.

to the leading reactionaries in the government to visit the United States on missions with high-sounding titles but no real functions, could hardly have been refused.

In the cities where American troops were stationed there was no doubt at all about the ability of America to secure the removal of anyone it disliked and to protect any groups that it wished to support. Local Kuomintang forces were obviously not going to oppose the Americans unless American action were so crudely managed as to leave no possible way of saving face.⁷ In any city with American troops the liberals could have been given complete security and freedom of action.

In fact the United States allowed the extreme reactionaries to play a leading part in the National Government. In the cities with American troops, power and office have been in the hands of the extreme reactionaries or semigangster elements in the Kuomintang, sometimes of leading collaborationists. In Peiping the presence of American Marines did not prevent the appointment of the former head of the Nazi Gestapo organization to a position in the Kuomintang secret police.

Liberals received much less protection from the Americans than they had from Lung Yun, the Yunnan warlord, before his removal by Chiang Kai-shek in October 1945. Even in the cities with American troops liberal meetings have been broken up, liberal newspapers suppressed, and liberal leaders beaten up, arrested, or kidnapped.

In spite of the declared intentions of America to avoid intervention in the civil war American assistance to the Kuomintang was continued in forms which directly strengthened its military position in the civil war.

If it were assumed that the United States were acting in the same sort of way as any other power in modern Chinese politics, and this is the natural assumption for a Chinese without foreign training to make, the deduction from the situation was obvious. Namely that the United States was firmly supporting the ultrareactionary, irreconcilably anti-Communist group in the Kuomintang; that the statements of American policy praising the liberals and calling for democracy and settlement by compromise were merely a foreign form of the conventional euphemisms like calling a government opium monopoly an opium suppression bureau. Of course it was a good thing to suppress opium; but what could the government do when it needed money? Of course the Americans liked democracy, civil liberties, and so on; but what could they do when they needed reliable allies against Communism?

This is, most probably, the sort of picture that American policy has presented to the majority of Chinese. It fully explains the fact that, "The reactionaries in the Government have evidently counted on substantial American support regardless of their actions" (to quote General Marshall). The Western-trained group in the Kuomintang have realized that America does not too much like the extreme reactionaries but they have considered that the bad relations between America and Russia would always secure them American support against the Communists.

A very slight relaxation of the strict forms of diplomatic correctness would have made a very big difference to the chances of success of American mediation. The most obvious example is the failure to make any protest in March 1946 when there was growing evidence of Kuomintang failure to carry out its part of the agreements and when the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee repudiated some of the key points in the settlements reached through American mediation. This was most probably responsible for the change in the Communist party line from conciliation and readiness to accept American mediation to its present uncompromising anti-American attitude.

By the end of General Hurley's ambassadorship the Communists were extremely suspicious of America. General Marshall undoubtedly impressed the Communist leaders with his personal integrity but their willingness to accept American mediation must have met with considerable skepticism from the more doctrinaire members of the party. It could be argued, on doctrinaire Marxian theory, that American policy was inevitably determined by the position of America as a capitalist, imperialist power; that whatever General Marshall's personal intentions he could not in fact change the policy dictated by the interests of the groups that controlled the American government.

⁷ After the assassination of Li Kung-pu and Wen I-to last summer the American Consulate in Kunming protected a number of other liberals against the secret police without any local American troops to back them.

To the Communist Central Committee, the attempt to reach agreement through American mediation must have seemed a policy that was worth trying as a last hope of avoiding civil war but which, on theoretical grounds, was not very likely to succeed. American silence in March and the beginning of April must have seemed convincing proof of the correctness of the doctrinaire position. The Kuomintang was repudiating the agreements which General Marshall had mediated and America did nothing about it. When it came to the point General Marshall appeared to be powerless against the forces that linked America to the right-wing Kuomintang, exactly as Marxian theory predicted. The Communist party could no longer afford to trust in American mediation but must strengthen its military position. If the Communist leaders still felt confidence in General Marshall's personal good faith they may have felt that to appeal to him to safeguard the agreements would only cause him an embarrassing loss of face.

If this analysis of Communist policy is anywhere near correct then a statement by General Marshall, at the beginning of April 1946 denouncing the right-wing Kuomintang in the sort of terms he was finally prepared to use in January 1947 would probably have prevented the Communist offensive in Manchuria and the change in party line which it indicated.

In many other cases simple plain speaking on the part of America could have greatly weakened the extremists on both sides by making it clear that America was not irrevocably committed to support of the right-wing Kuomintang.

In January and February 1946 when American mediation was accepted by both sides it produced a system of agreements which seemed to be more designed to impress the Americans than to solve the practical problems of Chinese politics. There is an interesting contrast between the 1946 agreements with their essentially western legal structure and the reports of the direct Kuomintang-Communist negotiations in September 1945 with their emphasis on practical problems.

The only part of the agreements which applied immediately to the practical situation was the truce agreement. This was very definitely only a truce and not in any way a settlement. It put military conflict into a state of suspended animation but it stabilized a completely impossible situation in which the two armies were so mixed up in the disputed territory that neither side could settle down to the badly needed economic and social reconstruction. Friction was almost inevitable and became quite certain when the truce was extended to include puppet troops. The Communist leaders could not really restrain their local units from continuing attacks on the puppets, who in many cases had a record for atrocities little better than the Japanese. Equally the Kuomintang could not really control many of the puppet units it had recognized as part of its army.

Almost everything except the truce agreement was a theoretical legal structure which started at the top with the constitution. On paper it looked very nice and if it had been possible to bring the whole system into effect simultaneously it might have worked. But all the bits were interconnected. Neither side could afford to make the concessions it had agreed to without some guarantee that the other side would do the same. The whole structure depended on the Western view of law, that the signing of a contract implied an unconditional obligation to observe it and that the enforcement of law in one case was an effective precedent for its enforcement in others. But in modern Chinese politics the observance of agreements has been the exception rather than the rule and the system could only have worked if America had been willing to guarantee the agreements with sanctions against either party which broke them.

In fact America seems to have taken the diplomatically correct but completely unrealistic position of operating entirely in terms of the legal forms of the agreements and refusing to take official notice of any actual failure to implement them. Months after the Military Reorganization Agreement had decided that all war-lord armies and all troops that had served under the Japanese should be disbanded and disbanded as quickly as possible the Truce Teams continued to treat former puppet units as legitimate parts of the Kuomintang army. Even more striking was the attitude to secret police activities in Chungking.⁸ These were undermining the whole basis of the agreements which were aimed at setting up a system in which parties could compete by legitimate political activities without needing private armies to protect them. If Chiang Kai-shek was unwilling or unable to secure obedience to the law from his own party organizations

⁸ On paper the National Government had implemented the civil liberties clauses of the agreements by issuing a set of decrees through the Supreme National Defence Council. Within two weeks, a meeting held by left-wing Kuomintang and other liberal groups in Chungking was broken up by the Kuomintang secret police and similar incidents continued.

or enforcement of the law by the local police even in his own capital the agreements were meaningless. But it was not until his statement in January 1947 that General Marshall made any official reference to the "quite obviously inspired mob actions."

It is probable that American mediation would have had a much greater chance of success if it had started from the bottom instead of from the top, if it had worked in the Chinese tradition of practical problems and personalities instead of in the American tradition of general legal principles.

A practical solution had to reconcile two claims both of which have had the support of moderate opinion in China. The basic Kuomintang case, which the Communists accepted in principle, can be put in President Truman's words: "The existence of autonomous armies such as that of the Communist army is inconsistent with, and actually makes impossible, political unity in China." The Kuomintang has had a legitimate case against allowing the Communists military as well as civil power in what would be in practice an independent North China.

The basic Communist case, which the Kuomintang have accepted in principle, is that there should be democratization, civil liberties, and local self-government. In North China the local government organizations set up under the Communists have been far ahead of the Kuomintang areas in honesty, efficiency, and degree of popular control. The Communists have had a legitimate case in claiming that these existing elected local governments should not be replaced by appointed Kuomintang officials who were proving scandalously corrupt and inefficient in all the areas they had taken over.

At the beginning of 1946 it should have been possible to secure a provisional settlement of outstanding practical issues in terms of the concessions which both parties were prepared to make in the agreements.⁹

This sort of provisional settlement would have enabled both sides to get down to the real job of reconstruction while discussing the more theoretical points of the constitution and army reorganization. It would have greatly increased the chances of further agreements as both sides would have made practical gestures of good faith which involved the repudiation of their extremists.

Of course there would have been difficulties in getting this kind of provisional settlement of actual problems, but even if it has always been true that one or both sides have only been willing to promise concessions but not to make them in practice, it would have been better to find this out at the beginning of 1946 rather than after a year of confusion and disillusionment. America could have started to face the realities of the situation a year sooner.

It would have been almost impossible to work for a settlement of practical problems within the limits of normal diplomatic traditions. At every step it would have been necessary to consider questions of fact and of personalities, to be prepared to challenge the good faith of the parties in any agreement and the correspondence of legal forms and official statements with reality.¹⁰

In fact American policy continued to operate in terms of legal forms even when the legal forms of early 1946 had obviously failed to be effective in the real situation. American influence on the Chinese government was concentrated on securing the passage of a comparatively democratic constitution though there was no reason to suppose that legal forms would gain a new effectiveness simply from being in a constitution.

Judged in terms of American objectives the basic mistake in American policy was failure to support the groups that would have been America's natural allies. The Democratic League and the left wing of the Kuomintang had a large pro-

⁹ In the Military Reorganization Agreement of February 1945, the Communists accepted a preponderance of Kuomintang troops even in the main Communist areas of North China. In a provisional settlement they might have been asked to concede control of the railways and strategic points at least to Kuomintang armies untainted by collaboration under commanders who might reasonably be expected to observe agreements.

In the agreements the Kuomintang accepted provisions for elected county and provincial governments. They also agreed to the quickest possible elimination of war lord and puppet troops. In return for military preponderance in North China they might have been asked to agree that existing elected local governments should take over the whole of areas of which they already controlled the larger part, at least till arrangements were made for new elections.

¹⁰ For example, it would have been necessary to take official notice of the fact that Yen Hsi-shan was a local war lord who had had close relations with the Japanese so that settlement was impossible while he remained the official governor and military commander in Shansi; or to investigate how far the Communists had actually set up elected local governments in Manchuria. The task would not have been impossible, but it was certainly not compatible with an official policy of nonintervention in Chinese affairs and correct diplomatic relations with the recognized Chinese government.

portion of leaders with American education and were the groups in China that really wanted a democratic system of the American type. Under any system which secured genuine free elections these groups might become a major force in Chinese politics. The right wing Kuomintang has little popular support and many people are afraid of the Communists in spite of their moderate programme.

The liberal groups received a lot of verbal praise from America but nothing more. The major weakness of the liberals in modern Chinese politics is that they do not control an army. They could only assume leadership with American support against the secret police and militarists but no support was ever given. Because America acted only through the recognized government, American assistance to China automatically meant American support for the groups that controlled the government by their command of the army and secret police organizations. On the one hand General Marshall tried to negotiate agreements, on the other American assistance strengthened the "irreconcilable groups within the Kuomintang party, interested in the preservation of their own feudal control of China, (who) evidently had no real intention of implementing them."¹¹

Secret police terrorism has greatly weakened the liberals and American assistance to the right-wing Kuomintang has made the naturally pro-American Democratic League almost as anti-American as the Communists whose anti-American and more extremist line dates from the failure of America to protest against the repudiation of the agreements reached through American mediation.

By failing to support its natural allies American policy has placed itself in a dilemma. Without continued American support the Kuomintang will probably lose the civil war and the Communists will play a leading part in a new Chinese government. On the other hand a resumption of large-scale military assistance to the Kuomintang might easily produce Russian support for the Communists, of which there has been no evidence up till now; and the Communists with a very large mass organization behind them would need very much less foreign assistance than the present Kuomintang government. Only very large-scale American intervention could then prevent a Kuomintang defeat.

The moral of all this obvious. Assistance to a country where there is a violent political struggle must be, in effect, assistance to the group that controls the recognized government so long as the forms of nonintervention and diplomatic correctness are preserved. There is no choice between supporting this group and discontinuing all assistance.

So long as the group that controls the government is confident of continued foreign assistance it will have no motive for compromising with its rivals or for introducing reforms that conflict with the vested interests of its members.

If it is desired to give support but at the same time to secure reforms or perhaps to secure a compromise between the government and opposition groups, then it is necessary to abandon the forms of diplomatic correctness and to intervene on behalf of the groups it is desired to support or in favour of the reforms which are desired.

Harvard University, May 1947.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

The Canadian Institute of International Affairs is an unofficial, nonpolitical, nonprofit-making organization founded in 1928 to promote an understanding of international questions and problems, and of Canada's position both as a member of the international community of nations and as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The Institute, as such, is precluded by its Constitution from expressing an opinion on any aspect of public affairs. The views expressed in this journal, therefore, are those of the writers.

APPENDIX XI

MEMBERSHIP OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. GENERAL

As an undergraduate at Oxford I was a member of the Oxford University Labour Club, supporting, and I think affiliated with, the British Labour Party.

In 1948 I joined the British Fabian Society, of which I am still a member, and between 1949 and 1951, I was a member of the Hull Fabian Society.

¹¹ From General Marshall's statement of January 7, 1947.

2. CONNECTED WITH CHINA

While in the United States in 1946 I became a "consultant" to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy. This Committee has been largely under communist influence but it was, at one period, publishing some quite interesting material on China and I was in agreement with its criticism of the totalitarian influences in U. S. Far Eastern policy. The only advice I have given to the Committee as "consultant" has been that it would completely discredit its ability to work for its ostensible objective if it allowed itself to become associated with support for the Soviet Union. In 1946 I sent a strong letter of protest when the Committee sent out a pro-Soviet pamphlet with its material on the Far East. In, I think, 1950 I wrote a letter to the Committee strongly criticizing an editorial in Far East Spotlight and saying that I could not remain associated with the Committee if it continued to support the Soviet Union, which, in my opinion, was a fascist power opposed to democracy. This produced a very conciliatory reply.

In 1946 I became Chairman of the China Campaign Committee in England. This committee had been formed at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese conflict to organise support for China. Its membership was fairly wide and included some Communists but control was in the hands of British Labour Party supporters. The joint secretaries, Miss Dorothy Woodman and Lady Selwyn Clarke, were both members of Labour Party organisations.

At the end of 1948 or beginning of 1949 the Committee was asked by Mr. Jack Ch'en of the New China News Agency in London whether, in view of the developments in the Chinese situation, we were ready to commit ourselves to full support of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Liberated Areas. We replied that while our general attitude had been favourable to the Chinese Communist Party because we felt that it had usually been in the right as against the Kuomintang, we could not commit ourselves to unconditional support and felt that we served a more useful purpose for Sino-British friendship by remaining independent.

Most probably as a result of this reply from the China Campaign Committee Mr. Jack Ch'en and members of the British Communist Party organised the Britain-China Friendship Association in 1949, and this organization received the support of the Chinese government. Members of the China Campaign Committee were invited to join the BCFA. We refused to accept suggestions for merging the two organisations but, with considerable misgivings, joined the BCFA as a means of keeping contacts with China after receiving the most explicit assurances that the BCFA would be run as a nonparty and not as a Communist-front organisation. These assurances were broken over the handling of a Chinese "friendship" delegation which visited England in October 1950. I published an article in the Manchester Guardian of 2nd January 1951, strongly attacking the BCFA management and, after some correspondence and controversy, resigned from the BCFA. Other non-Communist members of the China Campaign Committee also resigned.

As a matter of strategy, I would maintain that this temporary association with the Communist-controlled BCFA was justified. If cooperation had been refused before the bad faith of the management had been made clear, the Communists could have argued, with considerable effect, that they wanted to work honestly for Sino-British friendship but had found that non-Communists would not cooperate. As it is, there is clear evidence to show that the Britain-China Friendship Association was given every opportunity of working for its ostensible objective but instead chose to act in ways that worsened Sino-British relations.

I have spoken at meetings for the Peace with China Association which was organised by members of the China Campaign Committee with the wording of its objectives framed to exclude Communists and Communist supporters by accepting the correctness of the original UN action in Korea but I do not remember if I ever actually joined the association.

I have also belonged to a number of associations connected with politics though nonpolitical. For example, I was active in the Hull branch of the United Nations Association and I now belong to the Canberra Branch. I am a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

I cannot remember all the organisations, and societies with which I have been connected at various times, but, to the best of my recollection, the above list gives all the political associations in which I have played any sort of active part. I can state definitely that I have never belonged to any branch of any Communist Party in any country.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here, Mr. Chairman, a sworn statement by Miriam S. Farley on the UOPWA Union in the American IPR, dated June 10, 1952, which I would like to have received at this time.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1389" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1389

STATE OF NEW YORK,

County of New York, ss:

MEMORANDUM ON THE UOPWA UNION IN THE AMERICAN IPR

By Miriam S. Farley, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

The following is intended to correct and supplement certain inaccurate, incomplete or misleading statements concerning the relations between the American Institute of Pacific Relations (formerly American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations) and the United Office and Professional Workers of America (later merged in the Distributive, Processing and Office Workers of America) made before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security by Raymond Dennett (Hearings, Part 4, pp. 939-50) and Harvey Matusow (stenographic transcript, Vol. 55, pp. 6211-29).

On this subject I can speak from personal knowledge as I have been a member of the American IPR staff since 1934 and was a member of the union from 1939 to 1951, except for a period in 1946-48 when I was not employed by the American IPR. I was the first shop chairman in the American IPR and was an active member of the union for a number of years. My union activities were largely confined to maintaining and operating the machinery of collective bargaining in the American IPR office. Later, my feeling toward the union having changed, I became inactive, and remained a member only because it was required by the contract.

In 1939 the American IPR signed a contract with the Book and Magazine Guild, Local 18, UOPWA, CIO. The initiative in forming a union in the American IPR did not come from Frederick V. Field, as stated by Mr. Dennett. Mr. Dennett was not connected with the IPR at that time and, as he said himself, could not speak from personal knowledge. The initiative came from the American IPR employees. Their motive was nonpolitical; they simply wished to conduct their relations with their employer on a basis of collective bargaining. Mr. Field was executive secretary of the American IPR at this time, but he made no attempt to influence the employees either for or against joining the union.

At that time, so far as I know, the UOPWA was not under Communist control. The UOPWA had contracts at this period with a number of reputable organizations, including Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., Phi Beta Kappa, and the Foreign Policy Association. Ten years later, in 1949, charges were made in the CIO that the UOPWA was under Communist control. These charges were investigated by the CIO and as a result the UOPWA was expelled from the CIO in 1950. Subsequently the American IPR officers gave notice that they would not renew the contract with the union after it expired in May 1951, and it was not renewed. The decision not to renew was taken by the American IPR officers with the approval of the American IPR employees.

At no time, to my knowledge, did the union ever make any attempt whatever to influence, directly or indirectly, the policies, program, or publications of the American IPR. And I was in a good position to know of such attempts had they been made. Any attempt of this kind would have been resented and rejected both by the American IPR employees and by the Institute officers and Executive Committee members. In its relations with the American IPR the union confined itself strictly to normal union functions, i. e., negotiations with management on wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.

The implication in Mr. Dennett's testimony that the union attempted to "get rid of" him has no basis in fact. In saying this I do not mean to charge Mr. Dennett with a deliberate untruth. He may have believed this to be true, but it was not true.

From 1943 on the American IPR contract contained a standard union-shop clause, common in union contracts, requiring all new employees to join the

union. Mr. Dennett stated that he feared this clause might make it impossible for the American IPR to obtain the services of research persons whom it might wish to employ. It should be noted that the contract contained a number of loopholes. Certain categories of employees were excluded from its operation, including "research persons engaged for special research projects" (quotation is from contract as revised on January 6, 1945; earlier wording was "persons engaged temporarily for special projects"), "workers on a retainer basis," and "holders of fellowships working under the supervision of the Council but receiving no compensation from it." Other exceptions might be made by vote of the union members in the office. To the best of my knowledge and recollection the American IPR never in fact experienced any difficulty in engaging research persons because of the union shop clause in the contract.

Mr. Matusow testified that it was the policy of the Communist Party to attempt to get Party members into the IPR and similar organizations through the operation of the preferential hiring clause. It should be noted that he did not cite any concrete examples.

From the beginning the union contract contained a preferential hiring clause, another standard clause common in union contracts, requiring the American IPR to hire through the union provided the union could supply a "qualified" candidate for the job in question. Under the contract the American IPR could and did reject candidates recommended by the union if in its judgment they were not "qualified." (Any difference of opinion between the American IPR and the union as to whether or not a candidate was qualified would have been subject to arbitration under the terms of the contract; to the best of my knowledge no such case ever arose.) In addition, as mentioned above, various categories of employees were excluded from the operation of the contract. The American IPR was thus protected against having to hire only persons recommended by the union, which could rarely, if ever, furnish qualified candidates for senior, specialized or research jobs.

In practice, clerical employees were usually, though not always, hired through the union, but senior research, editorial and administrative employees seldom if ever came through the union. As regards the clerical employees who were hired through the union—who, of course, had no concern with IPR policy—it should not be assumed that any of them were Communists because of the fact that they were rank-and-file members of this union.

It should be added that the Pacific Council (i. e., the International Secretariat of the IPR) never had a contract with any union.

[SEAL]

MIRIAM S. FARLEY.

New York, N. Y.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of June 1952.

ELSIE JENKICHE,

Notary Public, State of New York.

Mr. MORRIS. I also have another statement sworn to by Miriam S. Farley, this one dated also June 10, 1952, supplementing previously sworn statement.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1389A," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1389A

STATE OF NEW YORK,

County of New York, ss:

SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT BY MIRIAM S. FARLEY

Miriam S. Farley, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

With reference to the mention of my name during testimony by Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security (Hearings, pt. 2, pp. 387, 395, 396), the following information is submitted for the record:

General Willoughby referred to me and two other people as persons who were "hired in the States and unloaded on Tokyo"; i. e., on General MacArthur's headquarters (GHQ, SCAP). He also, in answer to questioning, made a point of the fact that Army regulations prevented him from testifying regarding the contents of personnel files on present or former Government employees.

I am not acquainted with General Willoughby and never was employed by him. All of the three persons whom he mentioned, including myself, were employed by Government Section, GHQ, SCAP, headed by Brig. Gen. Courtney Whitney.

I was employed by the War Department as a civilian employee in Tokyo from February 1946 to February 1947. From February to August 1946 I served in Government Section, GHQ, SCAP, as an editorial analyst, and from August 1946 to February 1947 in the Civil Information and Education Section (C. I. & E.) as an information officer. Both jobs were purely operational; neither was at the policy-making level. I was recruited through War Department channels, and understood that I had undergone a security check and received clearance before I was put on the Government payroll.

At no time, to my knowledge, was the quality of my work for SCAP criticized. On the contrary, it was frequently commended by my superior officers in both Government Section and C. I. & E. I had originally agreed to remain in Japan for a period of 9 months. At the end of that time I was requested to remain longer, and did remain for an additional 3 months, during which I was repeatedly and strongly urged to continue in my job. I do not mean to suggest that I was indispensable, but it seems improbable that I should have been urged to remain in GHQ if my work had been considered unsatisfactory or if any doubts had been entertained as to my loyalty to the United States.

Confirmation of the above statements may be obtained from the following persons under whom I worked in Tokyo: In Government Section, Lt. O. I. Hauge, U. S. N., and Col. Charles L. Kades; in C. I. & E., Lt. Col. J. W. Gaddis and Mr. Don Brown.

As regards my letter to Hugh Deane, which is quoted in the record, this hardly requires explanation. In it I merely congratulated an acquaintance on a new job and offered assistance to the Government in time of war. My acquaintance with Mr. Deane is slight. At the time the letter was written (1942) I knew him chiefly as a former China correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor* and, as the letter indicates, as an employee of the Coordinator of Information. I had no reason to believe that he was a Communist.

[SEAL]

MIRIAM S. FARLEY.

NEW YORK, N. Y.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of June, 1952.

ELSIE JENRICHE.

Notary Public, State of New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, next is report No. 22 by John S. Service, dated September 4, 1944.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The report referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1390," and is as follows:)

[Report No. 22]

UNITED STATES ARMY OBSERVER SECTION
APO 879, September 4, 1944

Subject: The Growth of the New Fourth Army: An Example of the Popular Democratic Appeal of the Chinese Communists.

To: Commanding General, Fwd. Ech. USAF-CBI, APO 879.

1. The growth of the Chinese Communists armies during the present war has proved them to be an extremely powerful political instrument because this spectacular development would not have been possible without the support of the people of the areas in which they have operated. This widespread popular support must, under the circumstances in which it has occurred, be considered a practical indication that the policies and methods of the Chinese Communists have a democratic character.

2. This may seem to be jumping to an ipso facto conclusion.

(a) It might be assumed, for instance, that a patriotic desire to fight the foreign invader was responsible for this popular support. This is partially true.

But to the Chinese peasant (who is the only important class involved, both because of his overwhelming numerical superiority in China and because the Communists have had to operate entirely away from the cities) the idea of active personal resistance was entirely new. In the past the peasant has regarded all governments merely as something to be endured; there was little, as far as he was concerned, to choose from between them; and even if one was

slightly better or worse than another, it was no concern of his and there was nothing he could do about it.

So the peasant needed a great deal of education and indoctrination—and some tangible evidence that it would benefit his own interest—before he was willing to take up arms. The fact that the Communists were able to accomplish this while the Kuomintang was not, indicates a closeness to and an ability to appeal to the common people in terms which they understand. This is something akin, at least, to democracy.

(b) Furthermore, the people, if they were willing to fight, almost always—certainly in the early years of the war had two choices: They could fight with either Kuomintang or the Communists. It would have been more natural for them to have turned to the Kuomintang because it was the Government. Instead they turned to the Communists, who have come more and more to be regarded and treated by the Government as rebels. It would seem therefore that the peasants received better understanding and treatment from the Communists. This, again, is a *prima facie* indication of democracy. At least it can be said, on this basis, that the people must regard the Communists as more democratic than the Kuomintang.

(c) It might be argued that the Communists have the advantage of a "cause," that they use such direct appeals as distributing the land of the landlords to the peasants, that they spread a rabble-rousing communism, or that they have found an equivalent of the fervor which gave such impetus to the Taipings or the Boxers. But, in fact, this argument is never heard. Even the Kuomintang does not bother to advance it. If they did, it would be refuted by the evidence of every foreign observer who has traveled through the Communist guerrilla areas. The Communists are not even actively preaching communism—though it cannot be denied that they are, sometimes by not too subtle means, trying to create support for the Communist Party.

(d) It can also be claimed this popular support is chiefly due to the Communist skill in propaganda. The Communists are masters of this art, and it does have a part, but only a relatively small one. The war has lasted more than 7 years, longer than mere propaganda without positive results could hope to hold the stolid and practical Chinese peasant. Furthermore, the guerrilla warfare into which the Communists have drawn their supporters is the type which is hardest of all military forms on the peasant because the whole area is continually a battleground.

(e) Another argument, little heard because it is so obviously untenable, is that the Communists have forced the people to support them and join their armies. But the Communist armies were small when the war began; they did not have the military power necessary to have forced the people. Their armies, relatively speaking are still small. They are, for instance, much smaller than the Kuomintang uses to garrison areas of equivalent size far in the rear away from any enemy. It is obvious therefore that the Communist army does not need large forces to maintain its own rear—as it would if it carried out Kuomintang policies of conscription and taxation and was plagued by the same resultant problems of banditry and internal unrest. It is also true that these relatively small regular forces could not successfully fight off the Japanese and hold these areas unless they had the active assistance and participation of the people in large irregular auxiliary forces, which can only, by their nature, be voluntary. The Communists claim over 2,000,000 local volunteers, the Peoples Militia, who are an active force in resisting and harassing the enemy. This figure may be exaggerated—though the evidence we have so far been able to gather indicates that Communist statistics of this nature are not inflated. But an organization of this type cannot be created and made effective by the threat of military force. And the Kuomintang does not even claim to have such an organization.

3. The conclusion therefore seems justified that the peasants support, join, and fight with the Communist armies because they have been convinced that, the Communists are fighting for their interests, and because the Communists have created this conviction by producing some tangible benefits for the peasants.

These benefits must be improvement of the social, political or economic condition of the peasants. Whatever the exact nature of this improvement, it must be—in the broader sense of the term as the serving of the interests of the majority of the people—toward democracy.

3. I believe that this success of the Communist forces in winning the support of the people is particularly well shown in the history of the new Fourth Army (hereinafter referred to as N4A). This force has not received the publicity

given to the development of the Eighth Route Army, which was visited by a number of foreign journalists and other observers early in the war. In many ways, however, its growth has been even more remarkable.

4. The N4A was not organized until 1938. It was formed out of remnants of the old Red Army who had been scattered among numerous isolated areas in South and Central China since the withdrawal of the main Communist forces from Kiangai at the end of 1934. (See my Report No. 19, August 31, 1944, par. 2). This was therefore an entirely new force with no background of unified organization; it could hardly compare with the Eighth Route Army, which at the outbreak of the war was already a well-organized army in being.

When organized the N4A had a strength of only 12,000 officers and men: This is small compared with the 80,000 of the Eighth Route Army in 1937. Weapons and equipment were insufficient and mostly old; many of them were dug up from the ground where they had remain buried during the years of Kuomintang suppression. The new arms promised them by the Central Government were never forthcoming; all they ever received was a small amount of ammunition. Likewise the recruits that had been promised by the Central Government to fill their ranks were never turned over to them.

This new army was immediately thrown into action and was assigned the lower Yangtze Valley, where it was to attack already important and heavily garrisoned Japanese areas. In these areas, or close to them, there were also Kuomintang troops. The N4A army thus had much less favorable opportunities for expansion than the Eighth Route Army, which had first occupied large almost empty areas behind the Japanese lines, from which the Central Government forces had withdrawn and which the Japanese had left very lightly guarded as they moved south.

Having this greater freedom, the Eighth Route Army was able, as early as 1938, to establish stable bases to support its operations. When the Kuomintang, in the years 1939-42, made an attempt to recover this territory, the physical difficulties of distance and interposing Japanese lines made it impossible for the Kuomintang to bring great strength against them. But the N4A, operating partly in Kuomintang territory much more easily accessible to the Central Government, was subjected to much stronger Kuomintang pressure and was forced to change its bases of operations several times. The result has been that most of the present N4A bases date from only 1940 or 1941. This is a serious handicap to the Communist method of growth by the mobilization of local support through a comprehensive political and economic program.

The N4A not only had to move; it also suffered heavy losses in conflicts with the Central Government troops. There have been sporadic small engagements and several of considerable size. In the largest of these, the "incident" of January 1941, the N4A suffered about 7,000 casualties. Furthermore, since that time the N4A has been "illegal" by official mandate of the Central Government. Recruits joining it, therefore, know that they will be regarded by the Kuomintang as rebels and that this official vengeance will extend to their families. The Eighth Route Army has also suffered under this opprobrium, but to a much less extent.

What was the actual development of the N4A under these apparently unfavorable conditions?

At the end of its first year (spring 1939) the original strength of 12,000 *nad* grown to 35,000. Operations extended from Shanghai to Hangchow, from Nan-king to Hsuehow, and from Hsuehow west along the Lunghai Railway to the vicinity of Kaifeng. Equipment had been brought in by recruits and captured from the Japanese.

By the spring of 1942 strength had risen to 100,000 regulars. Operations in the area between the Yangtze and the Lunghai Railway had been extended to the Kiangsu coast; it had also moved forces into the Japanese-occupied areas around Hankow.

By the spring of 1944 the regular strength of the N4A had increased to 152,000 men, armed with 93,000 rifles, and supported by an organized Peoples Militia of 550,000. Operations had been extended into East Chekiang and into South and West Hupeh. Stable base areas had been created with a total population, paying taxes only to Communist-controlled governments, of about 30,000,000. All of these bases had withstood large-scale Japanese attacks and some areas had not been penetrated by the Japanese for over 2 years.

In this development the N4A has increased its size by more than 12 times. In a slightly longer period the Eighth Route Army has increased sixfold.

5. These results have been achieved by a force which started from almost nothing. It has grown as it went along, out of the people. It has been an

orphan, without any powerful, well-established government with large resources behind it. It has had to supply itself entirely.

During much of its history it has shared areas with or been in close proximity to Kuomintang troops. Despite the advantages of supply, reinforcements and government support, those Kuomintang forces did not have any such increase. To the contrary, they grew steadily weaker and most of them have by now disintegrated, turned puppet, or withdrawn. They have never carried out an offensive against the Japanese; and they have shown repeatedly that they cannot successfully withstand Japanese attack.

6. General Chen Yi, acting commander of the N4A (General Yeh Ting is still regarded as commander although he has been a prisoner of the Kuomintang since 1941) insists that the success and growth of the N4A is wholly due to its policy toward the people. The most important of these were the following:

(a) First it was necessary to win the people's confidence, in a military sense. Fortunately the original cadres were old and experienced guerrilla fighters. In their first engagements, the Japanese were not used to their tactics and were unprepared and overconfident because of their easy defeats of other Chinese troops. During the first year they had uniform success: after that they had newly trained and capable forces. The Communists always follow the policy of using their best troops in important engagements, holding their newer troops as reserve or to throw in after the enemy is retreating to give them experience.

(b) The first step after coming into an area is intensive propaganda to explain the war and secure popular support.

(c) This followed by the creation of mass organizations of the people. These include farmers, youth, women, militia, and so on. All of these are for the purpose of carrying out some function in resisting the enemy. But they are also encouraged to interest themselves in their own problems. For instance, the farmers are told that in the well-established guerrilla bases rents and interest have been reduced.

(d) Through and from these mass organizations, democratically elected governments are set up. At first these are on the village level. As the area becomes stabilized the system is extended until the hsien governments, and finally the base governments are elected by the people. Nominations and elections are carried out in general village meetings.

(e) As soon as some sort of government control is established, rents and interest are reduced. This is done moderately. The minimum standard is 37½ percent for rent. But in the first stage rents are not usually reduced by more than one-quarter. This is to avoid driving the landlords away and into Japanese camp. In many areas into which the N4A has gone, the power of the landlords has been very great and they have been able to hang on to their control and even in some areas to dominate the local governments. In such areas the Communists move slowly by strengthening the organization of the people until they gain control by democratic methods.

(f) Taxes are reduced because of the moderate requirements of the N4A and the elimination of corruption through popular election of officials.

(g) Taxation is made moderately progressive. At present the poorest approximately 20 percent of the farmers pay no tax. The highest rate on the rich landlords usually does not exceed 35 percent.

(h) Banditry is vigorously attacked and the welfare of the people is improved by the maintenance of peace and order. In addition to direct attack, the other policies of the Communists are effective in removing this old burden of banditry.

(i) As important as any of these is the practical demonstration of the unity of the army and the people. The army takes as one of its major tasks the protection of the people (to the degree that this often determines its military operations). It takes positive measures to prevent enemy interference with the sowing and harvest. It actually assists when possible in farm work. When and where able its troops produce a part of their own needs. It avoids any sort of arbitrary demands on the people, pays for what it takes, and replaces breakage or damage. It helps the people cope with disasters such as breaks in dikes. In times of poor crops it reduces its own rations to the level of subsistence of the people. It continually harps on the idea that the army and people are "one family."

(j) There is never any forced conscription. Except for the encouragement of the formation, on a volunteer basis, of such organizations as the militia, it avoids in the early stages of its control of an area, any attempt at recruiting.

(k) Within the army, it takes special measures to care for families of soldiers; emphasis is given to care of wounded; such practices as beating of soldiers are prohibited; and there is a democratic relationship—outside of purely military matters—between officers and men.

(l) Various other phases of the program include women's rights, intensive advancement of popular education, promotion of all types of cooperative societies, and so on.

7. General Chen, with whom I have had several long talks on these general subjects, can be excused if he paints an exaggeratedly pretty picture.

The fact remains that the Communists have been successful in winning the support of the people in the areas in which they operate, while the Kuomintang has not. General Chen laughingly says that the Communists should thank the Kuomintang for coming into the same areas, because they have provided the people with a basis for comparison.

We cannot yet say with certainty that the Communists' claims of democratic policies are true. But that they are at least partially true is the only reasonable explanation of the popular appeal which the Communist armies have shown.

8. It is requested that copies of this report be transmitted to the American Ambassador at Chungking and Headquarters, USAF-CBI for the information of Mr. Davies.

JOHN S. SERVICE.

Mr. MORRIS. Also, Mr. Chairman, I have report No. 34 by John S. Service, this one dated September 28, 1944, which I would like to introduce at this time.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The report referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1391," and is as follows:)

[Report No. 34]

UNITED STATES ARMY OBSERVER SECTION,
APO 879, September 28, 1944.

Subject:

The orientation of the Chinese Communists toward the Soviet Union and the United States.

To: Commanding general, Fwd, Ech. USAF-CBI, APO 879.

1. There is attached a memorandum on present policies of the Chinese Communists as they affect and are indications of present Chinese Communist orientation toward the Soviet Union and the United States.

2. This memorandum may be summarized as follows:

Summary: Politically, any orientation which the Chinese Communists may once have had toward the Soviet Union seems to be a thing of the past. The Communists have worked to make their thinking and program realistically Chinese, and they are carrying out democratic policies which they expect the United States to approve and sympathetically support.

Economically, the Chinese Communists seek the rapid development and industrialization of China for the primary objective of raising the economic level of the people. They recognize that under present conditions in China this must be accomplished through capitalism with large-scale foreign assistance. They believe that the United States, rather than the Soviet Union, will be the only country able to give this economic assistance and realize that for reasons of efficiency, as well as to attract American investment, it will be wise to give this American participation great freedom. (End of summary.)

3. The conclusion, which is the continual statement of the Communist leaders themselves, is that American friendship and support is more important to China than Russia. The Communists also believe, of course, in the necessity of close and friendly relations of China with the Soviet Union, but they insist that this should involve no conflict in interests between the United States and the Soviet Union.

4. This apparent strong orientation of the Chinese Communists toward the United States may be somewhat contrary to general expectation—which may be too ready to emphasize the Communist name of the party. Apart from what may be called the practical considerations that the United States will be the strongest power in the Pacific area and America the country best able to give economic assistance to China, it is also based on the strong Communist conviction that China cannot remain divided. I believe that the Chinese Commu-

nists are at present sincere in seeking Chinese unity on the basis of American support. This does not preclude their turning back toward Soviet Russia if they are forced to in order to survive American-supported Kuomintang attack.

5. It is requested that copies of this report be transmitted to the American Ambassador at Chungking and Headquarters, USAF-CBI, for the information of Mr. Davies.

JOHN S. SERVICE.

POLICIES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AFFECTING THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES

A. POLITICAL

1. The attempt to make Chinese Communist thinking more Chinese.—There is apparent in the major statements of theory by Communist leaders during the past several years an effort to get away from slavish attempts to apply Russian communism to China. The emphasis is laid on realistic study of China itself.

The strongest intellectual movement within the Communist Party has been against the "three great faults" of subjectivism, sectarianism, and pedantic formalism. The most important of these, judging from the attention given to it, is subjectivism, which is interpreted to include the dogmatic application of foreign theories unsuited to existing conditions in China. The attitude set forth as correct is "objectivism"—the application of theory on the basis of exhaustive study of actual facts and true conditions. The general effect of this movement has been to take the communism out of Chinese Communist thinking, at least in regard to the immediate future of China.

Examples of such Communist statements are numerous. Perhaps one of the best is a lecture entitled, "How To Change the Way We Study," given by Mao Tse-tung to high party workers at Yen-an in May 1941. This lecture is now included in a volume of selected papers which is required textbook for all Communist Party cadres. The following is a partial quotation:¹

"No one has begun in a really serious manner the study of the political, economic, military, and cultural history of China during the past century, the period of real significance. * * * Many of our comrades regard this ignorance or partial knowledge of our own history not as a shame, but on the contrary as something to be proud of. * * * Since they know nothing about their own country, they turn to foreign lands. * * * During recent decades many foreign returned students have made this mistake. They have merely been phonographs, forgetting that their duty is to make something useful to China out of the imported stuff they have learned. The Communist Party has not escaped this infection.

"We study the teachings of Marx and his followers. But the way that many of us learn those teachings is in direct opposition to their spirit. * * * Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin teach us to study seriously the existing conditions, starting from the actual objective circumstances, not from our subjective wishes. But many of our comrades are acting directly contrary to this guiding principle.

"* * * Many comrades learn the truths of Marx-Leninism merely for the sake of Marx-Leninism. * * * Although they can quote at length from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, yet they cannot apply their learnings to the concrete study of Chinese history and the present conditions in China: They cannot analyze and solve problems that arise from the Chinese revolution.

"These people, who are unscientific in attitude, who only know how to recite dogmas, who have degrees but no real knowledge * * * are a practical joke on real Marx-Leninism."

2. The application of Marxism to China.—I attempted to in my report No. 5 of August 3, 1944, to describe the Chinese Communist application of Marxist ideology to China. The gist was that the Chinese Communist Party in its present program has abandoned everything except the doctrine of historical materialism and the belief in the eventual socialistic society.

That exposition was based on very incomplete study and fragmentary statements by various Communist leaders. It was confirmed, however, in a striking way by Po Ku (generally referred to by the Kuomintang by his original name, Ch'ing Pao-hsien) in a conversation on September 3, 1944. Po Ku's comments

¹ This translation has been made by Communist sources in Yen-an. I have, however, checked it roughly by reading the Chinese original.

are of interest, not only because of his position as a member of the Political Bureau and former chairman of the Communist Party's Central Committee, but also because he is a Russian-returned and usually described in Kuomintang "analyses" of the Communists as the leader of a "pro-Russian clique." My notes or Po Ku's remarks are as follows:

"We regard Marxism not as a dogma but as a guide. We accept its historical materialism and its ideological method. It furnishes us with the conclusions and the objectives toward which we strive. This objective is the classless society built on socialism—in other words, the good of the individual and the interests of all the people.

"But to try to transplant to China all of Marx's description of the society in which he found himself (the industrial revolution of Europe in the nineteenth century) and the steps (class struggle and violent revolution) which he saw would be necessary for the people to escape from those conditions, would not only be ridiculous, it would also be a violation of our basic principles of realistic objectivism and the avoidance of doctrinaire dogmatism.

"China at present is not even capitalistic. Its economy is still that of semi-feudalism. We cannot advance at one jump to socialism. In fact, because we are at least 200 years behind most of the rest of the world, we probably cannot hope to reach socialism until after most of the rest of the world has reached that state.

"First we must rid ourselves of this semifeudalism. Then we must raise our economic level by a long stage of democracy and free enterprise.

"What we Communists hope to do is to keep China moving smoothly and steadily toward this goal. By orderly, gradual, and progressive development we will avoid the conditions which forced Marx to draw his conclusions of the necessity (in his society) for class struggle; we will prevent the need for a violent revolution by a peaceful planned revolution.

"It is impossible to predict how long this process will take. But we can be sure that it will be more than 30 or 40 years, and probably more than 100 years."

3. The Communist political program is democracy.—Advancing from the field of theory to that of practice, the Communist political program is simple democracy. This is much more American than Soviet in form and spirit.

Communists now are apt to argue that they were not really communistic even in the days of their power in Kiangsi. I am not competent to discuss this. But even though they may have distributed the land to the peasants as private property and have left the landlord enough for his own needs, still the fact remains that their governments were organized as Soviets during that period.

Starting in August 1935 the Communists based their policy on a democratic united front. Since that time—now over 9 years—they have adopted the San Min Chu I (as set forth by Sun Yat-sen in the manifesto of the first Kuomintang congress) have abandoned the Soviet form of government, have sought the cooperation of all groups based on the democratic rights of the whole people.

This Communist program is well known and there is hence no need for detailed description here. Basic documents are the above-mentioned manifesto of the first Kuomintang congress and Mao Tse-tung's book, *New Democracy* (a translation of which was submitted to the headquarters and Embassy under cover of one of my reports dated early in 1944).

First we must rid ourselves of this semifeudalism. Then we must raise our economic level by a long stage of democracy and free enterprise.

"What we communists hope to do is to keep the country moving smoothly toward this goal. By orderly, gradual, and progressive development we will avoid the conditions which forced Marx to draw his conclusions of the necessity (in his society) for class struggle; we will prevent a revolution in the violent sense of the term.

"It is impossible to predict how long this process will take. But we can be sure that it will be more than 30 or 40 years, probably more nearly 100."

3. The Communist political program is democracy.—Changing from theory to practice, the Communist political program is simple democracy. This is much more American than Russian in form and spirit.

Communists now are prone to deny that they were communistic even in the early days of their rule in Kiangsi. I am not competent to discuss this. But the fact was their governments were organized as Soviets during that period.

Starting in August 1935 the Communists reversed their basic policy on the basis of the united front line. Since that time—for over 9 years—they have adopted the San Min Chu I as set forth by Sun Yat-sen in the manifesto of the first Kuomintang congress, and Mao Tse-tung's book, *New Democracy* (a translation of which was submitted to the headquarters and the Embassy early in 1944).

Generally speaking, the Communists are faithfully carrying out this democratic program. There is no question but that in the areas under their influence they have given democratic rights to the people, and that the party is supported by the majority of the population.

Will stick to first manifesto, even if KMT fails.

The question of whether the Communists are willing to share their power with other parties in a democratic way is a question more difficult to answer. They are working in backward rural districts with a population without previous political experience. This has required them to assume a role in organization and leadership which gives them power and influence greater than normal for a political party as the Americans think it. Furthermore the only other real political party, the Kuomintang, has generally refused cooperation. Through their institution of such policies as the three-three system (not more than one-third of elective officials to be Communist), through their close cooperation with such liberal groups as the intellectuals, and through their inclusions of such groups as the landlords and merchant classes in their governments and efforts to give them reasonable treatment, the Communists seem to have demonstrated this broad-minded, democratic spirit.

Of course, it can be argued that the Communists are advancing their own interests and moving toward a goal of control of the country by the use of these methods. This is true. But it must be acknowledged that the Communists have not tried to eliminate such groups as the landlords and native capitalists, and that they realize that their own advancement and the interest of the country are best served by the cooperation of all groups based on reasonable protection of the interests of all those groups.

4. There is little aping of Soviet Russia and little evidence of strong ties to Russia.—Not only in theory and policy, also in the atmosphere and daily scene in Yen-an there is little direct evidence of Soviet influence. Except in speeches within the party there is little reference to Communism or to Marx and the other patriarchs of communism. In party institutions there are pictures of Marx and occasionally of Engles and Lenin; but these are rare. Stalin's picture is common but usually placed alongside those of Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Roosevelt, and Churchill.

The Communist newspaper gives considerable prominence to Russian war news but not more than it does news of American victories and much less than it does to the operations of the Communist armies.

Soviet influence is obvious in the organization of the Communist Party; but the same can be said of the Kuomintang.

Soviet examples also seem apparent in the measures used to promote the production campaign such as the selection and honoring of labor heroes, the assigning of planned quotas, and the stress on competition. But these measures seem to be effective and are hardly in themselves characteristically Soviet.

Since we have been in Yen-an one foreign play has been produced (in translation). This was Russian. But its choice was particularly appropriate because it was a war play, involving guerrillas and old Communist leaders whose main claim to position was that they had fought through the civil war and now had to be removed because they were out of date (Budenny?).

The Soviet symbols of the hammer and sickle are almost never seen. In fact the casual observer sees little to remind him of Russia or to make him think that the Chinese Communists are particularly attached to Soviet Russia or, as suggested by the extreme faction of the Kuomintang, in any way a front for the Russian Communists.

It cannot be said, on the other hand, that the Chinese Communists are trying to ape American models (except in the surprising ways of social dancing and a mild interest in bridge and poker). In fact they are imitating nobody. Their emphasis is on being Chinese. And in this they seek to come down to the level of the common people. There is no hocus-pocus such as the Kuomintang insists on of weekly Sun Yat-sen Memorial Meetings, no formal posting of Sun Yat-sen's (or anyone else's) picture to be bowed to before every meeting, no ceremonial of repeating Sun Yat-sen's will, no standing every time someone's name is mentioned. The Russian-inspired romanization of the Chinese language has been dropped. Except for limited audiences of the party cadres, the western drama has been abandoned for a popularization and development of the native northern Chinese folk plays and dances. Music has been made native. In every sphere the Communists have made the most strenuous efforts to go native and to approach the mass of the people in terms that they will understand.

B. ECONOMIC

Following views chiefly Po Ku, supplemented by talks with Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i:

1. The Communists agree that China must industrialize.—The Communists are just as convinced as the Kuomintang (and everyone else) that China must industrialize.

Where the Communists differ from the Kuomintang is in their motivation and emphasis. One gains the impression from China's Destiny and much of the present thinking in Chungking that the primary objective of China's industrialization is defense—in other words, national power. The Communists place this second. First in their minds (at least in their talk) is welfare. Unless the living standards of the people are raised, there can be no real foundation for either economic or political progress. The first great expansion, the Communists claim, should therefore, be in light, consumer industry and communications. More gradually and slowly there can be built up a heavy industry (or as China's Destiny calls it, a national defense) base.

The Communists also place greater emphasis on the idea that China will probably be predominantly an agricultural country, that China's agricultural resources and problems must therefore not be neglected, that China does not have the material resources to be a first-rank heavy-industry country.

2. China can industrialize at present only on a capitalistic basis.—China's basic condition at present is still semifeudalism. To get rid of this is the first important step. From this it is impossible to step at once to socialism because there is neither the political nor economic foundation. The Chinese people are not yet ready for socialism and will not be for a long time to come. To talk of socialism now is impractical. The next stage in China's advance must be capitalism. In this capitalism must be given the freest possible opportunity to develop the country economically. China's weakness now is the under-development of capitalism.

3. Foreign assistance will be necessary to bring about this industrialization.—China not only lacks enough native capital to finance large-scale industrialization, it also lacks an adequate industry to serve as a starting point for this industrialization, it lacks experience and technical personnel. The end of the war will see these conditions accentuated. China will be suffering from ruinous inflation, from the disorganization and destruction brought by the war. It is probable that the Japanese will complete the destruction of the rudimentary Chinese industry before they withdraw or are defeated.

These conditions make it impossible for China to follow Russia's example of building herself. Backward as Russia was after the Revolution, she had far more of a modern industrial base than China will have. Low as were the living standards of the Russian people, they were not as low as the irreducible minimum of the great majority of the Chinese people, and it was therefore possible for the Soviets to depress those living standards even further to raise the capital for their industrialization. But even Russia accomplished what she did only with terrific sacrifices. She did not do it on her own resources because she wanted to; but because she had to. China, even if she were able to accomplish such a Herculean feat, will be under no such compulsion to do so. The attempt would be foolish.

4. Soviet Russia will be unable to give this needed large-scale economic assistance to China. After the war, Russia will have a great part of her country to rebuild. Her own reconstruction and the continuation of her own internal development which was interrupted by the war will continue for a long time. Published reports indicate that the reopening of the mines in the Donbas Basin may take as long as 2 or 3 years of work. The report of Mr. Johnson, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce, of his talks in Moscow indicate that Russia herself will seek large-scale assistance from the United States after the war in imports of materials and machinery. These will have to be financed by loans.

It is therefore obvious that Russia will have neither surplus capital nor technical personnel available to assist us in the industrialization of China.

5. The United States is the only country which will be able to help China. Even if Russia were able (which she will not be) to assist China, the United States will be the logical country to play the greatest share. American resources will be tremendous. They have been geared to huge exports during the war. America will have industrial plants which will not be needed and can be exported whole. She will have capital to invest and the necessary technical per-

sonnel. In addition, her sea communications with China are better than those from European Russia. America faces on the Pacific. Siberia is still under development.

American ties with China are strong. America has all of China's good will. For reasons of China's internal unity it will be better for America to play the major role in this economic development.

The other European countries will be engaged in reconstruction of their own countries. They will not have capital to invest. The same will be true to some extent of Great Britain, whose large-scale participation in China will, in any case, be less welcome than American.

6. Great freedom must be given to foreign capital in this economic development of China.—Since our goal is the most rapid possible development of Chinese resources, communications, and industry, we must make investment attractive to foreign capital. We cannot reasonably expect China to reap all the profit.

The logic of our moderate treatment of landlords and merchants and limited reduction of rent and interest in order to obtain the support of these groups in a united front which can strengthen our bases economically will hold good. If we carried out drastic reduction of rents or confiscation of land and restriction of private business, we would cut off our own noses and weaken our bases by driving out these necessary capitalistic groups.

We must therefore give foreign capital very wide freedom of opportunity.

Experience has shown us that Government enterprises in our own areas cannot yet be operated efficiently. Our Army factories are not as efficient as privately run factories.

We believe that Chungking's efforts to create a bureaucratic industry (for instance, the enterprises of the National Resources Commission and the monopolies of H. H. Kung) are proving the same thing. They may enrich Kung and a few others. But they are rotten with favoritism, graft, and inefficiency. They are not the best means to bring about this economic development."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have here a document entitled "IPR Notes on Chinese Clippings." It is No. 15, dated July 28, 1943. It bears the initials TAB, CP, and P. Jaffe. It also has a notation "Return to W. H. H. File."

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be received in the record?

Senator WATKINS. You say this is a photostat of a document you found in the files?

Mr. MANDEL. It is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received and made part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1392" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1392

IPR NOTES ON CHINESE CLIPPINGS, NUMBER FIFTEEN, JULY 28, 1943

(By Yung Ying Hsu)

CHINESE COMMUNIST STATEMENT ON COMINTERN DISSOLUTION

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a statement on May 26 approving the dissolution of the Communist International. The full text of the statement was published in the Hsin Hua Jih Pae (May 28, 1943) with a total of sixty-three characters deleted by the censor. This censored version reads as follows:

1. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party fully endorses the proposal of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International to dissolve the Communist International. The Chinese Communist Party considers itself free, beginning this very day, from all the obligations provided in the Constitution, and in resolutions adopted by its congresses of the Communist International.

2. The Communist International has accomplished its historical mission. It has not only safeguarded revolutionary Marxism in Europe, America and Japan from distortions by the opportunists, aided the advanced workers [in these lands] to consolidate themselves into genuine workers' parties, supported the Socialist Soviet Union, and repeatedly opposed Fascism and Fascist wars, but has also offered its best aid to the advanced workers of the oppressed nations of the East in organizing into their own parties and becoming the people's vanguard standing in the foremost ranks of all movements for liberation. What is especially unforgettable for the Chinese people was the strong effort exerted by the Communist International in helping to bring about the united front of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in 1924, when Dr. Sun Yat-sen was still alive. Following that it helped the Northern Expedition to achieve its victory. During 1927 to 1937, the most trying period for the Chinese revolution, the Communist International again supported the people of China. Finally, during the six years of anti-Japanese war since 1937, it rallied its affiliated section and the toiling people of the nations in assisting the Chinese people against the Japanese imperialists' war of aggression. In a word, throughout its entire existence, the Communist International put forth its best effort to aid the suffering Chinese people.

As rightly stated in the proposal of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, conditions within nations and on an international scale have become so complex today that the existing organizational form has become unadaptable to the continuously growing labor movement in the different countries. In the present allied anti-Fascist war of liberation there is a much greater necessity for the national Communist Parties to solve their respective problems independently on the basis of the specific circumstances and historical conditions of their own people, thus broadening and hastening the national upsurge and mass mobilization in order to achieve a thorough-going and complete victory. [Meanwhile] the National Communist Parties and their leading cadres have grown up and reached their political maturity. In view of these facts the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International proposed to the national Communist Parties the dissolution of the Communist International. [It was held that] under present conditions the dissolution of the Communist International has become more advantageous than its continuance.

Since the present war situation does not permit the convening of an international congress, the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International lays this proposal before the national Communist Parties. In view of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party fully agrees with the reasons given in the proposal and endorses the dissolution of the Communist International. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party further points out that after dissolution of the First International by Karl Marx the labor movement in the different countries recorded a greater development. Dissolution of the Third International now will undoubtedly hasten the victory of the Anti-Fascist Global War as well as the liberation of all mankind.

3. The founding of the Chinese Communist Party was a sequence of a developing labor movement in China as well as of the unfolding of modern Chinese history since the "May Fourth" movement in 1919. It also meant that where there is a proletarian and labor movement, there will emerge a party of the proletariat. Even if there were no Communist International, the Chinese Communist Party would emerge according to the law of historical necessity.

After its founding in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party clearly pointed out the anti-imperialist and antifeudal road to the Chinese people for the first time in the modern history of China. Moreover, the entire membership of the Party set a practical example of undeviating loyalty, in defiance of torture and death, to struggle for the liberation of its nation along all lines. The Chinese Communist Party has received a great deal of help from the Communist International; but for a long time the Chinese Communists have been able to determine their own political path, policy and action with complete independence on the basis of the concrete circumstances and specific conditions in their own nation. Since the decision of the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, held in August 1935, not to interfere in organizational matters of the national Communist Parties, the Executive Committee of the Communist International and its Presidium have lived up to this decision and have not interfered with the organizational matters of the Chinese Communist Party. (29 characters deleted here). Since the War of Resistance, the Chinese Communist Party has

been carrying on a hard struggle unprecedented in history. These are the independent achievements of the Chinese Communist Party with its bare hands, unaided by any outside power. This may be said to be historically unparalleled in China's revolutionary movement during the last several decades.

Revolution can neither be exported nor imported. It can only arise through the internal development of each nation. This is the truth repeatedly dwelled upon by the Marxists. The practice of the Chinese Communist Party has completely vindicated this truth. In view of this fact, dissolution of the Communist International will strengthen the self-confidence and the initiative of the Chinese Communists, it will reinforce the link between the Party and the people of the entire nation, and it will increase further the fighting power of the Party. The Chinese Communists (13 characters deleted here) will remain militantly in the foremost ranks of the anti-Japanese war (21 characters deleted here) and to support the war effort of the national government, until our victory over the Japanese aggressors and their German and Italian allies, until the completion of the great task for an independent, democratic new China.

4. The Chinese Communists are Marxist-Leninists, because Marxism-Leninism is a science transcending national limits. The Chinese Communists will continue to base themselves on the conditions of their nation in applying and developing skillfully the principles of Marxism-Leninism, in order to serve our nation in war and in reconstruction. The Chinese Communists are also the inheritor of the best traditions in all of our national culture, thought, and ethics; they consider such tradition as their own blood and flesh and will continue to develop and glorify them. The campaign carried on by the Chinese Communist Party in recent years against subjectivism, against sectarianism, and against doctrinaire stereotypes is aimed at the further integration of the revolutionary science of Marxism-Leninism with Chinese revolutionary practice, Chinese history, and Chinese culture. This campaign has demonstrated a power of initiative in thought and in revolutionary practice on the part of the Chinese Communists. It also demonstrates that the Chinese Communists are surely able to accomplish the historical tasks of the Chinese people together with them. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is deeply convinced that our Party comrades will unite as one man to overcome our shortcomings and to develop our initiative and positiveness. If this is the case, we will surely accomplish our tasks despite the fact that our enemy the Japanese imperialists is still strong and that there are still innumerable difficulties lying ahead of us.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE, COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.

MAY 26, 1943.

MR. MORRIS. I would next like to introduce, Mr. Chairman, the sworn statement of T. A. Bisson, dated April 16, 1952.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1393" and is as follows:)

97 KINGSTON ROAD,
Berkeley 7, Calif., April 16, 1952.

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,

*Chairman, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: With reference to my testimony before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary, I wish to point out that I made an important denial in executive session but did not have an opportunity to repeat it in public session. I denied that my article (China's Role in a Coalition War) in the Far Eastern Survey of July 14, 1943, was written at the instruction or request of the Community Party and emphasized that it was written entirely independently and expressed only my own personal views at the time.

This denial is very important to me because it refuted a serious charge made against me by Mr. Louis Budenz before the subcommittee. Accordingly, I respectfully request that my executive session testimony on this point be made part of the printed record of the hearings. I feel that it is only fair to me and my reputation that this should be done immediately. Otherwise, the public record will give the impression that this serious charge against me has not been denied by me in sworn testimony.

May I also request that the full text of the Survey article in question, together with the reply to it by Dr. C. L. Hsia and my final comment printed in the Survey issue of August 16, 1943, be inserted in the printed record of the public hearing.

Reference was made in the public hearing of March 31, 1952, to my membership in the American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression. This committee was long headed by Mr. Henry L. Stimson as honorary secretary, a testimony to the character of the committee, which was exclusively concerned with stopping the sale of American war materials to Japan while it was engaged in its aggressive attack on China. Since this point was not made clear at the hearing, where I did not have my data available, I respectfully request that the statement here made concerning the committee be made part of the printed record of the hearing.

Would you kindly acknowledge this letter and give me assurance that my requests will be granted.

Sincerely yours,

[SEAL]

T. A. BISSON.

Subscribed and sworn to before me by T. A. Bisson this 18th day of April 1952.

EDITH LAWRENCE SMITH,

Notary Public in and for the County of Alameda, State of California.

My commission expires June 2, 1955.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce at this point the sworn statement of William L. Holland, dated April 12, 1952.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received and made a part of the record.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1394" and is as follows:)

NEW YORK, April 12, 1952.

SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM BY W. L. HOLLAND ON ISRAEL EPSTEIN

Mr. Israel Epstein has been mentioned in testimony before the subcommittee as the author of an IPR research report entitled "Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China." Since it has recently been alleged that Mr. Epstein is or was a Communist, I wish to explain how it came about that he prepared this study for the IPR.

My acquaintance with Mr. Epstein began in 1943 in Chungking when he was working as a correspondent for several newspapers and magazines, including, at one period, the New York Times. He was well known at that time as a writer on Chinese affairs and the author of a substantial book on China as well as many articles. In 1943 he had started work on an investigation of labor problems in Nationalist China. He had already collected a valuable amount of hitherto unavailable first-hand information on labor conditions in formerly backward parts of western China which were now being rapidly transformed by migration of industry from the coastal areas. He had had the close cooperation of well-qualified Chinese labor experts and had clearly acquired a unique knowledge of this problem, about which no serious research report had been written.

In my capacity as international research secretary of the IPR, I therefore commissioned Mr. Epstein (in 1943) to prepare a full report on this subject for the international research program of the IPR and authorized him to make arrangements with a number of Chinese colleagues, including the well-known sociologist, Professor Ta Chen, to work on this project during the ensuing year or two. Mr. Epstein did so and eventually returned to New York with a great collection of data which, after a long delay, he wrote up in a rather poorly organized first draft.

In accordance with the standard IPR procedure, this draft was submitted for comment to a number of people, including Prof. W. W. Lockwood at Princeton University, Prof. Owen Lattimore, and Prof. John K. Fairbank. It was also read by several persons on the IPR staff. All readers felt that the study contained valuable new information which ought to be made available, but some thought that there were also certain passages which expressed criticism of the Nationalist authorities in a tone not suitable for an IPR research volume. I therefore told Mr. Epstein that the study would be accepted for publication for the IPR only if he agreed to have the manuscript undergo considerable editing,

including the removal of the above excessively critical passages. Mr. Epstein agreed and finally approved the drastically revised version, which was subsequently issued in 1949 by the IPR in mimeographed form under the above-mentioned title.

The report contains a preface by me, clearly indicating that the study does not claim to be a definitive work but was simply intended as an interim compilation providing a useful body of reference materials pending the time when a more comprehensive book might be written.

I also arranged for an appendix (briefly sketching some outstanding postwar labor developments) to be added. This was written by Mr. Julian Friedman, then lecturer in colonial economics at the University of London and formerly labor attaché at the United States consulate general in Shanghai in 1946.

A glance at the volume will show that it is essentially factual and accurate in the general picture it gives of China's wartime and immediate postwar labor relations. It has been favorably reviewed in many journals.

W. L. HOLLAND.

STATE OF NEW YORK,

County of New York, ss:

William L. Holland, being duly sworn, declares that every statement in the above memorandum is true to the best of his knowledge.

RUSSELL S. GOLDE,

Notary Public, State of New York.

APRIL 12, 1952.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here a statement entitled "United States Economic, Financial, and Military Aid to China Since 1 April 1941," prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This is secret security information only when statement 7 is attached, and statement 7 is not attached to this report, therefore relieving it of its secret classification.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1395" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1395

UNITED STATES ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL, AND MILITARY AID TO CHINA SINCE
1 APRIL 1941Prepared by Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Progress Reports and
Statistics*United States economic, financial, and military aid to China since Apr. 1, 1941*

[In millions of United States dollars]

	Transfers Apr. 1, 1941, to Sept. 2, 1945	Transfers Sept. 2, 1945, to Dec. 31, 1951
<i>Aid to China furnished in whole or in part by the Army, Navy, and Air Force</i>		
1. Lend-lease program:		
May 6, 1941, to Sept. 2, 1945.....	\$845.3	714.1
Sept. 2, 1945, to June 30, 1946.....		17.9
Subsequent to June 30, 1946.....		50.3
Pipeline credit agreement.....		17.7
2. Military aid under Sino-American Cooperative Organization agreement (SACO).....		74.6
3. Transfer of United States naval vessels under Public Law 512, 79th Cong.....		123.1
4. Transfers under the China aid program authorized by sec. 404 (b) China Aid Act of 1948.....		3.0
5. Ammunition transferred by the United States First Marine Division in the Peiping-Tientsin Area.....		1.3
6. Ammunition transferred by Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific at Tsingtao, China.....		24.7
7. Mutual Defense Assistance Program. (See attached secret statement 7.).....		20.0
8. U. S. Army sale of excess stocks in West China.....		
<i>Aid to China furnished by agencies other than Army, Navy, and Air Force</i>		
9. Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner and War Asset Adminis- tration: Sale of surplus military equipment.....		3.9
10. Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner sale of civilian surplus property. (bulk sales agreement).....		55.0
11. Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner dockyard-facilities sales.....		4.1
12. Maritime Commission ship sales.....		16.4
13. Assistance by American Red Cross:		
Prior to VJ-day.....	4.6	
Subsequent to VJ-day.....		1.9
14. Export-Import Bank credits:		
Prior to VJ-day.....	20.3	
Subsequent to VJ-day.....		83.5
15. Economic Cooperation Administration program.....		213.5
16. United States foreign relief program (Department of State).....		43.9
17. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration—United States contribution.....		474.0
18. Board of Trustees for Rehabilitation Affairs.....		3.6
19. Stabilization fund agreement, 1941 (Department of Treasury).....	10.0	
20. 1942 Treasury credit (Public Law 442, 77th Cong.).....	485.0	15.0
21. Chinese Student Assistance (Department of State).....		5.2
Total.....	1,365.2	1,966.7
Grand total.....	3,331.9	

DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL CATEGORIES OF UNITED STATES AID

(Paragraph numbers correspond with numbers of items listed in table above)

1. Lend-lease program

As of December 31, 1951, Treasury Department records on fiscal operations show aid, both material and services, furnished to the Chinese Government under the lend-lease program amounted to \$1,627.6 million of which \$845.3 million had been delivered prior to VJ-day and the remainder of \$782.3 million had been delivered subsequent to VJ-day.

Of the total aid, \$1,627.6 million, the War Department, which included the Army Air Corps effected transfers amounting to \$1,420.7 million, according

to records of the Department of the Army. This amount includes: (1) Overseas transfers out of United States theater stocks and services rendered amounting to \$1,073 million. Approximately 97 percent of all overseas transfers of materials and services are supported by receipted transfer documents listing in detail the nature and extent of the aid furnished. (Photostat copies of receipted transfer documents attached as exhibit 1). Lend-lease shipments to United States commanding generals earmarked for China amounting to \$385.9 million against which credits for diversions to non-Chinese recipients and returns amounting to \$308.6 million were applied, leaving for these shipments a net of \$77.3 million as the value of actual transfers to the Chinese. (3) All other War Department transfers, amounting to \$270.4 million, took place in the continental United States and are supported by transfer documents of which approximately 98 percent are receipted by either Chinese Government representatives or their authorized agents.

The bulk of the lend-lease transfers made by the Department of the Navy were accomplished in China and in most instances are supported by receipts signed by representatives of the Chinese Government. The total lend-lease aid furnished by the Navy, according to Navy Department records, was \$71 million of which \$66.8 million represents the value of the 96 vessels charged to lend-lease and transferred under Public Law 512 (79th Cong.).

In addition to the War and Navy Department transfers, there were lend-lease transfers by Treasury Department, Maritime Commission, and other agencies totaling \$135.9 million, according to Treasury Department records.

Included in the above totals are amounts resulting from transfers under the pipeline credit agreement which authorized the delivery under credit arrangements of lend-lease civilian-type equipment and supplies contracted for but undelivered on VJ-day. The agreement provided for the shipment of \$51.7 million of such supplies to be paid for over a period of 30 years beginning July 1, 1947, with interest at 2½ percent per year. Goods with a value of \$50.3 million were actually delivered and charged to the Chinese under the terms of this agreement. Also included in the above totals are charges in the amount of \$25.9 million covering certain transfers made under lend-lease for which the Chinese Government agreed to pay. No other credit arrangements under lend-lease are indicated by the December 31, 1951, lend-lease reports of the Treasury Department.

The pricing policy for aid furnished under the Lend-Lease Act was United States procurement cost for new items and value based on condition for used items, plus an amount to cover packing, handling, and inland transportation. Charges for transfers out of excess military stocks overseas were United States procurement cost for new items, the value based on condition for used items, plus an amount to cover packing, handling, and inland and ocean transportation. (Statement 1.)

2. Sino-American cooperative agreement

The military transfers under the Sino-American Cooperative agreement (SACO) consisted primarily of ordnance supplies furnished the Chinese between September 2, 1945, and March 2, 1946, by the United States Navy. These transfers were accomplished in fulfillment of a wartime agreement calling for the exchange of services and supplies for certain specified services provided by the Chinese Government. (Statement 2.)

3. Transfer of United States Naval Vessels

A total of 131 vessels were transferred to the Chinese Nationalist Government as grant aid under Public Law 512 (79th Cong.). The procurement cost of these vessels was \$141.4 million of which \$74.6 million is reflected in this report as value of aid rendered under Public Law 512, and \$66.8 million is reflected in the lend-lease accounts with \$27.3 million prior to VJ-day and \$39.5 million subsequent to VJ-day. (Statement 3.)

4. China-aid program

Through December 31, 1951, shipments to the Chinese Government made by United States Government agencies under the China-aid program, for which \$125 million was appropriated, amounted to \$94.2 million. In addition, there was a cash advance of \$28.9 million made to the Nationalist Government of China to be utilized in direct procurement of military equipment by the Chinese on the open market. A portion of the cash advance was paid to the War Assets Administration and the Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner for certain surplus material obtained from them.

Pricing of aid furnished by the Departments of the Army and the Aid Force which amounted to \$71.8 million, was in accordance with the pricing policy established by the Department of the Army covering all military-aid programs. In accordance with this policy actual procurement cost was charged for items procured for foreign aid programs, plus packing, handling, transportation, and administrative costs. Full current replacement cost was charged for transfers out of stock, plus packing, handling, transportation, and administrative costs. Transfers out of excess stocks were priced at 10 percent of prices in effect in 1945, plus rehabilitation costs, packing, handling, transportation, and administrative costs. (Statements 4 and 4A.)

5 and 6. Ammunition transferred by United States marines

Between April and September 1947 the United States marines in the Peiping-Tientsin area and the Tsingtao area transferred at no cost to the Chinese Government approximately 6,500 tons of ammunition. Complete listings of the items and quantities transferred, together with dollar values, based on estimated 1947 procurement costs are attached. (Statements 5 and 6.)

7. Mutual Defense Assistance Program

As of December 31, 1951, certain military material with a value of \$24.7 million had been shipped under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. All detailed information concerning this program is classified for security reasons.

Pricing of aid furnished under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program is in accordance with the provision set forth in section 403 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended. (See attached secret statement 7.)

8. Sale of excess stocks of the United States Army in West China

In 1946 the United States Army contracted to transfer to the Chinese Government a broad assortment of United States Army supplies, with a depreciated landed cost value of U. S. \$67.24 million, plus CN \$5.16 billion and located in West China. In return the Chinese Government agreed to pay \$25 million (US) and \$5.16 billion (CN) for the property transferred.

Certain terms of the agreement follow:

"ARTICLE 4. In consideration of the immediate transfer of said property, China hereby agrees to purchase and to pay for the property thus transferred, and further agrees to hold the United States harmless for all claims for rents, damages, breach of contract or otherwise which may arise from any source whatever. . . .

"ARTICLE 7. China agrees to pay US \$25,000,000 and CN \$5,160,000,000 for the property thus transferred in accordance with the following terms and conditions:

"a. CN \$5,160,000,000 will be deducted from the total of the CN dollar advance made by China to the United States.

"b. US \$5,000,000 will be paid in cash.

"c. US \$20,000,000 will be payable in accordance with the terms of a contract to be negotiated between China and the United States Treasury Department, which contract will provide for:

(1) Principal to be paid in 30 equal installments.

(2) Interest at 2½ percent.

(3) Any surplus of settlement of US indebtedness to China for military expenditures in excess of China's cash down payments for surplus property of the US will thereupon be used by China for the purchase of property in the United States or will be applied to the liquidation of the unpaid balance of this contract.

"d. If at the completion of the transfer the actual net depreciated value computed as above is greater or less than the estimated net depreciated value stated herein, China's purchase price will be increased or decreased by the same percentage by which the actual net depreciated value varies from the contract referred to in c. above."

The cash down payment in United States dollars was later incorporated into the Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner bulk-sale agreement as part of the considerations received by the United States. The Chinese obligation of \$20 million was later included as one of the items presented as a United States claim in negotiations with the Chinese Government on settlement of war accounts.

9. Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner and War Assets Administration sale of surplus military equipment

The Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner and the War Assets Administration sold material and equipment to the Chinese Nationalist Govern-

ment with an estimated procurement cost of \$102 million for \$6.7 million, according to the records of the Department of State. The Chinese Government paid the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner \$2.78 million out of the \$125 million grant authorized by the China Aid Act of 1948. (See item 4.) The remaining \$3.93 million was paid to the United States Government; however, the source of these funds is not known.

10. Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner sale of civilian surplus property (bulk-sales agreement)

Under an agreement dated August 30, 1946, the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner sold to the Chinese Nationalist Government surplus property located in China and on various islands in the Pacific. Total acquisition cost of the property covered by this agreement was \$842 million, according to the records of the Department of State. The total sales price was \$175 million. Of this amount \$120 million was offset against obligations of the United States Armed Forces to the Chinese Government, and \$55 million represents a Chinese obligation to be paid in local currency for real property to be acquired in the future for United States diplomatic and consular establishments and for the expenses of educational programs under the Fulbright Act (Public Law 584, 79th Cong.).

11. Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner dockyard-facilities sales

The procurement cost of the property transferred under this sale was \$11.5 million and the sale price was \$4.1 million, according to the records of the Department of State.

12. Maritime Commission ship sales

The Maritime Commission sold the Chinese Government 43 vessels for a total sales price of \$26.2 million under the Merchant Ships Sales Act of 1946. Of this amount \$16.4 million was on Maritime Commission credit terms. The balance of \$9.8 million was paid in cash, obtained in part through an Export-Import Bank credit. (See item 14.) The total wartime procurement cost of the 43 vessels was \$77.3 million. This information was taken from page 1049 of the Department of State's United States Relations With China.

13. Assistance by American Red Cross; 15. Economic Cooperation Administration program; 16. United States foreign-relief program (Department of State)

The amounts indicated above regarding the aid furnished under these programs were obtained from Foreign Transactions of the United States Government, released in January 1952 by the Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, Clearing Office for Foreign Transactions.

14. Export-Import Bank credits

Amounts reflected in this report were obtained from the Export-Import Bank.

17. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration—United States contribution; 18. Board of Trustees for Rehabilitation Affairs

The values cited are from United States Relations With China (Department of State), page 1043.

19. Stabilization fund agreement, 1941 (Department of Treasury); 20. 1942 Treasury credit (Public Law 442, 77th Cong.)

The amounts of aid reported under these agreements are in accordance with the records of the Department of the Treasury.

21. Chinese student assistance (Department of State)

The amount of aid reported under this program is in accordance with records of the Department of State.

STATEMENT 1.—Statement of lend-lease aid provided to the Government of China, as of Dec. 31, 1951

	Total	Ordnance and ammunition stores	Aircraft and aeronautical material	Tanks and other vehicles	Vessels and other watercraft	Miscel- laneous military equipment	Facilities and equip- ment	Agricultural, industrial, and other commodities	Testing, recondi- tioning, etc., of defense articles	Services and expenses
Transfers period May 1941 to Sept. 2, 1945:										
Army (includes Air Force):										
Direct transfers	\$329,900,252.11	\$86,461,382.32	\$126,419,340.76	\$12,356,153.71		\$23,331,376.70	\$1,522,313.18	\$3,521,147.60	\$78.25	\$36,288,459.59
Oversea transfers	403,933,368.00	56,600,438.36	60,861,960.09	19,110,792.08		19,871,732.38	8,388,808.00	5,499,505.33		233,600,130.26
Navy	29,162,470.15	78,326.31	42,690.09		\$27,737,895.98			503,705.70	204,315.38	388,102.43
Treasury	73,943,806.37	47,417.41		32,770,074.99		3,402,602.19	17,681.55	36,980,756.00		725,274.23
Maritime	8,242,348.39				7,823,368.14					418,980.25
All other	93,283.68									93,283.68
Total	845,335,528.70	153,187,564.40	187,323,999.94	94,237,021.68	35,561,264.12	46,813,136.53	9,928,803.33	46,505,114.63	204,393.63	271,574,230.44
Transfers period Sept. 2, 1945, to June 30, 1946:										
Army (includes Air Force):										
Direct transfers	11,300,515.83		5,810,136.11			1,040.82	20,343.70	177,011.72	1,882.93	5,290,100.55
Oversea transfers	638,031,284.99		32,616,712.03	67,456,851.08		93,102,219.37	15,855.04	22,866,212.14		330,254,827.50
Navy	41,346,909.53			39,526,481.04		1,481,655.94			455.95	87,974.28
Treasury	43,155,250.54	250,342.32		28,278,974.01		572.18		14,875,704.35		
Maritime	10,397,133.33				10,397,133.33					
All other	55,207.53									55,207.53
Total	764,306,301.75	111,988,950.15	38,426,848.14	95,735,825.09	49,923,614.37	94,585,488.31	36,198.74	37,918,928.21	2,338.88	335,688,109.86
Transfers subsequent to June 30, 1946:										
Army (includes Air Force):										
Direct transfers	6,449,713.56		5,256,756.49							1,192,957.07
Oversea transfers	11,001,568.82			273,784.96		4,801,852.68				83,038.96
Navy	479,330.00				17,028.20	375,305.46				49,761.74
Total	17,930,612.38		5,256,756.49	273,784.96	17,028.20	5,177,158.14				1,325,757.77
Transfers all periods:										
Army (includes Air Force):										
Direct transfers	347,650,481.50	96,461,382.32	137,486,233.36	42,356,153.71		23,332,417.52	1,542,656.88	3,698,159.32	1,961.18	42,771,517.21
Oversea transfers	1,073,046,221.81	1174,181,538.38	33,478,672.12	86,841,429.05		117,775,804.43	8,404,663.04	28,365,717.47		563,997,996.72
Total, Army	1,420,696,703.31	270,643,320.70	230,994,905.48	129,197,582.76		141,108,221.95	9,947,320.52	32,063,876.79	1,961.18	606,769,513.93
Navy	70,988,709.68	365,903.23		67,281,405.22				503,705.70		525,838.45
Treasury	117,099,056.91	47,417.41		61,049,049.00			17,681.55	51,856,400.35		725,274.23
All other	18,639,481.72				18,220,501.47					418,980.25
Total	1,627,572,442.83	271,055,641.34	231,007,604.57	190,246,631.76	85,501,906.69	146,575,782.98	9,965,002.07	84,424,042.84	206,732.51	608,588,098.07

Includes net "Commanding general" shipments.

**STATEMENT 2.—Materials and services provided under Sino-American
Cooperative Organization Agreement**

Ordnance supplies and equipment.....	\$14, 284, 068
Radio equipment and supplies.....	1, 320, 664
Fiscal codes, aerology.....	957, 782
Equipage, shore bases.....	585, 045
Training of Chinese students.....	200, 000
Medical equipment.....	159, 494
Public-works construction and maintenance.....	79, 304
Furniture and fixtures.....	63, 449
Communications.....	14, 747
Clothing.....	2, 310
Aviation supplies and materials.....	67
Total.....	17, 666, 930

**STATEMENT 3.—Transfer of United States naval vessels under Public Law 512
Seventy-ninth Cong..**

	Number of vessels trans- ferred at a procurement cost of \$141.4 million	Number of vessels trans- ferred at a procurement cost of \$27.3 million in- cluded in lend-lease transfers prior to Sept. 2, 1945	Number of vessels trans- ferred at a procurement cost of \$39.5 million in- cluded in lend-lease transfers after Sept. 2, 1945	Number of vessels trans- ferred at a procurement cost of \$74.6 million re- ported under Public Law 512
Total.....	131	9	87	35
River gunboat.....	1	1		
Destroyer escort.....	6	2		4
Patrol-craft escort.....	2	2		
Large mine sweepers.....	12	4		8
Landing ships, tank.....	10		10	
Landing ships, mechanized.....	8		8	
Landing craft, Infantry (large).....	8		8	
Destroyer escort tender.....	1		1	
Landing craft, tank.....	8		8	
Auxiliary ocean tug tanker.....	2		1	1
Auxiliary floating drydock.....	2	1	1	1
Landing craft, mechanized.....	25		25	
Landing craft, vehicle and personnel.....	25		25	
Motor mine sweeper.....	1			1
Submarine chaser.....	13			13
Motor gunboat.....	6			6
Repair ship, landing craft.....	1			1

STATEMENT 4.—*Transfers under the China-aid program, authorized by sec. 404 (b), China Aid Act of 1948, through Dec. 31, 1951*

[In thousands of dollars]

	Army		Navy	General Services Admin- istration	Department of State Office of Foreign Liquida- tion Commis- sioner	Govern- ment of China	Total
	Ground program	Air pro- gram					
Medical supplies and equipment.	\$5,582.0	\$6.0	\$2.1	-----	-----	-----	\$5,590.1
Fuel, lubricants, and petroleum products.	-----	-----	144.4	\$7,675.0	-----	-----	7,819.4
Communication and transporta- tion equipment (except mili- tary aircraft and watercraft).	3,384.0	345.0	-----	-----	-----	-----	3,729.0
Industrial equipment.	452.0	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	452.0
Other equipment (except agri- cultural and military aircraft and watercraft.	14.0	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	14.0
Clothing, textiles and footwear.	3.0	-----	15.0	-----	-----	-----	18.0
Miscellaneous manufacturing end products (except ordnance, ordnance stores, and aero- nautical material).	299.0	-----	-----	6,030.6	-----	-----	6,329.6
Ordnance and ordnance stores.	51,355.0	3,999.0	4,481.3	-----	\$19.1	-----	59,854.4
Military aircraft and aeronautical material.	63.0	3,726.0	-----	-----	1,892.6	-----	5,681.6
Military vessels and watercraft.	-----	-----	1,592.6	-----	-----	-----	1,592.6
Services.	180.0	266.0	-----	-----	-----	-----	446.0
Technical aid.	-----	-----	559.7	-----	-----	-----	559.7
Ocean transportation.	1,800.0	310.0	-----	-----	-----	-----	2,110.0
Cash (Riggs National Bank).	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	28,880.8	28,880.8
Total.	63,132.0	8,652.0	6,795.1	13,705.6	1,911.7	28,880.8	123,077.2

STATEMENT 4A.—*Selected items shipped to China under the China-aid program*

	Number delivered
United States rifles, caliber .30.	132,851
Browning automatic rifles, caliber .30.	8,793
Heavy machine guns, caliber .30.	1,707
Submachine guns, caliber .45.	12,975
Rocket launchers.	1,196
Grenade launchers.	5,758
.30-caliber ammunition.	units 231,221,082
.45-caliber ammunition.	do 26,577,498
Rocket ammunition.	do 66,380
Grenades.	280,560

STATEMENT 5.—*Ammunition transferred to Chinese Nationalists by the United States Marines in north China, April–September 1947*

Type	Number of units trans- ferred	1947 esti- mated unit cost	Total esti- mated cost
Rockets:			
High explosive, antitank 2.36 inch.....	3,646	\$6.88	\$25,084
High explosive, antitank 4.50 inch.....	300	64.00	19,200
20-millimeter.....	9,493	1.84	17,467
37-millimeter.....	4,993	2.77	13,831
60-millimeter mortar.....	47,678	2.97	141,604
80-millimeter mortar.....	20,916	9.00	188,244
75-millimeter gun.....	5,577	10.51	58,614
105-millimeter howitzer.....	64,538	18.59	1,199,761
155-millimeter howitzer.....	18,726	23.00	430,698
155-millimeter prop, charge.....	10,725	4.93	52,874
Grenades:			
Hand.....	55,529	1.20	66,635
Rifle.....	23,038	3.48	80,172
Demolition blocks.....	47,438	.38	18,026
TNT (pounds).....	29,787	.25	7,447
Charges, M-12 prop.....	2,420	1.00	2,420
Bangalore torpedoes.....	3,020	6.02	18,180
Mines, antipersonnel.....	1,014	8.00	8,112
Mines, antitank.....	2,636	14.00	36,904
Small arms:			
.30-caliber.....	2,195,370	¹ 110.00	241,450
.45-caliber.....	94,100	¹ 60.00	5,640
.50-caliber.....	225,515	¹ 285.00	64,410
Grenade adapters.....	8,592	.26	2,234
Flame throwers:			
Portable.....	35	313.00	10,955
Cylinders.....	302	27.00	8,154
Bombs, 500 pounds GP.....	62	198.00	12,276
Demolition charges.....	3,248	4.40	14,291
Artillery fuzes.....	16,975	6.80	115,430
Pyrotechnics.....	13,174	9.30	122,518
Blasting caps.....	32,913	.17	5,595
Blasting fuze, feet.....	100,500	.04	4,020
Firing device.....	2,575	.80	2,060
Detonators.....	460	.04	18
Shaped charges.....	288	43.00	12,384
Detonating cord, feet.....	366,200	.04	14,648
Firecrackers, M-11.....	1,200	.03	36
Ignition cylinder, M-1.....	3,000	1.00	3,000
Napalm, gallons.....	12,751	.78	9,946
Bomb fuzes, AN, M-230.....	48	9.50	456
Shells, shotgun, 12-gage.....	9,000	54.00	486
Lighter fuze.....	72,581	.04	2,903
Total.....			3,038,183

¹ Cost per thousand units.

STATEMENT 6.—*Ammunition transferred by the Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific, at Tsangkou airfield, Tsingtao, China, April–September 1947*

Type	Number of units transferred	1947 estimated unit cost	Total estimated cost
105-millimeter howitzer.....	24,665	\$18.56	\$457,782
81-millimeter mortar.....	30,903	9.60	278,127
60-millimeter mortar.....	28,042	2.97	83,285
75-millimeter howitzer.....	9,337	10.51	98,132
155-millimeter prop charge.....	7,414	4.93	36,551
Grenades:			
Hand, fragmentation.....	27,575	1.20	33,090
Hand, all others.....	13,640	1.65	22,506
Rifle, all types.....	9,650	3.48	33,582
Bangalore torpedoes.....	1,810	6.02	10,896
Small arms, caliber .30, carbine and rifle.....	1,488,490	¹ 110.00	163,680
Mines:			
Antitank.....	732	14.00	10,248
Antipersonnel.....	686	8.00	5,488
Shaped charges:			
46-pound.....	634	43.66	27,680
10-pound.....	200	14.66	2,932
Grenade adapters, all types.....	4,272	.26	1,111
Shell, 37-millimeter, all types and shot.....	1,035	2.77	2,867
Rocket, high explosive, antitank.....	321	64.00	20,544
Flares, trip, all types.....	911	8.70	7,288
Device:			
Firing, pressnre-type.....	980	.85	833
Firing, pull-type.....	1,410	.74	1,043
Firing, push-type.....	340	.85	289
Firing, release-type.....	1,040	.85	884
Lighter:			
Fuze, waterproof.....	102,000	.64	4,080
Fuze, friction-type.....	55,000	.06	3,300
Pyrotechnic signals, ground.....	1,010	9.30	9,393
Fuze, igniting, hand grenade.....	7,725	.42	3,244
Shells, shotgun No. 00B.....	720	¹ 54.00	38
Cord, detonating (Prima) 500-foot spools.....	280	.64	11
Total.....			1,318,904

¹ Cost per thousand units.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have here the correspondence between the Attorney General of the United States and Senator McCarran on the question of the transmission to the Justice Department of the transcript of Mr. Lyle Munson and Mr. John P. Davies. There has been a contradiction in the testimony of Mr. Davies and Mr. Munson, and it is one of the things sent down to the Department of Justice asking them to look into it and look into the possibility that perjury may have been committed. I would like the files on this issue to go into the record at this point.

Senator WATKINS. Those may be received.

(The correspondence referred to was marked "Exhibit 1396, A, B, C, D, E, F. G." and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1396

MEMORANDUM

FEBRUARY 19, 1952.

To: Mr. Sourwine

From: Mr. Green

Re testimony of John P. Davies, Jr., and Lyle H. Munson—items contained in testimony appearing to be contradictory.

Below you will find some samples of apparently contradictory statements in testimony of John P. Davies, Jr., and Lyle H. Munson. All of the excerpts come from the confidential testimony of John P. Davies, Jr., of August 10, 1951, and the confidential testimony of Lyle H. Munson of February 15, 1952, except the last item which comes from the confidential testimony of Mr. Davies on August 8, 1951, and the open testimony of Mr. Munson dated February 15, 1952. The last

item referred to is peculiar in that Mr. Davies tends to mislead the committee in believing the situation existed which, in fact, was contradicted as not existing by the witness Munson.

There are other statements throughout the records which are contradictory by inference as well as misleading in fact, and if it is desired that all of these statements be cataloged, I shall be very happy to do so. I do believe that in the main most of the material differences in testimony appear in this Memorandum.

Item No. 1

(P. 38, Davies testimony, August 10, 1951:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Dr. Schwartz be retained by another Government agency for policy guidance?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir—categorically.

(P. 4, Munson testimony, February 15, 1952:)

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that Mr. Davies recommended that the six people whose names I have mentioned work for the Central Intelligence Agency in a position where they would give guidance to a certain program of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. MUNSON. It was Mr. Davies' recommendation in our conference with him that we, as officials of CIA, should avail ourselves of the knowledge and guidance and counsel that these six persons could provide us and that they should be used for consultation and guidance and for the preparation of materials that would be useful to us in our activities or responsibilities.

Mr. MORRIS. It was your understanding that they were to give the guidance rather than to be guided?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. The persons you are talking about are those named in the memorandum, that is, John K. Fairbank, and wife, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, and Benjamin K. Schwartz; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

(P. 16, Munson testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did the recommendations Mr. Davies made with regard to these persons or any of them involve the use of those persons as a part of the CIA operation or any CIA operation?

Mr. MUNSON. Mr. Davies recommended that we at OPC should consult with and procure guidance and materials from Professor Fairbank, and his wife, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, and Benjamin K. Schwartz, and that these materials and guidance should be used by us and that they would represent a proper approach to effecting our responsibilities.

Senator FERGUSON. And proper guidance?

Mr. MUNSON. And proper guidance.

Item No. 2

(P. 73, Davies testimony.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state she [Smedley] was not a Communist, but only "very sophisticated," or "very politically sophisticated?"

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever suggest that another agency of Government set her up in an office?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

(P. 18, Munson testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies have any plans to have any contacts with these listed persons or they with the Government in any capacity?

Mr. MUNSON. It was Mr. Davies' suggestion that these persons be situated physically outside Washington in some other geographical location and that they should be contacted and made use of only through what he called cut-outs or a cut out. This would seem to imply that these persons would not have been knowledgeable that they were furnishing guidance, counsel, and materials to the Central Intelligence Agency but that they were actually furnishing it to some intermediary who himself would have been knowledgeable of where it was going, but that the six persons would not have been.

(P. 25, Munson testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Agnes Smedley one of those recommended by Mr. Davies to be set up in this workshop or office somewhere away by themselves?

Mr. MUNSON. She was.

Item No. 3

(P. 38, Davies testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to have a categorical answer, if we can get it, and let me recall to you in that connection that you have already testified on this record that Dr. Schwartz did not serve as a consultant to you at any time.

Mr. DAVIES. He did not, certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. That being the case, sir, does that help you to answer the question as to whether at any time you told any person, a representative of another Government agency, that he had been helpful to you as a consultant?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, I could not have said that, because he was not my consultant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever say it?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I never did.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir. That is all I was trying to get at.

(P. 31, Munson testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies, at the conference which is the subject of the questioning today, that is, which took place on November 16, 1949, discuss Dr. Schwartz's possible Communist or Communist-front affiliations other than as a part of the group?

Mr. MUNSON. No. Mr. Davies did urge that Dr. Schwartz should be used by us in certain fields of our responsibilities, again as a source of guidance and counsel.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was recommending that Dr. Schwartz be retained by you for policy guidance; is that right?

Mr. MUNSON. In broad and general terms, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies state that Schwartz had been helpful to him as a consultant?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are quite sure about that?

Mr. MUNSON. I am quite sure about that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it make any difference to you that Mr. Davies has denied ever making such a statement? Would that change your testimony in any way?

Mr. MUNSON. It would not change my testimony in any way.

Item No. 4

(P. 79, Davies testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Other than in connection with top-secret matters, did you ever state that materials prepared by her (Anna Louise Strong) would represent the proper approach?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

(P. 24, Munson testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you understand Mr. Davies' recommendations to be, his statement to be that the materials prepared by them would represent the proper approach?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes, I did so understand.

Item No. 5

(P. 89, Davies testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Mr. Fairbank be used for consultation and guidance by an agency of the United States?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

(P. 37, Munson testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. But he did recommend that Mr. Fairbank be used for consultation and guidance by CIA or OPC?

Mr. MUNSON. In the manner we have indicated, yes.

(P. 23, Munson testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies ever state that materials prepared by Edgar Snow would represent the proper approach?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes, he did. Let me interrupt to say that it is not my recollection that he singled out Edgar Snow individually, but that he did recommend that these persons collectively would be supplying information and guidance which would represent a proper approach.

Item No. 6

(P. 91, Davies testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Professor Fairbank be set up in an office by some agency of Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state that Professor Fairbank was a person ideally suited to provide consultation and guidance for another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

(P. 24, Munson testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Davies recommend that Snow be set up in an office by an agency of the Government?

Mr. MUNSON. No, that Snow, along with the other afore-mentioned persons should be provided quarters and space in which to function. This was not designated as an office. Again such limiting terms or refined terms were not used. It was simply suggested that these persons be situated physically in an office or suite of offices at some distant point from which they would function.

Item No. 7

(P. 11, Davies testimony August 8, 1951:)

Senator SMITH. You can say "Yes" or "No," "I did," or "I didn't."

Then, if you wish to enlarge or explain, if you say "I did," then I can see how you might wish to go further and say, "Here is the reason I did," or "Here is what they do."

We are not asking you that at the moment. We are asking you now for the yes or no answer.

Did you recommend them for anybody?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, hypothetically, let us put it this way: Supposing—and this completely hypothetical—I were to have recommended the employment of somebody as a double agent, and then I was charged with having recommended somebody who was known to have belonged in the other camp from us.

The fact that I recommended the employment of a person as a double agent would be perfectly legitimate, and would be in the national interest of this country.

But if I can only reply to questions on this, "Yes, I suggested the utilization, not the employment, but the employment of so and so as a double agent"——

(P. 4224, Munson open testimony, February 15, 1952:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me ask this question: Was there anything in his recommendation which could have been construed or which, in your opinion, was intended as a recommendation that these people, or any of them, be used as double agents?

Mr. MUNSON. At no time did I understand that Mr. Davies was suggesting the use of any one or all of these persons as double agents.

Senator FERGUSON. They were to be used, were they not, according to this memorandum, as a unit?

Mr. MUNSON. They were to be used as a workshop team, or unit: yes, sir.

EXHIBIT No. 1396A

SEPTEMBER 21, 1951.

HON. J. HOWARD McGRATH,

*Attorney General of the United States, Department of Justice,
Washington 25, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I am submitting to you herewith the official transcript of the testimony of John P. Davies before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in executive session, on August 10, 1951. It is requested that you examine this testimony and check it against information available to you, with a view to determining, and advising the committee, what if any action by the Department of Justice is indicated.

Please return the transcript when you have concluded your examination of it.

Kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,

_____, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT No. 1396B

SEPTEMBER 27, 1951.

HON. PAT McCARRAN,

*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR SENATOR: This will acknowledge your letter of September 21, 1951, forwarding the official transcript of the testimony of John P. Davies before the

Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in executive session on August 10, 1951.

In accordance with your request I am having an examination made of this testimony and will communicate with you again in the matter in the near future.

Your sincerely,

WILLIAM AMORY UNDERHILL,
Acting Deputy Attorney General.

EXHIBIT No. 1396C

OCTOBER 29, 1951.

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: Further reference is made to your letter of September 21, 1951, with which you transmitted the official transcript of the testimony of John P. Davies before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in executive session on August 10, 1951.

The testimony of Davies has now been examined in light of the information available to the Department. As a result it appears that there is insufficient evidence of perjury or any Federal violation on Davies' part to sustain prosecution.

In accordance with your request I am returning the official transcript of Davies' testimony to you.

Sincerely,

JAMES M. McINERNEY,
Assistant Attorney General.

EXHIBIT No. 1396D

FEBRUARY 21, 1952.

HON. J. HOWARD McGRATH,
*Attorney General of the United States,
Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: On or about September 21, 1951, and under that date, I transmitted to you the official transcript of the testimony of John P. Davies before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in executive session on August 10, 1951.

In that letter I requested that you examine this testimony and check it against information available to you with a view to determining and advising the committee what if any action by the Department of Justice was indicated.

Under date of October 29, 1951, Mr. James M. McInerney, Assistant Attorney General, advised me that:

"The testimony of Davies has now been examined in light of the information available to the Department. As a result it appears that there is insufficient evidence of perjury or any Federal violation on Davies' part to sustain prosecution."

Enclosed herewith are official transcripts of testimony before this committee by Mr. Lyle H. Munson, in executive session on February 15, 1952, and in public session later the same day. It is requested that this testimony also be examined by you, in connection with the information previously made available to you, with a view to determining, and advising the committee, what action, if any, by the Department of Justice, now appears indicated.

With the thought that it may possibly be of some slight assistance to you, I am enclosing also a memorandum prepared by a member of the staff of the Committee on the Judiciary, indicating some (but by no means all) of the conflicts between testimony of Mr. Davies, previously referred to, and that of Mr. Munson, transmitted herewith.

Kindest personal regards and all good wishes.

Sincerely,

—————, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT No. 1396F

FEBRUARY 27, 1952.

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: Your letter of February 21, 1952, to the Attorney General, enclosing official transcripts of Lyle H. Munson's testimony before your committee in executive session on February 15, 1952, and in a public session on the same date, together with a memorandum on some conflicts between Mr. Munson's testimony and the previous testimony of John P. Davies, has been referred to me. I will be pleased to review this matter again in the light of the testimony adduced from Mr. Munson.

I have noted that in the memorandum to Mr. Sourwine, your staff representative, Mr. Green states:

"There are other statements throughout the record which are contradictory by inference as well as misleading in fact, and if it is desired that all of these statements be cataloged, I shall be very happy to do so. I do believe that in the main most of the material differences in testimony appear in this memorandum."

It would be very helpful to the Department's review of this matter if Mr. Green prepared a catalog of the additional material conflicts of evidence which he has encountered.

Sincerely,

JAMES M. MCINERNEY,
Assistant Attorney General.

EXHIBIT No. 1396 E

FEBRUARY 28, 1952.

MR. JAMES M. MCINERNEY,
*Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice,
 Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. MCINERNEY: This will acknowledge your letter of February 27, in which you suggest that Mr. Green of the Judiciary Committee professional staff be asked to prepare a catalog of the additional material conflicts of evidence which he has encountered in comparing the testimony of Mr. Lyle H. Munson with the prior testimony of Mr. John P. Davies, before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

It is my hope that the Department of Justice will make its own careful examination of the matters called to the Department's attention by my letter of February 21, 1952; and I would not wish either to suggest or imply that the Department rely entirely upon a memorandum prepared by a member of the Judiciary Committee staff, or that the Judiciary Committee is attempting to establish proof of the commission of an actionable offense.

The question is: What is the opinion of the Department of Justice, on the basis of an examination of the testimony to which attention has been directed, in connection with all information otherwise available to the Department?

Thanks for your prompt acknowledgement of my letter of February 21, and kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT No. 1396G

MARCH 12, 1952.

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I have received your letter of February 28, 1952, concerning the testimony of Mr. Lyle H. Munson and the prior testimony of Mr. John P. Davies, Jr., given before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee.

As you will recall, I stated in my letter of February 27, 1952, that I would review the matter again in the light of Mr. Munson's testimony based on the information presently available to the Department. A preliminary review has now been completed, in consequence of which it has been deemed appropriate to conduct further investigation predicated upon certain statements contained in Mr. Munson's testimony.

When this investigation has been completed you may rest assured that I shall advise you concerning any further action which the Department feels is warranted.

Sincerely,

JAMES M. McINERNEY,
Assistant Attorney General.

Mr. MORRIS. May I also put into the record at this time two transcripts taken before this committee in executive session, of John P. Davies, both of those have been transmitted to the Department of Justice, but I would like those introduced at this time as an exhibit, and may that bear the next consecutive exhibit number?

Senator WATKINS. You want it actually printed in the record at this point? It has been printed once.

Mr. MORRIS. No; it has not, Mr. Chairman. This is executive session testimony.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like it introduced as an exhibit rather than made part of the public testimony, because we have no public testimony here today other than this session. This is the executive sessions of August 8 and 10, 1951.

Senator WATKINS. They may be received as an exhibit and will be marked the next consecutive number.

(The transcripts referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 1397, 1397A," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1397

[EXECUTIVE SESSION—CONFIDENTIAL]

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, August 8, 1951.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Arthur V. Watkins, presiding.

Present: Senators Watkins and Smith.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

Senator WATKINS. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Davies, do you solemnly swear that the testimony given in the matter now pending before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. DAVIES. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN PATON DAVIES, JR., POLICY PLANNING STAFF, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. MORRIS. Would you give your name and address to the reporter?

Mr. DAVIES. John Paton Davies, Jr., care of Department of State.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present position, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. My present position is a member of the policy planning staff, State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you specialize in any one division of that planning staff?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not specialize in Far Eastern affairs?

Mr. DAVIES. No; because the planning staff operates as a unit and we deal with all areas.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Davies, have you recommended for employment with CIA John K. Fairbank?

MR. DAVIES. This is a question, if it is what you are leading to, which is of a top secret classification, and it is one which very few people in the Government are clear to know about.

It touches on an operation which is only slightly less sensitive than that of atomic energy.

I, therefore, am not at liberty to talk about this subject without clearance from my superiors.

MR. MORRIS. We will make the record clear on it, Mr. Davies.

Concerning John K. Fairbank, and you have answered as far as that is concerned, you are not at liberty to discuss it?

MR. DAVIES. The discussions regarding any recommendations I have made regarding the employment of persons in CIA.

MR. MORRIS. Yes. I was going to ask you about John K. Fairbank, Wilma Fairbank, Anna Louise Strong, Agnes Smedley, Benjamin Schwartz, and Edgar Snow.

It is your statement, Mr. Davies, that we will have to take this up with higher authorities in the State Department.

Now, could you recommend who, particularly, we can take this up with?

MR. DAVIES. I would make a formal request to the Department.

MR. MORRIS. You cannot recommend any one particular person?

MR. DAVIES. I can't, because this goes into the type of the operation.

MR. MORRIS. All right.

MR. DAVIES. I am sorry.

MR. MORRIS. That is all right, Mr. Davies. We wanted to find out, and we figured you would be the best one to find out from.

Senator WATKINS. Does your same objection pertain to answering any questions about any of these persons named, the same as with respect to the individual John Fairbank?

MR. DAVIES. No, sir; no objection to my answering any questions regarding them as persons.

Senator WATKINS. I understand he can answer with respect to the rest of them, except Fairbank.

MR. DAVIES. No, all of them. I can answer questions regarding them in general, but I can't answer any questions regarding any alleged charges that I recommended the employment of any one.

MR. MORRIS. It is not a charge, Mr. Davies. I have seen a sworn statement to that effect. It is our job here to look into things like that, and we decided the first person to ask would be you.

MR. DAVIES. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. You do know these people; do you not?

MR. DAVIES. Yes, I know all of those that you mentioned.

MR. MORRIS. I mean, the fact that you know them——

MR. DAVIES. That, of course, is no question.

MR. MORRIS. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. I fail to see that the fact of whether you did or did not recommend them is such a question that you could not answer it.

MR. DAVIES. I can't answer without going into the nature of the operation.

Senator WATKINS. Certainly, all he is asking you is whether you recommended them.

MR. DAVIES. This statement I can make: I did not recommend the employment of these people to be placed on the CIA rolls as a regular part of the American Government, to be taken into the operation as such.

MR. MORRIS. You did not recommend them?

MR. DAVIES. I did not recommend them.

MR. MORRIS. Well, will you make that clearer? You are making a qualification, are you not?

MR. DAVIES. To go into it any further would be to intrude into the nature of the operation, which is a highly secret operation.

Senator SMITH. Have they been recommended by anybody?

MR. DAVIES. That I can't answer, because I do not know.

Senator SMITH. Do you know these people yourself?

MR. DAVIES. I know these people, sir.

Senator SMITH. Do you know whether they are about to be employed in the State Department?

MR. MORRIS. It is in the CIA.

Senator SMITH. That is not under the State Department?

Mr. MORRIS. No. Mr. Davies is in the Planning Division of the State Department, and the statement is that he recommended the employment of these six people for a certain classified project with CIA.

Senator SMITH. That is the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Now, without asking anything about the nature of the project, we would like to know if the statement, and there are two statements that I have seen, are true, that you have recommended them as personnel for this project.

Mr. DAVIES. I have not recommended them for employment by the CIA as a part of the CIA operation.

Senator WATKINS. Have you recommended them for the CIA for any type of operation?

Mr. DAVIES. To go into an explanation, sir—

Senator WATKINS. I do not ask you to explain.

You understand what I mean. I am referring to any other operation of any kind.

Mr. DAVIES. Not for employment by the CIA in any operation. You see, we are in the very complicated business of a highly classified type of operation.

Senator SMITH. I know that, but it is just as important to us as it is to you, and it is just as important to the American people as it is to your Department, the way I see it.

Now, are these people recommended for any position of that kind? I do not know whether you use just technical words, or not.

Mr. DAVIES. I am trying to be helpful, you see, and give you as much as I can without transgressing security.

Senator SMITH. Now, are those people in the employment now of any department of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. Not so far as I know.

Senator SMITH. Do you know each of these parties whose names have been mentioned?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. You know all of them?

Mr. DAVIES. I know all of them.

Senator SMITH. Have you had contacts with them?

Mr. DAVIES. I have had intermittent contacts with them; yes.

Senator SMITH. Are you having any contacts with them now of any kind of a governmental nature?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Do you have any plans to have any contacts with them, or they with the Government, in any capacity?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I have seen two official reports which relate the story that I have expressed.

Now, tell me this: Do you consider those people Communists, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, they are people of a variety of points of view.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you consider John K. Fairbank a Communist?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you consider Wilma Fairbank a Communist?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Edgar Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. Agnes Smedley?

Mr. DAVIES. She is dead.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, did you consider her a Communist when you made the recommendations?

Mr. DAVIES. I made no recommendation of this type.

Agnes Smedley I have always regarded as at least a fellow traveler and probably part of the agitation apparatus.

Mr. MORRIS. And did you consider her such in 1949?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And did you make that clear at the time?

Mr. DAVIES. Make what clear?

Mr. MORRIS. That you considered her as you just described her?

Mr. DAVIES. There has never been any question in my discussions with Agnes Smedley as to what I regarded her as, which is, as I say, probably a part of the apparatus, but probably of the agitation side of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, Mr. Davies, is it your testimony that, in 1949, you did not make the statement that these people were not Communists?

Mr. DAVIES. And I did not make the statement they were not Communist?

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you did not make the statement that they were not Communists?

Mr. DAVIES. I never said that Mrs. Smedley was a Communist, or never denied, or never stated, that I did not regard Miss Smedley as not a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember considering these people as a unit of six?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean, six people.

Mr. DAVIES. Six people?

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember commenting and characterizing these six people, politically characterizing the six of them, and saying, "Whereas some people think they are Communists, they actually are not"? Do you remember making that statement?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Senator WATKINS. Or anything like it?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to ask you, you said you never recommended for employment of this type. Now, what did you mean by that?

Senator SMITH. I noticed that, too.

Senator WATKINS. What is the qualification for? That indicates that you may have recommended for something, but not of this type?

Mr. DAVIES. I did not recommend them for employment.

Senator WATKINS. Of any kind?

Mr. DAVIES. Any kind.

Senator WATKINS. At any time or place?

Mr. DAVIES. At any time or place.

Senator WATKINS. Or to anybody?

Mr. DAVIES. Or to anybody.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you recommend for any purpose?

Mr. DAVIES. We go then into the nature of this operation.

Senator WATKINS. You could say whether you recommended them or did not recommend them. That is all we want to ask about.

Mr. DAVIES. I think that pursuit on this, which can be clarified for you completely, should be conducted to my superiors, because I am not at liberty to go into any discussion which would help you out in any further examination of this type of operation.

Senator SMITH. What we have asked here was just a simple question, whether or not you recommended these people for positions, and you said "of this type."

That excited my curiosity, as it did Senator Watkins'; what did you mean by limiting yourself to "this type"?

Apparently you did recommend them for some type of work. We are not asking you at the moment what kind of work that was. We are asking you whether or not that was a fact that you did recommend them for some type of work.

That is not giving away any secrets, except the secret that you may have recommended them.

Mr. DAVIES. That, from my superiors, would be no secret, because they can discuss that.

Senator SMITH. I know, but we are trying to find out about these things. That is what we are constituted for. We are not going to get this from your superiors, if they already know it, but we just asked you a very simple question:

Now, did you recommend them?

Mr. DAVIES. But to answer intelligently, so that you would understand the answer completely, would be to have to go into the nature of this.

Senator SMITH. You can say yes or no, "I did," or "I didn't."

Then, if you wish to enlarge or explain, if you say "I did," then I can see how you might wish to go further and say, "Here is the reason I did," or "Here is what they do."

We are not asking you that at the moment. We are asking you now for the yes or no answer.

Did you recommend them for anybody?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, hypothetically, let us put it this way: Supposing—and this is completely hypothetical—I were to have recommended the employment of

somebody as a double agent, and then I was charged with having recommended somebody who was known to have belonged in the other camp from us.

The fact that I recommended the employment of a person as a double agent would be perfectly legitimate, and would be in the national interest of this country.

But if I can only reply to questions on this, "yes, I suggested the utilization, not the employment, but the employment of so and so as a double agent"—

Senator SMITH. Well, there is no suggestion here that we are going to require you to stop at answering "yes" or "no." We have asked you a simple question. The answer is either "Yes" or "No." You did or you did not. That is simple.

If you did, there is no reason, so far as I know, from our standpoint, why we would not give you full opportunity as to why you did, because it might completely exonerate you even if there had been anything wrong in the first instance.

Mr. DAVIES. Well, I can't answer it.

Senator WATKINS. You can answer the first question; but, if you cannot answer the next one—if there should be a next one—that would be one of the matters that we can consider as to whether we ought to require you to answer it or not.

If it should be highly classified, and somebody else ought to answer it, all right. We can bring somebody else in. But I think you ought to answer the question whether you did or did not recommend those people.

Mr. DAVIES. It can't be answered without leading right into this other question.

Senator WATKINS. I know; but, if it goes that far, that is one of those things. I do not think it is revealing any secrets or not, whether you did or did not. Not only that, but this is an executive session, sir.

Mr. DAVIES. I realize that. But this is more than top secret. I mean, it is highly classified, this whole business.

Senator WATKINS. Personally, I do not want to press you to revealing any top-classified secrets that you are under obligation not to reveal.

Mr. DAVIES. I am under strict obligations not to.

Senator WATKINS. But I cannot understand how on earth the question that has been propounded to you, about the recommendation of these people, could possibly be that kind of secret.

Senator SMITH. Apparently what Mr. Davies is worried about is if he says "Yes," which is a manifested answer to my mind—if you say "Yes" to that—then you feel that that standing alone might be prejudicial to you without an explanation, and you do not feel that you can give an explanation.

Mr. DAVIES. I can't give the explanation.

Senator SMITH. The point about this, to my mind, there is no reason why; but, if he answers "Yes" and then wishes to consult his superiors and get either permission or the reason why he cannot answer the rest of the questions, that would be perfectly all right. I do not wish to press him.

Mr. DAVIES. It leaves the story half told, and me completely on the spot.

Mr. MORRIS. I was just asking your individual opinion of these people. You considered John Fairbank not to be a Communist?

Mr. DAVIES. So far as I know.

Mr. MORRIS. Wilma Fairbank?

Mr. DAVIES. Not so far as I know.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Benjamin Schwartz?

Mr. DAVIES. So far as I know, not a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. And Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. DAVIES. At least a fellow traveler, and maybe a part of the apparatus.

Mr. MORRIS. Edgar Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't know well enough to really have a definite opinion.

Mr. MORRIS. And, finally, Agnes Smedley?

Mr. DAVIES. I answered that as certainly a part of the apparatus.

Senator SMITH. She is dead.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

You see, there are people of very different types; at least, they seem to me so.

Senator WATKINS. How about Mrs. Agnes Smedley? When did you first come to the conclusion that she was a member of the apparatus, or at least connected with it?

Mr. DAVIES. From the very beginning of the time I knew her.

Senator WATKINS. How long ago was that?

Mr. DAVIES. In 1938, when she was working with, and intimately identified with, the Chinese Communist delegation in Hangkow, which at that time was part of the United Front government in Hangkow.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Davies, the statements that I alluded to as having been read contained a report that, when the objection was raised, some of these people were Communists. You made the assertion that they certainly were not; they were just people who were extremely politically sophisticated.

Mr. DAVIES. That is untrue.

Mr. MORRIS. You never interposed an objection to a statement that any one of these people was a Communist?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Interposing an objection on your part would have been a defense of them.

Mr. DAVIES. The statement that you gave me is, of course, as given to you, a fabrication.

Mr. MORRIS. I am not holding the statement. I am telling you what it was.

Mr. DAVIES. But, had they asked me did I think that Fairbank was a Communist, I would have given them the answer that I gave you. If they asked me about any of the others, I would have given the answers I gave you, because that was my feeling.

Senator SMITH. You would have given the answer at that time and you still would have given the answer, to your own knowledge?

Mr. DAVIES. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is all, Senator.

I told Mr. Davies that we were just going to ask him about one thing. It was just that one thing that had come under our scrutiny, and we wanted to ask him about it.

Senator SMITH. You are talking about here, if you answered the question and then explained why, gave the reasons why you answered that way, that you would be disclosing top-secret information as to present conditions?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Senator SMITH. As to current conditions?

Mr. DAVIES. As an operation as a whole.

Senator SMITH. You mean an operation that started in 1949?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, I shouldn't say when it started, either.

Senator SMITH. Back at the time that this question was raised, and continuing on up to now?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions.

Senator SMITH. I think, Mr. Morris, that certainly none of us want to ask Mr. Davies to do something that he should not do. I think we might have the record made and have the chairman and members look it over and see if they want to pursue the matter further.

Senator WATKINS. I feel the same way about it, but I still feel that he could have answered "Yes" or "No."

Senator SMITH. He would have answered "Yes" to my satisfaction, because if he answered "No" that would have been a complete answer to the whole thing.

Mr. MORRIS. And you made a distinction between utilization and employment.

Mr. DAVIES. Exactly, a very important distinction.

Mr. MORRIS. All right.

Senator WATKINS. He said "employment of this type."

When you said you had not, as I understood it, recommended for employment of this type, you did not mean to say that you did not recommend them to be employed?

Mr. DAVIES. I will say that I made no recommendation that they be employed and put on the CIA rolls and become part of the CIA operation.

Senator SMITH. He is apparently drawing a distinction between "employment" in the general acceptance of the word and using somebody in a particular endeavor, maybe for compensation and maybe not. I think that is what he has in mind.

You have not said that, but that is what I believe you have in mind.

Senator WATKINS. That is a play on words, but it indicated something to me that there has been, apparently, a recommendation of employment at some time.

Senator SMITH. I think it indicates mysteriousness, myself.

Mr. DAVIES. It is a mysterious operation.

I am sorry I could not be of more help in this thing, but you understand.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you for coming down, Mr. Davies.

(Thereupon, at 10:25 a. m., the hearing was recessed to reconvene subject to call of the Chair.)

EXHIBIT No. 1397A

[EXECUTIVE SESSION—CONFIDENTIAL]

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C., Friday, August 10, 1951.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:30 a. m., Hon. Willis Smith presiding.

Present: Senator Smith.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; and Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

Senator SMITH. Come to order, please.

I understand that this morning we have present to testify Mr. John P. Davies.

Mr. Davies, will you stand and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you shall give in this proceeding before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. DAVIES. I do, sir.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN P. DAVIES, POLICY PLANNING DIVISION, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. SOURWINE. In order that this record may be full and complete, I respectfully suggest that we insert at this point a copy of Senate Resolution 336, Eighty-first Congress, second session, which is the basic authority for the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

Senator SMITH. Very well, that will be inserted.

(S. Res. 366 follows:)

[S. Res. 366, 81st Cong., 2d sess.]

RESOLUTION

Whereas the Congress from time to time has enacted laws designed to protect the internal security of the United States from acts of espionage and sabotage and from infiltration by persons who seek to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence; and

Whereas those who seek to evade such laws or to violate them with impunity constantly seek to devise and do devise clever and evasive means and tactics for such purposes; and

Whereas agents and dupes of the world Communist conspiracy have been and are engaged in activities (including the origination and dissemination of propaganda) designed and intended to bring such protective laws into disrepute or disfavor and to hamper or prevent effective administration and enforcement thereof; and

Whereas it is vital to the internal security of the United States that the Congress maintain a continuous surveillance over the problems presented by such activity and threatened activity and over the administration and enforcement of such laws: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized and directed to make a complete and continuing study and investigation of (1) the administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950; (2) the administration, operation, and enforcement of other laws relating to espionage, sabotage, and the protection of the internal security of the United States; and (3) the extent, nature, and effects of subversive activities in the United States, its Territories and possessions, including, but not limited to, espionage, sabotage, and infiltration by persons who are or may be under the domination of the foreign government or organizations controlling the world Communist movement or any other movement seeking to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence.

SEC. 2. The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate, to hold such hearings, to require by subpoenas or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and, within the amount appropriated therefor, to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report hearings of the committee or subcommittee shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words. Subpoenas shall be issued by the chairman of the committee or the subcommittee, and may be served by any person designated by such chairman.

A majority of the members of the committee, or duly authorized subcommittee thereof, shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, except that a lesser number to be fixed by the committee, or by such subcommittee, shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of administering oaths and taking sworn testimony.

SEC. 3. The committee, or duly authorized subcommittee, shall have power to employ and fix the compensation of such officers, experts, and employees as it deems necessary in the performance of its duties, and is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the various departments and agencies of the Government to the extent that such services, information, facilities, and personnel, in the opinion of the heads of such departments and agencies, can be furnished without undue interference with the performance of the work and duties of such departments and agencies.

SEC. 4. The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed \$10,000, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee on or before January 31, 1951.

MR. SOURWINE. I believe it would also be well to insert Senate Resolution 7, Eighty-second Congress, first session, which is the resolution continuing the authority of the subcommittee.

Senator SMITH. Very well; it is so ordered.

(S. Res. 7 is as follows:)

[S. Res. 7, 82d Cong., 1st sess.]

RESOLUTION

Resolved, That the limitation of expenditures under S. Res. 366, Eighty-first Congress, relating to the internal security of the United States, agreed to December 21, 1950, is hereby increased by \$75,000, and such sum together with any unexpended balance of the sum previously authorized to be expended under such resolution shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee and covering obligations incurred under such resolution on or before January 31, 1952.

MR. SOURWINE. I should like also to insert at this point the minutes of the Internal Security Subcommittee for Thursday, January 18, 1951, being that portion of the minutes which show the subcommittee approval of a resolution with regard to the quorum of the subcommittee.

Senator SMITH. Very well, it is so ordered.

(The minutes referred to follow:)

"The chairman laid before the subcommittee the following resolution:

"Resolved by the special subcommittee appointed to investigate the administration of the Internal Security Act and other internal security laws under Senate Resolution 366 (81st Cong.) of the Committee on the Judiciary, That pursuant to subsection (3) of rule XXV, as amended, of the Standing Rules of the Senate (S. Res. 180, 81st Cong., 2d sess., agreed to February 1, 1950) a quorum of the subcommittee for the purpose of taking sworn testimony shall consist of one Senator of said subcommittee.

"On motion of Senator Ferguson, there being no objection, the above resolution was adopted."

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Davies, you have testified before this committee in executive session on August 8, have you not?

MR. DAVIES. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. At that time, Mr. Davies, certain questions were asked you which you felt you could not answer, before, because they referred to a matter which, in your opinion, was of a higher classification than top secret; is that correct?

Mr. DAVIES. It is at least top secret. It is one of the higher categories of top secret.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you explain for the record, Mr. Davies, what the classifications are which are higher than top secret?

Mr. DAVIES. There are some categories, I believe, which I think it would be a violation of security to name, which affect certain operations.

Mr. SOURWINE. You understand that this is an executive session of a committee of the Senate?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And is it your understanding that it is a violation of security to discuss with this committee in executive session and in response to inquiries classified material?

Mr. DAVIES. Certainly, of top-secret classification.

Mr. SOURWINE. You feel, then, that it would be a violation of security to state to this committee on this record what classifications may exist higher than top secret?

Mr. DAVIES. I think that information is available to the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do too, Mr. Davies.

Mr. DAVIES. And I do not know whether those classifications are, themselves, classified material, and therefore—

Mr. SOURWINE. Not knowing that they are classified material, sir, on what basis did you previously refuse to discuss it with the committee?

Mr. DAVIES. The matter simply of identification of classifications?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. Because I can only identify them by relating them to the operation which they cover.

Mr. SOURWINE. I respectfully submit, sir, that you may not mean that answer to stand just the way you gave it.

Would you read that answer back, Mr. Reporter?

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to say, Mr. Davies, that the only way you can identify the various levels of classified material is by relating to the material itself?

Mr. DAVIES. I misunderstood you.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sure you have.

Mr. DAVIES. I was talking only about the top level of top secret.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am at the present time dealing only with the question of the method and degree of classification. I am seeking to establish for the record your familiarity with classified material, the way in which it is classified, and the relative importance of it. I think that question has become germane because of the problem that has arisen.

Mr. DAVIES. I am sorry; I misunderstood.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sure you did.

To rephrase the question: Would you tell the committee what the degrees of classification of classified material are?

Mr. DAVIES. Restricted is the lowest, confidential, secret, and top secret.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. And what comes above top secret?

Mr. DAVIES. There are classifications within top secret of certain material which has its own identification in the top-secret category.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the existence of such classifications within the top-secret classification itself a top secret?

Mr. DAVIES. I think so, because the identification of it uses a code name which is associated only with that particular operation.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever hear of the classification of "Top secret ultra"?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; that is one.

Mr. MORRIS. That does not involve a code name, does it?

Mr. DAVIES. No; that doesn't involve a code name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of the classification: "Top secret, eyes only"?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that involve a code name?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is one of the subclassifications of top secret, isn't it?

Mr. DAVIES. Eyes only, as I understand it, is not a security classification, but a distribution classification.

Senator SMITH. A what?

Mr. DAVIES. A distribution, as to whom it goes to.

Mr. SOURWINE. Top secret ultra is a security classification?

Mr. DAVIES. I should say so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, what authority do you have to classify material in the State Department, sir?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't have any authority in myself to classify material; I am not in a top-secret office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any authority to classify any material at any of the levels of classification?

Mr. DAVIES. I believe that I have authority to classify up to top secret.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you exercised that authority on occasions in the past?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever attempted to exercise the authority to classify some material or matter as top secret?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; but subject, of course, to the approval of that classification, which is the procedure.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean you have only made recommendations for that classification?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes. I mark it top secret and it carries on.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that material which you had originated?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, some of it—entirely what I had originated, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever classify anyone else's material as top secret?

Mr. DAVIES. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or any higher classification than top secret?

Mr. DAVIES. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any authority with regard to classification of material outside the State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not attempt to classify or pass on the classification of material at the Department of Justice or the CIA or Military Intelligence?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, is it true, then, that material which is not originated by you, in order to be top secret, in your understanding, must have come to you from one of your superiors in the Department with the top-secret classification?

Mr. DAVIES. That is, written material; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir.

Now, for the moment I would like to take a slightly different line of inquiry, and I would like to ask you some questions with regard to your knowledge of an acquaintanceship with certain persons.

Some of this will be repetitive of testimony which you gave day before yesterday.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Speaking now of Mr. Benjamin K. Schwartz, do you know Mr. Schwartz?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long have you known him?

Mr. DAVIES. Since 1948 or 1949.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall how you met him?

Mr. DAVIES. I am sorry; I don't recall the precise circumstances under which I met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you seen him on subsequent occasions?

Mr. DAVIES. I have seen him, roughly, I should say, three or four times.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any of those occasions?

Mr. DAVIES. I recall two of the occasions. I cannot give you the date beyond saying that the most recent one, I believe, was either late last year or early this year, and the previous one, I think, was some time in 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us something about the nature of those occasions?

Mr. DAVIES. A most recent occasion was when I had lunch with him and an American businessman by the name of Hartmann, I believe it is, who is a representative of Cornell Bros., in San Francisco.

Others present were Mr. C. B. Marshall, of the policy planning staff, and Mr. Kenneth Krentz, policy planning staff.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us what the purpose of the meeting was, sir? Was it social?

Mr. DAVIES. It was a casual get-together. He happened to be in town. He joined a luncheon that we had arranged with Hartmann.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Hartmann bring him in to the luncheon?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I invited him in to the luncheon.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you invite him?

Mr. DAVIES. Pardon?

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you invite him? By telephone?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't recall whether I invited him by telephone or whether—we had made a previous arrangement for lunch.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had made a previous arrangement?

Mr. DAVIES. I mean, as a matter of an hour or so. I had seen him in the halls, or some such thing, and had then said, "Come to lunch with us, because we are having lunch."

Mr. SOURWINE. Does he work within the Department?

Mr. DAVIES. Not that I know of. He was down from Harvard, where he was a research fellow, or maybe now on the faculty.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does he come to Washington frequently?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not believe that he does.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you see him when he does come to Washington?

Mr. DAVIES. He may have come on occasions that I have not seen him.

As I say—

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you usually know when he comes to Washington? Does he look you up, or call you?

Mr. DAVIES. No—well, I don't know. As I say, all I know is that on two occasions, either 1950 or 1951 I saw him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did I understand you to say on the occasion of this luncheon which was in 1951 with Mr. Hartman and the others, you were not sure whether you had invited him by telephone or whether you had met him in the hall?

Mr. DAVIES. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, if you had wanted to invite him by telephone, where would you have called?

Mr. DAVIES. He may have called me. I would not have known where to have called him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't recall whether he called you or not?

Mr. DAVIES. Or whether I met him in the hall and said "Come to lunch."

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall what was discussed at the luncheon?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; in general terms.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you tell the committee?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; with pleasure.

I asked Schwartz what he had dug up in his studies of the Chinese Communists.

I might say parenthetically here that Schwartz is one of the most—has made one of the most extensive studies of Chinese Communists' documents, history, and so forth, from original sources—which is very unusual—because he works in Chinese, Japanese, and the Russian languages, which is quite—

Mr. MORRIS. Is that at Harvard University?

Mr. DAVIES. It is Harvard. He is one of the really serious students of the subject. That is the end of my parenthetical comment, and now back to the subject.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. I was very interested in the strategy and the tactics which were being used by the Chinese Communists in Korea at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was in what month?

Mr. DAVIES. This must have been at the time of the Chinese offensive, after the big Chinese offensive in North Korea.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you recall the month, with that refreshment?

Mr. DAVIES. Let's see. That must have been in the winter or early spring that this luncheon took place.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is some time between January and the end of April of this year?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You cannot place it any closer than that?

Mr. DAVIES. I couldn't place it, because it was some time after the offensive, and I have been wondering about the strategy that was used, particularly the question of the human sea tactics which the Chinese Communists have talked a great deal about.

I queried Schwartz as to what he had discovered in his readings and research on the subject and he said there was, of course, a great deal of material on it. This was of considerable interest to us, because I had not had much success with our research people in getting translated material on the strategic thinking of the Chinese Communists.

It is strongly influenced by Clausewitz and is also influenced by Lenin, who, as you know, is influenced by Clausewitz in his military thinking, and therefore, Schwartz was a very interesting check point.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you find that the other members of the State Department staff who were with you at the luncheon were also interested in what he had to say?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, certainly, and so was Hartmann, of course, who is an American businessman, who knows the Far East very well. He is a very experienced man. He thought it was very interesting.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Schwartz interested with John K. Fairbank at Harvard?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't know whether he is formally connected with him or not. I don't know whether he is now. He was connected with Fairbank when doing his Chinese study.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you mean in Hawaii?

Mr. DAVIES. No, at Harvard, when he was doing his graduate work, and taking his doctorates.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't know whether Schwartz worked with Fairbank during the war?

Mr. DAVIES. He was in Military Intelligence during the war.

Mr. SOURWINE. Schwartz was?

Mr. DAVIES. Schwartz was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall, now that you have been thinking about the subject of Mr. Schwartz for some few minutes, perchance who it was that introduced you, or how you happened to meet him?

Mr. DAVIES. It was probably Fairbank, because Fairbank considered him one of the bright boys on the subject—

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he bring him in to see you, perhaps?

Mr. DAVIES. Who had these extraordinary qualifications.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he perhaps bring him in to see you?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't know whether he sent him down with a note or told him to call me when he came to Washington, or whether I may have seen him on a trip that I made up to Harvard in, let's see, I think that was 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you will pardon us; I want to be sure the record is straight. I realize we are going backward and forward over your recollection.

I understood that you had testified earlier that you had only known Schwartz since 1949. Are you saying now that there is a possibility that you might have met him in 1947? It is possible I misunderstood you, of course.

Mr. DAVIES. Now that I think back to my trip to Harvard, I may have known him since 1947. I would like to make that correction.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. It is possible.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Schwartz doing at Harvard at that time?

Mr. DAVIES. He was working, must have been working on his doctorate, or maybe his M. A., I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Fairbank present at that time?

Mr. DAVIES. At the time he was at Harvard, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. So they were together in 1947?

Mr. DAVIES. If I met Schwartz then, Fairbank was at Harvard in 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think the witness has testified, Mr. Morris, that he either was introduced to Schwartz by Fairbank at Harvard in 1947 or that Fairbank sent Schwartz to him in Washington, either with a note or telling him to call him.

It is in one of those two alternatives, is that right, sir?

Mr. DAVIES. I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have already partially answered this question, sir, but will you expand as much as necessary to complete the answer to the question, to wit: What do you know of Mr. Schwartz?

Mr. DAVIES. I know him through some of his writings, which I have seen in the mimeographic form, sent down by the Cluckhorn Russian Institute, at Harvard. They mimeographed some of his papers. I know him from his writings, which are considered very scholarly—rather dry—but a thorough study of the early period of the Chinese Communists, which is the period he is interested in.

As a person, he struck me as a shy, rather professorial, very dispassionate individual. That is about all.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have referred to one of the instances on which you met him, that is in 1951.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you could recall at least one other of the three or four. Would you tell us about that other one?

Mr. DAVIES. It was an instance in, I should say it was 1950 or 1949. This was at a period when he was trying to make up his mind whether to go on with teaching or to go into some Government job, research, or something like that; and we discussed the pros and cons of it in informal terms. It was, I believe, a visit to my office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say he had come to you for advice?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; he had come to consult me as to what he should do.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew him fairly well then, at that time?

Mr. DAVIES. Not particularly well, but I was one of the few people in Government that he knew, you see?

Mr. SOURWINE. I see.

Mr. DAVIES. And I must say that I could have recommended Government service to him very highly.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew him well enough to know what his circle of acquaintanceship was in Government at that time?

Mr. DAVIES. I knew some of the people that he knew, amongst the research people.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you apparently knew him well enough to know he didn't know very many people in Government?

Mr. DAVIES. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. That connotes a very good acquaintanceship with his circle of acquaintances, doesn't it?

Mr. DAVIES. No; because he told me he knew only so and so and so and so, a few people in our research shop who were doing research parallel to his, but in Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you advise him to do?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't like to give people advice about going into the Government or staying out of the Government. I think they have to make that bitter choice themselves.

Mr. SOURWINE. You then refused to advise him?

Mr. DAVIES. I certainly did. Thereby the Government loses many good people, too.

Mr. SOURWINE. I had thought perhaps because of your earlier answer that you could not advise him very strongly to come into the Government, or words to that effect, that you had expressed that view to him?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't recall whether I expressed it explicitly. I said I thought his considerable talents could be used in the Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon me. May we suspend for a moment?

Senator SMITH. Yes. We will take a short recess.

(At this point a short recess was taken, after which the hearing was resumed.)

Senator SMITH. We will reconvene. You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe you have now told us in substance what you know of that earlier meeting. Do you recall any other meeting that you had with Mr. Schwartz?

Mr. DAVIES. Not in definite terms. I think that I saw him on another trip that he made to Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before or after the occasion on which he had asked your advice?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, I am not sure whether it was before or after. It was on one side or the other.

Mr. SOURWINE. You must have seen him before that occasion on which he asked your advice or he would not have come to you for that purpose.

Mr. DAVIES. That is right; so it was presumably before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you place the time of the occasion when he came to see you at your office and asked your advice with regard to his career?

Mr. DAVIES. I believe that I recollected it was some time in 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you had already stated, I think, that it was in 1947 that you first met him.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; I may have met him in 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. How much later might it have been?

Mr. DAVIES. It might have been 1948 or 1949.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your statement that you cannot recall whether you met him in 1947 or 1948 or 1949?

Mr. DAVIES. When I first met him, I cannot recall whether it was 1947 or 1948 or 1949.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it also your statement, however, that on the occasion when you did meet him it was either through introduction by Mr. Fairbank at Harvard; or through a contact arranged by Mr. Fairbank here in Washington?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, is it your statement that at this time you do not recall any other occasions on which you met Mr. Schwartz?

Mr. DAVIES. Any other than——

Mr. SOURWINE. Than the two with regard to which you have testified, and the original meeting, concerning which you have not testified, except that there was such a meeting?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not recall any others. There may have been others.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your statement that you did not make a practice of meeting with him, that there were no frequent associations with him, or frequent meetings?

Mr. DAVIES. Certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that your statement?

Mr. DAVIES. That is my statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any occasions when you originated a communication with him?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not recall any such instance, but I may well have written to him and asked him if he was coming to Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it possible you might have written to him more than once?

Mr. DAVIES. I might have written to him more than once. I might have written to him twice. If I wrote at all, I don't think it was more than perhaps twice.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not then carry on a correspondence with him; is that correct?

Mr. DAVIES. I did not carry on anything that might be generally termed a correspondence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you say how many letters you might have received from him?

Mr. DAVIES. I doubt that I received more than one or two letters from him, perhaps informing me that he was coming to Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember receiving any particular letters from him?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I don't recall any.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember that you did receive certain letters from him?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I don't remember that, but I may well have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember that you did write letters to him on one or more occasions?

Mr. DAVIES. That, I can't be sure of, but I would not exclude that I had.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether you ever telephoned him?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't think I have ever telephoned him. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether he ever telephoned you?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, yes; I am sure he must have telephoned to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would that be on several occasions?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; that would probably be on one or two occasions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were those occasions when he had come to Washington, and wanted to let you know that he was here?

Mr. DAVIES. I should say that there would be such occasions.

Mr. SOURWINE. When he made those calls, was it in the nature of putting himself at your disposal or in the nature of asking for an opportunity to see you?

Mr. DAVIES. Asking for an opportunity to see me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall what he wanted, on any of those occasions?

Mr. DAVIES. Not otherwise than as I have previously testified.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether you ever sent him any telegrams or cables?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I do not recall any telegrams to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean that you did not send him any telegrams?

Mr. DAVIES. I did not, so far as I recall, send him any telegrams.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever send you any telegrams or cables?

Mr. DAVIES. Not so far as I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have a question, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. No; I do not think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Other than the occasion on which you all had luncheon, with regard to which you have testified, in the early months of 1951, is that correct?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; I would say early in 1951.

Mr. SOURWINE. Other than that occasion, do you recall ever breaking bread with Mr. Schwartz?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Other than the occasion concerning which you have testified, in 1950, that is, the occasion in 1950 concerning which you have testified, on which occasion he asked your advice with regard to his course of action—

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever discussed with him his employment or possible employment in the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. I may have discussed it with him on the first occasion that I met him, or if there was still another occasion, I might have discussed it at that time. We have established a total of three meetings, I believe.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; that is right.

Mr. DAVIES. And I said, I do not exclude that there may have been a fourth.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; it is your memory that when he first met you his possible employment in the Government was discussed?

Mr. DAVIES. That may well have been discussed at that time, because he was looking forward to what he would do after the conclusion of his studies.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was in 1947?

Mr. DAVIES. Either 1947 or 1948 or 1949.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; some time prior to the end of 1949?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You discussed with him the question of employment in the Federal Government?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he at that time ask you to assist him in any way?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't think so, because he had not, you see, made up his mind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Fairbank ask you to assist him in any way?

Mr. DAVIES. Fairbank initially, of course, was very anxious for him to stay in academic life and to go on and continue his studies and then teach.

Later—This must have been the end of 1950 or early 1951, when there was a question of Schwartz' being called back into military service again—Fairbank felt that his considerable talents should not be overlooked, and that if he were going back into military service he should be in some capacity where his experience and his training would be of use, or that, as an alternative, he might be placed in some other Government service; for example, the State Department, in the research field.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Fairbank told you that that is the way he felt about it?

Mr. DAVIES. That was his thought.

Mr. SOURWINE. He told you that that was his thought?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes. And a third alternative was that Schwartz continue at Harvard in the Russian Institute, but do work which could be considered as contributing to the national interest, and thereby his draft be deferred?

Mr. SOURWINE. This was in what year?

Mr. DAVIES. This was last year. I remember that conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Incidentally, is it Dr. Schwartz?

Mr. DAVIES. He is a doctor now; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor of what—philosophy?

Mr. DAVIES. I suppose Ph. D.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know when he got that degree?

Mr. DAVIES. I think in 1949 or 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. 1949 or 1950. Over what period was Dr. Schwartz connected with the Russian Institute at Harvard?

Mr. DAVIES. I can't answer that definitely, but I would say that the Russian Institute began to use his services as a consultant, or take his papers and publish his papers, shortly after they were established, which I think was in 1947 or 1948.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you learn that, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. I know Cluckhorn, and I see the Russian Institute stuff. It is sent down to me by Cluckhorn.

Mr. SOURWINE. They used his papers, then, as early as that, and identified them as his?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see.

Mr. DAVIES. They were mimeographed; I don't think they were printed. Monographs, with his name, and the heading at the top "Russian Institute".

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he still associated with the Russian Institute?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't know what he is doing now.

Mr. SOURWINE. When is the last that you heard of him or from him?

Mr. DAVIES. The last I heard of him was this luncheon that we had, and I have heard, so far as I can recall, nothing since that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever serve in any consultant capacity with the Department of State, or any agency of the Department of State?

Mr. DAVIES. That I cannot answer definitely. I think he came down on consultation at one time, whether formally or informally, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever serve you in a consultant capacity?

Mr. DAVIES. No; certainly not formally. I was interested in what he was writing, to see it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever tell him that you had recommended him or were going to recommend him for any position in which he could serve his Government?

Mr. DAVIES. In one of the earlier contacts—that is, perhaps the first one; or, if there was a fourth, in the early period—I told him, as I have indicated here, that I thought his considerable talents should be turned to use by this Government, and I said that I would want to explore on my own the possibilities of where he might be utilized, but gave him no indication.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you tell him that you had made any specific recommendations, or that you would?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you subsequently explore the possibilities of his utilization in Government?

Mr. DAVIES. I did, in the Department, I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. In research, and in connection with the question, which raises this whole situation.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not sure that I know just what you mean by that. Would you expand on that answer a little, if you please?

Mr. DAVIES. On the question of whether or not he might be utilized in a clandestine operation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with him the possibility of his utilization in a clandestine operation?

Mr. DAVIES. No; certainly not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Not ever, at any time?

Mr. DAVIES. Certainly not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever make a recommendation that he be used in a clandestine operation?

Mr. DAVIES. This is where I came in.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Davies, the term "clandestine operation" is sufficiently broad that it does not connote anything particularly classified.

Mr. DAVIES. I considered and suggested his utilization.

Mr. SOURWINE. You considered and suggested his utilization?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In a clandestine operation?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anyone else in the State Department ever suggest to you the utilization of Dr. Schwartz in a clandestine operation?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did any of your superiors in the State Department ever direct you to make a recommendation to any other agency with regard to the employment of Dr. Schwartz?

Mr. DAVIES. Insofar as I made any suggestions of this character, they were made under standing orders from my superiors.

Mr. SOURWINE. I can understand that, sir.

Mr. DAVIES. But not specifically with respect to Dr. Schwartz.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; I can understand that statement. But I would appreciate it, if you would, if you feel that you can, give us a direct "Yes" or "No" answer to the previous question. Do you recall it?

Mr. DAVIES. The answer is "No."

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. The answer is "No."

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; it is "No."

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry I confused the record a little bit by saying "Yes" after you said "No." I wanted to make it perfectly clear your answer was a direct negative.

Did you on your own initiative make a recommendation for the utilization of Dr. Schwartz by another agency, and, if so, did you make that recommendation without Dr. Schwartz' knowledge?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; without Dr. Schwartz' knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you feel that you are unable, for security reasons, to answer any further questions with regard to the nature of the recommendations that you made respecting the utilization of Dr. Schwartz by another agency?

Mr. DAVIES. I do, sir; because of the reasons which I have previously stated, and because it is, strictly speaking, the operation of another agency, which it would be most inappropriate in any event for me to comment upon.

Mr. SOURWINE. Until you are asked to comment upon what some other agency did, I do not think we need to cross that bridge. We are concerned at the moment, and up to this point, with what you did.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And I want the record to be perfectly clear on this point because, frankly, there may be some question with regard to what privilege you may have under the circumstances.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And I want to be sure the record shows your basis for claiming the privilege.

Now, on the basis of the testimony that is in the record, is this a fair statement:

You did make a recommendation to another agency for the utilization of Mr. Schwartz by that agency, in a clandestine manner; you made that recommendation on your own initiative, and not having been instructed or directed by any superior to make it. In spite of which situation, you now state that the making of it constituted a top secret or higher matter, concerning which you cannot testify.

Is that correct?

Mr. DAVIES. Would you read that back to me?

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Mr. DAVIES. That is not entirely accurate.

Mr. SOURWINE. By all means correct it.

Mr. DAVIES. Because, when I took an action, as you say, on my own initiative, it was not a private action, a personal action; it was an action in the line of duty, within the framework of standing orders that I had from my superiors. All of my actions within that framework were, because of the nature of this operation, properly not divulgable to anyone outside of the executive charged with knowing about and conducting this operation. That is my position. It is a very awkward one, in the circumstances.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wanted the record to show clearly what your position was. I think, in fairness to you, it must be. I trust you will appreciate that I was attempting only to summarize how the record appeared at that time.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that you might have a chance to correct it if it was giving a false impression of your true position.

Senator SMITH. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator SMITH. Back on the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this, then, Mr. Davies, a case in which you had exercised your prerogative to initiate a top-secret classification since, as you have stated, this was with respect to a subject which, under your general orders, you considered to require such a classification?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes. It was impossible for me to act with respect to this particular question, outside of the top-secret category.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to leave that for the moment, at least, and I want to ask what may appear to be an unrelated question, but we will bring it in later, Mr. Chairman, in connection with another line of inquiry.

Please don't let your natural modesty hold you down in answering this question, sir:

Is it not true that you are recognized as an authority on Far East affairs?

Mr. DAVIES. I think that is hotly disputed in certain quarters.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have tried over the years to make yourself an authority, or at least to keep yourself currently well informed on Far East affairs; is that not true?

Mr. DAVIES. I have endeavored to keep myself currently well informed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you believe that you are well informed on Far East affairs at the present time?

Mr. DAVIES. I believe that I am fairly well informed on Far East affairs. But, during the past 6 years, I have not kept very close contact with Far East affairs, ever since I proceeded to the Embassy of Moscow and the Soviet Union.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, I am sure you appreciate these questions are not being asked for the purpose of embarrassing you; they are a necessary line of questions, necessary to establish that you are an expert in the field.

Are you familiar with the Communist Party line as it applies to affairs in the Far East?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; I believe that I am, generally.

Mr. SOURWINE. You necessarily have tried to keep yourself apprised of that line as it changed?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you feel that you know what the Communist ideology is with regard to the Far East?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you attempt to keep yourself currently informed with regard to that ideology?

Mr. DAVIES. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you give us your own general conclusion as to the extent to which you may have sympathized with that Communist ideology?

Mr. DAVIES. I have at no time sympathized with the Communist ideology. My basic motivation, since I was a small American missionary boy in China, was almost Xenophonically American.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the witness will permit me to render an apology, which appears to be called for, I think we have a slight semantic difference. I did not use the word or intend to use the word "sympathized" in the connotation in which the witness accepted it. However, Mr. Davies, you had a perfect right to accept it that way.

May I rephrase my question?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I am really after is your own general conclusion as to the extent to which your own conclusions and feelings with regard to Far East matters coincided with the current Communist Party ideology on those same things.

Mr. DAVIES. I cannot say that my opinions coincide with Communist ideologies in any respect.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very good.

Now, if we may go back to Dr. Schwartz: Have you had a sufficient acquaintance with him to be able to have formed an opinion as to the extent to which his opinions agreed with Communist ideologies and the Communist Party line?

Mr. DAVIES. We went, in my relations with Dr. Schwartz, very little into the opinions. What I was after was what information he had dug up, and I would evaluate that myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is your answer to the question "No," then?

Mr. DAVIES. My answer to the question is that so far as I knew Dr. Schwartz, I saw no indication of his associating himself in any way with Communist ideology; to the contrary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have occasion to make inquiries concerning Dr. Schwartz' record, his possible affiliation with Communists or Communist-front organizations, or his loyalty?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I did not, because, I might go on and say a little further that when I considered him as potential material for Government use, I was interested in his knowledge, and not his attitudes, at that time. So far as the check on his attitudes, that was not my job. That was the job of the Security people. If they came up with a negative check on his attitudes, then I had no further interest.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that mean, sir, or by that do you mean that you never discussed the question of his possible Communist affiliations, with anyone in Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No; that did not arise with the people with whom I discussed this matter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, let me rephrase the question. Did you ever discuss Dr. Schwartz's possible Communist or Communist-front affiliations with any other person in Government?

Mr. DAVIES. I cannot recall any instance of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever defend him against the suggestion that he might have Communist or Communist-front connections?

Mr. DAVIES. I may have said that I saw no indications of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state with reference to him, that he was not Communist, but only very sophisticated, or very politically sophisticated?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a categorical answer? You never did make that statement?

Mr. DAVIES. That is a categorical answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever—

Mr. DAVIES. One doesn't make that statement about anybody, these days.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Dr. Schwartz be retained by another Government agency for policy guidance?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir—categorically.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state to a representative of another Government agency that Dr. Schwartz had been helpful to you as a consultant?

Mr. DAVIES. I cannot recall ever having made any such statement. However, it is true that I was interested in what Schwartz had produced. And in that sense, that any material coming in, information, is of help. In that sense, he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might have told a representative of another agency of Government that Dr. Schwartz had been helpful to you as a consultant?

Mr. DAVIES. I have no recollection of ever having said anything of that sort.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say categorically that you did or that you did not?

Mr. DAVIES. I would not have said it to—

Mr. SOURWINE. I have not asked any question about whom you said it to, sir.

Mr. DAVIES. I simply have no recollection of ever having made such a statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to have a categorical answer, if we can get it, and let me recall to you in that connection that you have already testified on this record that Dr. Schwartz did not serve as a consultant to you at any time.

Mr. DAVIES. He did not, certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. That being the case, sir, does that help you to answer the question as to whether at any time you told any person, a representative of another Government agency, that he had been helpful to you as a consultant?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, I could not have said that, because he was not my consultant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever say it?

Mr. DAVIES. No, I never did.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir. That is all I was trying to get at.

Now, I would like to discuss Edgar Snow. Do you know Mr. Edgar Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you meet Mr. Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. I first met Mr. Snow, so far as I can remember, in probably 1933 or 1934.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall the occasion, or in what manner you met him?

Mr. DAVIES. I think I recall a cocktail party at his house, to which I was invited, amongst many other people.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was in 1934?

Mr. DAVIES. 1933 or 1934, or maybe 1935.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did he live at that time?

Mr. DAVIES. This was in Peking. At that time he was a language officer at the Embassy, or then Legation, in Peking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how you came to be invited? Was it because of your diplomatic connections?

Mr. DAVIES. Very likely, and because it was a small community there, that entertained one another.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you see him on frequent occasions thereafter?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were the occasions of your meetings thereafter so infrequent that you can recall them?

Mr. DAVIES. They were so infrequent that I do not recall any.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you met him in 1933 or 1934 and you have never met him again?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, during that period of 1933, 1934, 1935, I cannot recall but one meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Perhaps it would be helpful if at this point, instead of asking precise questions, I simply requested that the witness give for the record his recollection of his acquaintanceship with Mr. Snow.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes. Mr. Snow was a journalist who traveled extensively throughout the Far East.

Senator SMITH. Is he the man who wrote the book *People on Our Side*?

Mr. DAVIES. I think he did write that book. I haven't read it. I think he has written it.

Senator SMITH. In which, as I recall, he attempted to show that not all righteousness was on our side, or something of that sort?

Mr. DAVIES. I have not read the book. He was a journalist who traveled extensively throughout the Far East, throughout Asia and Europe. Our paths crossed at various times because I, too, traveled on the same continents, and being Americans, we would meet each other on social occasions, or he would come into an office where I was stationed.

I cannot recall any instance of meeting him in the period following the first meeting, until 1942 or 1943, when I was detailed to the commanding general of the China-Burma-India theater.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was the general?

Mr. DAVIES. General Stilwell.

At that time Snow made several trips to the theater, and we met on those occasions, briefly, and then he would move on. He would come to the G-2, and to me, as one of the political advisers. He was around as a newspaperman, and my contacts with him were of that nature.

We made one trip together in the company of the American Ambassador to China, Mr. Gauss, in India, where Mr. Gauss was visiting. It was a trip from New Dehli to Allahabad. I stopped off there to see if I could get an interview with Nehru and Snow stopped off at the same time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that in your official capacity, which was—

Mr. DAVIES. That was in my official capacity as investigator, political officer, exploring for General Stilwell, the internal political situation in India, which was then very explosive and dangerous. He helped to arrange for a meeting with Nehru, and also got me into a meeting of the Indian Congress Executive Committee, and I think probably I was the first and only American official who had ever attended one of these meetings.

I then saw him some time during the war, at Cairo, for a day, as we passed, I remember meeting him at Shepards' Hotel.

Then my next recollection is a visit that he made to Moscow when I was stationed at the Embassy there, and we saw him then socially. And since then I do not recollect of any instance of having seen him.

Oh, I have seen him at the Metropolitan Club, but not to talk with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. What can you tell the committee about Mr. Snow, in addition to what you have already said?

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Snow is a man whom I never became well acquainted with, and therefore I have no very strong impressions of his personality or his outlook, beyond that he is a very active newspaperman who had leftist tendencies in the war years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean in 1941-45?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, and before it—in the thirties, when he wrote *Red Star Over China*.

Mr. SOURWINE. He had leftist tendencies when you first met him in Pekin?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he still has those tendencies today?

Mr. DAVIES. Not having seen him, I cannot speak from personal experience, although one of his recent articles on Tito and Russia seemed to indicate a considerable disillusionment with the Soviet Union.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have occasion to discuss political affairs with him?

Mr. DAVIES. Only as I would with any newspaperman trying to explore what information he had that would be of use to us.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any business relationships with him?

Mr. DAVIES. Commercial? Financial?

Mr. SOURWINE. Commercial or financial affairs conducted with the hope of mutual profit?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. That does not necessarily imply that you were both on the same side, because all business affairs are conducted with the hope of profit or loss.

Mr. DAVIES. No; only from an information profit on my side.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mean commercial or financial. You never had any commercial or financial business with him?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him to have any connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. I didn't know that he had any connections with the Institute of Pacific Relations. If, indeed he did, I didn't know it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now know whether he ever did?

Mr. DAVIES. No, I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. And do you know what the Institute of Pacific Relations is?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know any persons who are connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes. I could not give you a complete list, because I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you do know some?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. That lays the foundation for this question:

Did you ever see Mr. Snow in the company of any person whom you knew to be connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. Inasmuch as many Americans in the Far East belonged to the Institute of Pacific Relations, or subscribed to their journal, I assume that I must have, but I can't identify any such relationships.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any occasion to communicate or confer with Mr. Snow in connection with or through the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. And do you recall whether you ever wrote any letters to Mr. Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, I think I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. How extensive was that correspondence?

Mr. DAVIES. Very limited. He had a girl friend in Moscow. I remember his inquiring about her, and my writing back and saying that the NKVD had not gotten her and she was all right.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was at the time you were in Moscow?

Mr. DAVIES. When I was in Moscow.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that?

Mr. DAVIES. That was in, I should say, 1945 or 1946.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the only occasion you can recall when you corresponded with Mr. Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. That is the only occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you name this girl, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't remember what her name was. She was a girl who had contacts with people in the British Embassy. She was a—we all recognized her as somebody that the NKVD was trying to use on us. She was a cute dish.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say someone in the NKVD was trying to use her?

Mr. DAVIES. We assumed that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you all recognized her?

Mr. DAVIES. "Recognized" is the wrong word. We assumed that.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you say she was Mr. Snow's girl friend?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't—I think that—

Mr. SOURWINE. I wasn't asking you what you meant by it. You did use that word, didn't you—his "girl friend"?

Mr. DAVIES. I think it was an "A" political relationship.

Mr. SOURWINE. A what?

Mr. DAVIES. An "A" political relationship.

Mr. SOURWINE. What does an "A" political relationship mean?

Mr. DAVIES. A relationship without any political connotation.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SOURWINE. I think perhaps the committee might be interested if you might recall the young lady's name. I would like to ask you, if the name does come to your mind, or if you can in any way refresh your memory in the future and can furnish the committee with her name, would you try to do that?

Mr. DAVIES. I think I may be able to.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. If the name is subsequently furnished, may it be inserted in the record at this point, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why Mr. Snow wrote to you for information with regard to the young lady in question?

Mr. DAVIES. Because he had known me at various times, and I suppose that I was the member of the American Embassy staff that he had had the acquaintanceship with the longest.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he keeping close track on your movements at that time, do you know?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did he know you were in Moscow?

Mr. DAVIES. Where a foreign officer is is pretty well known to the correspondents corps. They know where we are, because they tell one another that so-and-so is in such-and-such a place.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought perhaps there might have been something in his letter that would give you a clue to that and that you would bring it out on response to the question. That is why I asked you that.

Mr. DAVIES. I don't recall the letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Something, that he might have wanted to find someone in Moscow he knew, and looked in the register to find if someone he knew was in Moscow, and said so in his letter?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; this was after his visit to Moscow, so he knew I was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. He had visited Moscow earlier?

Mr. DAVIES. That is my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. How much earlier was it?

Mr. DAVIES. A matter of months.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see him in Moscow?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; I said I had seen him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. We had, I recall, one meeting with him, a dinner which he gave, at which the British Ambassador was present.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought it might be possible that the young lady in question was a mutual acquaintance, that is, an acquaintance of both you and Mr. Snow, and that is why he wrote you about it.

Mr. DAVIES. I knew who she was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met her?

Mr. DAVIES. I had just met her socially.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met her in Mr. Snow's company?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Senator SMITH. Was she at the dinner?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since you presumed the young lady to be an NKVD agent, why was it that you told Mr. Snow that the NKVD did not have her yet, or had not gotten her yet?

Mr. DAVIES. A totalitarian state devours its own, you know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think he knew that she had the indicia of an NKVD agent?

Mr. DAVIES. I think so. Any American or Englishman who went into the Soviet Union and was there more than a day or two realized that all—

Mr. SOURWINE. You think he was sophisticated enough politically, so that he knew what the score was?

Mr. DAVIES. Something as elementary as that, I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any other occasions on which Mr. Snow wrote to you?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not recall any other circumstances.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say there was no other occasion?

Mr. DAVIES. I can't categorically say that, but I can—again it is a question that I cannot recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe the record should show, Mr. Chairman, by this questioning, I do not imply there was or was not another occasion. I am simply trying to get as accurately as possible just what the situation was.

Do you recall any other occasion on which you wrote to him?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any other occasion—

Mr. DAVIES. I can recall another occasion when he wrote to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. It was after he wrote the Saturday Evening Post article on Tito and he sent me a copy of it, and asked for my reactions. I did not reply.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was fairly recently?

Mr. DAVIES. That was while I was in Washington, within the past 3 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the only time you can recall that he ever asked for your reaction on something he had written?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why he wanted your reaction on this particular article at that time?

Mr. DAVIES. I think maybe he wanted me to say that I felt he had swung his views more toward center.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he indicate that in his letter to you?

Mr. DAVIES. No; that is an assumption.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know why that might have been important to him?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, his sense of esteem, I suppose.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you don't know?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any occasion when you got a telegram from him?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I do not recall any occasion when I got a telegram.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever send him a telegram or cable?

Mr. DAVIES. I think I can answer that "No."

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever telephone him?

Mr. DAVIES. I must have telephoned him, for instance, when he was in India.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean when you both were in India?

Mr. DAVIES. When we were both in India.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any other occasion or occasions?

Mr. DAVIES. I can recall no other occasions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever telephone him when you were both in the United States?

Mr. DAVIES. Not that I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever telephone you other than the occasion when you were both in India?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I have no recollection of his ever having telephoned me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever send a message to him by word of mouth through another person?

Mr. DAVIES. I have no recollection of having done that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever receive a message from him by word of mouth through another person?

Mr. DAVIES. I may well have, during the war years, when he may have told another correspondent that he was coming to Delhi or Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you received a message from him by word of mouth through another person since you have returned to the United States?

Mr. DAVIES. I have no recollection of ever having received such.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had, you would remember it?

Mr. DAVIES. I am quite sure that I would.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have occasion to make inquiry with regard to Mr. Snow's possible affiliation with the Communist Party or Communist front?

Mr. DAVIES. I remember in Moscow that we—in the Embassy, I discussed his orientation, and we had our doubts.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anything ever happen to dissipate those doubts in your mind?

Mr. DAVIES. Nothing happened to confirm the doubts that we entertained.

Mr. SOURWINE. My question was: Did anything ever happen to dissipate them?

Mr. DAVIES. I think that probably this Tito article tended to dissipate those views.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was in what year?

Mr. DAVIES. The date I can't recall. It was in the last 2 or 3 years—his article in the Saturday Evening Post.

Mr. SOURWINE. Prior to that time, nothing had happened to dissipate the doubts previously entertained?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it not true—psychologically—that the doubts that you maintain with regard to a person need dissipation by some outside impact? Your faith in a person may die of ennui but doubts don't die that way?

Mr. DAVIES. I think that is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is why I asked the question in that way.

Mr. DAVIES. However, I reserve judgment on this man because I think it is a terrible thing to go on the record about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you do reserve judgment or you did reserve judgment?

Mr. DAVIES. I said that the indications in his Saturday Evening Post article tended to dissipate the doubts.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a result of which, you now reserve judgment?

Mr. DAVIES. I have always reserved judgment with regard to whether a person is a Communist or not, until the full evidence is in.

Mr. SOURWINE. I hadn't asked that question.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir—your question was the doubts.

Mr. SOURWINE. I had initiated the line of inquiry by asking you if you had had occasion to check with or consult security officers with regard to the question of his loyalty.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a rephrasing of it, and now I will put the question in just those terms. Did you have such occasion?

Mr. DAVIES. Not with security officers, because we in the Embassy of Moscow were political officers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then I take it from that answer that subsequent to the occasion in the Embassy in Moscow when his—what was the word you used?—orientation was discussed there—

Mr. DAVIES. Orientation.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no subsequent occasion to inquire as to any loyalty question vis-a-vis Mr. Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I have had no occasion to.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have made no such inquiries of security officers or others?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I haven't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you ever recommend Mr. Snow for employment by an agency of the United States Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend to another agency of the Government or a representative of another agency of the Government that Mr. Snow be utilized by that agency?

Mr. DAVIES. The answer is the same as I gave on Schwartz.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you just give the answer? I respectfully suggest to you that perhaps what you really want here is just a "Yes" or "No" answer, but I would be happy to have you expand, if you wish to do so.

Mr. DAVIES. I am sorry; I have lost the trend of the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. So as to save time. I would be glad to repeat the question. Did you ever recommend to another agency of Government, or representative of another agency of Government, that Mr. Snow be utilized by that agency?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us anything about the circumstances under which that recommendation was made?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not feel that I can, for the reasons that I gave with regard to Schwartz.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do all of the other answers that you gave in connection with my inquiries concerning your recommendation of Dr. Schwartz hold true with respect to your recommendation of Mr. Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. To wit?

Mr. SOURWINE. To wit: That the recommendation was not initiated at a higher level, was your own suggestion, which you implemented in accordance with what you assumed to be a general directive under which you were operating?

Mr. DAVIES. Which was explicitly a general directive, not which I assumed, but which—

Mr. SOURWINE. I accept the correction.

Mr. DAVIES. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Under your construction of an explicit general directive under which you were operating?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all I meant by saying "all."

Mr. DAVIES. The answer is "Yes."

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever defend Mr. Snow against the charge or suggestion that he was a Communist or associated with communism?

Mr. DAVIES. That he was a Communist or associated with? No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever, in response to the suggestion that Mr. Snow was considered as a Communist or Communist sympathizer, say that he was not a Communist, but only very sophisticated, or very politically sophisticated?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever suggest or urge that Mr. Snow be used for guidance by another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that he be used for consultation and guidance by another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state to a representative of another agency of the Government that materials prepared by Mr. Snow would represent the proper approach?

Mr. DAVIES. The proper approach for what and for whom?

Mr. SOURWINE. If you would answer the question, then I would be glad to have you expand upon it with whatever qualifying information is necessary to make your answer perfectly responsive.

Mr. DAVIES. I will answer it this way: That to reply to this question takes us right into the heart of this operation, which is a top-secret operation, and in another agency.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would your answer then be that you never did so, except in connection with a top-secret operation, concerning which you feel you cannot testify?

Mr. DAVIES. My answer would be "Yes."

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, that you never did so, except in connection with a top-secret operation concerning which you feel you cannot testify?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Snow ever serve the State Department in a consulting or consultant capacity, to your knowledge?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. I take it that includes possible service to you as a consultant?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state to anyone that Mr. Snow had been helpful to you as a consultant?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. I neglected a question, and I must apologize for putting it out of context, Mr. Chairman, with regard to Dr. Schwartz.

Do you know anything of his possible connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall ever meeting him in company with or in connection with persons you knew to be members of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. Here again, I am in the same disability of not knowing who are members of the institute.

Mr. SOURWINE. I realize that I might get exactly the same answers as when I asked that question with regard to Mr. Snow.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever communicate or confer with Dr. Schwartz at or through the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are back on Mr. Snow now.

Did you ever recommend that Mr. Snow be set up in an office by an agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never did?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Dr. Schwartz be set up in an office by an agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, with regard to Agnes Smedley: Did you know Agnes Smedley?

Mr. DAVIES. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us of your acquaintance with her, when you met her, and follow through along the same lines we have already had with the other two persons that we have discussed?

Mr. DAVIES. I first knew Agnes Smedley in 1938 in Hanchow, when she was living there and working with the Chinese Communists. She had presented to the consulate general there a letter of introduction, which I might read here. It is a letter from the Department of State, Washington, May 4, 1934, to the American diplomatic consular officers.

"SIRS: At the instance of the Honorable Robert F. Wagner, Senator of the United States from the State of New York, I take pleasure in introducing to you Miss Agnes Smedley of New York City, who is about to proceed abroad.

"I cordially bespeak for Miss Smedley such courtesies and assistance as you may be able to render, consistently with your official duties.

"Very truly yours,

"CORDELL HULL."

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this presented to you?

Mr. DAVIES. This was a standard letter of introduction Miss Smedley carried, and which she presented to the American officials in Hanchow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it presented to you?

Mr. DAVIES. I saw it, or knew of it. I do not recall whether I physically saw the document, but I knew of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you saw it or you knew of it at the time you met her?

Mr. DAVIES. At the time I met her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did you get this photostat?

Mr. DAVIES. This is a photostat which I received from Mr. Clubb.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Clubb?

Mr. DAVIES. A colleague of mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean a colleague in the State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did he give it to you?

Mr. DAVIES. He gave it to me about 2 or 3 weeks ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ask him for it or did he bring it to you and suggest it might be well if you had it?

Mr. DAVIES. He brought it to me. He thought it might be of interest to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. We just thought it might be of interest?

Mr. DAVIES. No—it might be of use to me.

Mr. MORRIS. How long were you in Hanchow, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. I was in Hanchow from 1938 until 1940.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not mean to interrupt that, but I wanted to go back for just a moment, because I would like to have this put in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. Very well, it is so ordered.

(The letter above referred to follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U. S. A.

To the Diplomatic and Consular Officers of the United States of America.
Introducing: Miss Agnes Smedley.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 4, 1934.

TO THE AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR OFFICERS.

SIRS: At the instance of the Honorable Robert F. Wagner, Senator of the United States from the State of New York, I take pleasure in introducing to you Miss Agnes Smedley of New York City, who is about to proceed abroad.

I cordially bespeak for Miss Smedley such courtesies and assistance as you may be able to render, consistently with your official duties.

Very truly yours,

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask Mr. Davies for Mr. Clubb's full name.

Mr. DAVIES. Edmund Clubb.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that E-d-m-u-n-d?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. C-l-u-b-b?

Mr. DAVIES. Double b.

Mr. SOURWINE. What position does he hold with the State Department now?

Mr. DAVIES. He is Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why Mr. Clubb felt that this might be of service to you?

Mr. DAVIES. Miss Smedley has been mentioned in connection with me, publicly, in Miss Smedley's book and elsewhere.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to get the tie. As I understand it, you say Mr. Clubb gave you this letter 2 or 3 weeks ago. Wasn't that too late to have been of service to you in connection with any proceeding in the Department, and without knowledge that there would be or might be any proceedings before this committee?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, it was without reference to any proceedings in this committee, about which, of course, I had no forewarning.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. Is it your testimony that you do not know just how he intended it to be of service to you?

Mr. DAVIES. It might be of some use to me in case there were questions on the subject.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was a friendly gesture by Mr. Clubb?

Mr. DAVIES. A friendly gesture.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was a friend of yours and he made a friendly gesture?

Mr. DAVIES. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry, Mr. Morris—I interrupted you.

Mr. MORRIS. I just wanted to know what was his service in China before he went to Hanchow?

Mr. DAVIES. My official service in China began in 1933 in Yunnanfu. In 1933 I was transferred for my language study in Peking. I completed that after 2 years' study and then went to Mukden. I left Mukden in 1938 and went to Hanchow, and there we are.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before you go further, I want to clear up the question of your meeting. Is it your testimony that your initial meeting with Miss Smedley was in line of duty—that she came to the offices of the State Department which you were occupying, in which you were working in Peking, and——

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. In Hanchow?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In Hanchow. And that she either there presented, or had previously presented, and you knew about, this letter of introduction, and therefore you met her in connection with your official duties?

Mr. DAVIES. That is so. I was——

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, proceed.

Mr. DAVIES. I was a political officer reporting on the local scene. I was an investigator. My job was to know everybody that I could know on the local scene. I knew everyone from von Faulkenhausen, who was the German military adviser to the Generalissimo, to Agnes Smedley. As a political officer, it was my duty to know everybody I could know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why do you say from von Faulkenhausen to Agnes Smedley. Are they at opposite poles?

Mr. DAVIES. They are not, because one was a Nazi and the other was a member of the Communist apparatus.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was at what time?

Mr. DAVIES. This was in 1938.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were not at opposite poles?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, it depends on your reading of the meaning of whether the Nazis and Communists are at opposite poles or the same poles.

Mr. SOURWINE. I did not mean to be argumentative. I was trying to find out whether you intentionally used them in that way.

Mr. DAVIS. I think they are contrasting personalities.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Please go ahead.

Mr. DAVIES. Miss Smedley was at that time, as I have previously testified, intimately identified with the Communist headquarters.

She was a channel through whom foreign correspondents and members of the diplomatic and consular corps obtained information, established contacts with the Chinese Communist delegation in Hanchow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was her position in that regard known to the State Department—the American State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. To the Embassy and the consulate.

Mr. SOURWINE. You certainly had reported it to Washington?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, yes. Insofar as we sought to get information from the Communists, in addition to the other elements, we would use Miss Smedley as an intermediary, to see what we could get. That was during the period of the Japanese advance on Hanchow. The city was filled with correspondents and the official staffs of the various consulates and embassies there were very large. There was a constant coming and going and contact-seeking information, and in that way I had contacts with Miss Smedley, endeavored to get what information I could from her, the hand-outs that they produced at the Communist headquarters, asking her questions, officially had these various associations with her.

She then left Hanchow at the time the Embassy pulled out; the Chinese Government pulled out, and most of the correspondents left, which was just as the

Japanese came in. I stayed behind with the consul general's staff. We underwent the Japanese occupation.

Smedley told us that she was going out into the guerrilla territory in the outlying areas. This was of great interest to us for two reasons: One was that we were following the military campaign very closely, and were also interested in how the Japanese occupied, and observed their control, through the area, and were very interested in what the guerrilla resistance would be in the surrounding areas.

Secondly, Japanese-American relations were rather tense. The *Panay* had been sunk a short time before, and we never knew when, while under Japanese occupation, the balloon might not go up. We were therefore interested in the guerrilla movement from the view of getting out in the event of war between Japan and the United States. Therefore, I asked Smedley to keep us informed. She wrote to the British and wrote to us little notes that would be sent back in through the Japanese lines to us.

Her information on the guerrilla operations out there was of considerable interest to us. We always had to make very large corrections in her bias, but nevertheless, it was a first-hand account of guerrilla operations.

Mr. SOURWINE. With a deflection for windage, it showed reasonable accuracy?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes. It was of great use to us in our appraisals of the guerrilla operations. Her estimates, of course, were checked against what estimates we got from the Chinese agents who remained behind, and from what the Japanese carried in their communiqués, and what we got from missionaries who came from the area.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did her reports, after correction for bias, show sufficient accuracy to indicate that she had a pretty good knowledge or sources of information with regard to the matters she was reporting on?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, yes; because she had lived with the guerrilla units in these little villages and marched with them, not in the heart of battle, but on the periphery of battles.

Mr. SOURWINE. After that period, during which her services were utilized, and you had some contacts in your official capacity, what further acquaintanceship have you had?

Mr. DAVIES. I have had none.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did that period end?

Mr. DAVIES. It ended before my departure from Hanchow, which was late in 1940—or the summer of 1940, I think, so I would say it ended at probably about 1939.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since that time, have you sent her any letters?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has she sent you any?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you sent her any telegrams or cables?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has she sent you any?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you telephoned her or has she telephoned you?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any communication with her by word of mouth or through another person?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, at the time that you initially met her, did she present to you any letter of introduction from any person other than the letter that has gone into the record here?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anyone write you about her, or give her a good-character rating, or suggest that you get together, or anything of that sort?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't recall any such. She was a public figure, well known in the area.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything of her connections—still speaking of Miss Smedley? Do you know anything of her connections, if any, with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. None.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall meeting her in connection with or in the company of persons known to you to be members of the institute?

Mr. DAVIES. No; with the same caveat I gave on the other two.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if I might ask: Would you tell us at this point what generally have been your connections with the institute? May I have a response to that question?

Mr. DAVIES. Very slight. I have known, of necessity, many people who have been connected with the institute. I have seen their journal.

Mr. MORRIS. You are a member, are you not?

Mr. DAVIES. That, I don't know. I do not recall ever having been a member. I ask a question for information—whether subscription to the journal makes one a member? I don't recall having been a member, nor do I recall having subscribed to the magazine. I may have subscribed to the magazine, but I have no recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. You make payments to the institute, do you not?

Mr. DAVIES. I make payments?

Mr. MORRIS. Didn't you make payments to the institute?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I don't make any payments.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you ever pay dues to the institute, as such?

Mr. DAVIES. I have no recollection of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never applied for membership in the institute?

Mr. DAVIES. That I am not sure of. I have, as I said, no recollection of having been a member.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever get a bill for dues from the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. I have no recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. A bill, or other requests for dues?

Mr. DAVIES. I may have had solicitation from it. I do not exclude the possibility that I may have been a member, but I haven't checked back—I have no record of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say definitely that you have not, over a period of succeeding years, two or more, paid annual dues to the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. In the past 2 years?

Mr. SOURWINE. No—I said over a period of two or more years consecutively.

Mr. DAVIES. I have no recollection of paying any dues to the institute.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had you would have recalled it?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir; not necessarily.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you pay dues in organizations you don't know you belong to?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, I know I pay dues to the American Automobile Association.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you know you pay the dues?

Mr. DAVIES. I know I pay those dues. I have no recollection of ever having paid any dues to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever pay dues to the Amalgamated Sons and Daughters of I Will Rise?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You can say "No" to that?

Mr. DAVIES. I can say "No" to that because, of course, it was an organization in which I—it is utterly improbable that I would ever have had anything to do with it, whereas, the Institute of Pacific Relations, to my knowledge, was a very respectable, and rather stuffy, organization. It was one which I naturally really should have belonged to. I am afraid I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me for interrupting.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was a very good interruption, Mr. Morris.

With regard to Agnes Smedley, did you ever communicate with her through or in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have occasion to make inquiry with respect to Agnes Smedley's possible Communist connections?

Mr. DAVIES. Certainly. That was something we were all very interested in. Just what her relationships were—she denied, of course, that she was a party member.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever make inquiry in that regard subsequent to leaving the Orient?

Mr. DAVIES. No; because I lost interest in Smedley.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew her at that time to be a Communist?

Mr. DAVIES. In the Orient?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. I assumed that she was a Communist. As I have testified, I regarded her as a part of the Communist apparatus there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anything ever occur to change your mind with regard to her?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend Agnes Smedley for employment with another agency of the Government, that is, an agency other than the State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you recommend her employment with the State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend to a representative of another agency of the Government that Agnes Smedley be utilized by that agency?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us anything further about that occasion?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the same reasons that apply to the case of Dr. Schwartz and Edgar Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever defend Agnes Smedley against the charge or the suggestion that she was a Communist?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever defend her against the suggestion or charge that she had Communist sympathies, or was a member of a Communist-front organization?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state she was not a Communist, but only very sophisticated or very politically sophisticated?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever suggest that another agency of Government set her up in an office?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state that she had been useful to you or helpful to you as a consultant?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever suggest that she be assigned to produce materials for utilization by another department of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. Assigned? I beg your pardon, will you repeat that?

Mr. SOURWINE. That she be assigned to produce materials for utilization by another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state to a representative of another agency of the Government that materials prepared by her would represent the proper approach?

Mr. DAVIES. The same answer that I gave on Snow.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was that answer?

Mr. DAVIES. That this goes into the nature of the operation a top-secret operation, which I do not feel at liberty to discuss.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not sure that that is the precise answer you gave with regard to Mr. Snow, but it is the answer you intend to give here with regard to Miss Smedley?

Mr. DAVIES. It is.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you cannot answer that question, because to answer it goes into a top-secret operation about which you feel you cannot testify?

Mr. DAVIES. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Except with regard to the said top-secret operations, did you ever represent to a representative of any other agency of the Government—that is, other than the State Department, that materials prepared by Agnes Smedley would represent the proper approach?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever represent to a representative of an agency of the Government, other than the State Department, that Agnes Smedley could be used by that agency for consultation and guidance?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a categorical "No"?

Mr. DAVIES. A categorical "No."

Mr. SOURWINE. Moving now to Anna Louise Strong, are you acquainted, or were you acquainted with Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us about when you met her, and follow along the same lines we have had with the other persons concerning whom we have asked you?

Mr. DAVIES. I first met Anna Louise Strong in 1945 or 1946 at a reception in the Embassy. I do not remember the precise occasion, but my only contacts with Miss Strong were at the Embassy.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the Embassy where?

Mr. DAVIES. In Moscow. She was a member of the press corps.

Mr. SOURWINE. For what organization or publication?

Mr. DAVIES. I beg your pardon?

Mr. SOURWINE. What organization or publication did she represent?

Mr. DAVIES. My recollection was that she was a free lance. She may have corresponded for various Communist magazines or newspapers, but I don't think that she had a——

Mr. SOURWINE. Were free-lance correspondents permitted to roam around Moscow at that time?

Mr. DAVIES. Communists, or those who were a part of the apparatus, were permitted to roam around.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she a part of the apparatus?

Mr. DAVIES. I assumed that she was at least a fellow traveler, completely acceptable to the regime and under its control.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. DAVIES. Aside from the social contacts, for example, the Fourth of July, when she would appear at the Ambassador's reception, or contacts during the council of foreign ministers, in 1947, when Mr. Harriman asked me to help out with handling the press. In that situation I would see her, with a group of newspapermen, when the releases were made, and in similar circumstances. That was my only contact with her, and I have had no contact with her since.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you know of her besides the fact that she had this Communist connection or presumed Communist connection in Moscow?

Mr. DAVIES. I know little about her personal history.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she still alive?

Mr. DAVIES. I believe she is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where she is?

Mr. DAVIES. She is in this country, so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where?

Mr. DAVIES. But I do not know where.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was it that you knew her in Moscow?

Mr. DAVIES. In Moscow, 1945 through April of 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, since April of 1947, have you had any communication with her of any nature?

Mr. DAVIES. None whatsoever.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have not written her a letter, nor sent her a telegram or cable or telephoned her?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. And she has not written a letter to you or sent you a telegram or a cable or telephone to you?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you had any communications by word of mouth through any other individual?

Mr. DAVIES. None.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about her connections with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. No, I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you ever recall meeting her in connection with or in company with persons whom you knew to be members of the institute?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever consult with her or communicate with her or confer with her in connection with or through the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend Anna Louise Strong for employment by the State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend her for employment by any other department or agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend to a representative of another agency of the Government, that is, other than the State Department, that Anna Louise Strong be utilized by that agency?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us anything more about the occasion on which you made that recommendation?

Mr. DAVIES. No; for the reasons which I have cited in the other cases.

Mr. SOURWINE. The same reasons as cited in the cases of Dr. Schwartz and Mr. Snow and Agnes Smedley?

Mr. DAVIES. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you ever recommend that Anna Louise Strong be set up in an office by some agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that she be used for consultation and guidance by another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state to the representative of another agency of the Government that materials prepared by her would represent the proper approach?

Mr. DAVIES. The same answer that I gave on the others.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, you cannot answer that question, you are stating you cannot answer that question without discussing matters which are, in your opinion, top secret?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Other than in connection with top-secret matters, did you ever state that materials prepared by her would represent the proper approach?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state that she had been useful to you as a consultant?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had she ever been useful to you as a consultant?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she ever employed by the State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever receive instructions from any superior to make a recommendation to another agency of Government with respect to Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. DAVIES. I received no specific instructions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it correct, then, that the situation is the same with regard to Anna Louise Strong, Agnes Smedley, Edgar Snow and Benjamin Schwartz in that regard, to wit, that the recommendations which you made were your own implementation, of your own suggestion, acting under your construction of an explicit directive which was then in existence, and which you were attempting to follow out?

Mr. DAVIES. And which was of a top-secret category, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I accept the amendment.

All right, sir. Now, I have one more name to move on to, but I would like to go back for just a minute and pick up a loose end.

When we were talking about Mr. Edgar Snow, I did not ask you if you knew Mrs. Snow—did you?

Mr. DAVIES. Which Mrs. Snow?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know a Mrs. Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. I knew a Mrs. Snow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which one did you know?

Mr. DAVIES. Who wrote under the nom de plume of Nym Wales.

Mr. SOURWINE. N-y-m W-a-l-e-s?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was the Mrs.—that is, she was Edgar Snow's wife at the time you knew him?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where she is now?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you maintained contact with her?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have an acquaintanceship with her other than your contact with Mr. Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never had any social connections?

Mr. DAVIES. Any what?

Mr. SOURWINE. Any social connections with her.

Mr. DAVIES. She was a hostess at the cocktail party where I first met Snow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Aside from that?

Mr. DAVIES. Aside from that, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Professor John Fairbank?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us when you met him and under what circumstances, and what your acquaintance has been?

Mr. DAVIES. I met Mr. Fairbank in 1933 or 1934 when he was a student, doing a thesis on the Chinese maritime customs. This was in Peking. I was a language officer at that time.

I knew him fairly well, because we had many interesting comments. I was at that time, as I said, a student, and we were covering much the same ground.

I have maintained this acquaintanceship with Fairbank over these subsequent years. I cannot say when I next saw him after I left Peking in 1935.

In 1937, I think, was the next time I met him, and that was when I was home on leave, and then only briefly.

During the war he was a Government official employed in General Donovan's office.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Office of Strategic Services?

Mr. DAVIES. It preceded the OSS. I have forgotten the name of it. OIC, or something like that.

Mr. MORRIS. COI—Coordinated Information.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; it may have been Coordinated Information. But it was the office which preceded the OSS.

Mr. SOURWINE. These letters are a little confusing. What is the CIA?

Mr. DAVIES. Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the OIC?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, that is one I am not sure of the letters. It is the organization set up before they set up the OSS.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the OPC?

Mr. DAVIES. That is the Office of Policy Coordination, within the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. SOURWINE. Whether this was OIC or OCI that Mr. Snow was in we don't know?

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Fairbank.

Mr. DAVIES. I don't remember the initials. It was the organization which ultimately was replaced by the OSS.

Mr. MORRIS. I think it was called the COI, Coordinated Information.

Mr. SOURWINE. Office of Coordinator of Information.

Go ahead, sir, please.

Mr. DAVIES. He was in the book and periodicals acquisition organization. I do not recall under what office that was. It may have been under OSS or it may have been part of the State Department. But at any rate he was, during the war, in China as an official, carrying out official duties.

At that period I saw a good deal of him when I went to China and I saw him also, I think, in the United States when he came back and he was OWI.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the Office of War Information?

Mr. DAVIES. Officer of War Information. After the war years I did not see him again until I returned to the United States in 1947. My first meeting with him then, I believe, was in the fall of 1947. I have since seen him occasionally as he comes to Washington. Sometimes I discover he has been in Washington and I have not seen him. Sometimes we meet and have lunch together, or I go to his house for a drink, and that has been our relationship.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are then more than mere acquaintances?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are friends of long standing?

Mr. DAVIES. We are friends of long standing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall when was the most recent occasion that you saw him?

Mr. DAVIES. It was sometime this spring I saw him. I don't recall the date.

Mr. SOURWINE. Besides Dr. Schwartz, has he ever introduced to you or brought you into contact with other persons in connection with their possible future course of employment, or their employment by the Government or some agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't think so. No; I have no recollection of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. He never sent you any other bright young man?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever had any commercial relations, business relations, commercial or monetary, with Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you maintain a correspondence with him?

Mr. DAVIES. Irregularly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you maintained this irregular correspondence over a period of years?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever send him telegrams?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I don't recall sending him a telegram.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever send you one?

Mr. DAVIES. No; not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does he ever telephone you long distance?

Mr. DAVIES. He has; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Frequently or infrequently?

Mr. DAVIES. Infrequently.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall what it was about?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, that he was coming to Washington and would like to see me; have lunch with me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever telephone him long distance?

Mr. DAVIES. I think I may have; I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall what it would have been about, if you did?

Mr. DAVIES. No. It wouldn't have been of any importance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which means, of course, you don't recall what it was about?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever send to him or receive from him oral messages through some third person?

Mr. DAVIES. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he is a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations or has any connections with the institute?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet him in connection with or in the company of persons whom you knew to be members of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. Again, not that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever communicate with him or confer with him at or in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, or through the institute?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have occasion to make inquiries with regard to his possible loyalty or his possible connection with communism or the Communist Party or Communist-front organizations?

Mr. DAVIES. It had not occurred to me that it would be necessary to do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever do so?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have an opinion with regard to the question of whether he had any connection with communism or Communist-front organizations?

Mr. DAVIES. In my long acquaintance with him I have seen not the slightest evidence of any connections which might be considered disloyal to the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that mean that you do have an opinion, and that your opinion is that he has no such connection?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever heard of the charge that he is or has been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. DAVIES. Not until recently.

Mr. SOURWINE. How recently?

Mr. DAVIES. I am sorry. Was he a member of the Communist Party or associated with it?

Mr. SOURWINE. I said member.

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, member. No; I have never heard that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you heard the charge that he was associated with the Communist Party?

Mr. DAVIES. In the sense that I have heard the charge that he was sympathetic to the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. How recently did you hear that charge?

Mr. DAVIES. I should say it was in the last few months.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall where and how you heard it?

Mr. DAVIES. I think probably I read it in the Congressional Record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether you saw anything about it in the public press?

Mr. DAVIES. I have seen his name mentioned in the publications.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you a careful reader of the Congressional Record, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. Spasmodically.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether the mention of Mr. Fairbank in the Congressional Record was called to your attention?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might it have been called to your attention?

Mr. DAVIES. It might have been; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you would have found it yourself if it had not been called to your attention?

Mr. DAVIES. I might have found his name, and connected it with other names that I knew.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know there is no index in the Congressional Record?

Mr. DAVIES. I know there isn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say that it wasn't called to your attention?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I can't say that. It may have been called to my attention.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any possibility that Mr. Fairbank himself called it to your attention?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I can't think he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any possibility Mr. Clubb might have called it to your attention?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you recall having heard any other charge bearing any relation to communism, against Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of the allegation that he had carried messages for the Communists?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I hadn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend the employment of Mr. Fairbank by the State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend Mr. Fairbank's employment by another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Mr. Fairbank be used for consultation and guidance by an agency of the United States?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Mr. Fairbank be used to prepare materials for another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. My answer to that is that I cannot reply to it because to do so would be to go into a top-secret operation, which I don't feel ready to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. I did not mean to cross you up by changing the order of my questions, although I did change them. The question that I ask earlier in the series with respect to these other persons I will ask now with respect to Mr. Fairbank.

Did you ever recommend to a representative of an agency of Government other than the State Department the utilization of Mr. Fairbank by that agency?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us any further details with regard to that recommendation?

Mr. DAVIES. No; for the reasons which I have given with respect to the others.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Fairbank's wife included in that recommendation?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state that Mr. Fairbank could be trusted to prepare materials which would represent the proper approach?

Mr. DAVIES. I cannot answer that because to do so would be to reveal the nature of a top-secret operation.

Mr. SOURWINE. I take it you noted that that question is slightly different from the question I asked in that regard with respect to these other people. I do not want to trap you, Mr. Davies.

Mr. DAVIES. I am sorry.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question I asked was: "Did you ever state that Mr. Fairbank could be trusted to prepare materials that would represent the proper approach?" I am not urging you to change your answer nor am I attempting to coerce your answer. I call your attention to the fact that the question is slightly different in form from the similar questions that have been asked earlier.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; I did recommend that, but I can't go further into the reasons.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Did you ever state that you had perfect confidence in both Professor and Mrs. Fairbank?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us anything further about any occasion on which you may have stated that?

Mr. DAVIES. I probably have stated that on a number of occasions, because that is what I believe.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Professor Fairbank be set up in an office by some agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state that Professor Fairbank was a person ideally suited to provide consultation and guidance for another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend his use for consultation and guidance by another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend the use of Mrs. Fairbank for consultation and guidance by another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend the use of Professor and Mrs. Fairbank for consultation and guidance by another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever defend Professor Fairbank or his wife, or he and his wife, from any allegation of communism or Communist connections?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; I think I have, on a number of occasions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, does that imply that you had heard charges made against them on a number of occasions?

Mr. DAVIES. It implies that, as I said, in the past few months I have heard that he is a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you have defended them against such allegations only during the past few months?

Mr. DAVIES. No; there may have been earlier allegations. There may have been earlier allegations against which I have defended them.

Mr. SOURWINE. How early? Do you know?

Mr. DAVIES. I cannot recall. That would be going back at least months and maybe a year or two.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a year ago defending Professor and Mrs. Fairbank, or either of them, against allegations of Communist connections or Communist sympathies?

Mr. DAVIES. I may have—it may have been a year ago; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you, as early as 2 years ago, defending Professor and Mrs. Fairbank, or either of them, against allegations of Communist connections or Communist sympathies?

Mr. DAVIES. It may have been that early.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you defending them against such allegations as early as 1949?

Mr. DAVIES. It may have been 1949.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you defending them as early as 1948?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, if there were such allegations in 1948—

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you, sir.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. For you to defend a person against an allegation, you would have had to have heard it. Allegations might have been heard elsewhere, but they would have no meaning in that connection. All I can do is ask you whether you were defending them against such allegations as early as 1948.

Mr. DAVIES. I do not recall any allegations as early as 1948. There may have been allegations in 1949. If there were, I certainly defended them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have been since, presumably 1949, and subsequently, been defending Professor and Mrs. Fairbank, or either of them, against such Com-

munist allegations as may have been made against them and have come to your attention?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any specific allegations that have been made against them and on which you have defended them?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state that they were not Communists, but only very sophisticated or very politically sophisticated?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't think I ever used those words. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a categorical answer?

Mr. DAVIES. That is a categorical answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is Professor Fairbank a very politically sophisticated man?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; I would say that he is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he so politically sophisticated that he could be confused with a Communist?

Mr. DAVIES. A Communist is politically naive, for my money.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not feel that political sophistication is an earmark of communism?

Mr. DAVIES. I think it is the reverse.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would not, under any circumstances, refer to a Communist as being politically sophisticated?

Mr. DAVIES. Never.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would never refer to a person in terms of so being politically sophisticated as an explanation of why they might be mistaken for a Communist?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you never did so refer to any of these people in any other way?

Mr. DAVIES. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have just a few more questions and we will be through, Mr. Chairman.

Is your acquaintanceship with Professor Fairbank's wife the outgrowth of your acquaintance and friendship with him?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you had any independent acquaintance with her?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know her as well as you know Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does she have any professional attainments?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes. She is a very talented woman in a number of ways. She is an artist. She is something of a student of history. For a while she was in the Department of State and in the field in China as a cultural relations officer, dealing with students.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long ago was that?

Mr. DAVIES. That was, I believe, in the last days of the war, or right after the war.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who employed her for that job?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who recommended her?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long was she there?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't know. My impression is it was perhaps a year or perhaps 2 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has she been employed by the Government or any Government agency since then, to your knowledge?

Mr. DAVIES. No; not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether she is working at all?

Mr. DAVIES. Pardon?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether she is working at all?

Mr. DAVIES. Now?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does she write for publication?

Mr. DAVIES. Not that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she ever?

Mr. DAVIES. She may have. I do not know of any of her writings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she a stenographer or typist?

Mr. DAVIES. Not so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she an expert on foreign affairs?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she a specialist in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. DAVIES. No; not technically so.

Mr. SOURWINE. She doesn't work with and collaborate with her husband?

Mr. DAVIES. No. She is independently a very intelligent and well-educated woman.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that is the picture?

Mr. DAVIES. That is the picture.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, sir, if I may hop around a little bit, I think I have left some loose ends.

Did you know Edgar Snow's second wife?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. And do you know who she was?

Mr. DAVIES. That is, the current one, is it?

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, I am asking you.

Mr. DAVIES. The only wife that I knew was named Wales.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you speak the Chinese language, sir?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are, as a matter of fact, one of a relatively small number of persons employed by the State Department today who do speak the Chinese language fluently, are you not?

Mr. DAVIES. That may be so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how many others there are in the Department who do?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't, but I could make a rough estimate of 10 or 15.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many do you know that do? Do you think you know all of the 10 or 15?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't know the younger ones.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you name those employees or officials of the State Department who, to your knowledge, speak Chinese fluently?

Mr. DAVIES. Who speak Chinese fluently?

Everett Drumwright, John S. Service, Philip D. Sprouse, Fulton Freeman, Edmund Clubb.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the same Mr. Clubb referred to earlier in this hearing?

Mr. DAVIES. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you finished your answer?

Mr. DAVIES. That is roughly, yes. That is the list that comes to mind.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not mean to burden this record with conclusions nor to try to testify, but isn't it perhaps an unfortunate thing that we do not have more experts in that language in the State Department than we have?

Mr. DAVIES. It is a very serious matter, and it is also a serious matter that very few of them now are dealing with Far Eastern affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why is that? Do you know what that is?

Mr. DAVIES. I have my guesses, but they aren't—

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you know?

Mr. DAVIES. They are personal guesses.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you know why that is?

Mr. DAVIES. I think it is because they have been persecuted out of the Far East. You have two China language officers in London.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who are they?

Mr. DAVIES. James K. Penfield and Arthur Ringwalt. Both of them are senior officers. Penfield is No. 3 in the London Embassy. He went there from Czechoslovakia.

In Paris there is Philip Sprouse, who was Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs in the Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say he was?

Mr. DAVIES. He was, prior to Clubb's arrival.

In Brussels is Raymond P. Ludden. In Rome is Joseph E. Jacobs, who is a career Minister, China Service. And there is assigned to Rome, Fulton Freeman, who was one of the best younger officers in China Service.

In Tangiers is John Carter Vincent, who is of China Service.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say all—

Mr. DAVIES. At the present time, in the two posts which deal most intimately in the field with China, that is, Hong Kong and Formosa, there is no senior

China language officer. They are all junior officers that have come in since the war. They are young men with very little background and experience in the problems they have to deal with.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does Dr. Schwartz speak Chinese?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does Edgar Snow speak Chinese?

Mr. DAVIES. Poorly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Agnes Smedley speak Chinese?

Mr. DAVIES. I think poorly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does Anna Louise Strong speak Chinese?

Mr. DAVIES. Not that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does Professor Fairbank speak Chinese?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does he speak it well?

Mr. DAVIES. He speaks, reads and writes it well.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is a Chinese scholar?

Mr. DAVIES. He is a scholar.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does Mrs. Fairbank speak Chinese?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does she also read and write?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; not as well as her husband.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does she read well enough to translate?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't think so. That is very difficult.

Mr. SOURWINE. I apologize for that diversion. I thought it would be well to have that situation in the record.

Now, I want to get back to the question of the top secret, because I think we have to tie this record up.

Mr. DAVIES. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask: Can you, without violation of top secret, identify for us the specific general directive under which you were operating?

Mr. DAVIES. It is an NC document, national-security document, establishing the operation, organization, regarding whom I made the personnel recommendations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, I assume, since you have not identified it with more particularity, you feel you cannot, without violating the classification itself?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; that classification is a top-secret document.

Mr. SOURWINE. That being the case, will you undertake to make the proper approach through the proper channels to the persons who might be able to make a determination as to whether this committee can have that document under the classification, and subject to the classification, and to inform the committee of the determination which is made in that regard?

Mr. DAVIES. That I make the approach?

Mr. SOURWINE. I know of no other way, since you cannot tell us whom to approach.

Mr. DAVIES. I can say that the most appropriate person to go to in the situation is the Director of Central Intelligence, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will General Smith know what we are referring to when we refer to it in the terms which are referred to here, which are at best very vague?

Mr. DAVIES. I think he will.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think we will have no question as to what to ask him for? Do you see any impropriety, sir, in the committee requesting that you make the approach, since you obviously know specifically what it is, and attempt to get us an answer from General Smith? Would it be improper for you to do so?

Mr. DAVIES. I should be glad to do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could we make that a request of the committee, Mr. Chairman? Senator SMITH. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you will get us an official refusal, or if it can be submitted to the committee, or to the chairman thereof, under whatever restrictions may be necessary?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I can envisage the possibility that it might be something that would not be for the eyes or knowledge of the staff, perhaps, but I find it hard to envision the possibility that anything can be so top secret that, for instance, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee may not be permitted to see it under proper classification.

Mr. DAVIES. I shall transmit this request to my superiors, who in turn will—

Mr. SOURWINE. Through what channels or what manner you deem appropriate under the circumstances, but with the end of getting the committee a definitive answer on it.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The chairman asks me to say that I should make it clear on the record that I meant Senator McCarran, but I would like to state also for the record that I have just as great difficulty in imagining a refusal for the present chairman of this hearing as in the case of the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Senator McCarran.

Senator SMITH. There might be some difference there.

Mr. SOURWINE. The record shows that the request is first on behalf of the committee, with a request that if they want to narrow that, they narrow it as far as they think necessary down to the point of an absolute refusal, which we hope will not result.

Now, sir, do you know whether any of these six people, that is, Prof. Benjamin Schwartz, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, Prof. John Fairbank and his wife, Mrs. Fairbank, were ever hired as a result of this recommendation which you made?

Mr. DAVIES. Insofar as I know, none of them were hired.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you know that they were not hired, don't you, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. I cannot answer categorically on this, because if they were hired, it would have been by another agency, but so far as I know, they certainly were not hired.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have seen and talked with Professor Fairbank since the date of this recommendation, have you not?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you know that he wasn't hired?

Mr. DAVIES. I know that he wasn't—within my knowledge he was not hired. Senator SMITH. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were using the word "hire," were you using it solely in the connotation of employment as an employee for compensation?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, now, let me repeat the question:

Do you know whether any of these six persons were ever utilized by the agency to which you made the recommendations, along the lines of the recommendations you made?

Mr. DAVIES. I have no knowledge, but my belief and all of the information that I have points to the fact that none of them were used for this purpose.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, as a matter of fact, you have seen, as you testified, Mr. Fairbank, since the recommendation was made?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do know, do you not, that Mr. Fairbank was not and has not been utilized in accordance with your recommendation?

Mr. DAVIES. So far as my information goes, he was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you have never discussed the matter with him at all?

Mr. DAVIES. I could not discuss a clandestine operation with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Not necessarily as such; but I mean, as between good friends, you know pretty well what he is doing?

Mr. DAVIES. I know what he is doing. His time is taken up. In fact, he is now in Japan or on his way to Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he had been utilized in the way which you recommended, you would have had opportunity to have learned of it, in his case, at least?

Mr. DAVIES. I probably would have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us, sir, since the project did not go forward and the people were not utilized in accordance with the recommendations, why it still remains a top secret?

Mr. DAVIES. Because the authorities who are in charge of this operation consider it in that category.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, in order to secure permission to testify with regard to this subject, testify beyond the point where you have felt you must stop, would you have to go outside of your own agency?

Mr. DAVIES. I think I would, because this operation is not under the State Department. This operation is under CIA, which is another agency.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would then have to get permission from General Smith?

Mr. DAVIES. Precisely.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it be improper for you, at the committee's request, to seek permission from General Smith to give the committee testimony with regard to that recommendation in executive session, and subject to such classification as might be imposed?

Mr. DAVIES. I certainly can make that request.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you be willing to do so?

Mr. DAVIES. I would be glad to.

Mr. SOURWINE. May the record show that as a request of the committee?

Senator SMITH. Yes. The record will so show.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you will report back to the committee what the answer is or the ruling is?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

The two things you want are—let me summarize: One is the authorization under which I decline to reveal this information; and secondly, a request for authorization for me to reveal the further details?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. DAVIES. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am almost through, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask whether, in connection with your recommendation of these six people, Mr. Davies, you thought it necessary to make any spot check or then current check with regard to security?

Mr. DAVIES. On all operations involving personnel, I consider it necessary to have a security check.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you do feel it necessary?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make such a check with regard to any of these six people?

Mr. DAVIES. No, because that was not in my purview to make the check.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you recommended them, subject to security check?

Mr. DAVIES. This again goes into the nature of the operation.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a question you cannot answer?

Mr. DAVIES. That is a question I cannot answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think on that point we have reached an impasse, an amicable impasse, Mr. Chairman, and I have no further questions of this witness at this time.

Senator SMITH. Very well. Thank you very much, for your testimony, Mr. Davies.

The committee is recessed subject to call.

(Whereupon, at 2:45 p. m., the committee was recessed subject to call.)

Mr. MORRIS. I also have here, Mr. Chairman, a memorandum dated June 19, prepared by me for the chairman of this committee, explaining that I have been to the office of Carlyle Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary of State, and examined the penciled notes which Alger Hiss made during the Yalta Conference. As I indicate in this memorandum, the notes do indicate that Hiss was active at the Conference and had an active role in the Conference, but that there is no direct IPR association in the notes. There is one reference, however, to the fact that a memorandum was handled by or prepared by Hiss urging President Roosevelt to take up with Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin the question of unity between the Kuomintang and the Communists. We have not been able to verify whether the note was prepared by the Secretary of State himself or by Mr. Hiss. It is among the Hiss notes. It has a notation by Charles E. Bohlen which indicated that the point had been taken up with Premier Stalin. I think it describes it "with satisfactory results."

Senator WATKINS. That memo may be received as part of the record.

(The memorandum referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1398" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1398

MEMORANDUM

JUNE 19, 1952.

To: Senator McCarran.

From: J. G. Sourwine and R. Morris.

Mr. Morris spent three afternoons in the office of Carlisle Humelsine, Undersecretary of State, examining pencil notes of Alger Hiss made at Yalta. On the third occasion, he was accompanied by Mr. Sourwine, and together we reviewed the folder containing the Hiss notes. After Mr. Morris left on this third occasion, Mr. Sourwine stayed on with the expectation of conversing with Mr. C. E. Bohlen, but spoke instead with Mr. Humelsine.

The Hiss notes do not directly concern the Institute of Pacific Relations, but they are very interesting and significant in a collateral way.

On the very first page, Hiss made a diagram of the seating arrangement at Yalta. The seating was around a round table, at which was seated 19 persons. On Mr. Roosevelt's left was C. E. B. (obviously standing for Bohlen). On his right was E. R. S. (obviously standing for Stettinius). On Stettinius' right was Leahy, and on his left was Byrnes and Harriman. Behind the President were Hopkins, Matthews, and Hiss. Maisky was on Stalin's left, and on his right were Molotov and Vyshinsky, and Gromyko, in that order. On the upper right-hand page there was a notation headed "tonight, Harriman, Page, and A. H. with Gromyko and who else." Hiss' handwritten notes indicated that E. R. S. had suggested the words "and the dismemberment" (referring to Germany) be added to article XII of the Articles of Surrender. Molotov apparently had a proposal of his own which he withdrew after Stettinius' suggestion. On this same page, in what was apparently the first day of the session, Hiss made the following note: "Intermission—Gromyko indicated he had not understood from L. P. (Pasvol-sky?) the change in the third paragraph of our proposal. I straightened him out on the text but he was still not satisfied that the effect of the reference to Roman numeral VIII was clear or desirable. He also said he would have great difficulty explaining its effect to his colleagues. He said it would be much easier for the R's if we could drop the whole reference and ask if Pres. would agree to that. I said I thought so." Later in the notes after the Roman numeral VIII there is the following notation, "Prisoners of War." ST (obviously Stalin) suggests mention of prisoners of war should be deleted. It was explained that this should be among the conferees and that they could take a decision and it would not be necessary to publish it. Molotov is reported as having said that it would come up in meeting of the Foreign Ministers. There was nothing else on the notes that would link up a reference made in the intermission note above and this last note other than the identity of Roman numerals.

On February 8th Hiss made a notation that after meeting of Foreign Secretaries, Jebb, Gromyko and Hiss met as a committee to discuss U. N. conference procedures. A. H. (Alger Hiss) explains State Department views, but said Pres. had not approved. After lunch before plenary session E. R. S. cleared all with Pres. and A. H. told Gromyko and sent word to Jebb.

There was one document dated February 10, 1945, on the stationery of the Secretary of State. Subject: Recommendation that the three powers encourage Kuomintang Communists unity in the war effort against Japan. As this is likely to be the final plenary session, I suggest that some time during today's meeting you find occasion to urge the Marshal and the Prime Minister to see that full encouragement is given by the governments to Kuomintang Communists unity in the war effort against Japan. The importance of encouraging united Chinese efforts at the moment must be apparent to all three governments.

Alger Hiss had pencilled a note in the corner of the page: "Bohlen says the Pres. has already taken this up with Stalin."

It was in connection with this memorandum that Mr. Sourwine had hoped to see Mr. Bohlen. He wanted to find out whether Hiss had dictated the memo on the letterhead of the Secretary of State. We also wanted to find out from Bohlen what were the circumstances described in Hiss' handwritten note. This could possibly be a corollary factor in the IPR hearings. Mr. Bohlen subsequently told Mr. Sourwine he did not remember seeing this memorandum, but did remember telling either Secretary Stettinius or Mr. Hiss that the President had taken this matter up with Stalin. There is another activity of Hiss' indi-

cated in the remainder of the notes. Six pages of notes taken by Mr. Morris are in the subcommittee file.

Appended with this memorandum are copies of all the correspondence between the Chairman and the State Department on this matter.

FEBRUARY 21, 1952.

HON. DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: A witness before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Dr. Edna R. Fluegel, testified yesterday that, in the course of her official duties at the Department of State, she dealt with and handled the penciled notes of Alger Hiss taken at Yalta which were available to her in her work of postwar planning.

Dr. Fluegel was an employee of the Department from 1942 to 1948.

On the basis of this testimony, the Internal Security Subcommittee agreed that these handwritten notes of Alger Hiss should be made available in the original, or photostatic duplicate, to the committee.

Your cooperation in this matter will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

MAY 1, 1952.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On February 21, 1952, I wrote to you asking that the handwritten notes of Alger Hiss taken at the Yalta Conference in 1945 be made available to the Internal Security Subcommittee.

In my letter of February 21, it was pointed out that a witness before the subcommittee, Dr. Edna Fluegel, an employee of the State Department from 1942 to 1948, testified that, in the course of her official duties in the Department, she dealt with and handled the penciled notes of Mr. Hiss.

This letter is written to determine what action has been taken on my request of February 21, 1952, to you.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

MAY 22, 1952.

HON. DEAN ACHESON,
*Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Under date of May 14, 1952, over the signature of Mr. David Bruce, the Under Secretary of State, your Department made reply to my letter of February 21, 1952. In view of the length of time (nearly 3 months) that my letter was apparently under study in the Department, I must conclude the Department's reply was carefully considered, and represents firm policy; and, therefore, I must assume that you participated in the decision which this letter reflects, and concur therewith.

The Department's letter of May 14, 1952, was as follows:

"This is in reply to your letter of February 21, 1952, in which you request the penciled notes which Alger Hiss made at the Crimea Conference. These papers contain informal notes of the internal discussions of the members of the American delegation to that conference. They also contain informal notes of the discussions at the international meetings held during the conference at which Mr. Hiss was present.

"It has been the consistent policy of the Department not to permit the release of papers of this type. If release were to be permitted, each person participating in the discussion of an American delegation in the future would feel called upon to take similar notes. The discussion would tend to be for the record rather than the full and frank exchange of views which is essential if a considered position is to be developed. By the same token, if the informal notes of the international meetings were released, persons now active in public life in friendly governments would have just cause to feel aggrieved. The position of the United States in future diplomatic discussions might well be prejudiced.

"For the above reasons, the request to make these notes available must be respectfully declined."

That letter is a rather remarkable document. It will bear some discussion.

At the outset, let me say frankly it had not been expected the Department would refuse to make the Hiss notes available to the Internal Security Subcommittee; though consideration had been given to the possibility that the Department might report that no such notes were in its possession. I am therefore grateful for the confirmation, contained in the first paragraph of the Department's letter, of the fact that these papers are in the possession of the State Department.

The State Department's answer that "it has been the consistent policy of the Department not to permit the release of papers of this type" is not an honest statement of fact. Informal notes, and in fact full transcripts of conferences, have been released in the past. The Wake Island Conference is only one example in a long series. Furthermore, Sherwood's book, the Forrestal diaries, Byrnes' book *Speaking Frankly*, and Stettinius' book, all gave what purported to be intimate conversations and descriptions of informal statements made at the Yalta Conference. There should be nothing about Alger Hiss' notes which would make them sacrosanct; nor should there be anything about the conversations of the persons mentioned in his notes, even "persons now active in public life in friendly governments," which would entitle those conversations to protection in a situation where no protection was given to the conversations of such persons as General MacArthur at Wake Island, and all those at Yalta who are mentioned in the Byrnes, Sherwood, and Stettinius books and the Forrestal diaries.

Incidentally, speaking of "persons now active in public life in friendly governments", Mr. Churchill has written extensively on his meetings with many Americans, and on many occasions has been quite candid. To mention a case more in point, the "inside" story of Klaus Fuchs is now being syndicated. Would your Department object to disclosure of any notes Fuchs may have made?

Alger Hiss was not just another State Department functionary. He is a man who has been found by a jury to have been guilty of acts which brand him as a traitor of his country. What he did in the State Department were not the acts of an ordinary man. The notes he took and the influence he bore on the shaping of our policy at the Yalta Conference should be known and exposed at this time. Certainly, the contents of the Hiss notes are a proper subject of inquiry by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

There is an implication in the Department's letter that to release those notes would give notice to all persons in the State Department that any notes they might take would be subject to release in the future. Perhaps there may have been such an implication in the release of other notes and recollections of various meetings; but in the particular case of the Hiss notes there is only implied notice that if the taker of notes subsequently is proven to be a traitor to his country his notes may be subject to examination by a Senate committee.

Alger Hiss was in a position where he could have placed many persons in key positions in our Government. We should know what his notes show about those with whom he dealt, those upon whom he relied, and those who assisted him; and we should check up on what they are doing now. By nature, training, and doctrine, Communists attract other Communists and put them in positions of influence.

The position of the United States in future diplomatic discussions, about which the Department's letter expresses concern, would be much more hampered by the continued presence of persons Alger Hiss may have put into important positions than it would be by any revelation of what Hiss wrote in his notes. It is an ironical standard that every single secret that the United States Government possessed, according to testimony before our subcommittee, was available to Alger Hiss in his position as Director of Postwar Planning; yet the notes which Hiss wrote at Yalta are being withheld not only from the people of the United States but even from the United States Senate.

I noted particularly that the Department's letter made no mention whatever of security in connection with the Hiss notes. I assume this was not because the Department thought the matter of security unworthy of consideration, or failed to consider it, but rather because no valid question of security, under the circumstances, could exist.

Though this letter has been written, as I have indicated, in the light of the assumption that the Department's answer under date of May 14 and over the signature of Mr. David Bruce, the Under Secretary of State, represented a considered decision in which you had participated and with which you concur,

yet I want to ask if there is any possibility that you wish to modify or amend that reply in any way. It is hard and painful to believe that your attitude with regard to Alger Hiss extends so far as to embrace a determination to protect his notes not only against public exposure but even against examination by a duly constituted committee of the United States Senate. I earnestly hope you will tell me there is still further word to come from the Department on this matter. I await your reply.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

June 3, 1952.

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: In accordance with your request, I have reviewed the correspondence between you and Mr. Bruce regarding the notes which Mr. Alger Hiss took at the Yalta Conference. The concern of the Department which Mr. Bruce was stressing was that reports made by an employee of the Department stating views expressed or positions taken by representatives of other governments should not be made public by the Department. The Department has, of course, no power to control writings by former officers or employees or former representatives of other governments.

Neither the Department nor I have any concern in withholding the notes for any other reason. Since you believe that these notes may have information bearing on Mr. Hiss or his activities, I would be perfectly willing to have a representative of the committee examine the notes in the Department. If, as a result of this examination, the committee feels that it requires any portion of these notes for its work, the Department will be prepared to discuss the question further.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have some specimens of the "pumpkin papers," and some of them concern a handwritten memorandum of Harry Dexter White which was turned up in our hearings. These come from Senator Richard Nixon, a Senator from California, and they were turned over to the committee with a covering letter from Senator Nixon dated June 7, 1952. May they, with the covering letter, go into the record at this time?

SENATOR WATKINS. They may be received and made a part of the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1399" and are as follow:)

EXHIBIT No. 1399

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,
June 7, 1952.

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: At the request of Mr. Robert Morris, counsel for the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I have forwarded to you under separate cover the following documents:

1. Documents identified as K-1, K-2, K-3, and copy of a memo from Harold J. E. Gessell regarding the handwriting of Harry D. White. These documents came from my files.

2. Documents identified as Q-1, Q-2, Q-3, and Q-4. These documents were obtained by me from the Un-American Activities Committee of the House of Representatives.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON.

March 2, 1949.
EI/HJEG : ml.
#1829.

Director, Inspection-Investigation Service.
Chief, Identification & Detection Division.

Examination of handwriting of Harry D. White (Committee on Un-American Activities).

1. On February 21, 1949, Investigator Owens, of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the U. S. House of Representatives, personally and informally submitted three photostatic copies of documents purporting to bear the known writings of one Harry D. White, which are identified as follows:

K-1 Photostatic copy of letter dated June 11, 1934, addressed to "Dr. Jacob Viner, Treasury Department, Washington, D. C." and signed "Harry D. White".

K-2 Photostatic copy of Personal History Statement (Standard Form No. 6), which purports to be the Personal History Statement of Harry Dexter White, understood to bear certain writings made by Harry Dexter White.

K-3 Photostatic copy of final portion of Personal History Statement (Standard Form No. 6), purporting to bear the known writings of Harry D. White.

Investigator Owens also submitted eight pages (photostatic copies) of questioned writing herein identified as Q-1 through Q-8.

2. It was requested that an examination and comparison be conducted of the purported known writings of Harry D. White (identified as K-1, K-2, and K-3) with the questioned writings (identified as Q-1 through Q-8), to determine whether Harry D. White is the author of the questioned writing. It was also requested that the documents as submitted be photographed, and that several copies of each document be attached to the report.

3. A careful examination and comparison was conducted regarding the aforementioned writings and as a result of such a study, it is concluded that the person responsible for the writings appearing on K-1, K-2, and K-3, purporting to be the known writings of Harry D. White, also is responsible for all of the writing appearing on Q-1 through Q-8. In other words, Harry D. White is the author of the questioned writings purporting to be notes involving State Department activities.

4. The above conclusion is subject to verification upon examination of the original documents.

5. Photostatic copies of the documents as submitted, together with three photographic copies of each document, are attached.

HAROLD J. E. GESELL.

Atts.

LAWRENCE COLLEGE
APPLETON, WISCONSIN

DEPARTMENT OF
ECONOMICS

June 11, 1929

Dr. Jacob Viner
Treasury Department
Washington, D.C.

Dear Professor Viner:

The remuneration stated in your letter is quite satisfactory and I shall report at Washington in June 1930. I am looking forward with interest to the summer's work.

Sincerely yours
Henry D. White

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K 1

Standard Form No. 1
April 1917
Revised 1-1-22

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

(To be prepared by members of the Institute)

Department or Establishment Treasury Date Nov 2, 1924

1. Name in full (Mr., Miss or Mrs.) White Harry Reuben

2. Present address 134 E. Madison Washington D.C.

3. Last known residence 24th Street Washington D.C.

4. Place born Barnstable Mass. Oct 22, 1892

5. If overseas born, state whether naturalized citizen Yes

6. Indicate sex, marital condition, and age by check in box: Male Single

7. Number of years of previous service with you 2 1/2 years

8. A summary sketch of your past service for the United States Government at other than military or naval:

NAME OF EMPLOYER	POSITION	DATE APPOINTED	DATE SEPARATED
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>Assistant Secretary</u>	<u>500 Nov 15, 1922</u>	<u>15 Dec 1924</u>
<u>Treasury</u>	<u>Chief Clerk</u>	<u>100 Oct 1, 1921</u>	<u>15 Dec 1924</u>

9. Family members of your family who are furnished with you in the U. S. Government service. If so, state below:

NAME	POSITION AND DEPARTMENT OR OFFICE	RELATIONSHIP
<u>None</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>None</u>

10. Do you have held any State Governmental office? If so, state below:

11. Are you married? If so, state name of wife or maiden name of a person who was in the military or naval service:

12. Military and naval service. If any, check: (1) to indicate branch and other information and give dates of enlistment and discharge:

NAME	BRANCH	DATE OF ENLISTMENT	DATE OF DISCHARGE
<u>None</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>None</u>

13. Military and naval service. If any, check: (2) to indicate branch and other information and give dates of enlistment and discharge:

14. Organization U. S. Treasury 1919

15. Rank Chief Clerk

16. Organization U. S. Treasury 1919

17. Rank Chief Clerk

18. Organization U. S. Treasury 1919

19. Rank Chief Clerk

K 2

4/10/30 - Taylor tried to pass the matter (under the
 this to the State to Hull & S. G.) to himself
 against an offer for financing & settlement of
 his & Wilson's debt to the U.S. The
 payment offer was made to Wilson & proposed to
 be received & paid but not to be settled
 a pattern on their part. At the settlement
 without considering the whole problem. The fact
 the Japanese amount was \$100,000. But
 was no reason to accept the offer on the basis
 matters of principle, precedent, policy, etc.
 (What is believed Taylor to have possibly have
 desired to pass W. into no debt settlement
 arrangement of that character. It is believed
 that Taylor tried to borrow \$100,000, possibly
 under the guise of securing a loan for the U.S.)

4/7/30 - N. named Captain to go to Japan with
 until he had been to Japan. After a week
 expected to Japan. As all on exchange conditions he is to
 act solely as an agent of communication and not discuss
 matters. Englishmen are not now interested in

II

in some border of against Japan, some incident may develop which will lead them to the measures of our cooperation. We are likely to act alone only if unusually local incident occurs such as another Panay incident.

A few months ago the ship has increased greatly its storage facilities for oil. Tanks built underground with two layers of thick cement and air space between for protection against bombing - says by the way that through the ship's gun, many concrete bunkers had been destroyed in the past. But for all that we were as strong for our time as last.

See sketch of ship to see how China and its spirit.

If Japan repeats another incident like the many recent ones machinery is all ready to cut off Japanese imports into U.S. & force her dollar balances. This was done at the time of the 1911-12 war. It remains unknown outside of Germany.

We have just agreed to purchase 50 million dollars of cotton from China. The China has ~~the~~ will have left (almost all in London) a total 100 million of dollars. Her dollar reserves are almost all gone.

Butler just called to Mr. (Copy at a minute) minutes by the end of the month. Payment to him. He said that if he gets more power he would greatly strengthen ties with U.S. & R. & reason of the fact that France will not come to her aid and of the fact that the United States is not. He also said that if he gets the end of the year he would get through with the resistance "like utter" and would also get through with the resistance against their wishes. He must forget that there is any chance of his

becoming smaller.

Raymond believed the solution of French ~~economic~~ ^{economic} situation is ~~sharp drop~~ ^{to permit} a ~~sharp~~ sharp drop in the franc. Also to ~~bring in~~ ^{bring in} a ~~amount~~ ^{amount} that would include ~~any~~ ^{any} ~~amount~~ ^{amount}. Blum claims he doesn't want to be ~~known~~ ^{known}.
 Now he has been tried ^{to} get Eng. & U.S. to agree to support the franc. (Not the slightest chance. The prospects of continued depreciation of franc are very strong.)

I have heard nothing as to Capt. Ingersoll's mission to Tokyo and my earlier explanation. He is so the Treasury is concerned he is supposed to be there in case of another incident with Japan. In that event he would serve as secret liaison man between Eng. & U.S. unknown to anybody as to the nature of his mission. The Chamberlain turned us down at the time of the Penny incident when we asked him whether he would cooperate with us in placing exchange restrictions against Japanese operations in case we decided to do so, but another Munich-like incident may bring them around.

3 State Dept. was eager to accept Hungary's debt offer & sold idea to Sec. W. & President. But Congress doesn't want to begin debt negotiations with Hungary.

The Van Zealand report was not
taken seriously here.

Q 3

(via Colman)

Backman of the Swiss Nat. Bank said 2/10/38 that the Japanese have recently put out a feeler to some of his banks for a loan for industrial development in Manchukuo. However, his bankers had not sufficient interest in such a proposition even to submit it to the National Bank for consideration and possible approval.

Schacht impressed me with some of my friends as expressing some hope in the New Zealand report on a basis for a possible agreement between Germany and the British and the French.

Schacht said he positively did not know what had taken place at the meeting between Hitler and Schuschnigg.

65 big snail
4 little slips

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have one other affidavit here, and that is an affidavit by Igor Bogolepov, who has been a witness before this committee. I would like this added to the list of affidavits previously introduced.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The affidavit referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1400" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT 1400

THE AIMS AND METHODS OF SOVIET POLICIES IN THE FAR EAST IN 1937-44

I. GENERAL BACKGROUND

The theory which guided the Soviet Far East policy more than actual balance of powers was Lenin's theory of colonial Asia as a reserve of the world proletarian revolution. In Stalin's time this theory was completed by recognition of the fact of the failure of the worker movement in the west to become a vehicle for Communist domination; now the poor and bewildered masses of the Orient had to play the role of cannon fodder for communism, and, contrary to Marx, the pace of the world revolution had to take an east-west direction, instead of a west-east direction. Out of this came the change in the Communist tactics and slogans from the internationalistic proletarian line to nationalistic popular line.

I have to repeat once more and with full responsibility that although strange to the western mind, this theoretical set-up, and not merely political realities, commanded the mind of Soviet leaders and their actions.

II. POLICIES TOWARD JAPAN

One can say that in case of Japan the Soviet policies were less internationalistic in form—that is, communistic—and more customary than anywhere in the relations of the Soviet Union with other foreign countries; it must be emphasized, however, that generally speaking the mentality of the members of the Politburo and their actions were motivated by interest of the international Communist movement and Communist world revolution rather than by any Russian national interest, the latter always being sacrificed for the first.

Since the rise of nazism and the beginning of Japanese aggression on the Asiatic mainland Stalin's main preoccupation consisted in avoiding a war on two fronts; as we know here he succeeded fully and wholly. This line of policy required a lot of appeasement in the case of Japan. Therefore, the Comintern was actually "put on ice" in the case of Soviet relations with Japan. The Soviet policy toward that country was channeled through the Foreign Office (NKID) and not through the Comintern, as it was in the case of China. Being frightened by Japanese menace, the Soviet leaders required always from the Foreign Office staff to carry out such kind of policy which will not induce the Japanese to believe we are carrying out Communist subversive tactics. We were ordered to be extremely careful and polite to the Japanese. The idea was to make the Japanese believe that the U. S. S. R. intended to entertain with them relations as usually existing between nations, that Comintern and Communist tactics were not to be applied by the U. S. S. R. in its relations with Japan. Previously to my own participation in the negotiations with the Japanese on the oil concessions on Sakhalin and fisheries around Kamchatka, I had to read the directives and then had to sign them as proof I had read them. Of course, all this does not preclude the efforts of Soviet military and naval intelligence to penetrate Japan (mostly with the assistance of Koreans and Chinese as well as the White Russian emigrants). Yet more important in China proper the Soviet Union met military aggression of Japan with methods of propaganda, Communist subversive activities, and so forth, that's along the usual Communist lines of conducting the struggle.

The second aim of the Soviet policy toward Japan besides the tactics of appeasement, of avoiding much friction directly between the U. S. S. R. and Japan, was indeed the aim of diverting the Japanese aggression from the northwest to the southwest (from the Soviet angle of view). In this respect the Soviet Foreign Office was instructed to let the Japanese think that the U. S. S. R. would not

oppose any Japanese move against (a) British, Dutch, and other European colonies in China and Indonesia, (b) China proper.

I remember having read in the secret files of Litvinov's office the same instructions to the newly appointed Ambassador Malik in 1938. At the same time the Japanese were told that every attempt to move in the general direction of the Soviet sphere, including Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang, would "create serious consequences."

In accordance with this double line of ideas, the Chinese Communist forces were transferred in 1931 from the south China to Yen'an and adjoining areas. It was tantamount to an invitation for the Japanese to attack China proper as well as a warning against any aggressive steps toward the Siberian border. We had in our files the text of declaration to that effect made by Karakhan to the Japanese Government.

Only after long hesitation and arguing inside the Politburo the Soviet Union decided to take a risk of an open clash with the Japanese on the Siberian border in order to show that Soviet leaders meant business. Everything was at stake to defeat the Japanese military reconnaissance in strength directly on the Siberian border (1938) and in the steppes of Mongolia (1938-39). In the Khalkin-Gol operation Marshal Zhukov first proved his military talent, and the invading force was circled and annihilated with the help of then secret task force of the famous tanks T-34. The risk was worth while to undertake. The strength of the Soviet Far East defense impressed the Japanese greatly. The reports of the Soviet ambassadors in Great Britain and Japan, as I remember, told that this was the turning point in the Japanese policy. Then they decided positively to take the Pacific and Indonesia direction instead of Siberia-Mongolia. As Litvinov told me in 1939 that here was the great success of Soviet policy and one of the main premises of the failure of the coming German onslaught.

It is quite obvious that the Soviets were vehemently opposed to any attempt by the Japanese to approach the United States or vice versa. They were interested only in an open clash in the Pacific, for this would be the surest guaranty for them on their Far East frontier. I can only wonder myself at the thinking of some people—that is why the Soviet Union did not release to the United States Government information of the coming attack on Pearl Harbor. As General Vlassov, one of the defenders of Moscow, told me later that Pearl Harbor rescued Moscow in December 1941.

WASHINGTON.

District of Columbia, ss:

I have prepared the within statement, and I represent that the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief and are predicated on the basis of my experience within the Soviet organization.

IGOR BOGOLEPOV.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of June 1952.

[SEAL]

CHAS. E. ALDEN.

Notary Public, District of Columbia.

My commission expires August 18, 1952.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have something here?

Mr. MANDEL. I have two quotations from a volume entitled "The United Front" by George Dimitrov, pages 52 and 193, which I would like to introduce into the record.

Senator WATKINS. They may be received.

(The quotations referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1401" and are as follows:)

"Comrades, you remember the ancient tale of the capture of Troy. Troy was inaccessible to the armies attacking her, thanks to her imprégnable walls. And the attacking army, after suffering many sacrifices, was unable to achieve victory until, with the aid of the famous Trojan horse, it managed to penetrate to the very heart of the enemy's camp."

(The United Front, by Georgi Dimitrov, general secretary, Communist International, International Publishers, 1938, p. 52).

"The efforts of the Communist Party, directed toward ending the civil war in the country and establishing collaboration with the Kuomintang and all other political groupings and armed forces of China in the organization of resistance to the Japanese marauders, have the sympathy, endorsement, and support of the friends of the Chinese people throughout the world." (ibid, p. 193).

Mr. MANDEL. I have here excerpts from the testimony of Lee Pressman before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on August 28, 1950, which I would like to introduce in the record, including several pages.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The excerpts referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1402" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1402

HEARINGS REGARDING COMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT—PART 2

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C., Monday, August 28, 1950.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:50 a. m., in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood, Francis E. Walter, Burr P. Harrison, John McSweeney, Morgan M. Moulder, Richard M. Nixon, Francis Case, and Harold H. Velde.

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; Donald T. Appell, and Courtney Owens, investigators; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call at this time Mr. Lee Pressman.

Mr. Wood. Let us have order, please.

Mr. Pressman, will you hold up your right hand, please. You swear that the evidence you will give this committee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. PRESSMAN. I do.

Mr. Wood. Have a seat, please.

TESTIMONY OF LEE PRESSMAN

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you state your full name?

Mr. PRESSMAN. My name is Lee Pressman.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Pressman, the record of proceedings of this committee shows that you appeared before it on August 20, 1948, and at that time you refused, on constitutional grounds, to answer certain questions relating to your alleged affiliation with the Communist Party.

The Committee on Un-American Activities has learned through the public press that when you recently resigned from the American Labor Party you issued a statement to the effect that you were doing so because of the Communist control of that organization. The committee has consistently endeavored to give an opportunity to witnesses who have appeared before it to repudiate their Communist affiliations or associations. A full disclosure of your knowledge of Communist Party activities would perform a great public service, especially at this time, when acts of military aggression are being committed by the forces of international communism. It would also be evidence that the break with your alleged Communist association has been full and complete, and that your action was taken in good faith.

The committee will not be satisfied with a mere perfunctory repudiation of the Communist Party, nor, it is suggested, will the American public. The committee desires to know if you are willing to cooperate with it in its effort

to expose Communist activities by answering such questions as will be propounded to you with regard to Communist activities during the course of this hearing?

Mr. PRESSMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask at this time for the opportunity of making a brief statement to the committee.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Pressman, you will be accorded the privilege of making whatever statement you desire, but you have just been asked a direct question, and we would like to have a direct answer to that question.

Mr. PRESSMAN. May I suggest the question was rather lengthy.

Mr. WOOD. The latter part was direct.

Mr. PRESSMAN. I believe my statement, which will be very brief, will answer the question, as well as indicate precisely what my position will be before the committee today.

Mr. WOOD. Then will you be prepared to answer questions asked you?

Mr. PRESSMAN. That is correct.

Mr. WOOD. Proceed.

Mr. PRESSMAN. I understand, Mr. Chairman, there is a desire that I further clarify the position which I took in my recent letter resigning from the American Labor Party. This I desire to do, as well as take this opportunity to expose many distortions which have been circulated regarding my past activities. There has been considerable speculation regarding my past activities. I propose at this moment to set forth a few very simple facts.

In the early 1930's, Mr. Chairman, as you may well recall, as well as other members of this committee, there was a very severe depression in our country. The future looked black for my generation just emerging from school. At the same time, the growing specter of nazism in Germany presented to my mind an equally grave threat.

In my desire to see the destruction of Hitlerism and an improvement in economic conditions here at home, I joined a Communist group in Washington, D. C., about 1934. My participation in such group extended for about a year, to the best of my recollection. I recall that about the latter part of 1935—the precise date I cannot recall, but it is a matter of public record—I left the Government service and left Washington to reenter the private practice of law in New York City. And at that time I discontinued any further participation in the group from that date until the present.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I state the following at this time:

There were three other persons in that group in addition to myself. They were all at the time with me in the Department of Agriculture. They have all been named before this committee by others.

I state to you that I am prepared, as I will indicate, to answer any and all questions regarding my activities in the past up to the present, and possibly project my viewpoint into the future. It would be offensive to me, as it would be to practically all people, to have to name individuals with whom I have associated in the past.

What I have stated to you would indicate that I offer no additional information that this committee does not already have. However, that is a decision which this committee will have to make in propounding its questions to me and the directives you issue to me.

Bear in mind, sir, there may be others like myself who, out of deep convictions, will change their beliefs. If this committee assumes the position that those who do change their convictions and beliefs, as I have, must also be compelled to take what I submit would be an offensive—offensive to one's own personal self—position, that might well be discouraging to other people to do what I have done. But, I repeat, that is a decision which this committee will have to make.

Now, I believe it is of interest to comment that I have no knowledge regarding the political beliefs or affiliations of Alger Hiss. And when I say I have no knowledge, I am not endeavoring to quibble with this committee. I appear here, as I necessarily must, as a lawyer. I am a lawyer. When one asks me for knowledge, knowledge to my mind is based on fact, and I have no facts. And bear in mind, sir, that as an attorney, to be asked to comment on a case now pending in court is a very unusual experience for an attorney, because anything I say undoubtedly may have an impact one way or another on that case, and for that reason I am trying to be very, very precise. I do know, I can state as a matter of knowledge, that for the period of my participation in that group,

which is the only basis on which I can say I have knowledge, Alger Hiss was not a member of the group.

Now, those two statements of mine are based on knowledge, which embraces facts within my possession. I do not believe that this committee would want me to hazard conjectural surmise. That is not my function. You want from me, I assume, facts and nothing but facts.

Now, there has been a great deal of wild speculation, a great deal of unfortunate distortion, regarding my name as it arose in the course of previous testimony before this committee by a man named Chambers.

When I left the city of Washington I advised the group—and I believe on that occasion Mr. Peters may have been present—that I was leaving the city of Washington, leaving the Federal Government, and I was disassociating myself from the group, or the Communist Party, or any group of the Communist Party.

Mr. WOOD. Were all members of the group present when you made that assertion?

Mr. PRESSMAN. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you assign any reason for doing so?

Mr. PRESSMAN. I think the most precise way I can put it is to say, as I have stated before, that I wanted to leave the Federal Government, that I was going back to the city of New York and that I preferred from that moment on, at least, in my private practice, not to have organizational relationship with the Communist Party, such as being a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. TAVENNER. That did not mean that you had severed all connection with the Communist Party, did it?

Mr. PRESSMAN. At that time?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

Mr. PRESSMAN. At that time it did not.

Mr. TAVENNER. Tell the committee about your subsequent connection with the Communist Party.

Mr. PRESSMAN. Over the past number of years I have had contacts and dealings with known leaders of the Communist Party whom I have met from time to time.

Mr. TAVENNER. And what was the nature of those contacts which you have mentioned?

Mr. PRESSMAN. They would discuss with me their viewpoints, their recommendations, and suggestions, with respect to organizational activities of the CIO while I was counsel for the CIO. I discussed those problems with these people. When they made recommendations or suggestions which I deemed to be of assistance or helpful to the CIO, I accepted them.

I state here now, as categorically as I can, that at no time from 1936 until 1948 did I take instructions or directives from anyone, including these leaders of the Communist Party, which were contrary to the established policy of the CIO. The only persons who gave me instructions or directives while I was with the CIO were the official officers of the CIO. And here now I challenge anyone to point to a single act or utterance of mine while I was with the CIO, Mr. Chairman, which was contrary to the established policy of the CIO.

Mr. CASE. But you did receive instructions during the period you were a member of the Communist Party and in the Department of Agriculture?

Mr. PRESSMAN. I would say I do not recall instructions as such, Mr. Congressman, because in the kind of work I was then doing there was nothing I could be instructed about.

Mr. NIXON. Mr. Pressman, can I go back a moment to your break with the party. You said you wanted no organizational relationship with the party?

Mr. PRESSMAN. In the sense of considering myself a member completely committed to all the policies and doctrines of the Communist Party.

Mr. NIXON. Was your break in 1935 an ideological break with the party?

Mr. MANDEL. The next is a letter of transmittal from the Library of Congress with the material sent to us on June 16, 1952, covering the contributors to the Far Eastern Survey of Pacific Affairs.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1403" and are as follows:)

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
Washington 25, D. C., June 16, 1952.

Hon. PAT McCARRAN,
Chairman, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: We are transmitting to you the study on the contributors to the Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs, which we have compiled for the subcommittee.

Sincerely yours, ,

W. C. GILBERT, *Acting Director.*

[illegible]

No.	Name	Publica- tion	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items		
23	H. F. Angus.....	FES.....									2	1	2	1	9½	3										9½	3	26	10	
24	William N. Angus.....	FES.....													2	1										2	1	2	1	
25	"Anonymous".....	FES.....																												
26	Vera Anstey.....	FES.....							10	1	9	1	19	2	3½	1										3½	1	3½	1	
27	E. H. Austice.....	FES.....															1½	1			2½	1	4	1			8	3	8	3
28	John Apostol.....	FES.....																												
29	Salvador Araneta.....	FES.....															1	1								1	1	1	1	
30	Capt. Jaek Arbolino.....	FES.....															5	1								5	1	5	1	
31	Gilbert Archey.....	FES.....															½	1								½	1	½	1	
32	Elizabeth H. Armstrong.....	FES.....															1½	1								1½	1	1½	1	
33	Juleau Arnold.....	FES.....															1	1								1	1	2½	1	
34	F. V. Asbeek.....	FES.....																												
35	Frank Ashton-Gwatkin.....	FES.....																												
36	"Asiaticus".....	FES.....																												
37	Ungku A. Aziz.....	FES.....	15	1									15	1															56½	5
38	Carl Bache.....	FES.....										½	1	½	1	½	1										½	1	1	2
39	Paul S. Bachman.....	FES.....																												
40	H. W. Baernsprung.....	FES.....																												
41	K. H. Bailey.....	FES.....	1	1									1	1															2	1
42	Sydney Bailey.....	FES.....																									8½	3	10	4
43	H. F. Bain.....	FES.....																									1½	1	1½	1
44	John Earl Baker.....	PA.....																									2	1	2	1

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

No.	Name	Publica- tion	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total			
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items		
111	Isaiah Bowman	FES	½	1									½	1														½	1			
112	Robert G. Bowman	FES																														
113	R. J. F. Boyer	PA																	1	1								1	1			
114	Alex L. Ter Braake	PA							9	1			9	1														9	1			
115	Anita Bradley	PA									½	1	½	1														½	1			
116	Alexander Brady	FES	10	1							10	1																12½	2			
117	Robert A. Brady	PA						½	1		1½	1	1½	1					1	1							1	2½	2			
118	Ralph J. D. Braibanti	FES	13½	1							13½	1																13½	1			
119	Jean-Yves Le Branchu	PA													3	1	4	1	5½	1							12½	3				
120	Willem Brand	FES																														
121	William Brandt	PA																	1	1½	2	1	2				1½	1	4½	6		
122	Herbert Bratter	FES	19	1	17½	2					36½	3																77½	4			
123	J. B. Brebner	PA																										52	3			
124	John Brent	FES													1½	1											1½	1	1½	1		
125	Hilda A. Bretholtz- Austern	PA																										3½	2			
126	A British Observer	FES																										1	1			
127	Roswell S. Britton	PA																														
128	J. B. Brigden	FES																										23	2			
129	Alan Houghton Brodrick	PA							5½	2			5½	2														12	1			
130	Bernard Brodie	FES																										5½	2			
131	Fawn M. Brodie	PA			4½	2	1	1			1½	1	7	4					1½	1								1½	1			
132	Jan O. M. Broek	FES	½	1					9	4	3½	1																	7	4		
		PA	1½	1	½	1	10	1	2	2		13	6	1	1	2	1											2½	1	15½	7	
												14	5															3½	3	17½	8	

[illegible]

No.	Name	Publica- tion	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	Subtotal	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	Subtotal	Grand total
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
155	Claude A. Buss.....	FES....						---	$\frac{1}{2}$		$\frac{1}{2}$			$6\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{71}{2}$	3
156	Paul Butter.....	PA.....						---	$\frac{1}{2}$		$\frac{1}{2}$			$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{2}{2}$	2
157	Charles Buttrose.....	FES....						---	$\frac{1}{2}$					$4\frac{1}{2}$	4	4
158	Hugh Byas.....	PA.....			3	1		$3 \frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$		2	1			$\frac{4}{3}$	1
159	Hector C. Bywater.....	FES....						$1\frac{1}{2}$							$\frac{1}{2}$	1
160	W. R. E. B.....	FES....														
161	C.....	FES....														
162	John F. Cady.....	FES....							$9\frac{1}{2}$				$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
163	George Caiger.....	PA.....							$\frac{1}{2}$				6	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{16}{5}$	5
164	Oliver Caldwell.....	FES....							$\frac{1}{2}$					$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
165	Merton Cameron.....	PA.....		1				1				1			1	1
166	Schuyler Camman.....	FES....														
167	Persia Campbell.....	FES....								$\frac{1}{2}$				$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
168	Andrew Caniff-Gra(dan- zev).	FES....			$\frac{1}{2}$	1		$\frac{1}{2}$	1						$\frac{1}{2}$	3
169	Marian Cannon.....	FES....													$20\frac{1}{2}$	3
170	A. Capell.....	PA.....													5	4
171	Evas F. Carlson.....	FES....	6					6					1		1	1
172	W. A. Carothers.....	FES....													6	2
173	Edward C. Carter.....	PA.....		1	1			1							1	1
174	Gwendolen M. Carter.....	FES....			4	3	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$9\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$					$\frac{1}{2}$	15	9
175	William D. Carter.....	FES....				$10\frac{1}{2}$	2	$10\frac{1}{2}$		$1\frac{1}{2}$		2		$11\frac{1}{2}$	3	5
176	Frank T. Cartwright.....	PA.....													$\frac{1}{2}$	1
												$4\frac{1}{2}$			$\frac{1}{2}$	1

[illegible]

No.	Name	Publica- tion	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
199	Chatham House Paper (Eng.).	FES													15	1											15	1		1
200	Su-ching Ch'en.	FES																												
201	Han-seng Chen.	FES																												
202	Shou-Yi Chen.	FES													6	1	1 1/2	1	4	1							4	1		4
203	Ch'ao-Ting Chi.	FES														2	2	2	2	3	1						8	7		35 1/2
204	Tuan-sheng Ch'ien.	FES																												28
205	At-Li S. Chin.	FES																												
206	Rockwood Q. P. Chin.	FES																												
207	Small Political Parties of China.	FES																												
208	A. Kaining Chiu	FES																												
209	S. R. Chow.	FES																												
210	John L. Christian.	FES																												
211	Coehing Chin.	FES																												
212	Ching-Lai Chin	FES																												
213	Arthur C. Churchill	FES																												
214	Andrew H. Clark	FES																												
215	Colin Clarke	FES																												
216	Elizabeth Allerton Clark	FES																												
217	Walter Clark	FES																												
218	J. R. Clementin	FES																												
219	Harlan Cleveland	FES																												
220	Edwin Clough.	FES																												

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No.	Name	Publica- tion	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total		
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items	
243	Harold J. Coolidge.....	FES.....													4	1			1	1							5	2	5	2	
244	Elizabeth W. Cope.....	PA.....																	2½	1					2½	1	2½	1			
245	D. B. Copland.....	FES.....																													
246	Charles H. Corbett.....	FES.....												8	2				9	1							9	1	9	1	
247	Percy Corbett.....	PA.....																									1	1	1	1	
248	Duvon C. Corbitt.....	PA.....	1	1	4½	2	1½	1	¾	1	7½	5	2½	1		1	1											7½	5	7½	5
249	Richard J. Coughlin.....	FES.....																									4½	1	4½	1	
250	John W. Coulter.....	PA.....																													
251	Reginald Coupland.....	FES.....																													
252	Donald Cowie.....	FES.....												12	1																
253	Spencer Cox.....	PA.....																													
254	John G. Crowford.....	PA.....																									4	1	4	1	
255	A. Creech Jones.....	PA.....																													
256	Hertlee Glesner Creel.....	FES.....												1	1																
257	George B. Cresey.....	PA.....												5	1																
258	W. R. Crocker.....	PA.....																									3½	2	3½	2	
259	E. H. G. Crosby.....	FES.....																													
260	Sir Josiah Crosby.....	FES.....																													
262	Robert M. Cullum.....	FES.....																													
263	Margaret S. Culver.....	PA.....																													
264	Kenneth B. Cumberland.....	FES.....												4	1				4	1											
265	George Cunningham.....	PA.....																													

No.	Name	Publica- tion	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
266	Jean A. Curran, Jr.	FES																								
267	S. J. C.	FES																								
268	"J. B. C."	PA											1	1											2	1
269	F. W. Dalley	FES	2	1					2½	1				4½	2					2	1					
270	Howard Daniel	PA																								
271	M. L. Dantwala	PA																								
272	Edward M. David	FES																								
273	Madeline David	PA																								
274	J. W. Davidson	FES																								
275	C. Collins Davies	PA																								
276	C. H. Davies	FES																								
277	Harold C. Davis	PA																							5	1
278	Joseph S. Davis	FES																								
279	Kingsley Davis	PA																								
280	C. C. Dawson	FES																								
281	Edgar Packard Dean	PA																								
282	Vera Micheles Dean	FES																						6	1	6
283	J. W. Decker	PA																								
284	John De Francis	FES																								
285	Jane Degras	PA																								
286	John C. De Korne	FES																								
287	Paschal M. D'Elia, S. J.	PA							9	1				9	1										2½	1

No.	Name	Publica- tion	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total				
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items					
266	Jean A. Curran, Jr.	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	10	2	---	---	10	2	10	2			
267	S. J. C.	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---			
268	"J. B. C."	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	3	2				
269	F. W. Dalley	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	4½	2				
270	Howard Dantel	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	10	1				
271	M. L. Dantwala	PA	1	1	4½	3	3	2	1½	1	5½	4	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	4½	1	---	---	1½	1	9	7			
272	Edward M. David	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	4½	1				
273	Ma'elme David	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	½	1				
274	J. W. Davidson	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1	1				
275	C. Collins Davies	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1½	1	20	4		
276	C. H. Davies	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1	1				
277	Harold C. Davls	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---			
278	Joseph S. Davis	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	5	1			
279	Kingsley Davis	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	6	1			
280	C. C. Dawson	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---			
281	Edgar Packard Dean	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---			
282	Vere Michels Dean	FES	½	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1	1			
283	J. W. Decker	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---			
284	John De Francis	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---			
285	Jane Degras	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	4	2			
286	John C. De Korne	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	2	2			
287	Paschal M. D'Elha, S. J.	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	4	3			
		FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
		PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	9	1			
			---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	2½	1			

No.	Name	Publica- tion	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	Subtotal	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	Subtotal	Grand total
			Number of pages	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
288	P. Demieville.....	FES.....										3½	1	3½	1	7
289	Raymond Dennett.....	FES.....				7½	3	17½	6	4	1	3½	1	4	21½	
290	Tyler Dennett.....	FES.....					3½	1	3½	1					3½	1
291	Eleanor Denison.....	FES.....		5	2	12	3	19½	6						19½	6
292	R. A. Derrick.....	FES.....										1½	1		5½	1
293	KI Hadjar Dewantara.....	FES.....													1½	1
294	Margaret Dewar.....	FES.....													1½	1
295	A. Gordon Dewey.....	FES.....								1½	1		½	1	1½	1
296	R. Van Dijk.....	FES.....													2	1
297	Subhas K. Dhar.....	FES.....							2½	1					2½	1
298	Ethel B. Dietrich.....	FES.....								½	1				½	1
299	Maurice Dobb.....	FES.....													12	2
300	E. H. G. Dobby.....	FES.....							2	1	2½	1			4½	2
301	Vera Dodds.....	FES.....											1	1	1	1
302	Dudley B. Donald.....	FES.....	1½	1				1½	1						1½	1
303	Anthony Do Yangly.....	FES.....													7	1
304	J. G. Drabbe.....	FES.....										½	1		½	1
305	C. Dragoni.....	FES.....													2	1
306	W. M. Drummond.....	FES.....													1½	2
307	Wilbert B. Dublin.....	FES.....													1½	2
308	Homer H. Dubs.....	FES.....											11	1	11	1
309	Paul S. Dull.....	FES.....				1½	1			2	2				3½	3
								1½	1		2	1			2	1

No.	Name	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
		Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
310	Foster Rhea Dulles.....																								
311	J. Kyuang Dunn.....																								
312	J. Leslie Dunston.....																								
313	R. Ernest Dupuy.....																								
314	Walter A. Durham, Jr.....																								
315	J. J. L. Duyvendak.....			5	1																				
316	"E".....							3½	1	1	1	4½	2			2	1							2	1
317	Frances M. Earle.....															½	1							½	1
318	Ruth Earnshaw.....																								
319	Paul E. Eaton.....															1	1							1	1
320	W. Eberhard.....																								
321	Kernit Eby.....																								
322	H. Edelman.....																	1	1					1	1
323	Editors.....																	3½	1	3½	1			7	2
324	Corwin D. Edwards.....							2½	1									1½	1					1½	1
325	Geertul Van Eeghen.....																								
326	Fred Egan.....																								
327	F. W. Eggleston.....																								
328	Polly Eggleston.....																								
329	Emily L. Ehle.....																								
330	Ivan Elchibegoff.....																	6½	1	2	1			8½	2
331	Barnard Ellinger.....																								
																1	1							1	1

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No.	Name	Publica- tion	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total			
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332	George Fielding Elliot.....	FES												2	1														2	1		
333	Edwin R. Embree.....	FES												1½	1														1	1		
334	John F. Embree.....	PA				1	1							1														2½	2			
335	Brooks Emeny.....	PA							4	1				4	1													11	5			
336	Rupert Emerson.....	PA																									4	4				
337	Edgar B. Emery, Lt. Col.	FES																														
338	Leonard Engel.....	PA												13½	5													25	7			
339	J. F. Engers.....	PA				3½	2	1	1					4½	3												2½	1	2½	14		
340	R. C. K. Ensor.....	FES																											2½	1		
341	Barbara Entenberg.....	PA																											4½	3		
342	I. Epstein.....	FES																											1	1		
343	Jean Escarra.....	PA																											1	1		
344	Willard R. Espy.....	FES												1	1													4½	1	4½	1	
345	Ethel Ewing.....	PA																											2	1	2	2
346	Charles B. Fabs.....	FES																														
347	John K. Fairbank.....	PA																											2	1	2	1
348	Wilma Fairbank.....	FES												3	1													16	5	16	5	
349	Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley..	PA																											6½	2	11	4
350	Fobert A. Falconer.....	FES																											2	2	2	2
351	Chaoying Fang.....	PA																											1½	1	1½	1
352	Miriam S. Farley.....	FES																											6	2	19	6
353	Victor Farmer.....	PA																											2½	2	3½	2

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397	Phillip Fugh.....	FES.....																											$\frac{1}{2}$	1
398	Shuji Fujii.....	FES.....																											1	1
399	Holden Furber.....	FES.....																											4	1
400	J. C. Furness.....	FES.....																											22	3
401	T. J. Furnival.....	FES.....																											$\frac{1}{2}$	1
402	B. G.....	FES.....	15	2					1	1	13	1	29	4	2	1	5	2			41 $\frac{1}{2}$	1			4 $\frac{1}{2}$	1			70 $\frac{1}{2}$	12
403	L. G.....	FES.....																											5	1
404	D. R. Gadgil.....	FES.....																											22	14
405	Eugenia Gage.....	FES.....																											3 $\frac{1}{2}$	1
406	R. Galletti.....	FES.....																											22	2
407	Charles Gamba.....	FES.....																											1	1
408	Sydney Gamble.....	FES.....																											3 $\frac{1}{2}$	1
409	Siegfried Garbuny.....	FES.....																											22	2
410	Howard C. Gary.....	FES.....																											1	1
411	Gussie Esther Gaskill.....	FES.....																											1	1
412	Lionel Gelher.....	FES.....																											2	1
413	Stuart Gelder.....	FES.....																											$\frac{1}{2}$	1
414	George Gelman.....	FES.....																											3 $\frac{1}{2}$	1
415	W. H. George.....	FES.....																											3 $\frac{1}{2}$	1
416	Alexander Gerschenkron.....	FES.....																											2	1
417	Sudhin H. Ghose.....	FES.....																											1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1
418	D. Ghosh.....	PA.....																											3 $\frac{1}{2}$	2

No.	Name	Publica- tion	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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419	Kathleen Gilbert.....	FES.....																											2½	1
420	Rodney Gilbert.....	FES.....																											2	1
421	Huntington Gilchrist.....	FES.....																												
422	Courade Gini.....	FES.....	2	1									2	1															2	1
423	Leslie Glass.....	FES.....																											3½	1
424	G. de T. Glazebrook.....	FES.....																											1½	1
425	Sidney Glazer.....	FES.....															1½	1											1½	1
426	Patricia Glover.....	FES.....	13	1									13	1															13	1
427	Harry G. Glowes.....	FES.....																	2½	1									2½	1
428	Tashi Go.....	FES.....																												
429	H. Carl Goldenberg.....	FES.....																											6	1
430	Ira Gollodin.....	FES.....																											9	1
431	Carley Goodrich.....	FES.....																											2	1
432	L. Carrington Goodrich.....	FES.....																											1	1
433	Leland M. Goodrich.....	FES.....																											½	1
434	J. King Gordon.....	FES.....																											4	1
435	Margaret S. Gordon.....	FES.....																											1	1
436	P. H. Gore-Booth.....	FES.....																											3	2
437	B. J. Gould.....	FES.....																											3	2
438	Randall Gould.....	FES.....																											6½	1
439	Pierre Gouron.....	FES.....																											1	1
440	Andrew J. Grad.....	FES.....																											1	1
																													1	1
																													1	1
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No.	Name	Publica- tion	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	Subtotal		1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	Subtotal		Grand total
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	
485	Norman D. Harper.....	FES.....													6	1	6	1
486	George H. C. Hart.....	P.A.....													11	3	11	3
487	L. V. Hart.....	P.A.....		12	1			12	1									12
488	Evelyn Harvey.....	FES.....											$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
489	J. M. D. Haste.....	P.A.....										1	2		1	2	1	2
490	Ernest O. Hauser.....	FES.....								$\frac{1}{2}$	1				$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
491	Edwin Haward.....	P.A.....																21%
492	Everett D. Hawkins.....	FES.....					$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	3		$\frac{1}{2}$	1	2	3	9%
493	H. B. Hawthorn.....	P.A.....					4	1	4%	1	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1			1	2	1%
494	R. G. Hawtrev.....	FES.....		1	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	2			1			4%	1	8%	2
495	John G. Hazam.....	P.A.....		6	1			6	1			1			1	1	1	1
496	John Hazard.....	FES.....										8	1	2	1			13
497	Stephen Heald.....	P.A.....													10	2	13	3
498	S. Heaslett.....	FES.....								1	1							74
499	John Heath.....	P.A.....													1	1	1	1
500	Robert Heine-Geldern.....	FES.....														1	1	1
501	W. H. Van Helsdingen.....	P.A.....											$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
502	Milton Helmick.....	FES.....					7	2	7	2	3	1			3	1	3	1
503	Clarence Hendershot.....	P.A.....		3	1						5%	1			5%	1	8%	2
504	Harold Henderson.....	FES.....																1
505	Albert W. C. T. Herre.....	P.A.....		$\frac{1}{2}$	1	2	1		2%	2		2	1		2	1	4%	3
506	Lawrence I. Helges, Jr.....	FES.....									1	1			1	1	1	1

No.	Name	Publica- tion	1941		1942	1943	1944	1945		1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
507	Walter Hill.....	FES						9	1	9	1					9	1		
508	Rita Hinden.....	FES																	
509	Eleanor M. Hinder.....	FES						1/2	1	2 1/2	2					2	1	2	1
510	W. J. Hinton.....	FES			2	1										2 1/2		2 1/2	2
511	Alice Tisdale Hobart.....	FES																	
512	William Ernest Hocking.....	FES														2		2	1
513	H. V. Hodson.....	FES								1/2	1								
514	E. Adamson Hoebel.....	FES			1 1/2	1			1 1/2	1						1 1/2	1	1 1/2	1
515	H. Ian Hogbin.....	FES					1	1	1	1	1								
516	Arthur Holcombe.....	FES								1/2	1					1	1	9	3
517	W. L. Holland.....	FES														1/2	1	1/2	1
518	Leon Hollerman.....	FES														2	1	2	1
519	D. S. Holman.....	FES														12	2	12	2
520	Claire Holt.....	FES														2	1	2	1
521	D. C. Holtom.....	FES														11 1/2	1	11 1/2	1
522	Pieter Honig.....	FES														11 1/2	1	11 1/2	1
523	Carl E. Hopkins.....	FES														11 1/2	1	11 1/2	1
524	Bernard L. Hornann.....	FES														11 1/2	1	11 1/2	1
525	Hot Spring Conference (Extracts).....	FES														11 1/2	1	11 1/2	1
526	Hou Wal-long.....	FES														11 1/2	1	11 1/2	1
527	Gunji Hosono.....	FES														11 1/2	1	11 1/2	1
528	Ernest Hotson.....	FES														11 1/2	1	11 1/2	1
		PA														1		1	1

No.	Name	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
		Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items				
529	Harry Paxton Howard.....	24	1			4	1							28	2												32	3	
530	Janet K. Howie.....	2½	2											2½	2												10	4	
531	Charles P. Howland.....																										5	2	
532	C. L. Hsia.....					1	1			1	1																1	1	
533	Hsia, Pin fang.....							2	1					2	1												33	3	
534	C. Y. Hsiang.....																										7	1	
535	C. Y. Hsu.....	15	1											15	1			1½	1								15	1	
536	Frances L. K. Hsu.....																										1½	1	
537	Leonard S. Hsu.....																										1	1	
538	Shushi Hsu.....																										42	2	
539	Y. Y. Hsu.....			3½	2	2½	2							6	4												3	1	
540	Charles Y. Hu.....	6	1	4½	3	25	3	1½	1				70½	8													6	4	
541	Hsien-Chin Hu.....			4	1									4	1			2	1							2	1	2	1
542	Hu, Shih.....																											4	1
543	G. E. Hubbard.....					3	1	1	1					4	2												6½	3	
544	Deborah Hubbard.....	1	1					3½	2				3½	2	4	1										4	1	14½	6
545	L. E. Hubbard.....												1	1													10	4	
546	G. F. Hudson.....																												
547	E. R. Hughes.....																2½	1	2	1					4½	2	6	3	
548	John Hughes.....					3	1							3	1		2½	2		1½	1	1½	1		5½	4	7	5	
549	A. F. D. Hulsewe.....																										3	1	
550	Joy Hume.....																	1½	1					1½	1	3	2	3	2
																											2	1	

No.	Name	Publica- tion	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total				
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items					
551	Arthur Hummel.....	FES.....			$\frac{1}{2}$	1							$\frac{1}{2}$	1			$\frac{1}{2}$	1								$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	2				
552	John P. Humphrey.....	PA.....																											2	1			
553	Warren S. Hunsberger.....	FES.....																											1	1			
554	Charles Hunter.....	PA.....			11	1							11	1															14 $\frac{1}{2}$	2			
555	Ellsworth Huntington.....	FES.....																											1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1			
556	Bruce Hutchison.....	PA.....																											$\frac{1}{2}$	1			
557	D. Graham Hutton.....	FES.....																												1			
558	Albert Hyma.....	PA.....																											11 $\frac{1}{2}$	1			
559	Yamato Ichihoshi.....	FES.....																											10	1			
560	Nobutaka Ike.....	PA.....																											$\frac{1}{2}$	1			
561	Arthur D. Ince.....	FES.....			13 $\frac{1}{2}$	1							13 $\frac{1}{2}$	1			3	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	5	1	3	1	5	1	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	4	27	5	5		
562	Glen Ingles.....	PA.....							4	1			4	1							1	1				1	1	1	1	1	1		
563	E. Burke Inlow.....	FES.....																	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	2	1			4 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	2		
564	H. A. Iunis.....	PA.....																															
565	P. F. Irvine.....	FES.....																												2	1		
566	Jeter A. Isley.....	PA.....															1	1											1	1	1		
567	H. R. Issacs.....	FES.....															$\frac{1}{2}$	1											$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	1	
568	Germaine Krull Ivons.....	PA.....																															
569	N. J.....	PA.....															3 $\frac{1}{2}$	1											15	1	1	1	
570	W. T. Jackman.....	FES.....																											3 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	1	
571	Grace James.....	PA.....																												9	8	8	
572	Jack James.....	FES.....																												1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	1
		PA.....																	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	1									3 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	1	1

No.	Name	Publica- tion	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
573	Roy E. James.....	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
574	R. W. James.....	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
575	Eliot Janeway.....	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
576	R. J. Jardine.....	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
577	David R. Jenkins.....	FES	7	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	7	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
578	Shirley Jenkins.....	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
579	W. Ivor Jennings.....	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
580	Phillip Jessup.....	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	1½	2	2½	2	4	4½	3	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
581	Eugene I. Johnson.....	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
582	Guy B. Johnson.....	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
583	Nelson T. Johnson.....	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
584	Bruce Johnston.....	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
585	Eric Johnston.....	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
586	Reginald F. Johnston.....	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
587	William C. Johnstone.....	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1½	1	½	1	---	---	3½	1	---	---	---	---	---	---		
588	F. C. Jones.....	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
589	George E. Jones.....	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
590	Joseph Jones.....	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
591	Stella Jones.....	PA	18	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	18	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
592	Ellen Van Zyll de Jong.....	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
593	Arthur Jorgensen.....	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
594	Elizabeth Jorgensen.....	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		
		PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---		

No.	Name	Publica- tion	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total			
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items		
617	W. P. M. Kennedy.....	FES.....																											1	1		
618	P. H. B. Kent.....	FES.....																											1½	1		
619	R. J. Kerner.....	P.A.....							1½	1			1½	1														3½	1	1		
620	George H. Kerr.....	FES.....	4	1							20½	4	21½	5			3	1										3	1	27½	6	
621	Yongjeung Kim.....	P.A.....																											2	1		
622	R. Kingsland.....	FES.....																											1	1		
623	Alexander Kiralfy.....	P.A.....	6	1																									1	1		
624	Stuart Kirby.....	FES.....																											1	1		
625	Grayson Kirk.....	P.A.....																											2½	1		
626	Benjamin Kizer.....	FES.....	2½	2					1½	1	2½	1	3½	3															4	2	4	2
627	Otto Klinebery.....	P.A.....																											3½	3		
628	M. M. Knight.....	FES.....																											6	5		
629	F. B. J. Kuiper.....	P.A.....																											4	2	2	2
630	K. E. Knorr.....	FES.....																											2	1	1	1
631	Ko Siang-Feng.....	FES.....																											2	1	1	1
632	Albert Kolb.....	P.A.....																											2	1	1	1
633	G. H. Van der Kolff.....	FES.....																											1½	1	1½	1
634	E. Kondapi.....	P.A.....																											1	1	1	1
635	Johanna Felhoen Kraal.....	FES.....																											½	1	½	1
636	Lawrence Krader.....	P.A.....																											½	1	½	1
637	H. Kraemer.....	FES.....																											½	1	½	1
638	T. J. Kreps.....	P.A.....																											½	1	½	1

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683	J. D. Legge.....	FES.....																	1	1					1	1	1	1	1						
684	T. P. Leggett.....	FES.....																					1	1	2	2	2	2	2						
685	Kit-king Loi.....	FES.....																							1	1	1	1	1						
686	Alexander H. Leighton.....	FES.....									2½	1	2½	1												2½	1	2½	1	1					
687	George Kin Leung.....	FES.....																									20	2	20	2	1				
688	Joseph R. Levenson.....	FES.....																																	
689	Werner Levi.....	FES.....											6	2	9½	3			1½	1			10½	2	7½	2	33½	9	33½	9	1				
690	Bernard W. Levmore.....	FES.....																									1½	1	1½	1	1				
691	Marion J. Levy, Jr.....	FES.....																	½	1						½	1	½	1	1					
692	Roger Levy.....	FES.....																									1	1	1	1	1				
693	Daniel H. Lew.....	FES.....									½	1	½	1					½	1					½	1	½	3	43½	10	43½	10			
694	A. B. Lewis.....	FES.....									½	1	½	1					½	1					½	1	½	1	½	1	1	1			
695	An-che Li.....	FES.....																											15	2	15	2	2		
696	Choh-Ming Li.....	FES.....																	6	1	2½	1			8½	2	8½	2	8½	2	8½	2	2		
697	T'ai-ehn Liao.....	FES.....								8	1			8	1												1	1	1	1	1	1			
698	Henry R. Leiberman.....	FES.....														13	1									13	1	13	1	13	1	1			
699	Channing Lien.....	FES.....																					2½	1	2½	1	2½	1	2½	1	2½	1	1		
700	D. K. Lieu.....	FES.....																											3½	1	3½	1	1		
701	Dang-chen Lieti.....	FES.....																													18	3	18	3	3
702	Phillip Lilienthal.....	FES.....																									5	1	5	1	5	1	1		
703	Yu Lin.....	FES.....											1	1	1½	1							15	1	16½	2	16½	2	39½	9	39½	9	9		
704	Yutang Lin.....	FES.....								16	1			16	1														1	1	28½	5	28½	5	5
		PA.....																														5	1	1	

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			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
771	Alfred Max	FES																										
772	Miyeko Mayeda	FES																										
773	Adrian Mayer	FES																										
774	Margaret Mead	FES																										
775	Elliot G. Mears	FES																										
776	Helen Mears	FES																										
777	H. de Meel	FES																										
778	Ju-ao Mei	FES																										
779	D. H. Mehta	FES																										
780	H. Seidler Meisel	FES																										
781	William Melish	FES																										
782	William E. Nelson	FES																										
783	Audrey G. Menefee	FES																										
784	Chih Meng	FES																										
785	A. R. Menjes	FES																										
786	James M. Menzies	FES																										
787	Lord Meston	FES																										
788	L. Metzknackers	FES																										
789	Colette Meuvret	FES																										
790	John Richard Mez	FES																										
791	Margaret Portia Mickey	FES																										
792	Franz Michael	PA																										

No.	Name	Publi- cation	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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793	Joe Mickle.....	FES									1	1	1	1														1	1	
794	Frank Midkiff.....	FES																												
795	Edward W. Mill.....	PA																												
796	Agnes R. Miller.....	FES																												
797	Cleyton Miller.....	PA																												
798	Margaret Miller.....	FES																												
799	Walter Mills.....	FES																												
800	Lemona A. Mills.....	PA																												
801	Ian F. G. Milner.....	FES																												
802	Jeanne S. Mintz.....	PA																												
803	Nicholas Mirkowich.....	FES																												
804	C. Clyde Mitchell.....	PA																												
805	Kate Mitchell.....	FES																												
806	D. Mitrany.....	FES																												
807	Kilmer Moe.....	PA																												
808	Azizah F. Mohamined.....	PA																												
809	P. K. Mok.....	FES																												
810	J. T. Moll.....	PA																												
811	V. M. Molotoff.....	FES																												
812	Chang Monllu.....	PA																												
813	R. Montagne.....	FES																												
814	H. J. Van Mook.....	PA																												

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815	Girija Mookerjee	PFS																					1	1		1	1	1	1
816	Penderel Moon	PFS																					1	1		1	1	1	1
817	E. S. Moore	PFS													1														
818	Harriet Moore	PFS	10½	4			4	5	1½	1	17½	11																	
819	T. Inglis Moore	PFS							17½	2			1	1											1	1	46½	9	9
820	Helen Howell Moorehead	PFS													3½	1			2	1			1½	1	3½	2	3½	1	2
821	Alfredo T. Morales	PFS							½	1																			
822	William T. Moran	PFS											½	1				8	1										
823	P. C. Morantie	PFS							½	1																			
824	Leslie Morgan	PFS																						1	1	1	1	1	1
825	John Morris	PFS																											
826	Ian Morrison	PFS													4	3			3½	1					5	4	5	4	4
827	Richard Morse	PFS													1	1			12	2			6½	1	6½	3	6½	1	3
828	Robert S. Morton	PFS																											
829	W. L. Morton	PFS							4½	1						9	1		1½	1					10	1	10	1	1
830	Phillip Moseley	PFS												4½	1														
831	Raymond Moyer	PFS	1	1	1½	1							2½	2											2½	1	4½	3	1
832	Shikamatsu Mukai (by: Gradjanzev)	PFS																											
833	Roads Murphey	PFS													6	1			2½	1					6	1	6	1	1
834	Paul Mus	PFS																											
835	James McAuley	PFS																							7	1	7	1	1
836	J. A. McCallum	PFS													½	1			1½	1			13	2	1½	1	1½	3	3
															1½	1									1½	1	1½	1	1

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837	Robert M. Gullum.....	FES. PA					1	1				1			1	1
838	Evelyn McCune.....	FES. PA					1	1							1	1
839	George McCune.....	FES. PA					3	1	4½	1	5½	1			13	3
840	Shannon McCune.....	FES. PA					1½	1	1½	1	6½	2			16½	2
841	Orville J. McDiarmid....	FES. PA					1	1							9	4
842	A. H. McDonald.....	FES. PA										3	1		3	1
843	C. M. McDonald.....	FES. PA								1	1				1	1
844	Edgar Melms.....	FES. PA													2	1
845	A. D. McIntosh.....	FES. PA													2	2
846	Vernon McKay.....	FES. PA								½	1				2	1
847	A. D. McKinlay.....	FES. PA													½	1
848	Harley Farnsworth Mc- Nair.....	FES. PA							½	1					17	1
849	Theodore McNelly.....	FES. PA											3½	1	3½	1
850	Carey McWilliams.....	FES. PA	2	1	2	1	4	2							4	2
851	"E. N.".....	FES. PA														
852	"J. E. N.".....	FES. PA											5½	1	4	7
853	C. Nagtegoal.....	FES. PA													1	1
854	Vernon Nash.....	FES. PA								1½	1				1½	1
855	Walter Nash.....	FES. PA	4	1			4	1							12	1
856	Vishwambhar Nath.....	FES. PA	7	1			7	1					2	1	7	1
857	R. S. Nathan.....	FES. PA													2	1
858	Arthur L. Neal.....	FES. PA	10	1			10	1							10	1
								20	1						20	1

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No.	Name	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	Subtotal	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	Subtotal	Grand total	
	Publication	Number of pages	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	
903	P. H. Partridge	FES											4½	1	4½	1
904	Surendra J. Patel	FES														
905	George F. Patrick	FES										1½	1	1½	1	
906	J. A. Patterson	FES														
907	H. S. Patton	FES			1	1	1								1	1
908	Prasert Patumanon	FES													3½	1
909	Robert Payne	FES											½	1	½	1
910	Melvin Tun Pe	FES								8	2			8	2	2
911	Cyrus H. Peake	FES								1	1			1	1	1
912	Thomas P. Peardon	FES													13½	4
913	B. R. Pearn	FES							1½	1			1½	1	1½	1
914	F. A. Pearson	FES							1	1			1	1	1	1
915	Graham Peck	FES												3	1	1
916	Nathaniel Peffer	FES						3	1	1	1			2	1	1
917	N. A. Pelcovits	FES						5	1					8	4	3
918	Karl J. Pelzer	FES	2½	1	2	½	1			1½	1			5	1	5
919	Robert L. Pendleton	FES	2½	1	2	2	4½	3	3½	2	1½	2		4	3	6
920	E. F. Peurose	FES						8	1	½	1		5	1	16	10
921	B. Ward Perkins	FES											8½	2	8½	2
922	W. B. Pettus	FES												3	1	1
923	G. Pfeifer	FES								½	1			1½	1	1
924	Ward Phelps	FES						1	1			2	1	2	1	1

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No.	Name	Publica- tion	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
947	Helen Pratt.....	FES. PA.					6	1					6	1												
948	Sir John Pratt.....	FES.																								
949	Lawrence Preuss.....	PA.																								
950	Ernest Price.....	FES. PA.													3½	1								3½	1	
951	Harry B. Price.....	PA.									9	1	9	1												
952	Maurice T. Price.....	FES.															1½	1						1½	1	
953	M. Phillips Price.....	FES.			9	1							9	1												
954	Charles H. Prien.....	FES.																								
955	Alan Priest.....	FES.																								
956	Ida Pruitt.....	FES.																								
957	Wei-meng Pu.....	FES.																								
958	Victor Purcell.....	PA.																					15	1	15	1
959	Richard Pyke.....	PA.																								
960	Harold S. Quigley.....	FES.													1½	1								1½	1	
961	I. H. Qureshi.....	PA.			5	1					6½	1	11½	2	8½	2			3	1				11½	3	
962	"G. R.".....	FES.													1	2								1	2	
963	"G. F. R.".....	FES.																								
964	Walter A. Radius.....	FES.																								
965	F. A. Rager.....	FES.																								
966	J. Rablner.....	PA.																								
967	T. A. Raman.....	FES.									1½	1	1½	1					15	3	2	1		17	4	
968	Jeanette Randolph.....	FES. PA.																						2	1	
											2½	5	2½	5	12	8	1½	1						12½	9	

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No.	Name	Publica- tion	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total			
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items		
991	John Ridley	FES																														
992	Victor Rienecker	FES														1	1									1	1	1	1	1		
993	Fred W. Riggs	FES									1½	1	1½	1		2	1						12½	2			2	1	2	1	19½	
994	W. F. Rivers	FES														5½	2								3	1	3	1	3	1	3	
995	James R. Roach	FES																					4	1	8	2	12	3	12	3	12	
996	Charles Robequain	FES														2	1									2	1	4	2	4		
997	Stephen H. Roberts	FES																											14	1	14	
998	C. J. Robertson	FES																											11	1	11	
999	Jean de La Roche	FES																											15	2	15	
1000	Glen Rockley	FES						4½	1	1	14	1	15	2															4½	1	4½	
1001	Charles P. Rockwood	FES																											2	2	2	
1002	H. R. Rodwell	FES															1	1					1	1			2	1	1	1	2	
1003	Earl Rolph	FES																1	1									1	1	1	1	
1004	Agnes Roman	FES	1½	1									1½	1															1½	1	1½	1
1005	V. Romm	FES										4½	1	4½	1										14	1	14	1	14	1	14	1
1006	Carlos P. Romulo	FES								5	1			5	1														3	2	3	2
1007	William Ronau	FES																											5	1	5	1
1008	Ernest C. Ropes	FES																											10	1	10	1
1009	Nicholas Roosevelt	FES																	½	1						1½	1	1½	1	1½	1	
1010	S. Rose	FES														5½	2												5½	2	5½	2
1011	Alma Rosenthal	FES																											7	1	7	1
1012	Lawrence K. Rosinger	FES																											½	1	½	1
		PA	2½	1	4½	1							4½	1					5½	1	6½	2	2	1			14	4	17	23	17	23
		FES												5														21½	2	67	14	

No.	Name	Publica- tion	1941		1942	1943	1944	Subtotal		1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	Subtotal		Grand total
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
1013	Herbert Rosinski	FES															10½	2
1014	G. A. Johnston Ross	FES															2	1
1015	Lloyd Ross	FES			5	2			5	2					5	1	10	3
1016	Fred J. Rossiter	FES		2	1			2	1								2	1
1017	Andrew Roth	FES	1	1				1	1								2	2
1018	Cecile Rotho	FES					3	2	3	2							2	3
1019	David Nelson Rowe	FES			6½	2	5	2	11½	4							31½	7
1020	Newton Rowell	FES					17½	2	17½	2					11	3	22½	7
1021	D. W. Rowland	FES															2½	2
1022	Manuel Roxas	FES								1	1						3	2
1023	P. M. Roxby	FES															1	1
1024	M. N. Roy	FES			6	1			6	1					14	1	14	1
1025	Masamichi Royama	FES																
1026	Barnard Rubin	FES								½	1						4	1
1027	Beatrice G. Ruebens	FES								3½	1				3½	1	¾	1
1028	Gaston Ruoff	FES					1	2	37½	3							38½	5
1029	W. Carl Rufus	FES						1	1	1							1	1
1030	Shintaro Ryu	FES													4	1	4	1
1031	G. H. S	FES																
1032	K. R. Sabarwal	FES															1	1
1033	Milton Sacks	FES															21	1
1034	A. L. Sadler	FES										1½	1	1			2½	2

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1057	A. Arthur Schiller.....	FES							11	1				11	1			1	1						½	1	1½	2	1½	2		
1058	Preston Schoyer.....	FES																									23	3				
1059	B. Schrieke.....	FES			1½	1								1½	1	1									1	1	2½	2				
1060	Frederic D. Schulthiers.....	FES																									16	1				
1061	Frederick L. Schuman.....	FES																									1½	1				
1062	Elizabeth B. Schumpeter.....	FES																									2½	1				
1063	Benjamin Schwartz.....	FES																									7	1				
1064	Leonard J. Schweitzer.....	FES																									18	1				
1065	E. K. Scott.....	FES																									4½	1				
1066	F. R. Scott.....	FES																									2½	1				
1067	William O. Sroggs.....	FES																									1½	1				
1068	P. J. Searles.....	FES																									1½	1				
1069	Edward G. Seldensticker.....	FES																									2	1				
1070	Max Seitelman.....	FES																									1	1				
1071	Yasushi Sekiguchi.....	FES																									3½	1				
1072	Hilda Selwyn-Clarke.....	FES																									8½	4				
1073	Gertrude Emerson Sen.....	FES																									8½	4				
1074	Carlo Sforza.....	FES																									16	1				
1075	Judy Shahn.....	FES			1	1																				3½	1	3½	1			
1076	Eileen Shanahan.....	FES																									½	1	½	1		
1077	R. Lauriston Sharp.....	FES																									1	1				
1078	Glenn Shaw.....	FES																									14	2	14	2		
		P.A.																									3	1	5½	3		
																											10	1				

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1079	LA, Robert B. Sheeks,	FES																											5	1
1080	C. S. N. C.	FES													5	1			3½	1							8½	2	8½	2
1081	George F. Sheldon	FES															1	1									1	1	50½	27
1082	Jack Shephard	FES																									12½	2	12½	2
1083	Wm. R. Shephard	FES																											8	1
1084	Ladif Ahmad Sherwani	FES																	7	1							7	1	7	1
1085	Tetsujiri Shidachi	FES																											2	1
1086	Chao-Ying Shih	FES																											1	1
1087	Heng-Kuo Shih	FES															8	1	1½	1							9½	2	9½	2
1088	Russell G. Shiman	FES																									28	11	28	11
1089	James H. Shoemaker	FES													11	1											11	1	11	1
1090	James T. Shotwell	FES																									10½	2	10½	2
1091	Krishnakal Suridharani	FES																									16	1	16	1
1092	Hsi-Hsu Shu	FES	16	1																							20	1	20	1
1093	George M. Sinclair	FES																	½	1							½	1	½	1
1094	Anup Singh	FES																									6½	2	6½	2
1095	B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya	FES													6½	2			½	1							½	1	½	1
1096	P. H. W. Sison	FES																									4	1	4	1
1097	G. William Skinner	FES																									16	1	16	1
1098	Frank W. Slack	FES													½	1											½	1	½	1
1099	J. Sluski	FES																												
1100	Edward O. Seidensticker	FES																	1½	1							1½	1	1½	1
1101	Bradford Smith	FES																									5	1	5	1
1102		FES																									4½	1	4½	1
1103		PA													4½	1											1	1	1	1

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1123	F. H. Soward.....	FES	1	1							$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	2					$\frac{1}{2}$	1				16	1	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	8	
1124	W. F. Spalding.....	FES																												
1125	James P. Speer.....	PA															2	1							2	1	2	1		
1126	Hans Spieler.....	FES																												
1127	J. E. Spencer.....	PA																												
1128	Charles Nelson Spinks.....	FES	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	1									5 $\frac{1}{2}$	1							4	1			4	1	12	2	1	
1129	H. M. Spitzer.....	PA			7	1			5 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	14	4	10	1					1				10	1	26	6	2	
1130	Harold Sprout.....	PA													7	2									7	2	7	1	1	
1131	Odo B. Stade.....	PA	2	1									2	1												2	1			
1132	C. P. Stacey.....	FES																									1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1		
1133	Staff Members.....	PA																												
1134	Eugene Staley.....	FES	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	1							9	2													1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	3	
1135	L. Dudley Stamp.....	PA					8	1					8	1													21	3		
1136	W. E. H. Stanner.....	PA			1	1			2 $\frac{1}{2}$	1			2 $\frac{1}{2}$	1													8	1	1	
1137	Geoffrey Stead.....	PA											1	1	1	1									1	1	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	3		
1138	Andrew J. Steiger.....	PA																									1	1	1	
1139	G. Nye Steiger.....	FES	8	1									8	1													7 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	2	
1140	Gunther Stein.....	PA	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	2			6	2	1	1			10 $\frac{1}{2}$	5													7	2	8	1
1141	H. Arthur Steiner.....	FES	12	1	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	6	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	6				28	12	17	2			3 $\frac{1}{2}$	1							11 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	12	6	
1142	Jesse F. Steiner.....	PA																									4	1	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	2
1143	Joseph E. Stepanek.....	FES																												
1144	Robert P. Stephens.....	PA																									2 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	1
		PA																									6	1	6	1
		PA																									14	1	14	1

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1145	Harley Stevens.....	FES.....													4	1										4	1	4	1
1146	Alexander Stevenson.....	PA.....																											
1147	J. A. Stevenson.....	PA.....													1	1										1	1	1	1
1148	Downie Stewart.....	FES.....																											
1149	Downie Stewart.....	FES.....																											
1149	Kermit G. Stewart.....	PA.....																											
1150	John R. Stewart.....	PA.....	8	3	8	2																							
1151	John R. Stewart.....	PA.....																											
1151	Marguerite Stewart.....	FES.....																											
1152	Marguerite Stewart.....	FES.....																											
1152	Maxwell Stewart.....	PA.....																											
1152	Maxwell Stewart.....	FES.....																											
1153	Oliver Stewart.....	PA.....																											
1153	Oliver Stewart.....	FES.....																											
1154	J. Leighton Stuart.....	PA.....																											
1154	J. Leighton Stuart.....	FES.....																											
1155	John Stigall.....	PA.....																											
1155	John Stigall.....	FES.....																											
1156	Leo C. Stine.....	PA.....																											
1156	Leo C. Stine.....	FES.....																											
1157	Edward Stone.....	PA.....																											
1157	Edward Stone.....	FES.....																											
1158	Edward Stone.....	PA.....																											
1158	Edward Stone.....	FES.....																											
1158	Julius Stone.....	PA.....																											
1158	Julius Stone.....	FES.....																											
1159	Wm. T. Stone.....	PA.....																											
1159	Wm. T. Stone.....	FES.....																											
1160	Russell W. Storey.....	PA.....																											
1160	Russell W. Storey.....	FES.....																											
1161	G. R. Story.....	PA.....																											
1161	G. R. Story.....	FES.....																											
1162	Samuel S. Stratton.....	PA.....																											
1162	Samuel S. Stratton.....	FES.....																											
1163	Anna Louise Stroug.....	PA.....																											
1163	Anna Louise Stroug.....	FES.....																											
1164	Graham Stuart.....	PA.....	12	1																									
1164	Graham Stuart.....	FES.....																											
1165	Frank Kat-Ming Su.....	PA.....																											
1165	Frank Kat-Ming Su.....	FES.....																											
1166	A. D. Suehsdorf.....	PA.....																											
1166	A. D. Suehsdorf.....	FES.....																											

No.	Name	Publica- tion	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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1167	Walter Sullivan.....	FES																								
1168	B. H. Sumner.....	PA																								
1169	E-Tu Zen Sun.....	FES																								
1170	J. S. Sun.....	FES																								
1171	T. R. Sunde.....	PA							3	1	10	1	13	2												
1172	Hagwon Sunoo.....	PA															1	1	1	1					2	2
1173	R. Supomo.....	FES																								
1174	W. B. Sutch.....	PA																								
1175	K. G. Swaswamy.....	FES																								
1176	Roger Swearingen.....	PA																								
1177	Lennig Sweet.....	FES																								
1178	Raymond G. Swing.....	PA																								
1179	Gerard Swope.....	FES																								
1180	Richard Symonds.....	FES																								
1181	"L. Y. T.".....	FES																								
1182	Irene B. Taeuber.....	FES										1½	1	1½	1											
1183	Masao Takahashi.....	FES																								
1184	Yasaka Takaki.....	FES																								
1185	Kenzo Takayanagi.....	PA									2	1	16½	3												
1186	Phillip Talbot.....	PA							13	1	1½	1													3½	1
1187	Frank M. Tamagna.....	FES							8	1			8	1											7	1
1188	L. K. Tao.....	PA																						7	1	7
			13	1									13	1												

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1189	E. J. Tarr.....	FES	---	---	---	1½	1	1½	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
1190	Louis Tarue.....	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	2½	2	---	---	---	---	2½	2
1191	Y. Tateyama.....	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
1192	Mary Taussig.....	PA	5	---	---	---	---	5	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
1193	R. H. Tawney.....	FES	2	1	---	---	2	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	5	1
1194	A. H. Taylor.....	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	2	1
1195	George E. Taylor....	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
1196	Griffith Taylor.....	PA	6	1	1	---	---	7	---	---	1½	---	---	---	7½	2
1197	K. W. Taylor.....	FES	18	---	---	---	18	1	---	2	---	---	---	---	49½	7
1198	Paul S. Taylor.....	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
1199	William H. Taylor....	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
1200	Frederick J. Teggart..	PA	13½	1	---	---	13½	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	23½	7
1201	S. Y. Teng.....	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
1202	Donald G. Tewksbury..	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1	---	---	1½	1	1½	1
1203	Robert B. Texton.....	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
1204	D. T. Thakur.....	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
1205	Mendell Thomas.....	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
1206	Norman Thomas.....	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
1207	S. B. Thomas.....	FES	---	4	1	---	4	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
1208	Laura Thompson.....	FES	---	---	---	5½	1	5½	1	1½	2	37½	3	1½	1	1
1209	Virginia Thompson....	PA	21½	7	14	1½	5½	45½	11	7½	4	16	5	6½	1	34½
1210	Warren S. Thompson....	FES	15½	2	1½	1	1	19	6	6	6½	2	1½	1	13	4
		PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	2	1	---	---	---	2	1

No.	Name	Publica- tion	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items		
1211	M. Thong	FES															1	1							1	1			1	1
1212	Alice Thorner	FES									3½	2	3½	2	3	1	2½	2	6½	1					8½	2	12	4		
1213	Daniel Thorner	FES															2½	2	4	1					6½	3	6½	3		
1214	James Thorpe	PA													1½	1					1				2½	2	2½	2		
1215	M. B. Thresher	FES																									7	1		
1216	Richard C. Thurnwall	FES															4½	2			1	1	2	1	7½	4	7½	4		
1217	J. Tideman	PA																									13	2		
1218	Sa Ting	FES																									1½	1		
1219	Alice M. Togo	FES															½	1							½	1	½	1		
1220	W. Stark Toller	FES															4	1							4	1	4	1		
1221	Pauline Tompkins	FES																									1	1	1	1
1222	Chakkratong Tongyal	FES																	½	1					½	1	½	1		
1223	James G. Torrens	FES													3½	1									3½	1	3½	1		
1224	Peter Townsend	PA																									½	1		
1225	Arnold J. Toynbee	FES																			½	1			½	1	½	1		
1226	H. J. Timperley	FES																									38	2		
1227	Glenn T. Trewartha	FES																									13	2		
1228	H. M. Trivedi	FES																									3	1	4½	2
1229	Reginald Trotter	FES																			4	1	2	1	3	1	6	2	2	2
1230	Tseng Chao-lun	FES																			3½	2			3½	2	3½	2		
1231	Tiugtu F. Tsiang	FES																									1	1		
1232	Shigeto Tsuru	FES																	½	1					½	1	½	1		
		PA																									2	1		
																					10	1			10	1	10	1		

No.	Name	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	Subtotal	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	Subtotal	Grand total
	Publica- tion	Number of pages	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
1233	Charlotte Tyler	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	5
1234	Edith Tyrell	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	2
1235	Lt. George Uhlman	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1
1236	A. J. Ultee	PA	3½	1	---	---	3½	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	2½
1237	Puey Ungphakorn	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	3½
1238	Unidentified	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1
1239	Sanutaro Uramatsu	FES	2	2	---	---	3½	1½	2	24	---	---	24	2	24
1240	John Useem	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	45½
1241	Freda Utley	FES	---	---	---	---	---	4	1	6½	---	1	11	4	63
1242	Teijiro Uyeda	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	58½
1243	F. Van Asbeck	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	11
1244	Amry Vandenbosch	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	2
1245	Justus M. Van Der Kroef	PA	---	---	2½	1	2½	---	---	---	---	8	8½	3	11
1246	M. H. Van der Valk	PA	---	---	---	---	---	2	1	1	1	5	8½	2	24
1247	Geertin M. Van Eeghen	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	3
1248	Anthony Vangley	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	46
1249	Mary Van Kleeck	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	8
1250	Louise Merrick Van Pat- ten	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	13½
1251	H. Vonkatasubiah	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	3
1252	Ilza Veith	FES	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	4	---	2	6	2	6
1253	A. Ventaryman	PA	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	3
1254	J. A. Verdoorn	PA	---	---	---	---	---	2	1	---	---	---	---	2	1
		PA	---	---	---	---	---	12	1	---	---	---	12	1	12

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total		
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items	
1255	Lt. Col. Jesus A. Villamor	FES													1 1/2	1											1 1/2	1	1 1/2	1	
1256	Harold M. Vinacke	FES													1	2											1	2	1	2	
1257	Leonides S. Virata	FES	1	1			1 1/2	1			1	1	2 1/2	2	14	2					2 1/2	1				16 1/2	3	1	1		
1258	Fraus H. Visman	FES																													
1259	V. Vlze	FES																													
1260	Bernard H. M. Vlekke	FES																													
1261	C. A. Vileland	FES																													
1262	Werner Vogel	FES																													
1263	H. F. Von Haast	FES																													
1264	E. de Vries	FES																													
1265	"B. W."	FES																													
1266	Harold Wakefield	FES																													
1267	Seyler Wakukawa	FES																													
1268	Harold Van Waldhelm	FES																													
1269	Nym Wales	FES																													
1270	E. Roland Walker	FES			19	1																									
1271	R. C. Wallace	FES																													
1272	Richard J. Walsh	FES																													
1273	Robert M. Walsh	FES			1 1/2	1			1	1			1	1													1	1	1	1	
1274	Lin Yu Wan	FES																													
1275	Chin-An Wang	FES																													
1276	Chi-Chen Wang	FES																													
		P.A.																													
																													</		

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No.	Name	Publi- cation	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	Subtotal	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	Subtotal	Pages	Items
1343	Charles Wolf, Jr.	FES.														
1344	Emma Wold	P.A.														
1345	Arnold Wolfers	FES.	5	1				6	1							
1346	Bryce Wood	P.A.				14	1	14	1							
1347	F. L. W. Wood	FES.														
1348	G. L. Wood	P.A.														
1349	H. G. Woodhead	FES.	7	1				7	1							
1350	Dorothy Woodman	FES.														
1351	Charles J. Woodworth	P.A.														
1352	Barbara Wootton	FES.														
1353	Arthur F. Wright	FES.							8	1				8	1	
1354	George Wright	P.A.														
1355	Mary O. Wright	FES.	2	1				2	1							
1356	Quincy Wright	P.A.														
1357	Ruth O. Wright	FES.				5	1	8	1	13	2	3½	1	2	5½	2
1358	Ching-Chao Wu	FES.														
1359	Chi-Yuen Wu	P.A.														
1360	Leonard T. K. Wu	FES.														
1361	Arthur Wubolg	P.A.				17½	4	17½	4	14	2			14	2	
1362	Woodrow Wyatt	FES.				5	1	5	1							
1363	O. Kay Vye	P.A.														
1364	O. K. Y.	FES.			3	1		3	1							

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No.	Name	Publica- tion	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
1387	C. Yun.....	FES.....																								
1388	H. C. Zen.....	PA.....									2	1	2	1												
1389	"X Y Z".....	PA.....	9	1									9	1												
1390	Sophia Chen Zen.....	FES.....																								
1391	Carle C. Zimmerman.....	PA.....	14	2									14	2												
1392	Erich W. Zimmerman.....	FES.....																								
1393	Maurice Zinkin.....	PA.....																								
1394	Reference matter.....	FES.....	276	1	85	23	86	25	98	25			270	73												
		PA.....			373	1	38	1	1½	1	25	1	763½	5	42	1	26	1	22	1	21	1	22	1	133	5

No.	Name	Publica- tion	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
1387	C. Yun.....	FES.....	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1	1	1	1
1388	H. C. Zen.....	FES.....	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
1389	"X Y Z".....	FES.....	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
1390	Sophia Chen Zen.....	PA.....	---	---	---	---	---	24	1	---	---	---	24	1	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	24	1	1
1391	Carle C. Zimmerman.....	FES.....	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	14	2	2
1392	Erich W. Zimmerman.....	PA.....	3	2	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	3	2	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	5 1/2	4	4
1393	Maurice Zinkin.....	FES.....	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
1394	Reference matter.....	PA.....	123	12	41	16	7	1	33	1	20	1	209	30	17	1	19	1	25	1	5	1	1	1	1	6 1/2	3	6 1/2	3	
			21	1	23	1	16	1	24	1	1	1	104	5	22	1	33	1	33	1	35	1	26	1	21	170	6	1,170 1/2	21	

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter from the Immigration and Naturalization Services, dated December 12, 1951, dealing with the case of Charles Bidien.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1404" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1404

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER

Please address reply to
and refer to this file no: A-2987117—Inv.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Washington 25, D. C., December 12, 1951.

Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: This is in response to your letter of December 1, 1951, requesting full information regarding the deportation proceedings of Charles Bidien.

Your inquiry appears to relate to the Charles Bidien who is the subject of immigration file A-2987117. He was born at Aceh, Sumatra, Indonesia, on July 18, 1904, and is an Indonesian citizen of the Malayan race. His name in his native land was Sheh Bidien Ben Aroon.

A warrant of arrest in deportation proceedings was issued against him on September 16, 1948, charging him with: (1) membership in an organization advocating the overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the United States; (2) membership in an organization that circulates or distributes printed matter advocating such overthrow; (3) being an immigrant not in possession of a valid immigration visa at time of entry; and (4) being an alien ineligible to citizenship and not entitled to enter the United States under any exception.

He was accorded a hearing under this warrant of arrest on November 1, 1949, at the New York Office of this Service. Charges (3) and (4), above, were found sustained by the evidence. Charges (1) and (2), above, were not sustained as no evidence was adduced bearing upon these charges. Admissible evidence to sustain these latter two charges was not available for production at the hearing.

According to the record, Bidien last arrived in the United States February 8, 1930, at Boston, Massachusetts, as a seaman aboard the S. S. *City of Rangoon*, and deserted the vessel at the port of Philadelphia. He was never lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

On December 21, 1949, an order of deportation was entered. The warrant of deportation was issued on the same date. His deportation was effected on the SS "Batory" which sailed foreign from the port of New York January 20, 1950.

I hope that the foregoing satisfactorily answers your inquiry.

Sincerely yours,

ARGYLE R. MACKEY,
Commissioner.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a photostat which I had made of an article from Political Affairs, of September 1947, a Communist Magazine, the article being by Charles Bidien.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The photostat referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1405" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1405

[Political Affairs, September 1947]

INDONESIA: ASIAN NEW DEMOCRACY

(By Charles Bidien)

The struggle for Indonesian independence is at a turning point. Either the Dutch war against the Indonesian Republic will be stopped by United Nations action, or the Dutch will continue their present imperialist offensive. This

offensive will be along the following lines: (1) Occupation of all deep-water ports and major cities; (2) capture of transportation, communications, irrigation, and industrial facilities; (3) military operations to divide the island of Java into three distinct units, and to effect the division of Sumatra into small areas.

The Netherlands Government is rapidly consolidating its position in Republican territory. The fate of the Indonesian Republic has wide political ramifications for the entire colonial world, since Indonesia alone of all the prewar colonies to set up independent governments since the end of the war, has set a pace in political democracy and economic change comparable to the European new peoples' democracies. Furthermore, as a nation of 70 million people, 90 per cent of whom are Moslems, Indonesia exerts a progressive influence on the Mohammedan countries. Indonesia is of major significance to world trade, having in prewar years produced 90 percent of the world's quinine, one-third of the world's rubber, one-fourth of its tin, as well as great amounts of sugar, copra, tapioca, spices, tea, coffee, tobacco and petroleum. Its need for industrialization and expanded commerce make Indonesia important to the United States and Great Britain.

All of these constructive potentialities are in danger of being lost at this time. The undeclared Dutch war, started on July 19, against the Indonesian Republic, focused world attention on Dutch policy for the first time since the Ukrainian request that the Security Council investigate the Indonesian crisis in February, 1946.

During the period from August 17, 1945, when the Indonesian Republic was set up, until the present, the Netherlands has vacillated between a policy of negotiating with the Indonesian Republic, and one of conducting outright warfare to destroy it. Discussions with the Indonesian Republic reflected mass pressure within the Netherlands; gradual withdrawal of British forces which had borne the initial military efforts against Indonesian independence; limited aid to Dutch imperialism from the United States acquired at great sacrifice of Dutch interests in the Indies; and the unparalleled unity and resistance of the Indonesians. However, the Dutch imperialists never abandoned their desire to crush the Republic and regain dominance in Indonesian financial affairs.

The policy of "limited" war has been championed by Lieutenant-General S. H. Spoor, Commander of Dutch forces in Indonesia, with the support in the Netherlands of the Right Wing of the major party, the Labor Party (Social-Democrat); as well as the Catholic Party, the Anti-Revolutionary Party, and other imperialistic-minded groups. In an appeal for additional American credits and war material on February 13, 1947, General Spoor outlined the plan of operations:

The policy I will follow is that of the late President Theodore Roosevelt: namely, soft words backed up with a big stick. . . . Our intention is to undertake a series of limited objectives. In this way we hope to eliminate resistance without stirring up trouble over a wide area.

Within the Netherlands, only the Communist Party is calling for an end to the imperialistic war; the other parties are backing the Beel government in its grandiose plans of conquest. The following are the objectives of the Dutch imperialist war.

* * *

1. *The Dutch imperialists aim to weaken the Republic in order to wrest major political and economic concessions in a "legal" manner.*

The Dutch have utilized the past six months of negotiations and relative quiet to mobilize a full fighting force of at least 100,000 trained men, and adequate equipment purchased with the 1946 loans from the United States. They have stabilized their positions in the major cities that were captured by the British. They have extended and entrenched their perimeters. From October 1946, when a truce was signed between the Republic and the Netherlands, Dutch forces, by agreement, took over many strategic oil areas, plantations, and other prewar Dutch properties. After the signing of the Linggadjati Settlement—by which the Dutch granted *de facto* recognition to the Republic in Java, Madura, and Sumatra, and the Republic gave up its claim to the other islands until 1949—the Dutch set up puppet governments in East Indonesia (Bali, Celebes, and lesser islands) and Borneo.

Having limited the Republican areas, the Dutch now consider themselves strong enough to make demands upon the Indonesian Republic so as to weaken its internal structure. Most significant of these, and the one on which negotia-

tions were deadlocked, was Dutch insistence on joint Dutch-Indonesian gendarmerie to "police" the Republic. The Republic, having made major concessions, refused this obvious attempt to dominate the functioning of its administration; supervise political, trade-union, and cultural organization; gain access to the entire industrial and agricultural development of the Republic; and acquire legitimate power to create "incidents" and disturb peace and order as an excuse for Dutch military intervention. The refusal of the Netherlands to arbitrate this and other disputed points under the provisions of Linggadjati, and Dutch resistance to U. N. consideration of the issues, fully confirm the Republic's fears that the Dutch will negotiate only when they can impose all conditions upon a prostrate Republic.

* * *

2. The Dutch strive to command absolute control of all ports, thus assuring final decision on imports and exports, and all inter-insular, coastal, and ocean-going traffic.

Before the war, the Netherlands had absolute control of inter-insular and coastal shipping through the government-owned fleet, K. P. M. This Dutch monopoly not only prevented the growth of Indonesian or other shipping, but was one of the Netherlands East Indies government's instruments to enforce its economic cartel system. It was virtually impossible to transport commodities even from island to island, without the approval of the shipping monopoly. Thus, in cases of rebellion, an island or an area could be starved into submission by halting the shipping of exports and imports.

In the present Dutch war, this has been a major tactic in cutting the Republic off from the rest of the world. The Dutch economic blockade has been over 90 per cent effective. Thus the huge stockpiles of sugar, rubber, rice, quinine, and other commodities within Republican areas have been kept off the world market, and imports of textiles, machinery, shoes, rolling stock, and other items desperately needed by the Republic have been kept from reaching it. This war of economic attrition has not only cost the world millions in trade, but has retarded the reconstruction and development of Indonesia by many years beyond the blockade.

This use of the blockade received wide publicity in relation to the efforts of the American Isbrandtsen shipping line in March, 1947, to purchase exports from the Republic. The Dutch seized the ship, confiscated the cargo, and attempted to hold the master and crew for court-martial. Similar actions were taken against British and Chinese shipping. In each case the Dutch tried to buy off the shipping interests and make them deal with the Netherlands.

However, the rapid interest taken by Australian, American, and British business in the great market offered them by the Republic and in the tremendous stockpiles it could produce, threatened to place the Dutch in a weak bargaining position. Therefore, one of the first objectives in the current Dutch drive has been the deep-water port of Cheribon, in Republican lands since 1945. The fall of this port on July 25 called a halt to Republican trade with Singapore and India. This will have a particularly great impact on India, since the Republic had pledged half a million tons of rice to relieve Indian famine, in exchange for imports of Indian textiles. Up to the fall of Cheribon, the Dutch had waged an unsuccessful war against this trade.

* * *

3. The Dutch imperialists want to establish political control through puppets in partitioned islands.

The Indonesian nationalist movement grew rapidly after World War I. The Dutch made every effort to suppress the political parties and trade unions, and imprisoned or drove into exile their leaders. Efforts were also made to buy out leadership or act as a front for Dutch rule. This was practiced particularly in relation to the feudal remnants in the islands, where hereditary village chiefs, nobility, and co-administrators with the Dutch retained their positions and titles through government patronage, Japanese occupation perpetuated this hierarchy, with the former Dutch puppets serving in the same capacity for the Japanese.

Dutch propaganda regarding "Japanese influence" has never been leveled against these elements. The Dutch have made every effort to utilize them again. The leaders of East Indonesia and West Borneo, which are Dutch satellites in the Indonesian archipelago, are prewar Dutch agents. A notable example of this tactic to divide and destroy the Republic was the recent Soedanese

"revolt" in West Java. Openly precipitated by the Dutch immediately after the signing of Linggadjadi, this "revolt" was the first major effort in military operations to destroy the Republic. The so-called leader of the Soedanese separatist movement was a notorious Dutch puppet before the war, a rabid racist who practiced atrocities on Dutch prisoners of war during Japanese occupation, and now a loyal adherent to Dutch rule "for at least 100 years" over Indonesia. The recent Dutch all-out attack on the Republic was supported by the head of the state of East Indonesia who declared the war was "police action" in "internal affairs."

While the Indonesian Republic has abolished the bulk of these Dutch-preserved offices, the Dutch have by no means given up their intention to place Indonesian puppets in office so as to mask the bloody military dictatorship which is characteristic of Dutch administration over Republican areas. The Dutch thus hope to beguile international opinion by presenting Indonesians mouthing Dutch policy, and to divide resentment and opposition within the governed areas. The Dutch captured Ratulangi, Republican Governor of Celebes, and six of his associates, and without trial have kept them imprisoned since then. These men were outstanding resistance fighters against the Japanese. Their crime today is their support of the Republic and their refusal to repudiate their positions of leadership. Perhaps the fact that Celebes, now within the Dutch puppet-state of East Indonesia, is rich in rubber, sugar, and manganese has had some influence in this Dutch action.

* * *

4. The Dutch aim to regulate all industrial changes through domination of urban areas.

The major cities in Indonesia are seaports (Batavia, Soerabaja), railroad and transportation centers (Medan), or close to the exploitation of major exports (Palembang, near the major Sumatra petroleum and tea centers). Thus, control of urban areas actually means control over production areas, transportation terminals and routes, shipping centers, and the industrial plants processing the raw material. These actually were the first line of attack and conquest by the Dutch.

While control of these areas cannot starve the Indonesians into submission (since rice production centered in the interior is the basis of the Indonesian diet), it can make the Republic incapable of offering the people more than a bare subsistence diet. The resulting shortages of clothing, curtailment of industrial productivity, and deterioration of transportation would lessen internal support, keep it at the lowest economic level, block its political and economic influence on Asia, and keep the riches of the islands out of the world market. No government, operating under such handicaps, could long withstand concerted military or political pressure to make major concessions.

* * *

5. The Dutch imperialists want to supervise and allocate agricultural production and the removal of natural resources.

Exports from Indonesia before the war fell into two major categories: agricultural products and petroleum; manganese, and tin. The last three items were exploited by European and American firms exclusively; and in the case of tin from the island of Billiton, it was owned by the Dutch royal family outright. Other than spices, most agricultural export produce came from European-owned plantations. Rubber, tin, petroleum and sugar production were all regulated by international cartels. The Indonesians were primarily laborers. The wealth of the country flowed out in a steady stream. Dutch capital investment in Indonesia of one billion dollars yielded an annual profit of \$160,000,000.

The economic policy of the Republic would make drastic changes in the economic position of the Indonesians, since it is based on the principle that profit from the exploitation of the riches of Indonesia must be reflected in the national income. But the essential fact is that the Dutch imperialists, despite any agreement entered into between the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands, have no intention of losing their stranglehold on Indonesia's economy. In their eyes, the only fashion in which the devastation of the Netherlands, its acute dollar-shortage, its steadily increasing indebtedness to the United States, can be overcome, is to regain and strengthen Dutch control over Indonesian production and development.

* * *

6. *The Dutch imperialists strive to halt growth of Indonesian bourgeoisie and economic expansion.*

The existence of the Indonesian Republic as an economic force presents a major threat to Dutch investment, not through limitation of the latter, but as a developing industrial center. In the prewar period, Indonesian capital was invested primarily in land. In Indonesian business, such as kapok and cigarette factories, Chinese competition proved keen; in other industries Europeans held virtual monopoly. But above all, the pauperization of the Indonesian masses was so extensive that for all practical purposes there was no Indonesian capital. A survey for the N.E.I. government, by Huender, of Indonesian income during the 1920's estimated the Indonesian's normal annual income at \$57 in produce and money, in cash only \$19. Such standards applied to over 80 per cent of the population. There did not emerge, therefore, an Indonesian bourgeoisie; the population was an almost inexhaustible cheap labor reservoir.

However, the Indonesian Republic immediately took steps to develop Indonesian enterprise and industry. Communications, transportation, and irrigation were nationalized. Those industries essential to the welfare of the people as a whole were placed under government ownership, supervision, or control. To encourage the development of industry, the National State Bank now gives financial backing to enterprises if capital is not available. Plans to spread ownership among the people by the issuance of shares of stock at a small face value have been projected. Cooperatives are also being encouraged. Plans have been made to diversify agriculture; large European estates, which were usually centered on the most fertile areas, are being broken up to permit the Indonesian farmers to move off marginal lands, and to facilitate crop diversifications by bringing more land under cultivation.

These rapid transformations in the Republic's economic life threaten Dutch, British, and American imperialist monopoly control over Indonesia. The growth of an Indonesian bourgeoisie, not like the development of that class during the rise of English capitalism, but within the framework of a planned economy such as Czechoslovakia or Poland, is part of an intensive economic program to raise the Indonesian standard of living and industrialize the country under five, ten, and fifteen year plans.

* * *

7. *The Dutch objective is to weaken the influence of other capitalist nations in Indonesia, particularly Great Britain and the United States.*

During the first two decades of this century, British and American investments in Indonesia grew rapidly. The Dutch, whose final conquest of Indonesia was completed only in 1908, tried to combat the severe depression that hit the Netherlands in 1900 by intensified super-exploitation of Indonesia.

By 1913, of 206 million guilders invested in East Sumatra, only about 109 million constituted Dutch capital. By 1929, foreign capital (other than Dutch) accounted for 40 per cent of the investment in crops, aside from sugar, throughout Indonesia. However, it was in petroleum, due to the lack of Dutch capital, that American and British interests grew most rapidly; Standard Oil of N. J., Standard Vacuum, Socony, and Royal Dutch Shell (British) were the leaders in the field. British American Tobacco, Lever Soap, and other concerns expanded in the 1930's at the expense of older and weaker Dutch interests.

With the crisis of 1929, the bottom fell out of this intensively exploited area. Exports declined by 50 per cent, but the *value* of exports fell 75 per cent. In 1928 the Netherlands East Indies government showed a profit of 54 million guilders in agricultural enterprises; by 1932, these enterprises showed a deficit of 9 million guilders. Through the Crisis Acts of the '30's, the Dutch tried to bolster up their position; they tried to stabilize world markets through participation in rubber, tea, sugar, tin and petroleum cartels; preferential tariffs were introduced. Nothing brought an upward trend. British and American capital, particularly the latter, made concerted efforts to squeeze out Dutch interests by great purchases of rubber, tin, petroleum, and quinine as the Second World War drew near.

The jockeying for top position in Indonesian economy was halted by the Japanese invasion; but the postwar rivalry continues. But for the advent of the Indonesian Republic, which presents a threat to all imperialism, the Dutch would have fallen before the American financial drive. However, to enable the Dutch to continue in at least the position of watchdog and policeman in Indonesia, over 300 million dollars has been loaned by the U. S. to the Netherlands and Netherlands East Indies governments, and great amounts of American lend-lease and war surplus material, American-trained Dutch marines, and a major force of

British Indian troops were put at the disposal of the Dutch imperialists. The positions taken by the British and American governments toward the Republic through their diplomatic statements, and their actions in the Security Council are designed to prevent the Indonesians from achieving full political and economic independence.

With the upsurge of democratic and independence movements in colonial and semicolonial countries throughout the world, imperialism is losing ground every day. The United States, as the backbone and moving force of imperialism is taking the leading role in United Nations discussions to preserve Dutch imperial rule of Indonesia, with American imperialism as the guiding force. Thus, the United States is leading the bloc to prevent United Nations consideration of the substance of the Indonesian question, namely, independence.

However, the imperialist rivalries for hegemony over Indonesian economic affairs continue. The deeper the Netherlands falls under American control through loans, the more desperate the Dutch efforts to force economic concessions from the Indonesians. Because the Dutch have spent two years in fruitless efforts to wear down Indonesian resistance, British and American business interests have been trying direct negotiations for contracts with the Indonesians. In its July attacks on the Republic, the Dutch hoped for a rapid conquest, approved by Great Britain and the United States, because prolonged hostilities would hamper the economic plans of all three imperialist governments. At the same time, by its token show of military power, the Dutch hoped to limit vigorous American and British economic expansion in Indonesia.

The Dutch have won their round so far because the United States carried the Security Council along over Soviet objections by having the Council instruct both Dutch and Indonesians to cease fighting without calling on both sides to withdraw to pre-attack positions or set up machinery to settle the over-all dispute. But the Dutch will pay heavily to American imperialism for this maneuver. Furthermore, in view of the magnificent struggle of the Indonesian Republic, and the support it has won from Asiatic, Middle Eastern, and South American countries, as well as from the Soviet Union, the Dutch may before long discover they have won no more than a Pyrrhic victory.

* * *

8. *The Dutch imperialists want to restrict the growth of Asian unity for industrialization, commerce, and cultural exchange.*

Since the end of the war, a tremendous independence movement has swept over Asia. A general Asian confidence has developed in its ability to throw off the yoke of European domination. The movements in various Asian countries have drawn active sympathy and support to each other. This has been particularly true with regard to the Indonesian Republic. Support has come from Viet Nam, the Malayan independence movement and anti-imperialist forces in Japan and the Philippines. Mass protests and demonstrations in India, by British acknowledgment, have led to unrest among Indian troops in Indonesia. Moreover, consistent efforts have been made to establish the closest economic and political relations between these two countries. Dutch opposition has not stopped this intercourse, but has instead strengthened international support for the Republic. Singapore, the trading center of the Malay peninsula, has exerted great pressure against the Dutch economic blockade; Chinese importers and exporters, through the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, threatened to boycott Dutch goods throughout Asia. The entire Far Eastern world has assisted the Indonesian Republic because of its political and economic advancement and above all because its united resistance to colonial rule has created a major, immediate threat to imperialism.

This was clearly demonstrated at the Inter-Asian Conference called this year under the auspices of India. Although a non-governmental, non-partisan meeting, the Conference had the highest political significance as the first meeting of the Asian people—including Soviet delegations—to discuss the questions of ending imperialist domination, and substituting therefor cooperation of all Asian countries for the joint utilization of their resources to effect rapid industrialization and to raise the health, educational, social and cultural levels of the Asian people.

Reports of the Conference indicated that the speeches of the Indonesian delegates, particularly Soetan Sjahrir, then Premier, were given the most serious attention. Indonesians, forming the largest delegation, were elected to the Central Committee of the Asian Conference, and will continue to exert great influence in its affairs.

The moral and material aid rendered the Indonesian Republic by Asian peoples has not gone unnoticed by the imperialists. One of the important considerations for Great Britain and France in Security Council discussions of Indonesia has been the prospect of a fully independent Indonesia acting as a catalyst for the French and English colonies throughout Asia and Africa. Thus, despite the cost, despite the greatly strengthened position of the working class in England and France, despite imperialist antagonisms—the United States, England, the Netherlands, and France have operated as a U. N. bloc, with only minor differences to resolve, regarding the Indonesian Republic.

These, in short, represent major objectives of Dutch imperialism in its war on the Indonesian Republic. Let us now turn to the Indonesian people's forces themselves.

* * *

An understanding of the present internal relation of social forces in Indonesia requires a brief background survey of the subjugation of the Indonesian people, and the development of their struggles for national liberation.

In discussing the history of the Indonesian people one might go back to the 7th Century Sumatran Kingdom of Sriwidjaja or the 13th century Empire of Madjapahit. These feudal governments, which extended Indonesian rule from Ceylon to Formosa, were the "Golden Age" of Indonesia's history, periods of the development of the arts, education, culture, and the skills of trading, navigation, and manufacture. During the decline and dissolution of the Empire of Madjapahit in the 15th and 16th centuries, Portuguese, Spanish, English, and Dutch traders began their search for the fabulous Indies, the Spice Islands. From 1602, when the first Dutch traders established a foothold in Indonesia, the islands became the scene of constant revolts, which were suppressed with bloody terror, and expansion of European imperialist control.

As has been noted, it was in the 20th century that the Dutch made the most concerted efforts to link up Indonesian economic life with the demands of the Western, industrialized nations, and the economic vicissitudes which resulted brought about the mass pauperization of the people. While the bulk of the Indonesians were peasants (with average holdings of 2½ acres), oppressive taxation and substandard incomes compelled most of them to seek at least occasional or seasonal work on European capitalist agricultural export enterprises like sugar and rubber.

Indonesia came under the political influences of the day. The Russo-Japanese War, and the First World War, began to show the vulnerability of European power and prestige. The Chinese Revolution under Dr. Sun Yat Sen opened new vistas of a free Asia; the impact of the Socialist revolution in czarist Russia gave tremendous impetus to the colonial liberation movement.

Political parties and trade unions—all with a nationalist approach—grew rapidly. The railway, pawnshop, and tram workers struck in 1921, 1923, and 1925. A small organization of Moslem merchants, formed in 1912 to combat the Chinese bourgeois group, became a mass political instrument of two million members by the 1920's. The Netherlands East Indies Government Penal Code was revised to make punishable by fine and imprisonment "indirect" criticism of the Government. Oppression became so great that in 1926-27 revolts broke out in Java and Sumatra, which were vigorously suppressed by the Dutch. Political movements and parties were abolished, trade unions broken up; over 1,300 Indonesians were exiled or thrown into the Dutch concentration camp of Boven Digoel in New Guinea. The Communist Party, which led the revolts, was illegal from 1927 on (and until the autumn of 1945 after the establishment of the Republic). The present leaders of the Republic, Soekarno (Nationalist), Hatta (Moslem), Sjahir and Sjahrifoeidin (Socialist) were all imprisoned by the Dutch for political and trade union activity.

Despite all Dutch efforts, the nationalist movement continued to grow, constantly changing its organizational names and form, but acting consistently in its efforts to bring democracy and independence to Indonesia. Just before the start of the Japanese War, the Indonesians petitioned the Netherlands Government for adequate representation in the Indies Government and military training to enable them to withstand expected Japanese aggression. The request was denied as not being "practical."

The brief limited defense of Indonesia by the Dutch was followed by 3½ years of Japanese occupation and exploitation. In order to achieve maximum rice production for Japanese consumption, many of the plantations set aside for European export crops were broken up into individual holdings; because of the

shortage of rolling stock and shipping, areas were made economically self-sufficient. All these changes, made for military expediency and under conditions of virtual slavery and starvation of the Indonesian people, nevertheless gave the people the opportunity to acquire skills that they were later able to utilize in building the Republic. The Indonesians did not passively accept Japanese rule any more than they had Dutch control. A disciplined resistance movement, under Communist and Socialist leadership, organized sabotage against Japanese communications and transportation, and five major revolts in Java, Sumatra, and Borneo.

Dutch propaganda that the Indonesian Republic is Japanese-inspired has as much logic or truth as the assertion that the new postwar peoples' democracies are German-inspired.

* * *

At the time of Japan's unconditional surrender, the Indonesians had the strength, the issues and the lack of effective opposition enabling them to seize power. Under the leadership of President Soekarno, a Constitution was drawn up for a democratic Republic which provides for freedom of speech, press, religion, assembly, and organization; and the right to work and to strike. Starting on a narrow Nationalist-Moslem base, the Republic has been broadened. Today, the government is a coalition of the Nationalist, Moslem, Socialist, Labor, Peasant and Communist Parties. In the Central Working Committee (Parliament), the Left Wing (Sajap Kiri), consisting of the Labor, Socialist, Communist, Peasant, and People's Parties, commands a voting block of two-thirds and represents the advanced political and economic position of the people. The representation accorded Chinese and other national minorities, areas not yet under Republican authority, the Christian Party and the Catholic Party, as well as to the women and youth movements, testifies to the inclusive national character of the Republic.

The Labor Party is structurally similar to the British Labor Party, although radically different in political character. Based on the All-Indonesian Federation of Trade Unions (S. O. B. S. I.), the national organ of craft and industrial unions, the Labor Party reflects the military and class-consciousness of the workers. Labor-management committees have been set up to insure maximum production: during the early crisis days of the Republic, the unions pledged to work without pay, if necessary, to sustain the Republic. Furthermore, S. O. B. S. I. is affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions. The recent appeal by S. O. B. S. I. for international working-class solidarity with the Indonesians to prevent Dutch aggression shows the high level of responsibility and vanguard position taken by Indonesian labor.

Action has already been taken by the Australian Waterfront Federation in renewing its boycott of all shipping for use by the Dutch in Indonesia. The Executive Board of the National Maritime Union in the United States has called on its members to vote affirmatively that the entire membership "boycott all vessels designed to aid the Dutch in their war of aggression." There are sporadic strikes of Dutch dockers that are hindering Dutch shipping to a considerable extent. A rank-and-file motion passed at the recent British Labour Party convention called for a halt to training of Dutch troops in Great Britain. Both India and Pakistan have condemned the Dutch colonial war, and have revoked, for the time being, Dutch rights to land any aircraft on their soil.

The Socialist Party of Indonesia, basing its political position on Mao Tse-tung's writings, has worked in harmony with the Indonesian Communist Party for the past two years. This is an Asian example of the new Socialist-Communist coalitions that have developed in Eastern Europe, and contrasts sharply with the Netherlands, where the Socialist Party supports imperialist war against Indonesia.

The economic policies of the Republic, projected by A. K. Gani (Chairman of the Nationalist Party), Minister of Economics and Deputy Premier, are perhaps the most comprehensive in all Asia. Projecting public, private, and mixed property and funds for the industrialization of the country, Indonesian, foreign and mixed capital to increase Indonesian production, the Five-, Ten-, and Fifteen-year plans will change Indonesia from a backward, poverty-stricken, agricultural and raw-material exporter, into a technologically advanced state.

Any consideration of the basic changes in Indonesia has little value without a keen awareness of the imminent danger of their destruction. China and India, because of great populations, huge land mass, and strategic locations, continue as the major countries of the Far East. But Indonesia at this moment is the focal

point of attention in the Far East and the United Nations because of its decisive significance to the entire colonial and imperialist world. Unlike the Philippines or Viet Nam, where the independence forces have not yet achieved sufficient unity and a wide enough mass base, or China, where the struggle is being resolved internally, or yet India, where the imperialists succeeded in affecting a three-way split among the Hindu, Moslem and Princely interests—the Indonesian Republic has forged the support of all sections of its people in consistent revolutionary struggle against imperialism. Indonesia is the only colonial country that has proved capable of forcing consideration of colonial independence at the highest international level, the Security Council.

At this juncture, the demands of the Republic are clear: international supervision of the cease-fire order of the Security Council, withdrawal of Dutch troops from Indonesia, international settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian crisis, full diplomatic recognition internationally, and membership in the United Nations.

Support of these completely just conditions must be developed in the United States. The recent Republican proposal that the U. S. use its offer of "good offices" to settle the Indonesian question by urging United Nations action clearly indicates that American prestige in Asia has reached a low point because of the actions of American imperialism in giving full support to the Dutch. Sharply fixing responsibility for the Indonesian situation on the imperialist powers, the note of the Indonesian Republic to the United States (August 7, 1947) stated:

The Republic feels sure that the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands will all agree, in view of the fact that two years of negotiation and mediation failed to prevent the outbreak of large-scale hostilities, that in arbitration by a United Nations commission lies the only and final hope of settling the dispute by peaceful means.

The American people bear the major responsibility for the establishment of such a commission and lasting peace in Indonesia. In addition to demanding that such a fully representative international commission be established to arbitrate the issues in Indonesia, the American people must demand that there be no bypassing of the U. N. by the United States. They must demand that the U. S. recognize the sovereignty of the Indonesian Republic. They must insist that no American supplies be sent to the Dutch for war on Indonesia; and a boycott should be declared here on Dutch goods, and an embargo on Dutch and other shipping of materials for the Dutch imperialist war. The action of the Executive Board of the N. M. U. deserves the applause of all labor, all anti-imperialists. It calls for support by all unions.

Imperialist forces in the United States have brought war to the Indonesian people in the past two years; it rests with the American people to change United States policy to one of friendship with the Indonesian Republic.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is an excerpt from the testimony of Ambassador Philip Jessup from hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the excerpt dealing with the Soviet IPR Council.

Mr. MORRIS. May that go into the record?

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The excerpt referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1406" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1406

TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR PHILIP JESSUP REGARDING THE SOVIET COUNCIL OF IPR

"A national council was established in the U. S. S. R., the Soviet Union, in 1934, but did not participate at all in the activities of the Pacific Council after 1939."

(Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Congress, first session, on Nomination of Philip C. Jessup to be United States Representative to the Sixth General Assembly of the United Nations, October 4, 1951, p. 444.)

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a statement from the diary of Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey from a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. We are just putting the diary itself in. We are not extracting testimony from the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The diary referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1407" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1407

STATEMENT FROM THE DIARY OF SENATOR H. ALEXANDER SMITH OF NEW JERSEY

This is an entry of November 23, 1949, Wednesday:

"We are in New York. Yesterday I went to the meeting of the United States delegation to the United Nations. Met old friends Austin, John Cooper. Also Mrs. Roosevelt and Ruth Bryan Rohde.

"Talked with Francis Wilcox re China situation.

"Went up to Assembly at Flushing. Lunch with Philip Jessup and Ray Fosdick. They are leaning toward the British who want to recognize Communist China. Also they do not seem to see the dangers in the Formosa situation."

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a study made by the staff of the research director on the number of communications to and from the IPR and Philip Jessup.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of this, Mr. Chairman, is to show activity on the part of Mr. Jessup within the Institute of Pacific Relations. I mean, the number of letters sent by him or received by him in connection with our investigation.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The study referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1408" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1408

MEMORANDUM

A study of the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations for 1939 shows 262 communications to Philip C. Jessup and 128 from Jessup.

A similar study of communications for 1940 shows 91 communications to Mr. Jessup and 50 from Mr. Jessup.

A similar study for 1941 shows 10 communications to Jessup and 8 from Jessup.

A similar study made for 1942 shows 3 to Jessup and 2 from Jessup.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is the incorporation papers of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. May that go into the record?

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The papers referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1409" and are as follows:)

No. 25407

EXHIBIT No. 1409

CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

We, the undersigned, being all of full age and citizens of the United States and a majority of whom are citizens and residents of the District of Columbia, desiring to form a corporation pursuant to and in conformity with Subchapter Three of Chapter Eighteen of the Code of Laws of the District of Columbia, DO HEREBY CERTIFY:

FIRST: The name of the Corporation shall be THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

SECOND: The Corporation shall have perpetual existence.

THREE: The particular business and objects of the Corporation shall be: Amended and recorded Jan. 14, 1947.

To promote the study of the problems of the peoples and nations of the Pacific area by means of cooperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations by stimulating attention to these problems on the part of others and by means of such research and educational methods as discussion conferences, language and other schools, Far Eastern seminars, international conferences, study groups, publications and other lawful and appropriate methods.

In pursuance of and not in limitation of the general powers conferred by law and the objects and purposes herein set forth, it is expressly provided that this Corporation shall also have the following powers:

To do all such acts as are necessary or convenient to attain the objects and purposes herein set forth, to the same extent and as fully as any natural person could or might do, and as are not forbidden by law or by this certificate of incorporation or by the bylaws of this Corporation.

As a nonprofit Corporation, none of the income of which shall accrue to any member, to purchase, lease, sell, mortgage, hold, receive by gift, devise or bequest, or otherwise acquire or dispose of such real or personal property as may be necessary to the purposes of this Corporation.

To have offices and promote and carry on its objects and purposes, within or without the District of Columbia, and in the states or territories of the United States and in foreign countries.

To have all powers that may be conferred upon corporations formed under Sub-Chapter Eighteen of the Code of Laws of the District of Columbia.

FOURTH: The property of the officers, trustees and members of this Corporation shall not be subject to or chargeable with the payment of corporate debts or obligations.

FIFTH: The Board of Trustees shall have power to make by-laws for the government of the Corporation and to alter, change or amend the same.

SIXTH: The principal office of this Corporation in the District of Columbia shall be located at No. 3417 Quebec Street NW., in the City of Washington.

SEVENTH: The meetings of the members and of the trustees of this Corporation may be held in the District of Columbia, or elsewhere within the confines of the United States or its possessions.

EIGHTH: The number of Trustees of this Corporation for the first year of its existence shall be fifty.

Witness our hands and seals this 20th day of February One thousand nine hundred and thirty-nine.

ESTHER CAUKIN BRUNAUER [Seal]
WILLIAM T. STONE [Seal]
ROY VEATCH [Seal]

ERNEST O. PALAND,
Witness.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss:

I, Ernest O. Paland a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, do hereby certify that ESTHER CAUKIN BRUNAUER, WILLIAM T. STONE, and ROY VEATCH, parties to a certificate of incorporation bearing date of February 20th, 1939, and hereto annexed, personally appeared before me in said District, the said Esther Caukin Brunauer, William T. Stone, and Roy Veatch being personally known to me as the persons who executed the said certificate of incorporation and acknowledged the same to be their act and deed.

Given under my hand and seal this 20th day of February, 1939.

[NOTARIAL SEAL]

ERNEST O. PALAND,
Notary Public, D. C.

My commission expires April 15, 1943.

OFFICE OF THE RECORDER OF DEEDS

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and verified copy of the Certificate of Incorporation of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., and of the whole of said Certificate of Incorporation, as filed in this Office the 20th day of February A. D. 1939.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of this Office this 21st day of February A. D. 1939.

[SEAL]

(Signature) _____,
Recorder of Deeds, D. C.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a clipping from the Daily Worker showing the candidacy of Corliss Lamont on the American Labor Party ticket for the United States Senate.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The clipping referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1410" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1410

[Daily Worker, June 10, 1952]

ALP LEADERS RECOMMEND CORLISS LAMONT FOR SENATE

Former Representative Vito Marcantonio, State Chairman of the American Labor Party, announced today that at a meeting of the American Labor Party State Executive Committee, held on June 3, the nomination of Corliss Lamont as the ALP candidate for United States Senator from the State of New York was unanimously recommended to all ALP clubs and to the ALP State Convention, which will take place on Aug. 28, 1952.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a compilation of the Government posts held by Philip C. Jessup as taken from the hearings of a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and also from Who's Who and also from the Biographical Register of the Department of State.

Mr. MORRIS. It is background material, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The compilation referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1411" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1411

GOVERNMENT POSTS OF PHILIP C. JESSUP

App. drafting officer in the Dept. of St., Oct. 15, 1924.

Asst. solicitor, Dept. of State, 1924-25.

Asst. to Elihu Root, Conf. of Jurists on Permanent Ct. Internat. Justice.

Legal adviser to Am. amb. to Cuba 1930.

App. Chief of Div. of Personnel & Training, Office of For. Relief & Rehabilitation Operations, Dept. of St., February 1, 1943.

Transferred to Office of For. Econ. Admin., Sept. 30, 1943.

Asst. Sec. gen. U. N. R. R. A. and Bretton Woods Confs., 1943-44.

Consultant, Bd. of Econ. Warfare & Navy Dept.

Asst. Dir Naval Sch. Mil. Govt and Administration, 1942-44.

Asst. on judicial orgn., U. S. del. San Francisco Conf., 1945.

App. Consultant, Div. of Int. Org. Affairs, Dept. of State, Sept. 5, 1945.

Rep. of U. S., United Nations Comm., on Progressive Development of Int. Law & Codification, Apr. 25, 1947-Dec. 5, 1947.

January 5, 1948.—Appointed deputy United States representative in the Interim Committee of the U. N. General Assembly (That is sometimes referred to in our record as the Little Assembly).

January-March 1948.—Representative of United States in Interim Committee, dealing with—

(a) Korea: Consultation by U. N. Temporary Commission on Korea with Interim Committee.

(b) Pacific settlement: Study of methods for improving international co-operation in the political field.

(c) Veto: Recommendations on the problem of voting in the Security Council.

April 14, 1948.—Appointed United States representative to the second special session of the U. N. General Assembly.

April-May, 1948.—Representative of United States in General Assembly, dealing with—

(a) Palestine: Problem of disposition of Palestine following termination of the mandate.

(b) Jerusalem: Provisions for protection of the holy places and measures to carry on municipal administration in Jerusalem.

June 7, 1948.—Appointed United States deputy representative in U. N. Security Council.

June 25, 1948.—Appointed Deputy Chief, United States mission to the U. N.

June 1948.—Representative of United States in U. N. Security Council.

February 1949.—dealing with—

(a) Palestine (June–November): Preservation of cease-fire between Israel and Arab States.

(b) Atomic energy (June): Forwarding to General Assembly of U. N. Atomic Energy Commission's report.

(c) Trieste (August): Consideration of Yugoslav charges concerning administration of zone A in Trieste.

(d) Hyderabad (September): Consideration of complaint made to Security Council following Indian "invasion" of Hyderabad.

(e) Berlin (October to February): Security Council consideration of Berlin blockade by U. S. S. R.

(f) Israel (December): Security Council consideration of Israeli application for admission to U. N. membership.

(g) Indonesia (December–January 1949): Security Council consideration of second Dutch police action and recommendations designed to bring about a political solution.

September–December, 1948.—United States representative to third regular session of the U. N. General Assembly in Paris, dealing with—

(a) Consideration of the problem of the future of Palestine but chiefly occupied with Security Council problems noted above.

December 2, 1948.—Appointed Acting Chief, United States mission to U. N., with personal rank of Ambassador.

December 2, 1948.—Appointed acting United States representative, U. N. Security Council.

March 2, 1949.—Appointed United States Ambassador at Large. (Present position.)

March–April, 1949.—Negotiations in New York with Soviet U. N. Delegate Malik which resulted in lifting of Berlin blockade.

April–May, 1949.—Delegate at second part of third regular session of U. N. General Assembly, New York, but not actively in charge of any item on agenda.

May–June, 1949.—Adviser to Secretary of State at sixth session of Council of Foreign Ministers, Paris:

(a) Austrian Treaty: Further negotiations and limited agreements among Big Four to move toward conclusion of Austrian Treaty.

(b) Berlin: Agreement concerning access by Western Powers to air sectors of Berlin.

(c) Germany: Further discussions on restoration of economic and political unity of Germany.

July–September, 1949.—Assignment in Department of State to work on far eastern problems:

(a) Editorial supervision of final states of preparation of China white paper.

(b) Preparation for anticipated debate in General Assembly on Soviet violations of Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945.

(c) Discussion with consultants on far eastern problems.

September 1949.—Adviser to Secretary of State at meeting of three Foreign Ministers, New York, including especially—

(a) North Atlantic Treaty.

(b) Western Germany.

September 1949.—Adviser to Secretary of State at meeting of four Foreign Ministers, New York, Austrian Treaty.

September–December, 1949.—United States representative at fourth regular session of U. N. General Assembly, dealing with—

(a) Italian colonies: Negotiation and adoption of Assembly resolution on disposition of former Italian colonies.

(b) Consideration of the question of "Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of August 14, 1945, and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations."

December 20–March 15, 1950.—Trip through the Far East and Middle East, visiting Hawaii, Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Formosa, Hong Kong, Philippines, Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, Thailand, Ceylon, India, Pakistan,

Afghanistan, including Bangkok Conference of United States representatives in area, February 13-15.

May 1950—Fourth session, North Atlantic Council meeting and three Foreign Ministers meeting, London.

May 29-August, 1950.—General and varied assignments in State Department including far eastern questions especially as a result of the aggression on Korea, June 25, 1950.

April 5, 1950.—Designated Department of State consultant to the National Security Council.

August 3, 1950-February, 1951.—Designated Department of State representative on the senior staff of the National Security Council.

September, 1950.—Fifth session, North Atlantic Council meeting and three Foreign Ministers meeting, New York.

October 1950-February 1951.—General and varied assignments in State Department including preparations for and participation in meetings with Prime Minister Attlee, December 4-8, 1950, and preparations for and participation in meetings with Prime Minister Plevin January 29-30, 1951.

March 5-June 20, 1951.—Four Power deputies meeting, Paris, discussion of agenda for possible meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

July 1951 to present.—Assignment to western European subjects, including NATO, preparation for Foreign Ministers' Conference in Washington and Ottawa NAC Meeting.

Sources :

Who's Who In America, Vol. 26, 1950-51, page 1390.

Biographic Register of the Department of State, April 1, 1951, page 226.

Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, First Session, on Nomination of Philip C. Jessup to be United States Representative to the Sixth General Assembly of the United Nations, October 15, 1951, pages 842, 843.

Mr. MORRIS. It gives Mr. Jessup's connection with the Government. He has been one who has figured in the hearings of the IPR.

Mr. MANDELL. Next is a compilation made by the Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service of Reviewers of Books on the Far East which pertains to our report.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The compilation referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1412" and is as follows:)

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SELECTED REVIEWERS, BOOK REVIEW DIGEST 1945

- P. 5: Richard Watts
A. Woolcott; his life and his world, by Samuel H. Adams, New
 Repub. 112: 795, Je. '45; 800 words.
- P. 26: Richard Watts
Old Leatherface of the Flying Tigers, by Keith Ayling, New Repub.
 113: 293, S. 3, '45; 950 words.
- P. 89: Richard Watts
Artie Greengroin, Pfc., by Harry Peter M'Nab Brown, N. Y. Times,
 p. 6, Jl. 15, '45; 1,100 words.
- P. 96: Eleanor Lattimore
China in black and white, by Pearl Buck, Weekly Book Review,
 p. 4, D. 23, '45; 310 words.
- P. 97: Owen Lattimore
Tell the people, by Pearl Buck, Weekly Book Review, p. 5, Ap. 8,
 '45; 950 words.
- P. 132: Eleanor Lattimore
The Asian legacy and American life, by Arthur Christy, Weekly
 Book Review, p. 5, Jl. 29, '45; 1,000 words.

- P. 212: T. A. Bisson
Japanese nation, by John Fee Embree, Nation 161:262, S. 15, '45,
 360 words.
- P. 212: T. A. Bisson
Japanese nation, by John Fee Embree, Sat. R. of Lit. 28:17, S. 1,
 '45; 900 words.
- P. 212: Gunther Stein
Japanese nation, by John Fee Embree, Yale, R. n. s. 35:342, win-
 ter '46; 40 words.
- P. 223: Eleanor Lattimore
Earthbound China, Fei Hsiao-T'ung, and Chang Tse-I, Weekly Book
 Review, p. 26, N. 25, '45; 400 words.
- P. 237: T. A. Bisson
What to do with Japan, by Wilfrid Fleisher, Sat. R. of Lit. 28:21,
 Mr. 17, '45; 650 words.
- P. 237: Gunther Stein
What to do with Japan, by Wilfrid Fleisher, Yale R. n. s. 35:342,
 winter, '46; 40 words.
- P. 242: Owen Lattimore
Report from red China, by Harrison Forman, Atlantic 175:133,
 Ap. '45; 650 words.
- P. 242: Edgar Snow
Report from red China, by Harrison Forman, N. Y. Times, p. 3, Mr.
 11, '45; 2,100 words.
- P. 243: Richard Watts
Report from red China, by Harrison Forman, Sat. R. of Lit. 28:9,
 Mr. 10, '45; 2,250 words.
- P. 344: Eleanor Lattimore
Challenge at Changsha, by Paul Hughes, Weekly Book Review, p.
 7, D. 23, '45; 380 words.
- P. 367: L. K. Rosinger
The future of Japan, by William Crane Johnstone, Nation, 161:17,
 Jl. 7, '45; 360 words.
- P. 367: Richard Watts
The future of Japan, by William Crane Johnstone, New Repub.
 112: 876, Je. 25, '45; 1,150 words.
- P. 367: T. A. Bisson
The future of Japan, by William Crane Johnstone, N. Y. Times, p.
 4, S. 2, '45; 700 words.
- P. 367: T. A. Bisson
The future of Japan, by William Crane Johnstone, Pacific Affairs
 18:384, D. '45; 1,220 words.
- P. 367: Gunther Stein
The future of Japan, by William Crane Johnstone, Yale R. n. s.
 35:342, winter '46; 40 words.
- P. 371: Richard Watts
Stephen Hero, by James Joyce, New Repub. 112:518, Ap. 16, '45;
 1,150 words.
- P. 409: T. A. Bisson
Asia on the move, by Bruno Lasker, Sat. R. of Lit. 28:14, Mr. 3,
 '45; 800 words.
- P. 411: Richard Watts, Jr.
Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, New Repub. 112:302, F. 26,
 '45, 1550 words.
- P. 411: Edgar Snow
Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, N. Y. Times, p. 3, F. 25, '45;
 1750 words.
- P. 411: T. A. Bisson
Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, Sat. R. of Lit. 28:9, Mr. 10,
 '45; 750 words.
- P. 414: Richard Watts
A star danced, by Gertrude Lawrence, Sat. R. of Lit. 28:17, Ag.
 18, '45; 650 words.
- P. 419: Richard Watts
The ballad and the source, by Rosamond Lehmann, New Repub.
 112:481, Ap. 9, '45; 1350 words.

- P. 433: Richard Watts, Jr.
Vigil of a nation, by Lin Yu-T'Ang, New Repub. 112: 180, F. 5, '45; 1550 words
- P. 461: T. A. Bisson
Japanese militarism, by John McGilvrey Maki, Nation 160: 627, Je. 2, '45; 300 words
- P. 465: Richard Watts
Little superman, by Heinrich Mann, N. Y. Times, p. 11, D. 16, '45; 600 words
- P. 504: Nym Wales
Strangers in India, by Penderel Moon, Weekly Book Review, p. 4, Ap. 8, '45; 650 words.
- P. 516: Richard Watts
Theatre book of the year, by George Jean Nathan, N. Y. Times, p. 8, N. 25, '45; 600 words.
- P. 518: Owen Lattimore
Korea and the old orders in eastern Asia, by Melvin Frederick Nelson, Ann. Am. Acad. 242: 171, N. '45; 400 words.
- P. 552: L. K. Rosinger
Forever China, by Pierre Stephen Robert Payne, Survey G. 34: 450, N. '45; 450 words.
- P. 570: Annalee Jacoby
My twenty-five years in China, by John Benjamin Powell, N. Y. Times, p. 7, D. 16, '45; 1350 words.
- P. 570: Owen Lattimore
My twenty-five years in China, by John Benjamin Powell, Weekly Book Review, p. 2, N. 11, '45; 1350 words.
- P. 573: Owen Lattimore
Japan and the Son of Heaven, by Willard DeMille Price, N. Y. Times, p. 3, O. 14, '45; 700 words.
- P. 607: Richard Watts
China's crisis, by Lawrence Kaelter Rosinger, New Repub. 113: 138, Jl. 30, '45; 1950 words.
- P. 607: T. A. Bisson
China's crisis, by Lawrence Kaelter Rosinger, N. Y. Times, p. 4, Jl. 29, '45; 600 words.
- P. 608: Owen Lattimore
China's crisis, by Lawrence Kaelter Rosinger, Weekly Book Review, p. 4, Jl. 15, '45; 1,350 words.
- P. 608: T. A. Bisson
Dilemma in Japan, by Andrew Roth, New Repub. 113: 473, O. 8, '45; 1450 words.
- P. 608: Gunther Stein
Dilemma in Japan, by Andrew Roth, Yale R. n. s. 35: 340, winter '46; 1,000 words.
- P. 610: T. A. Bisson
China among the powers, by David Nelson Rowe, Nation 160: 255, Mr. 3, '45; 350 words.
- P. 610: Edgar Snow
China among the powers, by David Nelson Rowe, N. Y. Times, p. 8, My. 20, '45; 700 words.
- P. 610: L. K. Rosinger
China among the powers, by David Nelson Rowe, Pol. Sci. Q. 60: 300, Je. '45; 650 words.
- P. 610: Eleanor Lattimore
China among the powers, by David Nelson Rowe, Weekly Book Review, p. 16, F. 18, '45; 850 words.
- P. 647: Richard Watts
Rickshaw boy, by Shu Ch'ing-Ch'un, New Repub. 113: 163, Ag. 6, '45; 1,050 words.
- P. 660: Eleanor Lattimore
Chinese labor movement, by Helen Snow (Nym Wales, pseud), Weekly Book Review, p. 12, Ap. 8, '45; 800 words.
- P. 667: Richard Watts
Small general, by Robert Standish, N. Y. Times. p. 7. O. 14, '45; 900 words.

- P. 673: Richard Watts
Challenge of Red China, by Guenther Stein, New Repub., 113: 873, D. 24, '45; 750 words.
- P. 673: Nathaniel Peffer
Challenge of Red China, by Guenther Stein, N. Y. Times, p. 4, O. 28, '45; 1,400 words.
- P. 673: Owen Lattimore
Challenge of Red China, by Guenther Stein, Weekly Book Review, p. 3, O. 14, '45; 1,250 words.
- P. 678: Edgar Snow
Russia is no riddle, by Edmund Stevens, Weekly Book Review, p. 3, Mr. 25, '45; 1,000 words.
- P. 697: Richard Watts
Building of the Burma road, by T'an Pei-Ying, Weekly Book Review, p. 5, O. 14, '45; 900 words.
- P. 712: T. A. Bisson
Through Japanese eyes, by Otto David Tolischus, Nation, 160: 522, My. 5, '45; 280 words.
- P. 712: T. A. Bisson
Through Japanese eyes, by Otto David Tolischus, N. Y. Times, p. 6, Ap. 15, '45; 900 words.
- P. 713: Richard Watts
China after seven years of war, by Hollington Kong Tong, Sat. R. of Lit., 28: 13, Mr. 3, '45; 1,100 words.
- P. 713: Guenther Stein
China after seven years of war, by Hollington Kong Tong, Weekly Book Review, p. 2, Mr. 4, '45; 800 words.
- P. 746: T. A. Bisson
Asia for the Asiatics, by Robert Spencer Ward, Sat. R. of Lit., 28: 11, Jl. 21, '45; 1,000 words.
- P. 746: Eleanor Lattimore
Asia for the Asiatics, by Robert Spencer Ward, Weekly Book Review, p. 18, Ag. 26, '45; 450 words.
- P. 746: Guenther Stein
Asia for the Asiatics, by Robert Spencer Ward, Yale R. n. s., 35: 342, winter '46; 300 words.
- P. 782: Eleanor Lattimore
I saw the Russian people, by Ella Winter, Weekly Book Review, p. 4, Ja. 20, '46; 2,000 words.
- P. 787: Richard Watts
American guerrilla in the Philippines, by Ira Wolfert, New Repub., 112: 713, My. 21, '45; 1,250 words.

SELECTED REVIEWERS, BOOK REVIEW DIGEST, 1946

- P. 1: L. K. Rosinger
Betrayal in the Philippines, by Hernando Abaya, New Republic 115: 771, D. 9, '46; 650 words.
- P. 137: Richard Watts
Innocents in Paris, by Gilbert Cesbron, N. Y. T., p. 5, Je. 23, '46; 900 words.
- P. 144: Guenther Stein
Sun Yat-sen, by Stephen Chen and Pierre S. R. Payne, p. 16, Jl. 11, '46; Christian Science Monitor; 450 words.
- P. 144: Richard Watts
Sun Yat-sen, by Stephen-Chen and Pierre S. R. Payne, Weekly Book Review, p. 5, Jl. 14, '46; 1,650 words.
- P. 145: Owen Lattimore
Collected wartime messages, by Chiang Kai-shek, Weekly Book Review, p. 5, O. 20, '46; 1,350 words.
- P. 219: Richard Watts
China Cycle, by R. P. Dobson, Sat. R. of Lit. 29: 9, S. 28, '46; 750 words.
- P. 224: Richard Watts
Tour of Duty, by John Dos Passos, New Repub. 115: 267, S. 2, '46; 900 words.

- P. 231: Owen Lattimore
China and America, by Foster Rhea Dulles, Weekly Book Review, p. 5, Je. 2, '46; 900 words.
- P. 244: Richard Watts
Wrath in Burma, by Fred Eldridge, Weekly Book Review, p. 5, My. 12, '46; 1,500 words.
- P. 231: Richard Watts
China and America, by Foster Rhea Dulles, New Repub. 115: 52, Jl. 15, '46; 850 words.
- P. 312: Richard Watts
The B. O. W.'s, by Gillmore, Margalo, and Patricia Collinge, Sat. Rev. of Lit. 29: 11, F. 2, '46; 1,200 words.
- P. 329: Richard Watts
China in the Sun, by Randall C. Gould, Weekly Book Rev., p. 5, Ja. 27, '46; 1,500 words.
- P. 376: Richard Watts
Krazy Kat, by George Harriman, New Repub. 115: 487, O. 14, '46; 550 words.
- P. 404: Eleanor Lattimore
Doctors East, Doctors West, by Edward H. Hume, New York Times, p. 7, My. 5, '46; 1,250 words.
- P. 458: Richard Watts
Thicres in the Night, by Arthur Koestler, N. Y. Times, p. 1, N. 3, '46; 1,550 words.
- P. 473: Eleanor Lattimore
Chinese Family and Society, by Olga Lang, N. Y. Times, p. 42, S. 15, '46; 1,150 words.
- P. 478: J. K. Fairbank
The United States Moves Across the Pacific, by Kenneth S. Latourette, Pol. Sci. Q. 61: 602, D. '46; 1,250 words.
- P. 478: Owen Lattimore
The United States Moves Across the Pacific, by Kenneth S. Latourette, Weekly Book Review, p. 16, Je. 2, '46; 950 words.
- P. 508: Richard Watts
It is Dark Underground, by Pin fei Loo, Weekly Book Review, p. 2, My. 19, '46; 1,000 words.
- P. 530: Richard Watts
Eamon de Valera, by M. J. MacManus, N. Y. Times, p. 6, O. 27, '46; 1,100 words.
- P. 634: L. K. Rosinger
Chinese Constitution, a study of forty years of constitution making in China, by Wei-Tung, Pan, Am. Hist. R. 51: 718, Jl. '46; 400 words.
- P. 640: Richard Watts
Torrents of Spring, by Pierre S. R. Payne, N. Y. Times, p. 5, My. 12, '46; 850 words.
- P. 644: Richard Watts
Oscar Wilde, his life and wit, by Hesketh Pearson, Weekly Book Review, p. 3, Jl. 21, '46; 1,150 words.
- P. 654: Richard Watts
Wind in the Olive Tree by Abel Plenn, New Repub. 114: 738, My. 20, '46; 1,000 words.
- P. 695: Richard Watts
South of Heaven by Lettie Rogers, N. Y. Times, p. 7, O. 20; '46; 950 words.
- P. 733: Richard Watts
Burma Surgeon Returns by Gordon S. Seagrave, Weekly Book Review, p. 1, Mr. 10, '46; 1,300 words.
- P. 852: Richard Watts
Soviet Asia Mission by Andrew J. Steiger and Henry A. Wallace, New Repub. 115: 83, Jl. 22, '46; 1,100 words.
- P. 855: Richard Watts, Jr.
Black Ships off Japan by Arthur C. Walworth, New Repub. 115: 52, Jl. 15, '46; 450 words.
- P. 855: L. K. Rosinger
Black Ships off Japan by Arthur C. Walworth, Sat. R. of Lit. 24: 23, Ap. 20, '46; 800 words.

- P. 856: Eleanor Lattimore
Chinese Mind by Gung-hsing Wang, N. Y. Times, p. 21, Jl. 14, '46;
650 words.
- P. 856: Richard Watts
Chinese Mind by Gung-hsing Wang, New Repub. 115: 52; Jul. 15,
'46; 80 words.
- P. 866: Richard Watts
Homecoming by Joseph Wechsberg, N. Y. Times, p. 4, Jl. 14, '46;
1,200 words.
- P. 886: L. K. Rosinger
Thunder Out of China, Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, New
Repub. 115: 666; N. 18, '46; 1,000 words.
- P. 886: J. K. Fairbank
Thunder Out of China by Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, N. Y.
Times, p. 1, O. 27, '46; 1,850 words.
- P. 886: Edgar Snow
Thunder Out of China by Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby,
Sat. Rev. of Lit. 29: 12, O. 26, '46; 1,600 words.
- P. 886: Richard Watts:
Thunder Out of China by Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby,
Weekly Book Rev., p. 1, O. 27, '46; 1,450 words.
- P. 886: Richard Watts, Jr.
Our Neighbors, the Chinese by Vaughan White, New Repub. 115: 52;
Jl. 15, '46; 220 words.
- P. 886: Eleanor Lattimore
Our Neighbors, the Chinese by Vaughan White, Weekly Book Rev.,
p. 18, My. 5, '46; 1,300 words.
- P. 901: Richard Watts
Victorian Doctor by Thomas George Wilson, Weekly Book Rev., p. 2,
Je. 16, '46; 1,300 words.
- P. 912: Eleanor Lattimore
A Chinese Village by Mou-Ch-un Yang, Weekly Book Rev., p. 19,
Mr. 3, '46; 400 words.
- P. 918: Richard Watts
Mirror of the Past by Kodne Zilliacus, New Repub., 115: 826, D. 16,
'46; 1,650 words.

(Source: 1945 Book Review Digest.)

SELECTED REVIEWERS BOOK REVIEW DIGEST, 1947

- P. 60: Richard Watts
Cervantes, by Aubrey F. Bell, New Republic 117: 28, S. 15 '47; 1,550
words.
- P. 74: Richard Watts
Stick but not streamlined, by John Betjeman, New Republic 117: 28,
Ag. 4, '47; 1,900 words.
- P. 84: Richard Watts
Big Yankee, the life of Carlson of the Raiders, by Michael Blankfort,
N. Y. Herald Tribune Weekly Book Report, p. 7, Mr. 2, '47; 1,200
words.
- P. 110: Edgar Snow
War or peace with Russia? by Earl Russell Browder, N. Y. Times,
p. 7, April 6, '47; 1,150 words.
- P. 132: Richard Watts
Speaking frankly, by James Francis Byrnes, New Republic 117: 28,
O. 27, '47; 1,550 words.
- P. 135: Annalee Jacoby
Look south to the polar star, by Holger Cahill, N. Y. Times, p. 5,
Feb. 9, '47; 650 words.
- P. 135: Richard Watts
Look south to the polar star, by Holger Cahill, Sat. Review of Lit.
30: 23, Feb. 15, '47; 800 words.
- P. 157: Annalee Jacoby
Autobiography of a Chinese woman, by Bu-Wei (Yang) Chao, N. Y.
Herald Tribune Wkly., Bk. R., p. 14, Mr. 16, '47; 550 words.
- P. 160: Richard Watts
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Macmillan), New Repub.
116: 37, F. 10, '47; 850 words.

- P. 160: Owen Lattimore
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Macmillan), N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 5, F. 16, '47; 600 words.
- P. 160: J. K. Fairbank
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Macmillan), N. Y. Times, p. 3, F. 9, '47; 800 words.
- P. 160: Nathaniel Peffer
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Macmillan), Pol. Sci. Q. 62: 598, D. '47; 330 words.
- P. 161: Richard Watts
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Roy pubs.), New Repub. 116: 37, F. 10, '47; 850 words.
- P. 161: Owen Lattimore
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Roy pubs.), N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 5, F. 16, '47; 600 words.
- P. 161: J. K. Fairbank
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Roy pubs.), N. Y. Times, p. 3, F. 9, '47; 800 words.
- P. 161: Nathaniel Peffer
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Roy pubs.), Pol. Sci. Q. 62: 598, D. '47; 330 words.
- P. 161: J. K. Fairbank
Tides from the West, by Chiang Monlin, Ann. Am. Acad. 253: 224, S. '47; 420 words.
- P. 161: Annalee Jacoby
Tides from the West, by Chiang Monlin, Sat. R. of Lit. 30: 19, Je. 7, '47; 750 words.
- P. 178: Richard Watts
Foreign mud, by Maurice Collis, New Repub. 117: 29, O. 6, '47; 140 words.
- P. 186: Richard Watts
Future of freedom in the Orient, by Ralph A. Coniston, New Repub. 116: 27, My. 19, '47; 110 words.
- P. 186: Nathaniel Peffer
Future of freedom in the Orient, by Ralph A. Coniston, New York Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 11, Ag. 24, '47; 550 words.
- P. 201: Richard Watts
Roosevelt era, by Milton Crane, New Repub. 117: 25, D. 1, '47; 1,600 words.
- P. 208: Richard Watts
Behind the silken curtain, by Bartley Cavanaugh Crum, New Repub. 116: 31, Ap. 14, '47; 900 words.
- P. 229: Edgar Snow
Russia, menace or promise, by Mrs. Vera (Micheles) Dean, N. Y. Times, p. 7, Ap. 6, '47; 800 words.
- P. 278: Richard Watts
Unfinished revolution in China, by Israel Epstein, New Repub. 116: 27, Je. 23, '47; 750 words.
- P. 279: Owen Lattimore
Unfinished revolution in China, by Israel Epstein, N. Y. Times, p. 5, Je. 22, '47; 700 words.
- P. 304: Richard Watts
Why they behave like Russians, by John Fischer, New Repub. 116: 31, Ap. 28, '47; 1,200 words.
- P. 311: Richard Watts
You're the boss, by Edward Joseph Flynn, New Repub. 117: 26, S. S. '47; 1,800 words.
- P. 315: Richard Watts
Collected tales, by Edward Morgan Forster, New Repub. 117: 27, Jl. 14, '47; 1,400 words.
- P. 338: Richard Watts
American Agent, by Mark J. Gayn, and John Cope Caldwell, New Repub. 116: 27, Je. 23, '47; 140 words.
- P. 338: L. K. Rosinger
American Agent, by Mark J. Gayn, and John Cope Caldwell, Sat. R. of Lit. 30: 12, Je. 14, '47; 600 words.

- P. 366: Richard Watts
Journals, by Isabella Augusta Gregory, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 4, Ap. 6, '47; 1,300 words.
- P. 441: Richard Watts
Report from Spain, by Emmet John Hughes, New Repub. 116: 27, Je. 23, '47; 1,250 words.
- P. 454: Richard Watts
No peace for Asia, by Harold Robert Isaacs, New Repub. 116: 25, My. 19, '47; 2,000 words.
- P. 454: Owen Lattimore
No peace for Asia, by Harold Robert Isaacs, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 10, Je. 22, '47; 600 words.
- P. 454: Annalee Jacoby
No peace for Asia, by Harold Robert Isaacs, N. Y. Times, p. 6, My. 18, '47; 800 words.
- P. 477: Richard Watts
Portable James Joyce, by James Joyce, N. Y. Times, p. 1, Mr. 2, '47; 1,400 words.
- P. 479: Richard Watts
Fabulous voyager, by Richard Morgan Kain, N. Y. Times, p. 42, Mr. 2, '47; 700 words.
- P. 481: Richard Watts
Zotz!, by Walter Patrick Karig, New Repub. 117: 31, O. 20, '47; 850 words.
- P. 486: Annalee Jacoby
Three came home, by Mrs. Agnes Keith, N. Y. Times, p. 5, Ap. 6, '47; 650 words.
- P. 523: T. A. Bisson
History of Japan, by Kenneth Scott Latourette, Am. Hist. R. 53: 178, O. '47; 280 words.
- P. 523: Richard Watts
China: a short history (rev.), by Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore, Saturday R. of Lit. 30: 16, My. 10, '47; 800 words.
- P. 636: Owen Lattimore
This is Pearl!, by Walter Millis, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 1, O. 12, '47; 1,650 words.
- P. 663: Richard Watts
Bend sinister, by Vladimir Vladimirovich Nebokov, New Republic 117: 26, Jl. 7, '47; 1,650 words.
- P. 668: Richard Watts
There is a tyrant in every country, by Gilbert Neiman, New Repub. 116: 26, Je. 16, '47; 1,350 words.
- P. 703: Richard Watts
The bear coughs at the North Pole, by Pierre Stephen Payne, New Repub. 117: 29, O. 6, '47; 230 words.
- P. 703: Owen Lattimore
China awake, by Pierre S. R. Payne, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly., Bk. R., p. 18, N. 2, '47; 650 words.
- P. 703: J. K. Fairbank
China awake, by Pierre S. R. Payne, N. Y. Times, p. 6, O. 19, '47; 1,000 words.
- P. 704: J. K. Fairbank
Revolt of Asia, by Pierre S. R. Payne, Nation 165: 422, O. 18, '47; 1,650 words.
- P. 704: Richard Watts
Revolt of Asia, by Pierre S. R. Payne, New Repub. 117: 27, O. 6, '47; 1,300 words.
- P. 716: Owen Lattimore
Breaking New Ground, by Gifford Pinchot, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly., Bk. R., p. 5, D. 21, '47; 1,200 words.
- P. 724: Richard Watts
Russia, a short history, by Helen Gay Pratt and Harriet Lucy Moore, New Repub. 116: 29, My. 26, '47; 60 words.
- P. 737: Richard Watts
When the mountain fell, by Charles Ferdinand Ramuz, New Repub. 117: 31, O. 20, '47; 850 words.

- P. 745: Owen Lattimore
Japan, past and present, by Edwin Oldfather Reischauer, N. Y. Times, p. 10, Ja. 26, '47; 700 words.
- P. 764: Richard Watts
Juardez and his Mexico, by Ralph Roeder, New Repub. 117: 27, N. 10, '47; 1,700 words.
- P. 765: Richard Watts
I remember distinctly, by Agnes Rogers, New Repub. 117: 26, S. 1, '47; 1,800 words.
- P. 767: Richard Watts
F. D. R., letters, by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, New Repub. 117: 26, D. 1, '47; 140 words.
- P. 776: Richard Watts
Bread and rice, by Doris Rubens, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly., Bk. R., p. 4, Ap. 27, '47; 1,350 words.
- P. 795: Richard Watts
Judas time, by Isidor Schneider, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly., Bk. R., p. 10, Mr. 30, '47; 1,100 words.
- P. 798: Richard Watts
Harder they fall, by Budd Wilson Schulberg, New Repub. 117: 27, Ag. 11, '47; 1,700 words.
- P. 802: Richard Watts
Story of Mrs. Murphy, by Natalie Anderson Scott, New Repub. 116: 24, Je. 30, '47; 1,250 words.
- P. 818: Richard Watts
End of a Berlin diary, by William Lawrence Shirer, New Repub. 117: 28, S. 22, '47; 1,650 words.
- P. 837: Richard Watts
Stalin must have peace, by Edgar Snow, New Repub. 116: 31, Ap. 28, '47; 1,200 words.
- P. 854: Richard Watts
Four in America, by Gertrude Stein, New Repub. 117: 28, N. 17, '47; 470 words.
- P. 855: Richard Watts
Wayward bus, by John Steinbeck, New Repub. 116: 37, Mr. 10, '47; 1,250 words.
- P. 870: Richard Watts
Just tell the truth, by John Louis Strohm, New Repub. 116: 29, My. 26, '47; 140 words.
- P. 874: Richard Watts
Your newspaper, by Leon Svirsky, New Repub. 117: 27, D. 15, '47; 1,150 words.
- P. 884: T. H. White
Richer by Asia, by Edmond Taylor, New Repub. 117: 28, S. 8, '47; 1,100 words.
- P. 884: Owen Lattimore
Richer by Asia, by Edmond Taylor, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly., Bk. R., p. 1, Jl. 13, '47; 1,350 words.
- P. 890: Richard Watts
Complacent dictator, by Samuel John Gurney Hoare Templewood, New Repub. 116: 39, F. 3, '47; 1,200 words.
- P. 924: Fairbank, J. K.
Last Chance in China, by Freda Utley, Nation 166: 78, Ja. 17, '48; 1,050 words.
- P. 924: Owen Lattimore
Last Chance in China, by Freda Utley, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 20, N. 30, '47; 1,200 words.
- P. 935: Richard Watts
Saxon charm, by Frederic Wakeman, New Repub. 117: 28, O. 13, '47; 1,300 words.
- P. 940: T. H. White
Stories of China at War, by Chi-chem Wang, N. Y. Times, p. 4, Ja. 12, '47; 700 words.
- P. 946: Richard Watts
When the going was good, by Evelyn Waugh, N. Y. Times, p. 7, Ja. 12, '47; 900 words.

- P. 946: Richard Watts
Comics, by Coulton Waugh, New Repub. 117: 28, D. 15, '47; 180 words.
- P. 958: Richard Watts
Year of Stalingrad, by Alexander Werth, New Repub. 116: 27, My. 26, '47; 1,500 words.
- P. 959: Richard Watts
Meaning of treason, by Rebecca West, New Repub. 117: 24; D. 8, '47; 1,500 words.
- P. 964: Richard Watts
Report on the Germans, by William Lindsay White, New Repub. 117: 25, July 21, '47; 2,300 words.

SELECTED REVIEWERS, BOOK REVIEW DIGEST, 1948

- P. 7: Richard Watts, Jr.
Turning stream, by Duncan Aikman, New Repub. 118: 25, Je. 7, '48; 380 words.
- P. 22: Richard Watts, Jr.
What the people want, by Ellis Gibbs Arnall, New Repub. 118: 24, Je. 21, '48; 1,150 words.
- P. 40: J. K. Fairbank
Two years with the Chinese Communists, by Claire Band and William Band, Nation 166: 581, My. 22, '48; 750 words.
- P. 40: Owen Lattimore
Two years with the Chinese communists, by Claire Band and William Band, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 6, Jl. 11, '48; 1,150 words.
- P. 98: Nathaniel Peffer
MacArthur's Japan, by Russell Brines, Nation 167: 500, O. 30, '48; 400 words.
- P. 134: Richard Watts
Persuade or perish, by Wallace Carroll, New Repub. 119: 26, S. 6, '48; 1,300 words.
- P. 157: J. K. Fairbank
The Far East, by Paul Hibbert Clyde, Am. Hist. R. 53: 889, Jl. '48; 240 words.
- P. 205: Richard Watts
United States and Russia, by Mrs. Vera Dean, New Repub. 117: 29, D. 29, '47; 850 words.
- P. 234: Richard Watts
Enjoyment of living, by Max Eastman, New Repub. 118: 17; Ap. 12, '48; 750 words.
- P. 238: Richard Watts
Freedom and order, by Anthony Eden, New Repub. 119: 23, Ag. 2, '48; 1,300 words.
- P. 242: Richard Watts
Eisenhower speaks, by Dwight David Eisenhower, New Repub. 118: 31, My. 17, '48; 1,300 words.
- P. 243: Richard Watts
Hate, hope and high explosives, by George Fielding Eliot, New Repub. 119: 22, S. 20, '48; 1,250 words.
- P. 249: J. K. Fairbank
Eastern Asia, by Thomas Edson Ennis, Ann. Am. Acad. 258: 137, Jl. '48; 550 words.
- P. 255: L. K. Rosinger
The United States and China, by John King Fairbank, Am. Hist. R. 54: 364, Ja. '49; 550 words.
- P. 255: Owen Lattimore
The United States and China, by John King Fairbank, Nation 167: 104, Jl. 24, '48; 1,000 words.
- P. 255: Richard Watts
The United States and China, by John King Fairbank, New Repub. 119: 24, Jl. 12, '48; 1,550 words.
- P. 255: Annalee Jacoby
The United States and China, by John King Fairbank, N. Y. Times, p. 1, Jl. 11, '48; 140 words.

- P. 257: Richard Watts
Jim Farley's story, by James Aloysius Farley, New Repub. 118: 21, Mr. 15, '48; 1,550 words.
- P. 268: Richard Watts
America's destiny, by Herman Finer, New Repub. 117: 27, D. 22, '47; 750 words.
- P. 280: J. K. Fairbank
Changing China, by Harrison Forman, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 8, Ja. 2, '49; 750 words.
- P. 302: Richard Watts
Japan diary, by Mark J. Gayn, New Repub. 119: 25, N. 29, '48; 1,200 words.
- P. 280: Annalee Jacoby
Changing China, by Harrison Forman, N. Y. Times, p. 32, N. 14, '48; 700 words.
- P. 318: Richard Watts
Goebbels diaries, by Joseph Goebbels, New Repub. 118: 21, Ap. 26, '48; 1,350 words.
- P. 435: Richard Watts
Latin America, by Ray Josephs, New Repub. 119: 23, Ag. 23, '48; 1,300 words.
- P. 471: Richard Watts
Making of an insurgent, by Fiorella Henry La Guardia, New Repub. 118: 22, My. 24, '48; 1,450 words.
- P. 474: Richard Watts
Pursuit of Robert Emmet, by Helen Landreth, New Repub. 118: 25, F. 16, '48; 1,450 words.
- P. 505: Richard Watts
Of flight and life, by Charles Augustus Lindbergh, New Repub. 119: 24, Ag. 30, '48; 1,200 words.
- P. 506: Eleanor Lattimore
Carola, by Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R. p. 6, F. 1, '48; 450 words.
- P. 571: Nathaniel Peffer
Mirror for Americans: Japan, by Helen Mears, Nation 167: 499, O. 30, '48; 600 words.
- P. 571: Richard Watts
Mirror for Americans: Japan, by Helen Mears, New Repub. 119: 34, S. 27, '48; 1,250 words.
- P. 571: L. K. Rosinger
Mirror for Americans: Japan, by Helen Mears, Survey G. 37: 475, N. '48; 700 words.
- P. 603: Richard Watts, Jr.
Politics in the Empire, by Warren Moscow, New Repub. 119: 24, Ag. 16, '48; 1,150 words.
- P. 666: Richard Watts
The southern Americas, by Abel Plenn, New Repub. 118: 25, Mr. 29, '48; 600 words.
- P. 709: Richard Watts
When this you see remember me, by William Garland Rogers, New Repub. 119: 24, Ag. 9, '48; 1,450 words.
- P. 728: Richard Watts
The silent people speak, by Robert St. John, New Repub. 118: 28, F. 2, '48; 1,250 words.
- P. 747: Richard Watts
This was normalcy, by Karl Schriftgiesser, New Repub. 118: 24, Je. 7, '48; 1,100 words.
- P. 755: Richard Watts
One thousand Americans, by George Seldes, New Repub. 118: 26, Ja. 5, '48; 1,200 words.
- P. 757: Richard Watts
Donald of China, by Earl Albert Selle, New Repub. 118: 22, F. 23, '48; 1,250 words.
- P. 757: Owen Lattimore
Donald of China, by Earl Albert Selle, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 4, F. 8, '48; 1,600 words.

- P. 768: Richard Watts
Quest for love of Lao Lee, by Shu Ch'ing-Ch'un, New Repub. 119: 26, D. 27, '48; 950 words.
- P. 772: Richard Watts
The South, old and new, by Francis Butler Simkins, New Repub. 118: 26, Ja. 19, '48; 1,300 words.
- P. 784: T. A. Bisson
Americans from Japan, by Bradford Smith, Sat. R. of Lit. 31: 12, S. 4, '48; 900 words.
- P. 794: Richard Watts, Jr.
Busy, busy people, by Samuel Spewack, New Repub. 119: 25, N. 22, '48; 800 words.
- P. 798: Richard Watts, Jr.
The invisible island, by Irwin Stark, New Repub. 119: 26, Jl. 26, '48; 1,250 words.
- P. 801: Richard Watts
Russian journal, by John Steinbeck, New Repub. 118: 22, Apr. 19, '48; 1,300 words.
- P. 807: J. K. Fairbank
Stilwell papers, by Joseph Warren Stilwell, Nation 166: 608, My. 29, '48; 1,900 words.
- P. 807: Richard Watts
Stilwell papers, by Joseph Warren Stilwell, New Repub. 118: 30, My. 31, '48; 1,500 words.
- P. 811: Richard Watts
Earl Warren, a great American story, by Irving Stone, New Repub. 119: 22, S. 13, '48; 1,250 words.
- P. 824: Richard Watts
Silent children, by Sze Mai-mai, New Repub. 118: 29, Mar. 22, '48; 1,100 words.
- P. 864: Richard Watts
Great rehearsal, by Carl Clinton Van Doren, New Repub. 118: 27, Ja. 26, '48; 1,000 words.
- P. 878: Nathaniel Peffer
New Paths for Japan, by Harold Wakefield, Nation 167: 500, O. 30, '48; 110 words.
- P. 904: Richard Watts
We need not fail, by Sumner Welles, New Repub. 118: 23, Je. 14, '48; 1,400 words.
- P. 912: Richard Watts
United States and South America, by Arthur Preston Whitaker, New Repub. 118: 24, My. 3, '48; 1,100 words.
- P. 922: Richard Watts, Jr.
Idea of March, by Thornton Niven Wilder, New Repub. 118: 22, Mr. 1, '48; 1,150 words.
- P. 932: Richard Watts, Jr.
China; the land and the people, by Gerald Freeman Winfield, issued in cooperation with the American Institute of Pacific Relations, New Repub. 120: 26, Ja. 17, '49; 900 words.
- P. 932: J. K. Fairbank
China; the land and the people, by Gerald Freeman Winfield, N. Y. Times, p. 1, D. 12, '48; 1,650 words.
- P. 936: Richard Watts
Indonesian story, by Charles Wolf, New Repub. 118: 24, Je. 28, '48; 800 words.

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- P. 58: Edgar Snow
China shakes the world, by Jack Belden, New Repub. 121: 18, N. 7, '49; 2,200 words.
- P. 58: Owen Lattimore
China shakes the world, by Jack Belden, N. Y. Herald Tribune Bk. R., p. 3, O. 23, '49; 1,500 words.
- P. 58: Nathaniel Peffer
China shakes the world, by Jack Belden, N. Y. Times, p. 47, O. 23, '49; 600 words.

- P. 77: Nathaniel Peffer
Prospects for democracy in Japan, by Thomas Arthur Bisson, Nation 168: 337, Mr. 19, '49; 800 words.
- P. 159: J. K. Fairbank
Way of a fighter, by Claire Lee Chennault, Nation 168: 244, F. 26, '49; 1,400 words.
- P. 159: Richard Watts
Way of a fighter, by Claire Lee Chennault, New Repub. 120: 23, Mr. 7, '49; 1,000 words.
- P. 159: Annalee Jacoby
Way of a fighter, by Claire Lee Chennault, N. Y. Times, p. 1, Ja. 30, '49; 1,550 words.
- P. 201: Nathaniel Peffer
Russia's race for Asia, by George Creel, N. Y. Times, p. 10, Mr. 13, '49; 450 words.
- P. 201: Edgar Snow
Russia's race for Asia, by George Creel, Sat. R. of Lit. 32: 11, Ap. 9, '49; 1,150 words.
- P. 201: Owen Lattimore
Confucius, the man and the myth, by H. G. Creel, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 15, S. 11, '49; 900 words.
- P. 201: J. K. Fairbank
Confucius, the man and the myth, by H. G. Creel, N. Y. Times, p. 7, My. 8, '49; 900 words.
- P. 252: Edgar Snow
Social forces in southwest Asia, by Cora Alice DuBois, Sat. R. of Lit. 32: 21, My. 14; '49.
- P. 259: Edgar Snow
Stalin and Co., by Walter Duranty, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 4, Mr. 13, '49; 750 words; p. 14, Mr. 20, '49; 180 words.
- P. 286: Edgar Snow
Next step in Asia, by John King Fairbank (and others), New Repub. 121: 28, D. 12, '49; 360 words.
- P. 448: J. K. Fairbank
Venerable ancestor, by Harry Hussey, N. Y. Times, p. 6, N. 20, '49; 650 words.
- P. 533: Edgar Snow
Situation in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., pl., Ap. 10, '49; 1,650 words.
- P. 534: T. A. Bisson
Situation in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, Survey 85: 455 Ag. '49; 700 words.
- P. 612: Nathaniel Peffer
Allied occupation of Japan, by Edwin M. Martin (pub. under auspices of Am. Inst. of Pacific Relations).
- P. 661: Owen Lattimore
China changed my mind, by David Elwyn Morris, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 8, My. 1, '49; 750 words.
- P. 661: Annalee Jacoby
China changed my mind, by David Elwyn Morris, N. Y. Times, p. 12, Jl. 17, '49; 550 words.
- P. 672: Richard Watts
World must be governed, by Vernon Nash, Sat. R. of Lit. 32: 11, D. 31, '49; 750 words.
- P. 846: Owen Lattimore
Out of exile, by Soetan Sjahrir, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 3, Mr. 13, '49; 950 words.
- P. 846: Richard Watts
Out of exile, by Soetan Sjahrir, New Repub. 120: 24, My. 9, '49; 900 words.
- P. 890: J. K. Fairbank
Chinese conquer China, by Anna Louise Strong, N. Y. Herald Tribune Bk. R., p. 3, N. 13, '49; 1,100 words.
- P. 890: Edgar Snow
Chinese conquer China, by Anna Louise Strong, Sat. R. of Lit. 32: 18, N. 19, '49; 1,250 words.

- P. 906: Richard Watts
W. C. Fields; his follies and fortunes, by Robert Lewis Taylor, Sat. R. of Lit. 32: 26, O. 22, '49; 800 words.
- P. 920: Nathaniel Pepper
American-Russian relations in the Far East, by Pauline Tomkins, N. Y. Times, p. 22, N. 20, '49; 550 words.
- P. 984: Richard Watts
Land of milk and honey, by William Lindsay White, New Repub. 120: 23, F. 21, '49; 1,200 words.

SELECTED REVIEWERS, BOOK REVIEW DIGEST 1950

- P. 91: Nathaniel Pepper
Peking diary, by Derk Bodde, N. Y. Times, p. 3, O. 29, '50; 1,000 words.
- P. 330: J. K. Fairbank
Outer Mongolia and its international position; ed. by Eleanor Lattimore; with an introd. by Owen Lattimore [issued under the auspices of the Int. secretariat. Inst. of Pacific relations]. N. Y. Times, p. 11, Ja. 1, '50; 320 words.
- P. 398: T. A. Bisson
Education for a new Japan, by Robert King Hall, Survey 86: 92, F. '50; 320 words.
- P. 476: T. A. Bisson
Kokutai no hongi (Cardinal principles of the national entity of Japan), by Japan, Ministry of education, Survey 86: 92, F. '50; 320 words.
- P. 537: T. H. White
Pivot of Asia, by Owen Lattimore, New Repub. 123: 20, Jl. 10, '50; 1,250 words.
- P. 537: J. K. Fairbank
Pivot of Asia, by Owen Lattimore, N. Y. Herald Tribune Bk. R., p. 1, Mr. 19, '50; 1,600 words.
- P. 537: T. A. Bisson
Pivot of Asia, by Owen Lattimore, Survey 86: 467, O. '50; 650 words.
- P. 589: J. K. Fairbank
Korea today, by George McAfee McCune, and Arthur L. Grey, N. Y. Herald Tribune Bk. R., p. 1, Jl. 23, '50; 1,750 words.
- P. 648: Richard Watts
Companion in exile, by Ferenc Molnar, Sat. R. of Lit. 33: 52, Ap. 15, '50; 750 words.
- P. 650: Edgar Snow
Stakes of democracy in southeast Asia, by Hubertus Johannes Van Mook, Sat. R. of Lit. 33: 12, Jl. 22, '50; 800 words.
- P. 718: Nathaniel Pepper
Two kinds of time, by Graham Peck, N. Y. Times, p. 4, N. 5, '50; 800 words.
- P. 757: Nathaniel Pepper
United States and Japan, by Edwin Oldfather Reischauer, N. Y. Times, p. 1, Jl. 16, '50; 1,700 words.
- P. 763: Nathaniel Pepper
Roof of the world, by Amaury de Riencourt, N. Y. Times, p. 29, Ap. 16, '50; 450 words.
- P. 790: Nathaniel Pepper
Western world and Japan, by Sir George Bailey Sanson, Nation 170: 183, F. 25, '50; 1,050 words.
- P. 899: Edgar Snow
Left wing in southeast Asia, by Virginia McLean Thompson, Sat. R. of Lit. 33: 12, Jl. 22, '50; 800 words.

MR. MANDEL. Next is a photostat of a round-table conference in which Owen Lattimore participated, dealing with the terms of unconditional surrender for Japan.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The photostat referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1413" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1413

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE

A Radio Discussion by LEEDS GULICK, PAUL HUTCHINSON and OWEN LATTIMORE

592d Broadcast in Cooperation With the National Broadcasting Company

NUMBER 381

JULY 8, 1945

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More on This Topic

- BECKER, CARL, *The Declaration of Independence*, New York; Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1945. *The classic work on the eighteenth-century background, the various texts, and the place of the Declaration in American political philosophy.*
- . *Modern Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941.
- . *New Liberties for Old*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942.
- BOWERS, CLAUDE G. *Jefferson and Hamilton: The Struggle for Democracy in America*, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1925.
- . *The Young Jefferson*, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1945.
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- BROWN, STUART GERRY (ed). "We Hold These Truths." New York: Harper & Bros, 1941. *A collection of documents of American history.*
- CURTI, MERLE. *Growth of American Thought*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1943.
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- MACLEISH, ARCHIBALD, "Cultural Relations," *Vital Speeches*, February 1, 1945.
- . "Humanism and the Belief in Man." *Atlantic*, November, 1944.
- MEIKLEJOHN, ALEXANDER. *What Does America Mean?* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1935.
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- . *What Is Democracy?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941. *A discussion of contemporary democracy and an explanation of its relationship to liberty and equality.*
- MILLER, JOHN C. *Origins of the American Revolution*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1943. *A study of the forces leading to the Revolution.*
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- SHOTWELL, JAMES T. "Bridges to the Future," *Survey Graphic*, February, 1945.
- SMITH, T. V. *The Democratic Tradition in America*. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941. *A statement of faith in the democratic way of life.*

Around the Round Table . . .


LEEDS GULICK, visiting professor of Japanese at the University of Chicago, was born in Osaka, Japan, and has lived in the Orient for a number of years. He is, at the University of Chicago, at the present time the director of the A.S.T.P. Japanese Area and Language instruction. Professor Gulick received his B.A. and M. A. degrees at George Williams College and has studied at the University of Chicago. From 1924 until 1937 he served as a superintendent of schools. He has written numerous magazine articles and is the author of *Christian Camp Conference Leaders' Manual* (1934); *Nihonga* (1945); and *Selected Japanese Vocabulary* (1945).

PAUL HUTCHINSON, managing editor of the *Christian Century* magazine, was editor of the *China Christian Advocate* in Shanghai China, from 1916 to 1921.

He also was, for a time, executive secretary of the China Centenary Movement for the Methodist Episcopal church in China and was the secretary of the Epworth League in China. He studied at Lafayette College, where he received his Ph.B. degree, and Garrett Bible Institute, where he received his B.D. degree. Mr. Hutchinson has been managing editor of the *Christian Century* since 1924. He is a regular magazine contributor and the author of *Guide to Mission Stations in Eastern China* (1919); *The Next Step* (1921); *The Spread of Christianity* (1922); *China's Real Revolution* (1924); *What and Why in China* (1927); *The United States of Europe* (1929); *Men Who Made the Churches* (1930); *World Revolution and Religion* (1931); *Storm over Asia* (1932); *The Ordeal of Western Religion* (1933); *From Victory to Peace* (1943); and joint author of *The Story of Methodism* (with H. E. Luccock) (1926).

OWEN LATTIMORE, director of the Page School of International Relations of John Hopkins University, studied at St. Bees School in England and at Harvard University. From 1920 to 1926 he was engaged in business in China, and since that time he has traveled widely, working on various research projects in China for the Social Science Research Council, the Guggenheim Foundation, the Institute of Pacific Relations, and Harvard-Yenching Institute. He was editor of *Pacific Affairs* from 1934 to 1941. Professor Lattimore served as political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek (1941-42), and he has been associated with the Office of War Information on Pacific operations. He has been a regular contributor to many magazines and is the author of *The Desert Road to Turkestan* (1929); *High Tartary* (1930); *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict* (1932); *The Mongols of Manchuria* (1934); *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (1940); *Mongol Journeys* (1941); *The Making of Modern China* (with Eleanor Lattimore) (1944); and *Solution in Asia* (1945).

THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN TODAY



Source: Hugh Borton, *The Administration and Structure of Japanese Government* (Department of State Publication No. 2244 [Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945]).

TERMS OR UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER FOR JAPAN?

Mr. GULICK. The policies which we adopt in the next few months are crucial. They may determine the early termination or long duration of the war. Hutchinson, as managing editor of the *Christian Century*, in a recent issue in your magazine you reprinted a recent petition to the President.¹

¹ See "A Petition to the President," *Christian Century*, June 27, 1945, and the text of the petition on page 762 of the same issue of *Christian Century*.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. That petition was an attempt to give expression to the feeling that there are many Americans who believe that the term "unconditional surrender" is still not understood by the Japanese and that it needs to be cleared up in their minds as well as in the minds of most Americans.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Unconditional surrender, I believe, is the only stand which we can take against the Japanese at the present time. Unconditional surrender is something which has to be determined on the spot by the theater commanders; and, short of unconditional surrender, we should only get into a situation in which the Japanese were trying to play off one of the Allies against the other.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I can see that there is that grave difficulty, but is it not true that, while we have unconditional surrender as you might say, a given element in this situation, something has to happen after unconditional surrender. It is time now that we were given an idea as to what that something is going to be.

Mr. LATTIMORE. There are two things which before unconditional surrender we must make clear to the Japanese. First, we must make it clear that nothing will be satisfactory except their complete defeat. The second stage is something else again and concerns how we behave after victory. If the Japanese can get it into their heads that after our victory we are a people who will behave in a decent and humane manner and will not exterminate them like some inferior breed, why, so much the better.

Mr. GULICK. But these points should be specifically stated, I believe, in something like Wilson's Fourteen Points, which seemed to hasten the end of the first World War. I do not know that we ought to issue generalities, because they will say, "There, again, they are just putting something over on us."

Mr. LATTIMORE. There is an incomplete parallel there. I do not think that the situation is the same as it was in Wilson's time. If we—specifically the United States—were to make a declaration of that kind at the present time, we should simply be acting on our own without the other United Nations. One essential condition of unconditional surrender is that the nations which demand it should be completely unified.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. And that means, does it not, that the time is here when we should be seeking some clear-cut understanding among the United Nations which would really unite us on what we are after in Japan?

Mr. GULICK. You see, the Japanese idea of unconditional surrender may be most anything, and, probably because of their propagandists, it has meant enslavement. They have watched the way that we have acted in Italy and said, "Well, that is fine. That is not enslavement." And then in Germany it seemed more harsh, so they do not know just what we might mean. Of course, our original idea of unconditional surrender was in order that we might have something to state before the world to prove that we are united.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Japanese, I believe, know very well what unconditional surrender would mean. It would mean complete military defeat, and they are trying to avoid that. Their propaganda on the radio right now is trying to balance America and Russia against each other, and they hope that the other United Nations will also be split from China. In other words, they want to squeeze out of the war without a complete military defeat. If we are to counteract that, we have to have complete understanding among all the United Nations about unconditional surrender and about the administration of the victory which is to follow it.

Mr. GULICK. I think that you have misunderstood what I meant about that. I do not think that the United States should, just on its own authority, issue what the terms should be; but I believe that the United Nations should work that out.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Yes, but, as I understand Lattimore, what he means is that we have come to the point now at which in the coming Big Three conversations—and perhaps following them, bringing China into the conversations—we should reach a clear understanding among ourselves as to how we are going to handle Japan after the military victory is complete. I agree with that. We are very far from an understanding on that point as yet.

Mr. LATTIMORE. We have to expect the development in the Far East to follow somewhat the course that it did in Europe. You will remember that at the time that Roosevelt launched the phrase "unconditional surrender," it was at a period when cooperation among America, Russia, and Britain in the war against Germany was only beginning to develop its full potentiality.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. That is true.

Mr. LATTIMORE. And the phrase "unconditional surrender" was a signal that the United Nations were really getting together and that Germany would have to deal with all of them alike. We are getting to the same stage against Japan, and I think that it is reasonable to expect that the coming Big Three meeting will be followed up by other meetings which will really align the United Nations as a whole against Japan. Until that is done, any talk of modified terms for the Japanese is likely only to give them the hope that they can succeed in splitting us, and, therefore, such talk is more likely to prolong their resistance than to reduce it.

Mr. GULICK. How about the terms which were drawn up after we had taken Germany, for instance, or Italy? Did they have any effect upon the surrender?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. There was in that case complete collapse, and it was not a case of negotiating at all, except that there may have been some sort of secret negotiations which went on for the preservation of the House of Savoy in Italy, about which we know nothing; but we are dealing now with a nation which still has an army of four million men on its front lines. What we are feeling after, I take it, is whether or not it is possible to introduce psychological elements which will put those four million men out of action more quickly than simply by blasting them out of action.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The biggest psychological element is the feeling that the united lineup against them is something which is much greater than their four million men and that they cannot possibly split us.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. That is true, and I, therefore, say that I feel that we need to understand each other quite as much as we need to have the Japanese understand us.

Mr. GULICK. I see that the three of us do not agree exactly upon what terms should be stated or how much, so that we cannot argue this out. Let us go on to the matter of what might be done, however, in administration following the collapse of Japan—whether it is early or late. We might divide the discussion into three parts: the military, the political, and the economic.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. There is no great question as to what has to be done on the military question. Japan has to be demilitarized. That is what it amounts to. We have to wipe out the whole setup—the Japanese army and the navy, the shipbuilding and the airplane-building industries. Everything which has contributed to make Japan a military state headed toward aggression in the Pacific has to be wiped out.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That includes a lot of economic and political action as well, because we cannot forget that the civilian warmakers—that is, the big industrialists and financiers of Japan—are really primarily even more responsible for Japan's going to war than the military and the navy, since the army and the navy are only the striking instruments and the tools.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I quite agree with that, but that is the economic side which Gulick was saying that we would lead to after we talked about the military. That really goes to show that we cannot divide the categories in any such clear-cut way as he was suggesting, because they are all mixed up together. Behind the army clique which we are forever talking about in Tokyo there does stand this oligarchy of big business.

Mr. LATTIMORE. And they are not in opposition to each other; they are in partnership with each other.


Mr. HUTCHINSON. Exactly.

Mr. GULICK. You are quite right, but what I was saying was that our listeners would like to know what specific points we are making on this issue. Then we can let it go at that, I believe, without further discussion. They would include; (1) the evacuation of whole territories outside the home islands of Japan; (2) the complete demobilization of the army and the navy and the air force; (3) the dismantling of the factories which manufacture armaments and the dismantling of the navy yards; and (4) the delivery to the United Nations for trial and punishment of all the war criminals.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. And at that point, including, as Lattimore was saying, the people who have been responsible for the policy which has produced this aggressive Japan. They are the big-business elements.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Zaibatsu people—the same people who a lot of Americans unfortunately think are the crowd with whom we should deal in Japan after the war, because they stand for law and order. So far as we stand for any Japanese, we have to stand, not for that bunch, but for the Japanese people. Only when the power of that bunch is crushed, can the Japanese people rise up, and only then can we find anyone else to deal with. And we will not find that until we have imposed unconditional surrender.

RESOURCES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA



Source: Philip E. Lienthal and John H. Oakie, *Asia's Captive Colonies* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942), and Elizabeth Allerton Clark, *Peoples of the China Seas* (Los Angeles: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942).

Mr. GULICK. By Zaibatsu, you mean the fifteen wealthiest families that control the economic life of Japan.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. The Mitsui, the Mitsubishi, the Yasuda. . .

Mr. LATTIMORE. The whole crowd, and I would include the Emperor and the Imperial Clan with them, because the Imperial Clan, with its economic and financial holdings, is built into the whole structure.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Yes, of course, for they have stock in everything. There is a further point which I would like to get at for a minute. It seems to me that what we really should be trying to do in Japan at this moment is to get the idea

across to the Japanese masses that we come as liberators. They have been slaves of this old oligarchy and the hangover of the feudal order and the rest of it. The Japanese, whether he is a common soldier in the army or whether he is a farmer on his little plot, is a virtual slave. Now we should be coming in to say to them, "After we have wiped out this crowd who has been running things, we mean to give you a chance to have the kind of a government and the kind of a nation which you deserve."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am thoroughly in favor of that, and I think that we may reasonably count on a certain element of cooperation in Japan.

Mr. GULICK. Of course, that will take a lot of reeducation of the people, will it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. First, it will take a little bit of that good old "chaos" of which so many people are afraid. I cannot think of any country in the world in which a little period of chaos would be more healthy, because the respectable people in Japan and the decent people in Japan will not be able to get their heads up before they have had some chaos. I mean specifically the people who tried to vote against military aggression in the last election which they had.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. That was very significant—that final vote or election that they had before the military crowd simply ran away with things in Manchuria.

Mr. LATTIMORE. You will find that that crowd will not be able to get in touch with the people in the State Department who stand for a Japanese equivalent of a Darlan policy, a Badoglio policy, and all that kind of thing.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Yes, it seems to me that if there is any one thing clear about that Far Eastern situation at the present time, it is that to attempt to work through a puppet system out there will simply produce in the long run a worse tragedy than we have had.

Mr. GULICK. Then you believe that we should not have the Emperor or an Imperial family of any kind on the throne or in any relationship to the government?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I am not saying that. What I am saying is that, in the long run, that is something which has to be settled by the Japanese themselves, and I am saying that to attempt to use the Imperial family as puppets, as, for instance, the Japanese have attempted to use Wang Ching-wei as a puppet in China, will simply land us in unutterable confusion and a blind alley.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I agree with you there, and I am afraid that it is a very dangerous notion that a lot of Americans have that we could use the Emperor to do our job for us. It seems to me that the only way out of that is to put the Emperor and Imperial Clan, the whole gang of them, out of circulation the moment we get to Japan—simply sequester them, do not kill them or anything like that, but put them out of circulation.

Mr. GULICK. I will agree with you on that if, however, we use the Emperor in the first place to declare the war over, because he is the only man to be followed or obeyed by the military forces.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not so sure of that. I think that the Japanese can surrender without a top command to surrender, just as the Germans surrendered without a top command to surrender. When the time comes, they will surrender.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. You mean that generals in the field will surrender?


Mr. LATTIMORE. Generals in the field will surrender, or at least troops in the field will surrender. We have the beginnings of that already. Do not forget that, when we come to the home islands of Japan, we are dealing with bigger areas in terms of square miles. People are not going to be crowded into little caves where they can put up last stands. There is going to be room to run away, and when you get room to run away is when you get the time that people surrender.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. And you do not believe that we are going to need anything like this Flenzburg business which we had in Germany?


Mr. LATTIMORE. Not unless we create in the Japanese mind the idea that we are fighting a race war, that all Japanese are yellow-bellied so-and-so's, and that Americans are not going to deal with them as human people. If you give them an idea that when they have surrendered, they will get a reasonable break, then they will surrender.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I am glad to hear you say that, because your experience out there has been so extensive that it carries great weight, and that is what I have been trying to believe myself. It seems to me, then, that what we really should be trying to get across to the Japanese people as a whole these days is that surrender does not mean that they are going to have to exchange one despotism for another but that surrender will mean that, in place of the despotism which they have known, they are going to have a wholly new opportunity to build a democratic order of their own.


THE FAR EAST IN THE WORLD



= EASTERN ASIA

 $\frac{1}{8}$ OF LAND AREA OF WORLD

THE UNIVERSITY
OF CHICAGO ROUND
TABLE PHOTOGRAPH
by H. Hayden

 $\frac{1}{3}$ OF POPULATION OF WORLD

Mr. GULICK. I agree with you in that we ought to let them know beforehand that we are going to allow them to form the kind of government which they want. If they want the Emperor back, all right—after a number of years, of course.

Mr. LATTIMORE. But if they get the Emperor back, it should be done by a Japanese plebiscite in which they are allowed to vote for having the Emperor back or having a constitutional monarchy or a republic. If it is done in that way, then the Japanese Emperor would come back not as a divine ruler but as a ruler by permission of the people. However, I am perfectly convinced that, in the disillusionment following defeat, the Japanese will all turn to the common idea prevailing in the world today—that progressive government is government under republican forms by democratic methods—and that very soon there will be a Japanese demand for doing away with the Emperor and that at that point we should not have a conservative American policy of preserving the Emperor.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Yes, exactly, and therefore our responsibility is simply to see that there is a period after surrender in which the Japanese democratic forces

SOUTHEAST ASIA



get a chance to develop while we have the Emperor and his crowd, as you say, "on ice" somewhere. When the people have really had a chance, then let there be the plebiscite. Then the decision will be up to the Japanese, and let us let them go to it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. But there is an all-important point of timing there, and that is the one point on which I should criticize your *Christian Century* petition, Hutchinson, for it might mislead people as to timing, both in this country and in Japan. It would mislead them in the sense that they might think that if there were a little bargaining about the terms, it might end earlier. I am convinced that the more bargaining there is, the longer the Japanese will go on fighting, because they hope that they will be able to split the United Nations; and, therefore, we have to show an absolutely firm and unshakable front on the idea of military unconditional surrender.

Mr. GULICK. While we do not agree on the terms that should be stated, I believe that they should be specifically stated, however. Then there would not be the bargaining going on.

Mr. LATTIMORE. They have been, I think, specifically enough stated.

Mr. GULICK. By Truman's statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. By Truman's statement that this is military unconditional surrender and that it does not mean the extermination of the Japanese people.



THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE MAP BY N. H. HARRIS

Mr. HUTCHINSON. And there is the Cairo Declaration, also. That has to be taken into account.²

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Cairo Declaration is one element of consideration. One unspoken thing is also all-important. While we have promised not to exterminate the Japanese people, we should not promise not to exterminate the Japanese financial and industrial oligarchy which is back of the whole nasty business.

Mr. GULICK. That brings up the statement, then, in the *Christian Century* about the administration of the merchant marine, finance, and industry by commissions of the United Nations.³

Mr. HUTCHINSON. That means simply this: That by defeating the army we do not really defeat the Japanese threat to peace. As I have said before, behind the army lies this economic oligarchy. If we do not break that up and administer the whole economic situation long enough to be sure that it is broken up and that a new group has moved in to whatever Japanese economy comes on, why, then the war was practically fought in vain.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is your point not that we have not only to administer the industries through the United Nations commissions, but that the United Nations commissions should not work through the nominees of the old Zaibatsu oligarchy. We have to allow new people to come up in Japan who will constitute a vested interest against the return of the oligarchs and against the return of the financial agents of the Imperial household and so on.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Yes, and who will not be interested in a type of economy that is the old-fashioned imperialism—getting foreign territory in order to get raw materials.

Mr. LATTIMORE. And should you not go on beyond that and say that the restoration of Japan's economy is not our primary concern, but, on the contrary, the Japanese should in all Asia have the last priority on restoration of their standard of living.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. China has first priority.

Mr. LATTIMORE. China, the Philippines, and all other territories overrun and damaged by the Japanese. Japanese industry can contribute to that rehabilitation. After it has done so, the Japanese should have no more basic war-making heavy industry but may be allowed to have consumer industries and other light industry, obtaining their materials at market prices on a free world market and not obtaining them by political control of dependent territories.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Exactly, and thus we give the Japanese people the chance for a very decent, probably improved, standard of living, because of their not having to carry the tax burden of this tremendous military establishment.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I dislike comparing a nice people like the Swedes with the Japanese, but I have said before that there is no reason why Japan should not become a Sweden of Asia. Sweden at one time was an aggressive country, yet now, for many years, it has been one of the most progressive countries in the world. It has no major war-making industry. It is a peace-trading system.

Mr. GULICK. Of course, what you have left out of your calculations is the slave position that the Japanese laborer will feel. If they are to produce for other countries first in reparations and particularly not under their accustomed rulers

² President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill met at Cairo in November 1943. From that conference the following general statement was issued:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan.

"The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and the air. This pressure is already rising.

"The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan.

"They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.

"It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.

"Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.

"The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

"With these objects in view, the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

³ Point 4 of the petition to the President says that the signers request: "Administration by commissions of the United Nations of the Japanese merchant marine, finance and industry with a view to the complete demilitarization of Japanese life and the restoration of Japan to membership in the world community. * * * " (*Christian Century*, June 27, 1945).

of the wealthy class, I think that they will tend, at first anyway, to lie down on the job.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Why should they feel in a slave position if they are getting more food than they have been under the old order? I think that it is perfectly possible, under the kind of set-up that Lattimore and I have been suggesting, that actually the Japanese farmer on his little plot will be better off, in terms of the standard of living, than he ever was before.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not only the farmer but also the industrial worker. If we dispossess the monopolists who are gouging the ordinary people of Japan to pay fantastic profits on their war-making industry, we will have a margin there which we can use for raising the level of the peasant and the industrial worker. Then, far from feeling enslaved to work for other Asiatic countries, he will feel liberated from his own oppressors and feel that he has something in common with other peoples in Asia who also want progress and economic development and republican self-government.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. In other words, he has to come into this freedom bloc that is growing up in Asia, that you have talked about in your book.⁴

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that that is quite possible, yes.

Mr. GULICK. He may look to that later on, but certainly in the immediate future he will not be any better off than he has been. The farmer has always been able to hide out enough food that he has needed to support life. Of course, when you point out that agrarian reform will give him more land that is another thing. When the factories will pay more to labor, again that will help the population as a whole; but I do not believe he will be willing to trade those for the direction under the heel of a commission from a foreign power.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Neither were the Germans willing to trade it, but that is not the point. Neither the Germans nor the Japanese can expect that the reward of surrender will be immediate prosperity, and enough Japanese, like enough Germans, have been abroad to see the work done by their own conquerors to show that the nation is guilty. The nation has a certain expiation to work out, and there is no reason why they should not work it out.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Of course, we are taking for granted that there is going to be common sense in the administration of this thing, that it is not going to be a matter of United Nations commissars' going in.

Mr. LATTIMORE. How far can you take common sense for granted? Common sense is something for which we have to work hard, and we have to put pressure on our own government to get it sometimes.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I admit that that is true, but at least it should be a program that is aimed toward developing this new industrial group in Japan just as rapidly as possible.

Mr. GULICK. In other words, a new "Yalta Conference" perhaps should be in the making for that very purpose.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Politically, we certainly need a "Yalta Conference" in Asia as one step toward the final military victory over Japan. Otherwise, the military victory will lead us up into a position that is politically unclear.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Yes, but do not forget that a Yalta Conference for Japan has to have China in it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It has to have China in it, and in my opinion it has to have Russia in it, because Russia will be important in the future of Japan whether they fight or not. In fact, they have already made a military contribution simply by tying down Japanese troops.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I was taking that for granted, because Russia was in the Yalta Conference originally, that conference that you are using in your parallel.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I see, yes, I think, though, that in the Yalta Conference for Asia there should not be first-class participation and second-class participation. The full equality of the United Nations should be essential to that concept.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. One of the things that needs to be pinned down right away on this whole Far Eastern situation is that China is in this thing just as much as we are and should have not merely formal but actual equality.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is somewhat difficult to summarize a discussion that has moved as rapidly as this one has over so much ground in this ROUND TABLE discussion, but I think that I can say this: We are agreed that there must be unlimited victory over Japan—a clear-cut military victory. There is some disagreement among the three of us about whether the prosecution of the demand for unconditional surrender should be accompanied by some sort of declaration

⁴ Owen Lattimore, *Solution in Asia* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1945.)

to Japan comparable to Wilson's Fourteen Points in the last war. However, all of us are in agreement again that, after victory over Japan, the utmost should be done to make the Japanese feel that, while they have a great deal to expiate, they are not going to be treated as a pariah or outcast people and that they will have a chance to build a better Japan than the one which has brought so much misery in Asia and the world.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without script, although participants meet in advance, prepare a topical outline, and exchange data and views. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company. The supplementary information in this transcript has been developed by staff research and is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the ROUND TABLE speakers.

WHAT DO YOU THINK

1. How do you define "unconditional surrender"? What did it mean in the case of Italy and Germany? Do you favor similar action and policy for Japan? Or do you favor the acceptance of victory upon the basis of certain terms? Which course, in your opinion, will hasten the end of the war? Do you favor a "Yalta" agreement for Japan?
2. What should be the objectives of American policy in the Far East? Toward Japan? Upon what basis can cooperation with the other great powers be effected for the Pacific? What is the relation between the political and economic problems of the Far East? How can Japanese aggression be eliminated?
3. What are the inherent dangers in the peace settlement for the Pacific? What should be the role of China? Upon what basis can Japan be reconstructed to take her place among the nations of the Orient? What policies must be adopted by the Western powers if a future race war is to be avoided?
4. Why is it important that the United Nations cooperate in future policies for Japan? Do you believe that they should occupy Japan after the war? Or do you think that an overwhelming military defeat will be enough? How can Japan be demilitarized? What should be done with Japanese industry and its present economic system? Would you agree with the suggestion that Japan become the "Sweden of Asia"?
5. What does Mr. Lattimore mean when he says that, after the defeat of Japan, a "little period of chaos" would be "healthy"? If Japan is occupied, should the United Nations try to establish order, or should they encourage a revolution in the effort to build a new Japan? What are the "democratic forces" in Japan upon which a new regime might be built? How can they be encouraged? What would be your attitude toward a communist revolution in Japan?
6. Discuss the role of the Emperor in Japan today and the system of State Shintoism. Can there be peace in the Far East without the uprooting of emperor-worship and Shintoism? How can these be effectively eliminated from Japanese life?
7. What are the prospects for a United Nations' policy toward the Far East which will put an end to the traditional policy of Western imperialism? How will the end of imperialism in the Orient affect and condition the people of the Western world? What are the probable political consequences of the coming industrialization of Asia?

More on This Topic

"AMG Plans for Japan," *Nation*, June 16, 1945. *Excerpts from a letter by a member of the training program for Japanese military government which criticizes the policies which are being advocated.*

BALLING, FRANCIS C. "Unconditional Surrender and a Unilateral Declaration of Peace," *Political Science Review*, June, 1945.

BISSON, T. A. *America's Far Eastern Policy*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1945.

"The Far East—from War to Peace," *New Republic*, May 28, 1945. *A special issue which is devoted to discussions of the Far East by prominent authorities.*

FLEISHER, WILFRID. "What to Do with Japan," *Life*, April 16, 1945.

———. *What to Do with Japan*. New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1945.

HAILEY, FOSTER. "The War Converges on Japan," *Yale Review*, summer, 1945.

HALSEY, ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. "A Plan for Japan," *Collier's*, April 28, 1945. *Says that he does not believe in "halfway" measures and suggests how he would deal with Japan to prevent another war.*

- HUTCHINS, ROBERT M. "The New Realism," *Commonweal*, July 6, 1945.
 "Japan," *Fortune*, April, 1944. *The entire issue is devoted to discussions of various phases of Japanese life.*
- LAMOTT, WILLIS CHURCH. "What Not To Do with Japan." *Harper's*, June, 1945.
Argues that military and economic restrictions should be enforced but otherwise we should adopt a policy of "hands off" and allow Japan to become a "good third-rate power."
- LATTIMORE, OWEN. "Freedom Bloc in Asia," *Common Sense*, March, 1945. *Says that our basic attitude toward the Orient must be a recognition that the age of imperialism is over and that a policy toward Asia involves the imposition of terms on Japan and the creation of a democratic bloc of nations on the continent.*
- . *Solution in Asia*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1945.
- MACNAIR, HARLEY F. *The Real Conflict between China and Japan: An Analysis of Opposing Ideologies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938. *Says that the "nonphysical factors involved in the present struggle in eastern Asia are at least as important as the physical."*

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Anna H. Rubio appeared in our hearings. There was testimony from the Ohio State Un-American Activities Commission bearing on her behavior before that committee. I would like this put into the record. This is the reply of the Ohio committee; it is dated June 13, 1950.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1414" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1414

OHIO UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMISSION

STATE HOUSE

Columbus 15, Ohio

ADAMS 5751

Senator Roscoe R. Walcott, Pres. Pro Tem
 Senator Leo Blackburn
 Senator Charles J. Carney
 Senator James G. Headley
 Senator C. I. Powell
 Representative John V. Corrigan
 Representative Robert W. Reider
 Representative Kenneth A. Robinson
 Representative Louis J. Schneider, Jr.

House Speaker Gordon Renner, Chairman
 Senator Joseph W. Bartunek, Vice Chairman
 Representative Samuel L. Devine, Secretary
 Sidney Isaacs, Legal Director and Counsel
 James F. Worster, Chief Investigator
 Margaret H. Moorhous, Office Secretary

JUNE 13, 1952.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,
Special Counsel, Subcommittee on Internal Security,
Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: This is in reply to your inquiry of May 10, 1952, concerning Anna H. Rubio whose signed letter in behalf of the China Aid Council was introduced into the official records regarding the investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mrs. Anna H. Morgan, in answer to a subpoena, appeared before this Commission on April 1, 1952. Although she was not questioned as to her affiliations with the China Aid Council, nor whether she was the Anna H. Rubio whose letter was introduced on page 1514, Vol. V. of your hearings, it appears that Mrs. Anna H. Morgan and Anna H. Rubio are one and the same person. The enclosed newspaper item from the Columbus (Ohio) Citizen for March 27, 1948, shows that Anna H. Morgan was formerly known as Rubio, and also that Alfred (Al) Rubio is a son by a former marriage.

Anna Hass Morgan, upon her appearance before this Commission on April 1, 1952, being first duly sworn, gave her name as Anna H. Morgan. Thereupon she refused to answer the following questions invoking the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights as her protection.

Where she resided.

Was she a citizen of the United States.

How long she had been a resident of Franklin County, Ohio.

Where she was employed.

If she was, or had ever been a member of the Communist Party.

That it was not a fact that she was, during the entire time of her residence in Franklin County, Ohio, a member and an active member of the Communist Party of Franklin County.

That it was not a fact that as of January 9, 1949, she was not the finance director of the Communist Party of Franklin County.

If, on that date, she didn't take full responsibility as cochairman of the Franklin County Communist Party, directing registration and securing new recruits.

If, in February 1949, in her capacity as executive secretary of the Communist Party of Franklin County, she didn't report that she had recently attended the Ruthenberg dinner in Cleveland, Ohio.

Did she report to the Franklin County section of the Communist Party at the time that Martin Chancey (Ohio State Communist Party secretary) had emphasized that the fund drive in Franklin County being conducted at that time must go over the top with the point that if members had to borrow money to meet the quota, they must do so, and the quota would not be reduced but might be increased ten percent. And did she recall making that report for the Franklin County Communist Party section.

If, during the time she was not the paid Communist Party organizer for the Communist Party in Franklin County, having been promised \$35 a week for that duty.

If it was not a fact that on April 24, 1949, she attended a Marxist class held by the Franklin County Communist Party at the home of Manny Shore at 454 South Wayne Avenue, at which time she reported that she had received no pay for eight weeks at \$35 a week from the Communist Party.

If it was not a fact that on May 9, 1949, at a regular meeting of the Communist Party of Franklin County, she announced that she and her husband might have to leave Columbus because her salary had not been paid and her husband at that time had no job.

If it was not a fact that she was a delegate to the Franklin County Communist Party convention held in Columbus, Ohio, from June 6 to 13, 1949.

If it was not a fact that on the fifth day of June, immediately prior to that convention, she was elected executive secretary of the Franklin County Communist Party.

If it was not a fact that on the 26th day of June a Communist Party meeting was held in her home.

If it was not a fact that at that meeting held in her home, Robert Campbell, a State Communist Party functionary, spoke on the subject of white chauvinism, a white Communist Party in the north-end of Columbus and a Negro Communist Party in the south-end.

If it was not a fact that on August 12, 1949, the executive committee of the Franklin County Communist Party met in her home.

If it was not a fact that at that meeting Robert Gunkle was introduced as the new Communist Party organizer for Franklin County.

If it was not a fact that a Communist Party meeting was held in her home on September 16, 1949.

If the principal item of discussion at that meeting held in her home was not the fact that Robert Gunkle had left Columbus, Ohio, without notifying the State committee of the Communist Party.

And that there was discussion as to who would take his place as his successor.

If it was not true that in February 1950 Arthur Rappaport was appointed to succeed Robert Gunkle, and that he and his wife resided in her home.

If it was not a fact that during that period of time her home was not actually the Communist Party headquarters for Franklin County.

If it was not a fact that on the 2nd of May, 1950, a Communist May Day meeting was held in her home.

If it was not a fact that at that meeting Arnold Johnson was scheduled to speak, had to return to New York when it appeared that Eugene Dennis might have to go to jail and Frank Hashmall was a substitute speaker.

Had she ever been employed by the American Zinc Oxide Company.

If it wasn't a fact that she was arrested under the name of Katherine O'Rourke for illegal picketing during a strike at the AZO strike.

If it wasn't a fact that of today she was in charge of activities of the Communist Party of Franklin County.

Was she not one of the four Ohio sponsors of the petition, "We Charge Genocide."

If it was not a petition presented to the United Nations alleging that as the official and studied policy of the United States Government to exterminate the Negro race in the United States.

If it was not a publication of the Civil Rights Congress.

If she was not a member of the Civil Rights Congress.

If she was not aware that the Civil Rights Congress had been cited as both a subversive and Communist organization by the Attorney General of the United States.

If it was not a fact that she was an active member of the Communist Party in Franklin County at the present time.

Where she resided before she came to Franklin County.

If it was not a fact that she was active in Communist Party affairs in Champaign, Illinois, prior to coming to Franklin County.

Enclosed are copies of letters addressed by Mrs. Morgan to the chairman of this Commission, and the statement she presented to the Commission at the time she appeared as a witness, together with photostat copies of her signature.

Kindest regards.

Yours very truly,

Sidney Isaacs,
SIDNEY ISAACS,
Legal Director and Counsel.

Encls. : 8.

[Columbus Citizen, Saturday, March 27, 1948].

WINDOW SHATTERED AT HASHMALL HOME—EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE COMMUNISTS AT LOW EBB

Glass in Communist Frank Hashmall's front door was smashed with a brick Friday night.

Hashmall, his wife and year-old son were not at their home at 1403 S. Fourth St., when the incident occurred. Neighbors said they didn't even hear a noise during the night.

But Saturday morning, shattered glass, a large paving brick, stones and hard lumps of clay gave mute testimony to the bombardment. The house of the Franklin County Communist organizer was still deserted at noon Saturday.

Presumably Hashmall was AWOL from his duties as Columbus' No 1 Communist who receives his pay check from party coffers. Neighbors said the family left the house early Friday morning.

But Ohio Communist headquarters in Cleveland insisted he was still at his job in Columbus Saturday.

"If Frank isn't in Columbus, he's supposed to be," said Martin Chauncey, Communist leader at the Cleveland headquarters. "He hasn't checked in here, and we haven't heard from him for several days."

Frank Hashmall's efforts to organize a Communist Party in Franklin County had reached a dismal stage Saturday.

Two attempts to pass out handbills to Timken plant workers had met with failure. His statements bitterly complaining about his party activities had ceased arriving at The Citizen.

The low point in Hashmall's activities in Columbus came seven days after he first identified himself as executive secretary of the Franklin County Communist Party. He complained at that time, in a signed statement, about the reception of his handbill-passing efforts and the publicity about it.

Developments came fast:

Last Sunday Hashmall's connection with the Cleveland Communists was disclosed in The Citizen.

Last Wednesday a second attempt was made to give Timken workers handbills. This effort was led by Arthur Vincent Rappeport, 45 E. 11th Ave., who protested "treatment" received when at attempted to distribute communistic handbills with Hashmall on March 19.

Workers again destroyed the handbills and police broke up the gathering at plant gates on Cleveland Ave.

Then came the disclosure that Hashmall's home is owned by Mrs. Anna Morgan's son, Alfred M. Rubio, a Communist. Rubio lives in Chicago and is a tool grinder. Mrs. Morgan said she had turned the home over to her son.

HUSBAND FIRED

Mrs. Morgan's husband, Richard C. Morgan, 154 E. Kelso Rd., was fired from his position of curator of the Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Museum the next day. Museum officials said they didn't like the "damning publicity."

Mrs. Morgan complained that she is an innocent bystander in the Communist activities led by Hashmall. She said she is not a Communist Party member.

She said she had closed her book shop at 38 E. Goodale St., because the business was losing money.

"All this Communist publicity," she added, "has made people afraid to come into the store.

"Just because I sold the house to my son, and a man they say is a Communist lives in it now, my business is ruined and my husband loses his job.

"INTERRACIAL UNITY

"My husband is an anthropologist. What we believe in is based on sound anthropological theory. We believe in interracial unity. We think everybody should have a chance."

She said her husband never had received official notice of his dismissal at the museum. Yet, officials there told reporters an official letter had been sent to Mr. Morgan Wednesday.

Mrs. Morgan, then Mrs. Rubio, was known to be interested in Communist activities when she lived in Indianapolis, a source there revealed Saturday. She later was divorced, and married Mr. Morgan.

"I have received threatening telephone calls," she said. "After the way they're treating that girl (Mrs. Hashmall) on Fourth St., I don't know what will happen next." She said she hadn't told police of her fears because she didn't think they would give her protection.

HELPED STRIKERS

Mrs. Morgan said she had tried to help Timken workers when they were on strike.

"We tried to help them in every way we could."

She was asked whom she meant by "we."

"Why, the decent people in Columbus," she replied.

DOESN'T LIKE IT HERE

Her son, Alfred, the avowed Communist, expressed strong dislike for Columbus.

"From what my mother wrote me and what I learned the day I went down (to accept the Hashmall house deed) I decided I didn't want to rear my two little girls there," he said.

"The Communist Party," he went on, "is fighting for the best traditions of America. It is slanderous to say we are members of any foreign power. Any member would quit if that were so."

He explained that a person trying to join the Communist Party must have two character references from party members.

IS EXCITABLE

Mrs. Morgan, an attractive middle-aged woman of olive complexion, becomes excited in her conversation. She rarely directly answers a reporter's question, but counters with one of her own.

Her white Goodale St. book shop is the most prominent structure in the area. The public part of the shop is backed up by several rooms used for routine store purposes.

Mrs. Morgan denied the store was a meeting place of Communists. She said she doesn't know where party members meet.

HITS TRUMAN PROGRAM

She stated political beliefs, several of which followed Communist Party lines. Among these was her dislike of President Truman's belligerent actions toward Russian aggression, Universal Military Training, and the draft.

She said she doesn't handle the Communist paper, "Daily Worker," and added that she had been criticized by some patrons because she carried literature of interest to Negroes.

Mrs. Morgan said her son, Alfred, and a second son, Carlos, are veterans of World War II. She said neither she nor Mr. Morgan plans to leave Columbus.

STATEMENT OF BELIEF BY ANNA H. MORGAN

On Sunday afternoon on returning home I found a subpoena dated March 25 stuck under the kitchen door. It was signed by one Gordon Renner, chairman of the Ohio Un-American Committee. On Monday evening again there was introduced a subpoena, this one dated March 24, signed by the same person but not bearing the stamp of the sheriff's office nor spelling my name correctly. This highly irregular service and slaphappy juggling of subpoena's (usually considered a serious and important document) is typical of the tactics of this unconstitutional committee which breaks laws to suit themselves and harasses, intimidates and smears citizens who dare protest corrupt political practices and the drive towards fascism. This committee was paid to investigate so-called Un-American and subversive activities but in all these months it has failed to state what it considers Un-American or subversive. This bipartisan witch-hunting committee feeds anti-red propaganda to the press without admitting that the Communist Party has never even been outlawed in the U. S. A. This committee persecutes all those who seek to establish a third party with a peace program in the 1952 elections. Its so-called "friendly" witnesses are the worse characters dragged from the labor movement; one witness was convicted of attempted rape; another mismanaged union funds; another urged youths to join an organization that he represented, then he sold out to the FBI and betrayed his young friends who followed him. Some FBI witnesses concentrate their attacks on peace workers, thereby seeking to boost the government's horrible war plans. Paid informers feed there lies to committees as long as committees feed money to them. Decent Americans traditionally reject all informers.

Who am I, you may ask. I am just an average American housewife. Daughter of a deacon I early was baptized in a Congregational Church. I accept its teachings of the brotherhood of man for every day in the year, not just for Sunday. I now present my sincere beliefs and let this committee and all interested citizens who pay this committee judge me.

I believe in the complete economic and social equality of all races and I ask this committee how come Ohio has never enacted FEPC legislation to guarantee those rights to its minority citizens? I feel that the American pattern of lynching Negroes, of murder and genocide in general is bringing down the hatred of the world upon us. I believe in freedom of speech as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. I demand that traditional American soap-box right to say what I think and let the man in the street decide for himself if I am a sage or a crackpot. I believe in clean newspaper reporting and I denounce those who use dirty journalism to build hate between nations with lies and half truths. Since the working man gives his strength, his life, his blood and his sweat to build up the big business machine I believe in his right to organize unions to protect himself from those who exploit him. I protest 76 percent of our national income being spent on war preparations while millions of our citizens lack decent housing, jobs, medical care, clothing, nourishment, education and our old age pensioners starve. I protest American planes dropping napalm bombs on Korean villages, making human torches of the living bodies of women, children and old men. I, who recall with horror the World War II pictures of naked bodies stacked like corded wood in the German concentration camps, I protest Atty. Gen. McGrath's boast that he is rushing to completion American concentration camps. Gen. Grow of the U. S. Army in his recently exposed diary boasts "we need not play fair * * * hit below the belt if necessary."

I protest that this policy of hitting below the belt has passed unjust judgment on these young Jewish parents, the Rosenbergs, who are now kept in solitary confinement of death cells on framed-up charges which have never been proved. I protest a cowardly Supreme Court riding on the political coat-tails of a corrupt administration instead of defending the Constitution of the United States and the Bill of Rights against the Smith, McCarran, Taft-Hartley Acts and all other pro-fascist legislation. I protest certain veterans organizations hounding simple citizens while they condone films like DESERT FOX, glorifying the

Nazi general Rommel. These veterans have already forgotten our heroes who died to defeat fascism. As the mother of veterans I hate war—I know the anxiety of long nights while sons serve in foreign lands.

I believe that peace can be achieved only through negotiation. It is futile for Americans to believe we can conquer the entire world just because we sit on the largest heap of atom bombs. As poisoned gas was outlawed after World War I, so should the atom bomb and cowardly bacteriological warfare be outlawed now.

I believe we cannot export freedom if we do not possess it. All the world watches cynically as Truman boasts of American freedom while his courts throw progressive leaders into jails as political prisoners on the framed-up testimony of discredited informers.

I challenge this committee to examine those who are dishonest in politics; to examine those who discriminate against and hurt minority groups; to examine those heads of educational institutions who stifle freedom of speech on the campus. I call upon Gov. Lausche to witness the tactics of this committee which sneaks about to the homes, offices of factories and institutions, calling on their victims for questioning while endangering those victims' reputations and livelihoods. I charge that this bi-partisan committee operates in an un-American and subversive manner in order to silence the independent voters during the 1952 election campaign.

Because this committee conducts its hearings like an inquisition, with no rules of evidence, its victims are denied the rights which they would have in a duly constituted court. Therefore I must claim the protection of the 5th amendment of the Constitution of the United States and remain silent before this committee.

(Signed) Anna H. Morgan.
ANNA H. MORGAN.

APRIL 1, 1952.

Room 8, House of Representatives.
State House, Columbus, Ohio.

5800 CLEVELAND AVE.,
Worthington No. 1, Ohio, April 2, 1952.

MR. GORDON RENNER,
Chairman, Ohio Un-American Committee,
State House, Columbus, Ohio.

DEAR SIR: Yesterday when you had me on the stand before your committee your man Issacs badgered me because I would not give my address. Last evening's edition of the Green Stripe, OHIO STATE JOURNAL, dated Wednesday morning, April 2, stated that I refused to give you my address, then it continued: "Mrs. Morgan, whose address, according to the commission records, is 5800 Cleveland Ave. * * *" After this came out we have received repeated calls threatening our lives and our property and warning us to get off Cleveland Ave. Furthermore, you allowed the press to take my photograph while in the hearing room which further identified me for attack. I thought I went before an investigating committee for questioning, not before a court charged with some crime. I would like to point out that when your "friendly" witness was on the stand and refused to give his address you did not release it to the press but you protected it. Apparently it is within the power of your committee to withhold from the press information that may hurt people and it is also in the power of your committee to feed to the press information that you know from long experience in Ohio will open your victims to violent attack. I went before you with the pride of a clear conscience—I have broken no laws. I have all my life stood for what was just and honest, but your committee, being what it is, has given me the publicity of a criminal. I now find it necessary to have my phone disconnected in order to gain a little rest. I send you this letter to inform you that if any harm comes to me, my family, or my property as a result of your inspired publicity I shall hold you responsible.

Yours truly,

[S] ANNA H. MORGAN.

5800 CLEVELAND AVE.,

Worthington 1, Ohio, April 11, 1952.

Mr. G. RENNER,

*Chairman, Ohio Un-American Commission,**State House No. 8, Columbus, Ohio.*

DEAR SIR: Last week following your performance on March 31 and April 1, I wrote to inform you that as a result of the publicity you fed the press we received so many threats and harassing phone calls it was necessary to order our phone disconnected.

This week on April 9 as a further result of your undesirable publicity with the publication of addresses the NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY notified me that it was lifting within five (5) days all insurance protection from my property which it has covered for years. I report this to you as proof of the result of your dirty work. Your committee is supposed to be a fact-finding committee but from the beginning it has operated as a bragging smear committee seeking headlines for political ends. You seem to think that you can ride to popularity (like the dixiecrat politicians who specialize in lynching) by availing yourself of the present red hysteria created by a corrupt bipartisan policy and aided and abetted by equally corrupt local newspapers. While the citizens of our state expected your committee to conduct yourselves like mature representatives of the voters you instead throw yourselves about and swagger around with the irresponsibility of school-yard bullies until regardless of one's party affiliation no decent citizen in the state respects you and cheap comedians constantly joke about you.

Your man Issacs badgered me to tell my address in an open hearing in a city which has become known all over the world (French papers reported this) for smashing the home and attempting to kill the family of persons with whom local Republicans happen to disagree. Your man Issacs sought to tell where I was employed when my own husband lost his state job through the Johnson-Hatcher frame-up and the corrupt Ohio Supreme Court shocked decent lawyers across the country by refusing to review the case, claiming he was not state employed (even though he had for 12 years been paid by state checks and had for 12 years had his salary deducted for the state retirement fund) and even though the greatest part of the money financing the Museum is appropriated by the state. Your man Issacs raised the question of my citizenship when any one of his paid stooges, either Worster or Prebbles using the skill of a half-wit could have (and no doubt did know) that I was born in Providence, R. I., and furthermore it is not yet subversive to be born—or have you already decreed that it is?

While you had your victim trapped at the hearing, denying us even the right of representation by attorney which is allowed common criminals in any cheap little politically controlled police court (and we were not charged with any crime even by the FBI) we who were under threat of heavy fines, jail sentences, etc., not for crimes committed but for perchance slipping into your technical "contempt" trap, we sat and saw you permit one of your committeemen ask us what day of the week it was (it being April fool's day) and when both Mr. Terrell and myself scorning this cheap humor at a hearing that was supposed to be a State Commission hearing, when we scorned to reply you as chairman did not have the decency to cut out such wise cracks and your committee laughed as if it were, oh, so funny. I have seen such "hearings" in Nazi movies but I never expected to have to stomach it even from your Ohio Gang.

Since your publicity has so affected certain unstable minds of the public to the point that a hysterical insurance agent removes insurance protection what guarantee have we that such unstable persons will not take one more step and stoop to arson? Since only that agent and you know of the lifting of this insurance I consider you responsible for any destruction that my property may suffer until such time that I may find an honest and courageous American who will insure it for me again.

Knowing you and your committee and understanding the mind of the sadist at work (your investigators behind closed doors threatened the livelihood of several persons they visited, knowing such persons had no one to whom they could appeal for justice or mercy) knowing your method of work I do not expect any reply from you except the same coarse laughter I heard when I sat before you and heard your man ask what day it was.

I am a housewife. I have a simple understanding of and a belief in the Constitution of the United States and the Bill of Rights but when you injected into the questioning by Isaacs your own question asking me if I knew what the 5th amendment said I smelled the rat that you were nosing out—that legal techni-

cality of "contempt." But I knew that we had reached a period in the history of Ohio if not in the nation when justice had broken down completely and judges are so corrupt. Your man Issacs asked did I not get arrested for illegally walking the picket line at the AZO strike. You were so corrupt you let that question go into the record but the record of our trial showed that the injunction against picketing was to have been signed at 9 AM but the bosses and the press got the corrupt Judge Reynolds out of bed very early to sign it so we could be trapped on the line. This is Ohio history in the making.

These hearings are your sounding board. With your questions so stacked you are able to inject anything you wish into the record and the press comes to you and sucks it up like pigeons milk. Only an aroused movement of the voters can clean up the condition which now exists. Atty. Gen. McGrath whose office prosecuted so many and filled our jails with political prisoners like the prisons of Hitler, Franco, and Mussolini, that high officer of justice proved to be the number one grafter of the nation. One would laugh cynically if so many good citizens were not in jail while he enjoys his ill-got millions. And this pattern extends all down the line from McGrath to you and your committee checking the "loyalty" of your fellow citizens. Loyalty to what? Truman? Dulles? McGrath? Costello? Morris? Or your man Issacs?

Very truly,

[s] ANNA H. MORGAN.

5800 CLEVELAND AVE.,
Worthington 1, Ohio, April 18, 1952.

Mr. G. RENNER,
Chairman, Ohio Un-American Commission,
Columbus, Ohio.

DEAR SIR: It is now brought to our attention that several persons who have been "investigated" by your committee have lost their jobs or been forced by bosses to resign, on the spot, the threat being that if they did not resign they would receive more undesirable publicity. This has led to several persons already moving out of the state. Whatever your committee touches it seems to contaminate with something fearful, repulsive, and un-American which panics the inexperienced and the weak.

I myself was dismissed this past week by my survey supervisor who stated that while he sympathized with my defense of the people's rights and while he recognized that your hearing was nothing more than a kangaroo court nevertheless since big advertising companies sent my checks through his hands it was necessary for him to disassociate himself from me until a more democratic government came to Ohio, perhaps in the fall of 1952. This dismissal I expected after your tactics of allowing photographers in the hearing room with your victims on the stand. (But the press did not publish photographs of your Columbus man DeLong nor did they emphasize his address.)

Because of the photographs which you allowed another member of my family has suffered extreme nervous strain when fellow associates circulating the pictures in the building where they reside impressed upon others that this person's relative was some sort of criminal. (In the United States a man was considered innocent until proved guilty of some crime but not in Ohio where you smear and slander first, then try to trap your victim through some technicality of the law into some sort of guilt with heavy punishment.) I recall that you insinuated you could "embarrass" me if I refused to answer your man Issacs. You were already trying to "embarrass" me but I have a clear conscience and know I have never broken a law outside of a U turn in a public highway—which I believe is a cleaner record than any of the politicians serving on the crucifixion committee.

Perhaps the most pathetic case of all those who lost their livelihood because of your legal blackmail was that of Mr. Robert Terrill. Do you recall how your man Issacs pompously referred to Mr. Terrill's "employment at University Hospital" and then read, not a copy of the loyalty oath of the university but read the oath from the very card that Mr. Terrill had signed thus proving to Mr. Terrill and the world at large that Mr. Terrill's bosses had been contacted and through the insinuation and innuendo Issacs, doubt was cast upon Mr. Terrill's loyalty and forces were already at work on Mr. Terrill's dismissal or compulsion to resign. (As a matter of fact there seemed to be nothing in the oath as read that Mr. Terrill could have violated and Issacs failed to show any subversive or disloyal conduct or to charge Mr. Terrill with any such act.)

And so because of sharp snooping of Issacs the aged and half-starved dishwasher at Ohio State University was told to resign? Now Ohio I suppose has cleaner dishes, if not cleaner politics under Chairman Renner? The cruel part is that in playing your political game Mr. Terrill's poor bed-ridden wife is the real victim. Mr. Terrill's income has been so limited that there have been many days when he had to decide whether to buy medicine for his wife or food. I recall your man Issacs, a tall, heavy-flushed man, red hair, red face, well-fed, hounding a poor aged Negro dishwasher whom Issacs sought to prove had some doubts that the capitalist system was the best in the world and maybe wanted to find out. You got \$50,000 to persecute such citizens—Mr. Jackson was already unemployed but it seemed to worry one Bartunek about the source of Mr. Jackson's livelihood.

I do not know how much of the taxpayer's money you paid to your friend DeLong to finger Terrill with his vague memoirs but to any honest and decent citizen it seems that if you base your work on the testimony of such already discredited characters we can accurately judge you and Issacs and the rest of your un-American Ohio Gang. For it stands to reason that a man who will make such statements in an effort to betray those who he himself claims were his former associates and those who he admitted gave him a job and a home for his wife and children (not to mention loans for medicine, furniture, his wife's false teeth, etc.) such a character who sells himself to you for I don't know how many pieces of silver will have no integrity even under oath on the witness stand and for more silver will name as many names as desired from any lists Issacs may feed him. Don't forget that Mrs. Roosevelt and Shirley Temple have also been suspected by the witch hunters but they had money and were not "investigated" like a poor dishwasher.

We are now reliably informed that of some 60 Columbus attorneys listed in the telephone book not one can be found who will go into your hearing room or into a Columbus court with a victim marked by you for crucifixion. Did you have to buy off these attorneys with your taxpayers' appropriation or was it your legalized blackmail that frightened them?

Mr. Renner—I have lived and traveled in fascist countries and I know fascism when I see it. This is fascism. You as chairman of this committee which functions as it does have accepted the role of chief fascist in Ohio and you and your machinations must be exposed to all voters, especially to those in decent organizations which can move against you.


As the Bible says, "As ye sow, so shall ye reap." You are riding high today on the crest of fascist hysteria sweeping the U. S. A. under the protection of McGrath's order to rush to completion his four concentration camps but I warn you that the American people will not stomach it for long and those fascist friends who support you now will flee like the rats they are when the tide turns.


Very truly,

[s] Anna H. Morgan
ANNA H. MORGAN.

Anna H. Morgan
anna H. Morgan

Yours truly,
Anna H. Morgan

Very truly,


Very truly,

 Anna H. Morgan

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated June 10, 1952, transmitted to us by William L. Holland which he requests be inserted into the record.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The letter referred to is marked "Exhibit No. 1415" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1415

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

Eldorado 5-1759

JUNE 10, 1952.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,

*Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security,
 Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR Mr. MORRIS: In connection with Professor David N. Rowe's testimony before the Subcommittee on Internal Security, I wish to point out that Professor Rowe on a number of points made inaccurate or misleading statements. Some of these have already been corrected by Miss Farley in her testimony.

In addition, however, Professor Rowe submitted a statistical analysis of some IPR publications by his colleague Professor Richard Walker, and I understand that the Subcommittee accepted this for inclusion in the record. These statistics were subsequently published in the *New Leader* of March 31, 1952, in an article by Professor Walker entitled, "Lattimore and the IPR," to which I have written a reply to Professor Walker. In the course of my reply I pointed out the inadequacy of his statistical analysis. Since the Subcommittee accepted Walker's statistics at second hand from Professor Rowe, it seems to me only fair that you should insert my own comments on these statistics into the printed record. I therefore enclose a copy of the relevant portions of my statement and request that you put it into the record.

In order to correct a number of other misleading impressions which Professor Rowe gave in his testimony, I am enclosing herewith copies of correspondence from the IPR files which in my opinion will help to give a more accurate picture of some of the incidents he mentioned. I request that you insert these documents into the record also. Please return the originals to us in the near future after you have made copies of them for your files.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Executive Vice Chairman.

MR. WALKER'S STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Mr. Walker's basis for selecting his so-called "anti-Communist" writers is quite unreliable. He uses my list (which I clearly described as only a partial

list) from my October 10 statement, whereas he could easily have ascertained that the IPR published contributions from scores of anti-Communist writers besides those whom I happened to mention in my list of 47. Following is a supplementary list (still incomplete) of other IPR writers whom I know to have been anti-Communist when they wrote for the IPR (and I am not aware that any of them later become pro-Communist). In addition, one could of course easily present an even longer list of reputable writers who may not have been *known* as "anti-Communist" but were certainly non-Communist and in most cases anti-Communist.

ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES OF ANTI-COMMUNIST IPR WRITERS

(1) *American*

A. Vandenbosch	Franz Michael	A. A. Schiller
C. Hartley Grattan	M. S. Bates	Charles N. Spinks
K. P. Landon	Donald Nugent	James H. Shoemaker
J. W. Masland	H. S. Quigley	J. R. Andrus
Galen Fisher	Andrew Lind	Warren S. Hunsberger
Percy E. Corbett	R. L. Pendleton	R. E. Dupuy
C. Walter Young	H. Foster Bain	J. E. Spence
William C. Johnstone	F. M. Keesing	C. Yanaga
E. F. Penrose	Tyler Dennett	N. Pelcovits
K. Pelzer	Julius Edelstein	K. Kurihara
F. Tamagna	Joseph R. Hayden	Glenn T. Trewartha
Philip Wright	K. S. Latourette	Carl L. Alsberg
Quincy Wright	John E. Orchard	Grover Clark
Charles Wolf, Jr.	Stephen W. Reed	Arthur L. Dean
Jerome Cohen	John R. Stewart	Royal Chapman
J. M. Maki	Joseph S. Davis	Theodore J. Kreps
William Ballis	Harold M. Vinacke	Arthur D. Gayer

(2) *Non-American*

F. C. Jones	E. M. Gull	W. J. Hinton
Sir Charles Collins	F. L. Ho	' L. Hsia
A. R. M. Lower	H. D. Fong	K. Kanai
F. W. Soward	C. H. Lowe	G. W. Keeton
Edgar McInnis	H. K. Lee	G. Laean
Victor Purcell	K. Takayanagi	H. Lauterpacht
Eleanor Hinder	N. MacKenzie	J. Th. Moll
Lord Hailey	H. Angus	I. Nitobe
T. Uyeda	P. Gourou	G. R. Parkin
T. E. Gregory	C. Robequain	Sir Harold Parlett
Li Ch'oh-ming	D. Lew	P. D. Philipps
Gaston Rueff	W. M. Borrie	G. L. Wood
Toshi Go	D. Copland	I. Clunies Ross
Sir James Allen	W. J. Cator	G. W. Swire
A. D. A. de Kat Angelino	Sir Paul Butler	K. Yokota
J. L. Christian	E. Denney	P. H. W. Sitsen
G. H. C. Hart	W. D. Forsyth	Sir William Barton
H. Visman	T. P. Fry	P. T. Bauer
J. H. Boeke	C. Y. Wu	Sir J. Crosby
M. Royama	O. M. Greene	

Turning now to Mr. Walker's list of 40 so-called "pro-Communist" IPR writers, we find that it is compiled from the McCarran Subcommittee's misleading list of 37 "IPR Personnel" plus Mr. Walker's additions of Kate Mitchell, Philip Jaffe, and Nym Wales. It should be noted first that many on the list of 37 were never, in any meaningful sense, IPR "personnel" (e. g. Solomon Adler, Lawrence Duggan, Alger Hiss, Hotsumi Ozaki, Mildred Price, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, Andrew Steiger, and Harry White). Many of them never wrote at all for the IPR (e. g. Adler, Currie, De Caux, Duggan, Hiss, Price, Smedley, Vincent, and White); and in fairness to Mr. Walker, I must note that he did not claim that these people did write.

Second, this was a list of people only *alleged* to be Communist or pro-Communist. There is no proof that many of them were or are. Indeed, many have given sworn testimony denying that they are or ever were Communists (e. g.,

T. A. Bisson, Owen Lattimore, Kate Mitchell, Maxwell Stewart, Benjamin Kizer, Joseph Barnes, John Fairbanks, and John Carter Vincent). Jaffe, whose name is added by Mr. Walker, does not belong on the list at all, as he wrote for the IPR.

But let us consider the much more important question of *what* these alleged "pro-Communists" actually wrote for the IPR. Here we cannot check exactly with Mr. Walker because he does not specify the titles which he included in his statistics. But in the arbitrary period, 1934-1947, which he selected, he must have included, for instance, some or all of the following studies:

Bisson: American Policy in the Far East

Mitchell: Industrialization of the Western Pacific

Norman: Japan's Emergence as a Modern State

Not everyone will agree with the views expressed in these publications, but they are very competent studies which certainly cannot be considered as pro-Communist. (Here again, in fairness to Mr. Walker, let me note that he did not say these *publications* were pro-Communist. He avoided listing the titles, probably because that would have exposed the misleading nature of his statistics). In the same way, most of the articles written for *Pacific Affairs* and *Far Eastern Survey* by the alleged "pro-Communist" writers turn out, on examination, to reveal little or no trace of "pro-Communist bias, partly because they were often purely factual and descriptive in character.

A much graver omission in Mr. Walker's table is his exclusion of a large number of the regular IPR research volumes, conference papers, and booklets for high schools. Why he omitted them is hard to imagine for they comprise a major part of the IPR output, but it certainly makes his statistics very questionable. For instance, he has omitted such important studies by "anti-Communists" as the following:

Taylor: America and the New Pacific

Mills: British Rule in Eastern Asia

Lieu: Industrialization of Shanghai

Buck: Land Utilization in China

Nasu: Aspects of Japanese Agriculture

Levy: French Policies in the Far East

Christian: Modern Burma

Chamberlin: Modern Japan

Boeke: Structure of Netherlands Indian Economy

Johnstone: The U. S. and Japan's New Order

Robequain: Economic Development of French Indochina

Keesing: The South Seas in the Modern World

Gull: British Economic Interests in the Far East

Lee: Land Utilization and Rural Economy in Korea

Wright: Trade and Trade Barriers in the Pacific

Royama: Foreign Policy of Japan

Pelzer: Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics

Grattan: Lands Down Under

Jones: Shanghai and Tientsin

Lin Yu-tang: Press and Public Opinion in China

Nitobe: Lectures on Japan

Shepherd: Industry in Southeast Asia

Porter: Crisis in the Philippines

Belshaw: Agricultural Organization in New Zealand

Wadham and Wood: Land Utilization in Australia

Thompson: Thailand, the New Siam

Uyeda: Small Industries in Japan

Besides the above, Mr. Walker has also omitted numerous other major research volumes and conference papers by writers who are certainly non-Communist, even if they may not be well known as anti-Communists. It is hardly necessary to present a list here. Examples can readily be found from a glance at the back catalogues of the IPR or its volumes of conference proceedings.

Now glance, however, at some of the studies by alleged "pro-Communist" writers, which Mr. Walker has also omitted from his list. Here are a few:

Lang: Chinese Family and Society

Field: Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area

Lattimore: Inner Asian Frontiers of China

Chi: Key Economic Areas in Chinese History

Here again, opinions may differ as to the importance of these studies, but it would be quite ridiculous to consider these valuable studies as pro-Communist.

W. L. HOLLAND.

The following paragraph, referring to Professor Walker's statistical analysis, was contained in my letter to the *New Leader* of April 5, 1952, and published by the *New Leader* on April 21, 1952:

"Professor Walker's statistics are highly misleading. For reasons of his own he takes an arbitrary period of 1934-1947 instead of the full period, 1925-1952, of the Institute's history. Even in that shorter period he considers only a portion of the total IPR publication, omitting the very important regular research volumes, the numerous conference papers and the pamphlets prepared for high-school use. Worse still, he makes his comparison on the basis of (a) my random and partial list of 47 IPR writers well known for their opposition to communism and (b) 40 persons who have been *alleged* (not proved) to be Communist sympathizers, in the hearings. The absurdity of this procedure is obvious. There are of course many other IPR writers besides those named in my list who are strongly opposed to communism. By excluding them, Professor Walker quietly omits a very large proportion of all IPR authors. On the other hand, by accepting mere allegations as his criterion of 'pro-Communists' he includes in his list of 'pro-Communist' publications a number of scholarly, objective and widely acclaimed studies which have no trace of pro-Communist bias."

W. L. Holland,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,

Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations.

DECEMBER 26, 1946.

Professor DAVID M. ROWE,

Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

DEAR DAVE: To my great distress I find that I shall not be able to return from China in time to attend the Princeton Conference. I had counted on going out to China by ship and coming back quickly by plane, as our budget won't permit of plane travel both ways. I have now had to postpone my departure until around January 17 in order to await Corbett's return, and will probably fly out by an UNRRA plane. I had hoped that there might still be a chance of my getting a ship back in time to attend the Princeton meeting, but it now seems quite clear that I won't be able to reach California until about April 7, and I will then have to attend the IPR National Conference in Southern California on April 9.

Under the circumstances, I must ask you to find someone else to take my place at the Princeton session. This is a real disappointment to me as I had been looking forward to this meeting. I would have told you about this the other day, but at that time there was still a chance that I might be able to get back here in time. In fact there is still a very faint possibility, but not enough to count on. If by any chance you can persuade the Army or Navy people to include me among the distinguished visitors that you are bringing over from China about the end of March, and if I would not need to pay more than the \$350 boat fare, I could probably make it, but I don't honestly believe you would be justified in spending money on me when you might use it for Chinese or other foreign guests. However if you think of any other angles that might be worked, please let me know.

I enclose a copy of my letter to Fei Hsiao-tung. He had written me that he was at last accepting your invitation on condition that Tsing Hua would give him three weeks absence and the government would allow him to go. He seemed doubtful whether permission would be granted and I wondered therefore whether you and Fairbank could enter into a conspiracy with me to get him over here for several months. Let's talk it over on Saturday.

Sincer. yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,

Secretary-General.

YALE UNIVERSITY,

FOREIGN AREA STUDIES,

New Haven, Connecticut, December 30, 1946.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,

Institute of Pacific Relations,

1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: I was very sorry indeed to hear that there is a strong possibility that you will not be able to get back from China in time for the Princeton conference, April 1, 2 and 3.

I am very reluctant to substitute anyone else for you in that meeting. I do not need to say how important I feel it would be that you should be there for these sessions. I have taken the responsibility of referring your letter to the Princeton Bicentennial, with the request that if it is at all possible they should secure your passage back to this country by Naval Air Transport with our other delegates from China to the Princeton conference. I do not know whether they can expand the number for whom they have requested these accommodations from the Navy Department. If there is any chance of our getting you back in this way in time for the conference, I am sure the Bicentennial authorities will do everything in their power to make use of it.

I do not know whether we can get a ruling from the Navy Department before you must leave this country for China in January. I wonder, therefore, if you can provide me with a very reliable address at which we could be sure to reach you in China by cable later on. This would make it possible for us to notify you in case we secure Naval Air Transport facilities for bringing you back to this country and to provide you with all necessary instructions in this connection. If we succeed in working this out with the Navy Department, I should be of the opinion that it would not cost the IPR anything. I do not believe there is any way in which we can pay the Navy Department for this service, but I should say that I don't know the facts on this point. I have sent to the Bicentennial authorities a copy of your letter to Fei Hsiao-tung. Naturally, I should be glad to see him remain in this country for a longer time than required by the Princeton meetings.

If any subsequent angles on the matter of your travel schedule develop, please inform me as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours.

[s] Rowe

DAVID N. ROWE,

Director of Far Eastern Studies.

dr/bm.

SEPTEMBER 17, 1949.

Dr. DAVID N. ROWE,

Foreign Area Studies, Yale University,

New Haven, Conn.

DEAR DAVE: I have your letter of September 14 enclosing the comments on Grad's manuscript on Japanese Agriculture. Naturally, I attach considerable weight to the views of such a qualified group of scholars. Your letter raises some difficult problems, however, because within the last few weeks I have received enthusiastic reports about the manuscript from other well-qualified persons in the State Department and other Washington agencies. There have, of course, been criticisms on specific points, some of which I had previously made myself. In the meantime, Grad, with the assistance of T. A. Bisson, has been making a very thorough revision of the manuscript and has recently written me that he expects to work for another two or three months on further revision and reorganization of the manuscript. For this reason, I am a little disturbed at your implied remark that Grad is unlikely to be willing or able to make the necessary revisions, and I therefore wonder if there are not some other factors in the whole matter. If so, I do hope you will let me know in all frankness. I will treat your remarks as strictly confidential.

While I am, of course, grateful to you for having taken the time and the trouble to obtain these detailed criticisms from your colleagues, I want to assure you, in case there has been any misunderstanding, that I have never expected the Yale Foreign Area Studies Division to take any responsibility for Grad's study on Japanese agriculture. It is his other Japanese Urban Community study for which I had requested the professional assistance and guidance of Embree and any other interested faculty people at Yale.

I would like to discuss this whole matter further with you after I return from a visit to Toronto next week. In the meantime, if there is any more "low down," please let me have it.

With all good wishes.

Yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,

Secretary General.

YALE UNIVERSITY,
FOREIGN AREA STUDIES,

New Haven, Connecticut, September 20, 1949.

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,

Institute of Pacific Relations,

1 East 54th Street, New York 22, New York.

DEAR BILL: Thank you for your letter of the 17th. In reply to it I would like to say that the work we have done on the Grad manuscript on Japanese agriculture has been without knowledge of the "very thorough revision of the manuscript" which you report that he is making with the help of T. A. Bisson.

I do not know exactly how to interpret the last three sentences in your first paragraph. I have shown, or read your letter over the phone, to Embree, Kaplan, Pelzer, and Yanaga, and have had it suggested to me that perhaps what you mean by "other factors in the whole matter" may be a possible lack of thoroughly friendly relations and working arrangements between Grad and those of us that have been concerned with his work here. If so, I assure you most sincerely that all of us are and have been on the best of terms with Grad. There is, as far as I know, absolutely no friction with him. This, I believe, is all I can contribute on the matter of further "low down" as you put it. The letter to you, and the memo to Grad of which a copy was sent you, were both worked out carefully by me in consultation with each of the persons named above, and at times in conference of as many as three of us at one time. These documents represent, I regret to say, our deliberately reasoned evaluations of the present work under consideration.

Naturally, you are at liberty to do what you will with our comments. In this connection, however, I do believe that the matter of our relation to his project on Japanese Agriculture is not as simple as indicated in your next to last paragraph. It is clear that the Rockefeller grant, your sponsorship, and our appointment of Grad as Visiting Fellow in Far Eastern Studies in the Graduate School for 1948-49, were all based upon his project for the Fukaya study. In regard to it he stated in his memo to the Foundation with your letter to Roger Evans of March 22, 1948, that "My work on the project will be supervised by Professor D. N. Rowe and John Embree of Yale University." (See also my letter to you of March 13, 1948.)

On the other hand, it seems that Grad has given *most*, if *not* all [pencilled note: (Not true)] of his time to the Agriculture study during the term of his appointment as Visiting Fellow. As he finished the chapters of this book, he gave them one by one to Embree, whose comments on were made at the time and have been generally summarized in the memorandum from myself to Grad. Grad also submitted the entire draft to me on completion. I suppose both Embree and myself could have fallen back on the fact that we were only responsible for the Fukaya study, in which case we should certainly have spared ourselves and the other three of our faculty much work. This, however, could well have seemed rather unco-operative. In addition, since Grad *was* Visiting Fellow here in Far Eastern Studies, I believe our responsibility runs at least as far as doing what we could to improve the work, even if only in order to protect ourselves and our organization. Now, I believe, that latter objective has been secured, and as to the former, the statement in my letter about its likelihood still represents I believe, the opinion of all of us. This does not mean that we will not make every effort to continue to help him, that is, if he wishes us to. We are all most friendly to Grad. Please keep in mind that I certainly, and I believe this applies to Embree also, did not ask to see Grad's materials on Agriculture. He submitted them to us on his own initiative. What would you have done if you had been in our position?

Now Grad is submitting to both of us the chapters, one by one, of his Fukaya study. Embree states and I agree, that we must now get Grad to submit to us a rather complete plan, so as to try to avoid much of the poor organization of material and duplication of treatment that characterized the work on Agriculture. Of course, we were hardly in a position to get this done at the beginning of the Agriculture project. Embree also has decided ideas about substantive revision of the first (and only submitted) section of the Fukaya work.

Incidentally, I find that we, as usual in such cases, gave Grad a one-year Visiting Fellowship. Your letter confirms our connection with the Fukaya project, and I will take steps to have the fellowship relationship extended for the academic year 1949-50. This should have been done before July 1, but the

administrative affairs of Foreign Area Studies have been in a state of readjustment recently. This is the only reason I can think of to explain this lapse.

Sincerely yours,

[s] David Rowe
DAVID N. ROWE.

DNR:dl

Pencilled note: (ack 11/3/49 MFH).

YALE UNIVERSITY,
FOREIGN AREA STUDIES,
New Haven, Conn., November 1, 1949.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: I have referred your letter of Oct. 19 to Provost E.S. Furniss who is now Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Area Studies, and he has authorized me to reply to it.

We note your statement regarding the new plan for the completion of the study on Fukaya by Dr. Grad, connected with his acceptance of a position with the United Nations Secretariat as a translator. I am glad to hear of this new arrangement, under which support the Rockefeller Foundation will be continued to allow Dr. Grad to engage the help of two assistants.

Under these circumstances the arrangement for Dr. Grad to call upon the services of members of the Columbia faculty to advise him from time to time on his study, seems a logical one. On our part, since any reappointment of Dr. Grad as Visiting Fellow at Yale had been deferred pending our discussion with you of the project, we will not find it necessary to take action of any kind on the reappointment, but will allow the whole matter to lapse.

I note your hope that some members of our staff will be available to read and criticize parts of the manuscript on an individual and informal basis. Arrangements for this would of course be made between your organization and the individuals of our faculty. These channels are always open to you at any time.

With all assurances of our cooperation in future matters of our mutual interest,

Sincerely yours,

[s] David N. Rowe
DAVID N. ROWE.

YALE UNIVERSITY,
FOREIGN AREA STUDIES,
New Haven, Connecticut, February 6, 1950.

Mr. CLAYTON LANE,
American Institute of Pacific Relations,
One East 54th Street, New York 22, New York.

DEAR MR. LANE: I wanted to write you in full approval of the point of view stated by you in the executive committee meeting last January 11, regarding editorial policy for the Far Eastern Survey. While I am in the fullest theoretical agreement with the position expressed by Mr. Lockwood as summarized at the bottom of Page four of the Minutes, I believe that from a practical point of view your position is the only tenable one.

I want to write you regarding a decision which I recently reached regarding my membership in the American Institute of Pacific Relations. I have decided to let this membership lapse and what I wanted to say is that I hope you will not read into this action any reflection on the recent administration of the IPR under your secretaryship. I have simply reached a stage where I must reduce my membership in organizations. I cannot afford as many memberships as I now support. Furthermore I cannot keep up with, not to mention participate in, the activities of so many organizations. I have recently decided that I will in the future maintain membership only in the American Political Science Association for professional reasons, and in the Far Eastern Association as an expression of my particular regional interest. It must be clear to you that I have not been able to participate in the activities of the IPR, either as a Trustee or

an ordinary member. I simply do not have the time or energy to keep up many organizational affiliations in the way in which they should be maintained.

My purpose in making the above statement is merely to indicate that my decision to let my membership in the IPR lapse is based upon nothing substantially more positive than the considerations mentioned above.

Sincerely yours,

[s] David N. Rowe

DAVID N. ROWE,

Chairman, Executive Committee of Foreign Area Studies.

DNR:cs

FEBRUARY 27, 1950.

Professor DAVID N. ROWE,

*Chairman, Executive Committee of Forcing Area Studies,
Yale University, New Haven, Conn.*

DEAR PROFESSOR ROWE: Thanks for your letter of February 6, expressing agreement with my position on the Philippines article.

Your decision not to renew your membership in the American IPR is bad news, particularly because having you as a Trustee assisted in a balance of views on the Board. In any case, I shall always welcome any expression of your views on American IPR matters you may wish to send me. Our close relations with the Far Eastern Association will be conserved.

Sincerely yours,

CLAYTON LANE, *Executive Secretary.*

CL:ae

MARCH 15, 1951.

Dr. DAVID N. ROWE,

*Graduate School, Yale University,
New Haven, Conn.*

DEAR DAVE: Because of your interest in the subject, I am sending you herewith a manuscript on Security Problems in Southern and Eastern Asia, by V. P. Dutt, of the Indian Council of World Affairs. I would greatly appreciate your comments and detailed criticisms of this study, which seems to me a rather immature and diffuse job with relatively little analysis of actual security problems.

I propose to write the Secretary of the Indian Council that I regard this report as quite unsuitable for publication as an IPR research report and that it is quite unsatisfactory as a substitute for the study the Indian Council was expected to do for us, namely, an analysis of security problems in India and the Indian Ocean area. However, it occurs to me that with a good deal of rewriting the Indian Council might find it possible to use Dutt's report as a more or less popular pamphlet for publication and distribution in India. I would, therefore, like your advice on this possibility, as well as your specific suggestions for revising the manuscript.

I apologize for inflicting this job on you. My only hope is here and there in the manuscript you may find a few points of interest, or at least some indication of Indian attitudes on some of the problems under discussion.

How is your own study going? Have you a tentative outline or table of contents which you could send me for my personal information?

All the best.

Yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Secretary General.

WLH:abs.

YALE UNIVERSITY,
FOREIGN AREA STUDIES,
New Haven, Conn., May 28, 1951.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,

*Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, New York.*

DEAR BILL: I return herewith the manuscript by Mr. V. P. Dutt which you sent me some time ago.

I have looked this manuscript over, but have not had a chance to scrutinize it as carefully as I would have liked to. It seems to me to be worth publication, although, on the other hand, it is hardly what I consider a study of security

problems as I would define them. There is a lot of information in this publication. Providing the IPR understands what it is doing in publishing this manuscript, I would see no objection to its being put out for information.

Please accept my apologies for the slowness of this reaction. I am completely swamped these days with many concerns.

Sincerely yours,

[s] David Rowe.

DAVID N. ROWE,

Professor of Political Science.

DNR: me.

enc. 1.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a photostat made by the Library of Congress at our request, of the Soviet personnel of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in 1928.

It shows the name of Mr. Bogolepov. That is the reason for it.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The photostat referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1416" and is as follows:)

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE,
June 10, 1952.

SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY,
S. O. B. 424 C.

(Attn.: Miss Walker.)

The attached information is forwarded in response to the inquiry from your office noted below.

Respectfully,

W. C. GILBERT,
Acting Director, Legislative Reference Service.

Material re: Geneva Disarmament Conference: list of delegates.

EXHIBIT No. 1416

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS,
C. P. D. 112,
Genève, le 15 mars 1928.

COMMISSION PRÉPARATOIRE DE LA CONFÉRENCE DU DESARMEMENT PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

LISTE DES DÉLÉGATIONS À LA COMMISSION PRÉPARATOIRE

LIST OF DELEGATIONS TO THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION

5ÈME. SESSION, GENÈVE, 15 MARS 1928

Allemagne:

Adresses à Genève

S. E. le Comte de BERNSTORFF, Ambassadeur en disponibilité, Membre du Reichstag, Starenberg bei Munchen.

H. des Bergues.

Le Baron E. de WEIZSACHER, Conseiller intime, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Berlin.

H. Métropole.

Contre-Amiral Baron von FREYBERG-EISENBERG, Reichstwehrministerium, Völkerbundstabteilung, Heer, Berlin W. 10.

Do.

Colonel F. von BOETTICHER, Reichswehrministerium, Völkerbundsabteilung, Marine, Berlin W. 10.

Do.

Colonel STRECCIUS, Reichswehrministerium, Völkerbundsabteilung, Heer, Berlin W. 10.

Do.

Argentina:

S. E. M. PEREZ, Ministre d'Argentine à Rome,
Piazza Esquilino, Rome.

H. des Bergues.

M. José María CANTILLO, Ministre de l'Argentine
à Berne, Légation de l'Argentine, BERNE.

Do.

Capitaine de Vaisseau Julian FABLET, Légation
de l'Argentine, Piazza Esquilino, 2, ROME.

Do.

Colonel FASOLA CASTANO.

H. des Familles.

Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques:

M. Maxime LITVINOFF, Membre du Comité central
exécutif U. R. S. S., Commissaire du peuple
adjoint aux Affaires Etrangères, Narkomindiel,
Moscou.

H. Bellevue.

M. Anatole LOUNATCHARSKY, Membre du Comité
central exécutif U. R. S. S., Commissaire du
peuple à l'Instruction Publique—Narkomindiel,
Moscou.

Do.

M. Simeon POUATCHIEF, Chef-Adjoint à l'Etat-
Major général, Narkomvoien, Moscou.

Do.

M. Boris STEIN, Directeur du Département au
Commissariat du Peuple pour les Affaires
Etrangères, Narkomindiel, Moscou.

Do.

M. Vs. EGORIEV, Professeur à l'Académie Navale
de LENINGRADE.

Do.

M. Vladimir EGORIEV, Sous-Directeur au Com-
missariat du Peuple pour les Affaires Etran-
gères. 3, Troilzki 18 log. 3, Moscou X 4, Traj-
danskaia.

Do.

M. Vladimir SOCOLINE-SCHAPIRO, Chef adjoint du
Protocole au Commissariat du Peuple pour les
Affaires Etrangères, Narkomindiel, Moscou.

Do.

M. I. BOGOLAEPOFF, Attaché au Commissariat du
Peuple pour les Affaires Etrangères, Narkomin-
diel, Moscou.

Do.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel has some other letters that he would like to enter in the record at this time.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter from the Coordinator of Information, dated March 17, 1942, to Mr. Holland, dealing with the relations between the Institute and the Office of the Coordinator of Information.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1417" and is as follows:)

(Pencil note: W L H)

(Pencil note: ECC, should we include one of these in the letter to Willits?)

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION,
Washington, D. C., March 17, 1942.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,

*Research Secretary, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: The Far Eastern Section of the Office of the Coordinator of Information wishes to acknowledge the assistance which it has received from the Institute of Pacific Relations and particularly from those in charge of its research activities. The outstanding example is the receipt of a number of manuscripts in advance of their publication by the Institute. These include the translation of a work by Charles Robequain on the economic development of French Indo-China, a manuscript by H. G. Callis on foreign investments in Southeast Asia, one by Virginia Thompson on Burma, and one by Chao Ting-chi on China.

This acknowledgement may be useful to you in any appeal you may make for support during the coming year. May I express the hope that your plans for the year will include provision for further cooperation with this Section. The immediate importance of this is emphasized by the fact that our own work has become more closely integrated with that of the Army and Navy.

We look forward to the continuance of the cooperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations with confidence that such cooperation will make for effectiveness in research and economy in the use of personnel.

Sincerely yours,

[s] C. F. Remer

C. F. REMER,

Chief, Far Eastern Section.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter to "Dear Mary," dated September 12, 1946, signed "Renee" who, according to our file is Renee Guthman, which I would like to incorporate into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you take this letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. All the letters are from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Those two are from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1418" and is as follows:)

(Pencil note: file. Guthman file ~~W-L-H~~. We seem to have hit a gold mine)

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

New York—Washington, D. C.—Chicago—San Francisco—Honolulu

Washington Office, 1710 G Street, NW., Washington 6, D. C.

Telephone District 8665

WASHINGTON 6, D. C., *September 12, 1946.*

DEAR MARY: No; I'll be in New York Monday and Tuesday. Only I find I can't keep both Washington and New York on my mind at once so I'm writing letters about Washington just as though I were here full time.

My accomplishments for the afternoon for Pacco were securing twelve copies of the Navy Insular Report to the United Nations, twelve copies of the Senate hearings on the Philippine Trade Act, twelve copies of the House hearings on the Philippine Trade Act and twelve copies of the House hearings of the resolution on Statehood for Hawaii. The latter three are being sent directly to you, the first one is being sent here and I will send them on up to you. Am I right in assuming that one copy of each is intended for the Amco library? I haven't done anything about getting them one for I figured one of the twelve would be for them.

I've gotten as far as locating the strategic Colonel from whom all copies of the Strategic Bombing Survey seem to emanate. I'll get as many copies of that as possible. I located a sergeant who said he could give me two copies but for any more I had to talk to the Colonel. So if the Colonel says no I know that I can at least get two copies.

What else may I do for you, m'am? Let me know, won't you.

See you Monday.

[S] RENEE.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated May 5, 1947, also addressed to "Dear Mary" from "Renee." Presumably Mary is Mary Healy and Renee is Renee Guthman. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. We had the photostat made.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1419" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1419

SUMNER WELLES, *Chairman*
MORTIMER GRAVES, *Vice Chairman*

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

New York—San Francisco—Los Angeles—Honolulu—Milwaukee—Seattle

Washington Office, 1710 G Street NW.

Telephone District 8665

WASHINGTON 6, D. C., May 5, 1947.

DEAR MARY: Thanks so much for sending me the news that Molly and Joan have passage from New Zealand. I wonder when that will bring them to this country?

On the Library of Congress list of declassified documents—in my own devious method I have discovered that such a list is in preparation but that they have no idea when it will be completed, if ever. A list of what they have received to date reclines in a little card file on the desk of one Mr. Greenwood in the documents section. He will be very glad to let anyone look at the list any time. But he says they have no way of telling how complete a list it is. They are trying to get all the agencies to let them know whenever any material is declassified but he seems to feel it is a losing struggle and that there is no way of checking up on just what proportion they do know about. However, what they do have they will be glad to let us in on. Will you be down soon or would you like one of us to take a look?

When will you be down? Soon, I hope.

Let me hear.

RENEE.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Renee Guthman from Mary F. Healy, dated April 30, 1947. I would like to offer it for the record.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1420" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1420

30TH APRIL 1947.

MISS RENEE GUTHMAN,
American IPR, 1710 G Street NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR RENEE: Bill Holland has received a cable from Miss St. George as follows:

"Now sailing by *Rangitata* May 7th via Panama advise Guthman." St. George.

I suppose it will be a long trip but at last we know they are actually on their way.

Pat Barnett has written me that she thinks the Library of Congress is preparing or has prepared a list of various Government documents that have been declassified and that a good way of keeping informed would be through the Library of Congress, for a copy of every declassified document is sent to them. Have you heard of such a list or do you know someone who would keep us informed of such documents.

All the best.

Yours,

MARY F. HEALY.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Renee Guthman from Marguerite Ann Stewart, dated December 6, 1946.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1421" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1421

DECEMBER 6, 1946.

MISS RENEE GUTHMAN,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1710 G Street NW., Washington 5, D. C.

DEAR RENEE: I am about to flit to San Francisco, but I do want to take a minute to give you my reaction to your suggestion of a rebate to the Far Eastern Commission for twelve subscriptions to the *Survey*.

I talked this over with Larry, and he said there was no sense in our giving a rebate to any government agency whatever. It seems that any publications they really want can be requisitioned in their budgets. In any case, a rebate on the *Survey* is highly impractical. The \$5 subscription price does not nearly cover the cost of the *Survey* as it is. I find that the past year it cost us \$6.80 per *Survey* subscription. So, the only thing I can suggest is that you tell the Commission that we are awfully sorry, but we cannot give them any reduction, and recommend that they take the number of subscriptions (at \$5 each!) that they can afford.

I am so happy to hear that you are planning to really push *Survey* promotion among government agencies. That will be simply swell!

Affectionately,

(Mrs.) MARGUERITE ANN STEWART,
Secretary.

MAS:rs.

P. S.—Congratulations on your interesting meetings and on your luncheon for Teddy White. I hear wonderful things about them.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Renee Guthman, from Marguerite Ann Stewart, dated December 3, 1946.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1422," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1422

DECEMBER 3, 1946.

MISS RENEE GUTHMAN,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1710 G Street NW., Washington 5, D. C.

DEAR RENEE: Thanks for the membership records. Yoshi is going to check them against our plates as soon as she gets time, probably next week when I am in California and she can have a bit more help than is the case when we are all working full tilt. One thing I notice from your list. You have included all the State Department men who are serving in various parts of Asia and whose mail is forwarded by the State Department. Strictly speaking, these are not Washington members. They merely use Washington as a forwarding address and are "members at large." Your list should not be cluttered up with them, for it is to your advantage to have an active list of people who are actually serviced by your office.

These, however, do not account fully for the discrepancies. Yoshi will endeavor to find other reasons for these in checking your list against hers.

Thanks for your list of nominees. I am afraid, however, that Wallace will have to be run for New York rather than Washington, as he tells us that his residence is now here. ECC strongly urges that Mrs. Frances Bolton be included in the Washington list of nominees. Will you please let me know at once if this is agreeable to you?

Affectionately,

(Mrs.) MARRUERITE ANN STEWART,
Secretary.

MAS:rs.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Renee Guthman from Marguerite Ann Stewart, dated November 19, 1946.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1423" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No 1423

NOVEMBER 19, 1946.

Miss RENEE GUTHMAN,

*American Council, Institution of Pacific Relations,
1710 G Street NW., Washington 5, D. C.*

DEAR RENEE: I am trying desperately to weed out the "free copy" list for the FAR EASTERN SURVEY.

I note that at the moment only three government agencies receive free copies (Library of Congress; two copies, Social Record Division, Library of Congress; one copy, Head of the Far Eastern Desk; one copy, and Division of Regional Information, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, one copy).

It seems to me that if we are going to give free copies to strategic government agencies, we should be systematic about it. In general, I believe that most government agencies should take out paid subscriptions, and I wish you would undertake this little piece of business for us. In the meantime, will you, Shirley, and Eleanor please go into a huddle and make out for me a "must" list of bureaus which should receive free copies? I suggest that these be addressed in the name of the bureau or division, not in the name of a particular person. Will you please give this your very earliest attention.

I had a talk yesterday with Mr. Halstead of the International Film Foundation, 1600 Broadway. He is the man who is to speak on the "Use of Visual Aides in Teaching International Understanding at your teachers' conference, and he is responsible for loaning us *Peoples of the Soviet Union*. I told him about the change of date, and he will be glad to save January 11th. I suggest that you write him confirming the date, place, and time, and that in the future he receive all his information from you directly. This will avoid any chance of slip-up.

Affectionately,

(Mrs.) MARGUERITE ANN STEWART,
Secretary.

MAS: rs.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Renee Guthman from Marguerite Ann Stewart dated November 4, 1946.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1424" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1424

NOVEMBER 4, 1946.

Miss RENEE GUTHMAN,

*Institute of Pacific Relations,
1710 G Street NW., Washington, D. C.*

DEAR RENEE: As Shirley has no doubt told you, I am simply thrilled about plans for the Teachers Conference on December 7th.

Enclosed is a draft of the program as I would suggest it. It has the advantage of having three speakers—approximately twenty minutes each—in the morning, rather than two long speeches such as Miss Summy suggested. I prefer the former, as an audience reacts better to several shorter speeches than to fewer longish ones. It has the disadvantage that the speakers are all women. This frequently happens at Teachers Conferences, and while I do not consider it ideal, I can think of worse elements in a conference.

I had a long talk with Miss Jean Gates, whom I believe you sent to me. I think she can give exactly the kind of talk teachers would like on Chinese cultural achievements and their contribution to the West. This is always useful to the classroom teacher. As Miss Gates is in G-2, she cannot speak on anything political but will, I believe, be willing to talk on a cultural topic.

Mrs. Dickinson has the advantage of bringing a recent first hand picture of Russia and of living in Washington, so that you will have no railroad fare to pay. She spoke the other night at the Herald Tribune Forum, where I understand she was very well received.

I have already arranged for the loan of the film (without charge) by Julien Bryan, *Peoples of the Soviet Union*. As it has been made by a new educational outfit working toward international understanding through visual aids, I took the liberty of asking their public relations man, who formerly lived in India, and has a Far Eastern slant, to go down (without any cost to us) and give a seven-minute talk after this film on the use of films in teaching international relations.

I will get you one or two other films, but have not as yet had time to do so. These will have to be rented.

As Shirley may have told you, I hope you will include a registration fee of approximately \$.75, in addition to the cost of the luncheon. This is the only way you can cover the cost of mailing, film rental, and honoraria for speakers.

I do not know whether you and Miss Summy had any conversation about this. I always feel that if it is at all possible, speakers should receive some honoraria, no matter how small. I would suggest ten or fifteen dollars for Mrs. Dickinson, Miss Gates, and Eleanor. Ethel, of course, will be glad to speak without charge.

Another \$.25 should be added to the total cost to cover the free kits. This is a swell idea and also important in a teachers' conference. I would suggest that we include Eleanor's new pamphlet, *Russia and America, Pacific Neighbors*, my article (enclosed) on Asia and the school curriculum, a school leaflet, and two bibliographies, *What to Read on China* and *Books on the Soviet Union*. We will be glad to make this available at cost or \$.25 per kit.

Do let me hear of your and Miss Summy's reaction to all of these ideas and to the enclosed program.

You certainly are a whirlbeater the way you are getting things lined up down there. Teddy White and all! I am so proud of you I could pop.

Affectionately,

MARGUERITE ANN STEWART.

Secretary.

P. S.—You will note that the titles on this tentative program are too long. I have designed them primarily to convey the content I have in mind for each speech.

TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS OF 'TEACHERS' CONFERENCE ON THE FAR EAST

Wilson Teachers College, Washington, D. C., Saturday, December 7, 1946,
10:30 A. M.—3:00 P. M.

MORNING SESSION (10:30—11:45)

1. China's Cultural Heritage and Her Gifts to the West—Jean Gates
2. The Soviets and Their Problems Today—Mrs. LaFell Dickenson
3. *American Problems and Policies in China and Korea—Eleanor Lattimore

LUNCHEON SESSION (12:00—1:30)

Asia and the School Curriculum—Ethel Ewing

AFTERNOON SESSION (1:45—3:00)

Films:

A Film on China—(30 minutes)

Peoples of the Soviet Union (33 minutes)

Films in the Teaching of International Relations (7 minutes)

*This would of course include among other things an analysis of Soviet-American relations in the Far East.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated October 14, 1946, addressed to "Dear Mary" from Renee J. Guthman.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1425" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1425

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

New York—Washington, D. C.—Chicago—San Francisco—Honolulu

Washington Office, 744 Jackson Place NW., Washington 6, D. C.

Telephone District 8665

OCTOBER 14, 1946.

DEAR MARY: I'm afraid I haven't done so well this time on the documents you asked me to track down, but here's the report on your October 8th letter.

The reports on the textile and education missions to Japan will be out next week or the week after. Mrs. Florence Thomason, who is in charge of the distribution of documents in the public liaison office, says that you will automatically get one copy but that if you want 12 copies they will be glad to send them to you on a written request. If you request them now they'll keep the request and mail them to you as soon as they are out.

Pawley's report on Japanese reparations hasn't yet gone to the President and they don't know whether it ever will be released generally. What I think you must be referring to is the report on the press conference he had when he returned. I am getting 12 copies of this sent to me and will forward them on to you as soon as they arrive. Pawley's report on German reparations is available as such through the State Department. If that's what you want you can request that at the same time as the above material from Mrs. Thomason.

I called the Gov. Printing Office and they said they had not filled your order because you had not sent the money along with it. How you would have known the prices I'm sure I don't know. But here is the dope:

U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey reports:

- | | |
|--|----------|
| 1. Japan's Struggle to End the War----- | 20¢ each |
| 2. Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Naga- | |
| saki----- | 45¢ each |
| 3. Summary Report (Pacific War)----- | 25¢ each |

[Handwritten: BAB—would you follow up your previous order with a check?]

I have tried and tried to get you twelve copies for free. But the Strategic Bombing Survey has been dissolved and the only distribution point for the material seems to be the GPO. Do you want to try sending in an order accompanied with a check or would you like one of us to go around there and buy the stuff and send it from this office to you? Whichever you say—it's no trouble for one of us to go over and pick things up. How you managed to get the first copies I can't imagine. They were so firm about "no tickie, no laundry" except for Gov. agencies.

Now, on the last two I'm afraid I haven't done well at all. Would you look at your one copy of the Industrial Disarmament of Japan and see if they give any Washington clues at all. No one in State or War seems to have ever heard of them at all and I can find no trace of a National Engineers Committee here in Washington. Sorry to be stupid but I imagine there must be some reference or name or address that would shed some light on the subject.

The same goes for Corwin Edward's report on the Japanese combines. No one in State seems to have ever heard of them. Do you have any further clues such as who Edwards is or for whom the report was made or anything like that? Guess I'm no rival for Scotland Yards yet.

Now there is one favor you can do for us, please m'am. The recent catalogue (I suppose it's too much to hope that the additional order has arrived yet, isn't it?) lists pamphlets from the Australian Council and from the Royal Institute. We have none of them here in the office either in the library or on our "for sale" shelf. Do you suppose your office could send me one copy of each of these? Somehow I have the feeling that you could do it without any effort where it would be a struggle for the AMCO shipping room if I asked them for a set.

When can I expect you down? Your bed is waiting for you and any day or any hour is convenient. So let me hear, won't you.

Best,

RENEE J. GUTHMAN.

MR. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 8, 1946, addressed to Renee Guthman from Mary F. Healy.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1426" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1426

STH OCTOBER 1946.

MISS RENEE GUTHMAN;

*American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1706 G. Street NW., Washington, D. C.*

DEAR RENEE: We have just received twelve copies of Hearings on Statehood for Hawaii from Representative Peterson's office. I believe these probably came through your good efforts. Thank you very much.

We have heard through Bill Lockwood that reports on textiles and education in Japan are now available in the State Department. At first I thought I would write to Margaret Carter to find out from who we should get these, but you seem to have such remarkable success I decided to ask you. We would like twelve copies of each report, if possible (I shall pass one on to the Amco library).

Also, we should like to obtain copies of Pawley's report on reparations from the State Department which was released some time back.

We have received one copy of each of the first reports of the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (one on Japan, one on Germany) and have an order in for some time with the government printing office for an additional ten copies. I wondered if you would have a chance to get in touch with Colonel McMurrin about our getting copies directly from the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Gravelly Point, Virginia as indicated in the attached correspondence, rather than ordering them through the government printing office. It took us a good month to get the first copies and we have not yet received any additional ones. I should tell you that the government printing office did not bill us for the first copies, so perhaps if Gravelly Point fails to comply you might try calling the GPO directly.

You see we are making full use of your generosity. It is wonderful to have someone to write to with these rather vague requests.

While I think of it, perhaps while you are on the trail of these reports you might see if we can obtain copies of the report on Industrial Disarmament of Japan made by the National Engineers Committee which was submitted to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy. We have received one copy from the Engineers Joint Council here, but would like ten to twelve more.

Sincerely yours,

MARY F. HEALY.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat from the list of the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations headed "List of Washington, Virginia, and Maryland members," dated October, 1946.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The list referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1427" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1427

OCTOBER 1946.

LIST OF WASHINGTON, VIRGINIA, AND MARYLAND MEMBERS

Capt. A. Alcan, 3130 Wisconsin Ave., D. C.
Mrs. Jane M. Alden, 4607 Connecticut Ave., D. C.
R. P. Alexander, 4507 Van Ness St., D. C.
John M. Allison, Division of Japanese Affairs, State Dept.
J. Russell Andrus, 602 Woodside Parkway, Silver Spring, Md.
C. O. Arndt, U. S. Office of Education, D. C.
Edwin G. Arnold, Box 234, R. F. D. No. 2, Fairfax, Va.
Mrs. Ellen Atkinson, 3447 S. Wakefield St., Arlington, Va.
Australian Legation, 3117 Woodland Drive, D. C.
Dr. O. E. Baker, University of Maryland, College Park, Md.
Mr. and Mrs. Robert Barnett, 4225 49th St., D. C.
John Barrow, 5034 41st Street, D. C.
Margaret Beard, 2110 Florida Ave., D. C.
Eric A. Beecroft, 2017—37th Street, D. C.
Konrad Bekkar, 1323 New Hampshire Ave., D. C.

Harold R. Benjamin, 3915 Calverton Drive, Hyattsville, Md.
 Charles R. Bennett, Hotel Fairfax, D. C.
 Prof. George H. Blakeslee, Division of Political Studies, State Dept.
 The Hon. Frances P. Bolton, House of Representatives
 Dr. Isaiah Bowman, Johns Hopkins University
 Mr. William Braisted, 3104 Cleveland Ave., D. C.
 Senator Ralph O. Brewster, Senate Office Bldg.
 Stephen C. Brown, State Dept.
 William O. Brown, Lanham, Md.
 Ralph J. Bunche, 1510 Jackson St., D. C.
 W. A. M. Burden, Commerce Dept. Bldg.
 Dorothy Burgeson, 4905 Potomac Ave., D. C.
 Ardath W. Burks, The John Paul Jones, 1717 "G" Street, D. C.
 Ralph H. Busick, 220 North Thomas St., Arlington
 Halleck A. Butts, 4701 Connecticut Ave., D. C.
 John F. Cady, 2824 S. Abingdon Drive, Arlington
 John C. Caldwell, 8408 Queen Anne's Drive, Silver Spring, Md.
 Schuyler Van R. Cammann, 4103 W Street, D. C.
 Ellsworth C. Carlson, 3207 Commonwealth Ave., Alexandria
 Mrs. Margaret R. Taylor Carter, Division of Public Liaison, State Dept.
 William D. Carter, 1215 16th St., D. C.
 Catholic Assn. for Int'l Peace, 1312 Massachusetts Ave., D. C.
 Len De Caux, C. I. O., 718 Jackson Place, D. C.
 Alfred D. Charles, 29 College Ave., Annapolis
 Chester Chartrand, 700 N. Wayne St. Arlington
 Jean-Felix Charvet, French Embassy, 2129 Wyoming, D. C.
 Office of Commercial Counselor, Chinese Embassy, 2001 19 St., D. C.
 The Hon. O. Edmund Clubb, Foreign Service Mail Desk, State Dept.
 Wallace M. Cohen, 6302 Oakridge Ave., Chevy Chase
 Mrs. Evelyn S. Colbert, 1858 Mintwood Place, D. C.
 Nickolas Cottrell, 1815 N. Randolph St., Arlington
 Cabot Coville, Mail Room, Dept. of State
 Mrs. Lillian Coville, 3114 Dumbarton Ave., D. C.
 David Daiches, British Embassy, 3100 Massachusetts Ave., D. C.
 The Hon. F. M. Davenport, 8000 Parkside Drive, D. C.
 Capt. R. A. Davies, USN (Ret.), Hunting Ter. Apts., 1200 South Washington St.,
 Alexandria
 Eleanor E. Dennison, 3900 39th St., D. C.
 Ellery Denison, Export Import Bank of Washington, D. C.
 Ludwell Denny, Scripps-Howard Newspapers, 1013 13th St., D. C.
 LaFell Dickinson, Pres., General Federation of Women's Clubs, 1734 N St., D. C.
 Ben Dorfman, U. S. Tariff Commission, D. C.
 Dr. H. V. Dreyhausen, Dir., Evans Products Co., 1608 20th St., D. C.
 Cora DuBois, 1639 Wisconsin Ave., D. C.
 James Terry Duce, Arabian-American Oil Co., Shoreham Bldg., D. C.
 Col. R. Ernest Dupuy, 2719 Dumbarton Ave., D. C.
 Clara Eastlake, 1411 No. Hartford St., Arlington
 Charleen Egan, 4905 Potomac Ave., D. C.
 Capt. E. M. Eller, USN, Office of Public Information, Navy Dept., D. C.
 Charles B. Fahs, 8411 Piney Branch Court, Silver Spring
 Elizabeth Fautz, FAO, 2841 McGill Terrace, D. C.
 Prof. Alfred P. Fernbach, Lyndhall Apts., Univ. of Virginia
 Dr. Henry Field, Library of Congress
 Gwendolyn R. Fillman, 2019 Eye St., D. C.
 Ruth Finney, 1525 28th St., D. C.
 Sam Fishback, 202 Wilmington Pl., S. E., D. C.
 Mr. and Mrs. F. M. Fisher, 2313 South June St., Arlington
 Ralph Fisher, 2005 North Madison St., Arlington
 Wilfred Fleisher, 2320 Tracy Place, D. C.
 Dr. Guy Stanton Ford, 3133 Connecticut Ave., D. C.
 John De Francis, 1706 Prest Road, Alexandria
 M. Jean Gates (Miss) 3100 Connecticut Ave., D. C.
 C. E. Gauss, Export-Import Bank, D. C.
 Mortimer Graves, 1219 16th St., D. C.
 James Frederick Green, 21 East Bradley Lane, Chevy Chase
 The Honorable J. C. Grew, 2840 Woodland Drive, D. C.
 Gordon Griffiths, 1811 N. Oak St., Arlington

H. Lawrence Groves, Dept. of State, Mail Room, D. C.
 Eleanor M. Hadley, Govt. Sect. (in Japan with military government)
 Jane E. Hallenbeck, London Hall, 1133 13th St., D. C.
 Dr. and Mrs. E. S. C. Handy, P. O. Box 57, Oakton
 George L. Harris, 2102 South Knoll St., Arlington
 Joseph C. Harsch, CBS, Earle Bldg., D. C.
 Lowell H. Hattery, 945 Pennsylvania Ave., D. C.
 Senator Harry B. Hawes, Transportation Bldg., D. C.
 Mrs. Carrol Healy, Netherlands Information Bureau, 1470 Euclid St., D. C.
 Sister Helen, Library, Trinity College
 Dr. Clarence Hendershot, 8454 Piney Branch Court, Silver Spring
 Arthur B. Hersey, 807 Chalfonte Drive, Alexandria
 James J. Hitchcock, 1821 M St., D. C.
 Claire Holt, 3260 Prospect Ave., D. C.
 Halford L. Hoskins, 1906 Florida Ave., D. C.
 Robert B. Holtz, 1188 National Press Bldg., D. C.
 James L. Houghteling, 2431 Kalorama Road, D. C.
 A. W. Hummel, 4615 Hunt Ave., Chevy Chase
 Robert Stuart Hummel, 1201 Clifton St., D. C.
 Lt. Com. W. S. Hunsberger, 16 West Woodbine St., Chevy Chase
 Lt. Walter G. Inman, USNR, 2310 9th St. North, Arlington
 Roy James, 1210 South Barton St., Arlington
 Dr. David Jenkins, 3500 39th St., D. C.
 Odette L. Jenzen, 1079 31st St., D. C.
 Joan Johnson, Cardinal Point, Norfolk
 Dr. William C. Johnstone, New Delhi, India
 S. Shepard Jones, 4404 Maple Ave., Bethesda
 Allen L. Jonns, 1320 Olds St., Norfolk
 Walter B. Kahn, 2231 Q St., D. C.
 Mrs. Mary Jane Keeney, 215 B Street, D. C.
 Arthr S. Keller, 1436 N. Inglewood St., Arlington
 John W. Kendall, 1313 Southview Road, Northwood, Baltimore
 Bessie J. Kibbey, 2025 Massachusetts Ave., D. C.
 H. S. Konijn, 1823 North Monroe St., Arlington
 Philip E. Krichbaum, 821 Maryland Ave., D. C.
 John F. Kullgren, 2800 Woodley Rd., D. C.
 Mrs. Helen B. Lamb, 2931 Morrison St., D. C.
 Margaret Lambie, 1661 Crescent Place, D. C.
 Emmanuel S. Larsen, 1650 Harvard St., D. C.
 Owen Lattimore, Roland View Rd., Ruxton, Md.
 Rev. Edmund J. Lee, Chatham Hall, Chatham, Va.
 Waldo G. Leland, Amer. Council of Learned Societies
 Morris R. Lewis, China
 Sir Willmott Lewis, 1202 National Press Bldg., Washington
 Ernest K. Lindley, 1227 National Press Bldg., D. C.
 Paul M. A. Linebarger, 2831 29th St., D. C.
 Walter S. Lippman, 3525 Woodley Rd., D. C.
 Frank Lorimer, 2930 Chesapeake St., D. C.
 Lewis L. Lorwin, 39th & Cathedral Ave., D. C.
 Dr. W. C. Lowdermilk, 3127 Patterson Pl., D. C.
 J. V. A. MacMurray, Lutherville, Md.
 Robert N. Magill, 231 First St., D. C.
 John McGilvrey Maki, Harvard University
 Kendric N. Marshall, 122 Aspen St., Chevy Chase
 Edwin M. Martin, 9 Brookdale Road, D. C.
 Col. Truman M. Martin, 4801 Connecticut Ave., D. C.
 George H. A. Masselman, 24 Woodhaven Blvd., Bethesda.
 Major Gen. Frank R. McCoy, 2516 Massachusetts Ave., D. C.
 Lt. Harry L. McMasters, USNR, 3720 9th St., D. C.
 Selden & Audrey Menefee, 2729 Daniel Road, Chevy Chase
 Eugene Meyer, World Bank
 E. W. Mill, 4100 Russell Ave., Mt. Rainier, Md.
 Mr. & Mrs. A. L. Moffat, 3705 Thirty-Third Place, D. C.
 Mrs. Boswell Moorhead, 2220 R Street, D. C.
 George W. Morris, 10 Shenandoah Road, R. F. D. 1, Alexandria
 Phoebe Morrison, 7320 Piney Branch Road, Takoma Park, D. C.
 William D. F. Morrisson, State Dept.

Warner Moss, 704 Powell St., Williamsburg, Va.
 Edgar A. Mowrer, 3301 Garfield St., D. C.
 Raymond T. Meyer, 400 High St., Chevy Chase
 Rev. James Murdock, 23-1840 Biltmore St., D. C.
 Prof. G. Bernard Noble, 909 N. Wayne St., Arlington, Va.
 Frank B. Noyes, Evening Star, Washington, D. C.
 Earl L. Packer, State Dept.
 Ruth E. Pardee, 227 N. Pitt St., Alexandria
 Dr. Leo Pasvolksy, Brookings Institute, D. C.
 Cyrus H. Peake, 4616 Hunt Ave., Chevy Chase
 Dr. Karl J. Pelzer, 5530 Broad Branch Road, D. C.
 James K. Penfield, State Dept.
 Marshall N. Peterson, 4107 Conn. Ave., D. C.
 Mrs. Gifford Pinchot, 1615 Rhode Island Ave., D. C.
 Abe Pivowitz, 3143 P Street, D. C.
 Jane F. Plimpton, 2139 R St., D. C.
 Major James Plimsoll, Australian Embassy
 Mrs. Hilda C. Pontius, 4020 Arkansas Ave., D. C.
 Catherine Porter, 2102 So. Knoll St., Arlington
 Mr. & Mrs. G. R. Powles, New Zealand Legation
 Olive I. Reddick, Hood College, Frederick, Maryland
 Helen Dwight Reid, AAUW, 1634 I St., D. C.
 Arthur R. Ringwalt, State Dept.
 Jay Robinson, 1631 S Street, D. C.
 Mrs. Eryl Rudlin, 3213 Volta Place, D. C.
 Robert Rutherford, State Dept.
 Corp. of St. Timothy's School, Catonsville, Baltimore
 Mr. & Mrs. F. B. Sayre, 4853 Rockwood Pky., D. C.
 W. A. Scharffenberg, 804 Houston Ave., Takoma Park, Md.
 E. E. Schefer, 119 South Oak St., Falls Church, Va.
 Karl de Scheinitz, 2505 P St., D. C.
 Lewis B. Schwellenbach, Wardman Park Hotel
 Katherine Sherman, 2808 8th St., Arlington, Va.
 William Phillip Simms, 1013 13th St., D. C.
 Lt. Bennet Skewes-Cox, 1635 Wisconsin Ave., D. C.
 Florence M. Smith, 2558 Mass. Ave., D. C.
 Henri Sokolove, 2010 N. Taft St., Arlington, Va.
 H. M. Spitzer, 901 16th St., D. C.
 Hon. Edwin F. Stanton, Bangkok
 John Stenhouse, 4808 Park Ave., D. C.
 Arthur Sweetser, 3060 Garrison St., D. C.
 Carlton B. Swift, 1318 29th St., D. C.
 Raymond Swing, 1613 19th St., D. C.
 Wayne C. Taylor, 1743 22nd St., D. C.
 William Lonsdale Tayler, Galesville, Md.
 Sen. Elbert D. Thomas, Senate Office Bldg., D. C.
 Laura Thompson (Mrs. John Collier), Vienna, Va.
 Daniel Thorner, 4522 49th St., D. C.
 M. B. Thresher, British Embassy, 3100 Mass. Ave., D. C.
 Mrs. W. H. Turner, Jr., 513 South Fairfax St., Alexandria, Va.
 TWA Library, 1740 G Street, D. C.
 Mr. & Mrs. J. Parker Van Zandt, 712-A Westchester Apts., D. C.
 Mrs. Ilza Veith, 4507 Prospect Circle, Baltimore
 Comm. K. L. Veth, Claridge Hotel, D. C.
 John Carter Vincent, State Dept.
 Elliot Wadsworth, 2416 Tracy Pl., D. C.
 Benjamin B. Wallace, U. S. Tariff Commission, D. C.
 Mrs. Isabel A. Ward, 1449 Chapin St., D. C.
 Lt. James T. Watkins IV, 2943 N. Charles St., Baltimore
 Capt. Leon H. Weaver, 2901 Erie St., D. C.
 Guy P. Webb, 5232 4th St., D. C.
 The Hon. Sumner Welles
 Alfred E. Wellon, 3517 Valley Drive, Alexandria
 Mrs. Stafford M. Wheeler, 7811 Stratford Road, Bethesda
 C. Martin Wilbur, Parkfairfax, Alexandria, Va.
 Mrs. Daniel Willard, Jr., 4204 Somerset Place, Baltimore
 Charles W. Yost, Department of State, D. C.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a tentative list of American delegates to the Ninth International Conference of the IPR. It is dated December 5, 1944, and was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The list referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1428" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1428

MASTER FILE COPY

12/5/44.

TENTATIVE LIST OF AMERICAN DELEGATES TO NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE,
HOT SPRINGS, VA., JANUARY 5 TO 19, 1945

- 1*Major General Clayton Bissell, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department
Ralph Bunche, Department of State
William A. M. Burden, Assistant Secretary of Commerce
Robert D. Calkins, Dean, School of Business, Columbia University
Frank Coe, Assistant Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration
Arthur G. Coons, Dean of Faculty, Occidental College, Los Angeles
Len De Caux, Publicity Director, Congress of Industrial Organizations
Rupert Emerson, Deputy Director, Liberated Areas Branch, Foreign Economic Administration
Frederick V. Field, Executive Vice Chairman, Council for Pan-American Democracy; formerly Secretary, American Council, IPR
Mrs. Frank A. Gerbode, Executive Committee, San Francisco Office, IPR
Admiral T. C. Hart, Navy General Board, Navy Department
Philip C. Jessup, Professor of International Law, Columbia University
Eric Johnston, Chairman, United States Chamber of Commerce
Grayson Kirk, Institute of International Studies, Yale Univ.
Owen Lattimore, Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins Univ.
Walter Lippmann, Columnist and author
J. A. MacKay, Vice President, National City Bank, New York
George Abbot Morison, Vice Chairman, Bucyrus-Erie Co., Milwaukee
Laurence Salisbury, Editor, *Far Eastern Survey*, American Council, IPR
Robert G. Sproul, President, University of California
Eugene Staley, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D. C.
Ralph Turner, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
John Carter Vincent, Chief, China Section, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
W. W. Waymack, Editor, The Des Moines Register and Tribune, Des Moines, Iowa

ALTERNATES

- 1*Colonel William Mayer, Chief Japanese Specialist, Military Intelligence Division, War Department
Boris Shishkin, Research Economist, American Federation of Labor

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the Yosemite conference staff as taken by me from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1429" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1429

[Secretariat 1936, Document 1 (subject to revision)]

Pacific Council—Yosemite Conference Staff

General Administration-----	Edward C. Carter.
Chief Liaison Officer-----	Hobart N. Young.
Pacific Council:	
Secretary-----	Edward C. Carter.
Minute Secretary-----	Kate Mitchell.

Research Committee:

Secretary----- W. L. Holland.
 Minute Secretary----- Ruth Lee Young.

Program Committee:

Secretary----- Charles F. Loomis.
 Minute Secretary----- Pardee Lowe.

Finance Committee:

Secretary----- Edward C. Carter.
 Minute Secretary----- Hilda Austern.

Publications Committee:

Secretary----- Richard Pyke.
 Asst. Secretary----- Hilda Austern.
 Minute Secretary----- Bruce Turner.

Education Committee:

Secretary----- Harriet Moore.
 Minute Secretary----- Sir Anthony Jenkinson.

Joint Meeting, Pacific Council and Finance Committee:

Secretary----- Edward C. Carter.
 Minute Secretaries----- Hilda Austern & Kate Mitchell.

Pacific Affairs:

Editor----- Owen Lattimore.
 Managing Editor----- Catherine Porter.
 Secretary to the Editor----- Harriet Chi.

The Press:

Conference Press Officer----- Chester H. Rowell.
 Deputy Press Officer----- Charles F. Loomis.
 Secretary to the Press Officer----- Sadie Rogers.

Conference Proceedings and Supervision of Recorders.

W. L. Holland and Richard Pyke.

I. P. R. Notes—special Conference issue-----

Bruno Lasker, Richard Pyke, W. L. Holland.

Conference Broadcasts-----

Charles F. Loomis.

Conference Bulletin Board-----

Pardee Lowe.

Language Problems-----

Charlotte Tyler.

Conference Library, Bookstore, Bibliographical Exhibit.

Chen Hausung Harriet Moore,
 Charlotte Tyler, Van Waldheim,
 John Stevens, Gertrude Van
 Eeghen, M. Matsuo, C. B. Falis,
 Neel A. Unger.

Conference Maps-----

Marian Cannon.

Data Papers: Distribution-----

Richard Pyke.

Ten Year History-----

Galen M. Fisher.

National Council Libraries-----

Richard Pyke.

Office Management and Financial Records--

Hilda Austern and Kate Mitchell.

Stenographic Bureau:

General Supervision and Supplies----- Annette Blumenthal.

Assistants to Edward C. Carter-----

Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley, M. Matsuo, Kate Mitchell, S. V. C. Morris, Pardee Lowe, Nan Lincoln Smith.

Assistants to Hobart N. Young-----

Sue Curtis (Secretary & Reservations), Rita Ayers (Office Areas), Benjamin De Roy, Rawson Holmes (Meetings) George Alsborg.

Assistants to Richard Pyke-----

Eleanor Breed.

Recreation.—Edith Hunter.

AUGUST 9, 1936.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the minutes dated August 25, 1936, headed "Record of group D." It is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

(The minutes referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1430" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1430

RECORD OF GROUP D

AUGUST 25TH, 1936—FIRST SESSION

(See Lattimore, pp. 5, 7)

Chairman—Dr. R. C. Wallace.

Rapporteur—Field.

Secretary—Miss Moore.

Recorder—Trevor Lloyd.

The Rapporteur presented a brief summary of the proceedings of previous day.

Chairman.—Suggested that the Group try to discover what are the announced aims of Communism in China and how do they oppose the aims of Reconstruction. He invited the Chinese delegation to explain its attitude to be followed by anything the Japanese might wish to add.

T. Z. Koo.—China. Offered an estimate of the influence and extent of Communism in China based on two aspects of the subject:

i. Regarding it as an organized political movement.

ii. As an ideal of economic organization.

i. As an organized political movement, it was not serious before 1918, when it was an intellectual movement with very little political force. In 1919 a Russian element was added providing a technique of organization and popular propaganda to the already existing idealism. Between 1922 and 1927 there followed a period when Communism and Nationalism joined forces, the former agreeing to give up its own organization and to cooperate. During this period of cooperation, the Communist groups were enabled to penetrate throughout China. During the years 1925-26-27, Communism as an organization reached its peak. Then came the separation of it from Nationalists groups, and since that time it has shown a steady decline in strength. Today the movement is weak and broken, with fragments continuing to exist in Shansi and Szechuan.

As an organized political force it has no immediate future, although in the distant future it may revive. It is not a matter of immediate concern.

ii. As an idea of economic organization it is very widespread indeed in view of the acute economic distress of the country. All who think of the future of China must think in Economic terms and Communism cannot be lightly brushed aside. Communism as an idea is still of interest and importance.

A new angle has been injected into the discussion with the pressure from without. Especially among younger people Communism is being seen as the only alternative to Imperialism (since the Manchurian conquest, etc.) and in the event of a choice being made the former will receive the most support. So, the speaker went on to say, internally there is acute distress and outside there is pressure. Together these may convert many to Communism. Those fully familiar with the conditions within China do not discuss the matter in terms of the failure or success of Communism. It has not yet been tried seriously. The Communists have had no chance of showing their real skill. All recognise that the Communism of 1936 is a very different matter from that of 1926. The earlier brand was based more on a class attitude, involving the confiscation of land and its redistribution, etc. But nowadays by their own pronouncements they are no longer stressing class consciousness. They are fighting Imperialism as represented by Japan. Further they are abandoning many of their economic theories in view of the need for practical application, e. g., the confiscation of property. They are working on a more reasonable programme with a wider appeal.

In summary, as a political factor it is a spent force. As an idea it is still worthy of consideration and there is a change in its method of approach at present.

Dr. Nasu, Japan, translating for General Banzai.—Communism in China is just changing its front, the speaker said and although it had lost power in Central China it is becoming more powerful in the north. Although Communism may not be readily exportable, Japan is worried about its possible influence in Japan. This is especially true when the C. P. makes so much of its slogan the fighting of Japan. That slogan is put on the banners of the Communists and causes the gravest dismay.

The Chairman.—Wondered whether there should be some discussion of the United Front.

— *U. S. delegate.*—Is this modification of aim by the Communists a foreshadowing of a cooperation between the Communists and Nanking in some future emergency.

Mr. Liu, China.—There have been rumours within the past year—it is very difficult to judge the sincerity of the Communists—that there have been discussions about a United Front between the Communists and Nanking, also for an agreement to allow the Communists to extend into Northern China in order to fight the Japanese. In northern Shansi a Government oil well was captured by the Communists and but minor changes in its personnel—a few years ago there would have been many beheadings. This shows, said the speaker, a disposition to work with the Government. On March 24th, 1936, there was a secret meeting of the Communist Party in Shanghai and the speaker understood that a United Front was discussed.

Dr. Nasu.—What connections exist between the Communist Party and the Third International or the U. S. S. R.?

Mr. Liu said that the Comintern had expressed its lack of desire to interfere in China—probably there existed very little contact.

Dr. Nasu wondered whether there was financial help or assistance with organization as in the case of Borodin.

Mr. Liu believed there had been no contact since December 1935.

Dr. Quincy Wright was interested in what Dr. Koo had said about the Communists changing their attitude. Mr. Bisson had already stated that Communists and the Nanking Government were in effect offering alternative methods for protecting the territorial integrity of China. What are the essential differences between the two groups and in what way do they offer alternative solutions of the problems of Japanese Imperialism.

Mr. Loong, Chinese delegate.—The Communists have given up the idea of confiscating property. They are not hostile to all Imperialist nations, merely Japan.

Dr. Mah, China.—A very great deal of attention is being paid to Communism in China in the outside world, particularly in Japan. People have a bogey of it. The speaker agreed with Dr. Koo in mentioning that Communism is a factor in the life of China, but it is probably a spent force as an organised political movement. Some years ago in the south Shansi (?) Province there was considerable fear that the movement might develop but on being driven from there and scattered very thoroughly by the Government, the danger passed.

The speaker went on to add that the sole difficulty was that small scattered groups are able to offer opposition to the Government's programme for reconstruction. The Government has had difficulty in completing its programme in Communist regions. From an ideological point of view he added, Communism need not disturb people. It is simply a manifestation of discontent and in view of the condition of the country would continue. If the National Government could alleviate the living conditions then Communism would have made a very great contribution to the progress of the country.

Further the speaker wondered whether the Communism of China was similar to that of Russia. The latter had developed a great deal since the early years. If Communism was to be regarded as a challenge to the evils of existing Society then it need not disturb one.

Certain principles were laid down by the Premier of Japan—Hiroto as a basis for Japanese-Chinese agreement. One of these was that the two countries should join together to remove the menace of Communism in China. The Chinese, the speaker added, are gravely suspicious. It would be difficult to discover just what are Communists. The Japanese might begin to describe as Communists those they had previously termed bandits, i. e., those in opposition to Japanese aggression. Under such an agreement it is possible, that, in view of what has already happened in the Northeast that the Japanese might send their troops to remote parts of China on the pretext of driving out Communists.

The failure of Japan to agree with China on the basis mentioned was largely due to such suspicions.

Dr. Nasu, Japan.—The speaker indicated that he could not pretend to represent the Hiroto Government—but if a definition of Communists was needed, it was those against whom Chang Kai Shek was fighting at the moment. Those occupying very large tracts of China at the present time. He did not think that Chang Kai Shek was a friend of the Communists—especially as the latter have been highly critical of him.

Any comparison between China and the USSR is misleading. The latter has changed a great deal and its attitude is partly due to its being firmly established and desirous of combining with foreign countries. Chinese Communism is not so firmly established and has not the experience of the USSR. The speaker doubted whether they had modified their attitude at all seriously. The change of front may have been due to their receiving a severe blow from Chiang Kai Shek.

Dr. Koo pointed out that when delegates asked for an opinion on the possibility of a United Front, it was impossible to give an answer. There are many in the present Government who believe that although the attitude of the Communists has changed, its fundamental policy does not change. It merely changes its outer appearance. At the moment they are capitalising on the anti-Japanese feeling that exists. Yet most observers think that as a whole the Communists are a group whose principles do not change. Such knowledge makes a United Front difficult. Fundamentally Communism is an internal problem for China and although it may be serious it will probably disappear before external threats. Thus, the speaker concluded under pressure from outside a United front might be formed. It was impossible to give a direct answer.

Dr. Wright, U. S. A.—In discussing the difference in Foreign Policy between the two factions suggested that the sole real difference between the Communists and the National Government lay in the speed with which they would demand the return of Chinese rights abrogated by treaty. The Nanking method he suggested was the capitalistic democracy way—that of gradualism. The Communists would denounce all foreign rights abruptly. Whichever way was followed there was a universal feeling that the matter must be solved.

Mr. Loong, China.—A great deal of attention is being directed, he indicated, to the Constitution and in a few months time it might be possible to answer the question. There was the possibility of the Communists being permitted to exist as a legal party.

Mr. Nimmo, Australia.—Pointed out that if the question of Communism was an internal one then nations were entitled to expect China to take the responsibility for what they did. Did the 1925-1927 efforts of the Communists effect the rights and lives of foreigners and did it provide grounds for foreign intervention?

Dr. Koo.—In the period mentioned in the question, so far as he knew there were no such problems. He was not aware of the Communists providing any grounds for foreign intervention.

The Communists were all driven inland, away from the Treaty Ports.

Queen Lattimore.—There had been a certain moral tone about the discussion of Communism, speakers had talked of it as being good or evil. The speaker wanted to discuss whether Chinese Communism was on the upgrade or going downward. He wondered what the governing factors were. The historical approach is the only possible one. The speaker congratulated *Dr. Koo* on his quite remarkable speech—the best short exposition of the topic he had ever heard—but doubted whether Communism was a spent force. It had merely changed its manifestations—it was not a spent force.

The matter could be discussed from two points of view.

i. As far as its strength went, in 1925-26 there was very powerful Russian influence. Since the movement retreated to the interior it had become separated and it was impossible for them to have obtained much financial assistance or ammunition. Thus for ten years it had been a completely Chinese movement. It had shifted its territorial position but its strength was undiminished.

The Party possessed a nucleus of highly trained men and around each of the nuclei there was a loosely organized group of discontented peasants—followers for negative reasons. The group was driven out of the old strongholds in Shanshi (?) and had done tremendous forced marches in taking up the new ground. They had moved and changed slogans but the principles remained unchanged.

The Communists believed that Communism would normally follow Capitalism as a stage in the evolution of Society and that the Revolution was merely a means of hastening the process. Thus it was possible for them to change the means in the face of Japanese aggression without modifying their principles.

ii. It has often been said that Japan is the only solid bulwark against the spread of Communism in Asia. The speaker suggested that the opposite point of view might well be put that Communism in China was the only bulwark against the spread of Japanese imperialism.

When Manchuria was being taken there was some resistance offered, probably comparable with that of Haile Selassie in Ethiopia. The Governor of Manchuria represented one of the progressive movements in China—he saw that railways and factories were built and a new group of vested interests arose founded on the westernisation of the country. The ineffective resistance showed that there existed a division of interest—the official policy was to make as great a nuisance as possible for Japan so that they might be prepared to come to a deal. The Governor was successful and at the moment lived in China still a rich man.

The Communists pointed out that aggression from Japan divided the people of China into two groups. The wealthy were leaders up to a point and were then prepared to compromise to save themselves. Then they deserted the masses. Further the speaker pointed out that they suggest that under the leadership of Nanking Chinese Reconstruction is only possible with foreign aid against Japan. Thus Nanking prepared for an opposition to Japan at some future date but if foreign aid was not forthcoming in time to stop Japan it will have to be bargained for. Thus a weak country—China—will be bound in the end to lose by playing with other nations for help. So that the Communists had a fundamental appeal to the people of China. "Here are a backward people, who must learn western techniques. Will this come through the agency of profit-making groups with the workers all lowered to a coolie class or is the people going to take it on its own." Such an appeal, he pointed out, was an appeal to temporary conditions—a front towards Japan that would not compromise—but there was also a separate long-term appeal offering Communism as the best possible means of freeing China to make her master of Western ways rather than to allow them to master her.

Communism needed to be thought of not only as a threat to Japan but also as a protection against her.

Mr. Kerr, U. K.—Was the Pau Cha system being used as an opposition to Communism or was it a half-way compromise, or was it a simple revival of an old system.

Mr. Liu, China.—Suggested that it was probably a survival of an earlier custom. It amounted to the collective responsibility of a small community for the behaviour of its members. Thus if a murder was committed in a village, the Government held the whole group responsible for detecting the murderer. It was also used to discover troublesome people like Communists. There was a further use as a channel for propaganda.

Dr. Koo suggested the main reason that of an antidote for crime—a village of ten families would report any newcomers. The Government used it as one of the agencies for clearing up bandits.

Dr. Wright, USA.—Had been trying to think of Communism as an international problem. As Dr. Koo had said it was an internal problem but the acceptance of Communist leadership by the country would have important international consequences. He had been thinking of Germany since the war. The inequities of the Treaty of Versailles were too much for the moderate Government of Stresemann to remove. A later and more violent government was able to bring about their rapid dissolution. There might be a parallel in China. There existed at the moment moderate parties using moderate methods. In the background there existed a more violent party. In ten years this picture might be well worth bearing in mind.

The future depends on the success of the moderates in handling the dominant problem. The Radicals will fade away if the moderates succeed. Otherwise if the moderates fail in their international policies then the Communists will come to the fore once again.

Owen Lattimore suggested that Communism is an internal question and that it was up to the Chinese to choose democratic Capitalism or Communism. But its effects are NOT internal since the intervention of Japan. The people of China may well say, "How can WE settle this problem when we are continually being interfered with from Manchuria—wave after wave flowing down until they reach the Yellow River?" After all he went on, far from being unable to build railways parallel with the South Manchuria it is now forbidden even to keep Provinces which are parallel with Manchuria. Japan keeps pumping propaganda—Japanese propaganda into Japan. In effect "cooperation" is the injection of the Japanese view of Chinese affairs into China.

Wright, USA suggested that the difference between internal and external affairs in International Law breaks down when as the Germans pointed out in their case—the occupation of the Ruhr complicated the internal matters of the country as a whole. Every State has the right to insist on complete sovereignty.

If foreign influences enter it may be impossible for China to control her own internal affairs. Then all other parties will fall before that which offers determined leadership against the common foe.

The *Chairman* wondered whether the few remaining minutes would be best spent in considering the attitude of the Japanese delegation to these points or in some consideration of question B 3 which read: "What are the specific objections of the Japanese Govt. to foreign help in schemes for Chinese reconstruction? * * * etc., etc." He suggested that at the beginning of the next session of the Round Table, the Japanese delegation be prepared to make a statement. He then invited short questions on the Chinese question in general.

Mr. Gull, U. K. asked Dr. Koo whether there was a parallel between the nationalists attitude being adopted by the Communists and the agreement of 1927. Was the separation of the two groups at that time due to a fear of Borodin getting too great an influence.

Dr. Koo.—Most of those present will see nationalism as a dominant note for years to come. When the Communist-Nationalist break up came it was not alone because of Borodin but because the Communists contrary to the agreement kept their own cell organisations intact.

Mr. Loong, China, felt that the matter was receiving too great attention, yet he believed that if the alternative was the loss of property rights or the loss of sovereign rights, he would not only raise his son to be a soldier but his two daughters also.

The *Chairman* thanked the Chinese for their most impressive and objective contributions.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations headed "Minutes" as taken by M. Price, which I offer for the record.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The minutes referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1431" and are as follows:)

(Pencil note: China Aid Council.)

Pencil note: As taken by M. Price.)

MINUTES

The following people from Indusco and China Aid Council met together on March 27, 1944, at the Jaffe home, 49 East 9th Street: Norman Applezweig, Melvin Fox, David Leacock, Agnes Jaffe, Ida Pruitt from Indusco; William Holland, Phillip Jaffe, Talitha Gerlach and Miss Price from China Aid Council. Rose Terlin could not come.

Talitha Gerlach was asked to preside.

It was decided to discuss: (1) Ways of working harmoniously with UCR, i. e., a *modus vivendi*; (2) The sending of funds to China by UCR.

Mr. Jaffe outlined what he thinks are the differences between China Aid Council and Indusco. In addition to its children's work, China Aid Council sends funds to Mme. Sun and these funds therefore cannot fall into any other hands than Mme. Sun's. Indusco, on the other hand, sends funds through the International Committee and Indusco must be assured that its funds go in a way satisfactory to Indusco. In this case therefore Indusco may have a problem.

The question was asked whether or not the International Committee is controlled by the K. M. T. Spokesmen from Indusco considered that this was not the case.

It was asked whether the fight should not be to try to democratize UCR. After discussion over what this process of democratization would consist of, it was decided that the first step would be to try to democratize the Program Committee.

One of those present felt that UCR should be strengthened but expressed the fear that this strength might be turned against the agencies' programs. He agreed that the first point that should be made is the democratization of UCR. *Mr. Jaffe* thought that we should talk in terms our immediate rather than our future problems.

Mr. Holland said that in his opinion the U. S. Treasury would most probably permit UCR to enter into the procedure of exchange of American money on the open market in China if a single, solid organization is used, such as UCR.

The point was brought up that apparently it is Dr. H. H. Kung who wants the money to be sent by one group such as UCR. This fact indicates that funds sent from the U. S. probably support other groups than those controlled by Dr. Kung. The sending of funds through one group is extremely dangerous in that it might mean complete control of all foreign funds by that group and in time preventing any other groups from carrying on relief and rehabilitation work in China.

Mr. Applezweig suggested that some machinery was necessary and expressed the opinion that the agencies receive the worst deal when each agency is dealt with separately. He proposed that an Inter-Agency Council be set up in which matters can be thrashed out before they are taken up with UCR.

Mrs. Jaffe felt that all agencies within UCR can work together but should be content to limit themselves to a few simple points to begin with.

Mr. Applezweig said there should be no tendency to keep the knowledge of such discussions from UCR, that the group should discuss frankly and openly with the view of improving relations with UCR.

Mrs. Jaffe pointed out that the meeting should be for the betterment of UCR and not against UCR.

Mr. Fox then said that CAC and Indusco both agree on the necessity for a strong UCR. UCR can only be strengthened, however, if there are strong agencies. The following resolution was suggested and adopted:

"In the interests of effective functioning of the agencies with United China Relief, it is suggested that an Inter-Agency Council to discuss matters of mutual concern be formed. During the past period there have been difficulties due to certain causes. One of these causes has been that agencies have felt that they have had neither direct representation nor representation elected by themselves on the Program Committee. When this matter has been worked out, it is to be hoped that there will be a discussion of other questions of mutual concern to the agencies and United China Relief."

The group decided, if Mrs. Carter would give her consent for China Aid Council's representatives to do so, to meet with ABMAC representatives on the following Tuesday at 6:30 at the Jaffe's.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a telegram dated November 29, 1944, addressed to Raymond Bennett, from Rose Yardumian. It is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The telegram referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1432" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1432

WASHINGTON, D. C., November 29, 1944.

RAYMOND BENNETT,

Institute Pacific Relations,

1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York:

Ellen Van Zyll DeJong Atkinson, formerly IPR research staff, now Far East Branch, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, eager attend Hot Springs conference as recorder, has discussed matter Bissell's aid Colonel McCormick, but because wording in your letter to Bissell requesting three junior officers cannot be assigned Mrs. Atkinson. Competent and good worker, helpful to IPR in Washington; recommend her highly. Would you be willing write Bissell immediately suggesting her name either in place of one of three officers or in addition to three Atkinson consulted on whether MIS should send representatives.

ROSE YARDUMIAN.

Zyll, IPR, IPR, MIS.

[Handwritten: HHP—Will you take this up with HA and see what she thinks? I have no objection but don't want to get wires crossed in MIS, and HA has talked with them since I have. D.]

Mr. MANDEL. This is a "Draft of suggestions for the Washington office," a photostat from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 23, 1943.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1433" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1433

JUNE 23, 1948.

ROUGH DRAFT OF SUGGESTIONS FOR WASHINGTON OFFICE

I. PRELIMINARY PREPARATION (TO BE COMPLETED DURING THE MONTH OF AUGUST)

1. An effort should be made to find more accessible offices and a minimum of furniture secured.
2. All IPR publications should be sent down, as well as maps, any duplicate materials in either library, a duplicate file of the American Council bibliography file, copies of bibliographical material prepared by American council, a list of periodicals in Amco and Pacco libraries. Such organizations as FPA, NPA, WPA might be asked to send their publications to the Washington office as well as the New York office.
3. The Secretary should talk with members of Amco and Pacco staffs to secure their ideas on development of Washington office and information on work each is doing.
4. The secretary should have a talk with Bob Barnett at the first opportunity.
5. The secretary should contact key people in government offices concerned with the Far East to inform them of existence of office and to discover how it can be most useful to their work, and to discover what information is available in their offices.
6. An informal advisory committee should be set up. Possible members: Harry Price, Michael Greenberg, Irving Friedman, Alvin Barber, Alger Hiss, Jim Shoemaker, Bill Johnstone, Wilma Fairbank, Mrs. Boulton.

II. POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF WASHINGTON OFFICE AND DUTIES OF SECRETARY

1. Arrangements and secretarial work in connection with two study groups already running under Johnstone's direction.
2. Possible organization of new groups, such as (a) small "clearing house" groups of specialists working on the same field in different government departments; (b) popular meetings and luncheons on appropriate occasions.
3. Secretary should keep in touch with activities of French, Dutch, and Philippine Councils.
4. Secretary should be prepared to perform any special tasks asked of her by New York staff.
5. Secretary should keep in touch with the activities of such organizations as the FPA, League of Women Voters, NPA, etc.
6. Secretary should keep informed as much as possible on developments in Congress.
7. Secretary should make and maintain contact with the press.
8. Secretary should be prepared to arrange for book reviews and contributions of articles and keep an eye open for likely speakers and authors.
9. Development of AmCo membership.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I incorporate by reference the State Department biographical registers into the record at this time? Senator WATKINS. Yes; you may have that permission.

(The incorporation by reference is noted and marked as "Exhibit No. 1434.")

Mr. MANDEL. I wish to enter into the record by way of reference the following document appearing as exhibit No. 18 in the appendix, part I, of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives on pages 245 to 292, entitled "Excerpts from speeches and resolutions adopted at the Third World Congress of the Communist International (June 22 to July 12, 1921), published by the Contemporary Publishing Association, New York City, 1921, pages 34-70, 75-114, 115-117, 131-149, 150-153, 190-199.

Senator WATKINS. The matter will be received as offered.

(The incorporation by reference is noted and marked as "Exhibit No. 1435.")

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is all, Senator. Thank you very much.

Senator WATKINS. We will be in recess.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p. m. the committee recessed, subject to the call of the chairman.)

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(NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.)

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